# TIBET DIGEST

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FOUNDATION FOR Non-violent Alternatives
An Initiative for Developing Peace Studies




**Tibet Digest is a monthly publication curated by FNVA, offering comprehensive coverage of significant developments pertaining to Tibet, Chinese politics, and Sino-Indian relations as gleaned from various open-source media outlets.**


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# SUMMARY OF NEWS

## CCP'S TIBET POLICIES

Executive Summary: CCP Policies in Tibet (March 2026 Digest)

The March 2026 developments reflect a systematic consolidation of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control over Tibet, combining legal codification, technological surveillance, cultural engineering, and economic integration. These policies are not isolated; rather, they form part of a coherent state strategy aimed at long-term political stability, territorial consolidation, and identity transformation.

### KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MONTH OF MARCH:

**1. Institutionalisation of Assimilation Policies**

The newly adopted Ethnic Unity and Progress Law marks a significant shift from implicit assimilation to formal legal enforcement. It:

- Mandates Mandarin as the primary language across education and public life
- Extends ideological conditioning into family structures, monasteries, and social institutions
- Encourages inter-ethnic integration, including marriage policies
- Aligns religion with state-defined "Sinicization" frameworks

This reflects a transition from administrative control to legal-ideological standardisation of identity.

**2. Expansion of Surveillance and Social Control Mechanisms**

The Chengdu case illustrates the scaling of predictive and pre-emptive surveillance systems, including:

- Four-tier risk classification (red to blue)
- Monitoring based on ethnic identity, mobility, and social background
- Expansion of "stability maintenance" to include economically vulnerable populations

Notably, Tibetans—even outside Tibet—are embedded within this surveillance architecture, indicating extraterritorial social control within China.

**3. Tightening Restrictions on Religious and Cultural Practices**

Policies targeting Mt. Kailash pilgrimage and digital expression demonstrate:

- Increasing securitisation of religious activity
- Use of permits, checkpoints, and ideological vetting
- Digital censorship of language, religious imagery, and identity expression

This indicates a shift from tolerance-within-limits to active management of religious behaviour as a security concern.

**4. Narrative Consolidation through Propaganda and Historical Reframing**

The continued celebration of "Serfs' Emancipation Day" and official speeches:

- Reinforce the liberation narrative of 1959
- Justify current policies through historical delegitimisation of pre-1959 Tibet
- Promote a development-security-human rights narrative aligned with CCP legitimacy

Simultaneously, cultural productions (e.g., Sinicized dance forms) indicate state-led cultural reinterpretation and appropriation.

**5. Strategic Economic Integration and Infrastructure Expansion**

The 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) places Tibet at the centre of:

- Energy security and green power transmission
- Transport connectivity and border infrastructure
- Digital infrastructure (e.g., high-altitude data centres)

These initiatives serve dual purposes:

- Economic modernisation
- Strategic-military mobility and border consolidation

**6. Controlled Accessibility and Isolation**
Despite China's broader visa liberalisation:

- Tibet remains highly restricted for foreign access
- Internal mobility is also regulated via layered permit systems

This reflects a deliberate policy of controlled exposure and information management.

## ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT

**1. From Autonomy Framework to Total Integration**
The cumulative evidence suggests that Tibet has moved beyond even nominal autonomy into a model of:

- Full-spectrum integration into the Chinese state
- Replacement of "ethnic autonomy" with "national unity governance"

This represents a structural departure from earlier CCP minority policies.

**2. Fusion of Technology and Ethno-Political Governance**
The integration of surveillance technologies with ethnic classification indicates:

- Emergence of a digitally enforced governance model
- Application of predictive policing to identity groups

Tibet is increasingly governed through a data-driven stability paradigm, similar to Xinjiang but more diffused.

**3. Cultural Security as National Security**
Religion, language, and cultural practices are now treated as:

- Vectors of political risk
- Domains requiring standardisation and ideological alignment

This securitisation reflects CCP concerns over identity-based resistance and transnational linkages.

**4. Development as a Tool of Control**
Infrastructure and economic initiatives are not neutral:

- They facilitate resource extraction and strategic mobility
- They deepen administrative penetration into remote regions

Development is thus embedded within a security-development nexus.

**5. Information Control and Narrative Dominance**
The restriction of access, combined with propaganda campaigns, indicates:

- A strategy to monopolise narratives on Tibet domestically and internationally
- Prevention of independent verification or external scrutiny

## FUTURE TRENDS AND TRAJECTORIES

**1. Deepening Legal Assimilation**

- Expansion of assimilation laws into education, religion, and family structures
- Increased criminalisation of cultural expression framed as "separatism"

**2. Expansion of Surveillance Ecosystems**

- Nationwide scaling of ethnic-linked monitoring systems
- Integration of AI, big data, and mobility tracking

**3. Acceleration of Cultural Transformation**

- Gradual erosion of Tibetan linguistic and religious autonomy
- Growth of state-curated Tibetan identity aligned with Han-centric norms

**4. Strategic Militarisation through Infrastructure**

- Continued build-up of border roads, railways, and logistics corridors
- Enhanced dual-use infrastructure (civilian + military)

**5. Increased Restrictions on Religious Mobility**

- Further tightening of pilgrimage routes and monastic activities
- Institutionalisation of "patriotic religious practice" frameworks

**6. Global Implications**

- Heightened international scrutiny on human rights and cultural preservation
- Potential linkage with:
- Supply chains
- Climate governance (Tibetan Plateau)
- Indo-Pacific strategic competition

### CONCLUSION

The March 2026 developments indicate that CCP policy in Tibet has entered a new phase characterised by legal consolidation, technological enforcement, and ideological uniformity. The trajectory points toward irreversible structural integration of Tibet into the Chinese state, accompanied by systematic transformation of its cultural and social fabric.
For policymakers, Tibet is no longer a peripheral ethnic issue—it is a core theatre where questions of sovereignty, identity, technology, and strategic competition intersect.

## BUDDHISM IN TIBET

Recent events surrounding the funeral of Choktrul Hungkar Dorje Rinpoche illustrate the tightening intersection of religion, security, and political authority in Tibet. The heavy securitisation of a deeply spiritual event—marked by surveillance, detentions, and interference in ritual practices—signals that monasteries are no longer treated as autonomous religious spaces but as sites of active state management. This episode, when read alongside official calls to "Sinicize" Tibetan Buddhism, points to a broader effort to reshape religious institutions into instruments of political conformity. The targeting of individuals, restrictions on expression, and control over symbolic elements—such as language and images—reflect a growing intolerance for any form of religious authority not aligned with the state. Taken together, these developments suggest that Tibetan Buddhism is being systematically redefined, not merely regulated, with long-term implications for cultural continuity, religious legitimacy, and social stability in the region.

## CCP POLITICS

**Executive Summary: CCP Internal Politics and Governance Trends (March 2026)**

Developments over March 2026 suggest that China's political system is entering a more complicated phase than surface stability might indicate. Power is clearly concentrated in Xi Jinping's hands to an unprecedented degree, yet this consolidation is unfolding alongside rising unease within the Party, visible strain across institutions, and growing uncertainty about the future—particularly on the question of succession. What emerges is a system that looks firm from the outside, but is increasingly shaped by caution, mistrust, and internal pressure.

### KEY DEVELOPMENTS

**1. Intensifying Purges and Political Discipline**
Recent disciplinary actions point to a widening and deepening campaign that goes beyond conventional anti-corruption:

- Senior officials are being removed on charges that carry clear political undertones, not just administrative violations
- Networks associated with earlier leadership figures, including those linked to Wang Qishan, are being steadily dismantled
- Investigations now cut across sectors—financial, regional, and bureaucratic

The pattern suggests that anti-corruption has effectively evolved into a broader instrument for enforcing political loyalty and reshaping the elite landscape.

**2. Military Restructuring and Loyalty Concerns**
The scale of changes within the People's Liberation Army is striking:

- A large number of senior commanders are missing, removed, or under scrutiny
- Even individuals once considered close to Xi appear vulnerable
- Civilian security organs are increasingly involved in military oversight

This points to a leadership deeply concerned about internal reliability. Loyalty is no longer assumed—it is being actively tested and enforced. At the same time, this raises questions about continuity, morale, and operational coherence within the armed forces.

**3. A Growing Succession Problem**
Perhaps the most consequential issue is the absence of a clear succession pathway:

- Term limits have been removed, but no successor has been identified
- Potential heirs are treated as political risks rather than assets
- Elite factions operate without clarity about the future

This creates a quiet but significant structural tension. In such an environment, political actors are likely to hedge, position cautiously, and prepare for multiple scenarios—conditions that historically have made systems more fragile rather than more secure.

**4. Bureaucratic Caution and Administrative Slowdown**
Across the Party-state system, behaviour is changing:

- Officials are increasingly risk-averse, prioritising survival over initiative
- Decision-making slows as individuals avoid actions that might attract scrutiny
- Governance becomes more about compliance than performance

The result is not visible breakdown, but a subtler form of stagnation—where the system continues to function, yet with reduced dynamism and effectiveness.

**5. Tightening Control Over Officials**
New restrictions on overseas travel and financial scrutiny reflect a leadership concerned about internal leakage:

- Officials face stricter controls on mobility and asset transparency
- Retrospective investigations, sometimes going back decades, increase personal vulnerability
- Fear of defection or disclosure of sensitive information appears to be a driving factor

This suggests a system that is becoming more inward-looking, with heightened sensitivity to internal risk.

**6. Informal Signals of Unease**

A number of smaller but telling developments stand out:

- Unexplained absences of senior officials from key meetings
- Deviations from established political protocols and staging
- Isolated acts of dissent breaking through even tightly controlled environments

In a system where formal communication is highly managed, these indirect signals take on greater analytical importance. They hint at underlying tensions that are not openly acknowledged.

## ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT

**1. Centralisation with Diminishing Institutional Depth**
Xi Jinping has succeeded in centralising authority to a degree not seen in decades. However, this has come at a cost:

- Institutional norms have weakened
- Collective leadership practices have receded
- The system increasingly depends on personalised authority

This creates an imbalance: strong control at the top, but reduced resilience within the system as a whole.

**2. From Anti-Corruption to Systemic Political Control**
What began as an anti-corruption drive has matured into a permanent feature of governance:

- It now functions as a tool to discipline elites and manage factional risks
- Its continuous nature reinforces uncertainty across the bureaucracy

While effective in consolidating authority, it also erodes trust, making the system more defensive and less adaptive.

**3. Political Loyalty Over Professional Capacity in the Military**
The emphasis on loyalty within the PLA reflects real concerns about cohesion, but it comes with trade-offs:

- Promotions and retention increasingly tied to political reliability
- Risk of sidelining experienced or capable officers

Over time, this could affect military effectiveness, particularly in complex or high-pressure scenarios.

**4. Structural Risks Around Succession**

The lack of a clear transition mechanism is not just a political gap—it is a systemic vulnerability:

- It encourages behind-the-scenes manoeuvring
- It increases the likelihood of instability in moments of crisis

This remains one of the most critical variables shaping China's political future.

**5. A System Turning Inward**

The tightening of controls over movement, information, and internal behaviour suggests:

- A leadership preparing for potential shocks—political, economic, or security-related
- A shift toward a more closed and tightly managed system

Such systems can maintain stability for extended periods, but often at the cost of flexibility.

### FUTURE TRENDS AND TRAJECTORIES

Looking ahead, several trends are likely to continue or intensify:

**1. Continued Purges and Elite Reshaping**

Further investigations and removals are likely, particularly targeting networks perceived as insufficiently loyal.

**2. Deepening Risk Aversion in Governance**

Administrative caution will likely grow, with fewer bold initiatives and greater emphasis on political alignment.

**3. Ongoing Military Tightening**

The PLA is expected to see continued restructuring, with loyalty remaining the central criterion.

**4. Expansion of Internal Control Mechanisms**

Monitoring of officials' finances, mobility, and affiliations will likely become more systematic and intrusive.

**5. Persistent Succession Uncertainty**

Absent a clear framework, speculation and quiet factional positioning will continue beneath the surface.

**6. Greater Reliance on Indirect Indicators**

Analysts will increasingly need to read between the lines—tracking absences, language shifts, and symbolic gestures—to understand internal dynamics.

