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
No.1



# Issue Brief

## Thread of Beads: An analysis of China's renaming of 62 locations in the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh since 2017

Tenzing Dhamdul,  
Tenzin Sherap and  
Tenzin Younten



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The Foundation for Non-violent Alternatives (FNVA) is a not-for-profit, non-partisan, public policy organisation, established to undertake the objective study and analysis of India's security that is directly linked with developments in contemporary China and Tibet. We do objective study of Tibet, Tibetan affairs and their related security implications for India. Our work is primarily focused on policy and decision makers in government, and politics with the objective to draw the government's immediate attention on its policy on China, Tibet, Taiwan, Southern Mongolia and East Turkestan and help shape policy in this area, through dialogue, webinars, seminars, research, translation of original materials in mandarin to english, policy briefs and publications.

The Center for Contemporary Studies in Security and Technology (CCSST) is a cutting-edge research center that focuses on the intricate interplay between security dynamics and technological advancements.

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# Thread of Beads: An analysis of China's renaming of 62 locations in the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh since 2017

Tenzing Dhamdul, Tenzin Sherap and Tenzin Younten

## Introduction

This issue brief examines the renaming of 62 locations in Arunachal Pradesh from 2017 onwards, culminating in the most recent release: the publication of an official map of South Tibet (Zangnan) along with the standardised Chinese names of 30 locations in Arunachal Pradesh, including names in Tibetan and Pinyin characters (the standard system of romanised spelling for transliterating Chinese). This was carried out by the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs on March 30, 2024. This ministry, is a cabinet-level executive department of the State Council of China and is responsible for social and administrative affairs.

This official exercise, encroaching upon India's sovereignty in Arunachal Pradesh, is not unprecedented. China has conducted four such exercises, including this one, resulting in a total of 62 locations being given "Standardised Names". Additionally, there have been longstanding tensions the two, such as locals of Arunachal Pradesh being issued stapled visas when traveling to China, among other issues.

We use the term 'Thread of Beads' as our title to emphasise how China, akin to its actions in the Indo-Pacific (where it has established a String of Pearls), is extending its influence throughout the Himalayan region, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh, for its own national security interests. The issuance of standardised names with accompanying maps lays the groundwork for an administrative setup facilitating potential future invasions. With Chinese media propagating the narrative that 90% of South Tibet (Zangnan) is illegally occupied by India, there is a heightened likelihood of confrontation in this region. The ramifications on India's long-term national security and the vision for Viksit Bharat (2047, India's transformation into a developed nation) must be considered. This renaming by Beijing is not merely an isolated act but part of a long-term plan aimed at destabilising the region, confusing the public, and promoting a narrative akin to its actions in Tibet and other occupied territories since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949.

We have used open-source materials including official communications by Beijing and trending Chinese articles/opinions in Mandarin. Furthermore, we have used satellite images to identify the given locations and have come out with the official names given by the Government of India. Through this we have been able to create tables and graphics that analyse highlights and trends from the four renaming exercises carried out by China till date, all occurring at crucial junctures in India-China relations, with the latter three happening almost annually post the 2020 Galwan Valley incident.

Each of China's renaming endeavours, have lead it to gradually creep upon the Indian State of Assam, prompting the Chief Minister of Assam, Himanta Biswa Sarma, to articulate his stance during discussions with journalists, stating, "My request to the Government of India is that we should provide 60 geographical names for the Tibetan area of China. It should always be tit for tat, although I refrain from commenting further as it falls within the purview of the Government of India's policy decisions. Nonetheless, if they designate 30 names, we should reciprocate with 60." Similarly, the Minister of External Affairs, Jaishankar, emphasised during the Corporate Summit 2024 on 1st April, "If today I were to change the name of your house, would it become mine? Arunachal Pradesh was, is, and will always

remain a state of India. Altering names does not alter this reality. Our armed forces are stationed along the Line of Actual Control..."

However when it comes to the ground, despite the recent 29th Meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on Border Affairs between the two nations on March 27, 2024, which affirmed the status quo, no major breakthroughs were achieved. This lack of progress is further exacerbated by the recent actions, occurring just three days after the meeting.

**Keywords:** *Thread of Beads, Arunachal Pradesh, India, Tibet, China, Southern Tibet, Dalai Lama, Cartography, Expansionism, Renaming, Sovereignty, Territory, Policy, Grayzone Warfare, Himalayas, Psychological Warfare, Bhutan, Neighbourhood, Geographic Types.*

### **Key takeaways:**

- *Since 2017, a total of 62 locations in Arunachal Pradesh have been renamed and claimed by China through its 'Thread of Beads' strategy.*
- *The renaming saga along the border disputes between India and China has its roots in Tibet's occupation from 1950 onwards and took center stage during the Sino-Indian War of 1962.*
- *25 Mountains and 25 Residential Areas have been renamed since 2017, this represents China's strategic military outlook towards Arunachal Pradesh.*
- *Of the 62 locations 17 districts (out of 26 districts) have had locations renamed with Tawang and Papum Pare district standing out with 7 renamed locations in these districts respectively.*
- *China's recent surge in renaming and claiming territories of India, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh, reflects its strategic interests and objectives aimed at expanding its territorial control.*
- *Tibet: It is imperative to consider the historical events surrounding Tibet since its illegal military occupation by China, highlighting China's success renaming efforts and the subsequent acceptance of Chinese narratives by the international community. The territory of Tibet and its traditional regions of Kham, Amdo, and U-Tsang region is much larger than just TAR. The parts of traditional regions of Tibet spanning over major parts of the Tibetan plateau are divided, renamed, and incorporated into the Chinese administration of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. The latest exercise carried out here is using Xizang (Mandarin for Tibet) instead of Tibet in official documents. (refer to FNVA's Policy Document 'Resetting India's Tibet Policy..')*
- *Bhutan: The 470 KMs border between China and Bhutan remains largely undemarcated. In 2021 a significant development occurred with the signing of the "Memorandum of Understanding on the 'Three-Step' Roadmap to Accelerate China-Bhutan Border Negotiations". This and other engagements purported the latest version of the Bhutan Election Commission map that confirmed China's sovereignty over the Kula Gangri Peak which covers 1,290 sq.kms (according to Chinese Media and confirmed by various articles detailing this handover including Manoj Joshi's article for the ORF titled as 'Doklam: To start at the very beginning').*
- *India can effectively counter adversarial narratives and safeguard our national security interests by continuously updating and disseminating accurate information with regard to Arunachal Pradesh.*
- *Essential to remain cognisant of the perspectives and concerns of the people directly impacted by these issues, particularly those residing in the regions under dispute.*

## **1. Navigating border contestations: The renaming saga between India and China**

The border disputes between India and China have their roots in Tibet's occupation (prior to this there was no border with China) that began in 1950 onwards and was brought to center stage during the Sino-Indian War of 1962, a conflict that occurred just a decade after both nations gained independence from colonial influence and internal civil and communal conflicts.

