At the heart of Chinese mythology is belief in the Mandate of Heaven. The Emperor of China has been given the divine authority to mirror heavenly order on earth. If the emperor fails to do so, he can be replaced. A successful revolution marks the shifting of this mandate from one king to another.

Although communism sees itself as rational, and so anti-religion and anti-mythology, the communist revolution under Mao Zedong effectively marked the shift in the Mandate of Heaven from the old order to the new. The rise of China into an economic powerhouse under Deng Xiaoping also indicates yet another shift in the Mandate of Heaven. The current leadership in China is now expanding its Pax Sinica.

Geography plays a key role in Chinese mythology. At the centre is the Forbidden City (Beijing) around which is China and around which is the peripheral nations who look towards China for guidance to create heavenly order on earth. Beyond are the lands of chaos, whose people are best kept out using projects such as the Great Wall of China.

By contrast, time (kala) plays a key role in Hindu mythology. Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism speak of a world that has no beginning (anadi), no end (ananta) and is always impermanent (anitya). Indian mythologies speak of great universal emperors (chakra-varti) but these are more conceptual than historical. India thrives in dynamic diversity, with multiple kingdoms that rise and fall from Mauryas to Guptas to Vakatakas to Rashtrakutas to Kadambas to Gangas to Pallavas to Pandyas to Cholas to Nayakas to Mughals to British.

There is no Beijing equivalent in Hindu mythology, though Delhi is often projected as such in post-Independence textbooks. India, known in Buddhist, Jain and Hindu texts as Jambu-dvipa or Bharata-varsha or Arya-varta, is bound not by politics but by religion; it has been united not by empires but by pilgrim routes, an idea that perplexes modern historians who try very hard to prove India is a creation of the British.

In Chinese mythology, there is authority and bureaucracy in heaven too. The gods enable the living to be successful, and successful mortals such as emperors, military commanders and noblemen take the position of immortal gods. The highly formal, hierarchical and socially-responsible Confucianism, with its great regard for authority, is balanced by the more mystical and occult Taoism, that speaks of harmony and flow.

Essentially, the tone is highly materialistic and worldly in contrast to the otherworldly nature of Indian mythologies, where the psychological matters more than the physical. Jain, Buddhist and Hindu mythologies place great value on yoga, the un-crumpling of the mind crumpled by hunger and fear.

In Chinese worldview, India is seen in two ways. Firstly, it embodies luan, chaos. This chaos threatens the Chinese sense of order. This makes India a perpetual threat. It makes the Chinese leadership nervous. Secondly, India is Sukhavati, the Western Paradise in Chinese Buddhism, source of great spiritual wisdom. It speaks about transcending materialism to be free of suffering, an idea that invalidates the promise of the material philosophies, be it communism or capitalism.

Until the arrival of the Europeans, Buddhism was the only foreign idea that has had a dramatic impact on Chinese history. Since then, China watches with trepidation the rising tide of Christian evangelism in South Korea and Singapore, and Islam on its Western borders, and the hurricane of technology coming from the West. The Chinese way is eroding, unless the Emperor takes charge. Hence, OBOR.

Is OBOR the Chinese equivalent of the ashwamedha, the Vedic ritual by which a king established his authority and sovereignty? Is India reacting like the insecure Indra, king of the sky? Or are we choosing the hermit’s isolation over the householder’s pragmatism? Is maya (delusion) at play as we indulge our inflated sense of importance?

The Chinese classic, Sun Tzu’s Art of War, is about winning while Krishna’s Bhagavad Gita is about union with the divine. Very different goals. Something we need to meditate on.

As the global limelight fades from President Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” summit, the main actors — Chinese state-owned companies — are warning about the political risks they face along the route.

Earlier this month Xi outlined plans to direct as much as 840 billion yuan ($122 billion) to build roads, railways, ports and pipelines across Asia and beyond, securing China’s central role in world trade. The plan has the country’s state-owned enterprises weighing investments in 65 participant nations, almost two-thirds of which have sovereign debt ratings below investment grade.

“Chinese companies’ risk awareness has grown, but they still lack the ability to discern where to invest or effectively manage overseas risks,” said Yin Yili, a vice president at a unit of China Communications Construction Co., one of the nation’s largest state-owned companies. “Over these past years, we’ve paid a great price and suffered big losses. We’ve paid a large amount in tuition fees.”