### CONCLUSION

Taken together, these developments suggest that the CCP is moving into a phase where control is tightening, but so too are the constraints within the system itself. Authority is highly concentrated, yet the space for institutional flexibility and open functioning is narrowing. The system is not unstable in an immediate sense, but it is becoming more rigid, more cautious, and potentially more brittle over time. The key question is not whether it can maintain control in the short term—it likely can—but how well it can adapt to future shocks without the buffers that more institutionalised systems typically provide.

## PROTESTS AND DETENTIONS AND OTHER NEWS FROM TIBET AND THE PRC

## TIBET

The developments over March 2026 present a layered picture of Tibet—one where intensifying political control, pressure on religious institutions, and cultural assimilation efforts coexist with economic

integration, infrastructure expansion, and selective narratives of development. Taken together, these developments highlight a region that is not merely governed, but actively being reshaped across social, cultural, and strategic dimensions.

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

**1. Intensified Pressure on Monasteries and Religious Figures**

The situation at Lung Ngon Monastery during the funeral of Choktrul Hungkar Dorje Rinpoche stands out as a defining episode:

- The monastery was surrounded by police and military forces, with severe restrictions on movement
- Religious practices were interfered with, including removal of Tibetan and English inscriptions
- Digital silence was enforced, with bans on sharing images or information
- Venerable Ugyen Jangchub was detained, reportedly beaten, and remains under threat of further detention

This incident is tied to earlier tensions, including accusations against the late Rinpoche for refusing to engage with the state-appointed Panchen Lama and for his independent social and educational work. His earlier disappearance and opaque death abroad add to the pattern of control over influential religious figures.

**2. Custodial Deaths and Coercion in Religious Spaces**

Several cases reinforce a troubling pattern:

- A young monk, Samten, died after detention under unclear circumstances, with strong allegations of custodial torture
- Authorities imposed silence on monasteries and returned bodies without transparent explanations
- A previously detained monk, Zega Gyatso, was released in deteriorating health and remains under surveillance

These cases reflect a recurring cycle: detention, coercion, limited information, and continued monitoring even after release.

**3. Criminalisation of Cultural and Educational Activity**

Monastic and educational initiatives are increasingly treated as political threats:

- Monks engaged in Tibetan language teaching or cultural preservation face arrest or harassment
- Ven. Palden Yeshe received a six-year sentence without publicly disclosed charges, reportedly linked to his teaching activities
- Even family members of detainees are subjected to detention, interrogation, and intimidation

The pattern suggests that language, education, and cultural transmission are now central arenas of control.

**4. Expansion of Assimilation Through Education**

The boarding school system continues to generate resistance:

- A Tibetan father was detained for refusing to send his child to a state boarding school
- Children are reportedly separated from language, religion, and community
- Reports indicate behavioural changes, including reduced use of Tibetan language and reluctance to engage with monasteries

Education is thus being used as a primary instrument of long-term assimilation.

**5. Continued Surveillance and Climate of Fear**

Across cases, a consistent environment emerges:

- Constant monitoring of monasteries and families
- Restrictions on communication and information flow
- Fear-induced silence within communities

Even minor acts—such as sharing information online—are treated as political violations.

**6. Parallel Push for Economic Integration and Connectivity**

Alongside repression, Beijing continues to advance economic initiatives:

- Trade through Zhangmu Port has increased significantly, with strong growth in exports, including new energy vehicles

- Customs processes have been streamlined to facilitate cross-border trade, particularly with Nepal
- Tibet is being integrated into the Belt and Road framework through logistics and trade facilitation

This reflects a strategy of embedding Tibet within regional and global economic networks.

**7. Expansion of Transport and Tourism Infrastructure**

Connectivity continues to expand:

- Tibet Airlines is significantly increasing routes, linking Tibet more closely with major Chinese cities and international destinations
- Tourism promotion, including organised charter groups from Hong Kong, is being actively encouraged

These efforts aim to:

- Increase mobility and economic activity
- Deepen integration with mainland China
- Shape external perceptions of Tibet

**8. Narrative Projection and Soft Power Efforts**

Tourism narratives emphasise:

- Cultural richness
- Development and modernisation
- Positive integration with the Chinese state

At the same time, these narratives contrast sharply with reports of restrictions on religious and cultural expression.

**9. Broader Strategic and Scientific Developments**

Two additional developments are noteworthy:

- China's expansion of its national water infrastructure network, including projects linked to Tibetan rivers, underscores the strategic importance of the Tibetan Plateau
- Scientific research on high-altitude genetic adaptation (e.g., yak-based studies) highlights Tibet's growing relevance in biotechnology and environmental research

**10. Global Tibetan Buddhist Developments**

The passing of Kyabje Chime Rinpoche marks:

- The loss of an influential figure in the global transmission of Tibetan Buddhism
- A reminder of the contrast between Tibetan Buddhism's global presence and its constrained space within Tibet itself

## ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT

**1. Systematic Restructuring of Tibetan Religious Life**

The cumulative evidence suggests that monasteries are no longer treated as autonomous spiritual institutions:

- They are being redefined as regulated and monitored entities within a political framework
- Religious authority is being subordinated to state authority

**2. Cultural Identity as a Security Concern**

Language, education, and religion are increasingly framed as:

- Potential sources of dissent
- Domains requiring active intervention

This reflects a shift from managing diversity to transforming identity itself.

**3. Dual Strategy: Control and Integration**

China's approach in Tibet appears to operate on two parallel tracks:

- Hard control: surveillance, detention, ideological pressure
- Soft integration: infrastructure, trade, tourism, development narratives

This dual strategy aims to:

- Stabilise the region politically
- Integrate it economically and administratively

**4. Long-Term Social Engineering Through Education**

The boarding school system represents:

- A generational strategy aimed at reshaping identity
- A shift from short-term control to long-term cultural transformation

**5. Information Control as a Core Tool**

Restrictions on communication and independent verification indicate:

- A deliberate effort to manage narratives
- Prevention of external scrutiny

### FUTURE TRAJECTORY

**1. Deepening Control Over Religious Institutions**

- Increased regulation of monasteries and religious leaders
- Further alignment of religious practice with state ideology

**2. Acceleration of Assimilation Policies**

- Expansion of boarding schools and Mandarin-based education
- Continued erosion of Tibetan language and cultural practices

**3. Continued Use of Detention and Surveillance**

- Persistent use of coercive measures against individuals seen as non-compliant
- Expansion of monitoring networks

**4. Expansion of Economic and Strategic Integration**

- Greater connectivity through transport and trade
- Increased role of Tibet in China's energy, water, and logistics strategies

**5. Growth of Narrative Management Efforts**

- Promotion of tourism and development narratives
- Continued restrictions on alternative accounts

**6. Rising Global Attention**

- Increased scrutiny of Tibet in the context of:
- Human rights
- Cultural preservation
- Environmental and water security

### CONCLUSION

The developments in March 2026 underscore that Tibet is undergoing a profound and multi-dimensional transformation. Control is tightening in religious, cultural, and social domains, while integration is accelerating in economic and infrastructural terms. The trajectory points toward a future where Tibet is more deeply embedded within the Chinese state, but at the cost of significant changes to its traditional identity and institutional structures. The long-term implications will likely extend beyond Tibet itself, shaping regional geopolitics, cultural continuity, and international engagement with China.

## PRC

The developments over March 2026 point to a system that is simultaneously tightening ideological control, expanding surveillance and disciplinary mechanisms, and reshaping society through both coercive and institutional means. While the state continues to project themes of ecological progress, modernization, and global engagement, a parallel trend is clearly visible: the narrowing of independent social, religious, and intellectual space within China.

### KEY DEVELOPMENTS

**1. Consolidation of Ideological and Social Control**

At the highest level, Xi Jinping's public messaging continues to emphasise:

- Ecological governance and "Beautiful China" narratives
- Social mobilisation through state-led campaigns such as nationwide afforestation

While framed in developmental and environmental terms, these initiatives reinforce a broader political pattern—mass participation under Party guidance, where civic action is closely aligned with state ideology.

**2. Expansion of Controls on Religion and Cultural Expression**
Several developments highlight a tightening grip on religious life:

- Traditional folk rituals such as the "Parade of the Gods" in Guangdong were actively blocked by police
- Children are now strictly prohibited from entering churches, with enforcement of regulations separating minors from religious practice
- Continued repression of groups labelled as "heterodox" (e.g., Zhonggong), despite claims of their eradication

These actions reflect a consistent approach: only state-sanctioned, politically compliant forms of religion are permitted to operate openly.

**3. Emergence of Localised Resistance**
Despite tightening control, instances of resistance are beginning to surface:

- In Lufeng, large-scale public defiance emerged against restrictions on traditional festivals, with citizens confronting police and documenting events
- Communities continued to assert cultural practices even under pressure

These are not organised political protests, but they indicate friction at the grassroots level, particularly where state intervention disrupts long-standing traditions.

**4. Institutionalisation of Punitive Governance Beyond Detention**
The state's coercive toolkit is expanding in more subtle but enduring ways:

- Dissidents and former prisoners are being denied pensions or forced to repay benefits, pushing many into financial distress
- Cases such as forced demolitions of homes during detention highlight how punishment extends beyond imprisonment

This reflects a shift toward long-term social and economic penalties, designed to deter dissent even after formal sentences end.

**5. Expansion of Surveillance Systems**
New surveillance practices demonstrate increasing sophistication:

- Tiered monitoring systems classify individuals (including Tibetans, Uyghurs, religious believers, and petitioners) into risk categories
- Surveillance persists across regions, tracking individuals even after relocation
- Hotels and local authorities are integrated into monitoring networks

This suggests a move toward predictive and networked surveillance, where entire categories of people are subject to continuous scrutiny.

**6. Deepening Party Control Through Extra-Legal Mechanisms**
The expansion of the Liuzhi system is particularly significant:

- Over 200,000 cases to date, with a sharp rise in 2025
- Detentions occur outside the formal legal system, often involving incommunicado detention and solitary confinement
- The system targets Party members but reflects a broader governance logic

This points to the normalisation of parallel disciplinary structures operating beyond judicial oversight.

**7. Restructuring of Media and Information Control**
China's media landscape is undergoing a major transformation:

- Closure of large numbers of local TV and radio channels
- Consolidation of resources into digital platforms controlled by the state
- Explicit framing of the internet as the "main battlefield" for ideological work

The objective is clear: to maintain narrative dominance in an era where public attention has shifted online.

**8. Expansion of Global Influence Through Academic and Media Networks**
Efforts to shape global discourse are also intensifying:

- Academic networks linked to Chinese institutions are promoting the concept of a "community of shared future"

- Partnerships with foreign universities and media organisations are being used to disseminate Chinese narratives

This reflects a more institutionalised and long-term approach to international influence, particularly in the Global South.

**9. Signals of Internal Tensions Within Strategic Sectors**

The removal of senior military scientists and defence experts from official records:

- Suggests continued purges or internal restructuring within sensitive sectors
- Points to ongoing efforts to enforce discipline and control within the military-industrial complex

## ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT

**1. A System Expanding Control Across All Domains**

What stands out is the breadth of control:

- From religion and education to media, pensions, and land rights
- From grassroots rituals to elite military institutions

Control is no longer episodic—it is system-wide and deeply embedded.

**2. Blurring of Legal and Extra-Legal Governance**

Mechanisms like Liuzhi illustrate:

- The growing importance of Party-led processes outside the legal system
- The erosion of boundaries between administrative discipline and coercive detention

This creates a system where rules exist, but their application is flexible and politically determined.

**3. Rising Tension Between State Control and Social Practice**

Incidents such as Lufeng suggest:

- A widening gap between state priorities and local cultural life
- Potential for friction when deeply rooted traditions are disrupted

While still limited, such episodes indicate that control is not always uncontested.