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Since then, India has successfully repelled and pushed back Chinese troops in the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), now known as Arunachal Pradesh, while similar achievements have not been realised in the Aksai Chin region. Despite numerous engagements, talks, and treaties between the two countries regarding the contested border, a lasting agreement has remained elusive. While a certain status quo has been tentatively agreed upon by both nations at the border, China has recently been testing India's resolve in areas such as Aksai Chin region and Arunachal Pradesh. The deliberate perpetuation of border disputes by China, despite resolving territorial issues with other nations, underscores its strategy to maintain India as a subordinate power in the region.

China realising its inability to confront India directly, as evidenced by the 2020 Galwan Valley Conflict, in Arunachal Pradesh, they have adopted a new form of Psychological Grayzone Warfare (unconventional warfare where there is no actual physical war but virtual war and pivoting through media, initiatives and narrative setting). A manifestation of this is the official exercises of renaming locations in Arunachal Pradesh, terming them as 'Standardised Names'. The most recent renaming exercise occurred on March 30, 2024, when 30 locations/areas were given these standardised names by the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs which is a state council organ, marking the fourth such exercise carried out by them. The previous 3 taking place on April 13, 2017; December 29, 2021; and April 2, 2023, renaming 6, 15, and 11 areas respectively by the same ministry. In total, 62 locations have been bestowed with these names, indicating China's administrative preparedness for potential illegal incursions into Arunachal Pradesh and its annexation.


Throughout these incidents, the Ministry of External Affairs of India has maintained a clear and diplomatic stance, swiftly responding within 2-3 days of China's announcements. Notably India stand on Arunachal Pradesh has been consistently supported by several nations including the USA and also the United Nations, recognising Arunachal Pradesh as a sovereign part of India. While the response for first release of standardised names may have caused some brief uneasiness (almost took a week to respond), subsequent responses have been prompt by the Government of India.

## **2. Analysing data: China's cartographic aggression, a meticulously planned approach**

### **a. The categories of geographic names:**

- Based on figure 1. below of the total 62 locations renamed by China, 25 are Mountains (peaks and passes) 25 are Residential areas, 9 are Water bodies (rivers, streams, and lakes), and 3 are Land segments.
- This clearly indicates a particular interest in the Residential areas and Mountains with both these geographic types, renamed 25 times each by China. Residential areas and Mountains play crucial roles in terms of military strategic outlooks.
- Mountains serve as important physical boundaries, while residential areas are sources of consumables, potential civilian targets and bases for administrative purposes.
- Additionally, our research indicates that certain mountains and lakes lack de facto names from the Government of India as evidenced on Google Earth/Maps. However we also found out that none of the Chinese pinyin names for the locations in Arunachal Pradesh appeared on Google Earth/Maps with these names being largely confined to Chinese official maps, document, media, sources and agencies including Baidu, all of which are predominantly in Mandarin (Chinese language). Yet we must look into it as Mandarin is the 2nd most spoken language in the world with more than 1 billion speakers, only second to English. (according to Statista)


**Figure 1: Geographical features of the 62 locations renamed by China in Arunachal Pradesh since 2017**



**Figure 2: District wise renaming of locations by China in Arunachal Pradesh since 2017**



**Figure 3: District wise map of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (by the Maps of India)**



**b. District-wise distribution of renamed locations:**

- Arunachal Pradesh comprises 26 districts, with 17 of them targeted for renaming by China. Among these districts, Tawang and Papum Pare stand out with 7 each. But there are 4 other districts namely Dibang Valley (sharing one of the longest borders with China and is also the largest in size among the 26 districts in Arunachal Pradesh), Upper Siang, Upper Subansiri, West Kameng, and East Siang with 6 each.
- Papum Pare district, closely associated with the capital region of Itanagar, effectively contributes to the count of renamed locations. This targeting of the capital region suggests China’s strategic interest in key administrative centers.
- Notably, Tawang holds significance due to its historical and cultural ties with Tibet: a. being the birthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama, b. the current 14th Dalai Lama’s entry point to India in 1959 during his forced escape from Tibet being from Khenzimane (to which China has ironically no qualms then) and c. its strategic location and with the recent inauguration of the Sela Tunnel Pass, providing all-weather connectivity between Tawang and Tezpur in Assam.

**c. "Thread of Beads" and encirclement strategy:**

- A glance at the map of Arunachal Pradesh reveals how the 62 renamed locations by China have effectively encircled the entire state, indicating a concerted effort to gradually rename the entire Indian state. This is part of ‘Thread of Beads’ strategy whereby it encircles the entire region much like what has already happened in the Indo-Pacific where people use the term ‘String of Pearls’
- This trend, if allowed to continue, poses serious implications for the region. The proliferation of Chinese names could further solidify China’s influence and territorial claims, reminiscent of its actions in Tibet and other occupied territories.
- Moreover, there is a discernible movement towards the Indian state of Assam, signalling potential future escalations.

In conclusion, China's systematic renaming of geographical locations in Arunachal Pradesh represents a calculated strategy aimed at asserting territorial dominance and encroaching upon India's sovereignty. These actions underscore the need for heightened vigilance and diplomatic efforts to safeguard India's territorial integrity.

It has become increasingly evident to Indian experts and stakeholders that China is employing a deliberate tactic to unsettle India and continue asserting itself as a dominant regional power, contrary to India's vision of Viksit Bharat by 2047. This is exemplified by the fact that, since the official formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, they have successfully resolved the majority of its border issues with the notable exception being India.