The concerns highlight a major challenge of Xi’s signature trade-and-foreign-policy initiative: Ensuring that state companies don’t become overexposed abroad at a time when they are struggling to shed costs and slash soaring debt loads at home. State-owned companies had already insured more than $400 billion in projects in the four years before Xi’s summit.

 

Some 71 percent of Chinese companies said political risk topped their concerns about investing abroad, according to a survey of 300 firms published in November by the Center for China and Globalization, a Beijing-based research institution. They cited “policy changes,” “political unrest” and “government expropriation” as top worries.

Yin, who heads the industrial parks department at CCCC’s Industrial Investment Holding Co., said that almost two decades of foreign investment experience hasn’t necessarily translated into enhanced risk-control procedures for Chinese companies. Many still lack vision, negotiation skills and local knowledge, he said, adding that they sometimes assume money can solve all problems.

“A lot of times they only see a bevy of opportunities, but not pitfalls underfoot,” Yin said. “There are more than 200 countries and regions in the world, and not every place is worth investment.”

Protests, Volatility

The Belt and Road route includes volatile areas like Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as Iraq, Syria and Yemen. African countries including Egypt, Kenya and South Africa are also on the list and scrambling to expand ties with China. Ethiopian Airlines Enterprise on Monday launched its fourth route to the country.

In 2014, protests over China’s oil-exploration in the South China Sea forced electronics maker Midea Group Co. to withdraw investment from neighboring Vietnam, which is part of the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s $1.5 billion Colombo Port City project in Sri Lanka has been dogged by demonstrations and briefly halted in 2015 after a new government pledged to review all deals by the previous Beijing-friendly administration.

Concerns about political risk were scarcely mentioned as Xi hosted almost 30 world leaders in Beijing on May 14-15. The president’s keynote address only referenced the need to manage broad financial risks, while the chairman of China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission told reporters that political and security threats were “completely controllable.”

‘Unstable Governments’

“China needs to not only worry about walking into political traps leading to investment loss, but also worry about security of staff and assets,” said Raffaello Pantucci, director of international security studies at the Royal United Services Institute. “You are looking at parts of the world where you have politically risky and unstable governments, a variety of security threats, and a government in Beijing which has little clear skill or experience in managing these problems.”

Risks were building long before Xi first outlined in 2013 the plan to recreate ancient Silk Road trading routes between Asia and Europe by land and sea. Beijing has been encouraging state companies to “go out” since the late 1990s, with much of that investment going toward oil and other raw materials in countries such as Venezuela, where slumping commodity prices have helped weaken the Beijing-friendly government.

More than $250 billion in China’s overseas investments failed between 2005 and 2015, according to the China Global Investment Tracker, a database maintained by the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation. The Center for China and Globalization, which separately analyzed 120 unsuccessful investments, found that political factors accounted for a quarter of all cases.

Risk Insurance

Such overseas investments are insured by the state-owned China Export & Credit Insurance Corp., or Sinosure, which covers government seizures, nationalization, political violence, contract breaches and payment delays because of political events. In an article published on the company’s website this month, Chairman Wang Yi described Sinosure as the Belt and Road Initiative’s “chief brake.”

Since 2013, Sinosure insured $440 billion of exports and investments in Belt and Road countries and paid out $1.7 billion in claims, Wang wrote. Projects insured included a 1,800 kilometer (1,100 mile) pipeline to Turkmenistan, a $1.6 billion power plant in Jordan and an $800 million dam in Cambodia.

Yuan Li, chairman of China Civil Engineering Construction Corp., which has more than 50 projects in Africa, said Sinosure’s insurance covers “extreme circumstances” like coups and war, but not normal political reversals.

“There is a change of government almost every month,” Yuan said by phone. “There is no insurance on the earth catering to that. Our policy is to make friends as widely as possible, and not to get closer to any one party than the others.”

Political concerns have led China’s state companies to steer clear of some markets. Gordon Li, the overseas business director for China Merchants Group’s international business department, said the company hasn’t considered adding India to the 48 port projects it’s financing in 18 Belt and Road countries.

“For us, the No. 1 consideration is political risk,” Li said. “It’s extremely important whether the destination countries have good relations with China or not.”

At his swearing-in three years ago, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi pulled a coup of sorts by featuring an array of heads of states from South Asian countries, including arch-enemy Pakistan, at an event that rarely has a high-profile foreign contingent. Months later, the Indian prime minister’s bromance with former US president Barack Obama—who even wrote a note in praise of Modi in Time magazine—was the subject of much adulation.