**4. Strategic Shift Toward Long-Term Social Engineering**

Policies targeting children, education, and media indicate:

- A focus on shaping future generations
- Efforts to align identity, belief, and information consumption with Party priorities

**5. Increasing Reliance on Deterrence Through Economic and Social Pressure**

The use of pensions, housing, and employment as tools of punishment reflects:

- A move toward indirect coercion
- Punishment that extends beyond formal legal processes

## FUTURE TRAJECTORY

**1. Further Tightening of Ideological Space**

- Continued restrictions on religion, culture, and independent thought
- Greater enforcement of compliance across all social sectors

**2. Expansion of Surveillance and Data-Driven Governance**

- More sophisticated classification and tracking systems
- Integration of digital tools into everyday governance

**3. Continued Use of Extra-Legal Mechanisms**

- Likely expansion or normalisation of systems like Liuzhi
- Greater reliance on Party-led disciplinary processes

**4. Increasing Friction at the Local Level**

- More frequent, though still contained, instances of social resistance
- Tensions where policy intersects with cultural practice

**5. Deepening Control Over Information Ecosystems**

- Further consolidation of media
- Expansion of state influence in digital and global information spaces

**6. Strengthening of Global Narrative Projection**

- Continued investment in academic, media, and institutional networks abroad
- Promotion of alternative governance models aligned with Chinese priorities

## CONCLUSION

The developments of March 2026 reflect a political system that is not only consolidating control, but also restructuring the relationship between state and society in a more intrusive and enduring way. Authority is being extended into everyday life—into belief, livelihood, communication, and identity. At the same time, small but notable signs of friction suggest that this process is not without limits. The direction, however, remains clear: a more controlled, more centralised, and more ideologically defined China, with implications that extend well beyond its borders.

# CCP'S TIBET POLICIES

## China celebrates Serfs' Emancipation Day to mark terminating one country, two systems policy for Tibet

29 March 2026, Tibetan Review

China has marked on Mar 28 the 67th anniversary of its termination of what was akin to a one-country-two-systems promise it had made to Tibet in 1951 with the raising of its Red Star flag before the Dalai Lama's Potala Palace in capital Lhasa. It organized Tibetan public cultural performances – including a Sinicized one in Beijing – and carried out a blaze of online publicity about having put an end to "the dark, cruel, barbaric, and backward theocratic feudal serfdom" in Tibet as if that justifies its current occupation rule there. People from all walks of life attended a flag-raising ceremony at the Potala Palace Square in Lhasa on Mar 28 morning to mark the region's 18th Serfs Emancipation Day, reported China's online *Chinadaily.com.cn* Mar 28.

Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai declared the dissolution of the "local" Tibetan government on Mar 28, 1959 and he replaced it with a temporary Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region (PCTAR) following the largely peaceful Tibetan uprising protests earlier that month, on the 10th.

China adopted Mar 28 as its Serfs' Emancipation Day on Jan 19, 2009 in the aftermath of another popular Tibetan uprising – the Mar 2008 large-scale protests which engulfed much of the Tibetan Plateau region, leading, as in 1959, to a full-scale military onslaught on the Tibetan civilian population. It ended with massacres, large-scale arrests, imposition of martial law, and shutting of Tibet from the outside world. The report said the annual commemoration recalls the "democratic reforms" of 1959 in the region that ended "feudal serfdom". Various activities have been held across the region to mark the event, it added.

Karma Tsetan, chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) government, delivered a televised speech on Mar 27 night to mark "the 67th anniversary of the emancipation of a million serfs in Xizang," the report said, using China's Sinicized name for Tibet. The "great democratic reform swept across Xizang with irresistible momentum, completely putting an end to the dark, cruel, barbaric, and backward theocratic feudal serfdom," he was quoted as saying. However, according to the exile Tibetan government, Chinese occupation rule has led to the killing or unnatural death of over 1.2 million Tibetans. the demolition of over 6,200 religious places of study and worship, and wholesale devastation of Tibet's fragile ecology which even led to unprecedented flood disasters in China. It is now accused of having embarked on a campaign of erasing the Tibetan identity in the name of strengthening national unity.

## Chengdu Surveillance System Expands: Four-Tier Monitoring Targets Ethnic Groups, Christians, and 'High-Risk' Individuals

29 March 2026, Vision Times

A surveillance system introduced in Chengdu is drawing attention for its breadth, with local authorities reportedly classifying residents into four warning levels and expanding oversight across a growing list of targeted groups.

Details of the system surfaced on March 20, when the social media account "Li Laoshi Bu Shi Ni Laoshi" shared submissions describing how monitoring is carried out at the neighborhood and police-station level. Information provided by multiple interviewees aligns closely with those accounts.

The system uses a four-tier scale: red, orange, yellow, and blue, to assess individuals flagged for monitoring. Those identified as key targets may remain under observation even after relocating outside Chengdu.

People described as "unreliable" are among those placed under closer watch. This category includes individuals with mental health conditions, former prisoners, petitioners, and those involved in legal disputes, groups often treated by Chinese authorities as potential risks to social stability.

Separate categories apply to people connected to Tibet and Xinjiang. The scope extends beyond residents from those regions to include ethnic Tibetans and people from autonomous prefectures within Sichuan, students studying in Chengdu, minors, elderly people born before 1949, and Han Chinese who previously worked in Tibet or Xinjiang.

Family ties can also determine inclusion. Individuals born in Chengdu may still be classified if their family background is linked to those regions.

One source familiar with local enforcement said follow-up checks continue even after a person moves away. Officials may visit a new address and carry out inquiries over a period of months.

At the provincial level, a centralized platform supports the classification system. Authorities have expanded earlier categories described as "three losses and one deviation" to a broader framework known as "five losses and one deviation," a classification system used to identify individuals considered socially unstable, including those who have lost access to schooling, family support, employment, or supervision, as well as those with criminal histories or behavioral concerns.

Young people who have dropped out of school and women working in the sex industry are also included in the management system, according to those familiar with its operation.

In practice, implementation varies across districts, but residents say the direction is consistent. More groups have been added over time, including people facing unemployment or financial strain, reflecting China's broader "stability maintenance" system, a domestic security approach aimed at preventing unrest before it emerges.

Authorities may assign monitored individuals to positions that require regular check-ins or digital records of attendance. While these roles may have limited practical function, they create a routine mechanism for oversight.



*Surveillance cameras in Hangzhou, in east China's Zhejiang Province on May 29, 2019. (Image: STR/AFP via Getty Images)*

**Monitoring extends into daily life**

Monitoring also extends into daily life. A staff member at a Chengdu business hotel said guests from Tibet and Xinjiang must be reported to local police upon check-in.

"All guest ID information is uploaded, and we also need to call the police station to report it," the employee said, describing a requirement that has been in place for years.

During politically sensitive periods, such as China's annual parliamentary meetings, held by the country's legislature, the National People's Congress, or National Day, restrictions tend to tighten. Residents described home visits, limits on travel, and pressure from landlords to push certain tenants to relocate.

Christians attending unregistered house churches said they face particular scrutiny. One believer said state security officers have urged members to join government-approved churches under the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, the state-controlled Protestant church system in China. Those who decline often meet in small groups to avoid attention.

Churches such as the Early Rain Covenant Church have faced repeated intervention by authorities in recent years. Local sources said some believers have been taken in for questioning or prevented from gathering.

A resident familiar with the situation said Chengdu's role as a major migration hub has contributed to the scope of monitoring. The city hosts a steady flow of people from Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as active house church networks, factors that have drawn sustained attention from authorities.

He added that economic pressures have also shaped the system. As more people face job losses or unstable living conditions, these groups are increasingly treated as potential risks.
Similar measures have been reported in other cities, with local authorities adopting comparable approaches to tracking and managing designated populations.
Online reactions reflect unease over the extent of surveillance. Some users described the environment as highly controlled, pointing to the widespread use of facial recognition and data collection.
One person who recently returned from Chengdu described a heavy police presence near Wuhou Shrine, including armed officers and an armored vehicle stationed along the street.
“The feeling was constant surveillance,” the user wrote.

## Speech commemorating the 67th anniversary of the liberation of one million serfs in Tibet

28 March 2026, China Tibet News Network



*Chairman of the Autonomous Region, Garma Tseten*

Comrades and friends:
Hello everyone! On the occasion of the 105th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China and the beginning of the 15th Five-Year Plan, as people of all ethnic groups in the region keep in mind General Secretary Xi Jinping's earnest instructions, forge ahead with determination, and write a new chapter in the modernization of Tibet with Chinese characteristics, we celebrate the 18th anniversary of the liberation of one million serfs in Tibet.
Sixty-seven years ago, a great democratic reform that completely ended the dark, cruel, barbaric, and backward theocratic feudal serfdom swept across Tibet with overwhelming force. From then on, the snowy plateau was transformed, and a new socialist Tibet, where the people are the masters, stands proudly at the top of the world. These 67 years of glorious history have witnessed the rebirth of millions of serfs and the development of human rights protection. For those who experienced old Tibet, memories of a "nightmare" and "hell" are etched into their minds. Dozens of cruel tortures, including cutting out tongues, noses, limbs, gouging out eyes, pulling out tendons, skinning, drowning, and even being thrown into scorpion pits, were used wantonly to punish serfs. The people living in new Tibet enjoy comprehensive, full, genuine, and effective rights...
Xiang Renquan, confident and high-spirited, embarks on his career with joy and laughter, a stark contrast to the territorial life of the old Tibetan serfs, who lived in fear and dared not even lift their heads. Sixty-seven years of hard work and struggle have witnessed a thriving economy and rapid development. In old Tibet, the three major lords controlled the vast majority of the means of production, resulting in extremely low productivity. The fruits of the people's labor were plundered, leaving them struggling on the brink of death. Democratic reforms completely removed the institutional obstacles hindering Tibet's development and progress, ushering in a magnificent new chapter of construction and development. From the birth of the first Lhasa Bridge, the first comprehensive hospital, the first modern factory, and the first institution of higher learning, to the ever-changing appearance and new look of the snowy plateau, Tibet's resounding progress has never ceased. The song "Strolling Through the New City" joyfully expresses the sweet feelings of the liberated serfs, while the recently popular "Strolling Through the New City Again" vividly depicts the new landscape of modernization. Sixty-seven years of spring and autumn have witnessed the people's happy lives and the profound changes in society.

In old Tibet, the average life expectancy was only 35.5 years, and four out of ten serfs did not survive childhood. After the democratic reforms, the vast majority of people lived a dignified, happy, and prosperous new life. Children happily went to school and grew up healthily, young people pursued their dreams and built their hometowns, and the elderly enjoyed their later years in peace and happiness. Today, the average life expectancy in the region has reached 72.5 years. The post-earthquake reconstruction in Tingri achieved "relocation within the same year of disaster," demonstrating the unparalleled superiority of the socialist system. Sixty-seven years of shared trials and tribulations have witnessed national unity, progress, and a shared future. In old Tibet, the reactionary upper class colluded with imperialist forces, deliberately provoking ethnic tensions and inciting separatist activities. After the democratic reforms, the Party's ethnic and religious policies were fully implemented and deeply rooted in people's hearts. All ethnic groups help each other and live

in harmony, achieving fruitful results in ethnic regional autonomy and painting a historical picture of great unity among all ethnic groups in the country. Practice has fully proven that without the Communist Party of China, there would be no new China, no new Tibet, and no prosperous and progressive Tibet today and a brighter tomorrow.

Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, under the leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping, the close attention of the Party Central Committee, and the strong support of the people nationwide, Tibet has entered a historical period of the best development, the greatest changes, and the most tangible benefits for its people. During the 14th Five-Year Plan period, General Secretary Xi Jinping visited Tibet twice for inspection and guidance, creating two historical firsts in the history of the Party and the country. He also wrote back to all the villagers of Gala Village and sent a congratulatory letter to the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau scientific expedition team, fully demonstrating his special concern for the work in Tibet and his deep affection for the cadres and people of all ethnic groups in Tibet. Tibet's GDP has crossed two 100 billion yuan thresholds, and the growth rate of major economic indicators has continued to rank among the top in the country, presenting a strong atmosphere of unity, harmony, and vigorous work. This is an era of gratitude, progress, and overlapping opportunities. General Secretary Xi Jinping's guidance and strategic planning are the greatest guarantee for the development of various undertakings in Tibet; the in-depth advancement of major national strategic projects is the greatest opportunity for Tibet's economic and social development. This is an era of high-quality development and a high-quality life. A modern industrial system is being rapidly built, urban and rural residents' incomes are steadily rising, the equalization of public services such as education and healthcare is continuously improving, ecological and border security barriers are becoming increasingly robust, and excellent traditional culture is shining brightly. The people's sense of gain is more substantial, their sense of happiness is more sustainable, and their sense of security is more guaranteed. This is an era of openness, sharing, efficiency, and convenience. More than 200 domestic and international air routes, 1,359 kilometers of railways, and 125,200 kilometers of highways ensure that people can travel freely and goods can flow smoothly. Getting on a bus right outside your door and picking up a package at your village entrance has become a reality; you can drink butter tea in Lhasa in the morning and see ice sculptures in Harbin in the evening. This is an era of deep integration and shared dreams. The sense of community of the Chinese nation is deeply rooted in the hearts of all ethnic groups. The creation of national model areas for ethnic unity and progress is tangible, perceptible, and effective. The positive situation of religious harmony, social harmony, and ethnic harmony is continuously being consolidated. People of all ethnic groups are united like pomegranate seeds, striving towards modernization and realizing the Chinese Dream together.