**Figure 4. Tables of the four batches of lists of renamed locations by China in the Arunachal Pradesh state of India :**

序号	标准地名	藏文名称	罗马字母拼写	经度	纬度
1	乌同岭	ཨ་ལྷོ་གླིང་།	Wo'gyainling	91°52'25"	27°34'54"
2	米拉日	མི་ལ་རི།	Mila Ri	93°52'25"	28°03'06"
3	曲登嘎布日	མཚོ་དཀར་རྟེན་དྲུག་པ་རི།	Qoidengarbo Ri	93°45'57"	28°16'50"
4	梅楚卡	མཚོ་ལྷོ་ཁ།	Mainquka	94°08'04"	28°36'03"
5	白明拉山口	བུ་ལ་མཚོ།	Bümo La	96°46'25"	28°06'55"
6	纳姆卡姆	ལྷོ་མ་ལ་བུ་ལ་རི།	Namkapub Ri	95°06'05"	28°12'49"

**Table A. 1st Batch on 13th April, 2017**

**增补藏南地区公开使用地名（第四批）**

序号	标准汉字名称	藏文名称	汉语拼音	地名类别	所属政区	经度	纬度
1	哈东山口	ཧ་དོང་ལ།	Hādōng Shānkǒu	山口、关隘	错那市	91°42'40"E	27°46'38"N
2	赤明错	ཇི་ལམ་མཚོ།	Chì míng cuò	居民点	错那市	91°46'27"E	27°32'33"N
3	白则林	འབེ་རྩེ་རྒྱུད།	Báizé lín	居民点	错那市	92°08'57"E	27°03'17"N
4	科马河	སུམ་མཚོ།	Kēmǎ Hé	河流	错那市	具体位置见附图	
5	马果	མག་མོ།	Mǎguǒ	地片	错那市	92°12'25"E	27°41'18"N
6	李措	ལི་ཚོ།	Lǐcuò	居民点	错那市	92°13'12"E	27°22'44"N
7	恰洞日	འཇགས་བུ་ལ་རི།	Qiádòng rì	山峰	错那市	92°51'53"E	28°08'32"N
8	哲崩日	ཇེ་བུ་ལ་རི།	Zhébēng rì	山峰	错那市	93°21'01"E	27°42'47"N
9	托交日	ཏུ་ཇེ་ལ་རི།	Tuōjiāo rì	山峰	错那市	93°22'12"E	27°24'56"N
10	德布日	དེ་བུ་ལ་རི།	Débù rì	山峰	错那市	93°37'03"E	27°08'39"N
11	济罗	ཇི་ལུ།	Jìluó	居民点	错那市	93°49'16"E	27°35'34"N
12	托布峰	ཏུ་བུ་པོ།	Tuōbù fēng	山峰	错那市	94°04'22"E	27°51'07"N
13	阿非则拉峰	ཨ་ཕི་རེ་ལ།	Āfēizélā fēng	山峰	墨脱县	94°21'33"E	27°40'60"N
14	珍嘎拉峰	ཇེ་ཀ་ལ་པོ།	Zhēngǎlā fēng	山峰	墨脱县	94°23'36"E	28°15'26"N
15	邦勾	པོ་གློ་བ།	Bānggōu	居民点	墨脱县	94°45'12"E	28°53'10"N
16	莫新	མོ་ཤིང་།	Mòxīn	居民点	墨脱县	94°47'30"E	28°48'33"N
17	更仁	ཀླུ་རིང་།	Gēngrén	居民点	墨脱县	94°58'28"E	29°08'12"N
18	仁更	རིང་ཀླུ།	Réngēng	居民点	墨脱县	95°16'19"E	28°08'33"N
19	打嘎拉峰	དཱ་གཤེ་ལ།	Dǎgǎlā fēng	山峰	墨脱县	95°20'22"E	28°15'41"N
20	仰桑河	ལྷོ་ལ་མཚོ།	Yǎngsāng Hé	河流	墨脱县	具体位置见附图	
21	嫩姆日河	ལྷོ་མོ་རི་ལ།	Nènmǔrì Hé	河流	墨脱县	具体位置见附图	
22	曲岗峰	ལྷོ་གླང་།	Qūgǎng fēng	山峰	察隅县	95°58'30"E	29°05'50"N
23	多尔山	དུ་འོ་ཤན།	Duō'ěr Shān	山峰	察隅县	96°04'01"E	29°11'15"N
24	龙古喀尔峰	ལུང་ཀུ་ཀེ་ལ།	Lóngūkǎ'ěr fēng	山峰	察隅县	96°07'35"E	28°18'53"N
25	贝空曲宗	བེ་ཀོང་ལྷོ་མཚོ།	Bèikōngqūzōng	居民点	察隅县	96°18'57"E	28°48'06"N
26	苏达错	སུ་དཱ་མཚོ།	Sūdà cuò	湖泊	察隅县	96°31'42"E	28°46'26"N
27	达普好工	དཱ་པུ་ཤོ་གླང་།	Dǎpǔhǎogōng	居民点	察隅县	96°36'38"E	28°19'13"N
28	达瓦岗峰	དཱ་བུ་གླང་།	Dǎwǎgǎng fēng	山峰	察隅县	96°52'21"E	27°57'20"N
29	涅阿西崩拉曲	ལྷོ་ལ་མཚོ་ལ།	Niē'āxībēnglā qū	河流	隆子县	具体位置见附图	
30	塔克新	ཏཱ་ཀེ་ཤིང་།	Tǎkèxīn	居民点	隆子县	93°12'18"E	28°25'57"N

**Table D. 4th Batch, 30th March, 2024**

附件 1

**增补藏南地区公开使用地名（第二批）**

序号	标准汉字名称	藏文名称	罗马字母拼写	地名类别	所属政区	经度	纬度
1	色拉（西山口）	སེ་ལ།	Sè La (Xī Shānkǒu)	山口、关隘	错那县	92°06'16"E	27°30'12"N
2	申隆宗	ཤིང་ལོ་རྩོད།	Sēngkǒngzōng	居民点	错那县	92°07'02"E	27°27'01"N
3	打嘎宗	དཱ་གླང་རྩོད།	Dǎgǎngzōng	居民点	错那县	92°11'58"E	27°10'29"N
4	瓦姆日	འབ་མཚོ།	Wāmǔ rì	山峰	错那县	92°53'13"E	27°05'00"N
5	迪乌日	དཱ་ལུ་རི།	Dēu rì	山峰	错那县	93°16'53"E	27°49'00"N
6	论珠日	ལུང་ཇུ་ལ་རི།	Lhūnzhū rì	山峰	错那县	93°49'27"E	27°23'55"N
7	马尼岗	མཚོ་གླང་།	Mān'īgāng	居民点	墨脱县	94°16'42"E	28°47'03"N
8	德约姆河	དེ་ཇེ་ལ་མཚོ།	Xényogmo Hé	河流	墨脱县	具体位置见附图	
9	古明新则峰	ཀུ་མིང་ཤིང་རྩོད།	Kūmíngxīnzé fēng	山峰	墨脱县	94°35'28"E	27°52'07"N
10	都登	དུ་དྲིང་།	Dūdēng	居民点	墨脱县	94°53'06"E	28°59'54"N
11	米培	མི་ལ་པ།	Mǐpéi	居民点	墨脱县	95°48'35"E	28°56'54"N
12	杜来河	དུ་ལ་མཚོ།	Dulāi Hé	河流	察隅县	具体位置见附图	
13	古里	ཀུ་ལི།	Gǔlǐ	居民点	察隅县	96°38'20"E	28°08'43"N
14	打坝	དཱ་བུ་མཚོ།	Dǎbā	居民点	察隅县	97°00'42"E	28°16'56"N
15	马加	མཚོ་གླང་།	Mǎjiā	居民点	隆子县	93°25'41"E	28°33'40"N

