One of the most ecologically diverse regions comprising 10,000 plant species, 300 mammal species and 977 bird species, the Eastern Himalayas have made history yet again as a new range of singing and sneezing plants and animals have been discovered in the last few years.

A fish that sort of walks, a monkey that can’t stop sneezing and a bird that enthralls with its singing are some of the newly found animals in last six years, according to World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).

Eastern Himalayan region that includes Nepal, Bhutan and the northern Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Sikkim, areas of north Bengal, Myanmar and southern Tibet has observed discoveries in the past five years that include 133 plants, 26 species of fish, 10 new amphibians, one reptile, one bird and one mammal.

“I am excited that the region – home to a staggering number of species including some of the most charismatic fauna – continues to surprise the world with the nature and pace of species discovery,” said Ravi Singh, CEO and secretary general of WWF-India and chair of the WWF Living Himalayas Initiative.

A band of new species

West Bengal has become the abode for the new species of snakehead fish that can breathe air and survive on land for four days.

A new bird known as the spotted wren-babbler, or Elachura Formosa, has the ability to sing an unusual high-pitched song which is likely to be found in northeastern part of India.

A new 47 millimeter long grayish blue-eyed frog called L bompu was found in Arunachal Pradesh, home to hundreds of undiscovered species during these last few years. Assam and Nepal have been bestowed with beautiful discovery of glorious orchids.

Image Credit: hindustantimes.com

The post 200 NEW SPECIES OF PLANTS AND ANIMALS DISCOVERED IN HIMALAYAS appeared first on fnvaworld.org.

Workers walk among newly installed solar panels at a solar power plant in Zhouquan township of Tongxiang, Zhejiang province December 18, 2014.
REUTERS/STRINGER

China has raised its solar power installation target for 2015 by 30 percent from its previous goal, state media reported, potentially adding to overcapacity as insufficient grid capacity remains a hurdle for the new plants to deliver power.

Solar plants can in theory delivery returns of 10-15 percent under long-term power purchase contracts with state utilities but in practice face problems of subsidy collection and panel quality, making investors wary of the sector.

China will add another 5.3 GW installed capacity of solar power stations this year, on top of an earlier national target of 17.8 GW, Xinhua reported, citing a notice from the National Energy Administration last week.

The new stations will be added mostly in Inner Mongolia and Hebei in the north and Xinjiang in the west, the report said.

The NEA required the project hosts to complete construction by end of this year and get connected to the grid by end of June next year, the report said.

China’s insufficient grid capacity and overcapacity has curtailed the sector’s growth. Nearly a tenth of the solar power generated during the first half of this year was unable to be delivered, according to the NEA.

China, the world’s largest solar market, installed 7.73 GW capacity in the first six months of 2015, the NEA has said, which would be only a third of the new target, meaning companies would need to speed up construction significantly in the second half of the year.

China, the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, has vowed to cap CO2 emissions by largely increasing the use of non-fossil fuel such as wind and solar, hoping for a peak in carbon emissions by 2030.

The country aims to raise the share of non-fossil fuels to 15 percent of its total energy mix by 2020 from around 11 percent at end-2014 as part of efforts to ease its dependence on coal and meet its climate pledges to the United Nations.

(Reporting by Kathy Chen and Chen Aizhu, editing by David Evans)

The post China raises solar installation target for 2015 appeared first on fnvaworld.org.

Subansiri Hydropower Project

India’s NHPC Ltd. has extended the deadline for bids to construct civil works of the powerhouse complex of the 2,000-MW Subansiri Lower hydroelectric project on the Subansiri River in India’s Arunachal Pradesh State. Bids now are due October 21
NHPC previously called for bids by July 31. Work on the project began in 2005 but has been delayed by protesters concerned about the project’s effects, including on fisheries and downstream populations. The run-of-river project consists of a concrete gravity dam and powerhouse that had been scheduled for completion in 2014.