In the first two years of his term, Modi travelled to as many as 36 countries—and all India’s neighbours—in an attempt to establish the world’s fastest-growing major economy as a regional soft power.

But in the past year the Modi diplomatic whirlwind has waned. Meanwhile, China—India’s nuclear-armed neighbour—under president Xi Jinping, appears to be making all the right moves in its foreign policy, particularly in Asia, to New Delhi’s increasing consternation.

“Modi sought to depict himself as a more decisive kind of leader who can actually make things happen quickly—and to an extent he has succeeded,” Michael Kugelman, a senior associate for South and Southeast Asia at the Washington DC-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, said. “Still, he is a product of a system and institutions that make it hard to move quickly, including in the area of foreign relations. And ultimately Xi and China win out from this.”

India: “Neighbourhood first” fails

Early in his term, Narendra Modi seemed on course to build India’s image in South Asia as a dominant regional power.

In visits that some dubbed part of a “neighbourhood first” strategy, he made the first trip by an Indian prime minister to Nepal in 17 years, and to Sri Lanka in 28 years. Further afield, he traveled to China’s neighbour Mongolia—the first Indian prime minister ever to do so—to send a subtle message to China, which has been increasingly active on India’s own periphery.

“Today, most countries use a combination of soft power and hard power, together called ‘smart power.’ Since Modi became prime minister in May 2014, India has employed such a blend, but with a strong focus on soft power,” Stéphanie M. L. Heng, a visiting fellow at New Delhi based think-tank Observer Research Foundation, wrote last year.

Modi, though seen as a strongman at home, sought to position his efforts abroad as diplomacy by consensus—not bullying—which India’s smaller neighbours have complained of in the past.

“Look, foreign policy is not about changing mindsets,” said Modi, explaining his strategy in July 2016. “Foreign policy is about finding the common meeting points. Where do our interests converge and how much? We have to sit and talk with every country.”

But by late 2015, things began to take a different turn. The government in Kathmandu blamed India for being complicit in an unofficial economic blockade caused by protesters from Nepal’s Madhesi communities (paywall), who were blocking a crucial checkpoint from where fuel and other crucial imports from India enter. Months later, India’s efforts to mend ties with Pakistan derailed—just weeks after Modi made a surprise visit to Islamabad—when terrorists attacked an Indian Air Force base in Punjab.

Last year Modi became mired with his domestic agenda as well, when his government withdrew much of the currency in circulation in a move against tax evasion, endangering economic growth, while preparations for major regional elections also loomed.

Now, despite the early promise of the swearing-in handshake between Modi and Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif, relations between India and Pakistan are perhaps at the worst they have been since the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. Further away in South Asia, India’s relations with the island nation of Maldives are stagnating under its new leadership. In Iran, where Modi offered to fund development of a port, the Indian and Iranian governments are squabbling over delays. Meanwhile New Delhi’s growing proximity to Washington has put India’s relations with Russia—an old ally—at risk, even as the China-Russia alliance remains robust.

“We can’t exactly blame Modi for not being able to stop China’s growing influence,” Alka Acharya, a professor of Chinese studies at New Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). “India had made a lot of offers, be it in Africa or in the Asian countries. But they have not fructified mostly because of bureaucratic failures. These countries wouldn’t want to wait for India and in that sense China has been much better poised.”

China: Fast-mover advantage

President Xi, the country’s most powerful leader in decades, has expanded investment and trade abroad, created new international institutions—one of which, in an overture to India, is headed by an Indian—and strengthened China’s military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and in Africa.

There are two major reasons China is able to move much faster than India on deals and aid, including a one-party system that gives Xi decision-making power far beyond what Modi is able to command. The world’s second-largest economy, China has far more resources, from the world’s largest foreign reserves, to some of its biggest infrastructure companies. So it’s no surprise India hasn’t been able to compete with China across different arenas from Southeast to Central Asia to Africa, where many nations are now highly dependent on economic ties with China.

But what is surprising is India’s inability to retain the advantage among its closest neighbours (leaving aside Pakistan). Instead, China has been able to build up a rock-solid strategic presence encircling India.

In Bangladesh, president Xi last year gave the country financing of over $24 billion towards power plants, a port and railways. In Sri Lanka, a massive Chinese-funded port has been under construction for several years and at one point, Chinese submarines docked at the country. In Myanmar too, China has been flexing its muscles, even offering to participate in the peace process. In Nepal, China has emerged as the Himalayan nation’s largest donor.