**Table B. 2nd Batch on 29th December, 2021**

附件 1


**增补藏南地区公开使用地名（第三批）**

序号	标准汉字名称	藏文名称	汉语拼音	地名类别	所属政区	经度	纬度
1	邦秋	པོ་ཇེ།	Bāngqiū	地片	错那县	91°43'32"E	27°43'58"N
2	江卡宗	ཇུང་ཀམ་རྩོད།	Jiāngkǎzōng	居民点	错那县	91°51'52"E	27°34'02"N
3	罗香日	ལོ་ཤར་ལ།	Luóxiāng rì	山峰	错那县	92°33'01"E	27°36'12"N
4	盒香日	ཀུ་ཤར་ལ།	Héxiāng rì	山峰	错那县	93°35'54"E	27°17'24"N
5	达东	དཱ་དོང་།	Dādōng	居民点	墨脱县	94°22'32"E	28°31'49"N
6	齐布日河	ཇེ་བུ་རི་ལ།	Qíbùrì Hé	河流	墨脱县	具体位置见附图	
7	东孜拉峰	དོང་ཇེ་ལ།	Dōngzīlā fēng	山峰	墨脱县	95°20'19"E	28°28'51"N
8	格多河	དེ་ལུ་མཚོ།	Géduō Hé	河流	察隅县	具体位置见附图	
9	古玉通	ཀུ་ལུ་མཚོ།	Gǔyùtōng	地片	察隅县	97°01'05"E	28°17'55"N
10	尼玛岗峰	ལི་མཚོ་གླང་།	Nímǎgǎng fēng	山峰	察隅县	97°15'14"E	27°58'08"N
11	久纽泽岗日	ཇུ་ལྷོ་ཇེ་གླང་ལ།	Jiǔniǔzé gǎng rì	山峰	错那县 隆子县	93°17'31"E	28°20'27"N

**Table C. 3rd Batch on 2nd April, 2023**



Figure 5. Geolocation map with Indian names of all the 62 locations renamed by China in Arunachal Pradesh since 2017




Map 1. Sixty Two (62) Regions in the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh that were given 'Standardised' names by China. Use Figure 7 as reference for further details.

**Figure 6. The batch-wise geolocation of areas renamed by China with Indian names since 2017**




**Map 2. 1st Batch,  
Six (6) locations  
renamed by China  
on 13/04/2017**



**Map 3. 2nd Batch,  
Fifteen (15)  
locations renamed  
by China on  
29/12/2021**



**Map 4. 3rd Batch,  
Eleven (11)  
locations renamed  
by China on  
02/04/2023**



**Map 5. 4th Batch,  
Thirty (30)  
locations renamed  
by China on  
30/03/2024**

**Figure 7. Comprehensive table of the 62 locations in the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh renamed by China since 2017, including official Indian names.**

<b>1st Batch (13th April, 2017)</b>						
S.no	Indian name	Romanize & Tibetan Name	Chinese Pinyin Name	Category of Geographic Name	Longitude	Latitude
1.	<b>Ugyenling Settlement, Tawang 790104</b>	Wo'gyainling(ཨོ་ཇུན་གླིང་།)	Wu jian ling	Residential Area	91°52'25"E	27°34'54"N
2.	<b>Mila Ri peak, Tali area, Kra Daadi, 791118</b>	Mila Ri(མི་ལ་རི།)	Mi la Ri	Mountain Peak	93°52'25"E	28°03'06"N
3.	Mountain within <b>Dumporijo, Upper Subansiri 791122</b>	Qoidengarbo Ri(མཚོ་རྫོང་རྒྱུ་ལུ་ལྷོ་རི།)	Qu Deng Nuan Bu ri	Mountain Peak	93°45'57"E	28°16'50"N
4.	<b>Mechuka town, Mechukha Valley of Yargep Chu/ Siyom River in Shi Yomi 791003</b>	Mainquka(མེན་ཅུ་ཁ།)	Mei Chuka	Residential Area	94°08'04"E	28°36'03"N
5.	<b>Chaglagam is located in Hayuliang S.O Papum Pare 792104</b>	Bumo La(བུ་མོ་ལ།)	Bai Ming la Shan kou	Residential Area	96°46' 25"E	28°06'55"N
6.	<b>Pasighat, East Siang 791102</b>	Namkapub Ri(གཤམ་ཁ་པུབ་རི།)	Na Mu Ka Mu	Residential Area	95°06'05"E	28°12'49"N
<b>2nd Batch (29th December, 2021)</b>						
7.	<b>Sela Pass, Tawang, 790105</b>	Se La (Xi Shankou)(གཞེ་ལ།)	Se La (Xi Shankou)	Mountain Pass, Narrow pass	92°06'16"E	27°30'12"N
8.	<b>Senge Village, Dirang Tehsil , West Kameng 790101</b>	Sengkezong(སེང་གེ་རྫོང་།)	Shenge Zong	Residential Area	92°07'02"E	27°27'01"N
9.	<b>Morsing Village, Kalaktang-balemu Tehsil in West Kameng 790002</b>	Daglungzong(དགུ་ལུང་རྫོང་།)	Da Long Zong	Residential Area	92°11'58"E	27°10'29"N
10.	<b>A Mountain Peak, Pakke Kessang, Seijosa 790103</b>	Wamo Ri(ཡམོ་རི།)	Wa Mu Ri	Mountain peak	92°53'13"E	27°05'00"N
11.	This mountain, near <b>Tabuma village</b> is located in Koloriang Circle of <b>Kurung Kumey 790102</b>	Deu Ri (མདུ་རི།)	Di Wu Ri	Mountain peak	93°16'53"E	27°49'00"N
12.	<b>Lhünzhub mountain, near Pai village, Mengio Tehsil in Papum Pare 791001</b>	Lhinzhub Ri(ལྷུན་ལྷུབ་རི།)	Lhun Zhu Ri	Mountain peak	93°49'27"E	27°23'55"N
13.	<b>Monigong, West Siang, 791001</b>	Mani'gang(མ་ནི་གང།)	Ma ni Gang	Residential Area	94°16'42"E	28°47'03"N
14.	<b>Siyom river, a right tributary of the Brahmaputra (Dihang or Siang), West Siang</b>	Xenyogmo He(མེན་ལོག་མེ་ལོ།)	Xi Yue Mu He	River stream	Refer to the attached map for the exact location	
15.	A peak located approx 4.85 away from <b>Sibe village</b> , in Sibe circle of <b>West Siang 791101</b>	Kumingxingze Feng(རུ་མིང་མིང་ཕེང་།)	Gu Ming Xin Ze Feng	Mountain peak	94°35'28"E	27°52'07"N
16.	<b>Tuting, Upper Siang, 791105</b>	Duding(ཏུང་རྫོང་།)	Dou Deng	Residential Area	94°53'06"E	28°59'54"N
17.	<b>Mipi Circle, Dibang Valley 792101</b>	Migpain(མིག་པམ།)	Mi Pei	Residential Area	95°48'35"E	28°56'54"N
18.	<b>Delei River</b> is a body of running water moving to a lower level in a channel on land · <b>Anjaw District.</b>	Dulain He(ཏུ་ལེན་མེ།)	Du Lai He	River stream	Refer to the attached map for the exact location (Geolocation :28° 4' 43" N 96° 31' 43" E)	
19.	<b>Goiliang village, Hayuliang S.O Papum Pare 792104</b>	Goling(གཤོག་གླིང་།)	Gu Li	Residential Area	96°38'20"E	28°08'43"N
20.	<b>Kibitho Village, Hayuliang S.O, Papum Pare 792104</b>	Damba(གཤམ་ཁ་པ།)	Da Ba	Residential Area	97°00'42"E	28°16'56"N