Also proposed in Arunachal Pradesh are the 1,800-MW Subansiri Upper and 1,600-MW Subansiri Middle projects.

NHPC seeks online electronic bids for construction of the balance of civil works of the Subansiri Lower powerhouse complex from the headrace tunnel intake structures to the tailrace channel.

The solicitation may be viewed and tenders submitted via the Internet site www.mstcecommerce.com/eprochome/nhpc or under “eprocurement” at the NHPC website, www.nhpcindia.com. Documents may be obtained for a fee of 40,000 rupees (US$630) and a transaction fee of 15,000 rupees (US$236) for access to the online tender.

Online bids now are due by 11 a.m. October 21. For information, see www.mstcecommerce.com/eprochome/nhpc or contact H.N. Satyanarayana, Chief Engineer (CC-I) 2nd Floor, NHPC Office Complex, Sector 33, Faridabad 121003 Haryana, India; E-mail: [email protected]; Internet: www.nhpcindia.com.

The post India developer extends construction call for 2,000-MW Subansiri Lower hydro project appeared first on fnvaworld.org.

Itanagar: Opposing mega dams on the Siang river in Arunachal Pradesh, an NGO on Monday appealed to the Centre not to give environmental clearance against all mega dams in Siang belt comprising four districts of Siang, East Siang, Upper Siang and West Siang.

The Siang People’s Forum (SPF) in a memorandum to Union Environment and Forest Minister Prakash Javadekar made it clear the people of the four districts would not compromise on its demand of scrapping all mega dams over the Siang river.

The Forum while informing that the issue of mega dam over Siang was pending with the Gauhati High Court after a PIL was filed this year, it urged the minister not to give clearance to the projects recklessly against the wish of the indigenous people.
The NGO is backed up by the State government as the construction of this mega dam might lead to consequences which will harm the indigenous people.

The State government declared that it will always aim for the betterment of the people of the region as it is the priority.
Endorsement of projects which will not benefit the local people is not acceptable by the state government.

Union minister declared that the dam only produce electricity but also help in regulation of flood.

The Brahmaputra river is locally known as Siang in the state of Arunachal Pradesh. (PTI)

The post Appeal against mega dam on Siang river appeared first on fnvaworld.org.

GUWAHATI: Assam’s successful Community Based Flood Early Warning System (CBFEWS) will now be replicated in Nepal and Afghanistan, Kathmandu-based International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) director general David Molden said here.

The CBFEWS, implemented by ICIMOD and biodiversity conservation NGO Aaranyak in Lakhimpur and Dhemaji districts, won United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’s Lighthouse Activity Award last year.

The CBFEWS project uses Information and Communication Technology (ICT) by deploying simple electronic sensors to produce flood warning signal, wireless technology for transmitting signals and mobile phones for disseminating flood warning messages to and through a wide network of communities and government agencies.
The project is a component of ICIMOD’s Himalayan Climate Change Adaptation Programme (HICAP) in the Eastern Brahmaputra River Basin (EBRB).

Molden, who is on a visit to the two districts and Itanagar in Arunachal Pradesh, said that Northeast is the one of the priority locations for ICIMOD to work on climate change, livelihood adaptations due to climate change-induced disaster and dependency on biodiversity.

Molden informed that Nepal and Afghanistan are interested to have similar flood early warning system technology so that responses to flood preparedness increases to cut losses to lives and properties. He however, added that the challenge for this technology would be to adapt to the situation of flash flood in these two countries.

ICIMOD water and adaptation specialist Neera Shrestha Pradhan said that has already started working on Ratu Khola river, one of the tributaries of Kosi river in Nepal.

“We have started working on flood early warning system with department of hydrology and meteorology. Three instruments have already been installed,” Pradhan said.

She added that works in Afghanistan is yet to take off. “We want to implement the project in Afghanistan in association with an organization called Focus Afghanistan,” Pradhan said.