Following the North Star ensures you won't get lost; following the Communist Party brings happiness. We must unswervingly follow the Party, firmly uphold the "two establishments" and resolutely achieve the "two safeguards," fully implement General Secretary Xi Jinping's important instructions on Tibet work and the Party's strategy for governing Tibet in the new era, and continue to focus on the four major tasks of stability, development, ecology, and border strengthening. We must work together with one mind and one goal, resolutely oppose separatism, safeguard national unity and ethnic solidarity, and strive to promote long-term stability and high-quality development. We must serve the people and fulfill our original aspiration, always adhering to the principle of putting the people first, upholding the general requirement of "three empowerments and one benefit," firmly establishing and practicing a correct view of performance, achieving results for the people and through hard work, truly making our achievements resonate in the hearts of the people. We must anchor our goals and shoulder our mission, focusing on the "four major tasks" and concentrating our efforts on the "four creations," improving our work style, vigorously implementing policies, acting immediately and working diligently to ensure a good start to the "15th Five-Year Plan" and the steady and long-term development of all undertakings in Tibet. We must unite our efforts to write a new chapter, effectively stimulate the enthusiasm, initiative, and creativity of cadres and the masses of all ethnic groups in their work and entrepreneurship, gather the strongest positive energy, draw the largest concentric circle, jointly build a community of the Chinese nation, and write a new chapter of beautiful Tibet.

Comrades and friends! As the tide rises and a thousand sails race, a new journey begins. Let us unite more closely around the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, and under the strong leadership of the Party Committee of the Autonomous Region, forge ahead with determination and hard work, demonstrating new responsibilities and achieving new accomplishments on the new journey of the "15th Five-Year Plan"!

May our great motherland prosper and flourish!

May Tibet have an even brighter future!

## China tightens Mt Kailash pilgrimage for Tibetan devotees

27 march 2026, Tibetan Review

Undertaking a pilgrimage to Mt Kailash has become more restricted to Tibetan devotees than even non-Tibetan tourists, with the former being subjected to onerous ID checks and patriotism tests, reported *bitterwinter.org* Mar 27, citing local Tibetan sources.

Tibetans now have to register with local security offices before they can step onto the pilgrimage route. This process includes new travel permits, background checks, and a review of "relevant documents," a phrase that in China can cover anything from an ID card to a political loyalty test, the report cited the sources as saying.

Tibetan pilgrims are stated to complain that even after getting the required papers, they are often stopped at checkpoints and questioned again.

Those who do not have the correct permit risk being detained immediately. Several Tibetans have already been turned back or temporarily held, highlighting that today in Tibet, simply walking around a holy mountain can be seen as a public security threat, the report said.

For centuries, Tibetan devotees have travelled to this remote destination in eastern Tibet's Purang area of Ngari region, to circumambulate the sacred mountain along its 40-52-km circuit, with many doing it by prostrating all along, as an act of religious devotion.

Tibetan Buddhists consider Mt Kailash to be the home of the deity Demchok (Chakrasamvara), a wrathful manifestation representing supreme bliss and harmony. He embodies the transformation of desire into awakened wisdom, often depicted in union with Vajravarahi, symbolizing the union of compassion and wisdom.

Bon practitioners connect it to the pre-Buddhist Tibetan religion's legendary founder Shenrab Miwo. To Hindus, it is the abode of the God Shiva. It is also sacred to the followers of the Jain religions, who associate it with the path to spiritual liberation. In short, it is one of the most significant pilgrimage sites in Asia.

## Tibet, a rare exception to China's visa-free entry for citizens of over 50 countries

27 March 2026, Tibetan Review

While China has opened up the People''s Republic of China (PRC) for visa-free entry or transit to a total of 77 nationalities from over 50 countries in an effort to give a boost to its flagging economy, Tibet remains a rare exception to the applicability of this rule. Even travels within Tibet are subjected to obtaining of further, specific permits, underlining the severe lack of accessibility to the region over which China has launched a new assimilation campaign under the vigour of President Xi Jinping's renewed Sinicization drive.

Tourists visiting the PRC can "move freely between provinces and cities"; however, Tibet is a significant exception, noted the travel website *travelandtourworld.com* Mar 27, correcting its claim in an earlier article.

All foreign passport holders — including those from visa-free countries — must obtain a Tibet Travel Permit (TTP) in addition to their Chinese visa (or visa exemption) to enter the Tibet Autonomous Region, the report noted.

This permit is issued by the Tibet Tourism Bureau and cannot be applied for independently. It must be arranged through a licensed Tibet travel agency as part of an organised tour package. Independent travel within Tibet is not permitted for foreign nationals, the report emphasized.

The permit is stated to typically take 5–20 working days to process, and travellers are advised to begin the process at least 20–30 days before their intended arrival.

Besides, Areas beyond Lhasa — such as Everest Base Camp, Namtso Lake, and Mount Kailash — require additional permits on top of the standard TTP, the report said.

Plan accordingly: Tibet is not a destination you can add to your itinerary at the last minute, the website said.

China has dramatically expanded its visa-free access programme since late 2023. As of Feb 2026, citizens from 50 countries can enter mainland China without a visa for up to 30 days per entry, for purposes including tourism, business, family visits, and transit.

In addition, China has bilateral mutual visa exemption agreements with a further 29 countries. Together, these two tracks cover approximately 77 nationalities whose ordinary passport holders can visit China for up to 30 days without any advance visa, the report said.

## Harnessing Xizang's high-plateau environment to build greener, more efficient data centers

27 March 2026, People's Daily



*Photo shows a data center managed by Ningsuan in Xizang autonomous region. (Photo/Xu Yuyao)*

On the outskirts of Lhasa, capital of southwest China's Xizang Autonomous Region, a giant complex with local architectural features stands nestled among the mountains. It is a data center operated by local computing company Ningsuan, with a total capacity of 140,000 server racks.

Inside the server halls, a notable feature is the absence of noisy air-conditioning systems.. Despite this, the environment remains cool. What enables this efficient cooling?

"Data centers are major heat generators, and at many facilities a large portion of energy is consumed by cooling systems," explained Tao Changjun, vice president of Ningsuan. "Here on the plateau, we harness the region's exceptionally dry air to naturally reduce temperatures and minimize energy consumption."

Compared to other high-altitude regions such as Yunnan and Guizhou, the air here is even drier; compared to other arid regions, the average temperature is lower. This combination creates ideal conditions for natural cooling.

A key indicator is the wet-bulb temperature, the lowest temperature possible using evaporative cooling. In Lhasa, summer wet-bulb temperatures are significantly lower than in most parts of the world.

"In simple terms, making use of 'dry air energy' means maximizing cooling through evaporation, using temperature differences to create pressure differences, and ultimately achieving natural ventilation," Tao said. Based on this principle, the company designed a system that allows fresh air to circulate through the data center to quickly carry heat away.

Overall, this approach expands how widely natural cooling can be applied in data centers and delivers significant energy savings. It not only ensures stable operations but also reduces total energy consumption by around 30 percent.

While the concept is straightforward, implementation was complex. Data centers require highly stable temperatures, necessitating precise control over evaporation rates, internal temperature gradients, and airflow to mitigate instability from weather fluctuations.

To address this, Ningsuan worked with Xi'an Polytechnic University in northwest China's Shaanxi province to develop a heat-matching algorithm. By fine-tuning airflow patterns and water evaporation cycles, the system maximizes thermal efficiency and keeps temperatures stable year-round.

Building the cooling equipment also brought challenges. Tao recalled that the first-generation units were designed and manufactured in other provinces before being transported to Lhasa. Initially, they operated normally, but soon began to report frequent errors.



*Photo shows a cloud computing center managed by Ningsuan in Xizang autonomous region. (Photo/Li Haixia)*

Analysis revealed the issue: while the equipment was adapted for high-altitude conditions like low air pressure and specific thermal properties, certain unique environmental factors, such as intense ultraviolet radiation accelerating material aging, had been overlooked -- posing a significant challenge for systems requiring precise control.

Engineers then launched a new round of technical upgrades. By improving operating modes and using advanced composite materials including synthetic fiber-based high-molecular fillers, they significantly enhanced the stability and safety of the equipment in plateau conditions.

Beyond economic efficiency, developing data centers in high-altitude regions demands careful ecological consideration.

To answer these concerns, the center uses heat recovery. Next to the data center sits a large greenhouse that remains warm throughout the year, heated entirely by recycled waste heat. Inside, warm-water fish can be farmed, and crops can be grown.

"Driven by technological innovation, Xizang's resource advantages can be effectively transformed into economic strengths," said Jiang Ning, president of Ningsuan. "In the future, data centers here may even generate revenue through carbon credit trading and heat recovery sales."

## China to debut Sinicized Tibetan tap dance to mark Tibet dissolution day

22 March 2026, Tibetan Review



China is to mark its full annexation of Tibet in Beijing on Mar 28 with theatrical presentations of

a Sinicized version of the Tibetan tap dance produced with the involvement of Chinese propaganda and dance bodies and a Tibetan dance group under an "arts-aid program" from Beijing, according to China's official *chinadaily.com.cn* Mar 22.

A landmark dance production inspired by Tibetan folk traditions will debut in Beijing on Mar 28, coinciding with Serfs' Emancipation Day in Xizang, the report said, citing the event's organizers at a news conference in Beijing.

The so-called "Serfs' Emancipation Day" marks China's tearing up of the "17-Point Agreement" of May 23, 1951 in the name of "democratic reform" following the Mar 10 Tibetan national uprising in Lhasa in 1959. The agreement had promised Tibet a sort of one-country, two systems autonomy. With this action, China announced the dissolution of the "local government of Tibet".

"Xizang" is Sinicized name used by China in a recent policy shift to avoid mentioning "Tibet", as it connotes a civilization and culture that is distinct from its own.

China began commemorating this day after the large-scale protests against its occupation rule which engulfed much of the Tibetan Plateau region in Mar-Apr 2008. Following it, China launched a more aggressive policy to assimilate Tibet, which President Xi Jinping has termed as Sinicization.

The report said that the production, titled as Tashi Shabdro—meaning "auspicious dance"— will run from Mar 28 to 29 at the China National Opera House.

Billed as China's first full-length Tibetan tap dance drama, the production is rooted in Lhaze Doishey, a folk-dance from "Xizang" that is recognized as part of the China's national intangible cultural heritage. It also incorporates elements of other traditional dances from the region, the report said.

The organizers have said the work follows a cross-generational narrative linking "Xizang" with other parts of the People's Republic of China. The story is stated to center on an aid doctor, his daughter and a Tibetan family, using dance to explore themes of solidarity, devotion and cultural inheritance.

The report said the production is a joint effort involving several cultural bodies, developed as part of an arts-aid program. It is guided by the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles and co-produced by regional publicity authorities, the China Dancers Association, a "Xizang"-based cultural investment group and a Beijing aid program office.

Huang Doudou, vice-chair of the China Dancers Association, has said adapting Tibetan tap dance into a full-length theatrical production posed significant challenges. He has noted that the project took three years to complete and involved multiple choreographic teams, in part due to the practical difficulties of working at high altitude.

He has described the production as an initial step toward bringing Tibetan tap dance to the stage in a longer dramatic format, while preserving its cultural roots and distinctive artistic style. That all remains to be seen.

## The New Chinese law mandates assimilation of Tibetans into Han Culture

19 March 2026, Tibet Post

The new Chinese law recently adopted by the People's Republic of China, which targets the Tibetan language, identity, culture, and religion as part of a policy of Sinicization, mandates the assimilation of Tibetans into Chinese culture through parents, monasteries, and public institutions; it will take effect on July 1, 2026.