21.	A unnamed village, near <b>Redding Camp village</b> is located in Limeking circle of <b>Upper Subansiri 791122</b>	Mejag(མེ་ཇཉག་།)	Ma Jia)	Residential Area	93°25'41"E	28°33'40"N
<b>3rd Batch ( 2nd April, 2023 )</b>						
22.	<b>Pangchen Village, Zemithang Circle, Tawang 790106</b>	ཕྱང་རྗེན།	Bangqin	Land Segment	91°43'32"E	27°43'58"N
23.	<b>Gyangkhardung, Tawang, 790104</b>	རྒྱུང་མཁར་རྫོང་།	Jiangkazong	Residential Area	91°51'52"E	27°34'02"N
24.	The mountain is approx <b>15.45 km</b> away from <b>Dillung village</b> , Nafra circle of <b>West Kameng district, 790001</b>	འོག་ལྷག་མ་རི།	Luosu Ri	Mountain Peak	92°33'01"E	27°36'12"N
25.	The mountain is approx 4.62km away from northern side of <b>Sangri village</b> , Sagalee circle of <b>Papum Pare district 791119</b>	གཉེ་ཤོ་རི།	Diepu Ri	Mountain Peak	93°35'54"E	27°17'24"N
26.	<b>Tato, Mechuka-Tato Tehsil, West Siang district, 791003.</b>	རྩ་གཏོང།	Dadong	Residential Area	94°22'32"E	28°31'49"N
27.	<b>Sidan river, West Siang District</b>	ཆེན་པོ་རི་ཆུ།	Qiburi He	River Stream	Refer to the attached map for the exact location	
28.	<b>Kalang Mountain, Mariyang, Upper Siang 791002</b>	མུ་དུང་རྩེ་ལ།	Dongzila Feng	Mountain Peak	95°20'19"E	28°28'51"N
29.	<b>Dau River (or Dav River)</b> , a tributary of the Lohit River near the <b>Goiliang village, Anjaw 792104</b>	དཔེ་ལྷོ་ལྷོ་ཆུ།	Geduo He	River Stream	Refer to the attached map for the exact location	
30.	Land Segment, in <b>Kameel Tong</b> , near Kibithoo, <b>Anjaw 792104</b>	མགོ་ཡུལ་ཐང།	Guyutong	Land Segment	97°01'05"E	28°17'55"N
31.	The mountain is approx 28 km away from the eastern part of <b>Warti village</b> , in Walong Circle of <b>Anjaw 792104</b>	ཉི་མ་སྐང།	Nimagang Feng	Mountain Peak	97°15'14"E	27°58'08"N
32.	This mountain is approx <b>3.05</b> away from <b>Dadu village</b> , just located in Taksing circle of <b>Upper Subansiri 791122</b>	ལྷོ་གླུ་གླིང་རྩེ་གཤང་མ་རི།	Jiuniuze Gangri	Mountain Peak	93°17'31"E	28°20'27"N
<b>4th Batch (30th March, 2024)</b>						
33.	<b>Hathungla Ridge</b> is near the Holy Tree of Grong Kukpa at Khenzimane (the Tree planted by HHDL when he reached India) and has a helipad along with various army housings, <b>Tawang</b>	ཉ་རོང་ལ།	Hudong Shankou	Mountain Pass, Narrow Pass	91°42'40"E	27°46'38"N
34.	<b>Thrillam Village, Lumla Circle of Tawang district 790140</b>	ཐྲི་ལ་མ་རྩོ།	Chilangcuo	Residential Area	91°46'27"E	27°32'33"N
35.	<b>Betchilling village</b> , Kalaktang circle of <b>West Kameng 790003</b>	བཟེ་ཆུ་རྒྱུང།	Baizelin	Residential Area	92°08'57"E	27°03'17"N
36.	<b>Dirang River</b> is a tributary of the Kameng River, flows through the <b>Dirang town, West Kameng</b>	མཁར་མང་ཆུ།	Kema He	River Stream	Refer to the attached map for the exact location	
37.	<b>Mago Village</b> Panchayat, Thingbu Tehsil, <b>Tawang district, 790105</b>	མག་ལྷོ།	Maguo	Land Segment	92°12'25"E	27°41'18"N
38.	<b>Lish village</b> , Dirang circle of <b>West Kameng 790101</b>	ལེ་ལོ།	Licuo	Residential Area	92°13'12"E	27°22'44"N
39.	<b>Snowy Mountain</b> , just 6.58 KM approx from Uno Lego Peak, in Palin takul in <b>Kurung Kumey 791118</b>	འབྲུག་མ་བུ་མ་རི།	Qiadong Ri	Mountain Peak	92°51'53"E	28°08'32"N
40.	<b>Chebang mountain</b> is 1.54 km approx. away from Chebang Village is located in Phassang circle of <b>Kurung Kumey 791118</b>	འབྲས་ལྷུང་མ་རི།	Zhebeng Ri	Mountain Peak	93°21'02"E	27°42'47"N
41.	The mountain is 3.5 km approx. near <b>RWD colony, Itanagar 791111</b>	མཚོ་ལྷོ་གླིང་མ་རི།	Tuojiao Ri	Mountain Peak	93°22'12"E	27°24'56"N