Molden said that in Itanagar he will attend the three-day Indian Mountain Initiative from October 7 next week will provide the opportunity to interact will mountain specialists, scientists, NGOs and policy makers.

One of the ambitious programme of ICIMOD involving India’s Northeast, China and Myanmar is the Landscape Initiative for Far Eastern Himalayas called Hi-LIFE.

Formerly called Brahmaputra-Salween Landscape Conservation and Development Initiative, Hi-LIFE is a collaborative effort of ICIMOD and governments of China, India, and Myanmar to involve local, national, and regional stakeholders for improving management of the biodiversity-rich landscape.

The post Nepal and Afghanistan to replicate Assam’s flood early warning technology appeared first on fnvaworld.org.

The Globalist.com
Philip Fearnside and Adriano Figueiredo
October 4, 2015

China influences deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia in a variety of ways. Factors such as timber harvesting and mining are well-known.

A lesser known factor that is now fueling a significant share of Brazil’s forest loss is Chinese demand for soy, beef and the infrastructure to get them from Brazil’s interior to the coasts.

Brazil’s exports to China – especially soybeans – have increased dramatically since 2003, and China is now Brazil’s top export market. Primary commodities have been the key element in driving this development.

These exports have a significant impact on the environment, while not improving human development indicators in the exporting countries.

While exports to China are not the only factor in continued deforestation in Brazil, our analysis has shown that Chinese soy purchases speed deforestation (see the full report here).

In Brazil’s Mato Grosso state, soybeans are a major force in the clearing of the “cerrado” (central-Brazilian savanna) and in Amazonian deforestation.

This is true both in areas that are climatically and topographically appropriate for planting soy and in areas that are not good for soy but where deforesters gain access using soy-related transportation infrastructure.

Meat and timber

The expansion of soy into pasture areas also displaces cattle ranching onto forested lands in the neighboring state of Pará, leading to still more deforestation.

China’s recent authorization of beef imports from Brazil may lead to additional deforestation as a direct effect.

Other commodities exported from Brazilian Amazonia include timber. China has cut almost all of its natural forests and, despite large-scale plantations of fast-growing trees, the country has a tremendous demand for wood.

Brazil has by far the largest remaining tropical forest, and Chinese demand is bound to focus on Brazil once available stocks elsewhere are exhausted.

Infrastructure through the Amazon

China is a new and growing source of infrastructure funding with less environmental restrictions and lower interest rates — although promised financing from China does not always materialize.

However, when it does, then the environmental consequences can be great. For example, China has offered to finance a 1,800-km railroad between Cuiabá (Mato Grosso) and Santarém (a port city on the Amazon River).

Another Chinese project, the “Transcontinental Railway,” is planned to connect Mato Grosso to Porto Velho, Rondônia, which is already connected to a deepwater soy port on the Amazon River via the Madeira waterway.

The railway project would subsequently continue on from Porto Velho to Peruvian ports on the Pacific for easier access to China.

Brazilian and multinational exporters themselves, responding to growing Chinese demand for commodities produced in the Amazon interior, are also investing in major infrastructure with heavy environmental consequences.

For example, Bunge, a multinational soy company currently responsible for 25% of Brazil’s production, opened a $700 million soy port in Barcarena, at the mouth of the Amazon River, in April 2014.

In the future, the soy to be exported from Barcarena is expected to arrive from Mato Grosso by barge via the planned Tapajós Waterway.

This waterway would convert the Tapajós River in Pará, and its tributaries in Mato Grosso, into navigable “hidrovias” (waterways) to bring soy to the Amazon River from the northern part of Mato Grosso.

While land use in northern Mato Grosso is currently dominated by cattle pasture, the reduced cost of transportation expected soon would lead to the area being converted to soy.

The Tapajós waterway depends on building a series of hydroelectric dams and locks to allow barges to pass formidable rapids.

Most controversial is the Chacorão Dam, which would flood 18,721 hectares of the Munduruku Indigenous Land.

