FOUNDATION FOR NON-VIOLENT ALTERNATIVES

TO UNDERSTAND THE NUANCES OF THE ONE CHINA POLICY AND HOW THE PRC CONFLATES IT WITH AREAS OUTSIDE THE CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

WEAPONISATION OF THE ONE CHINA POLICY

FOUNDATION FOR NON-VIOLENT ALTERNATIVES (FNVA)

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WEAPONISATION OF THE ONE CHINA POLICY

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From FNVA

The One China Policy and its agreements with different nations have remained in a fluid state of understanding meaning different connotations and dimensions. To understand its nuances and how PRC conflates it with areas outside the cross-strait relations has been on our agenda for quite some time.

China's foreign policy in cross-strait relations is vital to understand for several reasons. Firstly, the Taiwan issue remains a core interest for China and a potential flashpoint for conflict. China views Taiwan as an inalienable part of its territory and has vowed to use force if necessary to prevent Taiwan's formal independence. Beijing has sought to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and economically, while also building up its military capabilities to deter any moves towards independence. Secondly, China has increasingly sought to extend its "One China" principle beyond Taiwan to other regions it claims as part of its sovereign territory, such as Tibet and East Turkestan (Xinjiang). In Tibet, China has sought to tighten its control and assimilate the region, while cracking down on any signs of Tibetan nationalism or calls for greater autonomy. It is the only country in the world which resorts to arm twisting members of the international community to say they recognise that Tibet is an inalienable part of China, and it demands of the Dalai Lama that he publicly acknowledge that Tibet has been part of China since antiquity. This acknowledgement is important to Beijing as it does not have the legitimacy to rule Tibet on the basis of its military conquest in 1950 or the 1951 17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet. The One China Principle of the PRC has thus conveniently been extended to Tibet.

Similarly, in Xinjiang, China has implemented draconian security measures, mass internment of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, and a campaign of cultural assimilation. This reflects a broader pattern of China asserting its territorial claims and resisting any challenges to its sovereignty. Thirdly, China's approach to cross-strait relations and its treatment of Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, provides insights into its broader foreign policy orientation. China's insistence on its "One China" principle and its willingness to use coercion to enforce it, suggests that Beijing places a high priority on territorial integrity and will not hesitate to use its growing power to defend its interests. This has implications for how China is likely to behave on other issues, such as maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas, and its approach to international institutions and norms. Understanding China's foreign policy in the context of cross-strait relations and beyond is therefore crucial for assessing its global role and impact.

A two half day programme on "Weaponisation of the One China Policy" took place in August of 2023 which saw the participation from a host of experts on this topic. FNVA wishes to place its thanks and gratitude to each one for having made excellent presentations either in person or online. This is a report of that programme. In addition, FNVA has sought to include an article which clearly illustrates how the PRC has weaponised the international travels of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

The editors of this report thanks all its Trustees in particular Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli for making two insightful presentations and to Ambassador Shyam Saran for his foreword to this report. The editors also thank team FNVA – researchers Tenzin Lhatso and Tenzing Dhamdul for their meaningful contribution.

O.P. Tandon and Rebon Banerjee Dhar
Trustees, FNVA, October 2024

Foreword

In this compilation of perspectives and insights, we embark on a nuanced exploration of international relations, spotlighting the intricate dynamics surrounding the One China Policy, with a particular focus on India, China, and the United States. The contributors to this discourse bring forth a diverse array of expertise, including geopolitics, history, and diplomacy.

An interesting facet explored in this collection is the linguistic dimension of geopolitical narratives. The emergence of the "Wolf Warrior" feature in Chinese media and the advocacy of the use of "Xizang" to refer to Tibet, prompts examination of its potential ramifications. Beyond the semantic nuances lies a deliberate intent -- by adopting "Xizang," China not only seeks to replace "Tibet" but to sinicise its origins and current status. India's policymakers need to critically evaluate this linguistic shift and its implications.

The discourse expands to encompass the multifaceted challenges surrounding Tibetan refugees, their status in Nepal, and the intricacies of regional geopolitics. The nuanced discussion transcends mere policy prescriptions, delving into the cultural and anthropological dimensions that shape the perspectives of nations in the region.

This collection further delves into the evolving landscape of the One China Policy, revealing its weaponization on various fronts. From diplomatic coercion and economic pressures to the strategic deployment of the United Nations Security Council veto power, China's pursuit of the One China Policy reflects a multifaceted strategy. The contributors unravel the historical roots of the One China Principle, exposing its role in shaping China's contemporary geopolitical posture.

The coercive use of the One China Policy by China is a notable theme covered in this collection. Through diplomatic coercion, economic pressures, and strategic manipulation of international institutions, China has deployed the One China Policy as a tool to advance its geopolitical objectives. The contributors shed light on instances where China has leveraged its global influence exerting pressure on host countries, and wielding its veto power in the United Nations Security Council to enforce compliance with the One China Policy.

In the midst of these complex geopolitical considerations, the discourse underscores the need for nations to be cognisant of the multiple tactics employed. The importance of clear communication and strategic language choices is highlighted, particularly in countering narratives that may inadvertently align with China's foreign policy objectives.

A clear distinction is drawn between the One China Policy and the One China Principle. The contributors unravel the historical roots and strategic implications of both, offering a comprehensive understanding of their role in shaping Chinese narratives and their influence on international opinion.

The collection also explores how Taiwan, in the face of the One China Principle, navigates its own course. Taiwan's resilience and strategic acumen become evident in its responses to

the geopolitical challenges posed by China's rigid stance. The contributors delve into Taiwan's diplomatic manoeuvring, shedding light on its efforts to secure international recognition and foster strategic partnerships amidst the ever-evolving international situation.

This compilation invites readers to reflect on the evolving in trends in the region and enables a deeper understanding of the geopolitical chessboard where nations grapple with history, language, and power dynamics. The insights offered serve as an invaluable resource for scholars, policymakers, and anyone seeking a deeper understanding of the shifting trends in Sino-Indian relations and, in addition, Taiwan's resilient stance amid the complexities of the One China Principle.

Shyam Saran
Former Foreign Secretary, Government of India
President, India International Centre
Trustee, FNVA

Chairs and Panellists

OPENING SESSION

Chair: Ambassador Lakhan Mehrotra

After joining the Indian Foreign Service in 1958, Ambassador Lakhan Mehrotra served, inter alia, as India's Liaison Officer with the Dalai Lama at Dharamsala, First Secretary in the Permanent Mission of India at the U.N., Chargé d'Affaires in Mexico and Cuba, Chargé d'Affaires a pie in China, Consul General in San Francisco and Deputy Chief of Mission with Ambassador's rank in the Soviet Union. Subsequently, he served as High Commissioner in Sri Lanka and In between, during 1970-72, he served as Head of the Northern Division at the Headquarters when he was closely associated with developments in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim and the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign and independent country. He retired from the Indian Foreign Service in 1992 as Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs and Prime Minister's Special Envoy for Africa.

Keynote Address

Sikyong Penpa Tsering

Sikyong Penpa Tsering is the democratically elected political leader of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, formally known as the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), headquartered in Dharamshala, India. On May 27, 2021, he was sworn in as the Sikyong, a Tibetan title for the political leader, at an official ceremony attended by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, who had delegated his political authority to the elected leadership in 2011. Born in a Tibetan refugee settlement in Southern India, Sikyong Penpa Tsering graduated with a bachelor's degree in economics from Madras Christian College.

In 1996, he was first elected as a Member of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile and was re-elected in 2001, when he concurrently led the Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre (TPPRC) in New Delhi, where he worked to strengthen parliamentary support for Tibet, both in India and internationally.

Sikyong Penpa Tsering has been one of the longest-serving Members of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile, serving from 1996 to 2016, including two terms as Speaker of the House. Following his parliamentary tenure, he served as the Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the CTA to North America, engaging with U.S. Congressional leaders, senior officials, and leading think tanks. His work in North America significantly bolstered American support for Tibet and advanced key initiatives for the Tibetan cause.

SESSION 1

Chair: Ambassador Lakhan Mehrotra

Panellists

Dr Michael Mazza

A non-resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he analyses US defense policy in the Asia-Pacific region, Chinese military modernisation, cross–Taiwan Strait relations, Korean Peninsula security, and US interests in Southeast Asia. He is also a senior non-resident fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI).

Prof. Roger Chi-Feng
is an Associate Professor and Founding Chair of South and Southeast Asian Studies, FLAME University.

Dr Lin Hsiao-Chen
Currently serves as an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Graduate Institute of Strategic Studies (GISS) and the Graduate Institute of International Security (GIIS) at National Defense University (NDU). Dr Lin holds the unique distinction of being the sole Taiwanese recipient of both an M.Phil. and Ph.D. in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University, India (2013-2019).

SESSION 2

Chair: Ambassador Anil Wadhwa

Has been a member of the Indian foreign service from July 1979 till may 2017. In his 37 year career with the Indian foreign service he has been ambassador of India to Italy & San Marino, Thailand, Oman, Poland & Lithuania and has served in Hongkong and twice in Beijing, he has served in the permanent mission of India in Geneva and worked on deputation with the organisation for the prohibition of chemical weapons in The Hague. Ambassador Wadhwa was head of the East Europe division in the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi and looked after relations with Russia and Eastern European countries. As Secretary (east) in the ministry of external affairs he oversaw relations with ASEAN, South East Asia, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific, the GCC , Middle East and West Asia.

Panellists

Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli
Is currently, Dean, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, and Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. He is also an Honorary Fellow at University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. He served at the Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, New Delhi for nearly 1 years. He is a specialist in Modern Chinese History. He is also a Trustee at FNVA.

Prof. Jabin Jacob
Is Director, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar University and was formerly Fellow and Assistant Director at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi. Jabin holds a PhD in Chinese Studies from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is a PhD supervisor at the Naval War College, Goa, and a regular speaker at various other Indian defence training institutions. Jacob's latest publication is a co-edited volume with Hoang The Anh titled, 'China's Search for National Rejuvenation: Domestic and Foreign Policies under Xi Jinping'.

Bhuchung Tsering
Was born in Tibet, his family fled to India in 1960 in the wake of Chinese Communist invasion. He was a member of the Task Force set up by the Central Tibetan Administration to work on issues relating to the dialogue process with the Chinese leadership. He was also a member of the team led by the envoys of the Dalai Lama in the discussions that they had with the Chinese leadership between 2002 and 2010. He has testified in Congress on behalf

of the International Campaign for Tibet and spoken at Universities and Think Tanks. Currently he leads the research and monitoring unit at the International Campaign for Tibet's office in Washington D.C. He received the 2023 Truman-Reagan Medal of Freedom From the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation.

SESSION 3

Chair: Ambassador Pankaj Saran

Has been a former diplomat with forty years of experience in foreign, strategic and national security affairs. He has served in key positions within the Government of India in the Prime Minister's Office, the National Security Council Secretariat, Ministry of External Affairs and in Indian Missions in Moscow, Dhaka, Washington DC, Cairo and Geneva. He has served as India's Ambassador to Russia and India's High Commissioner to Bangladesh, and as Head of the Northern Division in the Ministry of External Affairs dealing with Nepal and Bhutan. From 2018 to 2021, he served as the Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Affairs under Prime Minister Narendra Modi dealing with regional and global strategy formulation, including maritime security and Arctic affairs, neighbourhood policies and technology and economic security. Pankaj Saran is presently Convenor of NatStrat, a Delhi-based independent Centre for Research on Strategic and Security Issues and a commentator on security and strategic issues. He is a Distinguished Fellow of the National Maritime Foundation and has contributed to publications and newspapers such as The Times of India, Hindustan Times and The Economic Times.

Panellists

Dr. Jianly Yang

Yang Jianli is a Chinese dissident with a United States residency. He is the son of a Communist Party leader. He left China to pursue a career in Mathematics at U.C. Berkeley. In 1989 he went back to Beijing in support of those demonstrating for democracy in Tiananmen Square. He received his Ph.D. in Mathematics from U.C. Berkerley and Ph.D. in Political Economics from Harvard Kennedy School of Government. When he returned to China again in 2002, he was put in prison for 5 years. Upon his release, Jianli founded Initiatives for China.

Dr Abhishek Kumar Darbey

Is a Research Fellow, Center for China Analysis and Strategy. His key areas of research on China studies are China-Africa Relations and the Chinese Military.

Prof. Peter Rutland

Is professor of Government and the Colin and Nancy Campbell Chair for Global Issues and Democratic Thought at Wesleyan University. He is an expert in contemporary Russian nationalism, politics, and economy, he has studied Russia and the former Soviet Union for over three decades.

SESSION 4

Chair: Gen. Ashok K Mehta

Commissioned in 1957, Ashok K Mehta joined the Fifth Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force) and is one of two officers who attended both the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, US and the Royal College of Defence Studies, UK. He is founder-member of Defence Planning Staff and his last assignment was General Officer Commanding IPKF (South) Sri Lanka. Gen Mehta has fought in every war and counterinsurgency operation between 1957 and 1991, except the 1962 war when he was on a peacekeeping mission in Congo. These include 1965 India-Pakistan war, 1971 India-Pakistan war both in East and West Pakistan, Indian Peace-keeping Forces Sri Lanka and several tenures fighting CIS in North-East and Kashmir.

After his retirement, as an independent security analyst, Gen Mehta has been involved in a number of Track one and Track two dialogues and peace processes: India-Pakistan, India-Sri Lanka, India-Nepal and a trilateral – India-Pakistan- Afghanistan. He has written and spoken about recent India-China clashes in Ladakh and Indo-Pacific. He has been involved in back channel dialogue on behalf of government in Nepal and Sri Lanka.

Panellists

Ambassador Vijay Kant Karna

Is a former Ambassador of Nepal to Denmark and currently, Director, Centre for Social Inclusion and Federalism (CESIF), Nepal.

Dr Tenzing Lhadon

She is currently a Research Fellow at the Tibet Policy Institute, researching on "China's changing economic relationship and its foreign policy direction".

Dr Maria Blancas

Maria holds a PhD in international relations from King's College London and is specialised in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly China, Japan and the Korean Peninsula. She has been involved in the cause of Tibet since 2013, Her main research interests are foreign policy, international security, economic statecraft and political economy. Currently she is the Business and Economic Affairs Advisor, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Mexico

CONCLUDING SESSION

Chair: Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli

Dean, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, and Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. He is a specialist in Modern Chinese History. He is a visiting Fellow at the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations, Beijing, since May 2007 and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at People's University, Beijing since 2014. He has been on the Editorial Advisory Board, "Global Power Shift: Comparative Analysis and Perspectives" edited a book series published by Springer since 2011 and is also a Member, Editorial Board, Tamkhang University Journal (Taipei) since 2011 and Contemporary International Relations, Beijing, since May 2007.

Special Address

Aloma Selanes

Aloma Sellanes (1959) is a Uruguayan writer who has been an activist for Tibetan cause during decades. She has participated in numerous meetings related to Tibet. She also has written articles on the topic and one book in Spanish, Los Latinomericanos y el Tibet, that it also was translated into Portuguese.

Closing Remarks

Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli

OPENING SESSION

Introductory remarks by the chair: Ambassador LL Mehrotra

We live today in a dangerous world, torn apart by conflicts and rivalries, far removed from the dream of humanity enshrined in the UN Charter—a world free from the scars of war and steadily moving towards peace and development. Unfortunately, fires are burning across every continent; some are small and manageable, while others rage, raising fears that they could escalate into major conflagrations. The war in Ukraine has reignited Cold War attitudes, ending the brief honeymoon between the USA and Russia, a development that has been advantageous for China.

China's phenomenal rise has disrupted established global equations. The U.S. is no longer the unchallenged superpower it once was. China is gradually but steadily encroaching on the international space previously dominated by the U.S., posing serious challenges across the Indo-Pacific region, Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America. For instance, in the Indo-Pacific region, we recently saw the world teeter on the brink of a major conflict between China and the U.S. when China laid a military siege around Taiwan, prompting the U.S. to intervene with full force to support Taiwan.

Moreover, while China views the South China Sea, like Taiwan, as an integral part of its national territory, the U.S. and its allies, including India, consider these waters to be international—a stance upheld by the International Court of Justice.

Today's discussion will focus on the weaponization of the One China policy. The U.S.-China relationship has come full circle since the historic 1972 Shanghai Communique, which marked the beginning of a new era in their bilateral relations. At that time, China openly declared the Soviet Union as its number one enemy—a statement I personally witnessed in Beijing. In contrast, today, China has strengthened its position through a strategic, political, and economic embrace of Russia.

The world wars of the first half of the 20th century have given way to proxy wars and international terrorism. Terrorist organisations like the Taliban have gained control of Afghanistan, while Pakistan, a state sponsor of terrorism, continues to bleed India with a thousand cuts. Despite being a signatory to UN resolutions on counter-terrorism, China has refused to condemn such actions against India, further demonstrating its hostility towards us. After what the international community termed the "rape of Tibet," China carried out a massive invasion of India in 1962, grossly violating our trust. The violation of the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh since April 2020 is another clear example of China's aggressive stance. Despite several rounds of talks, China has yet to withdraw from these areas.

On the sidelines of the last G-20 Summit in Bali, President Xi and Prime Minister Modi expressed their intention to stabilise bilateral relations. However, China's continued aggressive activities along the border have eroded India's trust in such pronouncements. India has been cautiously adapting to the new global context. As China's economic power grows and its technological advancements sharpen its military prowess, India has moved

closer to the U.S., Japan, and Australia through its membership in the Quad and bilateral defence cooperation. Furthermore, India's Act East policy has strengthened its ties with ASEAN countries, symbolised by the presence of ASEAN leaders at India's Republic Day celebrations, marking 25 years of dialogue partnership with ASEAN. I had the privilege of laying the foundation for this policy during my tenure as Secretary (East) in the Ministry of External Affairs from 1990 to 1992.

India's relations with China today bear little resemblance to the days of "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai." China's incursions into the eastern sector, most recently in 2014 during President Xi's visit to India, and their audacity to disturb the status quo whenever and wherever they can, such as in Doklam despite their standstill agreement with Bhutan, are stark reminders of their intentions. China's support for Pakistan, including military and economic assistance, aims to counterbalance India's influence in the subcontinent, undermining our relationships with our neighbours and creating political, economic, and military space for themselves in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Afghanistan. All of this stands in stark contrast to the amity and friendship that characterised our relations with China in the immediate aftermath of India's independence and the establishment of the Republic of China.

The responsibility now lies with China to rebuild this relationship by shedding its expansionist tendencies and aggressive actions, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region and against India. This is especially crucial at a time when India is emerging as a global power in its own right.

Key Note Address

Sikyong, Penpa Tsering

I would like to express my gratitude to Non-Violent Alternatives, under the leadership of Mr. O.P. Tandon, and Rebon Banerjee. Mr. O.P. Tandon served as my predecessor during my tenure as the Director of the Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Center here in Delhi. Additionally, Rebon Banerjee Dhar is a colleague with whom I have had the privilege of collaborating through the German Foundation, represented at this conference by the Director of South Asia.

I extend my heartfelt thanks for inviting me to this conference. I would also like to acknowledge and show my respect to Ambassador Lakhan Mehrotra, who, as you know, still converses in Tibetan. When I met him this evening, the first words he spoke were in Tibetan, asking how I was doing. His connection with the language and culture remains strong. I'd also like to express my appreciation to Ambassador Wadhwa for chairing the upcoming session and to all the distinguished guests in attendance. While we have known Dr Kondapalli for a considerable period, I look forward to engaging with him to gain insights into recent developments. My sincere thanks to all the invited guests and dignitaries for their presence here today.

Today, we are fortunate to have a multitude of experts who will delve into the intricate subject of China's weaponisation of the One China Policy. To set the stage, I'll provide a broad overview of this policy and its implications.

As I delved into my research to gain a deeper understanding of this policy and its underlying principles, I came across the writings of one of the Tibetan community's most distinguished diplomats, Mr. Lodi Gyari. Mr. Gyari played a pivotal role as the representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama during negotiations with Chinese counterparts from 2002 to 2010. Though he is no longer with us, I find it fitting to pay tribute to his memory by sharing an excerpt from his recent book, titled **"The Dalai Lama's Special Envoy: Memoirs of a Lifetime in Pursuit of a Reunited Tibet."** In this excerpt, he provides insightful commentary on the One China Policy.

I will now quote him verbatim, drawing from pages 291 to 294 of the aforementioned book. Afterward, I will expand upon some of the key issues concerning Tibet.

> *"Misrepresentation of the One China Policy … I would clear up an issue that has hampered some governments from feeling they could support our cause. Despite the PRC's contentions, its current 'one China policy' has nothing to do with the Tibet issue. Reference to my remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations on April 23, 2012 , in Washington D.C., should make this abundantly clear.*
> *The history of relations between Tibet and China and between Tibetans and Chinese is complex and cannot be understood simply in the context of the relatively young People's Republic of China. This may seem like an obvious assertion were not for the fact that many of us do not study history sufficiently, and our friends in Beijing seem intent on convincing today's policy makers not only that 'Tibet is an inalienable part of China' but also that the relations with the PRC must be predicated on a notion incorrectly applied to Tibet- that support for the Tibetan struggle violates the 'one China' principle…. As I mentioned already I wish to address a phantom cause for paralysis affecting the ability of some governments to put in place a credible and a flexible policy on Tibet and the worsening situation there.*
>
> *This is the well-known but apparently ill understood 'one China' policy invoked by the Chinese government to prevent legitimate inquiry or engagements by members of the international community with respect to Tibet. The 'one China' Policy, as you must know, was created in the early 1970s as instrument that enabled the United States to establish relations with the People's Republic of China and maintained relations with the Republic of China and maintain relations with the Republic of China or Taiwan. The then U.S president Richard Nixon and his national security assistant Henry Kissinger were responding to the Communist Chinese leaders' need for assurances on U.S policy with respect to Taiwan when they told Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong, that the United States was not pursuing a 'two-Chinas' policy. In the 1972 Shanghai Communique, the United States artfully acknowledge that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait claim that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China… and the United States does not challenge that position". This 'one China' Policy paved the way for the joint communique establishing diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China on January 1, 1979 and the adoption by the United States Congress of the Taiwan Relations Act that same year. Under the 1979 agreement, the United States recognizes the PRC government as the sole legal government of China, while the Taiwan Relation Act set out the nature of relations the United States would maintain with Taiwan in terms that were not inconsistent with the 'one China' policy*

but protected the status quo and therefore the status of Taiwan whatever that might be.

Adherence to the 'one China' policy has been reiterated by successive American Administrations, sometimes making explicit reference to the communiques mentioned above or to Taiwan's unchanging status. Although the 'one China' policy was articulated in the context of U.S China and U.S.-China and U.S.- Taiwan relation's Beijing increasingly demands that other governments with whom it establishes or maintains relations also endorse this 'one China' policy."

What is the relevance of this discussion to Tibet? If one has to look for any reference point for China-Tibet relations, it is not the 1972 Shanghai Communique but the '17-Point Agreement'. In fact, the lack of relevance of the 'one China' policy is precisely what I would like to address. No Tibetan government has ever claimed to be the government of China, so the application of 'one China' policy, to Tibet or for that matter, the PRC government's 'one China' principle that stresses the inalienability of both Taiwan and Mainland China as parts of a single China simply does not arise.

We have our differences with China's leaders when it comes to the history of Tibet and our historical independence from China but, as you well know, His Holiness the Dalai Lama's proposals and statements concerning ways to resolve the Tibetan question will envisage solutions that respect the sovereignty and territorial Integrity of the People's Republic of China as the state is considered today. These proposed solutions call for the exercises by Tibetans of genuine autonomy within the People's Republic of China and within the framework of its constitution- not for Independence.

Yet the PRC government vigorously pursues efforts to extend the applicability of 'one China' to Tibet and in recent years it has misled a number of governments into believing not only that the 'one China' policy applies to Tibet, but that it restricts the extent to which their government officials can interact with Tibetan leaders in exile including His Holiness Dalai Lama.

We believe that the intended effect of China's initiative is to limit outside governments from playing a constructive role in promoting a mutually acceptable negotiated solution for Tibet. Indeed, by accepting the applicability of 'one China' to Tibet, governments are subtly aligning themselves with the Chinese position that the Dalai Lama is trying to split China. While the PRC government is trying to intimidate some governments into believing that meeting with Tibetan exile leaders would violate the 'one China' policy, in reality, this assertion is counter-intuitive to the policy. If there were a connection, the adherence by any government to the 'one China' policy would have the opposite effect. Since the policy was developed precisely to make it possible for the United States to continue to conduct relations with Taiwan while recognizing the PRC government as the sole government of China, if the policy were at all relevant to Tibet, it then should enable governments to

> *conduct relations with the Tibetan exile leadership and His Holiness the Dalai Lama without incurring Beijing's displeasure. Beijing's resort to this argument in an attempt to thwart nations from embracing the Tibetan cause is telling. Our efforts to elevate the Tibet issue to a prominent place on the global stage have been extremely successful. The PRC in its concern over this united support is forced to resort to this contrived and irrelevant contention."*

I will continue by acknowledging that our esteemed experts, whom I am confident will delve further into this subject, are well-versed in the intricacies of the matter. However, it is crucial to draw a distinction between the One China Principle and the One China Policy.

The One China Principle's roots can be traced back to the moment when Chiang Kai-shek made the pivotal decision to relocate to Taiwan. This marked the division into two Chinas. Furthermore, we can even rewind the historical clock to the formation of the United Nations. At its inception, the United Nations recognised the Republic of China (ROC), which is synonymous with Taiwan, as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people.

It is important to note that, at that juncture, Tibet stood as an independent state, untouched by Chinese occupation. However, following World War II and the ensuing Cold War era, China seized the opportunity to annex regions such as Manchuria, East Turkistan, Mongolia, and Tibet, culminating between 1947 and 1950. It was only when China initiated the invasion of Tibet in October 1950, commencing from Chamdo, that the complex issue of Tibet-China relations came into existence. Under the looming threat of war and violence by the Chinese government, we were coerced into signing the 17-point agreement in May 1951.

The 17-point agreement, a historical document of its time, outlined the concessions the Chinese government was willing to grant to the Tibetan people. This document, while granting certain liberties, maintained the status quo regarding the powers, functions, and responsibilities of His Holiness' institution, with the exception of foreign relations and defense. Notably, it did not entail a change in Tibet's political system.

Initially, the Chinese government extended a friendly gesture towards Tibetans, leading to expressions of admiration for China and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) among the Tibetan populace. However, as time progressed, the true intentions of the Chinese government were unveiled, as they disregarded the provisions of the 17-point agreement. This occurred while Tibetans earnestly attempted to adhere to the stipulations outlined in the agreement. During this period, the Indian government also faced challenges in its relations with China. The Chinese government insisted on referring to Tibet as the "Tibet region of China." Tibetans found themselves navigating this complex situation. Concurrently, the United States began offering support for covert Tibetan operations. Initially, these efforts were facilitated by special operations, eventually transitioning to support from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This support spanned from 1956 until approximately 1968, a period characterised by shifts in U.S. strategic policies toward China, particularly in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.

In 1950, while Tibet faced invasion, the simultaneous occurrence of the Korean War cast a shadow over the events in Tibet. Regrettably, we were unable to attract as much international attention and support for our cause as we had aspired to.

By 1970-71, a significant shift in policy occurred, largely led by Henry Kissinger. It's worth noting that Western governments, including India, were not passive in their efforts to facilitate China's entry into the United Nations. China had actively pursued this since 1950, and countries such as Canada and India had made efforts to promote China's inclusion in the United Nations.

China eventually became a member of the United Nations in 1971, leading to the issuance of the first joint communication, the Shanghai Communique. Eight years later, during Jimmy Carter's presidency, the 1979 joint communique followed. Alongside this, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 was enacted to balance U.S. strategic policy in the region, reflecting a strategic ambiguity approach by the United States. This principle primarily pertained to Taiwan and China, emphasising the concept of there being only one China. Up until about 1992, consensus on this matter was fluid and subject to change. In recent years, there have been shifts in the positions of governments, with notable developments occurring in the wake of Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan. During this time, the United States asserted the right to defend Taiwan, further highlighting the complex dynamics in the Taiwan-China relationship.

Regarding Tibet, the timeline spans from 1945 to 1951 and extends to 1954 when the Tibet Region of China trade agreement was established. Diplomatic relations faced significant challenges, especially after the 1962 conflict. It was only after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988 that relations began to improve.

The assertion that Tibet is an autonomous region of China was reiterated by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao during his visit to China in 1993 and by Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2003 during his own visit. During that period, I served as the Chair of the Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Center, and we organised a seminar titled "Is Tibet Sold Out." This was prompted by the consistent Chinese government stance that an autonomous region is an integral part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. This position can be considered India's current perspective on the matter.

However, it's crucial to note that significant developments have occurred since then. India has urged China to embrace a "One India Policy" in exchange for India's acceptance of the "One China Policy." I must emphasise, though, that the "One China Policy" or "One China Principle" does not pertain to Tibet. To understand Tibet's situation, one must adopt a distinct prism and historical perspective, exploring how the international community can play a role in comprehending this complex issue.

During my visits to various countries and interactions with foreign offices, I've occasionally pointed out that the One China Policy doesn't extend to Tibet. On one occasion, I raised this with a foreign ministry official, and while he appeared surprised, he didn't pose any follow-up questions. I'm confident that today's discussions will help shed light on the distinctions between the One China Policy and the One China Principle, as well as the need for the

international community to comprehend and respond appropriately to this complex situation. One observation I'd like to share is that China tends to accept international agreements and norms when it aligns with their interests, staunchly defending them in international courts. However, when these norms and agreements don't serve their interests, they selectively interpret and apply them, which is indeed unfortunate. Nevertheless, it is our duty to uphold international law.

When it comes to international law, whether it's the Ukraine situation today or the historical Tibet issue, the principles of international law should remain consistent and apply universally. Tibet should not be treated as an exception in the application of international law. We communicate to governments that repeatedly stating Tibet as part of the People's Republic of China goes against international law. Simultaneously, endorsing negotiations between representatives of His Holiness and the Chinese government while maintaining that Tibet is a part of China presents an inherent contradiction. China governs Tibet with a firm grip and urges the international community to echo the statement that Tibet is an integral part of China. We have often questioned why China seeks this affirmation exclusively for Tibet, excluding other regions or nationalities within China. The answer lies in China's awareness that Tibet has never been historically part of China.

The current strategy adopted by the Central Tibetan Administration on the international stage aims to elucidate the Sino-Tibetan conflict and underscore the need for its resolution. It emphasises that Tibet should not be viewed through the lens of the One China Policy or Principle, which does not in the least apply to Tibet. I would like to emphasise that India has not concurred with the assertion that Tibet is an "inalienable part of China." This stance dates back to 2003 during Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to China. The resulting statement, which was meticulously crafted during late-night and early-morning sessions by the delegation accompanying the Prime Minister, specified that the “Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People's Republic of China”. While China desires India to declare Tibet as an "inalienable part of China," India has consistently refrained from making such a declaration, a stance that persists to this day. In essence, India's understanding of the Tibet Autonomous Region remains in line with that of several foreign nations.

SESSION 1

INTRODUCING THE ONE CHINA POLICY

Remarks by the Chair Ambassador LL Mehrotra

Regarding China's One China Policy. Firstly, I'd like to recall a very definitive statement made in writing by Mr. Richardson, the last Consul General of Britain in Lhasa. He stated that from 1913 to 1948, Tibet enjoyed complete freedom and independence.

Secondly, I have always emphasised, a point I learned from Mr. Shakapa during our time in New York, that the issuance of passports is a sovereign right of a state. It was the sovereign right of Tibet that passports issued by the Tibetan government in Lhasa were widely accepted, not only in India but also when Tibetan delegations traveled to the United States and the UK.

The third point I wish to highlight is that the 1951-17 point agreement was accepted by the Tibetan delegation. However, as soon as His Holiness the Dalai Lama crossed into India, he denounced it, citing duress. Regardless of the circumstances surrounding the agreement, it's noteworthy that when His Holiness himself visited China, at the personal invitation of Mr. Mao two years later, Mr. Mao promised him that Tibet would be an autonomous region, and its autonomy would be respected. However, this promise has not been upheld.

We saw a clear depiction of the evolving contours of Taiwan's policy concerning the One China policy. It is true that though Taiwan appeared to have lost significant ground when America recognised the PRC as the sole representative of China, and when the U.N. did the same towards the end of Carter's regime, it has not entirely lost its position.

Taiwan did lose some very firm supporters, such as El Salvador, which withdrew its support for Taiwan and aligned with the Chinese point of view. El Salvador was notably the only country to sponsor Tibet's appeal in 1950 when the PLA moved into Tibet, contravening their specific promises to India that they would only engage in a peaceful resolution of their differences with Tibet. The Dalai Lama and his cabinet approached the United Nations to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Tibet was not a U.N. member, and only El Salvador clearly supported Tibet's sovereignty, compelling the U.N. to debate the appeal of the Dalai Lama. As for what happened later, I'll focus on the discussion of Taiwan and the One China policy. The contours have indeed changed, and there is now more flexibility in Taiwan's attitude, though there is less trade with mainland China. Taiwan has increased its diplomatic efforts to develop political relations with countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia, and to some extent, they have succeeded in this endeavour.

Regarding agreements signed with China, I can assert with certainty that agreements we have entered into with them, over time, have been disregarded by the Chinese when they chose to act otherwise. For instance, the most recent aggression in Ladakh was in contravention of all agreements and understandings with the Chinese, particularly regarding the Line of Actual Control. This calls into question their commitment to upholding agreements.

I'd like to express my gratitude, for providing us with a comprehensive overview of Tibet's historical position and its relationships, both with China and as an independent nation. Furthermore, you've highlighted the Chinese actions that have not only betrayed Tibet but also India. The 1962 conflict, in total contravention of the 1954 agreement, was a stark

example of this betrayal. The 1954 agreement had been signed by the Chinese with a commitment to peace, non-interference, and non-aggression, but simultaneously, Mao was preparing for a war with India. This demonstrates their lack of respect for agreements and understandings.

In conclusion, the onus lies entirely with China. If they choose to behave in accordance with agreements and uphold their commitments, they will find India to be a very friendly nation. India's fundamental policy principle, unchanged since 1947, is to be friends with all and adversarial to none. We seek friendly relations with every country in the world. It's our sincere desire to maintain friendships and avoid animosity. However, it takes two to build and sustain friendships.

What is the One China Policy?

Dr Michael Mazza

I have been tasked with addressing a seemingly straightforward question: What is the One China Policy? I'll be delving into some of the topics covered earlier today, but with a greater level of detail. It's important to note that my perspective will primarily revolve around the U.S. One China Policy. While numerous countries worldwide, including India, maintain their own interpretations of a One China Policy, these can vary substantially. Therefore, my discourse today should be taken as an elucidation of the American perspective on the matter.

To comprehensively address the question at hand, it is imperative to delve into the historical backdrop that has shaped the United States' approach to Taiwan policy and its stance on cross-strait relations. This historical narrative unfolds as follows:

Chinese Civil War Culmination (1949): The Chinese Civil War, a protracted conflict between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT), culminated in 1949. The CCP emerged victorious and established the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland. In response, the KMT or the Nationalist party, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, which was in charge of the Republic of China flees to Taiwan along with the military forces.

Eruption of the Korean War (1950-1953): At this point the Truman Administration of the United States is effectively ready to wash its hands of the Republic of China which it had supported during World War II and during the Chinese Civil War. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 just about nine months after the establishment of the People's Republic of China ushered in a transformative period in U.S. policy in Asia. The Truman Administration perceived North Korea's invasion of South Korea as an international communist threat and, consequently, committed U.S. military forces to the defense of South Korea. This marked the commencement of substantial U.S. involvement in the Cold War in Asia.

Deployment of the Seventh Fleet: In a bid to forestall further escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait during the Korean War, the United States dispatched its Seventh Fleet to

patrol the waters between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland to prevent an attack by either side, either by the Communists against Taiwan or by Shanghai-shek and his forces against China.. This strategic move was designed to dissuade both the PRC and the ROC from engaging in any provocative actions against each other. The primary objective was to uphold regional stability while focusing on the Korean Peninsula.

Shift in U.S. Attitude towards the ROC: The Korean War prompted a significant transformation in the U.S. approach to the ROC. In 1949, the Truman Administration was inclined to sever its ties with the ROC, but by 1955, just two years after the Korean War had concluded, the United States and Taiwan signed a mutual defence treaty. Taiwan was now considered an integral part of the U.S. forward defence perimeter in Asia. This alliance marked a substantial commitment to the defence of Taiwan.

Persisting U.S. Backing for the ROC: Despite shifts in its strategic priorities and formal recognition of the PRC as the legitimate government of China, the United States sustained its support for the ROC government on Taiwan, both diplomatically and militarily. This enduring support resulted in the formulation of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which codified U.S. security guarantees to Taiwan in the aftermath of diplomatic recognition of the PRC.

Nixon's Visit to China (1972): In 1972, President Nixon made a historic visit to China. Several factors influenced this decision. Firstly, the United States, somewhat belatedly, recognised the Sino-Soviet split, which had begun in the early 1960s and escalated into conflict in 1969. The U.S. saw an opportunity to engage with China as a means of exerting pressure on the Soviet Union and potentially diverting Soviet attention away from Europe. Secondly, the Vietnam War was ongoing, and the Nixon Administration sought an honourable exit strategy. They hoped that by establishing relations with China, it could facilitate a resolution in Vietnam. Nixon's visit in 1972 led to the release of the Shanghai Communique, the first of three joint communiques between China and the United States. Notably, this document acknowledged the principle that "there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China," while the U.S. government did not challenge this position. This historical context forms the foundation of America's nuanced Taiwan policy and its intricate relationship with cross-strait dynamics.

It is crucial to reiterate that the United States does not officially recognise China's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan; instead, it acknowledges it without formally accepting or challenging it.

Maturing of relations between USA and the PRC: Throughout the 1970s, the relationship between the United States and China matured. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter made the significant decision to establish formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, leading to the second joint communique. I will highlight a couple of key quotes from that communique to shed light on the origins of the One China Policy.

The first quote underscores the United States' recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. In this context, the United States commits to maintaining cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

This signifies that the United States would establish formal diplomatic ties with China, severing its diplomatic relationship with Taiwan and withdrawing from the mutual defence treaty. Notably, the normalisation process did not provide a clear definition of what constitutes China. As far as the United States was concerned, it remained ambiguous whether Taiwan was included within the definition of China.

The second key quote acknowledges the Chinese position that there is only one China, and Taiwan is part of China. The United States acknowledged this position without officially recognising China's sovereignty over Taiwan.

However, it is important to note that the U.S. Congress reacted strongly to the normalisation decision, viewing it as a betrayal of a steadfast Cold War ally. Consequently, Congress swiftly passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in 1979. The TRA serves several crucial purposes, including establishing the legal foundation for maintaining the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship. It also led to the creation of the American Institute in Taiwan, effectively serving as the U.S. embassy in Taiwan.

The TRA explicitly outlines that the United States recognises peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as matters of international concern that are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States. This stance contradicts China's assertion that issues related to the Taiwan Strait are internal matters.

Furthermore, the TRA emphasises the U.S. policy to consider any efforts to determine Taiwan's future through non-peaceful means, such as boycotts or embargoes, as threats to peace and security in the Western Pacific area and a matter of grave concern to the United States.

Once again, this constitutes a firm and resolute rejection of the notion that cross-strait relations or Taiwan's status is purely an internal matter for the People's Republic of China (PRC). Instead, the United States is articulating its profound security interest in the well-being of Taiwan and the stability of the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) further establishes that it is the United States' policy to provide Taiwan with defensive military equipment. It reflects the commitment of the United States to furnish Taiwan with the necessary means to protect itself from external threats.

Moreover, the TRA underscores the United States' commitment to maintaining the capability to respond to any resort to force or other coercive measures that could endanger the security or the social and economic system of the people of Taiwan. In essence, this commitment means that the United States stands ready to intervene in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. It's important to clarify that this commitment does not legally bind the United States to intervene, but it affirms that it is U.S. policy to maintain readiness for intervention should a political decision be made to do so.

Moving ahead to 1982, we encounter the third and final U.S.-China joint communique. In this 1982 communique, the United States commits to a gradual reduction in arms sales to Taiwan. It is important to note that this commitment is conditional, contingent upon China's commitment to resolving differences peacefully.

Several outcomes emerged from the negotiations leading to the 1982 communique. Firstly, the pledge to reduce arms sales to Taiwan understandably raised concerns in Taiwan. To address these concerns and provide reassurance, the Reagan Administration formulated what became known as the "six assurances." These assurances can be summarised as follows:

1. The United States has not agreed to set a specific date for ending arms sales to Taiwan.
2. The United States has not agreed to consult with the People's Republic of China (PRC) regarding arms sales to Taiwan. The decision rests solely with the United States.
3. The United States will not assume a mediation role in negotiations between Taipei and Beijing.
4. The United States has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act, which serves as the legal foundation for ongoing arms sales to Taiwan.
5. The United States has not altered its stance concerning sovereignty over Taiwan, a matter that will be addressed further.
6. The United States will not exert pressure on Taiwan to engage in negotiations with the PRC.

These six assurances collectively serve as a reaffirmation of the United States' commitment to Taiwan's security and its continued support for Taiwan in the face of evolving diplomatic dynamics.

This effort was not merely aimed at reassuring Taiwan; it represented a pronounced articulation of U.S. policy, aimed at preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Another noteworthy development resulting from the 1982 communique was President Reagan's response. He was not entirely satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations, and upon the release of the communique, he issued a classified Presidential Directive. Although the existence of this directive had been known for several decades, it was formally declassified during the Trump Administration, making it accessible for public review.

The essence of this directive is quite explicit*: "The U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is contingent solely upon China's ongoing commitment to peacefully resolving differences with Taiwan."* It underscores the perpetual linkage between these two matters, emphasising that it is an enduring imperative of U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, the directive emphasises, *"It is imperative that the quantity and quality of arms provided to Taiwan are entirely contingent on the threat posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC), both in terms of quantity and quality."* In essence, it conveys President Reagan's unequivocal stance that any decision to diminish arms sales to Taiwan hinges entirely on China's behaviour and actions. President Reagan's position is unambiguous: the United States aims to maintain a stable military balance in cross-strait relations, and its commitment to Taiwan's defence capabilities remains steadfast and responsive to the evolving security landscape.

The present U.S. policy concerning Taiwan and the One China Policy can be characterised by several key components:

Sovereign Status: The U.S. regards Taiwan's sovereign status as undetermined. It acknowledges that Taiwan could either be a part of China, an independent entity, or something else entirely. This stance preceeds the Three Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), and the Six Assurances.

One China Policy: The One China Policy in the U.S. is not precisely defined within a single document. It is rooted in the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, the TRA, the Six Assurances, and other foundational documents, including a confidential Presidential Directive from the Reagan era.

Implementation: In practice, the One China Policy entails maintaining formal diplomatic relations with Beijing (the People's Republic of China) and informal yet robust diplomatic ties with Taipei (Taiwan). This encompasses cooperation in areas of defence, security, intelligence, and economics Taiwan consistently ranks among the top 10 U.S. trade partners.

Stated Neutrality: The United States adheres to a stated neutrality regarding the ultimate resolution of the cross-strait dispute. This neutrality endures as long as the dispute has been peacefully and voluntarily resolved, with the consent of the people in Taiwan. This implies that the U.S. remains open to a range of possible outcomes, as long as they are achieved without coercion.

U.S. Autonomy: The U.S. One China Policy is a distinctly American policy and it is America's policy alone. The U.S. government is responsible for defining the One China Policy and for implementing the One China Policy, and it retains the authority to modify or even abandon the policy if it deems such actions necessary. There are no legal obligations, whether stemming from treaties or domestic U.S. legislation, that compel the U.S. to maintain the One China Policy in its current form or any specific form.

Indeed, the One China Policy is distinct from Beijing's One China Principle. Beijing's One China Principle asserts that there is only one China, of which Taiwan is an integral part, and that this single China is governed by the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese officials frequently assert that the United States is violating this One China Principle. However, it's crucial to emphasise that the United States has never been bound by the One China Principle, and it does not endorse or adhere to it as a matter of policy. The United States simply acknowledges China's position on the matter without necessarily accepting or endorsing it.

Now, let's touch briefly on the concept of strategic ambiguity. While it is often associated with the One China Policy, it is a distinct and separate aspect of U.S. policy. Strategic ambiguity entails maintaining deliberate ambiguity regarding whether the United States would intervene to defend Taiwan in the event that China uses force. When this policy was first formulated, it aimed to deter two potential scenarios: deterring China from launching an attack on Taiwan and deterring Taiwan from taking provocative actions. The ambiguity served to dissuade Taiwan from acting provocatively, as it could not be certain that the U.S. would come to its aid. Simultaneously, China was deterred from using force because it

couldn't be confident that the United States would stay out of a conflict. This policy remains in effect today, although it could be argued that the United States is somewhat less ambiguous on this matter than it once was.