42.	<b>Daria hill</b> is 3.75 km approx away from Chimi Village , Itanagar Circle, <b>Papum Pare 791113</b>	བདེ་ཤིང་།	Debu Ri	Mountain Peak	93°37'03"E	27°08'39"N
43.	<b>Ziro town</b> and the district headquarters of the <b>Lower Subansiri 791120</b>	ཅི་ལ།	Jiluo	Residential Area	93°49'16"E	27°34'35"N
44.	The mountain is <b>4.23km approx. from Jigi Village</b> , located in Daporiji circle of <b>Upper Subansiri 791122</b>	མཛེལ་ལ།	Tuobu Feng	Mountain Peak	94°04'22"E	27°51'07"N
45.	The mountains is <b>3.88km approx from Roma Village</b> , located in Gensi Circle of <b>West Siang District 791125</b>	ཨ་ཕིང་ཅུ་ལ།	Axingzela Feng	Mountain Peak	94°21'33"E	27°40'60"N
46.	<b>Kadu peak</b> , Koyu EAC, <b>Lower Siang district</b> , has an elevation of 967 metres.	མཛིན་དགའ་ལ།	Zhengala Feng	Mountain Peak	94°23'26"E	28°15'26"N
47.	<b>Pango Village</b> , in Migging Circle of <b>Upper Siang 791105</b>	མང་མོང་།	Banggou	Residential Area	94°45'12"E	28°53'10"N
48.	<b>Mossing Village</b> located in migging circle of <b>Upper Siang 791105</b>	མོའི་ཕིང་།	Moxin	Residential Area	94°47'30"E	28°48'33"N
49.	<b>Gelling Village</b> , Tuting in the <b>Upper Siang District 791105</b>	གཤེན་རིང་།	Gengren	Residential Area	94°58'28"E	29°08'12"N
50.	<b>Rengging Village</b> - of <b>East Siang District</b> - near the worship center of Donyi Polo, Gagging, <b>Renggig 791103</b>	རིང་རྒྱལ།	Rengeng	Residential Area	95°16'19"E	28°08'33"N
51.	<b>Ketung: Dagala Peak</b> , <b>East Siang</b> , is the fourth batch of added place names for public use in southern Tibet.	དཀྱལ་ལ།	Dagala Feng	Mountain Peak	95°20'22"E	28°14'41"N
52.	<b>Nyglong</b> , <b>Yangsang Chu</b> or <b>Secret river</b> . <b>Upper Siang district</b> ,	གཡང་མཚང་ཆུ།	Yangsang He	River Stream	Refer to the attached map for the exact location	
53.	<b>Emra River</b> is a right-bank tributary of the Dibang River which eventually flows into the Brahmaputra River. The entire valley of the river is contained in the Etalin Circle of the <b>Dibang Valley district</b> .	ཉམ་མེ་ཆུ།	Niangmuri He	River Stream	Refer to the attached map for the exact location	
54.	<b>Chigu peak</b> is just 5.9km approx from Chigu Camp in Acheso Village located in <b>Dibang Valley district 792101</b>	ཅུ་མཁོང་།	Qugang He	Mountain Peak	95°58'30"E	29°05'50"N
55.	Snowy mountain, just <b>13km from Lal Bahadur Shastri Lake</b> in Anini Village <b>Dibang Valley 792101</b>	དུ་ཤི།	Duo er Shan	Mountain Peak	96°04'01"E	29°11'15"N
56.	Is a lushful green mountain, it is just <b>3.8km approx. Chohani Village</b> of <b>Lower Dibang Valley, 792110</b>	ལུང་འགོ་ལ་ལ།	Longguka er Feng	Mountain Peak	96°07'35"E	28°18'53"N
57.	The area is <b>9.8km approx. from Chengele Village 1</b> located in <b>Dibang Valley, 79210</b>	མཛེལ་ཆུ་འཛོམས་ལ།	Beikongquzong	Residential Area	96°18'57"E	28°48'06"N
58.	This lake is approx <b>29.23km Chengele village</b> located in <b>Dibang Valley 792101</b>	སོ་ལུ་མཚོ།	Suda Cuo	Lake	96°31'42"E	28°46'26"N
59.	<b>Taflagam village</b> is located in Chaglagam circle of <b>Anjaw, 792104</b>	དབུ་ཅོ་གོང་།	Dapuhaogong	Residential Area	96°36'38"E	28°19'13"N
60.	<b>Chowagong Mountain</b> , Chowagong Village, <b>Papum Pare, 792104</b>	ཆོ་བ་མཁོང་།	Dawagang Feng	Mountain Peak	96°52'21"E	27°57'20"N
61.	<b>Subansiri River</b> , <b>Upper Subansiri</b>	གཤེལ་ཨ་ཕིང་མེ་ལ་ཆུ།	Nie axibengla Qu	River Stream	Refer to the attached map for the exact location	
62.	<b>Taksing</b> , in <b>Upper Subansari, 791122</b>	མུང་ཀ་ཕིང་།	Takexin	Residential Area	93°12'18"E	28°25'57"N

### 3. Implications of China's cartographic aggression

China's recent surge in renaming and claiming territories of India, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh, reflects its strategic interests and objectives aimed at expanding its territorial control. This move signifies Beijing's intent to gradually engulf almost the entirety of Arunachal Pradesh in the future. Such acts must be closely scrutinised in light of China's history of renaming areas in neighbouring South Asian countries, such as Bhutan and Nepal, eventually incorporating them into Chinese territory through forceful and manipulative means. The renaming of 62 locations in Arunachal Pradesh since 2017 underscores China's larger plan to annex Indian sovereign territory and integrate it into their country in the near future.