The National People's Congress (NPC) passed a law on March 12, 2026, titled "Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress in the People's Republic of China (PRC)." This law reinforces policies of "Sinicization" and "assimilation," particularly with regard to Tibetans and other oppressed peoples of Mongolia and East Turkestan. It mandates the Sinicization and assimilation of the Tibetan people, using parents, monasteries, various social organizations, and state institutions as instruments of implementation; the law is scheduled to officially take effect on July 1, 2026.

The new law aims to codify Xi Jinping's policy on ethnic affairs, which promotes greater integration and cultural assimilation under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime. It prioritizes the use of Mandarin in education, public services, and public life, thereby replacing previous policies that allowed instruction in minority languages such as Tibetan, Uyghur, and Mongolian. It also requires religious practices to align with Han-centered Chinese cultural norms and socialist values through the "Sinicization" of religion.

The law also requires parents and teachers to indoctrinate children so that they "love the CCP and China as a nation" and "internalize the idea that the Chinese people form one big family," while warning against any attempt to instill in children concepts related to their own Tibetan culture, religion, and customs. It forces Tibetan parents to perform additional tasks during their children's summer and winter vacations.

The Chinese new law further encouraged the inter-ethnic marriage, which aims to marry Tibetans and other ethnic people to Han Chinese and make their wives, husbands and children into Chinese.

Article 2 of the new law imposes the ideas of Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Xi Jinping on the population, particularly on Tibetan children and Tibetans. The law also requires the population to raise Chinese flags and display Chinese cultural symbols everywhere, even among truck drivers working in the field. It recently banned Tibetan cultural symbols such as thangkas and hats, which shows

that the Chinese government is deeply insecure and is trying to physically demonstrate that these people are citizens of the nation, yet it fails to impose Chinese culture on Tibetans, no matter what methods are used.

Article 5 of the new law states: "All citizens of the People's Republic of China are equal before the law. All ethnic groups in the People's Republic of China are equal. Any discrimination or oppression against an ethnic group is prohibited," however, Tibetans and other oppressed peoples are constantly subjected to discrimination in their professional lives, at their workplaces, when traveling, at school, and even when trying to book a hotel room, as hotels refuse to accommodate Tibetans.

Article 15 of the law requires Tibetans to "fully promote the use of the nation's common language (Mandarin) and script" and stipulates that "the use of the nation's common language and its script shall not be obstructed by any organization or individual." It forces Tibetans and other oppressed peoples to learn and use the Chinese language and script, and to abandon their own language and script.

This article stipulates that schools and other educational institutions must use the Chinese language and script as the primary language of instruction; this forces teachers and students to learn Chinese without any alternative and compels them to do so; it aims to make Tibetans and other non-Chinese populations lose their language, culture, and religion, and to assimilate them into Chinese culture.

Article 20 of the law compels Tibetan parents to instill in their children thougts such as "love for the Chinese Communist Party, the motherland, the people, and the Chinese people," and to encourage them to embrace the idea that the Chinese people form one single family; it also prohibits teaching Tibetan children their own language, culture, and religion, which constitutes a violation of their law and the fundamental rights of Tibetans.

Article 46 of the law requires Tibetan monasteries to carry out activities aimed at the Sinicization of Buddhism, to instill in Tibetan monks the communist ideas of Chinese leaders in the name of "patriotism," and to promote "ethnic, religious, and social harmony."

Article 60 of the law warns social groups, businesses, institutions, and other social organizations against any actions that could undermine the new law; if they do not cease such activities, they face penalties. It also warns these groups against any activity aimed at "dividing the nation"—an accusation often leveled against Tibetans who have organized peaceful protests against the Chinese government's oppressive policies toward the Tibetan people, language, and religion.

Following the passage of this law, criticism was voiced by the international community, academics, and human rights organizations, who stated that the law constituted an instrument of "forced assimilation" that could infringe upon the cultural, linguistic, and religious rights of Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Inner Mongolians. Some see this as a reversal of previous policies that granted only nominal regional autonomy.

Even before the new Chinese law officially took effect, Chinese authorities in Tibetan regions had already begun removing Tibetan-language signs from school gates, shops, and offices as early as March 15, 2026. These actions are evidence of the illegal and ruthless measures taken by the Chinese authorities against the Tibetan people, their language, culture, and religion, and are aimed at erasing Tibetan identity.

## Rights group criticizes new China cybercrime bill as threat to free expression and information access

19 March 2026, Jurist

Human Rights Watch (HRW) on Tuesday **reported** on threats to basic rights posed by China's new cybercrime bill, and urged the concerned governments to press China to scrap the draft law.

China's Ministry of Public Security published the proposed **Draft Law on Cybercrime Prevention and Control** in January, and while it addresses legitimate concerns—criminal online activities, fraud, child pornography, and illicit financial transactions—it also threatens "internationally protected rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and access to information," HRW found.

HRW China researcher Yalkun Uluyol noted that the bill would provide China's government with authority to expand and tighten social controls within its borders and beyond. Uluyol emphasized how the proposed legislation threatens online anonymity, free speech, and access to information. The researcher said many offenses in the bill are vaguely phrased, including phrases such as "disrupting the real-name management system," "harming national security," and "disrupting online order." HRW argued that lack of specificity creates a possibility of punishing legitimate online speech and activities.

The bill would also consolidate and reinforce China's real-name registration requirement across telecommunication, internet, and banking systems services, limiting anonymous expression. Provisions threaten to criminalize legitimate activities of journalists, human rights defenders, and security researchers by prohibiting publication of "information that goes against social order."

The new "abusive cybercrime regime" would also extend to citizens abroad as well as foreign individuals and organizations that provide internet service to users in China. The draft law would allow authorities to freeze funding and

investments of foreign entities that produce or disseminate information that harms state interests or bar them from entering the nation.
Earlier this month, China **adopted** a Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress that requires "people of all ethnicities, all state organs and armed forces, all political parties and social groups, enterprises, institutions, and organizations [to prioritize] a strong sense of the community of the Chinese people." HRW spoke out against the new legislation, criticizing the forced assimilation of the 55 recognized minority groups in China.

## Chinese "Wolf Warrior" Diplomat Geng Shuang Reassigned from Key Post

16 March 2026, ChinaScope

An article by *Creaders* reports that Chinese diplomat Geng Shuang, formerly China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, recently made his first public appearance after being reassigned as Vice President of the China Public Diplomacy Association. During the event, he met with the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, marking his first official engagement in his new role.
The report notes that Geng's transfer from a frontline diplomatic position at the United Nations to a role in a semi-official organization has drawn attention. Although the move is considered a lateral shift in rank, it places him outside direct involvement in China's core diplomatic activities. Geng previously served as a spokesperson for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was associated with the country's "wolf warrior" style of diplomacy, known for its assertive and often combative responses to international criticism.
Observers cited in the article suggest the reassignment may be intended to create a softer diplomatic environment ahead of a potential visit by U.S. President Donald Trump to China, indicating a possible shift away from a more confrontational approach following recent U.S. actions in Venezuela and the ongoing war with Iran.

## Greater role for Tibet, other frontier regions in China's new five-year plan, with focus on integration

16 March 2026, Tibetan Review

China said Mar 15 that the frontier regions of the People's Republic of China, especially Tibet and East Turkestan (Xinjang), had assumed a more prominent role in Beijing's 2026-2030, 15th Five-Year Plan to build a unified domestic market, strengthen energy security and expand opening up, due to their strategic importance.
Chinese analysts say that by featuring them in core sections on transport, energy, digital infrastructure and regional integration, Beijing is closely weaving these frontier regions into China's modernization tapestry, reported China's official *globaltimes.cn* Mar 15.
In the section on transport, the plan calls for stronger railways and feeder airports in western regions, better road networks in border areas, and improved cross-border transport connectivity.
"When more border area road networks are incorporated into national-level planning, it signifies the integration of frontier infrastructure into the country's broader transport system," Penpa Lhamo, deputy director of the Xizang Academy of Social Sciences, has said. "That is important for extending the unified domestic market across the full national space."
The report said the plan's energy strategy also propels the remote regions of Xinjang and Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) to the forefront of China's green energy expansion.
It said the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-2030) is expected to inject further momentum into the region's green power development. Tibet plays vital role in China's green power development agenda in both production and transmission.
It calls for continued development of major new energy bases in Xinjiang, the upper Yellow River region and the Hexi Corridor, outlining new power transmission channels for clean energy bases in frontier regions including Xinjiang, Xizang and Gansu Province, the report said, using the Sinicized names for East Turkestan (Xinjiang) and TAR (Xizang)
The report noted that in terms of public services, the plan urges more investment in education and healthcare in border areas, pointing to a shift from scattered projects toward more integrated public service systems. This apparently referred to China's much-criticized colonial-style boarding school system for Tibetan children and others.
"China is not choosing between a high-tech future and frontier development," Yang Fuqiang, head of the Institute of Sociology at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, has said. "It is bringing the two together, making the frontier an integral part of its modernization drive."

## China adopts law on national development planning

13 march 2026, Xinhua

China's top legislature on Thursday adopted a law governing how the country formulates and carries out its five-year development plans, formalizing a system that has long guided the world's second-largest economy.
The National Development Planning Law was passed at the closing meeting of the annual session of the National People's Congress (NPC).
Lawmakers on the same day also approved an outline of the country's 15th Five-Year Plan, a

blueprint that will steer China's development from 2026 to 2030.

The law draws on China's long-standing experience in national development planning, codifies proven practices into a legal framework, and aims to reinforce the strategic guiding role of national development plans.

Since 1953, China has developed and implemented 14 five-year plans, helping drive economic and social development, improve living standards and strengthen the country's overall national strength.

Divided into six chapters, the law sets out provisions on the formulation, review and approval, and implementation of national development plans, as well as oversight of their implementation.

The law formalizes the process under which the Communist Party of China Central Committee formulates recommendations, the State Council drafts plans, and the NPC reviews and approves them before they are released.

According to the law, national development plans should outline China's strategic intentions and the government's priorities, and guide social entities in their activities.

It specifies that national development plans should include an analysis of the development environment; guidelines; key goals and indicators; major strategic tasks, policy measures and projects; and measures to ensure the plans' implementation.

The law emphasizes the importance of public consultation in the planning process. As part of this effort, authorities launched a monthlong online consultation on the 15th Five-Year Plan last year, drawing more than 3.11 million responses -- an illustration of China's whole-process people's democracy in action.

This law embodies the idea that development is for the people, relies on the people, and that its benefits are shared by the people, said Nie Xin, a professor at Tsinghua University's School of Law.

The law also sets out requirements for implementing national development plans. It codifies a system for monitoring and evaluating plan implementation, including mid-term and final evaluations.

"The law provides strong institutional guarantees for the scientific formulation and effective implementation of national development plans within the framework of the rule of law," said Zhong Ying, a research fellow at the Institute of Contemporary China Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

## Beijing's Ethnic Unity Law Turns Mandarin into a Tool of Assimilation

12 March 2026, Impact Policies

China's National People's Congress (NPC) has approved the "Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress" law, requiring Mandarin as the primary language of instruction from pre-kindergarten through high school across the nation.

This state policy entrenches linguistic uniformity amid China's 56 recognized ethnic groups, where Han Chinese dominate and 55 minorities represent about 8.9% of the 1.4 billion population. Critics highlight it as a mechanism for cultural assimilation, sidelining languages like Uyghur, Tibetan, and Mongolian in favor of national cohesion, while raising broader human rights alarms over identity erosion.

Historical Context of Ethnic Policy Evolution

Since 1949, China's state policy on ethnic minorities shifted from celebrating diversity to emphasizing unity under Han-led frameworks. Early autonomy for minority regions, including cultural preservation efforts, gave way to campaigns imposing Mandarin in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia. The new law, passed by the NPC—which never rejects agenda items—nationalizes this via Article 15, mandating Mandarin "before kindergarten" through high school, barring minority languages from primary roles anywhere.

This reflects a "significant recent policy shift" toward homogenization, as noted in analyses of modernization efforts. Where diversity was once promoted through regional scripts and festivals, today's state policy prioritizes "modernization through increased unity," framing ethnic variation as a barrier to progress. Such changes accelerated under Xi Jinping, building on 2020 Inner Mongolia protests against bilingual education cuts and extending controls nationwide.