As you may be aware, President Biden has, on four occasions, alluded to the United States' commitment to defend Taiwan in the event of an attack. While other Administration officials have subsequently clarified or adjusted these statements, the fact remains that the President's remarks have been articulated publicly. This development has certainly not gone unnoticed by China, Taiwan, and the international community. It's worth noting that it is possible to maintain strategic ambiguity without necessarily adhering to the One China Policy, and conversely, one could uphold the One China Policy while adopting a position of strategic clarity regarding the defence of Taiwan. These elements are interrelated due to their connection to Taiwan policy, but they are not synonymous. The United States can preserve the One China Policy as is and concurrently transition to a stance of strategic clarity, affirming that it would come to Taiwan's defence if needed. Conversely, the United States could maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan while adhering to a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding its defence commitments.

How China Uses the One China Principle to Strangle in its Taiwan and Foreign Policies

Prof. Roger Chi-Feng

Today, I would like to discuss the U.S. China policy, a topic of great interest. It is impossible to address China's One China Principle without considering the role of the United States, as the U.S. serves as a key guardian of Taiwan's security in the Western Pacific region. It is important to clarify that the U.S. One China Policy and the One China Principle are distinct concepts. However, it's worth noting that policies, much like laws, often reflect the prevailing power dynamics, especially in international politics.

In the 1970s, during the tenure of President Richard Nixon and the leadership of Henry Kissinger, the U.S. adopted a strategy of leveraging its relationship with China against the Soviet Union. This was commonly referred to as "playing the China card." Today, it appears that the U.S. may be considering a different approach, potentially seeking to strengthen its ties with Russia as a counterbalance to China. While this was a stance held by the Trump Administration, it remains to be seen what the Biden Administration's perspective on this matter is.

The global landscape has evolved significantly since the 1970s, with China emerging as a major player, much like the Soviet Union during that era. This transformation prompts us to reconsider the U.S. One China Policy based on the One China Principle.

In summary, I would like to explore the changing dynamics of international politics and their impact on U.S. foreign policy, specifically concerning its relationship with China and the One China principle.

Policies are subject to change, particularly in the context of power politics. A recent development in the U.S. Congress pertains to the amendment of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative or the Type A Act of 2019. Notably, the

United States is now in the process of revaluating the international legal documents upon which the One China Policy, or policies favourable to China, have been established.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JULY 26, 2023

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

AN ACT

To amend the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 to provide that the United States, as a member of any international organizations, should oppose any attempts by the People's Republic of China to resolve Taiwan's status by distorting the decisions, language, policies, or procedures of the organization, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan International Solidarity Act".

SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION REGARDING UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2758 (XXVI).

Subsection (a) of section 2 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–135) (relating to diplomatic relations with Taiwan) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

"(10) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) established the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China as the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations. The resolution did not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people in the United Nations or any related organizations, nor did the resolution take a position on the relationship between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan or include any statement pertaining to Taiwan's sovereignty.

"(11) The United States opposes any initiative that seeks to change Taiwan's status without the consent of the people.".

The second section of this development is particularly intriguing as the United States is making efforts to address the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758. This resolution is significant as it played a pivotal role in Taiwan's exclusion from the United Nations, as mentioned by the Sikyong Mr. Penpa Tsering. Resolution 2758 is considered one of the most important international legal documents pertaining to Taiwan's international status. However, the United States Congress has now decided to reassess it. This indicates that the United States is actively re-evaluating its stance on these international legal documents, potentially leading to changes in its policies related to Taiwan and China. The evolving dynamics in the U.S. Congress reflect a reconsideration of the country's approach to international relations in the region. The United States is now looking to address the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, which established the representatives of the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole lawful representative of China to the United Nations. However, this resolution did not specifically address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people in any related organisation, nor did it take a stance on the relationship between the people around China and Taiwan.

"One China Principle" and One China Policies

- 一个中国原则 (OCPr) vs. 一个中国政策 (OCPos)
- OCPr: the syllogistic trap

1) There is but one China in the world
2) Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory, and
3) the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.

- Timing for use:

1) Establishing new diplomatic relations
2) Key events (Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in the Summer of 2022)
3) State and ministerial visits

- Beijing asks foreign gov't to accept the OCPr first, and based on it each gov't makes its own OCPo

It also lacked any statement pertaining to Taiwan's sovereignty. From the perspective of the U.S. Congress, there is a desire to diminish the legal authority or effectiveness of Resolution 2758. This is part of an effort to reconfigure the rules and policies so that the current policy can better align with the evolving dynamics of the international political landscape, especially in the context of the changing relationship between the United States and China. The United States seeks to adapt its stance to reflect these shifts in global politics.

The U.S. China policy differs from China's One China Principle, but they are interconnected you cannot have One China Policy without the One China Principle. The One China Principle consists of three key components:
1.There is only one China in the world.
2.Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory.
3.The government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is the sole legal government representing the entirety of China.

In the context of Taiwan and the Republic of China (ROC), which governs Taiwan, there are varying interpretations of the One China Principle. The Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan, especially within the non-ruling KMT and some factions known as the "pan-Blue camp," tend to embrace the first two parts of the principle: acknowledging the existence of only one China and recognising Taiwan as a part of China. However, they diverge on the third part of the principle, which asserts that the PRC is the sole legitimate government representing all of China. Instead, they argue that the ROC government represents the territory it controls, which is primarily Taiwan. This nuanced approach to the One China Principle has implications for the relationship between Taiwan and China. While both acknowledge one China and Taiwan as a part of it, the disagreement arises over which government holds legitimate authority over this territory. The PRC controls the mainland region, while the ROC governs the Taiwan region. This complex dynamic shapes the interactions between Taiwan and China, with both sides having their own interpretation of the One China Principle.

In daily affairs, especially in exchanges involving people from both sides (Taiwan and China), the two governments avoid using their formal designations. They often refer to each other as the 'Taiwan Region' or 'Taiwan Authorities' and the 'Mainland Authorities' to circumvent legal complexities and sensitivities. This approach is taken to navigate the intricate relationship between the two regions.

However, it's essential to note that while some political parties in Taiwan, such as the KMT and the pan-Blue parties, may downplay the One China Principle and not fully acknowledge the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal government for China. Most countries worldwide, especially when establishing diplomatic relations with China, formally adhere to China's One China Principle as a matter of diplomatic recognition.

Nonetheless, there are variations in the One China Policy adopted by different countries. Each nation, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and others, may have its own unique interpretation and approach to the One China Policy, reflecting their specific diplomatic and strategic interests. These variations in policy reflect the nuances and complexities of international relations in the context of the Taiwan-China dynamic.

The usage and mention of the One China Principle in practice can vary depending on specific occasions and events. The One China Principle is typically brought up in the following circumstances: When the People's Republic of China (PRC) establishes new diplomatic relations with a country, the One China Principle is included in the communication between the two parties. It serves as an important aspect of these diplomatic relations. During crucial events related to Taiwan's international status, such as high-profile visits, like former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in the summer of 2022, China will emphasise the One China Principle. China often reminds major global powers that adhering to this principle is an obligation written into the diplomatic agreements when the PRC established relations with these countries.

When China conducts state and ministerial visits, especially with smaller nations, it frequently requests that these countries reiterate the One China Principle. This repetition of the principle is a strategic move aimed at creating a degree of faith or acceptance, even if the statement is not entirely truthful. Repeating a statement multiple times can lead people to believe that it represents a norm or institutional rule, reinforcing the idea in international practice. China tends to make these demands, particularly with smaller powers that rely on China for foreign aid or assistance. This is especially noticeable in countries along the Belt and Road Initiative, such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. During state visits to these nations, the One China Principle is consistently emphasised and will be included in their respective joint statements. By doing this China creates a semblance of diplomatic pressure for the bigger countries in that region for example India.

Different strategies for different audiences: **内外有别**

- 对外（to foreign states, gov'ts and people)

- 对内（to Taiwan, HK, Macau and other ethnicities）

1) The '92 Consensus: One China with different interpretations
2) China as a family (中华民族大家庭) or Two Sides as A Family (两岸一家亲)
3) Using OCPr to bridle and set limits
4) Why does it work for Taiwan? The One China Constitution (一中憲法) and diplomatic recognition based on it; The Mainland Region and the Taiwan Region

The Chinese government applies different strategies of the One China Principle in its dealings with foreign governments and countries, and when dealing with its own people in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, and other regions with distinct ethnic identities within China's periphery. For Taiwan, the primary audience or target of the One China Principle is the pan-Blue parties, particularly the Kuomintang (KMT), which represents the Nationalists. The KMT, led by Chiang Kai-shek, was defeated by the Communists and retreated to Taiwan in 1949. They have experienced periods of governance in Taiwan during different presidential elections, with the most recent victory in 2016. As Taiwan approaches the next presidential election in January 2024, discussions surrounding this policy become a significant topic.

For the KMT and other pan-Blue parties, their key policy anchor is often referred to as the "1992 Consensus." This consensus is considered crucial by these political parties, as it involves the idea of finding common ground and maintaining peaceful relations with China. This concept represents a potential framework for engagement and cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China, and discussions regarding its implications are prominent during political agendas and election campaigns, particularly for presidential candidates from the pan-Blue camp.

In the early 1990s, Taiwan and China initiated talks and exchanges, marking the beginning of a dialogue between the two. This period of engagement began after the lifting of martial law by the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taiwan. Given that both governments do not officially recognise each other as the legal entity representing all of China, they needed a way to maintain exchanges and cooperation without causing diplomatic tensions or embarrassment.

The 1992 Consensus was developed during this period as a strategy to navigate the sensitive issue of the One China Principle. Instead of challenging the core substance of the One China Policy, the consensus focuses on a shared understanding. It acknowledges that the governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, specifically the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), believe in the existence of only one China.

This consensus allowed for a framework through which Taiwan and China could engage and interact while respecting their respective positions regarding the One China Policy. It provided a basis for communication and cooperation that did not require an official recognition of each other as the sole representative of China.

The 1992 Consensus provided flexibility for both Taiwan and China to define the concept of "one China" in their own terms, allowing for peaceful engagement and cooperation. This approach worked for many years, contributing to a stable environment for cross-strait relations.

However, in recent years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has observed shifts in Taiwan's younger generation, with many expressing a sense of disconnect from a Chinese identity that they are not Chinese. Additionally, pro-independence parties in Taiwan have been gaining traction with a growing voter base, indicating what appears to be an irreversible trend toward independence. In response to these developments, Beijing has chosen to downplay the 1992 Consensus and instead emphasises its own version of the One China Principle. While they may still mention the 1992 Consensus for the sake of appearances, the emphasis has shifted to their interpretation of the One China Principle. This change in approach reflects Beijing's concern over Taiwan's evolving political landscape and its attempt to assert a more unambiguous position on the One China issue.

China often employs a negotiation strategy that begins with a request for the other party to recognise the One China Principle. Initially, they present it as a loose rule or a simple principle, which they attempt to sell to their KMT counterparts. However, this is a deliberate tactic, as it allows them to lead the other party into acknowledging the One China Principle without going into specific details.

By gaining this general recognition of the One China Principle, China effectively puts the other party into a metaphorical cage called the “One China Principle.” Once a party acknowledges the principle in any form or with any adverb or adjective, they are bound by it. This recognition is then used by China as a means to claim that the other party has already accepted the principle, making it difficult for them to deviate from it.

The One China Policy, in this context, serves as a boundary that China uses to control the entire situation and constrain the actions of other parties, whether they are foreign governments, foreign groups, or political entities in Taiwan. It is a strategic tool for managing and influencing the behaviours and statements of those involved in cross-strait relations.

The One China Policy has various adaptations, including the idea that China is like a family. The relationship between China's core territory and its peripheral ethnicities is often framed in familial terms. A more recent example is the phrase "two sides of the Taiwan Strait is as close as a family," which was mentioned by Xi Jinping and adopted by the Taiwan People's Party. This phrase has gained prominence as political parties in Taiwan, under growing pressure from China, strive to maintain a peaceful stance to secure votes and electoral victories.

However, there are challenges for parties in Taiwan, especially the KMT and other pan-Blue parties, as they attempt to align themselves with China's preferences.

One obstacle is the existing constitutional structure of Taiwan, which is rooted in the idea of the One China Constitution. Changing or revising this constitution to better represent the realities is a complex task, which is complicated by China's threats to resort to force if such alterations are pursued.

This One China Constitution has raised suspicions and concerns. Taiwan to implement legal changes that better reflect the island's political realities and autonomy. The fear of provoking a hostile response from China has constrained Taiwan's ability to amend its constitution.

Taiwan faces a complex diplomatic situation when it comes to recognising disputed areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) such as Arunachal Pradesh. While there may be individuals or groups in India who recommend that Taiwan recognise Arunachal Pradesh as part of India, Taiwan cannot publicly endorse such a position. This is primarily due to the sensitivity of the matter and the potential repercussions it could have in Taiwan's relations with China. Publicly recognising a region like Arunachal Pradesh as part of India would likely result in a strong reaction from China. China considers Arunachal Pradesh to be a part of its territory, and such an endorsement by Taiwan would be seen as a violation of the One China Policy. These are some difficulties that need to be thought about, but at the same time these are not difficulties that we cannot overcome.



China has different strategies because it cannot exert equal pressure on different countries. While China pressures weaker countries to reiterate the One China Principle as a means to create societal pressure, it adopts different strategies when dealing with major countries. In the case of the United States, it asserts its own One China Policy, signalling a reluctance to be influenced by external pressures. However, when it comes to countries like India, which hold significant geopolitical weight, China's approach may differ, taking into consideration the specific dynamics and stakes involved. These observations demonstrate that China tailors its strategies to the diplomatic and geopolitical landscape, making it a dynamic player in international relations.

The "One China Policy" Framework of the US

- In the Shanghai Communique:

"The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes."

The recognition by the United States that both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain the concept of "one China" but have differences in terms of who represents China is a nuanced position. It essentially acknowledges the existing reality, where both the KMT government in Taiwan and the PRC government in mainland China lay claim to representing one China. This approach leaves room for flexibility and adaptation in the future.

This stance implies that the United States is open to recognising changes in the situation. If, for example, the dynamics in the region shift or if a new consensus emerges regarding Taiwan's status, the U.S. may be willing to reconsider its position. It underscores the fact that diplomatic relations and policies are not set in stone and can evolve in response to changing circumstances.

The red and purple parts of this statement indeed provide valuable insights for shaping future policies and diplomatic approaches. It highlights the importance of adaptability and responsiveness in international relations.

The United States' willingness to reduce the supply of military weapons to Taiwan gradually is another aspect demonstrating the flexibility and adaptability of its policy. While it is a promise that has not been fully kept, it shows that policies, including those related to arms sales, can be subject to change. The dynamic nature of international relations and evolving strategic interests are driving factors behind such adaptations.

The US's OCP foundation: Three communiques and TRA

- Shanghai Communique (1972)
- Joint Communique to establish the diplomatic relations (1979)
- Taiwan Relations Act (1979): Congressional Power
- August 17th Communique (1982): Six assurances

- The foundation of the US *One China Policy*
- A flexible "international regime," a legal edifice with "policy spaces"

The documents, laws, and acts mentioned are often regarded as the foundational elements of the One China Policy or One China Policy 1.0, which are the key principles that have shaped U.S. relations with China and Taiwan over the years. However, in recent times, the U.S. Congress has initiated various bills, laws, and acts that have led to changes in the practice and approach of the so called One China Policy. These legislative actions have contributed to shifts in how the United States deals with the issue, which has not gone unnoticed by the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The PRC perceives these changes as the United States altering the One China Policy, which has raised concerns and suspicions about the U.S. intentions and the actual content of its policy.

The Indian responses so far

- One China Policy: traditionally for Tibet "Autonomous Region," not Taiwan
- Generally shelving the One China Principle or Policy in public
- Practical application of the OCP in diplomatic practices: the rules when dealing with Taiwan by the MEA
- Praticality, flexibility, timeliness and IL-based: the Indian way to One China Principle/Policy

India's approach to China's One China Principle differs significantly from that of smaller powers in the Indian Ocean region. India's official documents and statements in its relations with China, especially those made after state visits and official meetings, do mention the One China Principle, but this has been primarily in the context of Tibet Autonomous Region and not Taiwan.

India has historically not considered Taiwan as a separate, legal entity outside of China. This perspective can be traced back to Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, who

believed that Taiwan, or Formosa, should eventually reunify with China. Thus, India's approach to the One China Policy traditionally revolves around Tibet Autonomous Region and not Taiwan. Unlike smaller powers in the Indian Ocean region, India has not incorporated the One China Principle into its official documents and foreign policy statements concerning Taiwan. While the One China Principle is mentioned in documents related to Tibet Autonomous Region, it is not applied in the same way to Taiwan, aligning with India's historical stance on the issue.

India's approach to China's One China Principle is characterised by practicality, flexibility, and a consideration of timeliness and international law. In practice, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) takes careful steps to adhere to its stance, especially when hosting Taiwanese guests or officials. The MEA sends out official documents instructing hosting parties to avoid referring to Taiwan as a country and to prevent the display of the Republic of China's national flag during such occasions.

India's approach to the One China Principle is pragmatic, and it uses its stance as a tool in response to specific situations. For example, in 2014, the late External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj famously mentioned 'One India' versus 'One China' to assert India's position. This flexibility is employed to counter China's assertiveness on the border and to push back against China's diplomatic pressures on various fronts.

India's approach to China's One China Principle is shaped by adherence to international law, as evidenced by its response to the issue of naming Taiwan in a manner consistent with international legal norms, such as calling it "Chinese Taipei." While India may not have a formalised One China Policy like the United States, it employs various tools to manage its relationship with both Taiwan and China. However, it is a crucial juncture for India to reconsider its One China Policy. Several factors should be taken into account:

China's Assertiveness: China has become increasingly assertive in enforcing its official policies and has used legal tools like the National Security Law to crack down on dissent in places like Taiwan. Scholars studying Taiwan-China relations and international relations often face threats and intimidation from China. As such, India should anticipate that China might become more assertive in dealing with those who do not adhere to its official policies.

One China Policy as the Core: The One China Principle is typically seen as the core of China's policy toward Taiwan. Therefore, India might face more accusations related to this issue in the future. It is imperative for India to engage in serious discussions and develop its own policy framework to deal with China more proactively and coherently across various diplomatic fronts, including the Taiwan issue.

In light of these challenges and changes in China's approach, India must move beyond a reactive stance and establish its own structured policy framework for dealing with China, rather than merely responding to Chinese pressure. Encouraging discussions and policy debates, like the one taking place in India, will be essential in shaping India's approach to the complex dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region and its relationship with China.

Shifting Dynamics of the One China Policy Then and Now

Dr Ling Xiaojin

The One China Policy is a nuanced and multifaceted diplomatic principle, its implications extending beyond the direct relations between China and Taiwan. Instead, it serves as a foundational tenet upon which many nations base their interactions with China. However, within the context of Taiwan, the policy's dynamics have evolved considerably, shaped by the island's political trajectory and the changing tenets of its major political parties.

This article provides an in-depth analysis of the One China Policy and its significance to Taiwan. It begins with exploring the foundational principles, delving into the stances of Taiwan's leading political factions and the historic 1992 Consensus. With a spotlight on both past and present, we endeavour to capture the shifting sentiments and interpretations of this policy within Taiwan.

Subsequent sections will address the broader global implications, focusing on the strategic weaponisation of the policy and its bearing on Taiwan's global diplomatic engagements. Within the canvas of the Indo-Pacific region, we'll explore the possibilities and challenges presented by this policy, with a particular emphasis on the Taiwan-US dynamic.

Concluding, the narrative will underscore the pivotal US support role, highlighting its efforts in assisting Taiwan to navigate the intricacies of the One China Policy and fortifying relations with other Indo-Pacific nations.

One China Policy and Taiwan

The One China Policy is a testament to the intricate political discourse surrounding Taiwan's unique position relative to mainland China. Its roots can be traced back to the vibrant conflicts of the Chinese Civil War, where the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CCP) vied for the mantle of China's legitimate representation.

A key figure in shaping Taiwan's stance on this matter, ROC Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan, voiced strong opposition to the "two Chinas" ideology. From the ROC's perspective, any suggestion that China's representation in the United Nations should be grounded in the "two Chinas" framework was entirely untenable. For them, such a stance implied an inherent division and separation of what they viewed as a single Chinese entity. Consequently, by the 1960s, the ROC's official stance shunned the "two Chinas" notion in favour of upholding the singular "One China" concept.

However, the underlying tensions persisted. Both the ROC and PRC were unwavering in their belief that they were the sole legitimate government of all of China, refusing to recognize the other's authority. This stance engendered geopolitical tensions and raised apprehensions of potential military conflict. The situation took a decisive turn in the 1970s when the United Nations accorded the PRC the status of the official representative of China. This moves relegated Taiwan to a position of diplomatic isolation. Emerging from this backdrop, the One China Policy was conceived as a strategic diplomatic framework to navigate these convoluted political waters.

The KMT's Vision of 'One China': Ma Ying-jeou's Era

The political dynamics in Taiwan concerning the 'One China' stance have largely been shaped by the two predominant political parties: the KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). While numerous parties participate in Taiwan's political landscape, the contrasting views of these two major entities on the 'One China' position warrant specific attention.

Ma Ying-jeou, representing the KMT as the former president of Taiwan, played a pivotal role in delineating Taiwan's stance on cross-strait relations. His diplomatic doctrine was initially captured in the 'Three No's' policy introduced in 2007: No reunification, No independence, and No use of force. However, signalling a shift in 2018, this stance was recalibrated to the "New Three No's," which opened the possibility for reunification by replacing "no unification" with "not excluding unification."

Under Ma's leadership, Taiwan experienced significant milestones in its relationship with China. A cornerstone of this period was the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed in 2010, facilitating enhanced economic integration between Taiwan and mainland China. Furthermore, in a ground-breaking diplomatic move, 2015 saw a historical meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping. This event marked the first face-to-face interaction between the leaders of Taiwan and China since the tumultuous civil war era of 1949.

Visually, the nuanced understanding of the 'One China' principle during Ma's tenure can be depicted through overlapping circles. In this representation, the CCP's interpretation is embodied by the red circle, whereas the blue circle mirrors the ROC's perspective under Ma Ying-jeou. This symbolic overlap accentuates the shared foundation in cross-strait interactions, albeit with distinct interpretations from each side.



Fig. 1: PRC and ROC's Perception of 'One China' During the Ma Administration.
(Illustrated by the author)

The 1992 Consensus: An Ambiguous Bridge in Cross-Strait Relations

The term "1992 Consensus" refers to an implicit understanding between the Republic of China (ROC) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) that was reportedly reached in 1992. This consensus, achieved through non-official channels and primarily facilitated via fax communications, did not result in a formal joint declaration and thus lacked any tangible documentation.

The significance of the 1992 Consensus lies not just in its existence but also in its inherent ambiguity. This very ambiguity has been both a bridge and a source of contention. While the consensus affirms the principle of One China, its interpretation varies between the two sides. The flexibility of this understanding, paradoxically, serves as a strategic advantage, allowing each side to define One China according to their respective political narratives.

Interestingly, as depicted in the accompanying visual representation, the evolving socio-political landscape in Taiwan indicates a shift in self-identification among its populace. Over the years, there's been a discernible trend wherein an increasing number of Taiwanese individuals distinguish themselves from a Chinese identity, opting instead to identify solely as Taiwanese or navigating a dual identity of both Taiwanese and Chinese. This evolving identity perception further underscores the complexities and nuances of the broader One China discourse.



Fig. 2: [The proportion of people in Taiwan who identify as Taiwanese has risen]. Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, Taiwan; Image Source: BBC.

The 2015 Ma-Xi Summit: Symbolic Gestures and Contested Narratives in Cross-Strait Relations

In 2015, a monumental event occurred in the annals of cross-strait relations: the Ma-Xi meeting. This gathering marked the first-time incumbent leaders from both sides of the Taiwan Strait met since the historic rift in 1949. The meeting was replete with symbolic significance. The two leaders, Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan and Xi Jinping of Mainland China engaged as "leaders," eschewing their formal titles in favour of the more neutral "Mr." Such a gesture was emblematic of mutual recognition of each side's governance status. By presenting himself as the leader of mainland China and not as the General Secretary of the PRC, Xi Jinping subtly conveyed a sense of parity between the two sides. This mutual address was an implicit acknowledgment of Taiwan's authority and governance status, a departure from China's longstanding "One China" rhetoric.

Nevertheless, the Ma-Xi meeting remains a contested event in Taiwan's political discourse. Ma Ying-jeou's stance on the 1992 Consensus and his overarching China policies, epitomized by this meeting, has sparked considerable debate. Detractors opine that Ma's overtures towards China rendered Taiwan economically beholden and risked compromising its sovereignty and democratic ethos. Conversely, proponents argue that Ma's diplomatic gestures ensured stability in volatile cross-strait relations, fostering an environment conducive to peace and economic growth. This bifurcated perspective underscores the complexities inherent in Taiwan's evolving relationship with its mainland counterpart.

The DPP's Vision of 'One China': Tsai Ing-wen's Era

In her New Year's Address delivered on January 1, 2019, President Tsai Ing-wen elucidated her position on cross-strait relations, underscoring the imperative of upholding the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. This stance reaffirmed her administration's unwavering commitment to fostering regional peace and stability.

The subsequent 2020 Taiwanese presidential election presented a striking dichotomy in cross-strait policy approaches. Representing the DPP, President Tsai championed the tenets of preserving the status quo, bolstering national sovereignty, and advancing democratic ideals. In contrast, her principal contender, Han Kuo-yu of the KMT, advocated for a more conciliatory stance towards mainland China, emphasizing the primacy of economic integration. The electoral backdrop was further complicated by the unfolding Hong Kong protests, bringing heightened scrutiny to questions of Taiwanese sovereignty.

Within this geopolitical context, President Tsai articulated her resistance to mainland China's coercive tactics, which manifested in threats and surreptitious interventions, aimed at eroding Taiwan's sovereignty. China's leader, Xi Jinping, proposed the "One Country, Two Systems" model for Taiwan, drawing parallels with Hong Kong. However, President Tsai firmly rejected this proposal, citing the evident challenges faced by Hong Kong under this framework. To safeguard Taiwan's sovereign rights and democratic governance, President Tsai delineated the "Four Recognitions" – a clear testament to her administration's stance on preserving Taiwan's unique political and cultural identity in the face of mounting pressures.

Contrasting Visions of the KMT and DPP on Cross-Strait Relations: Historical Roots and Contemporary Implications

The KMT and the DPP have historically embodied two contrasting visions of Taiwan's position on the PRC, with these differences stemming from deep historical roots. Their respective stances on the One China issue serve as a microcosm of their broader political ideologies and ambitions.

KMT: The historical philosophy of the KMT can be traced back to the firm assertions of Chiang Kai-shek during the Chinese Civil War. His stance that "Two enemies cannot live under the same sky" laid the groundwork for the party's later adherence to the "1992 Consensus," emphasizing a unified but ambiguously interpreted "One China." This perspective further promotes cross-strait cooperation and economic integration with mainland China.

DPP: Historically, the DPP has taken a more assertive approach towards Taiwan's sovereignty. Rooted in the drive for democracy and international recognition, their vision fundamentally diverges from the KMT. The DPP's ethos is underlined by the commitment to Taiwan as a sovereign entity, independent of any "One China" interpretation.

Lee Teng-hui and the KMT's Evolution: The leadership of Lee Teng-hui represented a significant pivot in the KMT's traditional stance. Amidst an evolving international context,

Lee introduced the policy of "Cautious Self-Restraint" (often referred to in Mandarin as "戒急用忍"). This policy was designed as a nuanced approach to cross-strait relations.

At its core, "Cautious Self-Restraint" emphasized patience and pragmatism. Lee advocated for a restrained and cautious approach towards provocative actions that could exacerbate tensions with the mainland. Instead of hastening to define Taiwan's sovereignty in absolute terms, the policy sought to navigate the complexities of the One China issue with a measured approach, focusing on maintaining stability while subtly affirming Taiwan's distinct identity.

This was a departure from the hardline views of Chiang Kai-shek, who during the tumultuous era of the Chinese Civil War, declared that "Two enemies cannot live under the same sky" (often rendered in Mandarin as "漢賊不兩立"), signifying his staunch opposition to the Communist Party of China. While Chiang's declaration underscored the deep-seated animosities of the time, Lee's leadership marked a shift towards a more adaptable stance.

Under Lee's guidance, the KMT moved away from the strict interpretations of "One China." While still acknowledging historical ties and sentiments like Chiang's, Lee recognised the pressing need to adapt to contemporary geopolitical realities. His tenure illustrated a Taiwan that was striving to harmonise its historical lineage with the imperatives of modern-day geopolitics.

Chen Shui-bian and the DPP's Vision: Chen Shui-bian's leadership ushered in a profound shift in Taiwan's cross-strait policy, embodying the DPP's distinct approach towards the One China issue.

Chen's presidency was marked by the articulation of the "Four Noes and One Without" policy. This not only underscored Taiwan's determination to protect its sovereignty against external aggression but also delineated clear boundaries in its relations with the mainland. The policy emphasised that Taiwan wouldn't declare independence, change its official name, or push for the inclusion of "One Country on Each Side" in the constitution. Nor would it advocate a referendum deciding between unification and independence unless faced with an external military threat.

Beyond policy pronouncements, Chen's term saw the conceptual introduction of "One Country on Each Side." This stance was a bold assertion that the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China were two separate and sovereign entities. By doing so, Chen and the DPP placed a greater emphasis on Taiwan's distinctive identity and its democratic values, aiming to distance the island from the shadow of Beijing's claims.

Chen's era also witnessed intensified efforts to bolster Taiwan's international standing. The DPP, under his leadership, pushed for more robust international engagements, strived for participation in international organizations, and aimed to reaffirm Taiwan's unique status in the global arena. These actions reflected the party's aspiration for Taiwan's self-determination and its vision of carving out a space for the island nation, distinct from the PRC's overarching shadow.

In sum, while the KMT under Lee Teng-hui sought to delicately balance tradition and modernity in its approach to the One China issue, Chen Shui-bian's DPP adopted a more assertive stance, emphasizing Taiwan's sovereign identity and its democratic aspirations. The visions of the KMT and DPP, while rooted in Taiwan's complex history, continue to shape its modern political and diplomatic landscape.

Tsai Ing-wen and The Augmentation of the New Southbound Policy: Amid the ever-shifting geopolitics of East Asia, Taiwan's diplomatic strategies have showcased a sophisticated evolution. The New Southbound Policy, spearheaded by Tsai Ing-wen, stands as a testament to Taiwan's ambition to diversify its economic affiliations and fortify its relations across Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific. Instead of diverging from Lee Teng-hui's original Southbound Policy, Tsai's approach can be seen as a deepening and broadening of it. Embracing a wider spectrum that includes trade, education, and cultural exchanges, Tsai's strategy underscores Taiwan's unwavering commitment to democratic ideals and sustainable development. A pivotal aspect of this rejuvenated initiative is the emphasis placed on India, positioning it as a key target nation, thereby reflecting a nuanced recalibration in Taiwan's diplomatic orientation.

The recent years have witnessed Taiwan's assiduous endeavours in parliamentary diplomacy and economic partnerships, fostering heightened global recognition and bolstering its diplomatic connections. Despite the overarching challenges - from the dynamics of US-China relations, the reverberations of the COVID-19 pandemic, to regional conflicts such as the Ukraine crisis - Taiwan has adeptly navigated its foreign policy to cultivate substantial partnerships, surpassing traditional diplomatic thresholds.

Furthermore, the enactment of the Taiwan International Solidarity showcases Taiwan's ambition to seamlessly integrate within the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). By strategically situating Taiwan within the broader Indo-Pacific narrative, these endeavours aim to alleviate the confines of the One China Policy. It signals a monumental shift, suggesting that the Indo-Pacific member states can engage with Taiwan with renewed confidence, acknowledging its enhanced legitimacy in the global arena.

"The Stratification of the One China Policy: A Study of China's Multifaceted Leverage"

In the contemporary geopolitical landscape, China's deployment of the One China Policy has transcended traditional diplomatic paradigms. As observed in recent periods, China has strategically intensified its utilisation of the OCP, effectively transforming it into an instrument of power and influence. This tactic encompasses the deliberate manipulation of diverse sectors — ranging from economic endeavours, the intricacies of agricultural trade, to the dynamics of tourism — all targeted at amplifying constraints on Taiwan's diplomatic manoeuvrability and its position on the global stage.

Amidst these challenges, Taiwan's proactive response to emerging global crises further underscores its strategic foresight. Notably, during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan became the first country to impose border restrictions on flights from China as early as December 31, 2019 [Data Source: Taiwan Centers for Disease Control]. Confronted with an intricate web of diplomatic quandaries and circumscribed avenues for soft power

diplomacy, Taiwan's extant administration has demonstrated a careful approach in relation to the OCP. This reflects Taiwan's commitment to protecting its interests and maintaining its sovereignty.

Conclusion

The year 2018 marked a particularly tumultuous period in Taiwan's foreign relations landscape, witnessing the severance of ties with multiple long-standing allies. Three countries - the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador - chose to discontinue their diplomatic relations with Taiwan, largely due to the diplomatic and economic pressures exerted by China.

Subsequent to this setback, Taiwan's diplomatic challenges persisted. In response, there has been a discernible shift in Taiwan's foreign policy strategy. Traditionally anchored around maintaining formal diplomatic allies amidst the complexities of China's One China Principle, Taiwan has transformed its strategy. Recently, the emphasis has been on economic cooperation and broader diplomatic interactions beyond just formal alliances.

A prime example of this evolved strategy was the visit of Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. This act of parliamentary diplomacy elevated Taiwan's diplomatic stature. Such engagements highlight Taiwan's evolving strategy, which focuses on bolstering its international standing through varied diplomatic channels, despite larger geopolitical challenges.

The contrasting stances on the One China Policy between the KMT and the DPP have significantly influenced Taiwan's diplomatic approach. While the KMT leans towards cautious engagement, the DPP takes a more proactive role in countering Beijing's restrictions on Taipei. Central to this is the sphere of collaboration between these two positions. Taiwan's strategic gestures towards India and alignment with Indo-Pacific nations symbolize its efforts to diversify its diplomatic relationships.

The discourse on the One China Policy has notably evolved. Taiwan's Foreign Minister has emphatically stated, "Taiwan has not been any part of China and that is beginning from the day that the People's Republic of China was established. The two sides are separate". This sentiment resonates with recent developments. For instance, in the wake of Nancy Pelosi's visit and China's 2022 military exercises around Taiwan, the spokesperson of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs responded in a press conference, emphasising India's stance of "resisting unilateral alterations to the extant status quo". Within the broader vision of the Indo-Pacific strategy, this statement and Taiwan's unequivocal position showcase a converging understanding between Taiwan and India regarding the One China Policy.

Remarks by the Chair: Ambassador LL Mehrotra

Thank you for providing a clear understanding of U.S. policy towards China under the "One China" principle, which you noted is conditional. I also acknowledge your argument that India's relations with China do not interfere with our direct relations with Taiwan. We do not approach Taiwan through China; rather, we recognize Taiwan's presence in our country as part of our cultural and commercial interactions.

We have permitted Taiwan to maintain a cultural office in New Delhi, and its representatives carry their own passports, not those of the People's Republic of China. Our stance is that any differences between China and Taiwan should be discussed and resolved peacefully.

Consequently, when China undertook military intervention and the U.S. moved its forces, we made a clear appeal for peace to be restored in the region. This has consistently been our policy on Taiwan.

I refer to the images because we saw many of them, which provided a very clear picture of the evolving contours of Taiwan's policy regarding the One China principle. It is true that although Taiwan seemed to have lost its standing when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the sole representative of China in the United Nations towards the end of Carter's administration, it has not lost entirely.

While Taiwan lost some firm supporters, such as El Salvador, which shifted its allegiance to the Chinese perspective, El Salvador was notable for being the only country to sponsor Tibet's appeal in 1950. This appeal came when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) moved into Tibet, contravening their explicit promises to India to resolve differences with Tibet peacefully. The Dalai Lama and his cabinet approached the United Nations to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity, a principle to which the United Nations is committed. However, as Tibet was not a U.N. member, only El Salvador clearly supported Tibet's sovereignty and forced the U.N. to debate the Dalai Lama's appeal.

While the subsequent developments are well-known, it is pertinent here to discuss the changes in Taiwan's stance. There is now greater flexibility in Taiwan's attitude, less trade with mainland China, and a more concerted diplomatic effort by Taiwan to develop political ties with countries, especially in South Asia and Southeast Asia. These efforts have yielded some progress.

SESSION 2

INDIA, TIBET AND THE INDO-PACIFIC AND THE ONE CHINA POILCY

Introductory Remarks by the Chair: Ambassador Anil Wadhwa

In recent times, China has successfully persuaded many nations, including most South Asian states, to reaffirm the One China policy, as discussed in our first session. This has coincided with growing conflicts with the United States in the Indo-Pacific region over the same policy. As far as India is concerned, it has neither formally discarded nor reaffirmed the One China policy in recent times, particularly amidst growing territorial conflicts with China.

We recall that in 1950, India was one of the first countries in the world to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and embrace the One China policy, even as it maintained ties with Taiwan. India was quite deferential to China and kept its political ties with Taipei well below the norm in Asia. However, as the first signs of trouble emerged on the Sino-Indian border in the late 2000s, India's enthusiasm for frequently and publicly proclaiming fidelity to the One China policy began to wane.

The last time India explicitly reaffirmed the One China policy was in 2008. Since then, India has referred to its well-known position rather than restating it explicitly. In 2014, then-Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj remarked that if India recognises the One China policy, then China should recognise a One India policy. This remains the current stance in light of the prevailing circumstances in Sino-Indian relations.

It's clear that India's policy towards Taiwan is characterised by a pragmatic approach that prioritises cultural and commercial interactions while avoiding direct interference in its relations with China. India maintains cultural ties with Taiwan, allowing them to have a cultural office in New Delhi and recognising their unique status as separate from the People's Republic of China. The focus is on peaceful resolution of differences between China and Taiwan. When tensions arise, such as China's military intervention, India's stance emphasises the restoration of peace in the region.

This approach demonstrates India's commitment to maintaining peaceful and non-confrontational relations with both China and Taiwan while acknowledging the complex political realities and striving for diplomatic solutions to conflicts. It reflects India's foreign policy principles of diplomacy and non-interference while promoting economic and cultural exchanges with both entities.

The history of India's stance on the One China Policy is an interesting one. India was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in the 1950s and embraced the One China Policy. However, as tensions and conflicts arose on the Sino-Indian border in the late 2000s, India's enthusiasm for reaffirming the policy began to wane. India has not formally discarded the One China Policy, nor has it been willing to reaffirm it, especially in light of the current circumstances in Sino-Indian relations. India's approach has been more nuanced, with a shift towards not explicitly restating the policy.

The last time India reaffirmed the policy was in 2008, and since then, it has referred to its "well-known position."

India's position is further complicated by the changing political landscape and its domestic policies, which can't be equated with what's happening in Tibet. The speakers emphasised the importance of India maintaining its own narrative and policies rather than falling into the trap of the Chinese narrative. In the context of Tibet and the Indo-Pacific, it is essential to listen to the Chinese narrative for better understanding, but it doesn't mean India should align its policies with that narrative. India should have its own individual policies, and the speakers emphasized the need to have clear narratives that don't equate different regional issues.

The evolving Indo-China relationship, especially in the context of ongoing border disputes, has influenced India's approach to the One China Policy. This shift in stance reflects a more cautious and pragmatic approach to the complex geopolitics of the region. Additionally, it highlights the importance of India's narrative and policy formulation based on its unique circumstances rather than merely echoing the Chinese narrative.

This nuanced stance is further discussed in the context of the Indo-Pacific and India's relations with Tibet in the session titled "India, Tibet, and the Indo-Pacific" within the broader framework of the One China Policy. The session emphasises the need for clear narratives that reflect a country's interests, rather than adopting another nation's narrative, while maintaining a stance that accommodates their domestic and international policies. The audience is encouraged to participate by asking questions, providing answers, or offering comments on these complex issues.

The OCP Agreements Between India and The PRC: How India has Tackled the One China Policy in its Foreign Policy

Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli

The topic of India-China relations, particularly in the wake of the Galwan incident, demands careful consideration. This incident has served as a catalyst for a comprehensive reassessment of the bilateral relationship between the two nations. Over the course of the last decade, India's position on the One China Policy has emerged as a subject of considerable scrutiny and concern. Significantly, the 2010 joint statement remains the most recent instance in which Indian leaders explicitly mentioned the One China Policy. While this statement also acknowledges the importance of upholding prior agreements, including the One China Policy, subsequent reaffirmations of this policy have been conspicuously absent.

Complicating matters is the historical context in which both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) have, at various junctures, underscored the significance of the One China Policy. The Republic of China, notably, was the first to assert itself as the sole legal government representing the Chinese people within the United Nations framework, a stance that carries substantial weight in the realm of international diplomacy. Subsequently, the People's Republic of China also adopted and actively promoted the One China Policy.

Also, it is crucial to acknowledge that contemporary India lacks the global influence and military prowess wielded by the British Indian government during its colonial era. This historical period featured not only significant naval power but also pivotal events such as the Opium Wars and the activities of the East India Company in China during the early 19th century.

Lacking global military support, the Nehruvian government had to come to terms with the PRC on the One China Policy. However, India's One China Policy was specifically focused on Taiwan rather than Tibet, and as the Sikyong mentioned, Tibet hardly figured in this policy.

The evolution and broadening scope of the One China Policy has taken over time. Originally, it pertained solely to Taiwan, but it has since encompassed other geographical areas and issues. In 2006, Dai Bingguo, the State Councillor, mentioned China's core interests during the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. This marked the point where the One China Policy became more flexible and expansive in nature. Initially, the policy was solely concerned with Taiwan, but it later expanded to include Tibet, Xinjiang, and Southern Mongolia. Since 2009, it has also encompassed the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands.

The Senkaku Islands issue arose in 2010-11 when the Metropolitan Government in Tokyo sought to nationalize the islands after the private owner left without an heir. Consequently, the Senkaku Islands became part of the discussions related to the One China Policy.

The One China Policy has been flexible and expansive in nature from a Chinese point of view as it started including various components within the One China Policy not just Tibet and Taiwan but also included other regions and hence one does not quite know when the other components of China's ambitions would be included in this One China Policy in the future. This suggests that China's approach to the policy has adjusted to accommodate a wider range of territorial claims and strategic interests, other than just Taiwan.

This sets the context for India's recognition of the One China Policy, which initially pertained to Taiwan and was extended to Tibet in 1954. However, it's worth noting that India's perspective on Tibet was primarily influenced by trade considerations rather than its integration into China.

When we examine the global stance on the One China Policy, we observe that numerous countries, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Japan, as previously mentioned, have chosen to recognise only the People's Republic of China's (PRC) claim regarding the One China Policy.

Meanwhile, there are countries like Canada, which have incorporated the concept of the "inalienability" of the territory of the People's Republic of China into their stance. The Canadian government has also acknowledged the position of the Chinese government in this regard. Similarly, Italy and Chile have adopted positions that include the inalienability clause.

The Shanghai Communique not only acknowledges but also emphasises the importance of a peaceful resolution in cross-strait relations. This implies that any disputes must be resolved through peaceful means. In the event that such a resolution cannot be achieved peacefully, the Taiwan Relations Act comes into play, which allows for arms transfers and other forms of support to Taiwan. Thus, the Shanghai Communique carries the caveat that disputes should be settled peacefully.

In contrast, the French and the Germans recognised China in 1964 and 1972 respectively, but notably refrained from making any explicit statements regarding the One China Policy. They have remained silent on their position concerning the One China Policy.

Australia, on the other hand, recognised the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1972 and adheres to a stance that acknowledges the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan as a province of

the PRC. Furthermore, countries like Israel, Panama, Gambia, and others align themselves closely with the PRC's positions on matters related to Taiwan, Tibet, and other regions.

Allow me to provide a concise summary of the diverse stances adopted by countries regarding the One China Policy:

Non-Mention: Notably, some countries, like France and Germany, have deliberately refrained from making explicit references to the One China Policy in their diplomatic discourse.

Inalienability Assertion: Other nations choose to incorporate the term "inalienability" into their joint statements, firmly asserting that both Taiwan and Tibet are integral and inseparable parts of China, this grants China a potent legal warfare tool. As you know China has three warfares Legal Warfare, Psychological Warfare and Media Warfare. Legal Warfare would be subjected to in the U.N in the bilateral relations in the regional organisations like the SEO or East Asian Summit or other multilateral institutions. So this is a powerful tool for China in terms of weaponising the One China Policy that is where the title of our seminar is located.

Acknowledgment without Endorsement: Certain countries merely acknowledge China's position without explicitly endorsing it. These countries, by simply taking note of China's stance, remain unbound by any specific obligations concerning the matters of Tibet or Taiwan.