Understanding the concept of "South Tibet" (Zhangnan in Mandarin) is crucial, as it forms the basis of China's claims in the region. According to Chinese sources, South Tibet encompasses an area of approximately 93,000 square kilometers and is said to have a population of approximately 1 million. The area is situated at the junction of four countries, bordered by Bhutan, India, and Myanmar, and is inhabited by Tibetan, Lhoba, and Monba ethnic groups. However, it is important to note that this narrative of South Tibet is not recognised internationally in terms of geography or legality in the 21st century.

China attempts to justify its claims through historical references, particularly the McMahon Line (refer FNVA's Policy Document "Resetting India's Tibet Policy 2022... page 28-29"). This 890-km-long line delineates the eastern border between India and China, following the watershed principle along the highest ridges. Beijing uses this very historical context to illegally claim territories and Grayzone tactics such as the establishment of Xiaokang villages in contested areas are used to further enforce their claim. In response, India has implemented its Vibrant Villages programme to counter these claims. However, there remains room for improvement in India's approaches to dealing with such Grayzone warfare, given India's initiative in this regard.

**Figure 8. Depiction of Southern Tibet (Zangnan) by Chinese sources that includes the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh**



#### 4. Similar Exercises Leading to Occupation and Annexation: Tibet and Bhutan


It is imperative to consider the historical events surrounding Tibet since its illegal military occupation by China, highlighting the success of China's renaming efforts and the subsequent acceptance of Chinese narratives by the international community. The recent official renaming of Tibet as Xizang, a Mandarin term for Tibet, signals a shift in tactics by China, necessitating careful navigation and understanding of policy changes by India in its best interest. China repeatedly exploits Tibet to advance its agenda, evident in its characterisation of Arunachal Pradesh as "South Tibet" (Zangnan in Pinyin Mandarin). Despite India hosting the largest number of Tibetan diasporic communities, including the Tibetan Government in Exile and the Dalai Lama, India must proactively manage and back Tibetans to support its own agenda. Notably, the 2001 detailed map of Tibet by the Amnye Machen Institute (a centre for Tibetan studies based in Dharamshala, India) includes areas bordering Tibet that has India where the state of Arunachal Pradesh is part of it, thereby aligning with Indian official records and dispels the Chinese claim of South Tibet being part of Tibet now.

In Arunachal Pradesh, the significance of certain renamed locations, such as the Hatungla Ridge which is at the vicinity of the Holy Tree Grong Kukpa in Khenzimane, underscores the historical and cultural ties between Tibet and India. This tree, planted by the 14th Dalai Lama upon his safe arrival in India after fleeing Tibet in 1959, symbolises the enduring connection between Tibetans and India.



**Figure 9. Map of Tibet by Amnye Machen Institute: Tibetan Centre for Advanced Studies that includes the entire three Tibetan chokas of U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo. Dispelling the popular notion of Tibet as being Tibetan Autonomous Reigion (TAR)**

**Figure 10. Map of Tibet by Amnye Machen Institute that shows India and the state of Arunachal Pradesh as neighbouring Tibet and not part of Tibet or South Tibet (Zangnan) as China proclaims.**



Turning to Bhutan, despite its current status as an independent nation with strong ties to India, China has initiated territorial annexation efforts in the region, reminiscent of its actions in Tibet. The 470 KMs border between China and Bhutan remains largely undemarcated. In 2021 a significant development occurred with the signing of the "Memorandum of Understanding on the 'Three-Step' Roadmap to Accelerate China-Bhutan Border Negotiations". This and other engagements purported the latest version of the Bhutan Election Commission map that confirmed China's sovereignty over the Kula Gangri Peak which covers 1,290 sq.kms (according to Chinese Media and confirmed by various articles detailing this handover including Manoj Joshi article for the ORF titled as 'Doklam: To start at the very beginning').

**Figure 11. The 7 disputed areas between Bhutan and China**

S.no	Bhutanese name	Chinese Pinyin name	Chinese character
1	Merak	Mo la sa ding	墨拉萨丁
2	Yadong southeast areas including Doklam, Lulin, Gieu, Chama and etc	Donglong, Yulin, ji wu and cha ma	亚东东南地区包括洞朗, 鲁林, 基伍和查玛等
3	Baiyu and Mingjuma areas	Bai yu, Ming jiu ma	白玉和名玖玛地区
4	Nyingma area	Ning ma	宁马地区
5	Mela Pass Area	Mai la Shankou	麦拉山口地区
6	Kula Kangri Peak near Himalaya	kula Gangri	库拉岗日峰附近及喜马
7	Chumbi Valley or Chhama Chu	Cha ma pu	查玛浦

Chinese media and sources have been pushing the narrative that Bhutan has indicated its willingness (which likely is forced coercion) to relinquish control over three disputed areas: the Maila Pass area, the Nyingma area, and the vicinity near the Kula Kangri Peak. This gesture is aimed at resolving the border dispute with China, which has already asserted sovereignty over the Kula Kangri Peak area.

The groundwork for such contested territories, which may ultimately result in annexation, can be traced back to several factors:

- Bhutan and Tibet Relationship: Historically, the relationship between Bhutan and Tibet, particularly during Tibet's period of independence, has played a significant role in shaping territorial disputes and contestations in the region, the Kula Kangri Peak contestation is a clear example of this.
- China's Standardised Naming: China's official designation of standardised names for these disputed areas serves administrative purposes and signifies its assertion of control and sovereignty over these territories. This tactic is often employed as a precursor to territorial annexation and consolidation.

In light of Bhutan's stance and China's actions, careful consideration and diplomatic efforts are necessary to navigate and resolve these contentious border issues in a manner that upholds Bhutan's sovereignty and territorial integrity.