Shifting the economic balance of Brazil’s politics

Brazil’s ability and willingness to mitigate the deforestation risks of soy-led economic expansion has been very limited thus far.

This is in part due to a newly emboldened ruralist class that has benefited from the boom – and from the decline of rival economic blocs.

The political influence of the “ruralist” voting block that represents large landholders in Brazil’s National Congress has increased markedly due to the large amounts of money entering Brazil from soy exports.

China is the top source of these export earnings.

The shift of Brazil’s economy towards agricultural commodity exports (The China factor), which strengthens the influence of large landowners and moves away from manufacturing, and therefore weakening the influence of industrialists and labor unions, is affecting virtually every aspect of Brazil’s politics.

Effects include the positions of the current presidential administration on environmental issues. The leader of the ruralist block has been appointed as Brazil’s minister of agriculture.

China’s exports of cheap manufactured goods to Brazilian manufacturers’ former export markets has cut deeply into Brazil’s exports from this sector.

In addition, China’s direct export of manufactured goods to Brazil further displaces Brazilian manufacturing and reduces the political influence of this sector within Brazil.

Significant effect on Brazil

Brazil and China have maintained an approximate balance in terms of monetary value between exports to and imports from China. Unlike countries that have little domestic manufacturing to lose, the effect in Brazil is significant.

Given all that, it is important to realize that the China factor in Brazil extends well beyond “just” deforestation and the environment.

As a matter of fact, the increasing exports of agricultural commodities from Brazil to China and rising imports of manufactured goods from China to Brazil are altering Brazil’s domestic political economy.

This manifests itself most acutely in a shift in political influence in Brazil from the manufacturing to the agribusiness sectors, with consequences for environmental policies.

The post Deforestation in Brazil: The China Factor appeared first on fnvaworld.org.

According to the central Chinese government, more than 10 million citizens will have to be resettled by 2050 to solve rural poverty and environmental degradation problems in China. This number does not include the 7 million people that have already been resettled over the last 30 years or so. The massive scale of these population resettlement programs was confirmed by President Xi Jinping during his recent visits to some of the provinces most concerned, where he called upon regional Party and state authorities to ‘implement with full force’ the environmental resettlement projects in order to ‘uphold both ecological and development standards’.

Chinese farmers rake and dry crops at a sunning ground in Chahantonggu village, Barunhaermodun town, Hejing county, Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, northwest China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, 20 September 2015. (Photo: AAP)

In China, environmental resettlement means resettling entire communities living in areas deemed unable to support sustainable livelihoods due to harsh environmental conditions. Ostensibly, resettlement serves the dual purpose of protecting the environment – by forbidding grazing and logging, reducing population pressure and land use – and helping local communities to break away from the cycle of rural poverty. Over the past few decades, these resettlement projects have been highly publicised and are said to be an integral part of China’s ‘sustainable development strategy’.

Less well known are the negative consequences associated with these resettlement projects, which expose vulnerable migrants to severe risks of social isolation, economic exclusion and material impoverishment.

A review of environmental resettlement programs over the last the 30 years in Chinashows that priorities of the state apparatus have consistently trumped those of the communities to be resettled. In other countries the promised beneficial results of resettlement programs simply do not materialise and authorities are generally very reluctant to fully involve local communities in the process of their own resettlement. This seems particularly true in China, where resettlement projects seem to put migrants in a situation of chronic impoverishment and higher vulnerability.

Data collected among environmental migrants from the province of Ningxia show that most suffered a sharp reduction in terms of housing size and a substantial increase in living expenses. Furthermore, access to basic social services, like healthcare and education, are not consistently enforced.

Resettlement results also in severe consequences that are not easily quantified but are still deeply disturbing for migrants. Even many years after resettlement, ethnic Mongolian migrants in Inner Mongolia say their new community remains nothing but an ‘empty frame’, leaving them with a deep feeling of confusion, loss of control and longing for their traditional lifestyle. Migrants often end up just as, if not more, vulnerable in their place of resettlement than in their original habitat.