Partially or completely oppose: Interestingly, there are also countries that either partially or completely oppose China's position on the One China Policy. A significant portion of the 14 countries that currently recognise Taiwan falls into this category, voicing opposition to China's position on the One China Policy. Across the spectrum, there exists a wide array of viewpoints on the One China Policy among United Nations member states and others. What's of particular importance is that a majority of these nations have, either under duress or due to incentives, willingly accepted the One China Policy. This often occurs when countries engage with initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative or participate in China's aid programs, highlighting the multifaceted nature of international relations concerning this policy.

China's recognition of the One China Policy and the diplomatic discussions with India took place in the early 1950s. A brief overview of the events:

The People's Republic of China (PRC) was officially established on October 1, 1949, following the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese Civil War.

Diplomatic discussions between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China occurred between December 1949 and April 1950. During these discussions, the People's Republic of China pressed India to recognise the PRC and sever all ties with the Republic of China, to support the PRC in the United nations and to hand over the Republic of China properties to the PRC.

Let me elaborate- the PRC also requested that India support its membership in the United Nations and hand over Chinese properties and assets in India, which had previously belonged to the Republic of China (ROC). A key point of contention was the ownership of properties like Haryana Bhavan close to Mandi house which had been part of the ROC Embassy in India. Vice Foreign Minister of the PRC, Chang Hanfo, handed over summons to the Indian side, requesting explicit clarification of India's attitude towards ownership of the institutions of the ROC and all other properties and assets in India. This become a key wrangling between the two sides. So Vice foreign minister of PRC Chang Hanfo told the Additional Secretary A K Sen in the South Block the "PRC hopes that the Indian government will inform us in explicit terms of its attitude towards the institutions of the reactionary remnant KMT clique and all Chinese properties and Assets in India."

The Indian delegate abstained from voting on a draft resolution at the United Nations sponsored by the Soviet delegate, which demanded the expulsion of the so-called delegate of the "reactionary remnant KMT clique." This abstention indicated that India continued to recognise the legality of the ROC's representation at the UN Economic and Social Council while denying recognition of the delegate sent by the PRC.

Mr. A.K. Sen's response on March 1, 1950, is equally intriguing. He stated,
"Firstly, the Government of India is not aware of any organisations that are remnants of KMT reactionaries." He emphasised that this term was not legally recognised. Therefore, the Government of India outright denies the existence of any remnants of KMT reactionaries within India. He clarified, *"There are individual Chinese who may have served or sympathised with the KMT, but their presence in India does not imply that the Government of India acknowledges them as KMT Representatives. They are merely enjoying the ordinary rights of asylum granted under international law."*

Moreover, Mr. Sen explained that properties and assets belonging to the governments of China and India would naturally be considered to have transferred to the recognised government. Secondly, he pointed out that the Government of India's delegation to the U.N. Economic and Social Council chose to abstain from voting on a proposal for the expulsion of KMT Representatives. They believed that this was a political matter, better addressed by the Security Council, which possessed the necessary competence to make such decisions. Mr. Sen also noted that the Chinese government was likely aware that a similar resolution had been voted upon by the Security Council, and the representative of the Government of India voted in accordance with their stance on that occasion. This marked the conclusion of the discussion on the matter.

During the Roosevelt government, an issue related to United Nations Security Council membership also emerged, becoming a part of the discussions between the PRC and Republic of India (RoI) delegations.

Now, turning to matters concerning Taiwan within the context of the One China policy, as I mentioned earlier, between December 1949 and April 1950, officials from both sides met in Delhi and Beijing. Their deliberations ultimately led to what they referred to as the "India model." It's worth noting that during these discussions, India introduced the concept of the "Inalienability Clause." This was a ground breaking development, as it was the first time this

clause was mentioned by India and subsequently endorsed by other nations. This marked the inception of the Inalienability Clause within the framework of the One China Policy, particularly concerning Taiwan. Therefore, it is essential to recognise the significant Indian contribution to the inclusion of the Inalienability Clause in the One China Policy, specifically as it pertains to Taiwan.

The second aspect to consider is that while this primarily aligns with the KMT's stance on the One China Policy, the Democratic People's Party (DPP) holds a fundamentally different position. They do not recognise the 1992 consensus. In fact, the Republic of China once dismissed it as the 1992 consensus as being nonsense. This assertion was made by Su Chi, who was the National Security Advisor at that time, and it pertained to the agreement between the KMT President and the CCP Chief General Secretary in 1992.

Since 1995, there have been established institutional contacts between India and Taiwan, primarily focused on trade, investments, and technology-related matters. While the Taiwan issue has surfaced in bilateral discussions several times, it has not always been explicitly addressed. However, certain declassified documents do shed light on this matter.

At the official level, on April 11, 2005, when Premier Wen Jiabao visited India and signed a joint statement with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the joint statement included the following passage: *"The Indian side recalled that India was among the first countries to recognise that there is one China, and its One China Policy remains unchanged."* This signifies the official stance of India on the One China Policy during that period. *The Indian side reaffirmed its commitment to adhere to its One China Policy,* thereby indicating India's stance that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

In another instance, during November 2006 when Hu Jintao visited Delhi, the Joint Statement once again emphasised the One China Policy. However, it is worth noting that this particular joint statement also contained a reference to the "three evils," and the origin of this concept remains unclear. These "three evils" encompass separatism, extremism, and splitism, as mentioned by the Sikyong, notably, this concept includes factors related to His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The inclusion of the "three evils" in the joint statement by the Government of India raises questions about the motivations behind its inclusion, and it remains a matter of uncertainty, at least from my perspective. Nevertheless, in this context as well, both sides reiterated their commitment to the One China Policy.

The next significant event occurred in September 2007 when the Malabar Exercises took place in the Bay of Bengal. This event is crucial not only in the context of the One China Policy but also because, during this time, Chen Shui-bian was advocating for Taiwanese independence. Issues such as passport matters, plebiscite, and various other factors added to the complexity. Additionally, there were speculations about a potential PLA (People's Liberation Army) invasion of Taiwan. As a result, the One China Policy once again played a role in India-China relations, and not just within the India-China context. If we look at the demarches issued by various countries, including the Kevin Rudd government in Australia and the Shinzo Abe government in Japan, we can observe a consistent emphasis on the One China Policy. This emphasis continued in 2008 when, just a few months after the Malabar exercise, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited China. During this visit, a somewhat

convoluted One China Policy was mentioned. For instance, on January 14, 2008, four months after the Malabar Exercise the Indian side recalled that India was among the first nations to acknowledge the existence of One China, and it reaffirmed that its One China Policy remained unchanged. Of utmost importance was the Indian side's declaration that *it would continue to adhere to its One China Policy and oppose any activities that ran counter to the One China principle*.

The formulation opposing activities against the One China Principle has not been explicitly mentioned in any joint statement between India and China. Nevertheless, it reflects the stance of the Government of India. The Chinese side has expressed its appreciation for India's position on this matter.

However, recent times have witnessed notable changes in the ground reality. For instance, Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August of last year (2022) was a significant development. When questioned about this visit and the PLA exercises, Arundham Bagchi, GoI spokesperson, made a statement on August 12th last year (2022). He expressed India's concern about recent developments and urged all parties to "*exercise restraint, avoid unilateral actions that could alter the status quo, work towards de-escalating tensions, and make efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region*".

These changes in the ground reality are significant, given that a substantial portion of Indian trade and investments—approximately 40 to 50 percent—originates from the region encompassing Taiwan, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan itself. Investments from these regions have been on the rise, underscoring the evolving economic and geopolitical dynamics in the area.

Indeed, the increasing trade component of India is a significant factor. Any military actions taken by China in the Taiwan Strait or in the South China Sea, including the areas near the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, could potentially affect India's interests and rights. Therefore, there is a genuine concern that India should play a role in ensuring stability in the region. The comments made by Indian officials have been relatively mild, primarily emphasising the need for restraint, avoidance of unilateral actions that could change the status quo, and the de-escalation of tensions.

In February of this year (2023), Dr Sujeet Kumar, a Member of Parliament, raised a question in the Rajya Sabha regarding whether the Government of India's position on Taiwan had changed. In response, Minister of State for External Affairs Mr. Murlidharan reiterated the government's stance, emphasising that they facilitate and promote interactions in various areas, such as trade, investment, tourism, culture, education, and other people-to-people exchanges. So without reiterating the One China Policy GOI mentioned the focal areas of interactions between India and China.

Notably, the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Center (TECC) has opened its third center in India, located in Mumbai. When questioned about this development, spokesperson Arindam Bagchi stated last month that "*our policy on Taiwan is clear and consistent*," and he emphasised *that the government promotes interactions in areas like trade, investment,*

tourism, culture, and education". The opening of the TECC Center in Mumbai should be viewed in this broader context of enhancing bilateral relations.

The "Act East" policy, which evolved from the previous "Look East" policy, has seen a notable increase in both trade and investment components. This shift is a response to changing ground realities, as well as concerns raised by countries like the United States, China, Japan, and Australia regarding PLA exercises in the Taiwan Strait has now also become a part of the Indian government's position although it is not explicitly reiterated. While the Indian government's position on the One China Policy may not be explicitly reiterated, it is evident that these developments have influenced India's stance.

In practice, several significant changes have occurred regarding India's approach to the One China Policy:

Stapled Visas for Arunachal Pradesh Residents: The Chinese Embassy's issuance of stapled visas to residents of Arunachal Pradesh once again has drawn attention to India's territorial sovereignty and has played a role in shaping India's stance on the One China Policy.

Tweaking of the One China Policy Since 2009: Despite the continued reiteration of the convoluted position that "we oppose anything opposed to the One China Policy," there has been a gradual tweaking of India's approach to the One China Policy. This reflects the evolving geopolitical landscape and India's willingness to engage with Taiwan and Tibet.

Invitations to TECC Representatives: Prime Minister Modi's invitation to TECC representative Mr. Tien Chung-Kwang and Sikyong Lobsang Sangay the predecessor to the current Sikyong Penpa Tsering, in May 2014 marked a notable shift. However, in the second inaugural, these invitations were not extended, signalling a nuanced approach based on geopolitical considerations tied to the One China Policy.

Indian Parliamentary Delegations Visiting Taiwan: In the first inaugural of President Tsai Ing-wen, there was representation by Indian Members of Parliament (MPs). For her second inauguration, Indian MPs participated virtually due to COVID-19 restrictions. Among them was Meenakshi Lekhi, who is currently the Minister of State but at the time was simply a New Delhi representative in the Lok Sabha. Additionally, there have been frequent parliamentary delegations visiting Taiwan.

Expansion of Investment from Taiwan: Investments from Taiwan, involving companies like TSMC and Foxconn, have expanded into India. This not only reflects economic interests but also implies a willingness to engage with Taiwan on business and technology-related matters.

Let's delve into the historical shifts in India's position on Tibet within the context of the One China Policy. There have been three key phases in India's stance on Tibet:

Nehru's Government in 1954: During this period, India's position on Tibet was relatively straightforward and is generally treated as border trade related matter. Tibet was treated

as part of China, without any significant caveats or additional factors being involved. The focus was primarily on border trade matters, and Tibet was considered as integral to China.

1988 under Rajiv Gandhi's Visit to China: In this phase, there was a notable shift in India's position on Tibet. During Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, the joint statement mentioned Tibet as an *"autonomous"* part of China. This addition of the term *"autonomous"* was partly influenced by the 1987 Strasbourg proposals put forth by His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Importantly, this change in terminology was linked to the presence of Tibetan refugees in India. The idea was that unless there was autonomy in Tibet, Tibetans would not have the conditions necessary for their return to their homeland. This shift reflected a more nuanced approach to the Tibet issue, acknowledging the aspirations of the Tibetan community for autonomy while maintaining recognition of Tibet as part of China.

Sumdorong Chu Incident and Operation Checkerboard: These are historical incidents erupted under Gen. Sundarji. 1988 The Joint Statement: Reference is made to a joint statement from 1988, although specifics are not provided.

2003 Visit by Prime Minister Vajpayee: Prime Minister Vajpayee visited China under significant pressure to include the term "inalienability" in the Government of India's policy towards Tibet, specifically referring to it as "an inalienable portion of the PRC." However, the final outcome only acknowledged that the 'Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) is part of the PRC'. At that time, there was considerable speculation that China had pressured the Vajpayee government to include the term "inalienability."

As the Sikyong mentioned, India has never reiterated that Tibet is an inalienable part of China. Successive governments have faced pressure, but this term has not been included, which means that legal warfare cannot be waged against India on this basis. Additionally, India has never stated that Tibet is a historical part of China. There is no mention of this in any joint statements or press comments.

This omission has implications for areas such as Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh, and other regions with significant Tibetan populations or affiliations, such as the connection to the Sixth Dalai Lama in Tawang. It is important to recognise that both the terms "inalienability" and "historical part" have been avoided in India-China joint statements. Consequently, the most substantial parts of these statements have been carefully crafted to omit these specific terms.

A significant development in the India-China relationship regarding Tibet-related political activities is the joint statement from April 11, 2005, during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India, plays a pivotal role in this context. Here's a breakdown of the key points:

Joint Statement of 2005: In the joint statement which reads, *"Indian side reiterated that it recognised the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as part of the territory of People's Republic of China (PRC) and that it did not permit Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India".*

Arrest of Tenzin Tsundue: Tenzin Tsundue, a Tibetan activist was arrested while raising the Tibetan flag in the Indian Institute of Science in Mumbai. This incident occurred during the visit of the Chinese President to Mumbai. It highlights the sensitivity of Tibet-related political activities during high-level diplomatic visits.

Protests and Restrictions: Tibetans were initially allowed to protest at the Boat Club in Delhi. However, the location of protests has shifted closer to Jantar Mantar in Connaught Place. It appears that there has been a gradual shift in the locations where Tibetans are allowed to protest. The restrictions on political activities have increased over time.

Change in Protesting Locations: A notable change occurred after 2014, with Tibetans also protesting in front of Hyderabad House in Delhi. This marks a significant shift in the ground reality regarding where Tibetans can engage in political activities in India.

The 2006 joint statement between Hu Jintao and Manmohan Singh revisits the subject of restrictions imposed on Tibetans in India, indicating a shift in India's approach. It's noteworthy that for the past 13 years, India has refrained from reaffirming the One China policy concerning Taiwan, Tibet, never on Inner Mongolia, nor on Xinjiang. Tibet has only been mentioned in the context of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra pilgrimage, with no further references.

The Indian experience with the One China policy reveals that the scope of One China policy areas has expanded, leading to increased costs for other countries in the international system. China has effectively used this policy as a bargaining chip in its foreign relations. For instance, countries like Uganda have made statements affirming China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, despite having little direct stake in maritime affairs or trade in the region. This underscores the incentives offered by China to nations that accept the One China Policy, such as financial aid and participation in projects like the Belt and Road Initiative.

It's worth noting that China's One China policy has largely been unilateral, with limited room for reciprocal gestures from China. When Sushma Swaraj, India's former Minister of External Affairs, raised the issue of India's long-standing acceptance of the One China policy without reciprocity regarding a One India Policy during a meeting with Xi Jinping's special representative Wang Yi at Jawahar Bhavan, it signalled that the matter remained unresolved in diplomatic terms. In diplomatic parlance, introducing such a topic at the conclusion of a meeting implies that the issue remains a subject of discussion and negotiation between the two parties.

Wang Yi did not provide a response, as this was the final matter addressed by the then External Affairs Minister. It underscores a notable issue with the One India Policy—China has not issued any statements acknowledging it, except for a reference to Sikkim, which occurred during Vajpayee's visit in 2003. To date, there has been no reaffirmation of any One India Policy.

In contrast, China brought the Kashmir issue to the United Nations Security Council in both 2019 and 2020, though these attempts were ultimately unsuccessful. Not only has China

refrained from acknowledging the One India Policy, but it has also taken actions that contradict it. This raises the imperative for India to re-evaluate its approach to the One China Policy in a more deliberate and comprehensive manner.

Remarks by Chair: Ambassador Anil Wadhwa

An important piece of history, detailing how the One China policy has evolved in the context of India and China, and highlighting the stances of other countries has been discussed. The inalienability factor where India has played an important role is particularly noteworthy.

I have three small observations to add. First, the language used by Arindam Bagchi in 2022, is identical to the language used by China regarding Article 370. If you compare the two statements, they are exactly the same as what the PRC used concerning India's action on Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir.

Second, Wang Yi and the reciprocity in the One China policy. This was stated in the room, and there was no response not while he was leaving the room but while he was seated. I was present there, so I can confirm this. There has been no further response to this point, and it has not been repeated since.

Third, regarding Tibet and India, regarding the pressure on the Vajpayee government is accurate. However, there was a historical context due to Sikkim and a quid pro quo occurring at that time. It is crucial to remember this context, as it was significant when these events took place.

China's Pursuit of the 'One China Principle' in the Indo-Pacific

Prof. Jabin T. Jacob

In the wide geography termed, the Indo-Pacific, China has been able to deploy economic inducement and economic coercion to a great extent in the pursuit of getting other countries to get to adhere to its idea of 'one China' or what it calls the 'one China principle'. Different countries have different capacities to respond to or to moderate this Chinese pressure. While following a 'one China policy', Japan and South Korea have balanced a great deal of investments in in China with maintaining fairly robust ties with Taiwan. Thus, in many ways while on the political plane there is a 'one China policy', in practice, this has not materially affected how Japan and South Korea interact with Taiwan.

With respect to ASEAN, the situation is similar – there are several countries that actually maintain fairly strong ties with the Taiwanese in the economic realm certainly but also in the political and even the security realms. Many of these countries send migrant labour, students and officials for various training programmes, etc. to Taiwan. In many ways, some ASEAN countries tend to play both sides of the Taiwan straits. However, ASEAN is a divided house and China is able to exploit the situation to prevent a strengthening of ties with Taiwan in the case of many countries. India meanwhile, has its own version of the 'one China policy' – while it does not accord diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, it has over the years improved bilateral ties but with a focus on the economic and security realms. While this is seen as falling short of the scale of the Japanese and the Koreans or of the Americans, the fact that needs to be acknowledged is that India goes one better than any other country by also challenging China's idea of 'one China' by denying that Tibet was ever historically part of China even if New Delhi recognises Chinese control over Tibet today.

Chinese Actors

The Chinese have a whole system in place and a range of actors to keep the environment in the countries they target attuned to Chinese interests. The local Chinese embassy and consulates are always big players in this endeavour. Chinese ambassadors now write

frequently in local media about various aspects of Chinese foreign policy – in recent years, there has been a great effort to counter accusations that the coronavirus epidemic originated in China or that China's authoritarian political system was responsible for the spread of the virus beyond its borders. Often there is a great deal of falsehood and propaganda that these op-eds contain exploiting the freedom of speech that many countries allow.

There are also other agencies or agents of the Communist Party of China that are active within embassies and within these countries such as the United Front Work Department (UFWD) for example, which is involved in outreach to Chinese diaspora and expatriates in particular as well as developing linkages with local elites – political, business, intellectual. There is also outreach to religious associations. For example, the Chinese are in touch with local religious bodies like the Buddhist Sangha in Sri Lanka to push forward their agenda on Dalai Lama, One China, the Xinjiang issue and so on and so forth.

Abroad, the 'one China principle' takes shape in various forms. The Chinese Embassy in Bangladesh, for instance, maintains an association of expatriates in the country that promotes the idea of 'national reunification' with Taiwan. The United Front Work Department is very concerned about ensuring that Chinese expatriates are on message as far as reunification even in a country like Bangladesh so far away from the Taiwan Strait.

China's provinces are also important actors. As a large country, China allows its sub- national units a fair degree of freedom on the economic front in their ties with foreign countries, regions and cities. China also uses these subnational entities to also push forward its foreign policy agenda on the 'one China policy'. In the United States, the Chinese Embassy and United Front Work Department associations or groupings are actually in touch with various governors in the states to conduct programmes telling them of the benefits of trade and business links with China, and therefore, of the need to oppose whatever the federal government attempts to do to counter Chinese mercantilist policies.

This element of reaching out to the states or the provinces in countries sister-city or sister-province agreements is a big facet of Chinese foreign policy especially in Japan and South Korea. Other important Chinese foreign policy actors include the state-owned enterprises and Chinese private companies which now deploy what we know as corporate social responsibility in countries to push Chinese projects and talking points. So it is not just the Chinese Embassy offering largesse to governments and political elites but also Chinese companies operating in various geographies. The Chinese, of course, exercise far greater control over their economic entities than countries like the United States or India do.

China's Methods

There are three aspects to how the Chinese are going about pushing its policies against Taiwan. One, while countries too have to be opportunistic and want to exploit the situation, the Chinese too, do a great amount of homework on these countries in order to exploit the possibilities for switching recognition. Two, the Chinese seem to have targeted those countries that current Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has visited during the course of her presidency in order to increase the diplomatic embarrassment for Taiwan. Three, even though the previous Ma Ying-jeou administration in Taipei was seen as positively inclined

towards China and towards reunification, it was clearly during this period that the Chinese were doing the homework for ensuring a switch in diplomatic recognition. In other words, they are never stopping their work no matter the political party in power in Taiwan.

Meanwhile, China is often the largest trading partner or one of the largest trading partners for many of countries and this provides additional leverage for the Chinese government when it comes to trying to enforce its 'one China principle' as the default 'one China policy' in many countries. It is in the Pacific Islands that China's coercive economic power and economic inducements have perhaps been the most effective. Several of the Pacific Islands have switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in just the last few years. For good measure, the Chinese have deployed massive fishing fleets engaged in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the region as a way of putting pressure on these countries for their relations with Taiwan. In countries like Sri Lanka or the Maldives or in the Pacific Islands many agreements the Chinese reach are secret agreements exploiting local political conditions and divisions to try and push forward an agenda that supports Chinese interests. The Chinese also target political parties or individuals that might speak against Chinese interests and there is now also the offer of security guarantees in many countries around the region. The Chinese are now increasingly more confident about and what they call their Global Security initiative. Essentially China uses the 'one China policy' for escalation or weaponises it. This is legal warfare and as part of its tactics, China then follows up with a growing set of demands based on the fact that a country has compromised once and therefore, it will do so again, conveying a sense of disappointment, even resentment, when other items in its list do not meet the same positive reception. This is how the Chinese negotiate. One result of this has been increasing pushback against the Chinese such as, for example, in the Solomon Islands where there is political upheaval because of the switch of recognition from Taiwan to China, and Fiji where, the Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka has made many excuses not to meet with the Chinese ambassador or to travel to China.

Impact on Taiwan

There is no doubt that China and Xi Jinping has engaged in a long-term and steady strategy of trying to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and to constrain its international space. In many ways, Beijing is declaring unequivocally that it does not believe that it can reach any sort of agreement or accommodation with Taiwanese administration of President Tsai because it sees her party in power, the Democratic Progressive Party, as pro-independence and Beijing's willingness to wait patiently for reunification seems to be dwindling. It is worth noting that pressure from China has also led to Taipei becoming willing to deal with authoritarian or non-democratic states. So in some cases, losing diplomatic allies might not be such a bad thing especially when there is parliamentary diplomacy between Taiwan and other countries to fall back on even if they do not have formal diplomatic relations. Taiwan is, in this case, better able to use its democratic identity to draw support from democratic forces in these countries. And with greater exposure to China leading to fissures and criticism of China within political systems that have made the switch from Taiwan, the latter comes out looking better still.

The Future

In terms of the future, we must not look at China's pursuit of the 'one China principle' as merely a territorial issue or one of balance of power – it also involves other principles and interests such as those of international law, regionalism, multilateralism, technology standards and so on. If countries do not bend to the 'one China principle' of the Chinese government in their 'one China' policies, then they are accused of 'hurting the sentiments of the Chinese people' and essentially, denying Chinese cultural and civilizational greatness.

In this regard, we must also pay attention to the Belt and Road Initiative and its scaling up in the form of the Global Development, Security and Civilization Initiatives. In fact, the Global Civilization Initiative is particularly important because China seems to be pushing forward a new narrative over and beyond the 'one China principle' – one could argue that the in many ways, the Global Civilization Initiative is an extension of its 'one China principle' in which the Chinese try to convey a very strong sense of Chinese cultural centrality and superiority over its neighbours. In other words, we are not going to see a dilution of the 'one China principle' but the Chinese Communist Party using it as an extension of or a scaling up of the cultural foundations of Chinese foreign policy. We already see this in the Chinese emphasis on extraterritoriality and cultural appropriation. Under the former, it has engaged in stringent efforts to control and regulate not just its own expatriate population abroad but also nationals of other countries who might be of Chinese ethnicity whether abroad or in China itself. China's cultural appropriation is already well-known in Tibet and Xinjiang.

To conclude, countries need to understand China's negotiation tactics and that its ever increasing list of demands for other countries to meet is not temporary or tactical. Chinese conceptions of self and history are evolving into an ever greater sense of superiority over other peoples and political systems on the one hand and a sharp sense of being wronged or denied on the other. This makes international responses to Beijing's 'one China principle' an increasingly touchy subject for China. The only feasible option for countries that deal with China is to actually confront the subject head on and to make clear the definition and limits of their own 'one China policy' as opposed to Beijing's 'one China principle', if they are not to come under increasing pressure to compromise on ever more issues.

Comments by the Chair: Ambassador Anil Wadha

It is very interesting that you discussed the thrust of China's One China policy, which extends beyond Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. You highlighted how China uses coercion through various means, such as political and business elites, sub-national governments, and religious bodies in countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. You also mentioned how state-owned enterprises are utilised for CSR activities, with fishing fleets and tourism, particularly in the Pacific, being leveraged as tools. Additionally, China provides security guarantees in several countries to promote the One China policy. I agree with your observation that China has been strategic in identifying opportunities to influence and even switch religions in various countries where possible. Although there has been some pushback, especially from democratic governments that have recognized this tactic more quickly, you rightly pointed out that initiatives like the BRI, GTI, and the Global Civilization Initiative will likely reinforce the Chinese narrative in the future. This, coupled with the scaling up of China's cultural influence and foreign policy efforts, signals that China's stance will likely become more vocal and demanding as we move forward.

Does the One China Policy Apply to Tibet?

Bhuchung K. Tsering

I want to touch this issue in three ways: First, on the varied definition of "One China Policy." Secondly, on Chinese strategy and agenda, and thirdly, on what can and should be done.

The clearest and most definitive political response to the question, 'Does the One China Policy apply to Tibet?' was already provided by Tibetan political leader Sikyong Penpa Tsering in his address earlier today, so I will not repeat the reasoning. In essence, the answer is that it does not apply to Tibet. However, as someone engaged in diplomacy and advocacy, I would like to explore this issue further to uncover any additional nuances.

No one clear definition of "One China policy"

Before determining whether the term applies to Tibet, we must first ask whether there is a single, clear definition of 'One China'—whether as a policy or otherwise. It is evident that no universally agreed-upon definition exists. This is something that everyone, including journalists and political analysts, needs to understand, as assumptions based on personal perspectives often lead to incorrect connections with other issues.

In my view, the Chinese government operates with two different interpretations of 'One China.' They have their 'One China Principle,' as outlined by other speakers today, and a 'One China Policy' that they seek to impose on other governments and parties they engage with. While the former is specific to Taiwan, the latter is more loosely applied to relations with other countries on various matters. China often presents these two interpretations as being the same to further its own agenda.

The United States, on the other hand, has its own "One China Policy"[1] again solely with reference to Taiwan. There are other governments who have their respective differing "one

[1] "The U.S. One China Policy: A Primer for Professional Military Education Faculty

China policy".[2] I don't want to go into details on these because these have all been laid out earlier today. Suffice it to say that one research has shown that there were more than nine different definitions of "one China" by various governments.[3]

Chinese strategy and agenda

One may ask, what is the Chinese strategy and agenda on its "One China Policy" assertion as it relates to Tibet? I feel there are four aspects to it.

First, many governments are, perhaps unintentionally, allowing China to shape the narrative around the 'One China Policy,' letting it be defined in a way that suits China's agenda. Despite the fact that Tibet has never claimed to be part of 'China,' Chinese authorities continue to present Tibet as falling under the 'One China Policy.' This leads governments to become reactive to China's framing, effectively allowing themselves to be used by Chinese authorities. Every issue raised by other speakers today, I believe, is part of China's broader effort to shape the international narrative.

Secondly, China is taking advantage of the ambiguity surrounding the definition of 'One China' to further its international agenda. At every opportunity, Chinese officials pressure countries, particularly smaller nations, to explicitly affirm that Tibet is part of China as a demonstration of their adherence to both the 'One China Principle' and the 'One China Policy'.

Thirdly, in their efforts to appease China, some governments voluntarily place Tibet within the framework of the 'One China Policy,' often reiterating this stance during meetings with Chinese officials or in other settings.

Fourthly, some governments, while responding to China, inadvertently end up reinforcing the Chinese narrative on 'One China' by drawing unintended parallels with their own domestic issues. As referenced by earlier speakers, the former Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj's 2014 remarks about a 'One India Policy' come to mind.

However, I would argue that 'One India' should not be equated with 'One China.' The 'One China' concept involves two claimants—the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China—whereas India has no comparable claimants. Equating the two risks legitimising China's position inappropriately.

Luke Bellocchi, Joint Forces Staff College, May 11, 2022, https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Media/Campaigning-Journals/Academic-Journals-View/Article/3026633/the-us-one-china-policy-a-primer-for-professional-military-education-faculty/

[2] The Many "One Chinas": Multiple Approaches to Taiwan and China, Chong Ja Ian, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 09, 2023 https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/09/many-one-chinas-multiple-approaches-to-taiwan-and-china-pub-89003

[3] ibid

Given the above, what could be done and what should be done by the international community?

It is clear that China's "One China Principle" does not have any connection to Tibet. But if governments are taking into consideration today's political reality of Tibet being included as part of People's Republic of China there are ways of addressing this issue even within that context.

First, don't let the Chinese drive your narrative on your definition of what your position on Tibet is.

Secondly, don't legitimise Chinese position by unnecessarily repeating formulations in the hope of a favourable response from China. In the United States, the State Department talking about Tibet with Chinese officials or in their statements, occasionally repeat that Tibet is part of China even when it is not warranted. Members of Congress have written letters to the State Department said they should not be doing this as "We should not allow the CCP to define the terms of our interactions with them."[4]

Thirdly, even if you put Tibet within the prism of the People's Republic of China and have to refer to that as the framework, there is no reason why the issues relating to Tibet cannot be raised within that context, whether bilaterally or internationally. The reason why I am saying this is because the Chinese authorities are using the "One China" adherence as a way to silence other countries from raising Tibet. The Chinese government, on its side, has no compulsion when it suits their interest to raise issues relating to other countries. One speaker today even mentioned the fact that China took the Kashmir issue to the United Nations. Given this, why should India shy away from raising the issue of Tibet more forcefully.

Lastly even within the framework of Tibet in the People's Republic of China, and I am not just talking about India alone but any other country, there can be ways of promoting or encouraging Tibetan people's aspirations by having incremental changes in the formulation. To begin with, in the United States, there is legislation, particularly the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018, which clearly defines what Tibet is. In the RATA it says[5], " Tibetan areas.--The term ``Tibetan areas'' includes--

(A) the Tibet Autonomous Region; and

(B) the areas that the Chinese Government designates as Tibetan Autonomous, as follows:

(i) Kanlho (Gannan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and Pari (Tianzhu) Tibetan Autonomous County located in Gansu Province.

(ii) Golog (Guoluo) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Malho (Huangnan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Tsojang (Haibei) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Tsolho (Hainan)

[4] Rubio, Leahy commend State Department Tibet language in the 2020 human rights report, May, 5, 2021, https://www.rubio.senate.gov/rubio-leahy-commend-state-department-tibet-language-in-the-2020-human-rights-report/

[5] Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act, Public Law 115–330, 115th Congress, December 19, 2018, https://savetibet.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/PLAW-115publ330.pdf

Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Tsonub (Haixi) Mongolian and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, and Yulshul (Yushu) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, located in Qinghai Province.
(iii) Garze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Ngawa (Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, and Muli (Mili) Tibetan Autonomous County, located in Sichuan Province.
(iv) Dechen (Diqing) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, located in Yunnan Province.."

India could also adopt a similar position given that even China itself treats all Tibetans as being of one nationality. The welfare of the Tibetan people is the bottom line of the Tibetan leadership in terms of resolution of the Tibetan issue. The Tibetan people are spread beyond the Tibet Autonomous Region to all Tibetan areas in the traditional Tibet that we speak of. So, India can and should take a position on all Tibetans, not just in the Tibet Autonomous region. If that can be done, then we can answer the question about whether the "One China Policy" can be applied to Tibet in a positive way.

Remarks by the Chair: Ambassador Anil Wadha

I believe it provides a clear understanding of how the Tibet issue should be approached. The main underlying theme, as you pointed out, is that China is using its own narrative to further its agenda, and others should be cautious not to fall into that trap. Instead, it is crucial to develop a narrative that is independent of the Chinese perspective. You also emphasised that it is not essential to adhere to the Chinese narrative when it comes to understanding the situation, but rather to formulate policies based on our own perspectives and domestic priorities. Furthermore, it is important not to equate what is happening in one part of the world with what is happening in Tibet. That, essentially, is our perspective.

Points Emerging from the Discussion

- Henry Kissinger's visit to China holds strategic implications and goes beyond mere symbolism. Here's a detailed analysis of some key aspects of his visit:
  Historical Context: Henry Kissinger, as a veteran diplomat, has a long history of involvement in US-China relations. He played a crucial role in orchestrating President Richard Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972. As a result, he has an enduring relationship with Chinese leaders and extensive experience in managing Sino-American relations.
  Economic: One of the central reasons for Kissinger's visit is likely to be economic in nature. China and the United States have complex economic interdependencies. China holds significant amounts of US Treasury securities and has made substantial investments in various sectors, including technology and finance. These economic ties come amidst uncertainties in the global economic landscape, such as supply chain disruptions due to the pandemic and tensions in Ukraine. Any new investments or potential economic agreements, such as Alibaba's investments in the US, are likely to be discussed. Regulatory considerations and opportunities for investments will be a part of the conversation.

Global Trade and Investments: It's probable that discussions will center on preserving the stability of global trade and investment between the two countries. Economic cooperation has been a pillar of US-China relations, and addressing issues like trade imbalances, market access, and intellectual property rights is essential.

Given Kissinger's historical role in shaping US-China monetary policies, this aspect could be on the table. Currency exchange rates and monetary policy coordination can have a significant impact on both economies, and ensuring a stable financial environment may be a point of interest.

Bilateral Investment: The prospect of new investments by Chinese companies, such as Alibaba, in the US may be discussed. The ever-evolving landscape of international investments demands continued dialogue on regulations and opportunities.

While the economic aspect is dominant, it's likely that the Taiwan issue will be addressed to some extent. Kissinger played a role in the Shanghai Communique, which recognised China's "One China" policy. The US remains committed to the Taiwan Relations Act, but finding common ground on this contentious matter will always be important.

The broader context of US-China relations will undoubtedly be a topic of conversation. Recent years have seen increasing tensions, from trade disputes to human rights concerns. Maintaining open channels of communication between these two superpowers is vital.

Regional and Global Security: Security issues, such as the situation in Ukraine, may also come up during Kissinger's visit. China's stance on regional and global security matters can have a substantial impact on US-China relations.

A diplomat of Kissinger's stature may be involved in contingency planning and crisis management discussions. This could include potential flashpoints like North Korea, the South China Sea, or any emerging security threats.

The visit could encompass cultural and educational exchanges, which have historically played a role in diplomacy between the two nations.

The nature and extent of these discussions may not be publicly disclosed, but they could significantly influence the trajectory of US-China relations, particularly in the context of the current geopolitical landscape.

The BRI has been central to China's foreign policy, but it's evident that some European countries have been reconsidering their involvement in BRI projects. Several factors contribute to this shift:

Debt Diplomacy: Concerns have arisen about the debt levels of countries participating in BRI projects, potentially leading to debt dependence on China.

The European Union, along with other countries like the United States, has been promoting alternative initiatives that focus on high-quality infrastructure and sustainable development. This competition could lead to a redistribution of focus from BRI to other initiatives.

International Pushback: Global concerns about BRI's geopolitical implications have encouraged some nations to re-evaluate their engagement. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) and other regional initiatives also provide alternatives for countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

India's approach to South Asia has evolved over the years. Historically, a more assertive and interventionist policy, often perceived as a 'big brother' approach, led to tensions in the region. India has been making efforts to improve its ties with its neighbours. Some key points are:

Non-Reciprocity Principle: This concept aims to facilitate greater cooperation with South Asian neighbours without expecting immediate reciprocity, aiming to reduce hesitance among neighbouring countries.
Regional Organisations: Active participation in regional organisations like SAARC and BIMSTEC to promote regional integration and connectivity.
Soft Power Diplomacy: Fostering cultural and economic ties through people-to-people contacts, trade, and educational exchanges.
India's approach recognises the diversity of countries in the South Asian region and seeks to accommodate their interests and concerns. This shift in strategy is designed to build a more cooperative and interconnected South Asia, which can lead to regional stability and economic growth.
In conclusion, the global dynamics are indeed evolving, and countries are reassessing their strategic positions and international engagements. The revaluation of the BRI and India's diplomatic strategies in South Asia are part of these ongoing transformations, which will continue to shape the future of international relations in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

- There seems to be a confusion regarding the distinction between India's policy on Tibet and its One China Policy. China appears to be intentionally merging these policies to further its own agenda. Recent instances, like the inclusion of the "three evils" in a joint statement, have raised concerns about India's approach.

- The question at hand is whether India's policy on Tibet is in harmony with its One China Policy and, if so, to what extent. The notion of "legitimising" One China Policy, especially when juxtaposed with India's call for a "One India Policy," prompts reflection on the underlying norms and principles. In summary, there appears to be a complex interplay between India's policy on Tibet and its One China Policy. This raises questions about their compatibility and whether there is a coherent stance on these matters. Further clarity is needed regarding India's strategic position and the guiding principles behind these policies for a comprehensive understanding.

- The One China Principle is rooted in the Chinese cultural concept of "people born to the same womb," signifying a shared ancestry and unity as if belonging to the same family. This ancient concept, dating back thousands of years, emphasises the idea that individuals are connected through a common origin. China extends this principle to territories like Taiwan, considering them as integral parts due to their historical connection. However, it's crucial to note that this concept doesn't apply universally to all individuals of Chinese descent worldwide. People in regions like Singapore and Malaysia, though having Chinese ancestry, have developed distinct identities over time. The concept of "Tumpao" doesn't necessarily extend to overseas Chinese populations in Southeast Asia or elsewhere, as they have formed unique identities beyond the ancestral connection to China.

- The second aspect of the One China Principle delves into historical events, particularly the aftermath of China's defeat by Japan in 1894. Li Hongzhang, a figure seen differently in various Chinese regions, is often portrayed negatively, particularly in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau. He is perceived as someone who, under the Japanese Occupation from 1894 to 1945, sacrificed Taiwan. The coastal regions of Mainland China, where the Japanese exerted control, including Manchukuo, contributed to the disintegration of the Qing Dynasty. In the

context of the One China Principle, the historical narrative surrounding Li Hongzhang serves as a cautionary tale. The term "Li Hongzhang" is used metaphorically to designate individuals or regions seeking independence from China. Within the Communist Party, being associated with Li Hongzhang is considered a significant cultural setback. The principle underscores China's sensitivity to regions or countries attempting to break away, especially in the post-Soviet space. This historical perspective shapes China's approach to sovereignty and territorial integrity, emphasizing the importance of unity and discouraging any move toward independence.

- In the post-Soviet space, the potential for countries to disintegrate is recognized, driven by various structural reasons. The One China Principle incorporates this element, highlighting the concern that countries might fragment for diverse reasons, akin to the Li Hongzhang phenomena. This aspect is a significant concern for the Communist Party in China, particularly within the Chinese mainland, rather than in Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Macau.
  At a political level, this concern is emphasised. The 100th anniversary of the Communist Party saw a strong statement from Xi Jinping, stating that they would "break the heads of those people who divide Taiwan from China." Such assertive language is unusual for a leader, but Xi Jinping chose this milestone to convey a powerful message. This statement reflects a defensive stance, with Xi Jinping indicating a firm commitment not to be perceived as a figure similar to Li Hongzhang. The weaponisation component within the One China Principle is thus evident in these declarations.

- The One China Policy is subject to change based on evolving ground realities and shifts in foreign policy. In the realm of International Relations, the policy reflects the power dynamics influenced by factors such as GDP and comprehensive national power. The ability to assert a hard state, as demonstrated by leaders like Kim Jong-un with North Korea's nuclear capabilities, plays a crucial role in shaping international interactions.
  For instance, North Korea, despite having a relatively small GDP of 52 billion dollars, leveraged its hard state status, including possession of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and nuclear weapons, to engage with influential leaders like Trump in Singapore and Hanoi. The power wielded by a state, driven by its leader's ability to mobilise resources, becomes a key instrument in navigating the One China Policy.
  Historically, China's approach to Taiwan was not as assertive, with instances like the Chongqing bombing being exceptions. In 1958, after the Taiwan Strait crisis, China outlined eight points aimed at the Taiwanese, and these points have since been implemented under the Kuomintang government. This reflects how the approach to Taiwan has evolved over time within the framework of the One China Policy.

- The One China Policy holds implications for India and is viewed through the lens of power dynamics. Nehru's assessment of China emphasized that India couldn't match China in terms of power. While India gained independence through non-violent means, China's rise was associated with the concept that power flows from the barrel of a gun, backed by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) supporting the Communist Party.

- During the initial years after 1947, India's armed forces were relatively weak, and it was only in the 1960s, with an expansion of defence budgets, that India began to strengthen its military capabilities. The increase in the defence budget in 1963 marked a significant shift.

The One China Policy, therefore, is seen as a reflection of power, and India's responses are shaped by this understanding of power dynamics in the geopolitical landscape.

- The One India Policy differs significantly from the One China Policy, and India does not consider China as a model for its policy. In the One India Policy, India includes regions like Punjab, Kashmir, and the Northeast, addressing issues related to sovereignty and territorial integrity. For instance, problems in Manipur are viewed within the framework of the One India Policy. Sushma Swaraj's formulations, as highlighted in the Parliamentary standing committee on Parliament Foreign Affairs, emphasise sovereignty and territorial integrity as essential components of the One India Policy. This stance reflects a clear deviation from subscribing to the Chinese narrative on the One China Policy, both in terms of narrative and components.

- This policy appears to operate as a form of cognitive warfare, strategically influencing global perceptions to align with Chinese objectives. It seems like an effort to shape the world's mindset while simultaneously pursuing various actions discreetly, including secret operations worldwide. This raises questions about how China envisions its role on the global stage and prompts the need to analyse it from a cognitive warfare perspective.

- Mr. Bhuchung Tsering emphasised how the Chinese are advancing a narrative, and his presentation points were concise and sharp. It is crucial to exercise caution in adopting language, especially when dealing with Chinese expressions. Indian diplomats, being more astute, may navigate these nuances effectively. However, less-experienced countries often adopt Chinese terminology without recognising its implications, not only in foreign policy but also domestically in China. When embracing phrases like "one China policy" or "community of human destiny" in bilateral or multilateral statements, it's essential to consider what concessions or implications arise in dealing with the Chinese.

- In recent times, India has adopted a more sophisticated and sharper approach, moving beyond a simplistic characterisation of "one India policy" and "one China." This nuanced strategy is crucial, not just for India but for other countries facing similar challenges. India has a responsibility to educate and inform its neighbours and other nations about China's cognitive warfare, leveraging its extensive experience in dealing with such tactics.

- Parliamentary delegations, particularly those visiting Taiwan, are already inclined to view the Taiwan and Tibet issues in a specific light. This predisposition should be maximized for greater impact. India also hosts parliamentary delegations on Taiwan and Tibet, but unfortunately, they don't receive adequate attention in the media or conference circuits. Rectifying this oversight and investing more in studying China, Tibet, East Turkestan, and Taiwan will enhance our understanding and better equip us to counter Chinese narratives and policies.

- China's increasing activities, including economic exploitation and territorial assertiveness, have raised concerns globally. The expansion of its influence, particularly in the South China Sea with the creation of artificial islands, has led to tensions with neighbouring countries and sparked debates about regional security dynamics.