**Legal Provisions and Their Assimilative Reach**

Beyond education, the law pushes
potentially enabling state-directed mixing to dilute minority enclaves, akin to past interventions in sensitive regions like Xinjiang's re-education camps or Tibet's relocation programs. It also criminalizes parents promoting "harmful" viewpoints that disrupt harmony, extending control from schools to homes and family socialization, with penalties that could include detention or fines.

These provisions, rooted in state policy, give authorities wide latitude against perceived dissent on ethnicity or culture, mirroring vague anti-extremism laws already used against Uyghurs and Tibetans. With Mandarin now compulsory nationwide—from urban kindergartens to rural high schools—minority languages retreat to secondary or extracurricular status, raising human rights concerns over forced linguistic conformity and cultural survival. Implementation details remain vague, with no public timelines or regional exemptions announced, amplifying fears of arbitrary enforcement.

**Beijing's Rationale as Modernization Tool**

Authorities present the law as advancing linking compulsory Mandarin to "employment

opportunities" and social mobility for minorities. By integrating youth into the mainstream economy—where job listings overwhelmingly require Mandarin—Beijing ties language to national strength, portraying assimilation as economic upliftment amid slowing growth and tech-driven urbanization.

This state policy narrative positions unity as essential for development, especially with minorities at 8.9% of the population but concentrated in resource-rich borderlands. Proponents argue it counters separatism risks, citing historical divisions, yet without protections for native tongues in heritage classes, it risks standardizing identity under Han norms, where diversity yields to centralized control and surveillance tech enforces compliance.

**Criticisms Centering on Cultural Erosion**

The law draws fire for marking a "setback" and "regression" in minority identity preservation, cementing Mandarin while marginalizing other languages spoken by millions. A generation of children may become as scholarly critiques warn, weaponizing education against heritage through rote standardization.

Human rights advocates see this as suppressing previously recognized diversity, with "mutually embedded" clauses threatening community cohesion and echoing forced relocations. In regions like Inner Mongolia, where 2020 language protests led to arrests, or Xinjiang's mass detentions, the nationwide mandate heightens tensions over cultural human rights, potentially sparking underground resistance or exile communities preserving scripts abroad.

Demographic Stakes and Long-Term Ramifications

Affecting over 125 million minorities in Xinjiang (Uyghurs at 46% local population), Tibet (Tibetans at 90%), Inner Mongolia (Mongolians at 17%), and Guangxi (Zhuang at 32%), the policy standardizes curricula for 8.9% of China's people. Fluency in minority languages—over 100 dialects—could plummet without primary schooling, fostering alienation, mental health crises, and economic divides despite Mandarin's urban job benefits.

Over decades, this state policy may erode identities irreversibly, turning schools into assimilation hubs while intergenerational transmission halts. Unclear definitions of "harmful" views invite overreach, per observers, with silence on safeguards—such as opt-out clauses or teacher training—fueling human rights debates and predictions of demographic Han-ification in minority areas.

**Comparative Insights from Global Policies**

Echoing Canada's Indigenous residential schools, which caused language extinction and trauma until apologies in 2008, or France's French-centric model marginalizing Breton (now 200,000 speakers), China's approach blends language mandates with controls at unprecedented scale via apps tracking attendance and AI-flagged "disloyalty." Unlike multilingual India (22 official languages) or Switzerland (four), it favors uniformity, raising human rights questions on pluralism versus security.

This state policy pivot from diversity rhetoric to enforced sameness mirrors broader patterns in centralized states like Turkey's Kurdish restrictions or Russia's Russification of Siberia, positioning education as a frontline in identity battles with lasting scars.

mplications for Stability and Global Ties

Domestically, resistance risks grow, as seen in 2020 Mongolian school boycotts or Tibetan self-immolations, potentially destabilizing resource frontiers amid economic woes. Internationally, it bolsters critiques from UN panels on Uyghur genocide, EU sanctions, and US bans on Xinjiang cotton, complicating Belt and Road deals.

Beijing upholds sovereignty, dismissing foreign meddling, but the law's assimilative thrust strains ties with Muslim nations and India, framing state policy as internal while drawing external scrutiny over human rights violations.

**Economic Dimensions and Youth Impact=**

Mandarin fluency promises factory jobs in Guangdong or tech roles in Shenzhen, but rural minorities face barriers like poverty (twice Han rates in some areas) and discrimination. Without bilingual bridges, state policy may widen inequality, producing underemployed youth resentful of lost heritage, fueling underground economies or migration.

Youth surveys from Tibet show Mandarin aiding exams but eroding pride; long-term, this could sap innovation from diverse perspectives, as homogeneous societies lag in creativity metrics.

**Balancing Unity Against Diversity Risks**

Faced with fragmentation fears amid Taiwan tensions, aging demographics, and US rivalry, Beijing's ethnic unity drive seeks cohesion through shared language. Yet, embracing optional minority protections—like Singapore's bilingualism or New Zealand's Maori revival—could align unity with pluralism, avoiding cultural erasure and brain drain.

Without adjustments—like clarifying "harmful," funding heritage programs, or monitoring bias—the law solidifies Mandarin as an assimilation tool. China's diverse voices may unify linguistically but lose richness, trading human rights and heritage for illusory strength.

## China to build, upgrade Xinjiang, Tibet highways for greater power projection

10 Mach 2026, Tibetan Review

In order to speed up economic development and strengthen border stability and national defence, China is to build a new, 394-km (245-mile) highway in Xinjiang running parallel to the 1962

Sino-India border war and upgrade the three existing highways running into Tibet over the next five years, reported *scmp.com* Mar 10, citing China's new Five-Year Plan.

The highway will link the northern and southern sides of the rugged Tianshan Mountains in Xinjiang (East Turkestan), the report said, citing the draft 15th five-year plan China released last week. Ir said the route will run parallel to a strategic road built in the 1970s to improve military mobility following the 1962 Sino-India border war.

Construction of the Dushanzi-Kuqa Highway in central Xinjiang was stated to have begun in September, to be finished in 2032. Once completed, it will allow year-round travel and cut journeys across the Tianshan Mountains to half or a third of the current duration, the report said.

Under the plan, China aims to complete two highways spanning all nine of its land-border provinces, apart from undertaking other constructions along its east coast bordering North Korea and Vietnam.

In Aug 2025, Beijing established the Xinjiang-Tibet Railway Company to oversee the construction of a strategic 1,980-km (1,230 miles) artery between Lhasa in Tibet and Hotan in Xinjiang. Hotan administers the Galwan Valley, the hotly contested area at the centre of the bloody war in 1962 and a deadly clash in 2020 that resulted in months of military stand-off with India and a diplomatic chill between the two Asian powers that only began to thaw last year, the report noted.

Liu Zongyi, director of the Centre for South Asian Studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, has said both economic development and strategic stability were driving China to expand infrastructure in border areas.

"Infrastructure holds significant strategic and economic value," Liu has said. "In the event of an emergency, personnel and resources could be deployed more quickly to frontier regions, which is crucial for border stability and national defence."

The report noted that following the mid-2020 Galwan clashes, both Beijing and Delhi significantly ramped up infrastructure construction near border regions.

For example, in 2022, China unveiled plans for a new highway between Tibet's Lhunze and Xinjiang's Mazha that will run near disputed areas, such as the Depsang Plains, the Galwan Valley and Hot Springs on the Sino-Tibet border Line of Actual Control (LAC).

And then, in 2024, the Indian government approved a plan to build the 1,637km Arunachal Frontier Highway, which is expected to connect 12 districts and 1,683 villages along the LAC, the report said, citing *The Times of India*.

The construction pushes themselves have sparked diplomatic tension. In January, India's external affairs ministry lodged a protest over China's road construction in Shaksgam Valley, which is administered by China as part of the Kashgar prefecture in Xinjiang but claimed by India.

India called the Chinese construction an "illegal occupation", while the Chinese foreign ministry responded that the area "belongs to China", adding that it was "fully justified" in conducting infrastructure construction "on its own territory".

The Shaksgam Valley, historically part of India's Union Territory of Ladakh, was transferred by Pakistan to China in 1963 under a provisional border agreement.

## NPC deputy slams Western criticism over draft ethnic unity bill

08 March 2026, China Daily

"The West has no right to lecture us," Xing Guangcheng, a deputy to the 14th National People's Congress and head of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies, said.

Xing, from the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, made the remarks in response to criticism from some Western media over a provision in a draft bill on promoting ethnic unity and progress.

When the draft was submitted for a second reading at the NPC Standing Committee in December, it added that schools and other educational institutions should use standard Chinese as the basic language of instruction.

Xing said the provision should not be interpreted as a language issue. Instead, he noted, it is closely related to people's livelihoods and development opportunities.

Without the ability to speak and write standard Chinese, many people — especially young people from ethnic minorities — may find it difficult to benefit from the opportunities created by China's nationwide development".

## Deeply study, thoroughly understand, and earnestly implement General Secretary Xi Jinping's important expositions on establishing and practicing a correct view of performance, and make new contributions to the united front for the long-term stability and high-quality development of Tibet.

05 March 2026, Tibet China Network

On March 2, Silang Nima, member of the Standing Committee of the Regional Party Committee and Minister of the United Front Work Department, presided over a meeting of the department's affairs committee. The meeting conveyed and studied the important instructions of General Secretary Xi Jinping on carrying out the study and education on establishing and practicing the correct view of performance

throughout the Party, as well as the spirit of the meeting of the Central Leading Group for Party Building, and arranged and deployed the study and education work in the United Front system.
Xu Zhitao, Vice Chairman of the Autonomous Region, attended the meeting.
Slang Nima pointed out that all levels and departments of the United Front system in the region should fully recognize the great significance of carrying out the study and education from the perspective of deeply understanding the decisive significance of "establishing the two foundations" and resolutely upholding the "two safeguards." In accordance with the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and the work arrangements of the Autonomous Region Party Committee, they should carry out the study and education on establishing and practicing the correct view of performance with the highest political stance, the strictest work standards, and the most pragmatic work style.
Slang Nima emphasized that it is essential to integrate the study, investigation, rectification, and establishment of new systems into the practical work of the United Front, grasping its nature and highlighting its characteristics, to ensure that the learning and education campaign achieves solid results. He stressed that the campaign should be used as an opportunity to deeply study, understand, and implement General Secretary Xi Jinping's important expositions on establishing and practicing a correct view of performance, guiding Party members and cadres in the United Front system to cultivate the mindset of "success need not be attributed to me" and strengthen their sense of responsibility of "success must include me." He urged them to proceed from the laws governing United Front work, work diligently and practically, do more work that lays the foundation for long-term stability and consolidation, continuously unite people's hearts and gather strength, and make new contributions to the long-term stability and high-quality development of Tibet.

## China Prepares New Law Enforcing Mandarin as Main Language of Instruction in Minority Regions

04 March 2026, Vision Times

Starting next year, schools serving China's ethnic minority groups such as Uyghurs and Tibetans will be required to teach core subjects in Mandarin Chinese, rather than those people's native languages, according to a new draft law.
The law will mark a significant shift from policies dating back to the Mao era, which allowed non-Chinese ethnic minorities to use their languages in a variety of public contexts.



*Tibetan Buddhist monks attend class under photos showing President Xi Jinping and other Communist Party leaders during a government organized visit to the Buddhist College of the Tibet Autonomous Region on May 31, 2021 in Qushui County, outside Lhasa, Tibet Autonomous Region, China. Travel restrictions for foreign travellers were recently loosened in a bid to boost tourism to Tibet. China's government is aiming for 61 million visitors annually by 2025, more than 15 times the number of Tibet's inhabitants. (Image: Kevin Frayer/ Getty Images)*

The proposed Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress is expected to be approved during the 2026 meeting of the National People's Congress in Beijing, to be held between March 4 and March 12. According to a draft cited by the Financial Times, the legislation is aimed at "forging a sense of community in the Chinese nation." It also provides for legal action against individuals, inside or outside China, who undermine "national unity" or promote "separatism."
While minority languages may still be taught as second languages in specialized classes, groups such as Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongolians would no longer be entitled to use their native languages as the main medium of instruction for core subjects in schools and universities.
The measure represents the latest step in Chinese leader Xi Jinping's "Sinicization" campaign, which critics say seeks to assimilate ethnic minorities more closely into Han-majority society. The Han account for about 90 percent of China's 1.4 billion people, though the country officially recognises 56 ethnic groups and numerous minority languages, some with their own written scripts.
Analysts say the legislation could significantly expand the legal framework for restricting religious, cultural, and political activities among minority communities, further tightening state control in sensitive regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet.
Over the last decade and earlier, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has ramped up social controls over ethnic minority regions, introducing policies and campaigns that have been criticized for erasing the local identities and allegedly involving vast abuses such as mass incarceration and forced labor.