As for the environment, these large-scale resettlement policies have in the past resulted in a lose-lose scenario, where the root environmental problems were far from being resolved by the resettlement of local communities. Although originally intended to protect and restore areas plagued by serious degradation, they have not always led to any sustainable improvements. Some resettlement projects have even resulted in the introduction of industrial livestock productionin areas previously untouched by intensive animal farming. These have had even more dire consequences on the environment than the traditional activities of resettled herders and farmers.

In view of these negative consequences, using alibis of environmental conservation and human development to justify population resettlement policies appears inappropriate, if not outright dishonest. The question of how traditional livelihoods of rural communities and environmental degradation interact is complex, and so far the answers provided by policymakers in the form of population resettlement have failed to solve any of China’s environmental or poverty problems.

While the current Chinese leadership seems determined to pursue and even accelerate these policies, it is not being held adequately accountable for past failed experiences. Sadly, public discourse on these policies in China is severely restricted. Scholars in China can tolerate criticism of these policies poorly despite numerous field surveys suggesting the detrimental results of the resettlement projects.

Other solutions — far less risky and disruptive for local communities — are also available. The example of organised Tibetan communities in Qinghai, among others, show us the benefits of a true local ownership of ecological conservation projects. A key to empowering local communities is ‘to work at the pace of the community, not at the pace of external parties’. These experiences of involving local population in the protection of their habitat (instead of resettling them) have made compelling cases that resettlement is far from the only solution available.

Whether these alternative solutions to resettlement can be implemented depends largely on the willingness of policymakers. For these solutions to be adopted, leadership must not only be aware of the existence of these alternative models but also have the will and the ability to adopt a flexible and participatory approach in the implementation of policies.

The post Population resettlement in China a lose-lose scenario appeared first on fnvaworld.org.

Environmental activists have accused China State Construction of flouting rules pertaining to handling of waste and effluents during a cross-sea bridge project. Photos: Bloomberg, Apple Daily

China State Construction Engineering (Hong Kong) is suspected to have violated the conditions of an environmental permit in relation to the construction of the local section of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge.

The company is facing allegations that it discharged effluents into the sea during the construction work, Apple Daily reported.

China State Construction began work in May 2012, under a contract worth HK$8.88 billion (US$1.14 billion), for the Hong Kong section of the cross-sea bridge.

The work includes reclamation of 23 hectares of land from the sea and construction of a 2.6-kilometer road and a tunnel to connect the Scenic Hill in Chek Lap Kok to the bridge.

According to the Apple Daily report, the firm discharged effluents into an area close to Kwo Lo Wan Road and near the headquarters of the Civil Aviation Department.

An unidentified source was quoted as saying that she heard from a relative, who is a contractor himself, that China State Construction has been releasing effluents into the sea for quite some time.

The company suspended the discharge for a while in the past, but has since resumed the illegal waste dumping, the person said, citing video footage taken by the relative.

The person accused the government of failing to do a good job in protecting the environment and the endangered Chinese white dolphins that are known to inhabit the waters.

The Highways Department, meanwhile, is said to have confirmed that it had sent a warning letter to the China State Construction previously and asked the firm to halt improper handling of mudwater produced during construction work.

Asked for its comments, the Environmental Protection Department said that it had on Sept. 24 sent some officials to the site for an investigation, but the inspectors found no effluent discharge.

According to the Water Pollution Control Ordinance, contractors who violate rules could face a fine up to HK$200,000 and possible suspension or revocation of permits.

Roy Tam, president of environmental group Green Sense, said there have been several cases in recent years where Chinese contractors have been ignoring Hong Kong environmental regulations.

The government should blacklist the errant entities and prevent them from undertaking any work here in the future, he said.