“As long as [China] is offering favorable terms for financing development, there will naturally be a keenness on the part of the smaller South Asian countries to embrace Beijing,” added Dhruva Jaishankar, of the India arm of the US think-tank Brookings Insitution.

In recent months, as the US turns inward under Donald Trump’s “American First” policy, China has positioned itself even more prominently as the new champion for globalisation, speaking out on climate change and trade.

Now, Xi’s foreign policy masterstroke, the One Belt, One Road initiative—which some have called imperialistic (paywall) in its ambitions—poses the greatest challenge for New Delhi.

One belt, one road to bind them

The newest plank of China’s foreign policy is an estimated $5 trillion (pdf) infrastructure spending spree proposed by Xi in 2013 that spans 60-plus countries across Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa.

Last week, when world leaders gathered in Beijing to hear China’s plans for the initiative, India declined to attend and instead expressed its strong opposition to the project, which includes a $46 billion China-Pakistan economic corridor. Parts of the project involve developing a portion of the Kashmir region that Pakistan holds, and that India says it illegally occupies.

“No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity,” the Indian government said in a statement released on the eve of the forum.

In Pakistan, Chinese companies will lease out thousands of acres of agricultural land and develop huge industrial parks—while also setting up a surveillance system spanning cities across the country, according to a report in Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper.

Yet some countries are overlooking sovereignty concerns to partner with China. In Southeast Asia, many of the countries with which China has conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea are participating in the Belt and Road program, including Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

China appeared unfazed by India’s decision to stay home.

“India’s objection to the B&R is partly a show for domestic politics, partly to pile pressure on China,” said an editorial in Global Times, a nationalistic Chinese state tabloid. “However, the absence of New Delhi in the B&R has not affected the forum in Beijing, and it will exert even less effect on the progress the initiative will make in the world.”

A key to catching up: Japan

According to the Economic Times newspaper, India and Japan are planning to fund infrastructure projects in East Africa, while Japan will join India in the expansion of Iran’s Chabahar port. In Sri Lanka too, the two countries are jointly planning to expand the Trincomalee port. They are also likely to partner to develop Dawei port along the Thai-Myanmar border, and in Bangladesh. But again, India might by stymied by a bureaucracy that is slow to act on deals that would further solidify ties—for instance by approving the purchase of amphibious aircraft from Japan, which is looking for a foothold in the global arms trade.

India could also continue to lobby other countries around the concerns it raised in its statement in OBOR, including debt burdens for participating countries, environmental standards and transparency in the bidding process.

“India can’t go around crying that the OBOR is a bad idea. What the Indian government can do now, is talk to countries and convince them about the potential risks that come with joining,” says Acharya, of JNU.

Sri Lanka, in particular, shows both the opportunities for and the challenges in countering China’s economic might. Remarks by Sarath Amanugama, a minister who was part of Sri Lanka’s OBOR delegation, suggest his country wants to carefully balance its ties with India and China.

“Taking sides is not rational in Sri Lanka’s interest,” said Amanugama in the wake of Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka, which came days ahead of China’s forum. “India is our brother, China is our friend… We don’t see the world divided between India and China.”

Just ahead of the OBOR meeting, Sri Lanka declined to allow a Chinese submarine to dock, a sign of growing concerns over China’s presence in the country, and perhaps of effective Indian lobbying. But Sri Lanka was also the only South Asian country other than Pakistan to send its leader to China’s forum, and came away from the meeting with a promise from Beijing for an estimated additional $24 billion in loans, even though the country is still struggling to pay the existing $8 billion debt to China.

“China is winning in many ways over India, and particularly in the race for influence across South Asia and the broader region,” said Kugelman, of the Woodrow Wilson Center. “Given how deeply entrenched China’s footprint is in South Asia, and given how OBOR will cement this deep presence, Modi has a very long road ahead of him to try to push back against Beijing.”

Liu Yunshan, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, awards a certificate to an author whose work is collected in “national achievements library of philosophy and social sciences” during a symposium on the formation of philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics in Beijing, capital of China, May 17, 2017. (Xinhua/Wang Ye)

BEIJING, May 17 (Xinhua) — While China is increasingly confident in its dazzling economic growth in past decades, the country is placing urgency on building more basic and lasting confidence — to generate its own great minds in philosophy and social sciences.

The Communist Party of China (CPC) has recently pledged to step up building “philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics,” a system including various fields such as history, economics, politics, culture, society, ecology and the military.