## Chinese Authorities Intensify Crackdown on Tibetan Language and Religious Content on Kuaishou

01 March 2026, Big News Network

Chinese authorities have intensified restrictions on Tibetan digital expression, with mounting evidence of strict monitoring and punitive action against users inside Tibet for sharing content related to Tibetan language, culture, religion, and identity on the Chinese social media platform Kuaishou, according to a report by Phayul.

Citing sources within Tibet, the Phayul report states that posts featuring Tibetan script, spoken Tibetan language, traditional attire, religious teachings, and images of revered spiritual leaders are increasingly subjected to censorship. Users reportedly face warnings, temporary suspensions, or permanent account deletions for sharing such content.

According to the report, Tibetans posting short videos of themselves wearing traditional dress and speaking in Tibetan have come under intensified scrutiny. In several instances, live-stream broadcasts were either abruptly terminated or had their viewer numbers restricted without explanation.

One source cited by Phayul revealed that even visible Tibetan script in the background of a live broadcast, including wall hangings, banners, or decorative inscriptions, can trigger platform intervention. Tibetan text written directly in live-stream captions reportedly fails to display altogether.

Sources also told Phayul that social media platforms operating in Tibet strictly prohibit the dissemination of religious teachings, prayer recitations, and images of prominent Tibetan Buddhist leaders, including Tenzin Gyatso. Even the inadvertent appearance of such imagery during video calls can reportedly trigger automated alerts.

Violation notices issued by Kuaishou, as cited in the report, typically state that a single infraction may not immediately affect an account. However, repeated posting of similar content can result in restrictions, temporary suspensions lasting days or months, or permanent deletion.

The Phayul report further states that on January 22, a Tibetan Kuaishou user disclosed that authorities have also imposed controls on writers publishing literary works portraying the authentic lives of Tibetan nomads. These works are allegedly criticized for 'negatively influencing society' or depicting meat consumption, accusations observers believe serve as pretexts for censorship.

Authorities have reportedly deleted the former Kuaishou accounts of several Tibetans who had previously faced imprisonment. Among them are Golog Palden, who served a three-year prison sentence, and singer Tsugte, also known as Ah Sang. Both reportedly had their pre-detention accounts permanently removed. Additionally, two accounts previously operated by environmental activist Tsongon Tsering have been deleted. The account of blogger Aga Gelek, also known as Sonam Choedrup, whose current whereabouts remain unknown, has also been removed from the platform.

According to Phayul, Chinese authorities justify such measures under broad internet governance regulations. Since June 2017, the Cyberspace Administration of China has enforced the 'Regulations on the Management of Internet Forum Services' and the 'Regulations on the Management of Internet Group Information Services.' These rules prohibit posting content involving political issues, sharing confidential internal documents, disseminating military-related materials, spreading rumours, or transmitting information related to state secrets.

The regulations also stipulate that individuals who create messaging groups, discussion forums, or financial transaction groups bear legal responsibility for all content shared within those groups, a provision that, according to observers cited by Phayul, significantly increases the risk of collective liability and fosters self-censorship among Tibetan users. (ANI)

# BUDDHISM IN TIBET

## China tightens grip on Tibetan Monastery during Rinpoche's funeral

31 March 2026, Tribune India

Chinese security forces imposed sweeping restrictions around Lung Ngon Monastery in Gade County, Golog, during the funeral rites of the late Choktrul Hungkar Dorje Rinpoche. From March 27 to 30, police and military personnel reportedly surrounded the monastery, severely limiting the movement and activities of monks and local Tibetans, as reported by Tibet Times.According to Tibet Times, authorities detained Venerable Ugyen Jangchup without explanation. Although released around midnight, sources allege he was physically assaulted while in custody at the Gade County police station and instructed to report back to a detention centre within three days.Due to ongoing restrictions, independent verification of his condition remains difficult. Witnesses said officials interfered with funeral proceedings on the first day, ordering the removal of English-language tribute banners and religious inscriptions displayed around the monastery.Authorities also reportedly banned monks and residents from sharing photos or videos online, while subjecting them to continued surveillance and harassment. One local source described the situation as deeply distressing, saying fear had become pervasive.

Additional accounts claim that during Ugyen Jangchup's detention, his belongings were searched and damaged, while his phone, computer, and even a portrait of the Dalai Lama were confiscated. Officials allegedly indicated he could face extended detention.

The report further links the tensions to earlier accusations by Chinese authorities against Rinpoche. He was reportedly criticised for not organising a formal for the state-appointed Panchen Lama, Gyaltsen Norbu, during a 2024 visit. Authorities also accused him of "inciting trouble" through his educational and philanthropic initiatives, as highlighted by Tibet Times.

Rinpoche had previously disappeared under unclear circumstances. In March 2025, officials informed monastery representatives that he had died in a hospital in Vietnam, though details were not disclosed. Monks sent to verify the claim were allowed only a brief, controlled viewing of his face, and his remains were later cremated without transparency, as reported by Tibet Times. (ANI)

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## Tension in Tibet: Monastery Under Siege by Chinese Forces

31 March 2026, Devdiscourse

Chinese authorities enforced strict measures at Lung Ngon Monastery in Gade County during funeral rites for a revered Tibetan monk. The restrictions, which reportedly included detention, surveillance, and interference with religious proceedings, have deepened community distress



and stirred allegations of rights violations by the state.In a stark display of control, Chinese security forces have reportedly surrounded Lung Ngon Monastery in Gade County, Tibet, during the funeral of the esteemed Choktrul Hungkar Dorje Rinpoche. From March 27 to March 30, movement was heavily restricted for monks and local residents, according to international reports.

The constraints included the unexplained detention of Venerable Ugyen Jangchup, who was allegedly assaulted and ordered to report back to a detention center. Authorities reportedly interrupted funeral proceedings by removing English-language banners and religious texts while forbidding the online sharing of photos or videos.

Further claims suggest that during his detention, Jangchup's belongings were searched, and items were confiscated, raising fears of extended imprisonment. The unrest is linked to previous accusations against Rinpoche by Chinese authorities, alleging failure to support a state-sponsored monk and inciting trouble through his charitable projects.

## China-appointed Panchen vows proactive move to Sinicize Tibetan Buddhism at annual two-sessions meet in Beijing

10 March 2026, Tibetan Review

Although the difference between Tibetan and Chinese cultures is stark and obvious, and Tibetan Buddhism cannot not be more different from China's, Beijing has been vigorously moving to change that by trying to assimilate the Himalayan territory in keeping with its false political narrative about Tibet being an integral part of China since ancient times. In keeping with this Sinicization drive, Gyaincain Norbu, appointed by China to replace the abducted, Dalai Lama-recognized 11th Panchen Lama Gedhun Choekyi Nyima way back in 1995, has said Mar 8 that Tibetan Buddhism is "an important component of China's traditional culture" and should be seen to appear as such.

Addressing the ongoing third annual plenary meeting of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in Beijing, the China-appointed 11th Panchen Lama has said: "In recent years, with the care and support of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese government, the Tibetan Buddhist community has actively explored ways to align with socialist society and has achieved positive results. The level of law-based and standardized management of monasteries has continued to improve. The interpretation of Buddhist teachings has kept pace with the times, and the system for cultivating monastic talents has become increasingly well-established. As an important component of China's traditional culture, Tibetan Buddhism has been effectively preserved and developed through its inheritance."

Regarding the challenges that supposedly lie ahead for furthering the assimilation drive, Gyaincain Norbu has said: "It is necessary to integrate the core socialist values more systematically and deeply into the interpretation of Buddhist teachings, the dissemination of Dharma, and the practice of cultivation," apart from other issues.

He has further said: "The fundamental guideline for addressing these issues lies in thoroughly studying, understanding, and implementing Xi Jinping Thought on Culture, the Party's policies on the governance of Xizang in the new era, and Xi Jinping's important thought on strengthening and improving ethnic work, his statements on religious affairs, and his instructions on Xizang-related work. Efforts should be coordinated across five dimensions, namely ideological guidance, rule-of-law practice, cultural integration, social service, and talent development."

He has called for continued carrying out of "in-depth patriotism and socialist education within the religious community, integrating education on the sense of national identity, citizenship, and the rule of law into daily Dharma teachings, so that the recognition of the motherland, the Chinese nation, the Chinese culture, the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and socialism with Chinese characteristics can become a conscious pursuit among religious practitioners."

He has called on religious circles in Tibet to take the lead in "respecting, studying, observing, and applying the law, conducting activities, managing affairs, and handling relations in accordance with

law" by working "in coordination with the government to raise the level of law-based governance of religious affairs."

For the purpose of promoting "cultural integration and strengthening Chinese identity", he has said: "We should adhere to strict governance of religious practice, actively forge a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation, and deeply explore teachings and regulations that are conducive to social harmony, progress, and healthy civilization. We should interpret doctrines and regulations in ways that align with the requirements of China's contemporary development and the fine traditional Chinese culture."

For strengthening talent cultivation and ensuring healthy inheritance, he has said: "We should improve the training model that balances modern scripture study with traditional practice, enhance learning of the national standard spoken and written language, Chinese history, legal regulations, and modern scientific knowledge, and focus on nurturing a group of high-quality monastic talents in the new era who love both their country and their religion, maintain purity and harmony, and uphold correct belief and practice."

He has vowed that "with a more proactive stance, we will guide monks, nuns, and believers to work together with people of all ethnic groups across the country, and strive forward with one heart and mind."

He has further said: "the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is now on an irreversible historical course" and "this provides an unprecedentedly broad stage for the healthy inheritance of all religions and bestows a profound historical responsibility on the religious community."

"The Tibetan Buddhist community is determined, with a deep sense of gratitude to the motherland and all sentient beings, to more consciously integrate into the overall national development, striving to be steadfast practitioners of patriotism, faithful inheritors of fine traditional Chinese culture, and active contributors to Chinese modernization," China's online Tibet news service *eng.tibet.cn* Mar 9 quoted Gyaincain Norbu as saying in his speech.

# CCP POLITICS

## Xi Jinping's Succession Trap

29 March 2026, Vision Times

A phrase reportedly circulating inside Zhongnanhai, the walled compound in central Beijing where China's top leaders live and work, captures the mood inside the Chinese Communist Party's ruling elite: "The air in Beijing is colder than it was in 1966."

The reference is historically loaded and deliberate. In the early 1960s, Mao Zedong felt increasingly sidelined by the pragmatic bureaucracy that Liu Shaoqi, then China's head of state, and Deng Xiaoping ran after Mao's Great Leap Forward ended in mass famine and political humiliation. Mao complained repeatedly that Beijing had become a place where "you can't stick a needle in or splash water on," meaning the official apparatus had sealed him out entirely. He said the air in eastern China was "lively" compared to the "stifling" capital and wanted to use provincial pressure to break through. That frustration led directly to the Cultural Revolution, the decade-long campaign of political terror that destroyed the careers and lives of millions of Chinese officials and citizens.

An anonymous source described as a "red second generation" figure, meaning someone from a revolutionary-era CCP family with insider access to Party circles, said the atmosphere inside Zhongnanhai today is one of "extreme severity." Mutual suspicion has replaced functioning governance. The remark reportedly leaked after a closed-door Party meeting and was used to describe how Xi, despite holding near-total formal authority, has ended up in a state of isolation that mirrors Mao's predicament before 1966. Xi's directives do not reliably travel past the compound walls.

Xi has spent years purging officials associated with the political networks of former leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. The bureaucracy he left standing has responded with what amounts to a system-wide work stoppage. Cheng Xiaonong, a U.S.-based Chinese political economist who has written extensively on CCP elite politics, has characterized this as the largest "bureaucratic strike" in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. Officials across the system have stopped competing for promotion. Their priority is to avoid drawing attention, avoid mistakes, and avoid becoming the next purge target. Xi's response has been to double down with more campaign-style enforcement sweeps, more political purges, and more pressure. The cycle feeds on itself.