The post China State Construction accused of pouring effluents into sea appeared first on fnvaworld.org.

Pan Yue, China’s most outspoken, innovative, and articulate environmental official, is back in action.

As China rolls out plans to tackle one environmental challenge after another — most recently Beijing pledged to initiate a nationwide cap-and-trade system for CO2 emissions in 2017 — it is easy to swing wildly between exultation and despair: Exultation at the ambition and despair at the current capacity. With every initiative, one must ask: Does China have the people, the institutions, and the structural incentives to implement its policies and programs? Most often, the answer is not reassuring.

The past few months, however, have brought reason for hope. Pan Yue, China’s most outspoken, innovative, and articulate environmental official, is back in action. Pan has served as a senior official within the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) and its predecessor, the State Environmental Protection Administration, since 2003, but was sidelined in 2009 for unknown reasons (speculation ranges from political problems to illness). Chinese media recently announced that Pan is now in charge of environmental impact assessments and has been promoted to deputy secretary for the Communist Party within the MEP. These responsibilities would reinforce his position as the second highest-ranking official in the ministry, squarely behind another well-regarded environmental official, the new head of the MEP, Chen Jining.

With Pan, what is old seems certain to become new again. For example, he is best known for his advocacy of the Green GDP program, which he introduced in the mid-2000s. It was eventually quashed by recalcitrant provincial officials, who did not want to reveal the degree to which they had failed to protect the environment, and the National Bureau of Statistics, which argued that it did not have the ability to undertake the statistical analysis necessary to calculate a Green GDP. Now, however, MEP is making a renewed push on this front.

Other “new” environmental policies that Beijing has announced over the past year or so have also been in Pan’s playbook for quite a while. In his 2007 book Thoughts on Environmental Issues, Pan introduces ideas such as the incorporation of environmental protection indicators into the performance evaluation of government officials and an environmental information disclosure system (see p. 242), both of which are currently being rolled out. He is also prescient in calling for China to take action on global climate change, claiming, “At the moment we are glad that the United States is still number one in carbon emissions, which leaves us a strong standing point… however, it is highly likely that China will be the number one carbon emission country in that time [in 2015]; everyone will be watching us then” (p. 295).

Pan may also find strong support for his views from on high. Well before Chinese president Xi Jinping’s current efforts to bring Confucianism back into Chinese political culture, Pan discussed the importance of integrating Marxism with traditional Chinese culture and philosophy as a means of ensuring a spiritual Chinese civilization and common prosperity (pp. 234-236).

Pan’s strongest fan base, however, has always been China’s environmental non-governmental organizations and on-the-ground activists, who look to him for both leadership and protection. He is a vigorous supporter of the “public’s right to know the truth” and the “right to supervise on planning related to national welfare and people’s livelihood” (p. 170). He has called broadly for the Chinese people — not simply a limited set of NGOs and government departments — to be able to “launch lawsuits in their own names” (p. 122). And when he asks, “What is a nation ruled by law?” and answers, “It is the equality enjoyed by everybody in front of the law,” (p. 123) it is almost certain that Chinese environmental activists everywhere are cheering.

With debate over the highly restrictive draft NGO law currently underway in Beijing, now more than ever, Pan needs to step forward to make sure his voice is heard. As he stated in an interview with Der Spiegel in 2005, “We need a law that enables and guarantees public participation, especially when it comes to environmental projects. If it’s safe politically to get involved and help the environment, then all sides will benefit. We must try to convince the central leadership of that.” Let’s hope that a decade later, Beijing will finally listen.

The post The Return of China’s Environmental Avenger appeared first on fnvaworld.org.

Climate change: Bhutan could lose over six percent of its Gross Domestic Product annually by 2100 due to melting glaciers and climate change induced extremes according to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) climate change and economics report for South Asia.

“Without capacity to cope with climate change, south Asian countries like Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal are likely to suffer extreme whether events,” ADB climate change and disaster risk management division’s director, Preety Bhandari said recently in a video conference to journalists attending a climate change press tour in Dhaka, Bangladesh.