- Late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's call to establish an Asia-Pacific Zone and the Indo-Pacific area reflects the growing recognition of the need for a collaborative approach to address the challenges posed by China's assertive behaviour. The concept of the Indo-Pacific emphasises the interconnectedness of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, underlining the strategic importance of the region. Several countries, including India, have expressed concerns about China's actions and are exploring ways to counterbalance its influence. India, with its geographical position and growing strategic capabilities, could play a crucial role in shaping the Indo-Pacific narrative. The militarisation of the region is a real possibility, given the geopolitical tensions. In this context, the issue of Taiwan becomes significant. China's One China Policy, which insists on considering Taiwan as a part of its territory, is met with resistance from countries that seek to support Taiwan's autonomy. The complexity lies in how countries navigate their relationships with both China and Taiwan without triggering conflicts. India, like other nations, faces a delicate balancing act. While it may not overtly exploit the Taiwan issue, it can contribute to regional stability by fostering partnerships, engaging in diplomatic initiatives, and participating in multilateral forums that promote a rules-based order. The evolving geopolitical landscape requires careful navigation to ensure peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region.
  The evolving dynamics in India's relationship with China are indeed noteworthy. The traditional mindset of humility on the international stage seems to be shifting towards a more assertive approach, marked by realpolitik considerations. However, as India navigates this transformation, it is essential to avoid adopting a purely transactional stance akin to the historical approach of the United States.
  India's positions on international issues should be grounded in a broader perspective that fundamentally aligns with the welfare of the nation as a whole. Striking a balance between assertiveness and a principled approach is crucial to ensure that India's interests are safeguarded without compromising on ethical considerations.
  A notable development is the use of the term "Xizang" by a section of the Chinese media, often referred to as the Wolf Warrior faction. While it may seem benign at this stage, the potential shift from "Tibet" to "Xizang" raises questions about India's response. If China seeks global acceptance of this narrative, India's policymakers must carefully consider their stance. Using "Xizang" over "Tibet" symbolises Chinese colonialism over Tibet.
  There may not be an immediate negative fallout if the Chinese authorities prefer "Xizang." However, policymakers must be vigilant about the underlying implications and the potential long-term consequences. Embracing a term associated with Chinese colonialism over Tibet may have broader geopolitical and ethical considerations that India needs to assess thoroughly.

- When we use phrases like "One China policy" or "community of human destiny," these terms hold significant meaning for the Chinese, and agreeing to such formulations in bilateral or multilateral statements can have implications. It's essential to understand what we gain from the Chinese when adopting these phrases. In recent times, India has adopted a more nuanced and sophisticated approach, moving beyond a simplistic characterisation like "One India policy" and "One China policy." This refined stance reflects a greater understanding of the complex issues involved. India is becoming sharper in its approach, and there is a recognition that using more sophisticated language is necessary. It's crucial to educate and inform not only within India but also among neighbouring countries and other nations interested in countering Chinese cognitive warfare. India, with its experience, plays a role in

building capacity at home and among its neighbours to effectively address and counteract Chinese policies. For instance, parliamentary delegations visiting Taiwan may already have predispositions regarding the Taiwan or Tibet issue. Leveraging these predispositions can be beneficial, and there is an opportunity to make greater use of such situations to advance India's interests and counter Chinese narratives effectively.

- Our parliamentary delegations on Taiwan and Tibet, unfortunately, do not receive sufficient attention, even within our own media space, seminars, or conference circuits. However, these are aspects that we can address internally. Investing more in studying China, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan is crucial. The more we delve into these subjects, the better equipped we become to counter Chinese narratives. Additionally, our enhanced understanding allows us to assist others in navigating and challenging the narratives put forth by China.

- The matter you've raised including China's escalating activities, economic exploitation, territorial contentions, and the shifting geopolitical landscape is intricate and encompasses various facets.

  Economic Exploitation and Territorial Contentions:

  China's assertive actions, such as territorial claims in the South China Sea and the construction of artificial islands, have elicited global concerns.

  Countries in the region are grappling with how to respond to China's expansive economic and territorial ambitions, seeking a delicate balance between economic interests and concerns about sovereignty and regional stability.

  Indo-Pacific Region Dynamics:

  The term "Indo-Pacific" has gained prominence as a geopolitical concept extending beyond the conventional Asia-Pacific framework, recognising India's burgeoning role in regional affairs. The proposal to establish an Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific zone, as advocated by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, signifies a paradigm shift in regional dynamics and cooperation.

  Taiwan Issue:

  Taiwan remains a sensitive and contentious matter. Many nations, including India, have adhered to the One China Policy, recognising the People's Republic of China as the legitimate government.

  Exploiting the Taiwan issue for geopolitical gains could have profound consequences, influencing global stability and diplomatic relations.

  Global Response:

  The international community closely monitors China's actions and assesses its response. Countries are forming alliances and partnerships to counterbalance China's influence.

  How nations navigate their relations with China, particularly concerning economic ties, is a pivotal aspect of global geopolitics.

  China's Future Trajectory:

  China confronts challenges in managing its international image amid apprehensions about its assertive conduct. It must judiciously calibrate its actions to avert further isolation and potential conflicts. Scrutiny surrounds the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China's global economic engagements, prompting nations to exercise discernment regarding the enduring implications of such partnerships.

  Militarisation Concerns:

  The potential militarisation of the Indo-Pacific region is a legitimate concern. Nations are enhancing their defence capabilities, necessitating dialogue and diplomatic efforts to

forestall conflict. In essence, China's actions pose challenges, and the international community, including India, is navigating these intricacies. Balancing economic interests, upholding regional stability, and preserving principles of sovereignty constitute pivotal aspects of the evolving geopolitical landscape. Moving forward requires judicious diplomacy, strategic partnerships, and a nuanced approach to regional and global dynamics.

SESSION 3

WEAPONIZATION OF THE ONE CHINA POLICY

Introductory Remarks by the Chair: Ambassador Pankaj Saran

FNVA's commitment to exploring key strategic and security issues that profoundly impact India and the broader region is commendable. The focus and quality of these discussions are noteworthy, and the outcomes hold significance not only for India but are closely observed on a global scale.

The subject at hand, "Weaponization of the One China Policy," is intriguing. I eagerly anticipate the diverse perspectives and interpretations on this theme, especially as they pertain to India. This discussion comes as an opportunity to delve into the intricate dynamics and repercussions of China's One China Policy, particularly in the context of India.

The implications of this policy reverberate worldwide and significantly influence India's strategic and security landscape, as well as its regional relations. The ever-increasing interest in this topic underscores its critical importance. While discussions are ongoing, I believe that understanding the historical and geographical context of contemporary China is fundamental. Regrettably, there is often a lack of awareness, particularly among younger generations in India, regarding China's historical roots and its transformation into the People's Republic of China.

This discussion offers us the platform to explore the weaponization of the One China Policy and its role as a diplomatic and strategic instrument. We aim to evaluate its implications, not just for India but for the wider region and the international community. By gaining deeper insights into this complex issue, we can better navigate our relations with China as it continues to expand economically, technologically, and militarily.

I eagerly await the presentations and ensuing discussions that will offer valuable perspectives on how India can adeptly engage in this multifaceted landscape and anticipate the actions of China in the ever-evolving global scenario.

How Chinese expansionism is secured by the One China Policy and how it has become the pillar of diplomatic ties for China*

Dr Yang Jianli

(* paper submitted post conference)

Chinese expansionism, marked by its assertive foreign policy and territorial claims, has become a focal point of international attention. A cornerstone of this expansionist agenda is the One China Policy, which asserts the People's Republic of China's sovereignty over Taiwan and related regions. Chinese expansionism has grown into a complex strategy with reverberations in both domestic and international arenas. At its core is the One China Policy, a policy that extends its reach beyond the issue of Taiwan, influencing China's global relationships, internal stability, its approach to ethnic and minority groups, and the broader landscape of Chinese official nationalism.

The origins of the One China Policy can be traced back to the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949), which concluded with the triumph of the Chinese Communist Party and the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Republic of China (ROC), under the leadership of the Nationalist Party, withdrew to Taiwan. The PRC's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan marked the inception of the One China Policy. This policy gained further strength when China was excluded from the United Nations in 1971, with the People's Republic of China assuming its seat.

Indeed, the One China Policy has evolved far beyond its original purpose and has become a central tool in China's diplomatic strategy. Let's explore how this policy has transcended its initial scope and how it influences China's international relations:

Economic Leverage: China's economic rise has enabled it to wield significant economic influence. The One China Policy often comes into play when countries seek to maintain or establish economic ties with China. Nations that wish to benefit from China's vast market are inclined to adhere to the One China Policy, fearing economic repercussions if they engage with Taiwan. China's economic leverage extends to trade agreements, investment

opportunities, and access to its consumer base, which puts pressure on countries to comply with its policies.

Soft Power Tactics: China employs soft power strategies to promote its One China Policy. This includes cultural exchanges, Confucius Institutes, and educational initiatives that shape international narratives regarding Taiwan. By controlling the narrative surrounding Taiwan's status and presenting itself as the guardian of the "One China" principle, China seeks to win hearts and minds around the world.

Narrative Control: China is adept at shaping the narrative around the One China Policy, presenting it as a matter of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This narrative not only influences foreign governments but also resonates with domestic audiences. The policy is framed as crucial for maintaining internal stability, and its adherence is presented as essential for preserving harmony within the nation. This narrative helps manage global perceptions of China's policies and counter international criticism.

Global Influence: The One China Policy has contributed to China's expansionism and diplomatic relations on a global scale. China's approach to international actors is often framed by whether they adhere to the policy or maintain relations with Taiwan. The policy aligns with the Chinese Communist Party's vision of national rejuvenation and asserts its leadership in the world. It serves as a tool to legitimise China's actions and project influence beyond its borders.

In conclusion, the One China Policy is a multifaceted diplomatic instrument that extends well beyond the Taiwan issue. It has become integral to China's international relations, shaping how countries interact with China and Taiwan and influencing their stances on a wide range of global issues. As China's influence continues to grow, understanding the dynamics of the One China Policy is essential for comprehending the evolving landscape of international relations.

United States: The U.S. follows a One China Policy that acknowledges the PRC as the legitimate government of China. However, it maintains unofficial relations with Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act, providing for economic and defence support to Taiwan. The One China Policy plays a crucial role in U.S.-China relations and impacts matters like arms sales to Taiwan and diplomatic recognition.

Europe: Many European countries adhere to the One China Policy, but the level of adherence varies. Some countries have official relations with the PRC but maintain unofficial ties with Taiwan. Economic interests, trade relationships, and China's diplomatic pressure often influence their stance.

Japan: Japan follows a One China Policy, recognising the PRC as the legitimate government of China. However, it has unofficial relations with Taiwan and maintains economic and cultural ties.

South Korea: South Korea adheres to the One China Policy, recognising the PRC as China's legitimate government. Its relationship with China is crucial for trade and regional stability, impacting its stance on Taiwan.

India: India maintains a unique position by not explicitly adopting a One China Policy. It recognises the PRC but does not include Taiwan in its foreign policy framework. India's approach to China and Taiwan is influenced by regional security concerns, economic interests, and international dynamics.

Other Countries: Various other nations have to navigate the complexities of the One China Policy. They may choose to recognise the PRC and not Taiwan, or they might maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan to promote economic and cultural exchanges.

It is crucial to delve into how the One China Policy, stemming from the Taiwan matter, has transcended its initial boundaries to exert influence on China's diplomatic engagements with diverse nations. Beyond its role in territorial conflicts, this policy has evolved into a strategic tool, discreetly moulding China's discourse of expansion and assertiveness in the realm of international relations. Leveraging economic clout, employing soft power strategies, and managing narratives, the One China Policy has emerged as a pivotal element in China's pursuit of global influence.

The One China Policy operates as a mechanism designed to underpin Chinese expansionism by preventing international acknowledgment of Taiwan as a distinct sovereign state. This policy has effectively dissuaded nations from formalising diplomatic ties with Taiwan and has exerted pressure on international bodies to exclude Taiwan from participation. A clear manifestation of this policy's influence is the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan. Nations that choose to recognise Taiwan run the risk of incurring China's disapproval and facing potential economic repercussions.

This practice not only serves to safeguard China's territorial claims but also solidifies the One China Policy's pivotal role in China's diplomatic dealings. China adroitly wields economic leverage as a subtle instrument to fortify the One China Policy and secure its expansionist ambitions. Countries seeking access to China's vast consumer market or desiring profitable trade relationships are compelled to adhere to this policy.

A notable example of this dynamic unfolded in 2017 when Panama recognised Taiwan, resulting in the swift suspension of diplomatic relations between China and Panama. China promptly established diplomatic relations with Panama's regional counterparts, illustrating how compliance with the One China Policy is met with rewards.

Also, China strategically employs the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as an economic avenue to subtly advance the One China Policy. Investment in infrastructure projects serves as a means to sway the stance of recipient countries on Taiwan, encouraging them to establish diplomatic relations aligned with China's policy.

The influence of the One China Policy extends through China's cultural diplomacy endeavours. By promoting Chinese culture and language, China enhances its soft power in

nations that recognise the policy. Initiatives like Confucius Institutes, for example, facilitate cultural exchanges while subtly reinforcing the narrative of a unified Chinese identity inherent in the One China Policy.

China's meticulous cultivation of cultural exchanges serves to underscore the policy's undercurrents, discreetly fostering an international milieu where China's vision of unity becomes the norm. This cultural influence facilitates China's expansionist objectives by creating a backdrop of mutual understanding and acceptance. China employs narrative control as a subtle means to magnify the influence of the One China Policy. Leveraging its global media outlets and digital platforms, China effectively shapes international perceptions by presenting Taiwan as an integral part of its sovereign territory. For instance, China portrays Taiwan as an inherent province destined for reunification, thus discreetly embedding the principles of the policy into the global discourse.

The One China Policy discreetly nurtures an environment conducive to China's ambitions for expansion and assertiveness. By forging alliances with countries that align with the policy, China establishes a diplomatic network that champions its interests. This network, in turn, amplifies China's influence within international organisations, granting it the ability to shape decisions and policies in line with its expansionist agenda. China's rhetoric, often rooted in the principles of the One China Policy, constructs a narrative that presents its actions as historical imperatives. This narrative discreetly fuels China's assertiveness by framing its expansion as a natural progression aligned with the core principles of the policy.

By consolidating its claims over Taiwan, China effectively projects its power in the East Asian region while deterring potential challenges to its territorial integrity. Taiwan's strategic location in the Western Pacific holds substantial geopolitical significance. Control over Taiwan enables China to extend its maritime boundaries, secure access to vital sea routes, and bolster its influence over regional security dynamics. The One China Policy reinforces China's commitment to safeguarding its territorial integrity and upholding regional stability, in harmony with its expansionist objectives.

The One China Policy further resonates in China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, where it is intricately linked with Chinese expansionism. This policy bolsters China's position by providing a historical foundation for asserting territorial rights, thus justifying the construction of artificial islands and militarisation in the region. For instance, China often cites historical maps and narratives that align with the principles of the One China Policy to substantiate its claims in the South China Sea.

The policy serves as a tool for advancing expansionism by framing the South China Sea as an integral part of China's territorial integrity. This portrayal dissuades foreign intervention and fosters a sense of entitlement to the region. This demonstrates that the One China Policy is not limited to Taiwan; it extends its influence over maritime boundaries and territorial disputes.

Chinese expansionism is also underpinned by economic motives. Taiwan, with its advanced technology and strong economy, offers attractive prospects for Chinese economic growth. The One China Policy empowers China to apply economic pressure on Taiwan and negotiate

concessions, facilitating further integration of Taiwan's economy into China's sphere of influence.

The One China Policy has evolved into a cornerstone of China's diplomatic relations. Numerous nations, driven by the desire to maintain diplomatic ties with China, adhere to this policy, refraining from formally recognising Taiwan. China effectively utilises its economic prowess to incentivise countries that align with its One China stance while penalising those who deviate from it. Consequently, this policy serves as a tool for China to wield "soft" power and influence international discourse.

On the domestic front, the One China Policy is intrinsically linked with the legitimacy narrative of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It constitutes a central element of the CCP's official nationalism, intertwining the party's role with China's resurgence as a global power. By associating national rejuvenation with the principles of this policy, the CCP reinforces its authority and garners widespread support, thereby strengthening its domestic legitimacy.

The One China Policy intersects with China's governance of ethnic minorities and regions, notably Hong Kong. This policy's assertion of a singular, unified China is employed to legitimise stringent measures in regions characterised by distinct cultural, ethnic, and political identities. This integration of the policy into domestic governance underscores its role as a means to sustain the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) authority and quell dissent. A pertinent example is China's crackdown on pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong, which is framed as a necessary measure to uphold the principles of the One China Policy.

In a similar vein, the policy shapes China's approach to ethnic minority regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet. The narrative of a united China underpins Beijing's endeavours to curtail cultural and religious practices in these areas, as divergent identities are perceived as challenges to the One China Policy's tenets.

The "one" in the One China Policy functions as a potent instrument, implicitly and overtly reinforcing narratives of an undivided territory, a dominant culture, cultural homogeneity, and the compelled assimilation of ethnic minorities. This concept empowers China to assert its territorial claims with increased vigour and rationalise its policies of cultural uniformity and the enforced assimilation of ethnic minority groups, all while presenting these actions as indispensable for the preservation of the nation's unity and stability.

The "one" in the One China Policy underscores the indivisibility of China's territory. This fundamental principle is extended to bolster China's narratives regarding territorial claims, such as in the South China Sea. By highlighting the unity of the nation, China positions its territorial aspirations as a natural continuation of historical unity. This narrative legitimises assertive measures, such as island construction and maritime expansion, by depicting them as efforts aimed at safeguarding the country's inherent unity.

The emphasis on "oneness" within the One China Policy subtly promotes the concept of a dominant Han Chinese culture. This narrative reinforces the notion of a singular Chinese identity, which can result in the suppression of other ethnic cultures. The policy's principles

are employed to downplay ethnic diversity in favour of the dominant culture, often leading to cultural homogenisation. For example, policies that discourage or suppress the languages and traditions of ethnic minorities are justified by aligning them with the goal of achieving a unified culture.

The "one" within the One China Policy serves as a foundation for rationalising policies of forced assimilation among ethnic minorities. China's narrative frames the assimilation of these ethnic groups into the dominant culture as crucial for maintaining unity and preventing internal fragmentation. The policy's principles are used to legitimise measures such as the operation of re-education camps in Xinjiang, where cultural and religious practices are suppressed to align with the dominant culture and the narrative of oneness.

China's narrative places a strong emphasis on the primacy of preserving national unity for the sake of overall stability. By aligning its policies with the principles of the One China Policy, the government argues that measures directed at cultural suppression and assimilation are imperative to avert internal discord. This narrative presents these actions as vital for sustaining harmony within the nation, justifying them in the context of maintaining domestic stability.

Furthermore, the narrative of oneness and an undivided territory, as per the One China Policy, serves to manage global perceptions of China's policies. By framing territorial claims and ethnic policies as integral to the nation's unity, China aims to counter international criticism. This approach aligns with its diplomatic strategy of projecting a consistent image while reinforcing the narrative that these actions are necessary for safeguarding the nation's oneness.

The narrative underpinning the One China Policy serves to bolster the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By positioning the CCP as the guardian of China's unity, this narrative reinforces the party's claim to leadership and authority. It justifies the CCP's firm measures by framing them as essential for upholding the party's vision of a united nation. The One China Policy is inextricably linked with the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy narrative. It constitutes a central element of the CCP's official nationalism, which intertwines the party's role with China's resurgence as a global power. By associating national rejuvenation with the policy's principles, the CCP reinforces its authority and garners widespread support, thus strengthening its legitimacy domestically.

The incorporation of the One China Policy into official nationalism is evident in educational curricula, media narratives, and public discourse. The narrative of a unified China and its historical territorial integrity reinforces citizens' loyalty to the CCP, fostering a sense of national pride rooted in the party's leadership and the policy's principles.

However, while the One China Policy has fortified Chinese expansionism, it has also generated significant controversies. Some countries, notably the United States, Japan, and India, maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan, leading to tensions with China. Furthermore, Taiwan's own ambitions for international recognition challenge the One China Policy, as it endeavours to establish itself as a distinct sovereign entity.

Chinese expansionism is intricately intertwined with the One China Policy, which serves as both a catalyst and an outcome of China's territorial aspirations. This policy not only consolidates China's expansionist agenda but also evolves into a cornerstone of China's diplomatic relationships through the use of economic inducements and "soft" power strategies. As China's influence continues to expand, it is imperative to grasp the intricate dynamics between the One China Policy and Chinese expansionism, the role it plays in the Chinese Communist Party's official nationalism, its policies of forced assimilation towards ethnic minorities, and its overall impact on legitimacy and stability. Such understanding is pivotal for comprehending the ever-evolving landscape of international relations, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

One China Policy and Africa

Dr Abhishek Kr. Darbey

Taiwan has been a key factor in China-Africa relations, and 'One China Principle' is the basic condition for the diplomatic relations between China and the African countries, which mean these countries, cannot establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Eswatini is the only African country that maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Besides, Taiwan has three representative offices in South Africa, Somaliland, and Nigeria. The One China Principle has isolated Taiwan in the continent to an extent but Africa's One China Policy is still giving enough non-diplomatic space to Taiwan that challenges China's Taiwan policy in Africa. As of July 2023, in Africa 53 out of 54 countries recognise the PRC and only Eswatini maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan and it has four missions in Somaliland, Nigeria, Pretoria and Cape Town in South Africa. Altogether, 30 African countries at one time or another maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan but today it has very limited presence in Africa. Taiwan provides visa services for 45 African countries at the Embassy of the Republic of China, Eswatini; Taipei Liaison Office in Pretoria, South Africa; and Taipei Trade Office in Nigeria. The Taiwan External Trade Development Council maintains five trade centres in Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. The total trade volume between Taiwan and Africa is US$6.235 billion in December 2021, and among the top trading African partners are: Algeria (bilateral trade volume US$233 Million), Egypt (US$639 Million), Eswatini (US$16.16 Million), Kenya (US$152 Million), Nigeria (US$625 Million), and South Africa (US$2,292 Million).

Anti-Secession Law 2005 prevents Taiwan secession from China and it promotes unification of Taiwan to mainland China. In Africa only 21 out of 54 countries supported the law, 33 of them did not support the law, and 10 among 21 which have started support for the law are maintaining trade relations with Taiwan. One of the goals of this law is to check the non-diplomatic engagement of Taiwan which is expanding in the continent. Most of the African countries have responded in different ways to One China Principle that says Taiwan is inalienable territory of China, and it is not completely accepted by many that reflects in their 'One China Policy' for instance, many African countries maintains trade relations with Taiwan and it helps African countries negotiate better with China. Many African countries

did not support Anti-Secession Law 2005 because it is not compulsory like "One China Principle', which is a prerequisite condition to establish diplomatic relations with China. Also, the law questions the aspiration of the people in Taiwan and therefore, many African countries are not supporting it.

Altogether, there are 30 African countries at one time or other that had diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Between 1960-1963, there were 23 African countries and among them 13 countries recognised Taiwan, 5 countries recognised the PRC and the rest 5 countries namely, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger and Sierra Leone recognised none of the two (Klein 1963: 49-50). In October 25, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 was passed and recognised the People's Republic of China (PRC) as "the sole legitimate representative of China to the United Nations. Consequently, some African countries shifted the diplomatic ties from Taiwan to the PRC and by the end of 1971, there were 20 African allies to Taiwan and 22 African allies to the PRC. However, in 1979 the United States shifted diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC, and thereafter, a large number of African countries also recognised the PRC.

Throughout the 1990s, the Chinese leaders' visits were substantial and the focus on Africa in terms of foreign aid and assistance reduced soon after the Chinese economic reforms and opening up. The economic relations of China-Africa improved significantly after 2000, for instance, the trade volume of China-Africa was $12 billion in 2002, $18.48 billion in 2003, $39 billion in 2005, $55 billion in 2006 and $73.6billion in 2007. The trade volume reached $200 billion in 2013 (Robert I. Rotberg 2014).

The deepening of economic and trade relations between China- Africa minimizes Taiwan's diplomatic presence in Africa. Specifically after the establishment of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 some African allies of Taiwan have shifted to the PRC. For example, these are the African countries that severed ties with Taiwan after 2000 Senegal, Liberia, Macedonia, the Commonwealth of Dominica, Vanuatu and Grenada, Chad, Malawi and the Gambia. Incidentally, since Chen Shuibian, the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party took over as the President of Taiwan in 2000many African allies severed diplomatic ties. In August 2006, the Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing and the Chadian counterpart Ahmad Allammi signed a joint communique to resume diplomatic ties between the two countries. According to the joint communique signed between China and Chad, "the Chadian government recognises that there is only one China in the world and the government of the PRC is the sole legitimate government representing China. Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory." Similarly, Malawi severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 2008 and it is said that two months prior to cutting diplomatic ties between Taiwan and Malawi, China signed with Malawi the memorandum of understanding for 'one China policy'.

Taiwan's Deputy Foreign Minister Yang Zipao claims that it was September 2007 the Taiwanese Ministry first noticed Beijing's sabotaging Taiwan-Malawian ties at the annual UN assembly. Xie Zhenyan, presidential candidate of the Chinese Nationalist party (KMT) condemned China for its "unreasonable" and "unwise" oppression of Taiwan. Whatever the Taiwanese government suggests, it is the Chinese economic strength that influences the Taiwan African allies. For instance, Burkina Faso is the biggest African trade partner of Taiwan and it used to receive about 8 percent of the country's ODA from Taiwan, but in the

recent few years a strong presence of China is seen there. China exploits a large market of Burkina Faso and about 16 percent of its import constitutes the Chinese manufactured goods. Similarly, since 2009 the China Petrochemical and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) has started oil exploration in the Nigeria-Sao Tome and Principe Joint Development Zone (JDZ). The Chinese economic rise strengthens their confidence to influence the African countries to strictly follow 'one China principle'. These forms of economic engagement provide an opportunity to the Chinese government to attract Taiwan allies and transform into a diplomatic partner.

Dollar Diplomacy

Competition between Taiwan and China to win over a new diplomatic partner led to the practice of 'Dollar Diplomacy'. It was in 1988 when Taiwan first practiced "Dollar Diplomacy" and accepted the dual recognition of Beijing and Taipei. In 1992, Taipei successfully established diplomatic relations with Niger by providing a foreign aid package of $50 million. In 1996, through the "Dollar Diplomacy" it was able to induce three Caribbean countries, one in Central America and eight countries in Africa to establish diplomatic relations with Taipei. In 1997, Taipei successfully convinced and established diplomatic relations with Chad by supplying $125 million and Chad was tired of waiting for the aid commitment by China of $238.3 million. Similarly, Taipei supplied an aid package of $30 million to Sao Tome and Principe in 1997 (Joseph YS Cheng 2009). Later on, between 1994 and 1998, four of these eight African countries resisted its diplomatic ties to China and this reflected the diplomatic contestation in Africa (Cheng 1992; Liu 2001; Taylor 2002). From 1993 to 1997, Liberia maintained a dual recognition of China as well as Taiwan and both the governments maintained their embassy in Liberia's capital Monrovia but this did not work as China refused to accept the dual recognition and stressed on "One China Policy". Thereafter, China increased its foreign aid substantially to counter Taiwan's "Dollar Diplomacy". Li Peng, then Chairman of Standing Committee of National People's Congress, during his visit to Africa in 2001, announced a free grant and an interest free loan of $24million to Tanzania and a free grant of $3.6 million to Zambia (Taylor 2002). At the same time, China strictly applied "One China Policy" in its diplomatic relations as well as in providing foreign aid and thereafter, China does not favour any aid and assistance to countries without diplomatic relations. This was clearly mentioned by China's then President Hu Jintao, during the announcement of China's commitment of assistance measures for the developing countries in UN Summit 2005.

By 2005, China had already established itself as a powerful economy and diplomatic influence of China is far stronger than Taiwan. Most of the developing countries are also willing to be with China as there is great opportunity in economic cooperation and China has proved itself as a reliable partner or friend to the countries having diplomatic relations with China. So, many developing countries still rely on China's foreign aid and economic cooperation.

Table: 3.1, "Dollar Diplomacy"- Diplomatic Rivalry between Beijing-Taipei in Africa.

Countries that broke with Beijing to establish relation with Taipei	Countries that broke with Taipei to establish with Beijing
1989 Liberia (second)*	1993 Liberia (Second)
1990 Guinea-Bissau	1994 Lesotho (Second)
1990 Lesotho (Second)*	1996 Niger (Second)
1991 Central African Republic (Third)*	1998 Central African Republic (Third)
1992 Niger (Second)	1998 Guinea Bissau
1994 Burkina Faso	1998 South Africa
1996 Gambia	2003 Liberia (Third)
1996 Senegal (Second)	2005 Senegal (Second)
1997 Chad (Second)	2006 Chad (Second)
1997 Liberia (Third)	2008 Malawi
1997 Sao Tome and Principe	Swaziland never established diplomatic relation with China.

*These countries previously had diplomatic relation with Taipei severe diplomatic ties to establish diplomatic relations with Taipei.

China's Africa Policy

The PRC announced its first White Paper on China's Africa Policy on 12 January 2006. The policy suggests Beijing's intention to pursue an 'independent foreign policy of peace', and here 'independence' means China does not align with any major powers of the world. The Chinese government also means that they seek for peace, and so they concentrate on development. The policy document suggests that China will develop relations with all the African countries based on Five Principles of Peaceful Cooperation. The white paper released is based on China's previous Africa policies, such as its Africa policy document released in 2000, FOCAC's 'Beijing Declaration', Programme of China-Africa cooperation in economic and social development, and 'Addis Ababa Action Plan' of December 2003, etc. The key elements in the white paper mentioned are, ongoing economic development in Africa; emphasis on historical experiences of China-Africa relations; the future bilateral ties will be based on 'sincerity, equality, mutual benefits, solidarity and common development'.

The key principles of the policy mentioned in the document are, 'win-win' exchanges; sincerity, friendship and equality; mutual benefits; mutual support and close coordination; learning from each other and common development; and adhere to "one China policy". The white paper suggests strengthening six areas of China-Africa relations namely, high-level visits; exchanges between legislative bodies; exchanges between political parties; to establish consultation mechanism; cooperation in internal affairs; and exchanges between local governments.

The policy also emphasised on the areas of education, science, health and culture, which are seen as new forms of engagements in China-Africa relations. It will include, training of African students in China; increasing cultural exchanges; administrative cooperation; consular cooperation to ensure the safety of citizens; environmental cooperation; cooperation in disaster management; strengthening people-to-people exchanges, especially the youth; cooperation of media; and expansion of cooperation in science & technology. In the areas of peace & security, the white paper mentioned the following forms of engagements: Chinese participation in the UN Peace Keeping Operation (UNPKO) in Africa;

enhancing cooperation in intelligence exchanges on terrorism; military cooperation, including the training of African armed forces; and exchanges between judiciary and law enforcement agencies.

The white paper also specifies that one China principle is the political foundation for China diplomatic relations with African countries and regional organisation. The African bilateral partner must refuse to have diplomatic relations with Taiwan and support China's national reunification. The white paper also suggests the policy measures enhance all-round cooperation between China and Africa. Yun Sun (2014) suggests that China has smoother relations and more policy success on the African continent, and in the case of Africa, it does not pose any direct threat to China's national security. He supported his argument and said that Africa does not support Taiwan, Tibet or Xinjiang in their pursuit of independence. Africa is also least interested in promoting democracy in China. It has always been relatively easier for China to secure African support which is most of the time crucial for the Chinese domestic as well as international agendas. Sun added that, despite the impressive growth of the Chinese economy, China's economic interest in the continent is relatively low.

According to Roth, "China's policies have not only propped up some of the continent's worst human rights abuses but also weakened the leverage of others trying to promote greater respect for human rights". In most of the cases, China has either blocked or abstained from voting on UN Resolution or sanction against Sudan. For instance, in July 2004, China abstained from voting on Resolution 1556 that demanded disarmament of Janjaweed militia in Darfur. On 31 August 2006 China abstained from voting on Resolution 1706 for expanding the mandate of UN mission in Sudan.

On questioning China's non-interference policy, Sophie Richardson, Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch, Asia Division commented, "China insists that it will not interfere in other countries 'domestic affairs', but it also claimed to be a great friend of the African people and a responsible major power. But that does not square with China being silent while mass killing goes on in Darfur."

The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue

On 21 February 2000 the PRC Government issued another white paper titled "The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue", and it suggests that the settlement of Taiwan issue and reunification of China is the fundamental interests of the Chinese nations. In October 1949, soon after the defeat of the Nationalist Party by the Communist Party of China, the Kuomintang (KMT) retreated and moved to Taiwan, and since then it remained an issue for the PRC. Thereafter, the PRC government issued several policy documents to uphold their sovereign rights over Taiwan and gradually evolved the "one China Principle". In 1979 the then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping formulated a constitutional principle "one country, two system" for the peaceful reunification of China. It means that there is only one China i.e. the PRC and the three distinct Chinese regions namely, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. The principle suggests each of the three regions could continue to have its own political system, legal, economic and financial affairs, including external relations with foreign countries. In the case of Taiwan even the autonomy of maintaining separate military forces is offered. The Republic of China (ROC) refused the proposal and all the major political parties of Taiwan are strongly against the principle "One China, Two System".

This white paper says from the 1990s Lee Teng-hui, former President of Taiwan and a Kuomintang member, has progressively betrayed the one-China principle and is striving to promote "two China". This document has also objected to the use of designations "Republic of China" and "government of the Republic of China" by Taiwan and claims Taiwan has completely forfeited its right to exercise state sovereignty on behalf of China and, in reality, has always remained only a local authority in Chinese territory. The document also claims that the Central People's Government telegraphed the United Nations, announcing that the KMT authorities had "lost all basis, both de jure and de facto, to represent the Chinese people". It blames the US government dishing out such fallacies as "the status of Taiwan has yet to be determined" and later, step by step, lobbied for "dual recognition" among the international community to create "two China". The document also highlights that during the 30-40 years after 1949, Taiwan claimed to be the sole legal authority of China and also opposed "two China" and "Taiwan independence". It suggests Taiwan has also maintained there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory. It also refers to the message issued by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) in January 1979 that pointed out "the Taiwan authorities have always stood firm on the one China position and opposed the independence of Taiwan. This is our common stand and our basis for cooperation."

In the above context, it should be noted that from 1949 to 1971 the United Nations recognised the Republic of China as the sole legal authority of China and in this phase the rivalry was between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) on their claim of authority over China. Throughout the People's Republic of China government has never said Taiwan or the Republic of China is an independent state but by de facto Taiwan still exists as an independent state and enjoys diplomatic ties with 22 countries. Since 1949, the PRC is in a stronger position over the Taiwan Strait crisis as mainland China was under their control and the CPC played a great role in transforming an isolated and relatively weak China into a powerful state with a very strong global influence politically as well as economically. On the other hand, the ROC government had jurisdiction only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu but it enjoyed strong support by several powerful democratic states which eventually did not work out in favour of the ROC. Today, the ROC government is working hard for the recognition of "two China" and Taiwan as an independent state, and the PRC government is working for reunification of China and to oppose the recognition of "two China". The PRC government complains that since the early 1990s, then President of the ROC Li Denghui trumpeting "two governments," "two reciprocal political entities," "Taiwan is already a state with independent sovereignty" and "At the present stage the Republic of China is on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China is on the mainland." It is said in the white paper that Li Denghui has become the general representative of Taiwan's separatist forces, a stumbling block in the development of Sino-US relations and a troublemaker in the peace and stability of Asia Pacific region. In the white paper, the PRC government tries to manipulate the entire context of the ROC government's previous position on "two China" and Taiwan as part of China, and it propagates Taiwan government has always been willing to cooperate in the reunification of China as their political position suggests so.

The PRC government believes the One –China Principle is the foundation stone for its policy on Taiwan and there is no clarity about the date of formulation of this policy but it is

generally said that this policy has evolved since 1949 without the existence of the term "one China Principle". The document suggests that Beijing has shifted its definition of one China slightly to encompass a concept called the '1992 Consensus' and under this consensus, both governments agree that there is only one sovereign state encompassing both mainland China and Taiwan, but disagree about which of the two governments is the legitimate government of this state. In the white paper it is said that on January 30, 1995, President Jiang Zemin explicitly pointed out: "Adhering to the One-China Principle is the basis and prerequisite for peaceful reunification." Among the various political parties in Taiwan the Pan-Blue Coalition which includes Kuomintang, the People First Party, and the New Party accepts the One China Principle but at the same time they also clarify that the ROC is the only legitimate "One China" while the PRC is illegitimate. On the other hand the Pan-Green Coalition parties which include the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union view Taiwan as a country separate from China. In this context it is to be noted that in 2003 the Republic of China established diplomatic relations with Kiribati and declared officially that Kiribati could continue to have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The Chinese government also explained in the white paper that Li Denghui's "two states" theory would make it impossible for China to achieve peaceful reunification. The Chinese government claims that the Taiwan government has announced that they will not amend their "constitution" and "laws" according to the "two states" theory.

There are debates about the questions involving the one China principle in the cross-straits relations. The Chinese government refutes the Taiwan government position on "two Chinas" and "two states" theory and defends the argument by suggesting the Chinese territory and sovereignty has not been split, and the two sides of the Straits are not two states. The Taiwan government strengthens their argument by suggesting that since 1949 each side of the Strait have been divided and governed separately, with neither side having jurisdiction over the other. They have further added that the government of the People's Republic of China has never ruled Taiwan and since 1991 Taiwan has witnessed a government that has nothing to do with mainland China. The Chinese government puts a counter argument suggesting that after the CPC's victory in the civil war in 1949 against the KMT, the government of the PRC replaced the government of the ROC as the legal authority of China including Taiwan. On the debate of Taiwan's status as a part of China by referendum on the pretext that "sovereignty belongs to the people", China opposes it by arguing under both domestic and international laws Taiwan's legal status as part of Chinese territory is unequivocal and there can be no premise for using referendum to decide any matter of self-determination. Second argument says, "Sovereignty belongs to the people" refers to all the people of the state, and not certain people or the people of certain regions.

The Chinese government also refutes democracy and system as an excuse for obstructing the reunification of China. It is said the Taiwan government has repeatedly declared that "democratization on the China mainland is the key to the reunification of China" and that "the real essence of the cross-Straits issue is a contest between systems." The Chinese government defends by saying the CPC and the Chinese government has consistently striven to promote socialist democracy and "one country two system" will support the functioning of Taiwan's current form of system. Here, the form of democracy that Taiwan practices does not match with what China talks about its socialist democracy, and in fact it can never be a better substitute as a form of democracy. In 1996 Taiwan had its first direct

presidential election and previously the president and vice president had been chosen in a ballot of the deputies of the National Assembly, in accordance with the 1947 constitution. So far six such democratic elections have been conducted in Taiwan including the recently held Republic of China presidential election 2016, and the aspirations for democratization of Taiwan that has developed among the Taiwanese is possibly the biggest hurdle for the Chinese government initiative of reunification of China.

In January 2006, China issued its African policy paper, aimed at presenting "to the world the objectives of China's policy towards Africa and the measures to achieve them." In section III of the document an emphasis on the significance Beijing places on Africa obedience to the "one China principle" is highlighted. The document further advances the "one China policy", stating that if African countries accepts the "one China principle" as the political foundation for the establishment and development of China's relations with African countries," Beijing would "co-ordinate positions on major international and regional issues and stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity and human rights." (Ian Taylor 2010)

Understanding "Anti-Secession Law, 2005"

On March 14, 2005 the Chinese government adopted Anti-Secession Law at the Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress as a step to strengthen their interest in reunification of China. Article 1 clearly says it is for the purpose of opposing and checking Taiwan's secession from China by secessionists in the name of "Taiwan independence. It also states the PRC shall never allow the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means. It claims Taiwan is China's internal affair, which subjects to no interference by any outside forces. The Anti-Secession Law upholds the principle of one China as the basis of peaceful reunification of the country. The Article 6 of the law emphasised on the measures to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and promote cross-straits relations. Article 6 enforces deeper engagement in economic, cultural and security aspects which may provide the PRC government an opportunity to influence the Taiwan government directly. Article 7 clearly says that the PRC stands for the achievement of peaceful reunification and to consult on the political status of Taiwan. Article 8 suggests the PRC government shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to resist "Taiwan independence". Article 9 ensures that while executing non-peaceful means against Taiwan, the PRC government shall exert its utmost to protect the lives, property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan civilians. The Article 9 of the Anti-Secessionist Law tries to justify the non-peaceful means of the PRC government by suggesting that the action will be on state or government or military but not on the Taiwanese. Here, the PRC government should not undermine the fact that the "Taiwan independence" is the aspiration of the Taiwan citizens who have already understood the significance of a democratic state. In this situation the non-peaceful means of the PRC government against Taiwan will not be easy and it may face the strongest resistance from the Taiwanese people. It is possible that such action of the PRC may be supported by the African allies but it may fail to get the African populist support.

African Response on Anti-Secession Law, 2005

On March 20, 2005 President of Nigeria Olusegun Obasanjo stated that Nigeria supported China's Anti-Secession Law and further added that the Anti-Secession Law enacted would serve as deterrence to the pro-independence forces in Taiwan. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs PRC 2005) According to a Nigerian newspaper *Leadership* reporting, in June 2015, the Taiwanese Trade Mission in Nigeria called for effective collaboration with the Nigerian Government to avoid double taxation on Taiwanese investments in Nigeria. It also demanded to ensure protection of Taiwanese investments in Nigeria and boost bilateral economic ties. It is estimated that the Taiwanese investment in Nigeria is about $91.3 million which includes 20 companies employing 2,000 Nigerian. The Taiwanese Trade Mission also stated, "Taiwan's edge in innovation and development in high technological electronics, machineries, petro-chemical industries, and highly value added agriculture should offset the disadvantage the primary industries in Nigeria are suffering. Nigerian conglomerates like Dangote Group, D-Link Nigeria and other high tech companies in Nigeria are currently benefiting from cooperative ventures with Taiwanese world renowned industries. Taiwan willingly shares its industrial know-how with interested friendly countries and their entrepreneurs including Nigeria." The deepening of economic ties between Taiwan and Nigeria will certainly strengthen Taiwan's pro-independence movement. The above information indicates Nigeria is dependent on both the PRC and Taiwan, and it certainly makes a difficult situation for the Chinese government in their goal of achieving national reunification. It also indicates that possibly the Nigerian government acts and negotiates on the Taiwan Strait issue primarily keeping in mind their own interests.

On 18 March 2005, the Ghana Chinese Chamber of Commerce on the Anti-Secession Law expressed their support and stated the law is an expression of the maximum goodwill and sincerity of the Chinese Government to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. There is no specific statement from the Ghanaian government on the Anti-Secession Law. According to a Taiwan News report, in October 2015 a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed between the Taiwan External Trade Development (TAITRA) and the Ghana Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCI). The President of GCCI Seth Adjei Baah stated, "Not only can we help Taiwan businesses gain access to the Ghanaian market, but also pave the way for additional opportunities in Africa's Sub-Saharan regions." It was assumed that Taiwan's product supply chains would gain easier access to the West African markets, while counterparts in Ghana could look to export their precious industrial minerals, cocoa, petroleum, and non-traditional items to the island. Peter W.J. Huang, President and CEO of TAITRA said that in February 2016 TAITRA will be leading a delegation of Taiwanese business people to Accra, Ghana's capital in order to bridge closer bilateral trade ties. It was reported on 24 February 2016 that Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA) is leading a business delegation of 32 Taiwanese enterprises to visit Ghana, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and South Africa from 20 February-5 March 2016. Therefore, there is a positive sign for the Taiwan-Ghana economic ties which will probably complicate China's national reunification process.

According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on March 15, 2005 Terence Sinunguruza, Minister of External Relations and Cooperation of Burundi indicated to the Chinese ambassador to Burundi Feng Zhijun that the government and people of Burundi understand and supports China's Anti-Secession Law.

On March 15, 2005, Ndongou, Foreign Minister- Level Representative of Gabon said to China's Ambassador to Gabon Xie Jinwei that Gabon fully understands and supports the adoption of Anti-Secession Law and the Chinese goal to achieve national reunification.

On March 16, 2005, on behalf of the Federal Council of the Ethiopian Parliament Speaker Mulatu expressed support to the PRC for the adoption of the Anti-Secession Law. He sent messages to Chairman Wu Bangguo of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and Chairman Jia Qinglin of the Chinese People's Political and Consultative Conference which said the Anti-Secession Law is aimed at peaceful resolution of Taiwan issue and peaceful reunification of China. He also added that this law will contribute to the peace and stability across Taiwan Straits and the world at large.

According to a Taipei based newspaper *Business Wire* reporting on December 2, 2009, the Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA) will lead a trade delegation of 30 Taiwanese companies to visit Algeria, Morocco and Ethiopia in December 2009. Similar Taiwan trade mission to Ethiopia was carried out by TAITRA in 2011 and 2013, but we do not see any significant trade exchanges between Taiwan and Ethiopia.

On March 16, 2005, the Parliament and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Namibia issued their separate statement to extend support for the Anti-Secession Law. The statement said Namibia understands and supports the NPC passed Anti-Secession Law which demonstrates the resolute determination of the Chinese government and people to realise peaceful reunification. Similarly, on March 17, 2005, the government of Niger expressed their support for China's Anti-Secession Law. It is also seen that on August 15, 2011 the Government of Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of Niger signed a trade agreement at Niamey. According to the agreement the two governments shall grant mutual favourable treatment for the export and import license, custom duties and other taxes on the basis of reciprocity; and to encourage and promote the visits of their manufacturers and merchants to each other's country; and shall organise permanent or temporary expositions in each other's territory.