Figure 12. China - Bhutan border conflict areas

中不边界领土争端



Translation of the Map:

1. Yulin disputed area
- 2.: Doklam disputed area
3. Chumbi Valley ( Chhama Chu) disputed area
4. Gieu disputed area
5. Baiyu disputed area
6. Merak - Sagten disputed area

Figure 13. Statistical table of disputed areas of the Yadong section between China-Bhutan(Square Kilometres):

	名称	我实控 (包括完全控制和有效控制, 后者指交叉巡逻)	争议面积	占比	我乡镇	不丹乡镇
1	基伍和查玛浦 (基伍曲、查玛浦上游和朗玛浦上游) (Dramana/Shakhateo/Giu)	110	138	80%	帕里镇、上亚东乡	Choompa Jamgoen
2	森穷隆巴 (朗玛浦中下游) (Sinchulumpa)	42	42	100%	下亚东乡	Chenpa Geychhukha
3	洞朗 (Doklam)	58.5	89	66%	下亚东乡	Nakha Tashigang
不丹算法小计		210.5	269	78%		
4	朗玛浦上游南支以南、恰尔塘、鲁林等	0	323	0%	下亚东乡	Chenpa Geychhukha
中国算法合计		210.5	592	36%		

Figure 14. Translation of statistical table of disputed areas of the Yadong section between China-Bhutan (Square Kilometres):

S.no	Name	China actual control (including complete control and effective control, the latter referring to cross-patrolling)	Disputed area	proportion	Township of China	Township of Bhutan
1	Gieu and Chhama Chu (Gieu Chhu, Upper Chhama Chu and Upper Langmarpo)	110	130	80%	Pali Town, Upper Yadong town	Choompa Jamgoen
2	Sinchula (Middle and lower stream of Langmarpo (Sinchulumpa)	42	42	100%	Lower Yadong town	Chenpa Geychhukha
3	Doklam	58.5	89	66%	Lower Yadong town	Nakha Tashigang
Bhutan Algorithm Subtotal		210.5	269	78%		
4	South of the upper reaches of the Langmarpo River, including Charithang, Lulin etc.	0	323	0%	Lower Yadong town	Chenpa Geychhukha
China algorithm total		210.5	592	36%		

## 5. Lessons Learned from Past Ventures and Missteps

Reflecting on our past experiences, it becomes evident that there are valuable lessons to be gleaned, particularly in terms of ensuring accuracy and clarity in our communications, as well as avoiding misinformation and sensationalism.

Firstly, it is imperative that we conduct thorough research and present our official perspective accurately, without succumbing to sensationalism or incentivised motivations. Instances of misrepresentation, such as the misnaming of Buma La as Bumla Pass by many mainstream Indian media outlets, highlight the importance of meticulous attention to detail as these pertain to national security. Buma La based on the latitudes and longitudes given by China pinpoints to Chaglagam village in Papum Pare, this was only noticed by few of our journalist. Furthermore, in the age of social media dominance, it is crucial to scrutinise the content created by influencers and content creators, ensuring that it is based on facts and comprehensive research (pertaining to national security). Instances where misinformation is disseminated, such as the misidentification of South Tibet as 'Zanjang' by a influencers whose content is almost crossing 1 million views, underscore the need for greater diligence and responsibility in content creation.

Moreover, our capacity to counteract misinformation and disinformation must be proactive rather than reactive. This entails maintaining updated and accurate digital maps, particularly in the digital space where much of the Grayzone warfare occurs. By continuously updating and disseminating accurate information, we can effectively counter adversarial narratives and safeguard our national security interests.

However, amidst these efforts, it is essential to remain cognisant of the perspectives and concerns of the people directly impacted by these issues, particularly those residing in the regions under contestation and dispute. By prioritising their voices and understanding their perspectives, we can develop more effective strategies for securing our frontiers while ensuring the well-being and interests of all stakeholders.

## 6. Conclusion: A possible way ahead

As India and China approach their respective 100-year founding anniversaries, both nations aspire to achieve the status of developed nations by then, with China even aiming for global hegemony. It is evident that in the years leading up to this milestone, there will be a strategic competition between the two, with unresolved border issues remaining a significant point of contention despite numerous meetings.

1. Key considerations for India include acknowledging the significance of the Thread of Beads and the encirclement of Arunachal Pradesh by China, which extends beyond what is currently portrayed in the media. There appears to be noticeable lack of seriousness across intellectual, military, and political circles regarding the extent of Chinese territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh.
2. It is imperative to raise awareness among the public, especially those residing in Arunachal Pradesh, to counter Chinese propaganda effectively.
3. Listening to and addressing the concerns of local residents in border regions is essential, as they are directly impacted by any escalation or confrontation.
4. Additionally, India must formulate a comprehensive Himalayan policy (refer to FNVA's Policy Document "Resetting India's Tibet Policy 2022... page 30-31"), considering the region's strategic importance, spanning across 13 Indian states and union territories with a population of nearly 50 million.

5. Efforts such as the Vibrant Villages programme have provided opportunities for local communities, and also simultaneously contributed towards national security. However, sustaining these initiatives should remain a top priority to ensure their long-term effectiveness.

6. Organising activities like the recent march by the Students for a Free Tibet - Tawang chapter to counter the renaming of regions in Arunachal Pradesh can send a strong message to China and empower local communities with information.

7. India's stance on renaming regions in China should reflect its commitment to defending its sovereignty and self-respect. Considering the sentiments of the people of Arunachal Pradesh and the discriminatory treatment they face from China, India should explore renaming regions of Tibet and Xinjiang with their original unsinicised names to gauge China's response.

8. Addressing the Sino-Tibet conflict is crucial for resolving border tensions with China. India must seize the current window of opportunity and reassess its Tibet policy to maintain strategic leverage against China (One can refer to the FNVA's Policy Document titled "Resetting India's Tibet Policy 2022..." for further elaboration and details on this matter). Waiting until 2028, as suggested by some, may diminish India's ability to leverage Tibetan interests.

China's aggressive policies under President Xi Jinping, reminiscent of Mao Zedong's era, underscore the importance of India remaining vigilant. Mao's "Five-Fingers" policy, aimed at territorial expansion, remains relevant today, as evidenced by China's continued renaming of locations in Arunachal Pradesh.

These renaming exercises carried out by China do not only limit itself to renaming locations but also sinicising the official Indian names and the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. Some examples include Ugyenling and Taksing settlement both of which are given standardised Chinese names of Wu jian ling and Takexin respectively. In total out of the 62 locations 29 have the same name but are in sinicised format as shown from figure 7. In conclusion, India must adopt a proactive approach to safeguard its territorial integrity and strategic interests in the face of China's assertive behaviour.

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