“These countries will be lashed by flooding, landslides and reduced energy production from hydropower because of climate change effects,” Preety Bhandari said.

Going by the report’s findings both hydropower and tourism industry, the highest revenue earners, are going to bear the brunt of climate change. Besides, climate change can also affect agriculture, which employs over 69 percent of the country’s population.

“The country’s slope dominated agricultural activities and heavy reliance on glacier fed lakes for hydropower, tourism and water could face immense challenges in the coming decades without global efforts to slow the climate change,” said ADB vice president for knowledge management and sustainable development, Bindu Lohani in a news release.

Without changes to current global behaviour, Bhutan would see an average loss of 1.4 percent of GDP annually by 2050. The loss could have already yawned to 6.6 percent of its annual GDP by 2100.

The annual loss however could be constricted to 1.7 percent by 2100 if proper mitigation and adaptation measures are embraced. “Reducing the economic losses in south Asia is possible only if the global community succeeds in keeping the mean temperature rise to 2 degree Celsius or less under Copenhagen-Cancun agreement,” ADB’s report on assessing the costs of climate change and adaption in south Asia states.

Retreat of glaciers could affect lives, settlements, farms and hydropower. Degradation of the country’s many river systems would also affect water availability and tourism.

“The potential risk of costly economic damage from GLOFs on key development sectors such as agriculture, hydropower and forestry is mounting,” ADB’s news release states.

Hydropower

The report on assessing the cost on climate change and adaptation in South Asia states, Bhutan is highly vulnerable to climate change because of its mountain ecosystems and high dependency on hydropower.

“The immediate impact on hydropower is at threat from glacier melting and perturbation in natural water sources,” the report states. As per the news release, higher temperatures melting the glaciers faster and loss of snow cover because of shorter winter would undermine hydropower generation.

Agriculture

While higher temperatures and carbon dioxide levels are predicted to increase rice production in Bhutan and India until 2030, rice yield is likely to decline gradually by 2050. By 2080, tropical and subtropical regions of Bhutan, Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka could see rice yield decline by over 23 percent.

“Occurrences of GLOF from glacier retreat coupled with rising temperature would cause much damage to cropland as well as livestock loss eventually undermining country’s food security,” report on costs of climate change and adaptation states.

In Bhutan rice yield loss per hectare by 2030 could mount to 3.2kg, 12.6 kg in 2050 and 22.5kg by 2100 in low altitude. Similarly, rice yield in both mid and higher altitude could also lose by 11.3kg and 1.8kg per hectare by 2100.

Bhutan is also likely to be battered with rising numbers of landslides and land degradation because 31 percent of its agricultural land being located on slopes.

“Climate change-infused events in Bhutan like GLOF and landslides would indirectly affect the health of the Bhutanese communities as a result of undermined food security caused by drying out of smaller streams and springs,” the report cautions.

Health

With rise in the temperature, malaria and vector borne diseases are likely to spread from lowlands of southern region to higher elevations.

“Bhutan could see significant rise of dengue and malaria,” ADB’s report predicts.

According to the report, annual morbidity from dengue may increase to 20,150 individuals with 178 deaths by 2090 in Bhutan. The report also projects 11,299 persons likely to suffer from malaria by 2090 with 74 fatalities by 2030.

The report urges South Asian countries to step up adaptive measures in response to climate threats such as introduction of drought and flood resistant crop varieties, increased efficiency and management in energy sector, improved surveillance and monitoring of disease and vectors. ADB also recommends protection of groundwater sources and promotion of use of recycled water.

“Countries must respond individually and collectively to cope with rising sea levels, disrupted water, food and energy supply and increased disease,” Bindu Lohani said.

The post Countries like Bhutan should step up adaptive measures to respond to the threats of climate change appeared first on fnvaworld.org.