According to the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) there are 21 African countries and the African Union has extended their support of the Anti-Secession Law passed by the National People's Congress of the PRC. They are namely, Comoros, Zambia, Lesotho, Niger, Nigeria, Mauritania, Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, Mali, Gabon, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau, Uganda, Namibia, Burundi, Central African Republic, South Africa and the African Union. In Africa there are altogether 53 countries and 32 of them have not extended their support for China's Anti-Secession Law, 2005. Among the 21 African states which have issued statements in support of China's Anti-Secession Law there are 10 countries namely, Zambia, Niger, Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, Gabon, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Uganda and South Africa having trade engagement with Taiwan. The above data also suggests that Taiwan is still a factor in China-Africa relations. There are two concerns for the PRC, one the expansion of Taiwan's economic engagements with African states and a significant number of African states that do not extend their support for the Anti-Secession Law and Reunification of China. It also means a number of African countries possibly willing to follow dual recognition but 'one China policy' compels them to do so.

Conclusions

'One China Policy' in Africa varies from country to country and all 53 countries follow the PRC advocated 'One China Principle' in their respective diplomatic ties with China. There are various factors identified that shape Africa's 'One China Policy': First, 'One China Principle' is the main factor that influences 'One China Policy' framed by an African country for the Taiwan issue. Most African countries recognise Taiwan as an inalienable part of the PRC but there are African countries having diplomatic ties with the PRC maintaining non-diplomatic trade relations with Taiwan. Over the years, the diplomatic partners of ROC have declined to one in the continent but there is expansion of non-diplomatic space for Taiwan in Africa. The increase in non-diplomatic space for Taiwan in Africa will create a condition where the 'One China Policy' will be in favour of the Africans because the Taiwan factor will help the African leaders to negotiate better with the Chinese.

Second, China's Africa policy is a major factor that influences the 'One China Policy' in the continent. In the Chinese foreign policy, Africa is given special significance which is reflected in the bilateral exchanges. It is mandatory that every year the Chinese Foreign Minister's first visit will be to Africa. There are regular bilateral visits by senior leaders from both sides including the heads of states. The stable bilateral relations is also a factor that shapes 'One China Policy' in favour of China.

Third, China's aid and assistance to Africa factors in framing Africa's 'One China Policy'. There countries in Africa indebted to the Chinese and it becomes harder for these countries under the given condition to negotiate better with the Chinese. Such countries generally reiterate China's position on Taiwan. China's aid program is part of China's Africa Policy aimed at pursuing 'One China Principle'.

Fourth, China's economic and trade relations with Africa influence the 'One China Policy' in the continent. Chinese investments in the various sectors in Africa including mining, infrastructure development projects create conditions for China to negotiate better with the African countries.

Remarks by the Chair: Ambassador Pankaj Saran

This is a comprehensive overview, and it highlights some of the complexities in the situation. It becomes evident that the approach towards Taiwan's offices, as well as the distinction between political and trade relations, is of paramount importance. The discussion about Nigeria's diplomatic negotiation regarding the location of the office underscores China's influence. However, some African countries, like Eswatini and others, have displayed the courage to maintain relations with Taiwan. The differentiation between diplomatic and political ties on one hand, and trade and economic relations on the other, is a crucial aspect. You mentioned that there are approximately 23 countries actively trading with Taiwan, which is a significant number.

One China Policy and Russia

Professor Peter Rutland

The Ukraine war is of global significance and the solutions will have to be a global solution involving countries such as India in trying to unpack the confrontation between Russia and the West

Mark Knight 24 February 2022

Russia is a strong supporter of the One China policy

- Russia consistently supports the 'one China' policy.
- It opposes US security guarantees for Taiwan and US military alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
- Russian rhetoric about unification became more assertive in 2021, after the US withdrawal from Afghanistn.

'Over the past 10 to 15 years, the US has developed a rather nasty habit of inciting its friends and partners to make risky and even reckless decisions, and then easily abandoning these friends and partners when the latter had to pay the bill. The reliability of American guarantees has been seriously and permanently undermined.' Andrei Kortunov Oct 2021

In addition to Afghanistan he cited US inaction in response to Georgia 2008 and Crimea 2014.

It is somewhat of an obvious point to make, that Russia has always been a very strong supporter of the One China Policy. It opposes the secession of Taiwan, it opposes U.S security guarantees for Taiwan, U.S provision of weapons to Taiwan and it opposes more generally U.S military presence in the Indo-pacific region. Andrej Kortunova, leading Russian scholar argued in October 2021 that Russian rhetoric about One China Policy had become more assertive this is before the Ukraine invasion. So Kortunova wrote "*Over the past 10 to 15 years the US has developed a rather nasty habit of inciting its friends and partners to make risky and reckless decisions and then abandoning these friends and partners when the latter has to pay the bill. The reliability of American guarantees has been seriously and permanently undermined*" so that is a key argument that Russia is making that the United States is an unreliable ally and the main case they have in mind of course is the abrupt departure from Afghanistan which came as a shock to American allies after 20 years of commitment the U.S just ran away. So I think Russia was emboldened by the Afghanistan experience to assume

that America will not get involved in Ukraine and other examples that Kortunova cited was the Russian attack on Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 neither of which caused any serious repercussions from the United States. so here we have more recently in September 22 the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Tashkent where again we saw Putin expressing his support for the One China Policy.

On the same page

In a September 2022 meeting with President Xi at the SCO summit in Tashkent Putin reaffirmed Russian support for One China policy and condemned US 'provocations' over Taiwan.

Ways in which the Ukraine war makes conflict over Taiwan less likely

- New anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles favor the defense, making invasion of Taiwan more costly.

  Bi-khim Hsiao, Taiwan's representative in the US, said on 30 May 2023 that Ukraine's success in defending itself will deter China from attacking Taiwan.

- Russian weapons have shown themselves to be less effective than NATO weapons.
- Russia is shown to be weak and unstable (Wagner mutiny), and thus less reliable as an ally for China.
- The sanctions have seriously impacted the Russian economy: sanctions on China would be even more damaging.

The two broad categories of factors which make it more likely to see conflict over Taiwan in the wake of the Ukraine war and factors that make it less likely. So starting with the more optimistic points these are the arguments about why the Ukraine war makes conflict over Taiwan less likely. First the Ukraine war has shown that the new generation of Technologies anti-aircraft, anti-ship, anti-tank, weapons are devastatingly effective and this favors the defense. So this enabled Ukraine to defend itself when Kiev was attacked and now unfortunately it is enabling Russia to defend itself against Ukrainian counter-offensive so

this technology favours the defence and in the case of Taiwan, Taiwan is the defending power. So Taiwan 's representative in the U.S said on 30th of May that Ukraine's success in defending itself will deter China from attacking Taiwan.

Second point is that in general the U.S Western weapons have performed more effectively in Ukraine than the Russian weapons. A lot of surprise that the Russian Air Force has not been able to establish air superiority even though the Russian Air Force vastly outnumbers the Ukrainian Air Force.

It is not just that the defensive weapons are more effective it is that the Russian weapons are less effective more generally Russia's debacle in Ukraine has weakened its standing, politically, militarily and economically and the failed Wagner Mutiny last month just to reinforce this sense that Russia is not stable and reliable an ally as China might have supposed. Final point is that the sanctions that the Western Powers imposed on Russia have not crippled the Russian economy but they have impacted the Russian economy quite severely and China given its concern about reviving economic growth China must be worried that Western sanctions on China would be at least as impactful as the relation as they've been on Russia.

The other broad reason for thinking that China may be more cautious after the Ukraine war is that before the Ukraine war divisions in the Western Alliance were growing President Emmanuel Macron of France talked about NATO being brain dead in 2019 but the Ukraine war has reunified Europe behind the U.S and even as strengthened NATO with Finland and Sweden joining the alliance again previously the European Union was very reluctant to join president Trump's trade war with China I think the unification around Ukraine and the fact that China is supporting Russia in Ukraine has made it more likely that the European Union will go along with more assertive U.S policy towards China.

The Ukraine war has unified European allies behind US leadership.

- In 2019 President Macron had talked about NATO being 'brain dead': in 2023 it accepted Finland and Sweden as new members,
- Previously the European Union was reluctant to join the US trade war with China.
- April 2023 comments from China's ambassador to France Lu Shaye, challenging the sovereignty of the Baltic states, sparked an outcry across Europe.
- Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu gave a speech in Prague on 14 June 2023, in the same room where the Czech president had spoken.

Ukraine war has unified Asian allies behind US leadership.

- Taiwan, Japan and South Korea joined the sanctions.
- Kishida's government plans to double Japan's defense budget to $310 billion by 2027.
- March 2022 Russia added Taiwan to the Unfriendly Countries and Territories List.
- August 2022 Taiwan cancelled visa-free travel for Russians, introduced in 2018.
- Sep 2022 the US announced a new $1 bn package for Taipei under its military sales program.
- 28 July 2023 the US announced a $345 bn weapons package for Taiwan, for the first time under Presidential Drawdown Authority,

The Ukraine war has also seen America's allies in the Eastern Pacific in the East Asia, Japan, South Korea and Chai Wan all joined the sanctions on Russia. Japan has promised to boost its defense budget by a 100% in response Russia added Taiwan to the unfriendly countries and territories list and in summer of 2022 Taiwan canceled the Visa free travel regime for Russians which had been introduced in 2018. So, we see that this the economic and some cultural ties between Russia and China have decreased and at the same time the U.S has been stepping up its arms sales to Taiwan and for the first time now just last week President Biden was announced that he would be sending some weapons to Taiwan under Presidential Drawdown Authority which means he can take the weapons from the stockpiles without getting Congressional approval.

Ways in which the Ukraine war makes conflict over Taiwan more likely

- It shows the US is unwilling to commit its own troops in combat against a nuclear armed foe.
- Fiona Hill said in May 2023 'the Ukraine war highlights the decline of the United States.'
- Deterrence failed. 'Allies must analyze, and urgently address, the reasons why deterrence failed in Ukraine' John Culver and Sarah Kirchberger, Atlantic Council
- Ukraine is depleting US attention, money and weapons, leaving less to invest in Asian security.
- Hence delays in arms deliveries to Taiwan because weapons are being sent to Ukraine.
- Ukraine shows that war can come at any time, and imposes a heavy cost.
  Taiwan has no desire to be the next Ukraine.

However, there are some ways in which the Ukraine war makes conflict over Taiwan more likely, first of all back to the point about the reliability of the US as an ally even though the US has been sending weapons to Ukraine it hasn't been sending its own troops so there's a clear red line that the United States does not want to get involved in direct combat with Russia and if you extrapolate that to Taiwan it implies that the U.S would also be unwilling to use its own forces to help defend Taiwan although obviously we don't know the answer to that question it is all speculation and extrapolation. Secondly, former National Security adviser on Russia at Fiona Hill who's a very cautious person said that uh the Ukraine war highlights the decline of the United States bluntly parked the U.S was trying to deter Russia from attacking Ukraine and it failed the deterrence didn't work and the threat of sanctions did not deter Russia so that key strategy of the United States failed and if deterrence failed in Ukraine maybe deterrence will also fail in regard to Taiwan.

The U.S has spent over 110 billion dollars in the last 18 months in Aid to Ukraine of which about 43 billion is military aid which is a colossal sum of money and it is depleted the stocks of ammunition and missiles in the U.S Arsenal so the simply less arms available to be sent or sold to Taiwan.

More broadly I think the depressing conclusion from the Ukraine war is that this shows that war is still possible in the 21st century that one country can attack a neighbour for no reason with no warning and that the costs of war on both sides, on all sides are very high indeed so nobody is winning from the Ukraine war, everybody is losing and so that's a rather depressing picture.

China's economic response

- China is buying more Russian oil and gas. In the first half of 2023, China imported 2.13 million barrels/day of crude from Russia. In June it was 2.6 mbd, up 38% from June 2022: 23% of all oil imports.
- In first half 2023 China doubled the import of Russian gas to $1 billion a month.
- China has avoided open and direct delivery of arms or components to Russia.
- Chinese companies have cut back ties to Russia for fear of secondary sanctions.
- China has not rushed to invest in Russia, has delayed agreement of second 'Power of Siberia' gas pipeline.
- Russia increased trade with China by 30% last year to $191 bn, now accounts for 22% of Russian trade. Port and rail bottlenecks are preventing further increase.
- China trade with Central Asia increased 60%, much of that is going on to Russia.

I talk briefly about the economics of the relationship, broadly speaking China and India have increased their purchases of Russian oil and this is giving important dollar revenue to Russia.

China's political response

- China has accepted the Russian narrative on Ukraine, that NATO is to blame.
- China has voted with Russia at UN.
- China's Global Security Initiative picks up Russian idea of 'indivisible security'.

However:

- China continues to voice support for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- Nov 2022 President Xi Jinping plea to stop making threats of use of nuclear weapons.
- Feb 2023 China's released 12 point peace plan: 'Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis' It was really about Taiwan not Ukraine.
- Foreign minister Qin Gang said in a press conference 14 April 2023 with German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock that China would not sell weapons to either side in Ukraine.

The political response of China has been that it accepts the Russian narrative on the Ukraine war has sided with Russia at the U.N and picked up even this Russian notion of indivisible security which means Russia has a veto basically over the security policy of its neighbours but there are some signs that China maybe distancing itself a little bit from the Russian position for example President Xi has been quite clear about the inadmissibility of the use of nuclear weapons something which Russia is not ruled out.

Distant neighbors



I also see some question marks on the Russian side even though they announced a No Limits partnership and President Putin and Xi have met over 40 times they've stepped up their joint military exercises including an exercise involving Russian ships passing through Taiwan ese Waters at the same time Russia is wary of China it is aware that China is the stronger partner it is aware that China is pushing a very hard deal on its oil and gas projects in Russia and so I think this the balance between Russia and China remains uncertain and the Carnegie scholar Mikhail Korostikov said a year and a half after the start of the war interaction between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China proceeds basically according to the same rules as before so I think the Ukraine war increased the stress on the Russia-China relationship but didn't fundamentally change it.

It is often forgotten that China had a large economic interests in in Ukraine before the war not as big as its imports and exports to Russia but still it was expanding in Ukraine and actually signed the lease on a vast amount of Ukrainian Farmland so the economic damage from the Ukraine war has also impacted China.

Comments by the Chair: Ambassador Pankaj Saran

Thank you so much Professor Rutland for this wonderful summary and insights into this very critical relationship which has been directly impacted by the Ukraine conflict as you have brought out and this is an area that there is a huge deal of interest in India to study and to understand not just what is happening today but also in terms of its medium term and long-term impact on Taiwan on the Russia China relationship and how these two major powers are going to deal with each other and also separately deal with the collective West which is the United States and Europe so these are critical questions and part and parcel of the whole discussion about the future of Taiwan and what we make of various Chinese documents regarding reunification and completion of their unfulfilled dream and ambition to reunite and this point about whether Ukraine has increased or not the chances of a conflict over Taiwan and as in your opinion you have you say that the prospects have reduced although there is another body of opinion which argues that chances of more tensions over Taiwan might have actually grown but anyway we will discuss all this and over to the discussion.

Points Emerging from the Discussion

- The alignment of African nations with China is often characterised by a tendency not to oppose Chinese positions, particularly in matters concerning human rights, including the situation in Urumqi and domestic violence within China. This alignment suggests that there exists a strong and consistent relationship between African countries and China, with Chinese stances frequently being supported by African nations.

- Expecting African nations to push back against China is not considered realistic due to their asymmetrical situation. Africa is a playground for major power rivalry and competition. This understanding is held by Africans themselves. In their developmental history, there was a stage where, because of their colonial past, whether it was the British, the French, or any other colonial power, they were very wary and suspicious of Western development and political agendas. This was particularly the case in the immediate postcolonial period when the rules-based order was being constructed. It was predominantly the victorious powers, largely from the Western world, that formulated these rules of engagement and determined how the world would be arranged and organised. The Africans were still dealing with the effects and hardships of the colonial period, so there was a natural reluctance to welcome the West.
  The first phase was characterised by anti-Western sentiment, which China capitalised upon. During this period, there was relative neglect of Africa by the West, and Africa pushed back against Western influence. It was during this time that China exploited this strategic vacuum and moved in rapidly.
  In countries like Ethiopia, for instance, the focus has been on education, teaching, and skill development by India, with the aim of making contributions wherever possible. The India-Africa Summit process, initiated 15 years ago, saw all 54 African leaders being brought to Delhi for the first time. This event marked a renewal of India's outreach to Africa.

- Despite some disillusionment with China and a growing scepticism surrounding initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it remains challenging for African nations to challenge China on the One China Policy. African countries acknowledge the downsides of the Chinese development model in Africa but are constrained by China's overwhelming influence and projection of power.

- This issue extends beyond Africa, in Europe too, there is a sense of caution regarding Taiwan and the One China Policy, with European countries not rushing to establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan or receive figures like His Holiness the Dalai Lama. European leaders and nations demonstrate similar circumspection. Realism must guide our expectations in Africa and beyond, considering the complex web of international relations and power dynamics at play.

- When delving into international relations, it is imperative to distinguish between the African and Russian contexts, as they occupy distinct theaters. A critical factor contributing to this dynamic is Africa's historical context, particularly its colonial legacy, which has left a lasting impact. During the immediate postcolonial era when the rules-based international order was taking shape, it was predominantly shaped by victorious powers, primarily from the Western world. The formulation of global rules and engagement understandably met with skepticism

from many African nations, given their painful experiences during the colonial period. The legacy of colonialism, characterised by exploitation and instability, led to a reluctance among African nations to fully embrace Western powers. This historical backdrop has profoundly influenced Africa's perception of its position in the global arena and the nature of its relationships with various global actors.

- It appears that we are entering the next phase of the geopolitical reality in Africa, where Africans are increasingly realising that China's entry into the continent has brought its own set of serious problems. This marks a shift where they have tested the promises made by China and are now discovering that Chinese policies in Africa are not as altruistic as initially portrayed. The euphoria and the positive image that China created for itself are now being scrutinized and questioned in various African nations. We may be at a point where the shine has been taken off China's image as a benevolent and undemanding development partner.

- Consequently, there is a need to reinvent relationships with both the West and countries like India. India has a unique relationship with Africa, with a different history and approach. In its own "quiet way," India has been fairly active in many parts of Africa, even though there might be some areas where this engagement is not as pronounced.

- We stand at the threshold of a new phase in Africa's geopolitical landscape. African nations are increasingly coming to terms with the fact that China's engagement in Africa has brought forth a host of significant challenges and complexities. We are now witnessing a period where African countries have undertaken a closer examination of China's policies and are discovering that they are not as altruistic as initially portrayed. The once-shining image of China as a benevolent and non-demanding development partner is gradually losing its lustre. Today, there's a growing awareness that the gloss on China's policies in Africa has faded. This phase necessitates a revaluation of Africa's relationships, not only with China but also with Western nations and countries like India. India, in particular, holds a unique position in Africa's history and geopolitics, marked by a distinct engagement that sets it apart from Western powers.

- Debt stress is a significant concern in Africa, with countries like Angola and Kenya ranking high among those indebted to China. While infrastructure projects initiated by Chinese investments have the potential to benefit both Chinese interests and African nations, the mounting debt obligations place African countries in a disadvantaged negotiating position, given their struggle to repay these loans. Moreover, China's substantial investment in constructing nearly 50 seaports, including overseas bases such as Djibouti, further skews the negotiation dynamics in China's favour. Looking ahead, one must consider whether the African continent will play a pivotal role in shaping China's evolving global influence and role on the international stage.

- China follows a consistent pattern in its foreign investments, particularly in countries with valuable mineral resources. This pattern comprises two primary elements:
  Resource Exploitation: China invests significantly in the extraction and development of mineral resources in these nations. These investments often involve substantial improvements in infrastructure within the mining sector, designed to enhance the efficiency of resource extraction.

Market Expansion: Concurrently, China seeks to expand its market presence in these regions. Infrastructure projects are meticulously planned to serve a dual purpose: supporting the mining sector's needs and facilitating the efficient transportation of mineral resources to China. This strategic approach aligns with China's overarching objective of ensuring a reliable supply of minerals to meet its industrial requirements. This approach reflects the complex interplay between economic, strategic, and geopolitical interests in China's foreign investments, especially in resource-rich regions like Africa.

- India acknowledges its limitations, particularly in terms of resources, which do not match China's financial capabilities. Nevertheless, India possesses unique strengths characterised by distinct dynamics. An exceptional case in Southeast Asia worth noting is the special relationship between Singapore and Taiwan. This relationship has historical origins and is marked by a notable level of comfort demonstrated by the Chinese government, extending to various aspects, including military exercises. Singapore openly acknowledges that its actions are conducted with the full knowledge and acceptance of Chinese authorities. Over the course of decades, a particular modus operandi has been established, giving rise to a form of 'exceptionalism' in Singapore's interactions with Taiwan. It's important to note, however, that this exceptional status is not replicated in other Southeast Asian countries or in the broader Asia-Pacific region, where diplomatic dynamics and relationships with Taiwan can vary significantly. India acknowledges its limitations, particularly in terms of resources, which do not match China's financial capabilities. Nevertheless, India possesses unique strengths characterised by distinct dynamics.

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- Recent U.S. visits to China raise significant questions about the purpose, objectives, and the underlying planning and calculations in Washington. This is a vital aspect of international diplomacy and foreign policy. Notably, there has been a shift in Washington's perception of China. While in the past, China may not have been considered the most significant major power in the world, recent U.S. National Security strategies and pronouncements indicate a change in this perspective. The U.S. now recognises China as a primary geostrategic and systemic threat to its power. This recognition marks a significant shift in how China is viewed on the global stage.

- For the past 40 years, China has aspired to be treated as an equal to the United States, and it seems they have achieved this goal to some extent. The acknowledgment of China's significance and the recognition of its status as a major global player by the U.S. reflect this shift.

- The concept of bipolarity, where two major powers dominate global affairs, is a crucial aspect of international relations. As the dynamics between the U.S. and China continue to evolve, it has the potential to shape the global balance of power, influence international policies, and impact various aspects of world affairs. These shifts and developments in U.S.-China relations have far-reaching implications for strategic planning, foreign policy, and the global geopolitical landscape. It's essential for policymakers and analysts to continually assess and adapt to these changes.

- The nature of this emerging bipolarity, as we witness it unfolding, encompasses tactical and strategic aspects. While a bipartisan consensus on China's significance exists in Washington, the challenge lies in defining the nature of the relationship with China. Does it entail containment, limitation, degradation, or direct confrontation? An intriguing theme surfacing in U.S. discourse is the concept of decoupling, which was once extensively discussed. However, the prevailing reality indicates that complete decoupling may not be feasible. As an example, consider the U.S. university system, where Chinese students significantly contribute to M.A., MPhil, and Ph.D. programmes, surpassing Indian students in numbers. Beyond this, there are broader dimensions, such as trade and high technology, including semiconductors, which have implications for U.S. citizens dealing with Chinese companies. They may risk losing their U.S. citizenship under specific laws. Looking to the future, India's potential and strengths could grow significantly if we navigate our course wisely. While we are distant from China, we possess unique capabilities. The question remains whether we are heading towards a classical bipolar world or if the emerging scenario combines elements of bipolarity with a substantial degree of multipolarity. In my perspective, we are not transitioning into a conventional bipolar world; rather, there is a nuanced landscape.

- Henry Kissinger's approach to India and China was indeed far from friendly, and his policies towards these nations are often seen as some of the most contentious pursued by any U.S. administration. Notably, Kissinger played a pivotal role in the U.S. decision to establish relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1971, rather than with the Republic of China (ROC). This marked a significant shift in international diplomacy, and the consequences of this move continue to be felt in the geopolitical landscape.

- It's intriguing to note the constant flow of high-level U.S. officials visiting China. This suggests an ongoing effort to establish boundaries in the U.S.-China relationship, aiming to prevent it from veering into a major crisis. Recent visits to China by top U.S. officials indicate a focus on managing this critical relationship. Having recently been in China myself, I observed an intense preoccupation with the United States in their diplomatic circles. It appears that they are significantly focused on their relationship with the U.S., with relatively less attention given to other global partnerships. The anticipation of the 2024 U.S. elections is palpable; it's seen as a potential game-changer, adding an extra layer of uncertainty to the bilateral relationship. The outcome of U.S. elections can indeed have a significant impact on international relations, and it's closely watched by countries around the world.

- When contemplating the idea of a new bipolar world order and comparing it to the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it becomes evident that they are fundamentally distinct. The deep economic interdependence between the U.S. and China sets it apart from the rigid ideological divide of the Cold War era. In the current global landscape, there is a delicate balance of power at play. China seems relatively comfortable with a bipolar world where it and the U.S. are the primary players, likely due to its growing global influence and recognition. On the other hand, Russia may find this bipolar dynamic less favourable, as it raises questions about its place in a world dominated by China and the U.S. This concern about its position could be a contributing factor to Russia's actions, such as the Ukraine conflict, where President Putin appears to be using military force to reassert Russia's standing among global powers. This suggests that Russia seeks to reclaim its position at the forefront of international politics. The evolving dynamics in the global landscape are complex and multifaceted, and the actions of major powers are influenced by various factors, including their perceived place in the international order.

- In regions like Central Asia, Russia and China indeed have distinct and sometimes conflicting interests. Both nations have economic stakes in the region, but China's success in integrating with Central Asian economies has outpaced that of Russia. While they may outwardly manage their relationship, there are underlying tensions.

- China's primary objective from Russia in this context seems to be stability along their extensive shared border, which spans approximately 4,000 kilometres. However, China does not appear particularly inclined to support Russia's economic development in the same way that it actively invests in other regions. Chinese investments in Russia have been relatively limited, even in projects like the proposed second natural gas export pipeline. Negotiations between the two nations have been protracted, with China driving a hard bargain on oil and gas prices from Russia. This underscores the complex nature of the relationship between Russia and China, which can be both cooperative and competitive, with each nation pursuing its own interests in various regions, including Central Asia.

- These complexities highlight the intricate relationships and power dynamics at play in the evolving global geopolitical landscape, with each major player pursuing its own interests and priorities. The seemingly positive appearance of the relationship between China and the United States might not be as rosy as it seems, particularly when we look beyond the rhetoric. A noteworthy point to consider, especially in the context of the Africa debate, is that China's primary influence is predominantly economic. In contrast to the Cold War,

where the U.S. and the Soviet Union were primarily driven by the fear of nuclear annihilation, the U.S.-Soviet relationship had little to no economic ties. China's ascendancy, on the other hand, is primarily propelled by its rapidly expanding economy. Security and military concerns, while still significant, take a secondary or even tertiary role in this new global landscape. This shift in dynamics should lead us to cautiously embrace optimism regarding the potential for the United States and China to find a modus operandi. The economic interdependence between the two nations is paramount. Roughly 10 to 20 percent of the GDP of both countries is intertwined, making decoupling a slow and challenging process.

- This economic interdependence also extends to Taiwan, where a staggering 70% of the world's microchips are manufactured. As a result, nations, including Russia and China, are heavily reliant on Taiwan for their chip supplies. Developing the capability to manufacture high-end chips elsewhere will take considerable time and effort, with not every country likely to succeed in this endeavour. In essence, Taiwan's unique role in the semiconductor industry, often described as "Taiwanese exceptionalism," is a pivotal element of the global narrative. While exceptionalism is a nuanced concept, Taiwan's contribution to the semiconductor industry stands out as a vital part of the story.

- The question of China's involvement in peacekeeping operations is indeed crucial, especially for those studying Africa. China made a significant shift around 2015 by deploying combat troops to U.N. peacekeeping missions. The outcomes of this shift have been mixed, with South Sudan serving as a notable example. In 2016, China had around 3,000 peacekeepers there, and unfortunately, some of them lost their lives.

- China's efforts to broaden its engagement from diplomacy and economics to include a security dimension have faced challenges and limitations. This expansion is an area of interest and concern. It would be valuable to hear the opinions and insights of others regarding this matter. Thank you for raising this important question, as it underscores the evolving role of China in international peacekeeping and its impact on various regions, particularly in Africa.

- Russia has indeed consistently resolved its border disputes with China, and it has a clear stance on issues like Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, acknowledging them as integral parts of the People's Republic of China. There is no ambiguity regarding Russia's position on these matters.

- However, there is some ambiguity when it comes to the question of provinces or regions seeking secession from sovereign states. China's policy firmly supports the territorial integrity of sovereign United Nations member states. In the past, Russia also adhered to this principle until the Kosovo crisis in 1999. During the Kosovo situation, Russia opposed its secession, while the U.S. supported it. Following this, Russia shifted its position and began supporting the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the Republic of Georgia in 2008, citing the protection of human rights as a reason. This move represented a departure from the previous "no secession" principle. This shift in Russia's stance, particularly regarding regions seeking secession, is indeed a complex and noteworthy aspect of its foreign policy, and it reflects the evolving dynamics in international relations.

- Indeed, Russia's change in stance, particularly in its actions in Crimea in 2014 and Donbas in February 2022, marked a departure from its previous "no secession" principle. This shift has placed China in a challenging position, as it maintains a policy against accepting the principle of secession.

- This evolving situation highlights the complex diplomatic landscape and potential conflicts of interest between nations regarding secession and territorial integrity. It underscores the nuanced and often divergent positions that major powers like Russia and China can take on such matters, creating intricate dynamics in international relations.

- The United States has indeed intensified its engagements with Taiwan, and there's an ongoing debate about whether U.S. involvement in the Ukraine conflict might impact its relationship with Taiwan, both politically and in terms of military support and economic ties. This view of the situation is grounded in the fact that despite political divisions that may arise in the U.S. due to elections and changes in leadership, there seems to be a strong bipartisan consensus in Congress in supporting Taiwan. This suggests that stable relations with Taiwan are likely to continue, regardless of political changes, which can provide a degree of reassurance regarding the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. The dynamic between the U.S. and Taiwan is a critical aspect of international relations, and it will be interesting to see how it continues to evolve in the coming years, especially in the context of broader geopolitical developments.

- It's important to acknowledge and understand the sentiments of Taiwan and the reciprocal efforts made by the Indian government. From an academic perspective, there appear to be certain gaps, particularly in cultural and educational exchanges with Taiwan. It's worth noting that when attempting to engage with Taiwan on cultural issues, educational matters, or similar exchanges, there appears to be a noticeable gap. For example, it's challenging to find individuals in Taiwan who can speak Hindi and provide insights into India-Taiwan relations. This gap contrasts with the situation in mainland China, where one can more easily locate individuals who are fluent in Hindi and capable of discussing India-China relations from a similar perspective.

- Looking back a decade or so, there was more active exchange of job opportunities for students, including interpretation roles and collaborations with industries. This collaboration and engagement appear to have diminished over time. It's important to foster these connections not only in the context of India-Taiwan relations but also as a broader aspect of international engagement. These exchanges can provide opportunities for students, professionals, and experts to gain insights, language skills, and cultural fluency that can be valuable in promoting cooperation and collaboration between nations. Efforts to revitalise and expand these exchanges may be important to bridge the gaps you've observed and to foster a more comprehensive and well-rounded relationship between India and Taiwan.

- Regarding cultural differences, a sense of non-affinity, and the practical challenges faced by Taiwan in engaging with India are important considerations. These factors can indeed influence investment and diplomatic decisions. It's clear that Taiwan has developed substantial dependencies on China due to its proximity and economic opportunities. The potential missed opportunities for Taiwan to explore closer ties with India, especially under

India's "New Southbound Policy." While official diplomatic recognition may not have been on the table, deeper engagements and collaborations in various sectors could have been mutually beneficial. Opportunities for collaboration and mutual growth are valuable and should be pursued, even without official diplomatic relations. Enhancing people-to-people connections, trade, educational and cultural exchanges, and cooperation in various fields can help bridge these gaps and create a more diverse and resilient network of international relationships.

- When considering Russia's potential role in a future Taiwan conflict, it becomes evident that its primary role would likely revolve around economic aspects. Russia's capability to supply energy to China through its extensive pipeline network could be of paramount importance, especially in dire scenarios like an economic blockade of China or disruptions in the supply chain to the People's Republic via sea routes. It appears that this economic dimension takes precedence. In the past, Russia served as a significant supplier of advanced weaponry to China. However, China's growing self-sufficiency in the development of military equipment has elevated its capabilities beyond those of Russia. Moreover, Russia grapples with internal challenges in producing an adequate supply of arms and ammunition, as exemplified by its situation in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Consequently, the military dimension of Russia-China relations appears to be receding, with economic ties assuming greater prominence.

- Regarding Tibet, it seems there hasn't been any noticeable shift in Russia's unwavering commitment to the One China policy as a foundational principle. Likewise, it's worth noting that the American policy on Tibet also aligns with the One China policy as a bedrock principle.

- Sergey Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, introduced the concept of "indivisible security," primarily in the context of European security, as a means to assert Russia's right to be included at the decision-making table, particularly in the face of its exclusion from NATO. This concept effectively conveyed that security should be viewed as a unified and interdependent whole, thereby emphasising that Russia's views should not be disregarded. This notion of indivisible security has been echoed to some extent by certain Chinese diplomats. However, the significance of such diplomatic language remains subject to interpretation. While it is a part of diplomatic discourse, the concept is less convincing, as it is evident that everyone's security is mutually interconnected. The critical question pertains to the terms and conditions that govern international interactions, and Russia's actions, such as its aggression against a neighbouring country, seem to violate fundamental principles of mutual respect.

- As for the Russian rhetoric on unification and its increased assertiveness in 2021, this appears to be related to the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Russia's signalling may suggest its potential support for a more assertive Chinese stance on Taiwan. While these signals are somewhat subtle and open to interpretation, Russian scholars have observed this shift. The Russia-China relationship has witnessed fluctuations over the past two decades, with moments of strengthening ties. It is now evident that Russia was working to enhance its relationship with China, anticipating its actions in Ukraine. Russia sought China's support at the UN for its actions in Ukraine, and, in return, signalled to China that it was fully supportive of China's objectives regarding Taiwan.

Remarks by the Chair: Ambassador Pankaj Saran

I believe the discussion about likely Russian reactions in the event of a conflict in Taiwan is of utmost importance and requires in-depth analysis. Professor Kondapalli's point about the multitude of scenarios we can envision for such a situation is valid, and we must consider how Russia might respond on diplomatic, economic, and military fronts. This topic warrants comprehensive discussion and exploration of possible outcomes. Regarding the recent visit by Henry Kissinger and the potential for a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan, it's a matter of significant debate. Personally, I hold the view that we are not necessarily headed toward a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan. Some commentators argue that the rise of China as a military and economic power might prompt pre-emptive action to curb its influence, while others, including Professor Rutland, suggest that the prospects of a Taiwan invasion or reunification are diminishing. I believe that while Taiwan is a matter of concern for the U.S. Congress and administration, there's no rush to act decisively. In my opinion, a miscalculation or misstep by China on the Taiwan issue would be a grave strategic error with far-reaching consequences, much more significant than the situation in Ukraine. It's vital for China to carefully assess the implications and repercussions of its actions in this context."

Indeed, it appears that China's economy is facing significant structural challenges, and the trade tensions with the United States have exacerbated these issues. In 2018, President Trump imposed tariffs on Chinese imports, and President Biden has maintained and expanded these tariffs. Additionally, there have been restrictions on Chinese high-tech companies such as Huawei, and the United States is investing in semiconductor and battery manufacturing, further demonstrating a protectionist stance. This protectionist sentiment in the U.S. has garnered bipartisan support and is negatively impacting China's economic interests. As a result, it seems that China may adopt a more cautious approach, as its economic strategy is encountering difficulties. In this context, China may see the importance of working cooperatively with economic partners like the U.S. to rebuild a more positive and stable relationship. The economic and geopolitical dynamics between the two nations are intricate and have the potential to shape the future of their relationship and global affairs.

The central question at hand pertains to the stability of the Chinese economy. For over a decade, China experienced a remarkable economic expansion, making it the most significant beneficiary of the existing international order. No other major economy, including the United States, Europe, Russia, or India, managed to achieve a tripling of their GDP in the post-2008 world.

However, there is now growing concern about the sustainability of this rapid growth. Evidence points to potential issues arising from the "dual circulation" strategy, where China aims to boost domestic consumption to fuel GDP growth. Additionally, there is mounting anecdotal evidence of a severe real estate crisis. These factors have prompted questions about whether China can maintain its six to seven percent growth rates in the coming years. While predicting China's economic trajectory a decade ahead may be too ambitious, the country does appear to be entering a phase of economic slowdown with structural challenges, particularly concerning its real estate sector. Moreover, the U.S. is intensifying its efforts to curb China's technological advancements, which is causing concern.

Regarding external behaviour, while evidence suggests that China continues to engage actively in Africa, the situation differs in some other regions. For instance, in Sri Lanka, India played a substantial role in economic support, rather than China. In Pakistan, the economic cooperation framework has faltered, and the country's economic situation has deteriorated significantly.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) seems to be losing some of its initial luster. The question arises as to whether China might respond to these domestic challenges with more aggressive or rash external behaviour. While some have suggested that external conflicts could serve as a diversion from domestic issues, this theory is not universally accepted.

The primary threat to Chinese stability, it seems, is internal. Challenges related to the domestic economy, real estate crisis, and structural issues present substantial concerns, and how China addresses these issues will likely have significant implications for its future stability and global role.

SESSION 4

WEAPONIZATION OF THE ONE CHINA POLICY

Introductory remarks by the Chair: General Ashok Mehta

As someone no longer involved in warfare, as evident from my bio, my focus has shifted to conflict resolution and peace processes. Having been through those experiences, one's perspective naturally evolves. Looking at the regional context, I'm grateful to Mr. Tandon and the FNVA for allowing me to chair this session. Typically, larger gatherings occur during the concluding session, but I'm pleased to see that we still have a dedicated audience present. Over the past two days, I've had the opportunity to participate in this conference and follow Mr. Tandon's work, which has long piqued my interest, particularly concerning the issue of Tibet. I've written and spoken about it, but I must admit that I've learned a great deal from FNVA's work. If you haven't already, I urge you to read their comprehensive report available outside. It's a true labour of love and a testament to their hard work. I could go on to extol their efforts further, but given my role as the lone soldier among diplomats, I must maintain a certain decorum and adhere to the schedule, especially concerning time. It's worth noting that we are currently 20 minutes ahead of schedule, a rare occurrence in most seminars where we usually run over time.

I'd like to commence by addressing the question about what Russia can or will do, but a more pertinent query might be related to India's stance, what India will do. A couple of months ago, The Times of India published an article posing a similar question outlining India's reliance on Taiwan for 40 percent of its trade. We've discussed the significance of microchips and various technologies sourced from Taiwan. So, the question Indians need to ask ourselves, albeit a matter we tend to be reserved about, is: What can we do if China carries out what Xi Jinping has proposed by 2027, aiming to realise the "China dream"? Numerous individuals, particularly American soldiers and sailors, have voiced their thoughts on this, suggesting a 2027 deadline when the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) will be prepared. However, some also caution against these claims. They argue that due to recent events in Ukraine, where the Russian military, presumed to be formidable, has encountered formidable resistance from the Ukrainians, it's clear that the PLA is untested in battle. The last time they engaged in a significant conflict was during the Vietnam War, and they sustained significant losses. I wrote about this during my time writing for a magazine called "Debonair."

So the question still needs to be asked, what will India do? What are India's tactics in this scenario? I had the opportunity to discuss this with a naval admiral from the Indian Navy. The trilateral dialogue involving Maldives, India, and Sri Lanka addresses the safety and security of the Indian Ocean region. It's important to note that 80 percent of Chinese trade flows through the Strait of Malacca, which is situated just below the Sri Lankan peninsula. India's geography, in combination with Sri Lanka's, provides a strategically advantageous position to exert influence on the Malacca Straits.

Back in 2008 or 2009, the term "China's Malacca dilemma" emerged because all of China's BRI activities require them to navigate through this strategic chokepoint. While China's BRI

includes plans through Nepal and Myanmar, no substantial progress has been made there. There were also proposals for building an SCS canal through Thailand to bypass the Malacca Straits. In practice, Chinese super tankers use the Sunda Straits further south as they cannot navigate the Malacca Straits.

So, India holds significant capacity, and there is no lack of capability here. We may not match China dollar for dollar, but we can compete ship for ship, soldier for soldier, and sailor for sailor, posing significant challenges to Chinese activities in the Malacca Straits.

We didn't do much in the past, but India has the potential to do a lot. It is essential for India and Taiwan, or India and the U.S., which have stakes in the Indian Ocean region and the Indo-Pacific, to collaborate on military matters and operations. I have recently written a piece suggesting that India and Taiwan or India and the U.S., as stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific, should explore military cooperation. The specifics can't be detailed here, but it is essential to understand what each party will do for the other in different scenarios.

Operationalising the Malacca dilemma is one of the key strategies that can be employed. There are numerous potential actions, but we are often hesitant. Additionally, we face the challenge of where to begin, given our past mistakes. Even on the issue of the One China policy, there is a credibility and legitimacy question that we must address.

Yesterday, it was pointed out the conflation of the One China policy with a One India policy. He correctly noted that applying the One China policy to Tibet would legitimise it. We have made various mistakes, and the challenge is where to start rectifying them. Regarding the One China policy, Professor Kondapalli informed me that although we may not reiterate the One China policy, the old agreements are still in place. We have not explicitly stated that we do not subscribe to the One China policy. Similarly, the Americans maintain strategic ambiguity on this matter.

The second point I want to emphasise is what we learned yesterday and in the past: the Chinese are extremely insecure about the territories they have incorporated, and we learned this because they incorporated these territories through the use of force, making them illegal. The next point is related to sovereignty. It's crystal clear, as pointed out by international lawyer Dr Michael Walt, that these territories never had sovereignty. Even the de facto Prime Minister of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) reiterated this point.

The third point that needs to be made clear is that the One China Policy applies only to Taiwan; it does not extend to Tibet. These are unequivocal facts that must be stated as such.

During the first meeting organised by FNVA a couple of years ago, we discussed how to revive the Tibet issue. The paper that was produced discusses a reset of policy and includes excellent ideas on addressing human rights violations. All the material is available for lawyers like Mr. Jethmalani to argue the case in the international court. However, the Indian government is the decision-maker in this matter, and given the gap between China and India, they must consider their course of action.

It's essential to recognise that the Americans are not going to hold India's hand in this matter. Whatever actions India takes, it will have to do on its own. Therefore, my Tibetan friends should understand that while we may want to rectify past actions by default, we need to determine where to start in this endeavour.

I'd like to comment on a paper, which focused on the weaponisation of the One China Policy (OCP) and the China South Asia Engagement Policy (CSEAP). They conducted case studies on India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh to illustrate how China is using coercion and duress to enforce these policies. These countries often feel pressured because of their smaller size, and India was also involved in promoting the OCP until it stopped in 2014. Their case studies reveal that China utilises every available tool to intimidate and compel these nations to adhere to the One China Policy. This has significant implications for South Asia.

One China Policy and Nepal

Ambassador Vijay Kant Karna

Nepal's One China policy has been consistent and unambiguous, with the country consistently supporting the One China Principle from 1960 to the present. Regardless of the government in power, whether it was the monarchy or the current Republic, Nepal has consistently upheld this policy. However, the topic of Nepal-China relations and its stance regarding India, China, and the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is an important one. When Speaker Nancy Pelosi from the United States visited Taiwan, it was a significant display of support for Taiwan, which China considers an integral part of its territory. While Nepal was not directly involved in this incident, it found itself drawn into the controversy due to a pressure statement issued by the then Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Ms. Hou Yanqi.

Ms. Hou Yanqi visited the Nepali Foreign Affairs Ministry and held meetings with various leaders, including former Prime Ministers and Communist Party leaders. She sought a statement from Nepal regarding Taiwan, but the Nepalese government did not issue any statement on the matter. In response, within three days, she issued a statement on behalf of China, saying, "China respects Nepal's longest-standing commitment to the One China Principle." When Nepal's Foreign Minister visited China, the Chinese Foreign Minister asked Nepal's government to comment on the situation. However, Nepal's Foreign Minister reiterated that Nepal has already expressed its commitment to the One China policy, and thus, there was no need for further reaffirmation.

The issue becomes even more intricate when it concerns Tibet. Nepal shares a border with the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in its northern region, and there is a significant population of Tibetan origin in Nepal, with as many as 25,000 Tibetan refugees residing in the country. This situation causes concern for China, as they fear that supporters and sympathisers of the Free Tibet movement might organise in Nepal and engage in activities advocating for Tibetan independence. Nepal's geographical proximity to Tibet and its population of Tibetan refugees indeed make it a sensitive issue in the context of Nepal-China relations and the One China policy.

The northern region of Nepal has witnessed some challenging moments over the years, primarily affecting people of Tibetan origin due to China's stringent policies. Tibetan

refugees have protested in various forms, and there have been instances of self-immolation as a form of protest. For instance, in 2009, on the 50th anniversary of the Dalai Lama's exile, there were such protests.