People in these fields must shoulder their responsibilities, consolidate confidence in Chinese culture and enhance innovation in their field, said Liu Yunshan, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, at a high-level seminar held on Wednesday to promote the project.

The remarks came just one year after Chinese President Xi Jinping, also general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, made a speech at a symposium on the development of philosophy and social sciences.

The speech, ranging from Marxism and the CPC leadership to talent cultivation and innovation, was regarded by academics and officials as a guiding thought on developing these fields.

A country without advanced development of the natural sciences could not possibly be a leading nation, and neither can a country without booming achievements in philosophy and the social sciences, Xi said at the symposium held on May 17 last year.

NEED OF THE TIME

Academics believe present day China requires great theory and great minds.

As the country is undergoing the most profound and widespread social reform in its history, the nation’s drive is expected to generate power and broad space for developing theory, said Professor Xie Chuntao with the CPC Central Committee Party School.

He noted that China’s performance in philosophy and social sciences has not kept up with its progress in reform and opening up, and efforts are needed to better sum up and analyze the country’s successful endeavors.

Academics must work harder to generate theories to support future development, Xie said.

Chinese academics are finding it more difficult to use Western theories to interpret Chinese practices in the economy, politics and society. They are also not being understood by their Western colleagues when explaining what China is doing now.

“As Chinese people have more engagement with the outside world, we have a deeper need for confidence,” said Professor Wang Yiwei with Renmin University of China. “If we cannot build our own guiding ideology, discourses and academic systems of philosophy and social sciences, we will never gain confidence in our path and socialist system.”

INNOVATION

At Wednesday’s seminar, Liu stressed innovation is a key focus in developing China’s philosophy and social sciences.

The study should focus on contemporary China. Chinese theories need to interpret China’s progress while the later needs to enrich the theories, he said.

His remarks echoed a guideline issued Tuesday by the CPC Central Committee to promote the development of China’s philosophy and social sciences.

Academics are encouraged to combine the achievements of the country’s traditional culture with foreign theories and innovate in knowledge, theories and methods, according to the guideline.

As part of the innovation efforts, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) has set up 19 think tanks focusing primarily on Marxism, economics and finance, international relations, society and culture as well as border areas. By the end of 2016, the academy had completed almost 13,000 written studies, over 147,000 papers and more than 27,000 research reports.

NEW THOUGHT

Stressing Marxism is the “soul and advantage” of China’s philosophy and social sciences, Liu urged increasing the sinicization of Marxism.

Studying new theories developed since the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012 is a priority, he said.

Liu called on studies of Xi Jinping’s speeches as well as new concepts, ideas and strategies of state governance, understand the Marxist stance, views and methods behind them, and apply the correct political directions and values in philosophy and social sciences.

Xi’s speeches are rich in content and deep in thought, including the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the “two centenary goals”, overall arrangement of economic, political, cultural, social and ecological development, the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation and the “four comprehensives.”

They also include the “new normal” theory, supply-side structural reform, democratic politics with Chinese characteristics, people-oriented development, ideological building, poverty eradication, a community of shared future, Party building, comprehensive state security and military strengthening.

To better interpret Xi’s speeches and thought, CASS has compiled 12 volumes of the studies answering major questions concerning the development of the Party and the country in the new era, said CASS President Wang Weiguang.

Chang, also a member of the Central Military Commission, made the remarks during his recent inspection tour which included Shanghai and Fujian, Jiangsu, Jiangxi and Zhejiang provinces. 

He called for clear understanding of the complicated situation facing China’s national security and development and of the importance of national defense education for all citizens. 

Chang said such education should include remembering history, looking at the past as a mirror, remaining level-headed, memorializing martyrs and maintaining a revolutionary spirit. 

He also called on citizens to uphold the truth, cherish peace and love the Party, the country and socialism. 

Moreover, Chang noted that national defense education should be a shared responsibility for the whole of society.

The regulation, which took effect Monday, defines the rules for enacting military laws and regulations as well as the drafting of standard documents. 

The regulation standardizes the formulation of military laws and regulations, which includes the drafting, submission, modification and issuance stages. 

It likewise regulates the review and gathering of records, and suggests measures to improve the management of documents.

The People’s Liberation Army has seen changes in its organization and structure since 2015. In September 2015, China announced that its armed forces would be reduced by 300,000 troops from 2.3 million. The previous seven military area commands were regrouped into five theater commands in 2016.