The Nepal-China border in the northern region has been historically used by Tibetans seeking to escape to India. In 1999, Karmapa, who was recognised by both the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government, escaped via Mustang, a Himalayan district in Western Nepal, and reached India. Given the presence of people of Tibetan origin in the northern border regions with China, such events over the span of a decade are not entirely unexpected. However, China has maintained a strict stance on any activities even remotely related to Tibetan freedom or independence. Following such events, the Chinese Ambassador visited the Nepali Foreign Ministry and met with several leaders, expressing concerns and requesting that these activities be stopped. The Nepali government assured the Chinese authorities that such incidents would not recur. These developments underscore the complex dynamics and sensitivities in the Nepal-China relationship, particularly with regard to the Tibet and the One China policy.

The curtailment of the human rights of Tibetan borderland residents has had a significant impact on cross-border ties between Nepal and China. Peaceful protest is a fundamental human right, but China has pressured Nepal to curtail such activities. This situation has led to severe measures, with basic rights of political expression being severely restricted.

An example of China's concern over political expression is illustrated during the risky operation in the northern district of Sindhupalchok after the earthquake of 2015. Chinese rescue teams discovered pictures, manuscripts, and teachings of the Dalai Lama inside the homes of border residents, particularly along the Tatopani-Khasa border point. The presence of these materials in the region raised alarm in China.

Under the pretext of earthquake damage and potential dangers, China unilaterally closed the Tatopani border. While it was recently reopened for one-way traffic, the border has not returned to normalcy. Local residents in the area have suffered significant losses, including their sources of income, and many have migrated to other places within Nepal. This disruption has also impacted people-to-people relationships across the border which has been taking place for years. Despite an agreement with China that allows Nepalese to go 30 kilometres inside China and vice versa, China's aggressive approach in dealing with issues related to Tibet has had a significant impact on the people residing across the Nepal-China border. This reflects the complexity of the situation and the challenges faced by borderland residents.

The Republic of China and Nepal have a longstanding people-to-people and religious connection with Tibet, rooted in cultural exchanges related to Buddhism. These ties have extended to cross-border marriages, trade, and various cultural interactions. For a long time, Borderland residents enjoyed free access to the border under the Tapathali Treaty of 1856 between Nepal and Tibet. Even Nepalese traders were not subjected to taxes before 1950.

However, the annexation of Tibet by China in 1950 led to the tightening of border controls. Nevertheless, crossing the border was relatively easy for local residents until the 1990s. Over

time, China gradually imposed stricter border regulations, and the situation has deteriorated over the years. Cross-border marriages, cultural and religious exchanges, and movement across the border, which used to occur on a monthly basis thanks to Borderland Resident Identity Cards, have become rare.

Today, many border districts with China, such as Lower Mustang, can barely use the Borderland Resident Identity Card as they could earlier. This has had a detrimental impact on the livelihoods and cross-border ties of local citizens, illustrating the significant challenges faced by these communities in the changing landscape of Nepal-China relations. The borderland residents have indeed suffered financially due to the disruption of trade, as well as the decline in cross-border marriages and cultural exchanges. Many have been forced to migrate from the northern border to other parts of Nepal to seek livelihoods.

Beijing's approach to increasing frontier surveillance along the Nepal-Tibet Autonomous Region border has further complicated the situation. Beijing has deployed officials of Han ethnicity to regulate the border, individuals who are not well-versed in the local language and are not familiar with the cross-border ties of the borderland residents. This approach by Beijing has contributed to a further disconnect between Nepal and the Tibet Autonomous Region, as these officials may not fully understand the local dynamics and relationships. It's another way in which Beijing has influenced the cross-border ties between Nepal and the TAR, making it more challenging for residents on both sides of the border.

China's actions in the TAR and their impact on the Nepal-China border region are indeed significant. The introduction by the PRC of a new border law in January 2022 has led to tighter border control, which further restricts the movement of people and goods between Nepal and Tibet. China's efforts to increase the presence of Han Chinese settlers in the region, with nearly 600 settlements facilitated by the government, have raised concerns about demographic changes and cultural assimilation in Tibet.

Additionally, China is actively involved in the "Sinicization" of Tibetan Buddhism, aiming to influence both the Tibetan Buddhist and non-Buddhist communities in Tibet and in neighbouring regions like Nepal. By exerting control over the selection and acceptance of reincarnate Lamas, China seeks to ensure that these selections align with their interests. This has implications for the traditional practices of Tibetan Buddhism.

Moreover, the Chinese government is imposing strict rules and aligning the practice of Tibetan Buddhism with the values of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC). This pressure extends to the creation of policies and rules that control various aspects of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries' operations, including their management and instructions. These measures are part of a broader effort to exert control and influence over religious and cultural practices in the region, with implications for cross-border relations and cultural preservation.

The Chinese government is influencing monasteries in Nepal while maintaining repressive policies towards religious communities such as Uyghur Muslims and Christians in other areas. This dual approach suggests that China has crafted distinct policies for different religious groups, taking into consideration the potential for soft power, social capital, and geopolitical advantages that can be gained by embracing Buddhism. In the early 2000s, China

initiated a new approach towards Buddhism, emphasising it as an ancient Chinese religion. This shift was exemplified by the hosting of the World Buddhism Forum, where China invited neighbouring countries to participate and establish an Asian Buddhist Heritage. Subsequently, Buddhism became a tool to encourage countries to align with Chinese initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative. This approach underscores how China is using Buddhism as a means to exert its influence and strengthen its regional and global ties namely the Belt and Road Initiative

In the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has adopted a strategy that emphasises the preservation and revival of Buddhist heritage. This includes promoting ancient Buddhist sites worldwide, including those in Nepal. China's approach has two key elements:

Connectivity and Development Projects: China has entered into agreements for vast connectivity and development projects in Nepal. These projects often focus on regions rich in Buddhist heritage to attract tourists from around the world. This approach not only supports economic development but also serves as a means to spread their religious and cultural influence.

Influence Over Heritage Sites: China is involved in various initiatives related to heritage sites in Nepal, such as those in Swayambhu Nath (Shambo) and Lumbini, as well as numerous monasteries and stupas. This involvement includes efforts to influence the local population. Additionally, in 2011, China proposed the creation of a commercial hub in Lumbini. This proposal met with internal and external opposition and was ultimately halted. It highlights China's ambition to leverage economic development in the region.

China has also attempted to influence Nepal's internal politics through ties with the Communist Party, reflecting its broader strategy of shaping political dynamics in neighbouring countries. These efforts underline China's multifaceted approach to extending its influence in the region and strengthening its presence in Nepal.

The significant influence of communist parties in Nepal, with over 60% of the population voting in favour of these parties, is indeed a crucial factor in understanding the dynamics between Nepal and China. The two major communist parties, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) –(CPN UML) and Communist Party Nepal (CPN) Maoist, have strong support among the population.

In 2019, the Chinese Communist Party signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) for training and cooperation. This includes training on Xi Jinping's political thought and other areas. Over the past six months, more than 300 Communist Party leaders from Nepal have visited China for training, and there has been a reciprocal exchange with Chinese leaders visiting Nepal to influence the Nepal Communist Party. This includes both virtual and physical training, indicating a deliberate effort to strengthen ties and exert influence. These developments demonstrate the active role played by the Chinese Communist Party in building connections with Nepal's political landscape, particularly with the country's influential communist parties, in order to further its interests and expand its influence in the region.

The period from 2016 onwards marked significant developments in Nepal's relationship with China. In 2016, Nepal signed the Transit Transport Agreement with China, a move driven by the need to diversify trade and establish trade and connectivity links through the northern frontier.

In 2017, Nepal also joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which expanded its engagement with China's ambitious global infrastructure and economic development programme. This was a pivotal moment in the deepening of Nepal-China relations. Around the same time, Beijing began to seek greater influence over Kathmandu's political landscape. In 2017, China facilitated a coalition of Communist parties in Nepal for the federal and provincial elections. Following the elections, the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) was formed. As long as the NCP remained in power, Chinese influence in Nepal continued to grow.

One notable example of this influence was in 2019 when around 50 Chinese Communist Party leaders trained more than 200 NCP leaders on Xi Jinping's political thought. This demonstrated the depth of political and ideological connections between the two countries. In 2022, Nepal's vote in support of Beijing's new security law for Hong Kong, which aimed to quell pro-democracy protests, further exemplified Nepal's alignment with China on political matters. These developments reflect the expanding economic, political, and ideological ties between Nepal and China in recent years.

In recent years, Nepal's alignment with China has become more apparent on the international stage, particularly in forums like the United Nations. In 2020, Nepal defended Chinese policies in the western region of Xinjiang, where the Uighur muslim community has been subjected to state-sponsored atrocities. Nepal's support for China's stance on Xinjiang at the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council underscored the country's growing alignment with China's positions.

Also, in December 2022, Chinese Vice Minister visited Nepal with the goal of preventing the split of the Nepal Communist Party (NCP). Hou Yanqi the Chinese envoy in Nepal, played a prominent role in these efforts. During her visit, she engaged with numerous NCP leaders and key political figures in a concentrated effort to prevent the split. Miss Hou's influence was significant, as demonstrated by her hectic schedule, meeting with the President, Prime Minister, former Prime Ministers, and other Communist Party leaders in a very short timeframe. Despite these efforts, the split of the Communist Party could not be avoided, highlighting the complex and evolving political dynamics in Nepal and the region's significance in China's strategic interests.

The political landscape in Nepal underwent significant changes in March 2021 when the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) was dissolved by a Supreme Court order, leading to its division into three separate communist parties. Concurrently, the Nepalese Parliament was engaged in discussions regarding the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact, which aimed to provide development grants to Nepal. During these discussions, China openly expressed its concerns and issued warnings about Nepal's involvement with the MCC. This led to exchanges of words between Chinese officials and the U.S. State Department. China sought to assert its security and political influence in Nepal and wanted

Nepal to refrain from engaging with the MCC. Nevertheless, the Nepalese government stood firm against this influence, and the Parliament ultimately ratified the MCC compact.
In response to Nepal's actions, China escalated its high-level engagement with Nepal. Over a span of a few months, there were three high-level visits from Beijing to Kathmandu. In March, Liu Shao, the head of the CPC International Liaison Department, visited. In July, the Chinese Vice Minister for Culture and Tourism, who is also the head of the National Cultural Heritage Administration, arrived. The Nepalese government declined to extend a welcome to him, but he independently arrived in Nepal. Despite no formal discussions with the Vice Minister, he stayed for five days, engaging in conversations with various Communist party leaders to explore possibilities of unification and forming a coalition.

In August, the Speaker of the Chinese People's Congress visited Nepal with an intent to convince Nepal to reconsider its engagement with American grants, such as the MCC. China was actively trying to dissuade Nepal from accepting such grants. In November, on the eve of federal and provincial elections, there was another visit.

Regarding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which Nepal signed in 2017, progress on projects has been slow due to several key differences between Nepal and China. These differences include the interest rates on loans and the management of the projects. Nepal has proposed joint management of the projects, and in March 2022, the Nepalese Prime Minister expressed to the Chinese Foreign Minister and other leaders that Nepal was not in a position to take loans. Instead, Nepal requested grants for BRI projects, as it faced limitations in taking on more debt. However, China stopped providing grants for BRI projects after 2018. These differences in project management, loan terms, and the availability of grants have posed challenges in Nepal-China relations and the progress of BRI projects in Nepal.

The complexity of Nepal's involvement in various initiatives and projects with China is evident. The argument presented by Nepal's finance ministry about taking loans from international institutions like the World Bank and ADB at a lower interest rate compared to Chinese loans has led to a reluctance to engage with China on certain projects, including those under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As a result, there have been delays in the implementation of BRI projects in Nepal.

Additionally, China has introduced various initiatives and programmes, including the GCI (Global Cooperation and Information) initiative, GSI (Global Service and Investment) initiative, and GDI (Global Digital Initiative). The involvement of Nepal in these initiatives has been marked by confusion and, at times, political divisions within the government. For instance, the President's participation in the GSI conference occurred without the consent of the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister. Moreover, the declaration of a Dragon Boat competition in Pokhara, organised by the Chinese Embassy, as part of the GCI added to the complexity.

In another noteworthy development, Yuan Jianjun a political member of the Communist Party, pledged 145 million for development activities in Nepal, marking a unique occurrence in which a party leader promised a grant for Nepal. This significant financial commitment is unprecedented. Moreover, Yuan Jianjun initiated the 'Silk Roadster' in Kathmandu, further

reflecting the multifaceted nature of Nepal-China relations and the diverse array of initiatives and projects being pursued, leading to a mix of support, confusion, and political implications in Nepal.

The BRI facing challenges in Nepal has led to the introduction of other programmes, such as software programmes for schools. However, the most alarming aspect is China's focus on the southern part of Nepal. This has left Nepal in a state of confusion regarding its stance on various policies and initiatives that China is urging it to support. Nepal has been reluctant to support the Global Service and Investment (GSI) initiative, even though China's investors in Beijing have communicated their efforts to convince Nepal. It appears that Nepal's stance on these matters is not easily swayed.

Overall, from 2015 to the present, China has been actively influencing the Nepalese Communist party, and this party has become a major instrument for China's foreign policy in Nepal. This dynamic highlights the evolving and intricate relationship between the two nations, marked by a mix of cooperation, tension, and influence in various spheres, including political, economic, and cultural domains.

One China Policy and the EU

Dr Tenzin Lhadon

I would like to make a small change in the title of the Conference by calling it the "Weaponisation of One China 'Principle' " rather than 'Policy'. The focus of my presentation is to highlight the difference between these two concepts and the importance for stakeholders including China to understand the fundamental differences between Policy and Principle and how these differences are reflected in the EU's interaction with China.

I would like to begin the presentation with a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in August 2022, which was a response to Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan. The second paragraph of the statement reads,

> *"there is but one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory, and the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China. This has been recognized by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, 181 countries have established diplomatic relations with China based on the one-China principle. The one-China principle is a universal consensus of the international community and a basic norm in international relations."*

The statement clearly outlines the intent of the People's Republic of China by calling the One China Principle a universally accepted norm. The intention is to equate the One China Principle with other universally accepted norms and principles such as human rights, sovereignty, democracy, religious freedom, and others, which is an outlandish claim. It is highly imperative to highlight the difference between the two concepts since there is an increasing tendency in media outlets as well as scholars writing on this particular issue to use Principle and Policy interchangeably, without recognising the importance of the fundamental differences between the two. Within International Relations, norms and principles have a very different nature compared to policies. Whereas Principle is a rather rigid idea i.e. it does not change such as norms that are universally accepted and adopted in International Relations. However, Policy tends to change i.e. it is not fixed but rather is time-

specific, country-specific, and context-specific and it changes with the circumstances. Therefore, the PRC consistently insists countries reiterate their commitment to the One China Principle, while nations such as India and the United States push forward their positions on the One China Principle i.e. their respective One China Policy.

I would like to state my conclusion at the very beginning of the presentation: As long as countries like the EU, the US, and India have a One China Policy and not a One China Principle, the question of the very definition of the entity called "One China" within these countries respective policies can change in the future and probably will change. This is also to highlight that it is important not to conflate Principle and Policy. Before discussing the One China Policy/Principle, it is crucial to understand what "One China" means not just for China but more importantly what "One China" means for other countries who have established diplomatic relations with China. Since each country maintains its relations with China in its way, it is interesting to dwell on what "One China" means to the EU as compared to what "One China" means to the US and India respectively in the context of real politik and norms.

As we have reached the end of the Conference, we now understand that the One China Principle is the position of the People's Republic of China on Taiwan i.e. Taiwan is an inseparable part of China and the Communist Party of China is the legitimate government of the whole of China i.e. One China. The "*Akhand* China" or "One China", borrowing from the term "*Akhand Bharat*", does not only include Taiwan today, and the implicit and indirect implication behind using the term "One China" is that there are other unresolved issues besides just Taiwan when China speaks of the One China Principle. The "*Akhand* China" or "One China" today includes the unresolved issues of Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea along with Taiwan. The entity called "One China" includes areas where the PRC faces dilemmas of sovereignty, legitimacy, legality, historical accuracy, and normative issues. Therefore, stakeholders like the EU, the US, and India must define what "One China" broadly means for them when they subscribe to the One China Policy. There is an increasing demand in India, the EU, and the US to revisit and renegotiate their respective One China Policy, but it is important for a country to first comprehensively determine its understanding of "One China" in its interaction with the PRC.

The EU, for instance, has projected itself as a normative power, a position that was popularised by a scholar called Ian Manners. At a time when Europe's power and stature in International Relations were degrading, Ian Manners put forward the idea that Europe, as a normative power, would place it back into the leadership role, in a similar case as Joseph Nye did with the US by calling it a Soft Power. Europe as a normative power states that it is leading other countries on norms, values, and human rights issues and has a value-laden foreign policy. Therefore, the question arises: How does the EU, as the normative power, maintain its relationship with China, an autocratic state with a completely different set of norms and values?

The EU established its diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1975 making it a comparatively new relationship. The partnership between the two, like any other, experienced ups and downs but the overall relationship enjoyed collaboration and cooperation on many issues. The EU-PRC relationship was later upgraded from a comprehensive partnership in 2001 to

a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2003. In the dynamics of EU-China relations, it is vital to discuss here EU's support for China during China's entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). When China was formally admitted into WTO in 2001, it was seen as China's formal acceptance of the world order and norms. During that time, two incredibly important powers, the US and the EU, had different positions/perspectives on China. In 2001, a few months before China joining the WTO, the then President of the US, George W. Bush, stated that "China is a strategic partner as well as a strategic rival but we can cooperate on matters of the economy". The US at the time was clear in its approach and on what China meant to the US, a strategic rival and a strategic as well as an economic partner. However the EU, in 2001, adopted a different approach. There was a communication between the European members in which it stated that it is important for the European countries to engage with China on matters related to the market but also more importantly on developing China into a more open society and bringing it to cooperate on issues of human rights, treatment of prisoners, freedom of religion and other value-oriented concerns. The EU recognized that China has a very different political system but believed that the latter had the potential to be a solution to these normative issues. It was very clear from the outset that the EU adopted a normative rationale for why it accepted and encouraged China to be part of the WTO.

However, since then, the EU-China relationship has undergone substantial change. In 2019, the European Union in their joint communique mentioned, for the first time, that China is a systemic rival and that it challenges the existing world order. That is a substantial shift from the belief the EU placed in China when it supported Beijing's entry into the WTO in 2001. The normative importance placed on China in its role in enhancing value-oriented issues has shifted towards the EU questioning the intent and the actions of China, framing the country as a rival rather than a partner of the existing world order. The relations continue to suffer for various reasons including China's handling of the pandemic, increasing human rights violations in Tibet and Xinjiang, crackdown on Hong Kong, cyber-attacks, and many more. The area of least friction remains the economic relations between the EU and China, which continues to remain significant, one where cooperation and engagement could overtake divergence over political issues. However, their economic relations have similarly witnessed challenges. The EU has questioned China's motives behind the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and even challenged the policy through its initiative called the Global Gateway after the US also brought a similar initiative, B3W (Build Back Better World). These initiatives are directly or indirectly challenging Xi Jinping's pet project, the BRI, and its increasing footprint in Europe.

The EU continues to engage with China but it remains to be a systemic rival for the EU. The reason China wants the EU to accept the One China Principle as a universal norm is also a matter of how the EU as the normative power in Europe will respond to this demand. Recently, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, in her speech at the Mercator Institute for China Studies mentioned how China's disregard for universal principles is seen in the Ukraine issue by supporting Russia's invasion and questioning the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Secondly, she raised the question of how China is undermining universal principles by committing human rights violations in Xinjiang. With these arguments in the background, it is interesting to see how the EU will respond to China's narrative on the universality of the One China Principle.

I would like to end my presentation by raising these questions, What are the borders of the entity called "One China" when we speak of the One China Principle or the One China Policy? It is equally important for stakeholders like the EU, the US, and India to define what their "One China" means. This has a direct impact on the Tibet issue since stakeholders tend to discuss the issue of Tibet independently of the One China Policy, whereas China defines the One China Principle by including not only Taiwan but Tibet and Xinjiang as well. The contradiction fundamentally lies in the difference between Principle and Policy and defining what "One China" is for other countries.

Remarks by the Chair: General Ashok Mehta

By focusing on this crucial issue of the One China Principle and One China Policy, which was touched upon yesterday, you have provided new insights and highlighted the fact that the EU approaches it differently, not strictly under the One China Policy framework. You also emphasized that the One China Principle doesn't just pertain to Taiwan; it extends to all territories seized by force and illegally occupied by China. As Ambassador Kant mentioned, China often pressures smaller countries into complying with its One China Policy at the drop of a hat. Thank you very much for your clarification and detailed explanation.

Weaponisation of One China Policy: Latin America

Dr Maria Blancas

Relations between Taiwan and Latin America have evolved substantially since the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. In this regard, the context of the Cold War basically determined the interaction between the region and Taipei, as the proximity with the United States has also been decisive not only within the foreign policies from the immediate neighbours, also for countries that are far apart from the northern hemisphere.

Latin America as much as any other region in the world has seen political challenges in both the domestic and foreign policy grounds, moreover in those countries where there were ideological extremes have been prevalent throughout history, as there have been right wing dictatorships and left wing populism. In the case of the former, most of these governments were inclined towards getting close to the United States, whilst in the case of the latter, governments have found sympathy and opportunities by getting closer to China. It is important therefore, to consider that in view of the quantity of political spectrums and different domestic realities, the region cannot be analysed under the same frameworks or under the same perspective as specific historical and political events have shaped the role and foreign policy decisions. Literature about China and Latin America in English generally tends to overlook the particularities and domestic contexts of the countries, therefore it is essential to consider the variables that distinguish each country.

It is for the aforementioned that the establishment and/or breaking up of bilateral relations with Taiwan has varied from one country to the other, as every country has had a different experience and interaction according to their domestic realities and objectives. The presence of both China and the United States has played a major role in the region and determined whether a country decides to adhere to the One China Policy or if it prefers to keep Taiwan as an ally. The role of China as one of the main economies in the world has been a determinant (if not the main) factor for Latin American countries to adhere to the One China Policy. This paper discusses briefly the evolution of diplomatic relations between the region

and Taiwan and stresses the importance of China's economic power as the major argument behind the decisions of some countries to adhere to the One China Policy, as well as define the concept of economic statecraft which is the main policy tool used by Beijing to subtly coerce other countries into accepting the condition of the One China Policy in return of loans, investments or other economic instruments.

The first section discusses the concept of economic statecraft, its relevance and why it applies to the case of China and the weaponisation of the One China Policy, while the second section addresses the practical dimension of this concept by showing the evolution of Taiwan's relations with Latin American countries where evidence shows that there is a correlation between Beijing's offers of economic instruments (mainly infrastructure projects and loans) and the adhesion to the One China Policy. Taiwan has a had a differentiated activity in Latin America therefore the third section explores briefly Taipei's involvement in some countries as a donor while in the two largest economies of Latin America (Brazil and Mexico), Taiwan is a major trade partner.

The section uses data from primary and secondary sources to illustrate Taiwan's activities in the region, mainly data and government sources and, discusses the role and importance of the Taiwan Trade Offices (TAITRA). In the third section, the paper shows the practical dimension of what has been addressed in the preceding sections by using some examples of the weaponisation of the One China Policy (Costa Rica, El Salvador) and how other countries (Mexico) keep on having economic interaction with Taiwan regardless of their acceptance of the One China Policy. Lastly, the paper concludes that China is effectively using economic statecraft to pressure other states to adopt the One China Policy and that Latin America has not been the exception.

What is economic statecraft?

Economic statecraft for the purposes of this paper can be defined as the use of economic instruments, mainly investment, loans and infrastructure projects for political objectives where the sender expects the target to act in a certain way convenient to the former. The pioneer of this concept is David Baldwin (1985) who explored the different dimensions from economic sanctions and at the same time, provided the practical perspective of this concept by mentioning the different case studies. In this regard, there are several types of economic statecraft, where sanctions just constitute one type of them, as they have evolved through globalisation and throughout time. The analysis provided by Blackwill and Harris (2016) for instance, provides a rather updated perspective from the modernisation of economic statecraft techniques. The authors label these techniques as 'endowments' which consist of measures that have been used by Beijing to coerce other states, such as cyber-attacks, controlling outbound investment, currency manipulation, among others. The role of China as a major economy forces other countries to interact with the country, therefore most of the world is vulnerable to these forms of coercion. In the case of Taiwan specifically, there has been a substantial study of how Beijing has sought to either coerce or condition Taiwan to the One China Policy though a variety of measures from economic statecraft, ranging from economic blockade to manipulating the results from local elections. Norris (2016) mentions in his work that China's measures implemented towards Taiwan have been largely ineffective in general due to the domestic variables in the country. The author explains that the role of domestic actors is relevant for the success or failure of economic statecraft, and this applied to Latin America gains relevance due to the essential role played particularly by local political elites as the main decision makers and facilitators for adhering to the One China Policy.

China's novelty regarding economic statecraft is that sanctions are normally related to mechanisms subject to a consensus, such as that of the Security Council and the United Nations but, as much as Beijing is open to offer benefits in return of adhering to the One China Policy, it is also determined to block or suspend these benefits when the target country does not act in accordance to its interests. In this sense, the target country can put itself in a condition of vulnerability so, it can be considered that added to the One China Policy, China's economic and financial instruments are an additional form of 'weaponisation'.



Taiwan's Relations with Latin America: An Overview

Latin American countries established diplomatic relations with Taiwan from the thirties until the early two thousands, as all countries were either subject or under the ideological influence of the United States during the times of the Cold War.

Taiwan existed since Sun Yat Sen's revolution therefore, some countries had diplomatic relations with the island before the foundation of the People's Republic of China. In this regard, after Japan's occupation and the foundation of the People's Republic of China and the beginning of the Cold War, most Latin American countries had diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In most cases it was until 1972 that nearly all countries adhered to the One China Policy after President Richard Nixon visited the country on that year. In a span of ten years, Taiwan became nearly isolated with its few options of diplomatic allies. The second drastic change in terms of the number of countries adhering to the One China Policy came at the beginning of the 2000s where most countries in the region turned their support to Beijing after the latter started to venture into Latin America announcing their investment and loan schemes.

Taiwan's Role in Latin America

Taipei's involvement in Latin America has been differentiated in general and largely determined by the domestic conditions of each country, so apart from economic exchange, Taiwan has also been a considerable donor in the region. In this regard, countries in the Caribbean (Haiti) and in Central America (Nicaragua) have been the major receptors of donations from Taipei. Evidence shows that registries of Taiwanese aid to Latin America almost disappear after 2010, as it is during those years in which most countries decided to adhere to the One China Policy. According to Maggiorelli (2019), most of the total aid budget (30%-50%) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is directed towards Latin American countries but the registry of data diminished from 2015 onwards. In terms of the destination of these funds, most are towards projects related to development and social welfare. These investments are aimed at building and creating capacities rather than tying the receiving country into a loan.

When circumstances in these countries started to move towards diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, Taiwan moved its support mechanisms to international organisations and directed them to the projects instead of directly to governments so as to avoid further clashes. Additionally, evidence shows that Beijing has also exercised some pressure to other countries in the region so that they do not accept Taiwan's aid anymore, like El Salvador. In contrast, the biggest economies of the region (Brazil and Mexico) have been a key part for economic exchange between Taiwan and Latin America to the extent of turning into a major trade partner for Mexico. In this regard and according to the Ministry of Finance (2022), Mexico and Brazil constitute Taiwan's major export partners, whilst Mexico and Chile are the main import partners. The case of Mexico is discussed in the last section of the paper. In spite of Taiwan's increasing economic importance in some industries such as semiconductors, economic exchange between Latin America and Taiwan does not account more than 5% of the total. Statistics from the Ministry of Economic Affairs show that Hong Kong, China, Japan, ASEAN countries, the Republic of Korea and the United States are the main trade partners from Taiwan.

Although Taiwan might not have diplomatic relations with most countries, trade keeps on being its major source of strengths so, instead of diplomatic representations, Taiwan has trade offices in various places around the world and Latin America is no exception.

Taiwan Trade Representative Offices

Taiwan has twelve embassies in total throughout the world and trade representatives in most countries. Taipei has relied on capital and economic relations as their major strengths that have allowed them to build a strong and diversified economy. In this regard, a strong economy is a major pillar for the survival of any state and, evidence shows that Taiwan's trade network has been strong and reliable enough to find support whenever there are conflicts with Beijing. A good example is the ban imposed to Taiwanese pineapples from Beijing arguably due to a trade dispute, and Japan bought nearly the whole amount of the available product.

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Country	Period
Argentina	1945-1972
Bolivia	1985
Brazil	1928-1974
Chile	1931-1970
Costa Rica	1944-2007
Cuba	1929-1960
Ecuador	1947-1980
El Salvador	1942-2018
Granada	1989-2005
Honduras	1941-2023
Jamaica	1972
Mexico	1928-1972
Nicaragua	2021
Panama	1912-2017
Perú	1931-1971
Dominican Republic	1944-2018
Sao Tomé and Principe	1997-2016
Uruguay	1966-1988
Venezuela	1944-1974

Country	Year
Belize	1989
Guatemala	1960
Haiti	1956
Paraguay	1957
Saint Cristobal and Nevis	1983
Saint Lucia	1984-97, 2007
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1981

Source: Michael Y.M. Kao, "Taiwan's and Beijing's Campaigns for Unification," in Harvey Feldman, Michael Y.M. Kao, eds., *Taiwan in a Time of Transition* (New York: Paragon House, 1988), 188.

One the major reasons for Taiwan to have a strong economy is due to the presence of Taiwan Trade Representative Office, which somehow institutionalises trade and economic relations between Taiwan and those countries adhered to the One China Policy. TAITRA was founded in 1970 as the means for Taiwanese enterprises to expand their operations around the world and, according to their registry, they have five local and sixty two international offices. The first overseas branch was established in Japan in 1972 4 , the year in which most countries in Latin America adhered to the One China Policy. The Taiwan Trade Representative Office has performed several activities and tasks throughout their presence around the world and, in the case of Latin America, there are nine representative offices including those inside the embassies they still have in the region. The biggest ones belong to Taiwan's most important trade partners, such as Mexico and Brazil. The impact and activities of the Representative however, has varied from one place to another, and a case of success is Mexico.

Mexico and Taiwan

Evidence in data from the Ministry of Economy shows that Mexico has built a strong dependency with the United States in terms of trade but, although the People's Republic of China constitutes the second main trade partner after the former, Taiwan has become the eight main trade partner for the country. Mexico adhered to the One China Policy in 1972 but diplomatic relations with Beijing have not been exempt from problems and controversies. In this regard, from Beijing's perspective, vicinity with the United States constitutes the biggest obstacle for consolidating its presence in Mexico. On the one hand, there is truth in this statement due to the level of regional integration in North America thanks to the United States, Mexico and Canada (USMCA) Treaty (previously known as NAFTA) which states on its clause 32.10 an explicit limitation to the establishment of a trade agreement with a non-market economy without prior knowledge from the other trade partners.

Range	Country	Imports	Exports	Total volume	Balance
-	World	505,703	494764	100467	-10939
1	United States	220985	398989	619974	169004
2	China	101015	9255	110270	-91760
3	South Korea	19055	6915	25970	-12140
4	Germany	17232	7541	24773	-9691
5	Canada	11248	13061	24309	1813
6	Japan	17085	4182	21267	-12903
7	Brazil	8805	3656	12461	-5149
8	Taiwan	11789	574	12363	-11215

On the other hand, evidence shows that in fact, local business sectors are sceptical towards doing business with China mainly due to concerns coming from unfair competition and unequal access to the market. Although there was an attempt for the use of Railroad Diplomacy in Mexico through China's participation in the bidding for the Mexico City-Querétaro, China Railway was dragged into in a corruption scandal due to their presence in a consortium headed by Grupo Higa, a corporate group related to President Peña Nieto (2012-2018) back then. Beijing used the same investment scheme for infrastructure projects used by other countries: a loan by a state-owned bank (China Exim Bank), the use of Chinese steel, and the presence of Chinese workers. The loan was examined by the Ministry of Finance and it was rejected due to concerns around conditions of the credit line, while the rest of the plan goes against the Law of Foreign Direct Investment. The case of the train represents one of the lowest points in Mexico-China relations and, China was pushed to the role of an importer of essential parts used for manufacturing industries in Mexico. Trade exchange by itself however, does not necessarily imply creating substantial capital goods for Mexico.

Taiwan on the other hand, has had an involvement that has been profitable for both countries in general. Evidence in data from the Ministry of Economy shows that both imports and exports have grown steadily since 1993 and the flow of foreign direct investment has been flowing constantly according to statistics from 2006 onwards. Trade in total according to data from 2022 accounts for 12,363.2 million USD, which makes it Mexico's eighth trade partner after Brazil. In view of Mexico's convenience in terms of geographic location, the COVID 19 pandemic and the sudden stringent lockdowns imposed by Beijing, the conversation around implementing nearshoring started to be a general trend. In this regard, several companies started to plan on advance and move out their production plants from China and look for other alternatives, and Mexico constitutes a practical option not only in terms of geography, also due to the exporting options generated by the trade agreement networks in Mexico.

Taiwan has also gained increasing relevance in the production of some goods so, the country's importance as one of the main producers of semiconductors for example, make it a key partner for industries in Mexico as nearly all manufacturing industries depend on semiconductors. In this regard, Taiwan Semiconductor Company is looking to establish a plant in the country to guarantee a more efficient supply chain and at the same time, the Taiwan Trade Representative has been bringing groups of Taiwanese businesses to Mexico to identify opportunities. Taiwan's exchange with Mexico in terms of benefits and profits, has proved to be profitable in general due to the level of capital created by this interaction. Taiwan and Central America: The price of One China Policy Taiwan has a long story with Central American countries, as most of them used to have diplomatic relations with Taipei until quite recently. In this regard, most of these countries adhered to the One China Policy during the 2000s, the decade of China's aggressive economic growth. The cases of these countries however, are not unique as there is a common pattern between China's so-called 'check book diplomacy' and the number of countries adhering to the One China Policy. Although each country has had a different story with Taiwan, evidence shows that the presence of substantial aid defined bilateral relations between Taipei and these countries. The International Cooperation and Development Fund started in 1959 and it is the agency from the Taiwanese government (part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in

charge of managing and sending donations. Maggiorelli mentions that registry from Taiwanese donations is confidential after 2015 but that data shows that some countries have disappeared from the registry immediately after adopting the One China Policy.

TAIWAN'S MAJOR IMPORT/EXPORT PARTNERS IN LATIN AMERICA

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF FINANCE, TAIWAN (2022)

3-1. 出口總值－按國家(地區)排名

3-1. Value of Total Exports - Ranking By Countries (Area) Value

111年(2022)

單位：百萬美元；%

Unit：Million US ；%

排名 Ranking	國家(地區) Country (Area)		金額 Value	占比 %	1月 Jan.	2月 Feb.	3月 Mar.	4月 Apr.	5月 May	6月 June	7月 July	8月 Aug.	9月 Sept.	10月 Oct.	11月 Nov.	12月 Dec.
15	墨西哥	Mexico	4,844	1.0	368	333	450	476	449	376	424	438	379	379	378	394
26	巴西	Brazil	1,396	0.3	142	99	115	117	128	114	135	125	116	108	102	96

2-1. 進口總值－按國家(地區)排名

2-1. Value of Total Imports - Ranking by Countries (Area) Value

111年(2022)

單位：百萬美元；%

Unit：Million US ；%

排名 Ranking	國家(地區) Country (Area)		金額 Value	占比 %	1月 Jan.	2月 Feb.	3月 Mar.	4月 Apr.	5月 May	6月 June	7月 July	8月 Aug.	9月 Sept.	10月 Oct.	11月 Nov.	12月 Dec.
28	墨西哥	Mexico	1,894	0.4	136	141	218	151	157	173	158	181	147	158	125	148
29	智利	Chile	1,670	0.4	155	184	164	164	110	218	98	154	71	122	105	124

Data also shows that in the case of Central American countries that receive foreign aid, Taiwan is the second aid donor after Spain and in terms of percentages, Taipei directs between 30% and 50% of its total aid budget to Latin America. The author mentions that according to data available from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Honduras was the largest receptor of Taiwanese aid until 2015. Tegucigalpa was the latest to get adhered to the One China Policy in March, 15th 2023 .

In terms of the management and use of donations, a part of the aid is sent as direct assistance, another share to non-governmental organisations and another share through the International Economic Cooperation Development Fund and, according to Maggiorelli, most of this aid is used in different development projects.



In the case of El Salvador for example, there are development projects funded by Taiwan mainly related to agriculture. Data from 2007 shows a project about technical cooperation aimed at improving agriculture practices where the Food and Agricultural Organization got involved and later on in 2016, El Salvador created a programme aimed at entrepreneurship, particularly on small and medium companies that was funded by Taiwan.

El Salvador adhered to the One China Policy in 2018 when the government of Sánchez Ceren started to receive alternative offers of investment from Beijing. While El Salvador argued that Taiwan was causing a problem to the country due to a disagreement regarding an infrastructure project, the prevalent view is that Beijing used offers of aid and investment that ended up being more attractive than those from Taipei despite the fact of the latter funding several successful development projects in the country.

Costa Rica shows a similar pattern in terms of bilateral relations, as the country used to be an important receptor of aid from Taiwan. According to Daniel Aguilera, this aid was classified into four groups: non-refundable aid (used for government purposes such as disaster and emergency relief); refundable aid (long term loans with a convenient interest rate); technical (receiving advice from development experts); and bank transfers (for the discretionary use of government officials, also known as 'Dollar Diplomacy') The government of Oscar Arias broke relations with Taiwan on June 1st , 2007 under the grounds of giving priority to the national economy due to trade deficit with Taiwan and being on the right track in terms of economic trends. Negotiations between Beijing and the Arias government however, were held behind closed doors a matter which raised concern in the general public. Later on, the media found out that Beijing had bought 300 million USD from Costa Rica's debt. Currently, Costa Rica has a Free Trade Agreement with China and data shows that there is a trade deficit between both countries in favour of China. In sum, data shows that relations between Taiwan and Central America were based on aid and according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this pattern remained the same until the beginning of the 2000s when Beijing implemented its strategy of using economic relations as an instrument to enforce the One China Policy. While each country has its own particularities in terms of bilateral relations with Taipei, there is a common pattern to all of them: they adhered to the One China Policy in return of guarantees of investment or loans or any other type of economic instrument.

Conclusion

This paper discussed the idea of weaponisation of the One China Policy in Latin America in general and, while relations between Taipei and Latin American countries is a complex object of study in itself, this paper includes some of the main aspects that have characterized the history of how each country adhered itself to the One China Policy for different reasons. In general, data and evidence show that Beijing has used the 'check book diplomacy' in this part of America. The first section explained that the use of economic instruments such as loans, infrastructure projects, and other means in return of specific political objectives is known as economic statecraft. The concept first appeared in 1985 in the work of James Baldwin (1985) who expanded the concept of sanctions as part of economic statecraft rather than the former as an independent concept. After Baldwin, there were other authors like Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris who provided a modernisation of the concept through the category of 'endowments' to classify the new tactics of economic statecraft, as globalisation has also provided new means to coerce other states, such as cyber-attacks, control of outbound investment, etc. China is effectively using economic statecraft for enforcing its view on those issues that are part of Beijing's interest, such as the One China Policy. In this regard, the second section shows two relevant aspects: there is a direct correlation between Beijing's strategy of expanding through economic means and the enforcement of the One China Policy, and that Latin America started to adopt it when the United States normalised relations with Beijing during the seventies. It is for this reason that some countries established diplomatic relations with China and Taiwan started to be isolated much later than the seventies. The third section therefore, explores the particularities of relations between Taiwan and Latin America, where evidence shows that Taiwan has had the role of a key economic partner and a donor in the region. In this regard, despite the adhesion to the One China Policy by most countries, Taipei established the Taiwan Trade Representative Offices that have worked as a link between Taiwanese companies and the countries in the

region. The case of Mexico for instance, shows a case of the success of TAITRA activities, as the business sector has had fruitful results with Taiwanese companies to the level of Taiwan becoming one of the top trade partners of Mexico.

Taiwan's role as a donor in the region as argued in this section, has proved to be the strongest evidence of China's economic statecraft through the use of 'chequebook diplomacy', as the cases of El Salvador and Costa Rica have shown, there is a direct correlation between China's economic clout and the number of countries in the region that have adhered to the One China Policy in a relatively short period of time (less than 20 years), and these countries have in common that Taipei constituted the second largest donor after Spain.

In conclusion, evidence shows that Beijing has effectively 'weaponised' the One China Policy in Latin America by using economic means such as loans and investment as well as the proposal for Free Trade Agreements in the region to further isolate Taiwan and at the same time, have additional economic partners. Bilateral relations between countries in the region and Taiwan however, has been determined by the particularities of each state and the presence of the Taiwan Trade Representative Office has further enhanced bilateral economic relations in those countries that have not adhered to the One China Policy.

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August 2023).

Points Emerging from the Discussion

- In 2022, the Nepalese foreign minister held discussions with the 10th Prime Minister of China, Wangyi who has since disappeared. During this meeting, a clear statement was made, asserting that Nepal would not be involved in any activities opposing China's stance on Tibet. This situation prompts inquiries into the regional dynamics, especially the migration patterns of people from India and Nepal to the West. While Tibetans from India often move to America due to documentation challenges, Tibetans in Nepal appear to do so out of concerns related to insecurity, encompassing actions by both the Chinese and Nepalese governments, as well as Nepal's stringent border policies. As Nepal and China grow closer and China invests more in projects like the Belt and Road Initiative, it raises questions about how Nepal's policies toward Tibet and Tibetans within its borders may change in the future. Will these policies improve or deteriorate? Additionally, the relationship between Bhutan and Nepal, two small but geopolitically significant countries in the region, should be considered. How might India's position in relation to Nepal and China evolve, especially as the United States becomes increasingly involved in the Himalayan region?

- It is important to note that the military was not mobilised during the 2009 incident; rather, it was the security forces. The event in question involved Tibetan refugees protesting in Kathmandu during the commemoration of the Dalai Lama's exit from Lhasa to India. During this protest, Tibetan individuals reached the top of the UNDP building. The police, considering it a diplomatic institution, deemed it unacceptable for such an action to take place. During my tenure as Ambassador in Denmark, I received inquiries from various foreign ministries questioning the perceived harsh police action. It's crucial to clarify that the military was not mobilised during this incident, the police response occurred in 2005. In 2005, when King Gyanendra assumed power, he signed agreements with the Chinese government. Previously, when Tibetans crossed the border, the police would arrest them and hand them over to immigration, following established procedures.

- The policy shifted after 2005 when immigration began transferring them to the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). UNHCR issued ID cards that the Tibetans could use while visiting places like Lumbini and other stupas in Nepal. Some would proceed to Dharamsala, while others might choose to return. However, after 2005, the Nepalese government discontinued this practice. In one instance, six Tibetans were arrested by the police and handed over to the immigration office. Upon reaching the immigration department, Chinese security officials from the Chinese Embassy were involved in the proceedings.

- It appears that these incidents involved a swift and abrupt intervention by Chinese officials who reached the immigration department and kidnapped all the Tibetans, then fled in diplomatic vehicles back to the Chinese Embassy. At that time, the King's rule prevailed, and political parties were not allowed to operate. Consequently, it was a challenging situation. There are approximately 5,500 Tibetan refugees who have not received ID cards since 1995 when the Nepal government ceased issuing them. This issue has become a point of contention in Nepal's relations with Tibetan refugees and Western countries. The Western countries, led primarily by the United States, are pressing Nepal to issue ID cards to the

refugees. However, the influence of China, especially through its Communist Party ties, complicates the matter. In 2021, when the Nepali Congress Prime Minister was ready to issue some form of ID card to the refugees, the Chinese Ambassador personally intervened and lobbied against it.

- The issue is further complicated by the fact that Western countries are divided on this matter, with the United States taking a more prominent stance while other countries, like Switzerland and the UK, have occasional involvement. Some other nations remain largely silent on the issue.

- One significant challenge is that the Tibetan refugees have not actively engaged in Nepalese politics or society. This lack of engagement has contributed to the problem and led to a gap in addressing their concerns. Additionally, there have been instances of deportation where the Nepalese armed police force arrested individuals crossing the border and immediately handed them over to Chinese authorities.

- It is true that China has made significant investments in Lumbini town, and there is evidence of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) facilitating navigation from Central Asia to Lumbini as part of a larger narrative.

- China has invested in building two monasteries In Lumbini, while other countries, including India, have also contributed by constructing monasteries in the region. Prime Minister Modi, during his visit to Lumbini, signed an agreement to initiate the construction of another monastery, further expanding the presence of cultural and religious institutions in the area. This reflects the collaborative efforts of nations to enhance religious and cultural significance of Lumbini, the birthplace of Lord Buddha. Lumbini is of particular interest to the Chinese, and it's known that over 150 Chinese individuals, ostensibly in the roles of monks and others, are residing there. However, their exact activities and intentions in Lumbini remain largely undisclosed to the public. In the case of Lumbini, notable development has been limited, despite a proposed $2 billion investment in 2004 through an NGO. This initiative was led by the current President of Nepal, who was the Prime Minister at that time. It aimed to create a commercial hub around the birthplace of Lord Buddha but faced criticism from international quarters. The initial plan aimed to create a commercial hub encompassing the three districts of Lumbini, namely Rupandehi, Nawalparasi, and Kapilvastu. However, there hasn't been significant progress or investment in this regard, and the project seems to have faded from public discussion.

- Controversies have also arisen around the classification of certain projects as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as exemplified by the recent case of Pokhara airport. The categorisation of projects as BRI-affiliated has sparked recent controversies, such as the case of China's claim that Pokhara airport, funded by a loan from the China Exim Bank, falls under the BRI umbrella. Following in-depth discussions, it was clarified that this project did not align with the BRI classification. This clarification prompted further discussions between Nepal and China regarding the nature of the project.

  In early June, around the 9th or 10th, China organised a Dragon Boat competition in Pokhara. They flew in approximately 76 participants via a charter flight from one of China's cities

directly to Pokhara. During the inauguration, which was attended by our Civil Aviation Minister and other government officials, the Chinese Ambassador made a statement that raised some controversy. He proclaimed that the Pokhara airport was part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This assertion sparked questions in the Nepalese Parliament, which led to the Foreign Minister's response that Nepal did not have any BRI projects currently in operation. However, it seems there is a disparity in how China interprets what falls under the BRI. According to the Chinese, nearly everything they are involved in is considered part of the BRI, even including projects funded by the World Bank and ADB, which has created some degree of ambiguity. Nepal has consistently maintained a clear stance that it will only accept projects accompanied by either soft loans or grants and is not open to signing projects that don't align with this policy. This stance conveys a resolute message to the Chinese side. The Nepal government's requirement for joint management of the project with a grant share of less than one percent seems challenging, especially considering that no country, including China, offers an interest rate lower than four percent. This could pose difficulties in implementing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects in Nepal.

- Regarding the proposed Himalayan Railway from Kathmandu to Lumbini, it faces three significant problems. Firstly, geological concerns, secondly, the financial aspect with a whopping $3.5 billion required for financing, and lastly, the engineering challenge of dealing with 98 tunnels. Moreover, only two percent of the railway would be on the surface, making this a colossal financial endeavour for Nepal, whether through loans or grants. The fundamental question arises: What will Nepal transport with this railway, given that Nepal does not have significant export goods to send to China. One suggestion humorously mentioned sending was sending Himalayan water to China, although it's already readily available in Tibet.

- Given the rise of Communist parties in Nepal, there is a growing concern about a "red corridor" from Pashupati to Tirupati in India.

- Regarding the Nepalese Communists, they are distinct from the previous extreme leftist movements. They have evolved and adopted more liberal policies. However, when it comes to China, there seems to be a significant alignment. On liberal politics, they are quite accepting of multi-party democracy, which both the Maoists and UML have practiced for several decades. Hence, I don't see a direct connection to the "red corridor" notion from Pashupati to Tirupati in this context.

- In 2022, the Nepalese foreign minister met with the now-disappeared Wangyi who was the 10th prime minister of China. During this meeting, there was a clear statement that Nepal would not be used for any activities opposing China's position on Tibet. This raises questions about the dynamics in the region, particularly the movement of people from India and Nepal to the West. While Tibetans from India tend to move to America due to the lack of documents, Tibetans in Nepal seem to do so because of fears of insecurity, including actions by the Chinese government and the Nepalese government's strict border policies. As Nepal and China grow closer and China invests more in projects like the Belt and Road Initiative, it raises questions about how Nepal's policies toward Tibet and Tibetans within its borders may change in the future. Will these policies improve or deteriorate? Additionally, the relationship between Bhutan and Nepal, two small but geopolitically significant countries in

the region, should be considered. How might India's position in relation to Nepal and China evolve, especially as the United States becomes increasingly involved in the Himalayan region?

- There is an unchanging policy on Tibet since 2005, and it remains a sensitive issue for the Chinese. They are known to exert extensive pressure in various ways, from reaching out to our leaders to contacting the Foreign Ministry and the President's office, creating significant political pressure.

- There was an incident in Humla where land encroachment by China was brought to light by a leader of the Nepali Congress, who had previously served as the Chief Minister of the Karnali Province. A Seminar was organised to discuss this encroachment. In response, the Chinese Embassy wrote a letter to the president of the Nepali Congress in a highly undiplomatic manner. The later accused Mr. Dikpal Kumar Shahi of being an agent of Western countries and India and made various allegations against him. During our seminar on the issue, the Home Secretary called me (Ambassador Karna) and asked why we were organising such an event. I replied that there was no legal basis for stopping us from holding such a programme in Nepal, and I was operating within the framework of the Constitution and the law. I told him that if there was a court order instructing us to stop, I would comply. However, the Home Secretary later informed me that it was the Chinese authorities who had approached him, pressuring him to call and ask us to stop the event.

- Despite these challenges, Nepal has continued to provide a space for Tibetan refugees. Recently, Tibetan refugees were allowed to celebrate the Dalai Lama's birthday on July 6th. This event was reported by various media outlets, including the BBC and international media they celebrated in a modest manner with the participation of several ambassadors. The office of the representative of the Tibetan government in Kathmandu, Lajimpat, has been closed in 2005, although they have library in the office but the board has been removed and the Nepal government not accepting as a representative all the representative is there so this is this is uh this is the situation I said that but never Army mobilising there are security forces but the problem is not the Nepali police problem is the Chinese and even the some spies they created among the Tibetan Refugee you might be aware about it so the Tibetan refuses are themselves spying against each other informing the Chinese Embassy this is the another issue that one that what our security official told me so this is the same

- It's noteworthy that the office of the representative of the Tibetan government in Kathmandu, Lajimpat, was closed in 2005. Despite having a library in the office, the board has been removed, and the Nepal government does not recognise it as a representative office. The representative is still present, but the situation is complicated.

- One significant issue is the presence of security forces; while there are Nepali police, the main concern stems from the Chinese authorities. Additionally, there are concerns about internal dynamics among Tibetan refugees, with reports suggesting instances of individuals spying on each other and providing information to the Chinese Embassy. This adds another layer of complexity to the situation, as mentioned by security officials.

- It's unfortunate that the Tibetan government's representative office in Kathmandu was closed in 2005, and the situation remains complicated. The issues including the role of the Chinese Embassy and internal divisions among Tibetan refugees, further illustrate the challenges and complexities surrounding the Tibetan refugee community in Nepal.

- Regarding Lumbini, it is indeed a fact that China has made substantial investments in the region, marked by the construction of two monasteries. India has also established one, with several other countries designating specific areas for their respective contributions. Lumbini holds a particular attraction for the Chinese, with an estimated 150 or more Chinese individuals residing in the area, often identified as monks or other roles. However, the exact nature of their activities and intentions in Lumbini remains largely undisclosed to the public. In the context of Lumbini, substantial development has been limited despite a proposed $2 billion investment in 2004, facilitated through an NGO. This endeavour was led by the current President of Nepal, who held the position of Prime Minister at the time. The overarching aim was to create a commercial hub cantered around the birthplace of Lord Buddha. Nevertheless, it encountered criticism from international stakeholders.

- Further complexities arose around the classification of certain projects as part of the BRI, as exemplified by a recent incident concerning Pokhara airport. Recent controversies have revolved around the categorisation of specific projects as affiliated with the BRI. A notable instance occurred when China claimed that Pokhara airport, funded through a loan from the China Exim Bank, was part of the BRI. Following extensive discussions, it became clear that this project did not fit under the BRI classification. This clarification prompted further dialogues between Nepal and China to ascertain the exact nature of the project.

- In early June, around the 9th or 10th, China organised a Dragon Boat competition in Pokhara. They flew in approximately 76 participants via a charter flight from one of China's cities directly to Pokhara. During the inauguration, which was attended by the Nepal Civil Aviation Minister and other government officials, the Chinese Ambassador made a statement that raised some controversy. He proclaimed that the Pokhara airport was part of the BRI. This assertion sparked questions in the Nepalese Parliament, which led to the Foreign Minister's response that Nepal did not have any BRI projects currently in operation. However, it seems there is a disparity in how China interprets what falls under the BRI. According to the Chinese, nearly everything they are involved in is considered part of the BRI, even including projects funded by the World Bank and ADB, which has created some degree of ambiguity.

- Nepal has consistently maintained a clear stance that it will only accept projects accompanied by either soft loans or grants and is not open to signing projects that don't align with this policy. This stance conveys a resolute message to the Chinese side. During a recent visit by a member of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo, a new concept known as the Silk Roadster was introduced in Kathmandu. While it's not entirely clear if this concept extends to other countries, it was officially declared in Kathmandu. However, it's crucial to note that the conditions proposed for this concept might not align with Nepal's interests or preferences. As per my understanding, officials from the Ministry of Finance have indicated that China's proposal includes a four percent interest rate and complete project management by Chinese experts. However, the proposed conditions from China, such as a

four percent interest rate and the complete project management by the Chinese, are not acceptable to Nepal, as conveyed by the Nepalese Finance Ministry.

- The Nepalese government is adamant about joint project management and insists that projects must be funded with less than one percent loans or grants. Finding common ground in this regard seems challenging because no country, including China, offers interest rates lower than four percent currently. Therefore, it becomes quite difficult for China to implement BRI projects in Nepal.

- Regarding the proposed Himalayan Railway from Kathmandu to Lumbini, it faces three significant problems. Firstly, geological concerns, secondly, the financial aspect with a whopping $3.5 billion required for financing, and lastly, the engineering challenge of dealing with 98 tunnels. Moreover, only two percent of the railway would be at the surface, making this a colossal financial endeavour for Nepal, whether through loans or grants. The fundamental question arises: What will Nepal transport with this railway, given that we don't have significant export goods to send to China? One suggestion humorously mentioned sending Himalayan water to China, although it's already readily available in Tibet. Regarding the Nepalese Communists, they are distinct from the previous extreme leftist movements. They have evolved and adopted more liberal policies. However, when it comes to China, there seems to be a significant alignment. On liberal politics, they are quite accepting of multi-party democracy, which both the Maoists and UML have practiced for several decades. Hence, I don't see a direct connection to the "red corridor" notion from Pashupati to Tirupati in this context.

- There's no inherent flexibility within the One China principle or policy as they are, indeed, fixed and unwavering in their nature. The One China principle is a calculated and strategic manoeuvre by China to coerce other countries into recognising not only Taiwan but also regions like Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea as integral parts of China, grounded in historical and legal claims. Even contentious issues like the Senkaku Islands fall under this broader principle. This strategic approach by China is meant to ensure compliance from other nations in acknowledging these territorial claims.

- To fully grasp the concept of the One China policy, whether it's India's, the EU's, or the U.S.'s, it's essential to understand that it is a direct response to the One China principle set forth by China. The One China policy comes into play as a reaction to this principle, which was established by China. The reason for any confusion lies in the absence of a well-defined policy regarding Tibet. When discussing Tibet and its relation to China, particularly in the context of the One China policy and China's dealings with India, it becomes evident that there isn't a straightforward response to the One China principle. In the context of today's discussions, the perceived confusion is not a matter of true perplexity but rather the need to delve into the strategic nature of the One China principle itself. When we consider the One China policy, it's crucial for stakeholders, such as India, to explore their approach to this policy as a flexible space for manoeuvring, claiming, and addressing various issues, including not only those concerning Taiwan but also matters related to Tibet, Hong Kong, and human rights. The feasibility of countries with a One China policy incorporating Tibet depends on the specific country in question. Take India, for example, which has a distinct perspective on Tibet, mainly due to its physical border proximity to the region. For India to establish a well-

defined Tibet policy or formulate a clear One China policy, it must first clarify what Tibet signifies for China, what it represents for India, and how the concept of One China relates to India. These are delicate matters to navigate, which is why we observe an element of ambiguity in India's Tibet policy.

- It can be argued that ongoing issues such as the Arunachal Pradesh dispute and border conflicts are inherently incorporated within China's One China policy and principle. For example, China maintains that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of Tibet, which implies its sovereignty over these areas. Given China's inclusion of Tibet in its One China principle, it becomes important to consider how India should respond to these complex situations. The ambiguity and reluctance in India's Tibet policy raise questions about how India's stance may evolve, particularly if China expands its One China principle to encompass Arunachal Pradesh and the border regions.

- The passage of a law by the Senate recognising the McMahon Line and affirming that Arunachal Pradesh belongs to India represents a significant political stance. This legislative action reinforces India's territorial claims and disputes China's assertions over Arunachal Pradesh. It signifies a formal and authoritative position on the border issue, providing legal backing to India's sovereignty in the region. The statement by the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, clearly declaring that Arunachal Pradesh belongs to India and emphasizing that the region shares a border with Tibet rather than China, reflects a perspective challenging China's territorial claims. This assertion aligns with the McMahon Line and signifies a nuanced approach, emphasizing historical and cultural connections with Tibet. If more Indians adopt a similar stance, it could contribute to shaping a narrative that challenges China's territorial assertions and strengthens India's position on Arunachal Pradesh.

SESSION 5

CLOSING SESSION

Special Address

Aloma Selanes

In the context of international relations, particularly concerning China, Tibet, and Latin America, it's important to consider the notion that "the enemies of my enemies are my friends." This concept becomes relevant when we examine how many people in Latin America perceive China as a friend, primarily due to its rivalry with the United States. Latin America has often been viewed by the U.S. as a region that can be influenced and dominated, which has shaped perceptions in the region.

The distinct political systems and ideologies of China and the United States contribute to these views. For some in Latin America, China represents a potential alternative to U.S. influence, driven not only by practical considerations but also by ideological convictions. It's worth noting the sympathies that unions and similar groups may have toward communism, which can lead them to view a strong relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (PCC) as a path to economic liberation. These dynamics underscore the complex interplay between international relations, political ideologies, and regional perspectives in Latin America.

Take, for example, the current situation in Argentina. This country boasts incredible natural beauty, an extensive agricultural sector with exceptional farming and livestock, and significant mineral resources. However, it finds itself teetering on the edge of a financial abyss, facing an insurmountable debt of $44 billion with the International Monetary Fund. Given the current economic climate, the prospects of repaying such a colossal sum seem bleak. In a desperate attempt to address this issue, Argentina sought a lifeline from the IMF, securing a loan of $7 billion to cover a portion of its towering debt along with accrued interests. Yet, there loom additional impending debt maturities, casting further uncertainty over Argentina's already beleaguered economy. The question that arises is whether there are alternative pathways that could rescue Argentina from its economic distress.

China's involvement in Argentina's financial landscape is undeniable. Initially, the collaboration between the two countries was financial in nature, as China provided a loan to Argentina, amounting to an impressive $19 billion. This loan began as a currency swap arrangement but soon evolved to the extent that Argentina had to seek Chinese approval to utilise a portion of these funds to service its substantial debt with the International Monetary Fund. What emerges from this financial interplay is not merely a close relationship between Argentina and China but also a significant reorientation. Argentina is sending a clear message to the IMF: "Be cautious, as I have the option to turn to China as my ally." In essence, engaging with the IMF is akin to engaging with the United States. The Argentine case is a prominent example of the considerable influence that China has exerted on our nation. It serves as a pivotal illustration of this evolving dynamic.

Furthermore, we must not overlook the substantial investments made by China in Latin America, such as the construction of two lithium carbonate plants and two hydroelectric dams. These initiatives underscore the pivotal role that Latin America plays in China's global business strategy. It's abundantly clear that Latin America's abundant natural resources, encompassing agricultural produce, mineral wealth, and freshwater reserves, have captured China's attention. This mutual interest in each other's assets and opportunities underscores the growing importance of the relationship between China and Latin America in the realm of international trade and cooperation.

Additionally, it's worth noting the substantial investments made by China in Latin America. China has committed significant resources to the construction of two lithium carbonate plants and the development of two hydroelectric dams in the region. These investments underscore the growing economic ties between China and Latin America. They highlight the importance of the business relationship between the two, as well as the strategic significance of the region for China. Latin America, with its abundant natural resources, including food, minerals, and water, holds immense appeal for China. The region's resources are of great interest to China's expanding economy, making it a pivotal area for future growth and collaboration. In turn, Latin America recognizes the economic opportunities that partnering with China can offer. This mutual interest solidifies the growing partnership between the two regions. I couldn't agree more.

Uruguay presents an intriguing case, different from the previous example. Despite being a relatively small country, Uruguay occupies a strategic position between Argentina and Brazil and stands as one of the most stable democracies in Latin America. Its current government leans toward the center-right on the political spectrum, and ideologically, it may not align closely with China. However, Uruguay is actively exploring the possibility of entering into a free trade agreement with China. This example illustrates the considerable interest that China generates in Latin America. It's apparent that China has established itself as a permanent presence in the region. Therefore, from a political perspective closely linked to economic considerations, the notion that Latin American countries could challenge China and its One China policy seems rather utopian. It's clear that the global developments related to Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, as well as the aspirations of Chinese citizens seeking freedoms, face challenging prospects in this context.

Specifically addressing Tibet's presence in Latin America, the Tibetan cause experienced a surge in attention during the 1990s and the early 21st century, up until around 2014. The Dalai Lama's visits to the region played a pivotal role in bringing Tibet onto the agenda. His talks drew thousands of attendees, making his name a familiar one among many. His representative organisation also actively engaged with labour, conducted numerous interviews, held meetings with opinion makers, politicians, and people from various walks of life. Tibet's cause found a place among us. The Dalai Lama's presence attracted significant interest and support from a considerable number of people. However, as with all things, change is inevitable. The conclusion of the Dalai Lama's visits coincided with the emergence of other pressing global issues, including conflicts, wars, immigration crises, pandemics, and criminal activities. Furthermore, the intense pressure exerted by China played a role in diminishing the interest and support for Tibet's cause. Nevertheless, there is a ray of hope on the horizon. In the wake of the prolonged pandemic, there has been a renewed interest and support for Tibet. Notably, some parliamentarians from Mexico and Chile have publicly expressed their support and have established support groups within their respective legislative bodies. Additionally, politicians from various countries have demonstrated their backing for Tibet. This resurgence of support signals that Tibet's cause may find a renewed place on the international stage.

To attain these objectives, it has been imperative to put in intense effort, spearheaded by the current representative of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), and supported by all those who rally behind the cause. The representative recently concluded a tour across various countries in Latin America, which suggests a potential revival of activities related to the Tibetan cause in our region. It's important to emphasise that this mission has never been an easy one, marked by numerous challenges and obstacles.

Regarding Tibet, it's unfortunate that we must examine it from a completely distinct perspective, one deeply rooted in history and context. This perspective is undeniably valid. However, for those who are geographically distant from China and Tibet, it might not be so easy to grasp this alternative viewpoint. Their primary need is to assess the advantages that arise from cultivating a constructive relationship with China.

In conclusion, permit me to express a somewhat idealistic hope. I earnestly desire that the other major Asian power, the honourable India, would become the most significant trading partner for Latin America. India is a peaceful and respected nation, the world's largest democracy. Strengthening ties with this Western part of the world would be highly beneficial.

Concluding Remarks

Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli

The discussions on the Weaponization of the One China Policy have brought forth a multitude of perspectives. The situation is nuanced. While 181 countries are often associated with adhering to the One China policy, it's important to clarify that these countries have not adopted this policy by choice. Rather, they have been pressured, coerced, or mandated to endorse it.

Regarding India's stance on the One China policy, it's essential to distinguish between voluntary adherence and a forced acceptance. India has been compelled to follow the One China policy, which has sparked considerable debate and contemplation. Notably, the discourse on discontinuing India's compliance with the One China policy began around 2010.

As a valuable takeaway from this two-day session, it's evident that (FNVA) must conduct more in-depth research and analysis on the overarching concept of the One China policy or principle. This session marks a positive starting point, with 13 presentations and the participation of four distinguished chairpersons. The sessions involved vigorous debates on various facets of the issue.

Furthermore, it's paramount to consider, as was wisely alluded to by Bhuchung Tsering la yesterday, that a dominant narrative has been shaping our understanding of this matter over an extended period. To achieve a more balanced perspective, we need to cultivate a counter-narrative. The task of reevaluating the One China policy should not be underestimated.

The insight into a larger geopolitical context emerging around this issue is noteworthy. It indicates that further research and discourse are imperative to fully comprehend the intricate layers of this multifaceted subject.

So given this context I think there is now a need for looking refresh on the issue of One China Policy. There is a pushback China would insist on acknowledging support and penalise those countries which are oppose the One China Policy and this is where the title of this seminar the weaponization of the one China policy.

When discussing the One China Policy, it's important to note that Taiwan was the initial focal point, stemming from the Chinese Civil War between 1945 and 1949 and the subsequent dynamics between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party of China. However, there has been a notable expansion of the One China Policy, extending beyond Taiwan to encompass regions like Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and the South China Sea. This expansion has even led to audacious claims, such as a Chinese journalist from the Global Times suggesting that Hawaii belongs to China. Moreover, shortly before Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow in March of this year, there were reports of renaming Vladivostok and other parts of Siberia, indicating the potential emergence of new 'One China' areas.

Since 2005, there has been a mention of Southern Tibet in official Chinese documents related to Arunachal Pradesh. In this evolving context, there is a pressing need to reevaluate the One China Policy.

Notably, China is pushing back and insisting that countries acknowledge, support, and penalise those opposing the One China Policy. The title of this seminar, 'The Weaponization of the One China Policy,' aptly reflects the idea that this policy has been used as a diplomatic tool in international relations."

The Weaponization of the One China Policy has primarily manifested in five key areas. The first is **diplomatic pressure** exerted on countries that have previously supported or endorsed the One China policy. These countries may not have actively implemented the policy to a significant extent, but they face considerable pressure from Chinese embassies, diplomatic missions, and foreign ministries to fully adhere to it. As Ambassador Karna highlighted, Chinese entities put varying degrees of pressure on these countries to enforce the One China policy, ranging from subtle diplomatic influence to more coercive tactics.

The second dimension of this weaponization relates to **individuals, particularly the targeting of Tibetans or Taiwanese living abroad.** An example of such a situation is when a Taiwanese individual passed away in Kashmir, which led to both Taiwan and the People's Republic of China's embassies becoming involved in the matter, highlighting how the influence of the One China policy extends beyond Tibet to Taiwan. This multidimensional approach to the weaponization of the One China policy illustrates its far-reaching impact and the diverse tactics used by China to ensure compliance with its policies.

The second aspect of diplomatic pressure as part of the weaponization of the One China policy concerns the **"Three Evils"** that the Chinese government has consistently emphasised. These "Three Evils" encompass separatism, extremism, and splitism, and they are central to China's official discourse on national security and regional stability. China has not only incorporated these concepts into its domestic laws, such as the National Intelligence Law and National Counter-Terrorism Laws passed in 2015 and 2017, but it has also promoted and advocated for these principles in various bilateral and multilateral forums.

This focus on the "Three Evils" serves as a basis for Chinese foreign policy and diplomatic interactions with other countries. It enables China to present its stance on issues related to Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and other regions where it perceives a threat to its sovereignty and unity. Through these diplomatic pressures and consistent messaging, China aims to ensure that other countries not only endorse the One China policy but also actively cooperate in combating what it regards as separatist, extremist, or splittist activities.

The third aspect involves **airlines**. Air India, in its previous state as a state-owned carrier, had a policy preventing flights to Taiwan. However, since Air India has been privatised, it now operates flights to Taiwan. Previously, around a hundred airlines were restricted from flying to Taiwan, but many of them, after privatisation, have been able to resume operations, aligning with globalisation and WTO compliance measures. The issue at hand revolves around coercion. Notably, various Western brands such as Nike and BMW faced coercion regarding Xinjiang sanctions. These brands were pressured due to their outsourcing of cotton products for their models and textiles. This coercion resulted in penalties affecting their commercial contracts, highlighting the impact of the One China policy on businesses and international relations.

Another dimension involves the **closure of embassies or consulates**. France, although not explicitly taking a position on the One China policy, had sold Lafayette-class frigates to Taiwan approximately 15 years ago. Despite this, the French Consulate in Guangzho has been shut down, showcasing China's willingness to apply extreme pressure. The Taiwan Economic and Cultural Center (TECC) office in Dhaka has also been closed, demonstrating the extent to which China can exert pressure on host countries.

Notably, in South Asia, there is now only one TECC office in India; the rest of the region lacks a TECC presence. This underscores the pressure China can apply as part of its One China policy. In a notable case, Lithuania upgraded its TECC office to a Taiwan Representative Office, leading to the closure of the entire Taiwanese Embassy in Beijing. The Taiwanese Ambassador, Diana, faced significant challenges, being declared a non-person and non-gradable. She had to make a swift departure to the airport, eventually landing in India and assuming her role as Ambassador here. This exemplifies the extent to which China is willing to go in enforcing its One China policy.

In instances where a country violates the One China policy or supports Taiwan independence or Tibetan freedom, China actively discourages such actions. While the concept of Tibet freedom has become less prominent since the Strasbourg proposals, it remains an issue. For countries supporting Taiwan independence, China exerts significant pressure, implementing political and policy responses to penalise these actors. China's approach involves acknowledging, supporting, or opposing positions related to the One China policy, and countries may face consequences based on their stance in these categories.

The second facet of weaponization is referred to as **"paging consensus,"** wherein China exploits principles such as the non-interventionism outlined in the U.N. Charter. In this context, China emphasises its influence through its membership in the United Nations

Security Council. It's worth noting that China has utilised its veto power around 13 times, with a significant number of these instances related to the One China policy. Consequently, China is likely to continue leveraging its global power, particularly its veto authority within the UN Security Council, to quash any perceived violations of the One China policy.

A third area where weaponization is apparent is in the realm of **economic reprisals**. For instance, after His Holiness the Dalai Lama visited Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, China imposed severe economic measures, including the shutdown of nearly 93% of Mongolia's trade with China and the imposition of increased tariffs. Consequently, the Mongolian economy suffered a significant downturn due to these Chinese policies. Mongolia faced such intense pressure that it refrained from inviting the Dalai Lama again. Similar tactics were employed against South Korea, Russia, and various other nations. Botswana faced considerable Chinese pressure, which influenced its decision not to grant a visa to His Holiness. South Africa also experienced similar pressure, leading to criticism from figures like Desmond Tutu, who questioned their government's refusal to provide a visa to the Dalai Lama.

These restrictions and measures can manifest themselves at both political and economic levels. For instance, restrictions may include cutting down on foreign direct investments (FDI), controlling tourism, and manipulating people-to-people contacts. A prime example is when after Dr. Tsai Ing-wen's electoral victory, the significant flow of three to four million tourists from China to Taiwan was abruptly halted. Today, Taiwan receives only a fraction of that number, with just a few hundred thousand tourists from China. This illustrates how the weaponization of tourism, FDI, people-to-people exchanges, and other avenues can be employed to exert pressure and further the One China policy.

The fourth dimension of weaponization involves **controlling sea lanes of communication**, particularly in the South China Sea and other maritime areas. These are crucial lifelines for global trade and commerce, and China's assertiveness in these regions is a reflection of its One China policy.

Finally, the weaponization of the One China policy extends to **military** exercises conducted by China. These exercises, often synchronised with other elements of power, highlight the strategic implications of the policy.

In summary, China employs a range of activities to weaponize the One China policy, and FNVA's contribution has been invaluable in bringing experts together to reflect on this policy and explore potential responses.

ANNEXURE 1
Abbreviations

AAGC	Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nation
B3W	Build Back Better World
BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CPN	Communist Party of Nepal
CSEAP	China South Asia Engagement Policy
CTA	Central Tibetan Administration
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
ECFA	Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
FOCAC	Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
GCCI	Ghana Chamber of Commerce and Industry
GCI	Global Cooperation and Information
GDI	Global Digital Initiative
GSI	Global Service and Investment
IECDF	International Economic Cooperation Development Fund
KMT	Kuomintang
LAC	Line of Actual Control
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
NPC	National People's Congress
OCP	One China Policy
OCPr	One China Principle
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
SAARC	South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
TAITRA	Taiwan External Trade Development
TAR	Tibetan Autonomous Region
TECC	Taiwan Economic and Cultural Center
TRA	Taiwan Relations Act
UFWD	United Front Work Department

ANNEXURE 2
The Programme

Tuesday, August 1 - 3:30 P.M. | Seminar Hall 1, New Block, Gate Nr. 1, India International Centre (IIC), New Delhi

DAY 1

OPENING REMARKS
4.-4.30 P.M.

CHAIR
AMBASSADOR L L MEHROTRA

DR. SUJEET KUMAR, MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, CONVENOR OF ALL PARTY INDIAN PARLIAMENTARY FORUM FOR TIBET (APIPFT)

H.E. MR. PENPA TSERING, SIKYONG, CENTRAL TIBETAN ADMINISTRATION

SESSION 1
INTRODUCING THE ONE CHINA POLICY 4.30 - 6.15 P.M.

CHAIR
AMBASSADOR LL MEHROTRA

WHAT IS THE ONE CHINA POLICY?
Michael Mazza,Non-resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

HOW CHINA USES THE ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE TO STRANGLE IN ITS TAIWAN AND FOREIGN POLICIES
Prof. Roger Chi-feng Liu, Associate Professor, Founding Chair of South and Southeast Asian Studies, FLAME University

SHIFTING DYNAMICS OF THE ONE CHINA POLICY THEN AND NOW
Dr. Lin Hsiao-Chen, Adjunct Assistant Professor, College of International and National Defense Affairs (INDAC)

SESSION 2
INDIA, TIBET AND THE INDO-PACIFIC AND THE ONE CHINA POLICY 6.15 - 8 P.M.

CHAIR
AMBASSADOR ANIL WADHWA

OCP AGREEMENTS BETWEEN INDIA AND THE PRC: HOW HAS INDIA TACKLED THE ONE CHINA POLICY IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY
Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli, Dean, School of International Studies, JNU, Trustee FNVA

WHAT DOES THE FUTURE OF ONE CHINA POLICY HOLD IN INDIA AND THE LARGER INDO-PACIFIC: HOW CHINESE EXPANSIONISM IS SECURED BY THE ONE CHINA POLICY
Prof. Jabin Jacob, Director, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar University

DOES THE ONE CHINA POLICY APPLY TO TIBET?
Bhuchung Tsering, Head of Research and Monitoring Unit, International Campaign for Tibet, Washington D.C.

WEAPONISATION OF THE ONE CHINA POLICY

To understand the nuances of the One China Policy and how the PRC conflates it with areas outside the cross-strait relations

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Wednesday, August 2 - 3:30 P.M. Seminar Hall 1, New Block, Gate Nr. 1, India International Centre (IIC), New Delhi

DAY 2

WEAPONISATION OF THE ONE CHINA POLICY

SESSION 3
WEAPONISATION OF THE ONE CHINA POLICY. 4-6.30 P.M.

CHAIR
AMBASSADOR PANKAJ SARAN

TAIWAN IN JAPAN'S SECURITY DEBATE
Prof. Titli Basu, Associate Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University

HOW THE CHINESE DOLLAR DIPLOMACY PLAYED A CATALYTIC ROLE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ONE CHINA POLICY IN AFRICA
Dr. Abhishek Kumar Darbey, Research Fellow, Center for China Analysis and Strategy

HOW CHINESE EXPANSIONISM IS SECURED BY THE ONE CHINA POLICY AND HOW IT HAS BECOME THE PILLAR OF DIPLOMATIC TIES FOR CHINA
Dr. Yang Jianli, President, Citizen Power Initiatives for China, Washington D.C.

ONE CHINA POLICY AND RUSSIA
Prof. Peter Rutland, Government and the Colin and Nancy Campbell Chair for Global Issues and Democratic Thought at Wesleyan University

SESSION 4
WEAPONISATION OF THE ONE CHINA POLICY 6.30 -7.45 P.M.

CHAIR
GENERAL ASHOK K. MEHTA

ONE CHINA POLICY AND NEPAL
Ambassador Vijay Kant Karna, Centre for Social Inclusion and Federalism (CESIF), Nepal

ONE CHINA POLICY AND THE EU
Dr. Tenzin Lhadon, Research Fellow, Tibet Policy Institute, Dharamsala

WEAPONISATION OF THE ONE CHINA POLICY LATIN AMERICA
Dr. Maria Blancas Larriva, Business and Economic Affairs Advisor, Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Mexico

SESSION 5
CLOSING SESSION. 7.45 -8.15 P.M.

ADDRESS
Aloma Sellanes, Author and Columnist

CONCLUDING REMARKS
Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli, Dean School of International Studies, JNU, Trustee FNVA

To understand the nuances of the One China Policy and how the PRC conflates it with areas outside the cross-strait relations

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ANNEXURE 3

Dr. Lin, Hsiao-Chen presentation

Flow of the presentation

I. Introduction: The One China Policy (OCP)

A. Background on the One China Policy
B. Perspectives: KMT and DPP

II. Shifting Dynamics: Then and Now

A. Changes in the political landscape
B. Evolving International Perspectives

III. Conclusion: Cooperation Potential in the Indo-Pacific amid the OCP

A. The impact of Weaponizing OCP
B. Exploring Cooperation Potential in the Indo-Pacific amidst OCP

A. Background on the One China Policy

- The One China Policy (OCP) is a highly complex political issue that revolves around the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty and its relationship with mainland China. The policy stems from the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949), during which the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were engaged in a struggle for control over China.
- In 1949, the KMT, led by Chiang Kai-shek, was defeated by the CCP, led by Mao Zedong, forcing the KMT to retreat to Taiwan. The CCP established the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland, while the KMT continued to govern the island of Taiwan, maintaining the Republic of China (ROC) as the legitimate government of all of China.

A. Background on the One China Policy (Contd.)

- *That we are unequivocally opposed to the "two Chinas" theory has been made clear in public statements at various times. Any arrangement that is purported to solve the question of China's representation in the United Nations on the basis of "two Chinas" can not be accepted, nor tolerated, by the Republic of China.*-- Statement by Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan opposed the "two China's" concept discussed by the US during the 27th Session of the Legislative Yuan on June 30, 1961.

- For decades, both sides claimed to be the sole legitimate government of China, and each refused to recognize the other's legitimacy. The situation led to heightened tensions and the threat of military conflict. In the early 1970s, the United Nations recognized the PRC as the legitimate representative of China, further isolating Taiwan diplomatically. Amid these circumstances, the One China Policy emerged as a diplomatic workaround.

KMT's Perspective

Ma Ying-jeou

Former president of Taiwan (2008-2016)

Ma Ying-jeou:
"Three No's"(2007) - No to reunification, No to independence and No use of force

- Ma Ying-jeou served as president of Taiwan from 2008 to 2016. He supported the 1992 Consensus and pursued a policy of rapprochement with China, known as "One China, Two Interpretations." This approach aimed to maintain the consensus while allowing both sides to interpret it differently, fostering economic cooperation and reducing tensions between Taiwan and China.

- During the 2007 presidential election, Ma advocated the "Three No's" policy, which included no unification, no independence, and no use of force. However, in 2018, he introduced the "New Three No's" policy, changing "no unification" to "not excluding unification." Throughout his presidency, Ma sought to enhance economic ties with China, resulting in the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010, a significant trade agreement between Taiwan and China.



- One China, Two Interpretations
- 3 No's
- ECFA
- Ma-Xi meet

1992 Consensus

- In 1992, Taiwan and Mainland China reached a political consensus known as the 1992 Consensus through informal negotiations via fax. It is a controversial understanding between the Chinese government and Taiwan's representatives.
- "One China, Different Interpretations" is a concept often referred to as "一中各表" (Yī Zhōng Gè Biǎo) in Chinese. This principle is related to the cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China and represents a way to acknowledge the existence of "One China" while allowing for different interpretations of what "One China" means.



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

DPP's Perspective

Tsai Ing-wen

Contemporary President of Taiwan (2016-)

Tsai Ing-wen: "Four Musts" (2019)

- ***The first must is to face the reality of the existence of the Republic of China (Taiwan).***
- ***The second must is to respect the firm belief of 23 million people in freedom and democracy.***
- ***The third must is to handle Taiwan's differences through peaceful and equal means.***
- ***The fourth must is for the government or authorized public institutions to engage in negotiations.***

- Overall, these "Four Musts" represent President Tsai Ing-wen's stance on Taiwan's sovereignty, democracy, peaceful relations, and the necessity for official dialogue and engagement.

"Four Recognitions"(2020) :

3. 蔡總統重申，以對等對話化解兩岸分歧；戰爭不是選項，任何一方都不能以非和平方式片面改變現狀，請問您支不支持這樣的主張？

非常支持	支持	不支持	非常不支持	不知道/無意見
39.8%	44.4%	4.9%	2.1%	8.7%
84.2%		7.0%		8.7%

1. The first recognition is that we must understand that it is China, not Taiwan, that is disrupting the current situation in the Taiwan Strait. China is attempting to change the world order, which has raised concerns among many democratic countries.

2. The second recognition is that China is exploiting the so-called "1992 Consensus" to hollow out the Republic of China (Taiwan). While some in Taiwan may not feel the changes in the situation, the illusory "1992 Consensus" they are asked to accept under pressure from the other side of the strait is manipulated by China. Under this manipulation, the "One China" concept is expanding, while Taiwan's representation is diminishing, and even being squeezed out. The Republic of China is being hollowed out in this process.

"Four Recognitions"(2020) : Contd.

3. The third recognition is that we cannot trade sovereignty for short-term economic benefits. As the President of the Republic of China, she cannot sacrifice sovereignty in exchange for short-term economic gains or trade economic development for diplomatic space.

4. The fourth recognition is that China is engaging in comprehensive infiltration and attempts to divide Taiwanese society. China will use disinformation, united front tactics, and infiltration methods to expand its influence on Taiwanese society. Even retired military personnel and generals have been involved in espionage cases, making the establishment of a national security net crucial and time-sensitive. Thus, the government has introduced the "National Security Five Laws," and it is pushing for the "Anti-Infiltration Act," which is the final piece in safeguarding national security.

B. Perspectives: KMT & DPP



There are clear differences in the perspectives of the KMT and DPP regarding the OCP. **The KMT supports the "1992 Consensus" and promotes cross-strait dialogue and cooperation, while the DPP rejects the "1992 Consensus**," emphasizes Taiwan's sovereignty and democratic values, and seeks international recognition and participation for Taiwan. These differing viewpoints and values continue to shape Taiwan's cross-strait relations and remain significant issues in Taiwan's political landscape.

II.
Shifting Dynamics:
Then and Now



A. Changes in Political Landscape

Two enemies cannot live under the same sky -- Chiang Kai-shek

- Chiang Kai-shek's "Two enemies cannot live under the same sky" is a concept often referred to as "汉贼不两立" (Hàn zéi bù liǎng lì) in Chinese. It was a political slogan endorsed by the ROC government under his leadership, expressing a negative attitude towards the CCP during the Chinese Civil War. It encapsulated the ROC's OCP at that time.

- After the ROC government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek insisted that the ROC represented the only legitimate "China." He regarded the CCP as "Han thieves," referring to them as a rebellious group. In his political perspective, the coexistence of the CCP and the ROC was not permissible as it would lead to confrontation and division. Therefore, he emphasized the slogan to express a hostile stance towards the Communist Party and to emphasize that only the ROC was the legitimate government representing China.

A. Changes in Political Landscape

Two enemies cannot live under the same sky - Chiang Kai-shek (Contd.)

- Chiang Kai-shek's concept was closely related to the ROC's OCP. This policy emphasized that Taiwan was part of China and asserted the ROC's status as the only legitimate representative of "China" in the international community. However, as the PRC gained increasing recognition and development on the global stage, the ROC government's position faced challenges, and its OCP came under scrutiny.
- In later years, the ROC government gradually adjusted its foreign policy, adopting a more pragmatic approach and stressing maintaining an independent and neutral identity, with minimal reference to the concept of "One China." This change was driven by considerations of the international situation and the need to seek flexibility and survival in a complex international environment.

A. Changes in Political Landscape

"Cautious Self-Restraint" policy-- Lee Teng-hui

- Lee Teng-hui's "Cautious Self-Restraint" policy is a concept often referred to as "戒急用忍" (Jiè jíyòng rěn) in Chinese. was a guiding approach during his tenure as Taiwan's president in the early 1990s. This policy was implemented in the context of Taiwan's transition from an authoritarian regime to a more democratic system.
- The main essence of the "Cautious Self-Restraint" policy was to emphasize a cautious and gradual approach to political reform and democratization. Lee Teng-hui recognized the importance of managing the transformation carefully to maintain stability and prevent potential upheaval. Instead of rushing into drastic changes, the policy stressed the need for consensus-building and incremental steps toward democratization.

A. Changes in Political Landscape

"New Southbound Policy"-- Tsai Ing-wen

- The background of President Tsai's New Southbound Policy (NSP) was to diversify Taiwan's economic and trade ties beyond China and strengthen relations with countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific. It aimed to reduce Taiwan's economic dependence on China and enhance its regional presence and influence.
- Unlike Lee Teng-hui's Go South Policy, which focused primarily on attracting investment from Southeast Asian countries, Tsai's New Southbound Policy encompassed a broader scope, emphasizing cooperation in various sectors, including trade, investment, education, culture, and people-to-people exchanges. Additionally, Tsai's policy emphasized Taiwan's commitment to promoting democracy, human rights, and sustainable development in partner countries.

B. Evolving International Perspectives

1. Taiwan's Global Recognition and Diplomatic Relations

- The 2018 diplomatic crisis in Taiwan resulted in the loss of three allies: the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, and El Salvador. China's pressure and economic incentives caused more countries, including the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Nicaragua, and Honduras, to sever ties with Taiwan.
- Taiwan's foreign policy has shifted from rigidly adhering to the OCP and counting diplomatic allies to prioritizing economic cooperation and diplomatic interactions. Nancy Pelosi's visit elevated Taiwan's diplomatic status through parliamentary diplomacy.



B. Evolving International Perspectives

1. Taiwan's Global Recognition and Diplomatic Relations (Contd.)

- As a result, many countries have followed suit, with prominent members of national parliaments visiting Taiwan. This trend indicates the establishment of parliamentary diplomacy, where diplomatic interactions have become more fluid and successful. In recent years, Taiwan has successfully established parliamentary-level exchanges with various countries.
- The emphasis on parliamentary diplomacy and economic cooperation showcases Taiwan's commitment to strengthening its international standing and broadening its diplomatic engagement. As Taiwan continues to pursue pragmatic and proactive foreign policy approaches, it gains recognition and support from a growing number of countries in various sectors, including trade, culture, technology, and security cooperation. This signifies a positive shift in Taiwan's foreign policy landscape, enabling more open and fruitful international interactions beyond traditional diplomatic constraints.

B. Evolving International Perspectives

2. Taiwan-US Relations and Implication for the OCP

- The U.S. House passed the Taiwan International Solidarity Act to counter China's efforts to exclude Taiwan from international organizations. It aims to enhance U.S.-Taiwan ties, support Taiwan's regional engagement, and address OCP challenges. This demonstrates the U.S.' commitment to Taiwan and sends a clear signal to other countries about its active role in addressing OCP-related issues.



B. Evolving International Perspectives

2. Taiwan-US Relations and Implication for the OCP (Contd.)

- The passage of the Taiwan International Solidarity contributes to Taiwan's better integration into the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and its significant role within the region. These efforts aim to address the constraints posed by the OCP, demonstrating that Indo-Pacific members no longer need to be overly concerned about the issue due to the legitimacy support.



III.
Conclusion:

Cooperation Potential in the Indo-Pacific amid the OCP

A. The Impact of Weaponizing One China Policy

- In recent years, China has continuously weaponized the OCP, using it as a tool to exert influence and power. This strategy involves weaponizing various sectors, such as the economy, agricultural products, tourism, and more, with the aim of further restricting Taiwan's diplomatic autonomy and international standing.

- Faced with numerous diplomatic challenges and constrained by limited soft power channels, the current Taiwanese government has adopted a relatively cautious approach in responding to the OCP. This approach may be perceived as an attempt to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape while striving to protect its interests and sovereignty.


Trade between Taiwan and Chinese mainland
($billion)
Exports
Imports
Total trade
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
*Exports indicate the amount of exportation from Taiwan to the Chinese mainland, while imports indicate the amount of importation from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan.
Source: China's General Administration of Customs
CGTN

Tourists to Taiwan
(year-on-year changes in percent)
South Koreans
Mainland Chinese
Foreign tourists in total
80
60
40
20
0
−20
−40
−60
Jan. 2016
July
Jan. '17
July
Nov.
Source: Taiwan Tourism Bureau


Million people
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
China
Japan and South Korea
Southeast Asia
Rest of world


Figure 1: Foundry Revenue by Market Share, 2021~2022
2021 Foundry Revenue $107,542 M
TSMC 53%
Taiwan 64%
Korea 18%
China 7%
Others 10%
Samsung 18%
UMC 7%
2022F Foundry Revenue $128,784 M
TSMC 56%
Taiwan 66%
Korea 17%
China 8%
Others 9%
Samsung 16%
UMC 7%
Source: TrendForce, Apr., 2022
Semiconductor contract manufacturers by market share
Total foundry revenue stood at $85.13 billion in 2020
SMIC
China
Other firms
GlobalFoundries
Others
South Korea
Samsung
Taiwan
TSMC
UMC



B. Exploring Cooperation Potential in the Indo-Pacific amidst OCP

- The KMT and DPP's positions on the OCP represent two ends of the spectrum, with the KMT advocating for a cautious approach and the DPP seeking ways to address China's restrictions on Taiwan. Between these two stances lies the space where Taiwan seeks to collaborate with India and also Indo-Pacific members, which is reflected in Taiwan's current diplomatic efforts to strengthen ties with these countries.

- Indeed, Taiwan's competitive advantage extends beyond the semiconductor industry, as it maintains a prominent position in various domains. This prowess in diverse sectors contributes to Taiwan's exceptional performance in the semiconductor field. To sustain its leading position, Taiwan acknowledges the necessity of international collaboration, prompting many countries such as Japan, Germany, and other European nations to express willingness to engage in partnerships with Taiwan. Similarly, Taiwan endeavors to establish enhanced cooperation with Indo-Pacific countries.

ANNEXURE 4

Weaponising His Holiness the Dalai Lama's international travels

The evolution of China's reaction to the Dalai Lama's travels:
Early Reactions: In the years immediately following the Dalai Lama's 1959 exile, China focused on strengthening its hold on Tibet while minimising the Dalai Lama's influence.

China's reactions to the Dalai Lama's visits have evolved from cautious diplomacy in the early years to more aggressive economic and diplomatic measures in recent times. This evolution reflects China's increasing assertiveness on the global stage and its sensitivity to perceived threats to its sovereignty.

China's reactions intensified as the Dalai Lama gained global recognition, especially after receiving the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize. During the 1990s, China adopted cautious diplomacy, trying to diplomatically isolate the Dalai Lama while still engaging with countries he visited.

The Hu Jintao Era: When Hu Jintao assumed power in 2002, there was a turning point in China's response. The focus shifted to the "Dalai Lama Effect" – the notion that countries receiving him would face economic consequences. A study revealed that nations officially welcoming the Dalai Lama at the highest political level experienced an 8.1% drop in exports to China in the subsequent two years. This effect was particularly noticeable in machinery and transport equipment exports.

Increased Assertiveness: By the mid-2010s, China's reactions escalated to more assertive and punitive measures.

The Global Context: China's response to the Dalai Lama's travels goes beyond bilateral relationships, reflecting its broader goal of influencing smaller nations. China utilises diplomatic pressure and economic leverage to discourage countries from hosting him. For instance, in 2016, despite China's objections and warnings about harming Sino-US relations, US officials, including President Barack Obama, met with the Dalai Lama, prioritising human rights and religious freedom.

Recent Developments:
Sri Lanka
China continues to frame its objections to the Dalai Lama's activities through the lens of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, portraying him as a separatist threat. In 2023, China strongly reacted to Sri Lankan monks inviting the Dalai Lama, demonstrating its insecurity about his influence. In 2017, when a group of monks invited the Dalai Lama after attending his teachings in India, Chinese diplomats met with Buddhist leaders and said the Dalai Lama was a "separatist" who would damage China-Sri Lanka ties if allowed to visit. The invitation was ultimately withdrawn. In 2015, when senior Sri Lankan Buddhist monks

expressed interest in inviting the Dalai Lama, China immediately reminded the Sri Lankan government of its economic support, making it clear that any visit would damage their relations.

Japan

The Dalai Lama's visits to Japan have been particularly notable, with thousands of Japanese and Koreans flocking to hear him speak in cities like Osaka and Tokyo. China has consistently condemned these visits, warning Japan and other countries against supporting the Dalai Lama's "separatist activities."

Taiwan

China has also strongly objected to the Dalai Lama's visits to Taiwan. In 2009, China denounced the Dalai Lama's visit, saying it could have a "negative impact" on cross-strait relations. When the Dalai Lama visited Taiwan in 2009, China's Taiwan Affairs Bureau said "No matter under what form or identity Dalai uses to enter Taiwan, we resolutely oppose this." China accused the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of "using the disaster rescue excuse to invite Dalai to Taiwan to sabotage the hard-earned positive situation of cross-straits relations." However, China did not appear to take strong retaliatory economic measures, likely because it did not want to escalate tensions with Taiwan's then-President Ma Ying-jeou, who had sought to ease cross-strait relations.

Mongolia

One of the most notable examples of China's assertive stance was its response to the Dalai Lama's 2016 visit to Mongolia. Despite Mongolia's insistence that the visit was purely religious, China imposed an economic blockade, delaying talks on a $4.2 billion loan and imposing new fees on shipments through key border points. This incident highlighted China's willingness to impose significant economic costs on countries that defy its stance on the Dalai Lama.

Dalai Lama's Visits to Africa and China's Reactions

China has also strongly condemned the Dalai Lama's visits to various African countries, using a combination of diplomatic pressure, economic leverage, and threats of retaliation to dissuade African nations from hosting or engaging with the Tibetan spiritual leader. In 2009, China pressured the South African government to ban the Dalai Lama from attending a Nobel laureates' peace conference, saying it would "hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and harm bilateral relations."

The Dalai Lama's Visits to Europe

Many European countries have recognised the Dalai Lama as a notable religious leader and have granted him significant attention, despite Chinese opposition. The Dalai Lama's visits to various European countries have been a particular source of tension with China.

France

The Dalai Lama has met with European political leaders during his visits, such as when he met with French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Poland in 2008. These meetings have drawn strong condemnation from China, which has accused the Dalai Lama of promoting Tibetan independence and interfering in China's internal affairs. When the Dalai Lama visited Poland

in 2008 and met with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, China cancelled a summit with the European Union in response.

European Parliament

The Dalai Lama's visit to the EU's Parliament and the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, where he has thanked the EU for its continued support.

The estimated negative effect of Dalai Lama meetings at the government level on European exports to China amounts to 11.5-13.1%. However, European governments have generally maintained support for the Dalai Lama's visits, despite strong objections from China.

Economic and Diplomatic Impact

Trade Deterioration: The Dalai Lama's visits to Europe, including Poland, Latvia, and Slovakia, have been linked to a negative impact on European exports to China. The estimated effect on European exports to China due to Dalai Lama meetings at government level amounts to 11.5% in the Fixed Effects regression and 13.1% in the Random Effects regression.

In summary, the Dalai Lama's visits to Poland, Latvia, and Slovakia created significant diplomatic tensions with China, particularly when he met with high-ranking officials. These visits also had a negative impact on European trade with China, as China imposed economic pressure on countries that hosted the Dalai Lama.

Global Impact

The Dalai Lama's travels affect China's global image and relationships with other countries. His visits highlight China's attempts to curtail his influence, harming its image as a global power. China's diplomatic pressure raises concerns about its growing economic and political leverage. These visits draw attention to China's human rights record in Tibet. China's attempts to thwart the Dalai Lama's visits have sometimes backfired, strengthening his ties with certain nations.

Diplomatic pressure

China has exerted significant diplomatic pressure on countries hosting the Dalai Lama, such as lodging formal protests with the US government following visits in 2016 and 2018. China also strongly objected to the Dalai Lama's participation in the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris.

Cancellation of high-level meetings

In 2008, China cancelled a summit with the European Union in response to plans for the Dalai Lama to visit Europe, including a meeting with the French president.

Conclusion

The Dalai Lama's international travels over the past decade and a half represent a constant source of tension between China and the countries he has visited. China consistently reacts with diplomatic pressure, economic retaliation, and warnings of damaged bilateral relations. Countries such as Mongolia, Sri Lanka, and European nations have experienced consequences ranging from trade disruptions to cancelled loans for hosting the Dalai Lama.

This highlights China's sensitivity to the issue and its willingness to use economic power to advance its political goals.

List of Countries His Holiness the Dalai Lama has visited

Source: https://www.dalailama.com

Europe	North America	South America	Oceania	Asia	Africa
Lithuania 2018 2013 2001 1991	**USA** 2024 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2001 2000 1999 1998 1996 1995 1994 1993 1991 1990 1989 1987 1984 1981 1980 1979	**Chile** 2006 1999 1992	**Australia** 2015 2013 2011 2009 2008 2007 2003 2002 1996 1992 1982	**Thailand** 1993 1972 1967	**Gabon** 1993
The Netherlands 2018 2014 2009 2001 1999 1996 1994 1990 1986 1973					
Latvia 2018 2017 2016 2014 2013 2001 1991	**Mexico** 2013 2011 2004 1989	**Peru** 2006	**New Zealand** 2013 2011 2009 2007 2003 2002 1996 1992	**Singapore** 1982	**Nigeria** 2009
Sweden 2018 2011 2005 2000 1997 1996 1991 1988 *1973*	**Canada** 2014 2012 2011 2010 2009 2006 2004 1993 1990 1980	**Colombia** 2006		**Israel** 1999 1994	**Senegal** (Dakar) 2004
	Puerto Rico *2004*	**Argentina** 2011 2006 1999 1992		**Indonesia** 1992 1982	
Germany 2018 2017 2015 2014 2013 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2005 2003 2001 2000 1999 1998 1996 1995 1994 1993 1991 1990 1989	**Nicaragua** 1994	**Brazil** 2011 2006 1999 1992		**Turkey** 1983	
Switzerland 2024 2018 2016 2015 2014 2013 2011 2010 2009 2005 2003 1999 1998 1999 1996 1995 1994 1993 1991 1988 1987 1986 1983 1979 1974 1973	**Costa Rica** 2004 1989			**Jordan** 2008 2006 2005	
Iceland 2009	**El Salvador** 2004				

Europe	North America	South America	Oceania	Asia	Africa
UK 2017 2015 2013 2012 2010 2008 2007 2005 2004 2000 1999 1996 1993 1991 1990 1989 1988 1984 1981 *1973*	**Guatemala** 2004			**Japan** 2018 2016 2015 2014 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 1999 1998 1995 1994 1993 1980 1978 1967	
Italy 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2009 2007 2006 2005 2004 2001 2000 1999 1997 1996 1994 1991 1988 1986 1982 1980 1973	**Trinidad and Tobago** 1995			**Taiwan** 2009 2001 1997	
Belgium 2016 2012 2009 2006 1999 1994 1990 1973				**Mongolia** 2016 2011 2006 2002 1995 1994 1991 1982 1979	
France 2016 2011 2009 2008 2004 2003 2000 1998 1997 1996 1994 1993 1991 1990 1989 1988 1986					
Poland 2016 2013 2010 2009 2008 2000 1993				**Malaysia** 1982	
Slovakia 2016 2009 2000					
Finland 2011 2006 1998 1996 1988					
Estonia 2011 2001 1991					
Spain 2007 2003 1997 1996 1990					
Hungary 2010 2000 1996 1993 1992 1982					
Czech Republic 2016 2013 2011 2009 2008 2006 2003 2002 2000 1997 1990					

Europe	North America	South America	Oceania	Asia	Africa
Slovenia 2012 2010 2002					
Austria 2012 2007 2006 2002 1998 1996 1993 1992 1991 1986 1983 *1973*					
Ireland 2011 1991 *1973*					
Norway 2015 2014 2005 2001 2000 1996 1991 1989 1988 *1973*					
Denmark 2015 2014 2011 2009 2000 1999 1988 *1973*					
Portugal 2007 2001					
Croatia 2002					
Luxembourg 2005					
Liechtenstein 1991					
Bulgaria 1991					
Buriyat, Kalmykia and Tuva 2004 1995 1994 1992 1991 1979					
England 1944					
Greece 1979					
West Germany 1989 1988 1987 1986 1983 1982 *1973*					

US officials meet Dalai Lama; China reacts with anger

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2024/08/23/2003822640
2024, August 23
Senior US officials on Wednesday met with the Dalai Lama, the US Department of State said.
The Dalai Lama, who is denounced by Beijing as a separatist, met with US Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights Uzra Zeya and US National Security Council official Kelly Razzouk in New York, where he is visiting to receive medical treatment.
During the meeting, Zeya "reaffirmed the US commitment to advancing the human rights of Tibetans and supporting efforts to preserve their distinct historical, linguistic, cultural, and religious heritage."

China's Panicked Reaction to Sri Lanka's Invitation to the Dalai Lama

https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/chinas-panicked-reaction-to-sri-lankas-invitation-to-the-dalai-lama/
2023, February 1
Its charge d'affaires in Colombo raced to Kandy to warn a top Buddhist monk of damage to bilateral relations if the Tibetan leader visited the island.
The Chinese government's rather excessive response to an invitation extended by Sri Lankan Buddhist monks to the Dalai Lama to visit the island underscores yet again Beijing's deep insecurities vis-à-vis the Tibetan leader. The incident also lays bare the open arm-twisting China indulges in with small countries to get them to toe its line.
According to reports, a group of senior Sri Lankan Buddhist monks who attended the Dalai Lama's public sermon at Bodh Gaya in India on December 29-31 expressed interest in the spiritual leader visiting Sri Lanka.
The monks' invitation to the Dalai Lama was reported in the Sri Lankan media. Before long, Chinese diplomats stationed in Colombo headed off to Kandy in the central highlands, where the Chargé d'Affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Colombo Hu Wei met the Mahanayake Thero of the Malwathu Chapter of the Siam Nikaya (a Buddhist monastic order), the Most Venerable Thibbatuwawe Sri Siddhartha Sumangala Thero.
According to a press release from the Chinese embassy, in the course of his "friendly conversation" with the monks Hu told them that the Dalai Lama "is not a 'simple monk' as he claims, but a 'separatist'," and a "political exile disguised as a religious figure who has long been engaging in anti-China separatist activities and attempting to split Tibet from China."
Reminding the monks of "China's firm support" to Sri Lanka, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic and the current economic crisis, Hu said that "both sides especially the Buddhist communities must prevent a sneaky visit of the Dalai Lama to the island to promote 'Tibetan independence'."
This was necessary to "safeguard the China-Sri Lanka historical relations from being damaged," Hu said.
The message was clear. China's relations with debt-trapped and dependent Sri Lanka would be "damaged" if the invitation to the Dalai Lama to visit Sri Lanka was not withdrawn.
Meanwhile, an official of the Tibetan government-in-exile said that the Dalai Lama did not intend to visit Sri Lanka. "At the moment, the Dalai Lama has no plans to visit Sri Lanka," he told The Federal.
The Dalai Lama's visits to countries across the world trigger objections from the Chinese government. In the case of India, where the Dalai Lama lives, his visits to Arunachal Pradesh in India's Northeast, where China claims territory, have never failed to raise hackles in Beijing.

China punishes countries that welcome the Dalai Lama. In November 2016, when the Tibetan leader visited Mongolia, a Buddhist country where he is deeply revered, Beijing retaliated by imposing an economic blockade against the landlocked country.
China has pressured Sri Lanka on Dalai Lama-related issues in the past as well.
In December 2017, the Chinese embassy in Colombo reportedly pressured the management of Irida Lankadeepa, a Sinhalese newspaper, to stop the serialization of the Dalai Lama's autobiography, "My Land and My People." When the Sri Lankan Tibetan Buddhist Brotherhood Society organized photo exhibitions of the Dalai Lama, the Chinese embassy complained to the Criminal Investigations Department to probe the Society's activities, Damenda Porage, its president, said.
China has objected to invitations to the Dalai Lama to visit the island in the past as well.
In 2015, months after a strongly pro-China government in Sri Lanka was defeated in elections, senior Sri Lankan monks during a meeting with the Dalai Lama in New Delhi "expressed a unanimous wish, shared by a large number of people in Sri Lanka, to see the Dalai Lama visit their country," Tibetan Review reported.
"They can invite, but the government may not grant a visa," a top official of the Sri Lankan foreign ministry told Reuters, adding that while "the Dalai Lama is very important," Sri Lanka's "close relationship with China is more important."
"The Dalai Lama would be happy to visit but does not want to cause any inconvenience to the Sri Lankan government," a senior aide of the Tibetan leader told Reuters amid the controversy in 2015.
The Dalai Lama did not visit the island in 2015, and the Chinese government lauded Sri Lanka for not providing "venues of connivance" to the Tibetan leader.
In 2015, Sri Lanka had already accumulated massive debts owed to China and was heavily dependent on it. But the situation it is in today is far worse; the country is in the grip of its worst economic crisis since its independence in 1948. Not only does it owe China billions of dollars but also, without Chinese support for its restructuring program, the IMF will not unlock its promised $2.9 billion loan to Sri Lanka to help in its economic recovery.
Under the circumstances, it is unlikely that the Sri Lankan government would have risked Chinese ire by allowing the Dalai Lama to visit. Thus, there was no need for the Chinese charge d'affaires in Colombo to rush to Kandy to meet the top prelate of the Malwathu Chapter of the Siam Nikaya.
In fact, even a phone call to the Sri Lankan foreign ministry warning against the Dalai Lama's visit was unnecessary. After all, Sri Lanka knows the consequences.
Yet so deep are Chinese insecurities over the Dalai Lama and his popularity that it was unwilling to take a chance. Hence, the warning wrapped in the "friendly conversation" with the senior monks at Kandy.

China cancels Mongolia talks indefinitely after Dalai Lama visit

The talks originally scheduled for next week were seen as crucial for Mongolia to access badly-needed Chinese loans and development projects
https://www.livemint.com/Politics/oezintRSVpvOQ0VN5txADP/China-cancels-Mongolia-talks-indefinitely-after-Dalai-Lama-v.html
2016, November 26

China postponed bilateral meetings with Mongolia indefinitely after its North Asian neighbour allowed a four-day visit by Tibet's spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama.
The two sets of talks originally scheduled for next week were seen as crucial for Mongolia to access badly-needed Chinese loans and development projects.
"The meeting was intended for negotiations on soft loans and the projects on Tavan Tolgoi railroad, a copper plant and coal gasification project. Unfortunately, the Chinese side

responded that this visit was unacceptable," Munkh-Orgil Tsend, Mongolia's foreign minister told reporters in Ulaanbaatar on Thursday.
A traditionally Buddhist nation that has deep historical ties to Tibet, Mongolia has hosted the current Dalai several times since 1979. Past visits have been met with reprisals from Beijing, which considers the Dalai Lama to be a separatist leader and routinely condemns nations that give him a platform to speak.
The visit, which concluded earlier this week, was purely religious in nature, said Munkh-Orgil, adding that it had been organized by Gandan Monastery and the government had played no role in the invitation.
China also cancelled a bi-annual consultative meeting between the two countries' Parliaments, said Munkh-Orgil. Preparations for a planned visit by Mongolian Prime Minister Erdenebat Jargaltulga to China next year are also in doubt, he added.
Since it declared its economy in crisis in August, Mongolia has been seeking emergency loans from bilateral partners and international financial institutions including China and the International Monetary Fund. The nation's budget deficit has more than doubled this year to $1 billion while gross domestic product contracted by 1.6% in the first nine months. Bloomberg

Beijing cancels Czech minister's visit as Dalai Lama visit fallout continues

https://english.radio.cz/beijing-cancels-czech-ministers-visit-dalai-lama-visit-fallout-continues-8209839
2016 November 2
Though it is two weeks since a visit by the Dalai Lama to Prague, the repercussions continue to be felt on the Czech political scene. In the latest turn of events, the Czech minister of agriculture – whose party colleague received the Tibetan leader – said China had put the kibosh on a visit during which he was to meet two cabinet members in Beijing.
The decision by Christian Democrat arts minister Daniel Herman to receive the Dalai Lama in Prague on October 18 put the cat among the pigeons in a major way.
The move split the cabinet, with foreign policy chief Lubomír Zaorálek of the Social Democrats accusing Mr. Herman of reneging on an agreement to not meet officially with the Tibetan.
And Mr. Herman's Holocaust survivor uncle did not receive a state honour from the president, though Miloš Zeman's people denied accusations he had pressured the culture minister to cancel the meeting.
The head of state backs closer ties with China and co-authored a declaration with other top officials reassuring Beijing there was no change in official Czech policy. That move led to accusations of servility.
And the matter continues to rumble on. On Tuesday Mr. Herman's party colleague Marian Jurečka, the minister of agriculture, made an announcement on Czech Television.
"I am saying this for the first time today. Tomorrow evening I was meant to fly to China, where I was to meet my counterpart, their minister of agriculture, and also the minister for water management. And the trip is not going ahead. Our diplomats in Beijing received information that both ministers were cancelling their meetings with me. The explanation was that it was for reasons that both sides would fully understand."
But what do this development and the kerfuffle over the Dalai Lama say about Czech-Chinese relations?
Leading Czech sinologist Olga Lomová says Prague has underestimated regular diplomatic means of dealing with the world's most populous state.
"I think what's happening here is we just push too much. We give too much in advance to China and we are too much afraid.
"I understand if China doesn't like if politicians are meeting with the Dalai Lama. It happened in the past in France and I don't know where.
"But I'm not aware that after such a meeting there would be such a reaction.

"Both sides need to sit down, negotiate and assure each other in a normal way. Not in the way that happened in our country."
Meanwhile, the cancellation of Mr. Jurečka's visit remains in the news. On Wednesday Foreign Minister Zaorálek said he was disquieted by the move and said his deputy would raise the matter with China's ambassador on Thursday.

Dalai Lama: Blackballed from Thailand

https://theworld.org/stories/2017/03/10/dalai-lama-blackballed-thailand
2017, March 10
Thailand — In the age of growing Chinese influence, there's a simple measure of a country's willingness to test China's wrath. Will they stamp the Dalai Lama's passport?
Add Thailand to the shrinking list of nations that won't.
China is succeeding in its mission to globally ostracize the Tibetan monk, likely the world's best-known Buddhist and the face of Tibet's resistance to Chinese rule. And despite Southeast Asia's entrenched Buddhism, China's diplomatic shadow has now blacked out the entire region for the Dalai Lama.
President Barack Obama is scheduled to meet the 74-year-old monk on Feb. 18 at the White House, only after dodging a proposed sit-down last fall. South Africa, fearing Chinese backlash, banned the Dalai Lama in advance of the 2010 World Cup. In the few Asian countries that still allow his entry, officials generally dodge photo-ops and sit-downs with the spiritual leader, described by China's communist party as a "jackal in monk's robes."
The Dalai Lama's popularity in America — where he's revered among conservative circles, left-leaning lawmakers and the Beastie Boys alike — is nearly matched in Thailand.
However, as in much of the world, the Dalai Lama's office says that Thailand has been quietly turning down the celebrity monk's visa requests.
Why would the Dalai Lama want to come to Thailand?
He's routinely invited by various Thai institutions, said Tenzin Taklha, joint secretary of the India-based Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
An estimated 95 percent of Thais are Buddhist, making Thailand perhaps the world's most Buddhist nation. Though the Dalai Lama practices Tibetan Buddhism — a more mystical branch compared to Thailand's conservative Theravada Buddhism — he is still highly regarded among Thais.
Thailand is also the base for one of the Dalai Lama's pet causes, democracy in military-dominated Burma and the release of imprisoned Burmese democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi. Her supporters are rallying support in advance of Burma's 2010 elections and her possible release.
"His Holiness the Dalai Lama last visited Thailand in 1993 when a group of Nobel Peace laureates held a solidarity meeting for fellow Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi," Tenzin Taklha said. "Since then, His Holiness has not been able to visit Thailand because of the refusal of the necessary visa from the Thai government, for reasons known to them."
Why won't Thailand allow him to enter?
A visit would infuriate China, one of Thailand's largest trading partners, and likely poison trade and diplomatic relations.
The Dalai Lama isn't explicitly barred through policy, said Chavanond Intarakomalyasut, secretary to the minister of foreign affairs. "Of course, we would consider it case by case," he said. "But, generally, we don't allow anyone to use Thailand as a base country to do any political activities or instigate violence in other countries."
The Thai foreign minister, Kasit Piromya, has indirectly acknowledged that a Dalai Lama invite would be an unwarranted insult to China.
Last year, he drew an oddly flattering parallel between the Dalai Lama and the fugitive billionaire and ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who is sought for arrest by the Thai

government. Thaksin is currently hopping the globe while organizing a movement to oust the ruling party.
Other countries shouldn't shelter Thaksin, Kasit said, just as Thailand shouldn't allow the Dalai Lama to criticize China from Thai soil.
Are there any Asian countries the Dalai Lama can still visit?
A few. The Dalai Lama's office is based in India, which borders Tibet and openly resents Chinese encroachment into its backyard. He is sometimes allowed to speak in Japan, though officials typically keep their distance. He is also occasionally granted access to Taiwan, China's bitter enemy, as well as Australia and New Zealand.
But a review of the Dalai Lama's travel schedule through the last two decades shows only two Southeast Asia visits: the 1993 Thailand visit and a 1992 trip to Indonesia.
The region is now too beholden to Chinese trade and aid to risk a Dalai Lama invite, said Kevin Hewison, director of the Carolina Asia Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
"The U.S. being tied up in the Middle East left a void that China has intentionally filled," Hewison said. "China's trade, investment and aid in Southeast Asia has made it the most important player in the region now."
These relationships are mostly business-driven and require few diplomatic concessions. "But there are some things you can't do," he said. "You can't support Taiwan. And you can't push independence for Tibet. It's self-censorship."

China Threatens Countermeasures after Dalai Lama Speaks at EU Parliament

https://www.voanews.com/a/china-threatens-countermeasures-after-dalai-lama-speaks-at-eu-parliament/3515178.html
2016, September 19
China expressed anger on Monday and threatened countermeasures after exiled Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama spoke at the European Parliament in the French city of Strasbourg and met its president, Martin Schulz.
China regards the 80-year-old, Nobel Peace Prize-winning monk as a separatist, though he says he merely seeks genuine autonomy for his Himalayan homeland, which Communist Chinese troops "peacefully liberated" in 1950.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang said the European Parliament and Schultz had ignored China's "strong opposition" about meeting the Dalai Lama, which ran contrary to the European Union's promises to China on the issue of Tibet.
"China is resolutely opposed to the mistaken actions of the European Parliament," Lu told a daily news briefing, adding that its leaders' insistence on taking an erroneous position had damaged China's core interests.
"China absolutely cannot remain indifferent, and we will make the correct choice in accordance with our judgment of the situation," he added, without elaborating on what China may do.
Few foreign leaders are willing to meet the Dalai Lama these days, fearful of provoking a strong reaction from China, the world's second-largest economy.
Last week, Beijing warned Taiwan not to allow the Dalai Lama to visit, after a high-profile Taiwan legislator invited him to the self-ruled island Beijing claims as its own.
Tibet's spiritual leader told the European Parliament last week he hoped the Tibetan issue would be resolved but urged the outside world and the European Union in particular not to hold back from criticizing Beijing.
The Dalai Lama, who also met the European Parliament's foreign affairs chairman, Elmar Brok, fled to India in 1959 following a failed uprising against the Chinese.
Rights groups and exiles accuse China of trampling on the religious and cultural rights of the Tibetan people, charges strongly denied by Beijing, which says its rule has brought prosperity to a once backward region.

Bon Jovi's first gigs in China cancelled by officials

2015 September 8

Bon Jovi's first ever concerts in China have been cancelled by government officials, the BBC has learned.

No reason was given, but media reports suggest that censors discovered the US rock band had used an image of the Dalai Lama as a backdrop at a gig five years ago.

China has previously banned artists like Bjork, as well as academics and politicians, who have shown support for the Dalai Lama or Tibetan independence.

Maroon 5 recently had shows cancelled.

The band, whose hits include Moves Like Jagger and She Will Be Loved, were also due to perform in China this month. The cancellation of their concerts was **linked to a band member, external** tweeting the Dalai Lama to wish him happy birthday in July.

Bon Jovi had been due to play Shanghai and Beijing next week.

The Financial Times reported , externalthe Communist party's Culture Ministry acted after discovering Bon Jovi had performed in front of a picture of the Tibetan monk at a 2010 concert in Taiwan, and had previously tweeted about the spiritual leader.

It said concert organisers AEG were trying to convince officials to relent, but they felt the chances were slim.

Stars refused

Bjork was banned from China for life after she chanted "Tibet, Tibet" during her song Declare Independence at a concert in Shanghai in 2008.

Linkin Park were barred in 2011 after they attended a youth media conference in Los Angeles and were photographed with the Dalai Lama. Prime Minister David Cameron also sparked **an angry response** from officials when he met with the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader in 2012.

Leaders in China have called the Dalai Lama a "splittist" and a "wolf in monk's robes".

The issue of Tibet is said to be especially sensitive at the moment ahead of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region.

A top Chinese official vowed on Monday to "crack down on separatist forces" in Tibet and "fight a protracted battle" against the "Dalai clique".

Announcing the Bon Jovi shows earlier this year, frontman Jon Bon Jovi had said he was "excited" to be performing in Beijing for the first time ever.

In a recent interview with Chinese state media he described the band's music as being about "individual freedom and expression".

Last month, he even recorded a cover of The Moon Represents My Heart, arguably the most famous Chinese love song ever.

China cancels vice minister's visit to Lithuania after Dalai Lama's call

https://www.15min.lt/en/article/society/social-enterprise-day-2021-counting-not-only-profits-but-also-positive-impact-528-1600622

2013, October 01

China cancels vice minister's visit to Lithuania after Dalai Lama's call Lithuania's Ministry of Transport and Communications has been informed by the Embassy of China that a visit of China's vice minister of commerce Jiang Zengwei to Lithuania, planned in October, has been cancelled because Lithuania's top officials met with the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama last month, the Lithuanian daily Lietuvos Žinios reports. Skaitykite daugiau: Yes, the Chinese Embassy has informed the Ministry of Transport and Communications that the planned visit of China's vice minister of commerce Jiang Zengwei has been cancelled," Ričardas Slapšys, spokesman for the transport minister, confirmed it to the daily. According to the newspaper, Chinese diplomats have visited the Ministry of Transport and Communications and apologized for the decision, saying that it's "only a political measure" in response to meetings with the Dalai Lama in Lithuania. The Dalai Lama paid his third visit to Vilnius in the middle of September. He had an unofficial meeting with Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė

and also visited the Lithuanian parliament where he met with MPs and members of the public.

Australia university accused of bowing to China by barring Dalai Lama

https://www.reuters.com/article/world/australia-university-accused-of-bowing-to-china-by-barring-dalai-lama-idUSBRE93H09T/
2013 April 18
CANBERRA (Reuters) - One of Australia's most exclusive universities has called off a talk to students by the Dalai Lama, prompting accusations it is bowing to China which has branded the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader a dangerous separatist.
Sydney University, ranked in the world's top 50, canceled the June visit by the Nobel Peace laureate to avoid damaging China ties, including funding for its cultural Confucius Institute, Tibetan activists and Australian lawmakers said.
"As a democratic country, we should be encouraging more open and frank discussion about the current situation in Tibet, not banning the country's spiritual leader from addressing students and staff at universities," said Greens Senator Sarah Hanson-Young, whose party wields the balance of power in the upper house of parliament.
Prime Minister Julia Gillard was heavily criticized for refusing to meet the Dalai Lama during a 2011 visit to avoid damaging two-way trade worth $120 billion last year.
Gillard this month led a trade delegation to meet Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, with both countries agreeing to a new strategic partnership including yearly talks between both leaders on foreign policy and economics.
China's human rights record in Tibet remains a controversial issue in Australia, a close U.S. ally, and Sydney University's new Institute for Democracy and Human Rights organized an on-campus talk by the Dalai Lama during his 10-day visit.
This was overturned by a decision to move the event off campus after the university warned organizers not to use its logo, allow media coverage or entry to the event by free Tibet activists.
Emails from university Vice-Chancellor Michael Spence, obtained by Australian television, expressed relief at the outcome, with Spence reportedly praising it as "in the best interests of researchers across the University".

China cancels UK visit over David Cameron's meeting with Dalai Lam

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/25/china-cancels-uk-visit-dalai-lama
2012 May 25
China called off a senior leader's visit to Britain after learning that David Cameron planned to meet the Dalai Lama, according to diplomatic sources.
Beijing summoned the British ambassador following the prime minister's meeting in London this month and warned publicly that the event had damaged relations with the UK.
But the cancellation of Wu Bangguo's visit had previously escaped notice because it had not been announced.
Wu, who is the country's chief legislator and serves on its top political decision-making body, has just concluded a tour of Europe that was due to include the short trip to Britain.
Chinese officials informed their British counterparts that the visit was cancelled after learning of Cameron's meeting with the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, sources said.
A spokesman at the British embassy in Beijing did not comment on the timing or cause of the cancellation, but confirmed: "There was a proposed visit by Wu Bangguo which has not happened.
"We very much regret that Chairman Wu was not able to travel to the UK; his visit would have been a good opportunity to continue deepening UK-China relations. We would welcome future visitors from the National People's Congress to strengthen the UK-China dialogue."

Wu chairs the standing committee of the NPC, the country's legislature.
The Chinese foreign ministry had not responded to queries at time of writing, but a spokesman warned after Cameron's meeting that the British government had "[hurt] the feelings of the Chinese people", meddled in China's affairs and harmed Chinese-British relations.
Hong Lei added: "We are strongly discontented and firmly opposed to it.
"We call on the British side to earnestly respond to China's solemn demand, stop conniving at and supporting separatist attempts to achieve Tibetan independence, take practical measures to eliminate the terrible impact and take actions to preserve Chinese-British relations."
A commentary published by the state news agency Xinhua described it as "a dark moment for China-Britain relations".
China alleges that the Dalai Lama wants to split the country, while he says that he seeks only meaningful autonomy for Tibet.
Beijing pays close attention to his travels and lobbies foreign leaders not to meet him, often warning that it will damage bilateral relations. It is particularly alert to arrangements suggesting the Dalai Lama is an official visitor akin to a visiting statesman and to awards and honours he is granted.
Cameron and Nick Clegg, the deputy prime minister, met him at St Paul's Cathedral – where the Dalai Lama was receiving the £1.1m Templeton prize – rather than on government premises.
Beijing's highest-level protest came in 2008 when it called off a major EU summit because Nicolas Sarkozy, then French president, was due to meet the Tibetan.
More recently, it is understood to have cancelled bilateral visits after the Estonian president and other politicians met the Dalai Lama last summer. A few months later there was fury from civil rights campaigners when the spiritual leader failed to obtain a visa to South Africa, where he hoped to celebrate his friend Desmond Tutu's birthday. South African officials denied they were bowing to pressure from China, its biggest trading partner.
Diplomats say the Czech Republic has had particularly frosty relations with China over its dealings with the Tibetan spiritual leader, who has visited the country nine times and was a friend of the late Vaclav Havel, its former president.
"They have been made an example of; it is easier to punish smaller countries," said one.
In 2010, researchers at the University of Göttingen in Germany said they had found meetings with the Dalai Lama damaged exports to China. Their study of 159 countries over 17 years suggested exports slipped by an average 8.1% in the two years after a country's officials met the Tibetan spiritual leader, but recovered after that.

China cancels visit by Estonian official amid Dalai Lama row

https://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/29465/
2011, October 11
China has cancelled the official visit of an Estonian minister later this month, in response to "an incident in Mid-August".

A visit to China by Agriculture Minister Helir-Valdor Seeder was axed because of the Dalai Lama's reception in Estonia last month. President Toomas Hendrick Ilves met with the Tibetan spiritual leader during his three-day visit, though the prime minister and speaker of parliament both declined a meeting.
The Chinese Embassy in Estonia formally protested the Dalai Lama's visit at the time, saying that it would hurt relations between the two countries.
"By allowing the Dalai Lama to visit Estonia and arranging official meetings with him, Estonia will seriously violate the basic principles of international relations," the embassy told national news agency ERR in a press statement

"It is requested that Estonian side seriously consider China's stance, immediately adopt measures to cancel the official meeting and stop interfering in China's internal affairs," the statement read.

China objects to Dalai Lama granted honorary citizen status by Rome

https://www.asianews.it/news-en/-China-objects-to-Dalai-Lama-granted-honorary-citizen-status-by-Rome-14442.html
2009, October 10
Buddhist spiritual leader is comforted in Tibet's search for autonomy. Beijing threatens actions that might affect its good relations with Italy. Today the Dalai Lama becomes honorary citizen of Venice.
Rome (AsiaNews) – China is angry that the Dalai Lama, Tibet's spiritual leader in exile, was granted honorary citizenship yesterday by the City of Rome. It warned of possible "consequences".
"This seriously hurts the feelings of the Chinese people," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu told a regular news briefing. "We express our strong dissatisfaction and opposition."
"We hope Italy pays attention to China's deep concerns and takes immediate, effective measures to remove the negative impact and maintain the healthy, stable development of bilateral ties," she added.
Jiang repeated that for China the Dalai Lama "is not a simple religious figure," but "has for a long time been a political exile engaging in separatist political activities" in favour of Tibet independence.
A few months ago Beijing abruptly cancelled a China-EU summit, angry over French President and then EU rotating President Nicolas Sarkozy's meeting with the Dalai Lama.
Yesterday the Dalai Lama was awarded honorary citizenship in Rome's Campidoglio, seat of the city government. In the Giulio Cesare (Julius Caesar) Hall, Rome Mayor Gianni Alemanno said that the award is a symbol of "our moral rejection of injustice, violence and oppression." It is "a moral revolt in defence of the identity of nations."
"We stand by you and strongly demand the full recognition of the autonomy of the Tibetan nation," the mayor added, albeit within the "territorial integrity" of China.
More conciliatory the Dalai Lama stressed again his option for "non violent action" which he will pursue "until death".
He noted that for many Tibetans their situation is dramatic; things are ready to explode, but urged them to remain patient and choose peace.
Starting last 18 January China has launched another harsh anti-Tibetan crackdown. About 6,000 people are said to have been arrested since then.
After his award the Dalai Lama left the Italian capital on his way to Venice. In the city of Marco Polo he will also be granted honorary citizenship.

China stops more Germany talks after Dalai Lama visit

https://www.reuters.com/article/world/china-stops-more-germany-talks-after-dalai-lama-visit-idUSL24731925/
September 24, 2007
China has cancelled talks scheduled for this week between its foreign minister and his German counterpart after Chancellor Angela Merkel met the Dalai Lama, denounced by Beijing as a separatist.
It is the second round of talks with Germany that China has called off since Merkel announced her private meeting with Tibet's exiled spiritual leader which took place in the chancellery in Berlin on Sunday.

Chinese officials have informed Germany that a traditional breakfast between the two countries' foreign ministers at the U.N. General Assembly in New York would not take place "for diary reasons", a foreign ministry spokesman said.
"We are trying to set up a new appointment with our Chinese partners for a different time," he told a regular news conference, declining to say if the cancellation was linked to the first ever meeting between the Dalai Lama and a German chancellor.
China had protested against Merkel's plans to meet the Dalai Lama and summoned the German ambassador in Beijing to object to the visit earlier this month.
On Saturday, Germany said China had cancelled talks on the rule of law due to take place in Munich on Sunday for "technical reasons". Germany's Justice Minister Brigitte Zypries had been due to attend.
Merkel's foreign policy adviser Christoph Heusgen tried to soothe tensions by calling China's ambassador in Berlin to brief him about the chancellor's talks with the Dalai Lama.
Heusgen made clear nothing had changed in terms of German policy towards China, said government spokesman Thomas Steg, adding that China's territorial integrity was not in question.
"Such talks must be possible without hurting German-Chinese relations," he said.
Critics of China's rule in Tibet say Beijing continues to repress Tibetan Buddhists' religious aspirations, especially their veneration for the Dalai Lama.
The spiritual leader, who fled Tibet for India in 1959 after a failed uprising against Chinese rule, says he only wants greater autonomy for the region.
Merkel has sought to develop diplomatic relations and promote German economic ties with China and she made an official visit there last month.
"We are confident we will be able to further develop the good relations built up between China and Germany," said Steg.
He added that no high-ranking meetings between German and Chinese officials were planned on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly, which Merkel is attending.

ANNEXURE 5

About FNVA

www.fnvaworld.org

OUR PRINCIPLES

FNVA' s principles are grounded in the belief that every cultural and religious tradition has appropriate non - violent methods for positive political, economic and social change at the local, national and the international level. Importance of food, shelter, health, livelihood opportunities and a clean environment for our future generations cannot be denied as these are essential elements for our existence, as are the rule of law, peace and respect for diversity and dignity of the individual for his political, social, economic, religious and cultural rights.

OUR MISSION

FNVA stands as a pivotal think tank, dedicated to the examination of Tibet, the strategies of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and China's influence within the immediate geopolitical region.

OBJECTIVES

The Foundation for Non-violent Alternatives has been established in 2009 as a not-for-profit, non-partisan organisation with the objective to focus on the geopolitical and strategic significance of developments in Tibet, China and the Himalayan region from an Indian policy perspective. As the sole Indian think-tank specialising on Tibet, we serve as a vital forum for dialogue and furnish policy reports to governmental and political decision-makers. Our focus is Tibet, across a border that did not exist until China' s takeover in 1950-51, with essential context from our study of the PRC, Southern Mongolia, East Turkestan (Xinjiang) and Taiwan.

WHY TIBET

For centuries there was no direct contiguous contact between India and China and effectively therefore no border between the two giant world powers. The invasion of Tibet by the Chinese 'People's Liberation Army' in 1949-50 shattered the peace and India now shares a contested border which has become the scene of deadly conflict.

The PRC presents the most complex foreign policy challenge for India. Tibet, at the heart of Asia, is the world's highest and largest plateau and a global climate change epicentre. China's policies in Tibet have direct geopolitical implications for India and present a unique challenge to the Indian Government. Key and urgent issues include: the militarisation of the plateau, construction of infrastructure at a breakneck pace, engagement on the borders and transboundary river water. The current posture from Beijing underlined by Xi Jinping' s leadership conveys intent to exercise regional dominance and counter any perceived opposition and threat. This is backed by an escalation of military presence in the border areas, the relocation of increasing numbers of people into 'defence' villages close to Arunachal Pradesh and Leh, Ladakh and encroachment into India's territory. There is increasing awareness in India that Tibet has been overlooked and little understood although it is integral to resolution and discussion of these issues. Tibetan Buddhism, practised by peoples across the Indian and Nepalese Himalayas, is now under threat of extinction in Tibet

itself due to China's policies of 'Sinicisation', which seeks to compel Tibetans to conform to a Chinese cultural nationalism, and have involved the destruction of religious institutes and the imposition of a dystopian surveillance society.

FNVA believes that Tibet's religious culture, based on principles of wisdom and compassion, needs to be protected not only for the Tibetan people but also for us and future generations. This is a particularly acute question for India and the Indian people - India is the birthplace of Buddhism, home of the Dalai Lama and around 66,000 Tibetans. All four Buddhist schools trace their roots to the ancient Indian Nalanda tradition.

Attempting to create a veneer of legitimacy for its control over Tibet, the PRC leadership claims that Tibet has always been a part of China, an unfounded claim that has no basis in history. Tibet is not only a political as well as a human rights issue but also a legal issue under International law since it remains an unlawfully occupied country. The Chinese Communist Party's (CCPs) rule in Tibet has no legitimate, historical nor legal basis. The international community and India in particular has the responsibility to expose the current reality of China' s oppressive policies in Tibet, and to lead calls for dialogue towards a resolution of the crisis in Tibet.

Tibet significantly impacts border security, geopolitics, regional stability, and the management of vital water resources, all of which are directly tied to India' s relationship with China. Thus, a nuanced comprehension of Tibet is indispensable for India to make well-informed decisions and craft policies that not only bolster its national security but also safeguard its broader interests in the region and its bilateral relations with the PRC. F N VA seeks to address this information and policy gap at a political moment when there is increasing recognition of the urgent importance of India's role.

WHAT WE DO

We provide broader and deeper understanding of the situation in Tibet and beyond through our work with Tibetan researchers with trilingual (Chinese, Tibetan, English) skills, Western and Asian scholars, Sinologists, environmentalists, and security/tech experts. We undertake: **Briefings and specialist reports** on China's policies and leadership developments; Undertake **research into new and developing areas**; We **analyse news**, reports and current events published in Mandarin and Tibetan languages. **Regional Dialogues** with academics, providing a platform for discussion between Mainland China and Tibetan scholars. Undertake international conferences on Tibet and China We bring out **Podcast** series. 'Tibet in Context' provides reflective conversation and analysis of unfolding developments in Tibet. We focus our attention on the strategically important Himalayan region through research programmes in order to understand and pre-empt China's transnational strategies to deepen its footprint in the Himalayan states of India, Bhutan and Nepal and implications for India's national security. Through its MoUs with hill universities, FNVA conducts talks, seminars, research and calls for interns to work on specific areas. **Conduct courses for professionals on Tibet** and trans-Himalayan matters. Undertake **welfare programmes** for Tibetans in the field of education, health, vocational training, sanitation, improving life in Tibetan settlements in India.

www.fnvaworld.org