Xi's crackdowns on the private tutoring industry, real estate developers, and major internet companies under the CCP banner of "common prosperity" have already been characterized by scholars as a "second Cultural Revolution." The parallel to Mao extends beyond economic policy to the fundamental dynamics of power inside the

Party: a leader who feels the system resisting him and responds with escalating political warfare.

Xi suspects his own generals

The military dimension sharpens the Mao Zedong comparison. According to what is described as an internal report originating from the Central Military Commission, the Party body that controls all of China's armed forces, Xi Jinping's wholesale purge of the Rocket Force, China's nuclear and strategic missile branch, and the Equipment Development Department was triggered by a specific discovery. Senior military officials had reportedly been holding private discussions about "contingency plans," exploring how to distance themselves from Xi's leadership under extreme scenarios.

The psychology matches Mao's almost exactly. In 1966, Mao moved against Luo Ruiqing, then chief of the general staff, and He Long, a revolutionary-era marshal, on suspicion that they were positioning themselves for a military coup. Xi's military purges have reportedly reached an intensity comparable to what China experienced during the early years of Mao's Cultural Revolution.

Rumors circulating within the system claim that some Chinese military figures privately communicated with Western counterparts, exploring the possibility of adopting a "neutral" stance in the event of an armed conflict over Taiwan. Whether these reports are fully accurate or partly inflated for political effect, they provoked a severe response from Xi and accelerated the CCP's purge campaign across the military establishment.

**Any heir becomes a target**

The succession question is where the parallel between Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong runs deepest, and where the structural danger to the Chinese Communist Party regime is greatest.

Ming Juzheng, a Taiwan-based political analyst specializing in CCP elite politics and factional dynamics, has argued that the Party's internal logic turns every designated successor into an immediate threat to the sitting leader. Mao's own experience proved the point twice over. He first turned against Liu Shaoqi, who had been positioned as his successor. Liu was stripped of all Party and state positions and died under house arrest during the Cultural Revolution, denied medical treatment as his health deteriorated. Mao then turned against Lin Biao, the defense minister he had formally named as his heir. Lin died in 1971 when his plane crashed in Mongolia, allegedly while fleeing China after a failed coup attempt. Mao ultimately handed power to Hua Guofeng, a provincial official with no independent power base, who was promptly sidelined by Deng Xiaoping's faction after Mao's death.

Xi has followed this logic to its endpoint. By pushing through the abolition of presidential term limits in 2018 and refusing to name or groom a successor, Xi has created what analysts describe as a CCP succession vacuum. Ming has stated plainly that Xi dismantled the succession mechanism to prevent being overthrown while still in power. The unintended consequence is that every faction within the Chinese Communist Party, including factions within Xi's own loyalist network, now operates in a state of extreme anxiety and quiet maneuvering. No one can see what the post-Xi era looks like, so everyone is either positioning for a power grab or scrambling for self-preservation. These are precisely the conditions under which palace coups become most likely.

Miles Yu (Yu Maochun), a former senior China policy adviser at the U.S. State Department under Secretary Mike Pompeo and currently a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, has framed Xi Jinping's approach as a textbook example of Leninist party power monopoly pushed to a structural breaking point. Yu argues that Xi abolished the CCP's succession system specifically to prevent power from leaking away during his lifetime. The result is a system Yu describes as "brittle." If Xi experiences a serious health crisis, the regime will have no legitimate mechanism for transferring authority. The entire system will fracture.

Yu has described Xi's predicament as a "classic dictator's tragedy." Xi has systematically closed off every path that could constrain him, and in doing so has left collapse as the only remaining trajectory. He eliminated the succession mechanism to ensure he could govern until death, replicating Mao's model. But Mao governed a closed, agrarian society largely cut off from global markets. Xi governs a globally integrated economy that depends on predictable political transitions and institutional continuity. Foreign investors and China's domestic business elites have drawn the obvious conclusion, and capital flight reflects it. Yu's assessment is that this CCP succession vacuum is the root cause of China's deepening economic and social instability.

**A cultural revolution without the crowds**

In 1966, Mao Zedong retreated to his compound at Dishuidong in Hunan province, plotting to unleash waves of Red Guard students to destroy the Party officials who had marginalized him. Today, Xi Jinping sits inside Zhongnanhai in Beijing, relying on big data surveillance systems, mass digital monitoring infrastructure, and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the CCP's top internal body for investigating and punishing officials, to accomplish the same objective through bureaucratic and technological means.

Cheng Xiaonong has described Xi's situation as a "Cultural Revolution without the masses." He considers it more dangerous than Mao's original. Mao, for all the destruction he unleashed, could mobilize genuine popular fervor. Millions of young Chinese believed in his cause, at least initially, and threw themselves into the campaign with ideological conviction. Xi Jinping cannot

draw on anything comparable. The defining feature of his rule is suspicion: CCP officials suspect each other, Xi suspects his officials, and no one inside the leadership compound speaks honestly to China's top leader.

Xi may not oppose the idea of naming a CCP successor in principle. The problem is structural and inescapable. At the apex of an authoritarian system with no institutional checks, any person designated as heir immediately becomes the flag around which every frustrated, frightened, or ambitious faction rallies. The heir becomes the alternative to Xi Jinping. And the moment an alternative exists, Xi becomes expendable.

So Xi watches the CCP bureaucracy atrophy. He governs in a political silence where compliance has replaced initiative and fear has replaced function. Many observers, inside China and internationally, now regard the eventual rupture of the Chinese Communist Party's governing structure as a question of timing rather than probability.

## Former Chief Liu Hui Expelled Over Unusual Charges in China Corruption Probe

27 March 2026, Vision Times

A senior Chinese official has been expelled from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and referred for prosecution on a series of charges (some of them rarely seen in official disciplinary cases), prompting speculation about deeper political implications and turmoil within the CCP's top echelons.

On March 26, China's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) announced that Liu Hui, former chairwoman of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and a vice-ministerial–level official, had been investigated for "serious violations of discipline and law" and expelled from the Party.

Among the accusations listed in the official notice were several unusual charges, including "making anonymous false accusations against others" and "associating with political swindlers." Authorities also accused Liu of resisting investigation, engaging in "superstitious activities," accepting improper travel arrangements, and using her position to seek benefits for others in exchange for large sums of money.

**Rare charge draws attention**

The allegation that Liu "made anonymous false accusations against others" has drawn particular attention, as it is rarely cited in cases involving officials of her rank.

Observers noted that such a charge suggests the individuals Liu allegedly targeted may themselves have held significant positions. Public records indicate that one of the few comparable cases involved Lu Wei, former head of China's Cyberspace Administration, who was sentenced in 2019.

Commentator Li Muyang said in a recent program that the language used in Liu's disciplinary notice appears to carry deeper political meaning: "Liu Hui implemented major decisions of the Party Central Committee with discounts and deviations, associated with political swindlers, made anonymous false accusations against others, resisted organizational investigation, and engaged in superstitious activities."

He argued that the phrasing suggests more than routine corruption charges, pointing instead to issues of political loyalty. According to Li, the reference to "discounts and deviations" in implementing central directives effectively implies disloyalty to top leadership. He noted that Liu's period of influence, particularly during her tenure as Ningxia's regional chairwoman from 2013 to 2016, may have been the focus of scrutiny.

**Career background**

Liu Hui, born in December 1959 in Tianjin, spent much of her career in Ningxia. She rose through regional leadership roles before becoming chairwoman of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in 2013, making her one of a small number of women to hold such a position at the provincial level.

Her tenure lasted only three years. In 2016, she was removed from her post amid criticism related to policies in the region and later reassigned to the State Ethnic Affairs Commission. Though she retained ministerial rank, the move was widely viewed as a demotion.

Liu retired from frontline positions in 2022 and stepped down from her advisory role in 2023. In July 2025, two years after her retirement, she was placed under investigation.

**'Superstitious activities'**

Another charge cited in the official notice, "engaging in superstitious activities," has also attracted scrutiny. Commentator Li Muyang linked the accusation to a 2016 visit by then-Premier Li Keqiang to Ningxia. During the trip, official images showed Liu wearing a headscarf while accompanying Li to a mosque—an act consistent with Islamic customs but potentially sensitive given her position as a senior CCP official.

Li Muyang suggested that such actions may have been interpreted politically, particularly in light of Liu's background and connections. Liu is widely regarded as having ties to the Communist Youth League faction, with connections to Li Keqiang dating back to the 1990s. Analysts note that factional affiliations have historically played a role in internal CCP dynamics.

Some commentators have also suggested that Liu's case may reflect broader political tensions within the Party. Li Muyang argued that the continued pursuit of Liu, even after her demotion and retirement, indicates a sustained effort to hold her accountable, stating: "In a certain sense, this can be seen as settling scores after the fact."

Other analysts have framed the case as part of a broader pattern in which officials linked to certain political networks face scrutiny as part of ongoing anti-corruption efforts. While no official statements have connected Liu's case to broader factional dynamics, the combination of rare charges and the timing of her investigation has fueled discussion among observers.
China's anti-corruption campaign, ongoing for more than a decade, has targeted officials across multiple sectors. However, cases involving unusual allegations or politically sensitive contexts often draw heightened attention, as they may signal shifts within the CCP's internal landscape.

## What do China's new 'correct view' rules for local Communist Party officials mean?

27 March 2026, SCMP

China's leadership has passed new rules on the work carried out by local committees of the ruling Communist Party and called for upholding a "correct view" of political performance.
The party's 24-member Politburo met in Beijing on Friday to review the latest regulations for local party committees, part of its push to align regional governance with the central leadership's strategic priorities.
Chaired by President Xi Jinping, the meeting laid bare a dual mandate for local officials: absolute loyalty to the party's central authority and the cultivation of a "correct view of political performance", according to state news agency Xinhua.
The revision to the regulations is intended to support China's latestAccording to the Xinhua report, local party leaders were tasked with the "top priority" of implementing the Central Committee's decisions with unwavering focus.
The leadership also called for "creative" execution that respected local realities, moving away from the "one-size-fits-all" or "simplistic and crude" methods that have drawn criticism in the past.
At the core of the regulatory update is an emphasis on "performance views".
"[Officials] must adopt and practise a correct view of political performance, focus on achievements that truly benefit the people and come from hard, practical work to produce results that can stand the test of time, public scrutiny and historical review," Xinhua said.
This serves as a warning against the pursuit of "white elephant" projects, deceptive data or short-sighted "vanity projects" driven by personal or small-group interests – failings that Xi previously warned would bring about "hidden dangers" and public dissatisfaction.
The new rules are part of a high-profile campaign on governance and performance appraisals that kicked off in February and will run to July.
Between February and July, officials from the county level up are to rectify any deviations from the "correct" line in their own duties and in assessments of those under their watch.
The campaign also comes ahead of next year's 21st National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
With local governments from the township to the provincial level preparing for the leadership shuffle, Xi said a "correct view" of performance was particularly vital now to ensure new appointments prioritised long-term public benefit over short-term vanity projects.
The new rules are meant to institutionalise "democratic centralism" within local leadership bodies that must be better educated on the concept of collective decision-making, Xinhua reported.
This involved improving rules for discussions and decisions, creating detailed "negative lists" of forbidden actions and strengthening oversight.
By defining exactly what to monitor, how to do it and who is held accountable, it added, the party sought to ensure that the collective leadership rules were being strictly followed.

## Xi Jinping Takes Down Wang Qishan's Last Loyal Aide

23 March 2026, Vision Times



*Former Chinese Vice President Wang Qishan in the Chinese Communist Party headquarters of Zhongnanhai on April 8, 2019, in Beijing. (Image: Kenzaburo Fukuhara - Pool/Getty Images)*

Zhou Liang, a Party committee member and vice head of China's National Financial Regulatory Administration, was placed under investigation on March 24, 2026, for suspected "serious violations of discipline and law," the standard CCP euphemism for corruption and political disloyalty. The announcement came from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Party's top internal enforcement body.
Zhou was born in October 1971 in Yongzhou, Hunan Province. He previously served as organizational department head at the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, vice chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, and vice chairman of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission.

Zhou began serving as Wang Qishan's personal secretary in 1997. Over the next two decades, he followed Wang through a succession of postings: the Guangdong provincial government, the State Council's Economic Restructuring Office, the CCP's Hainan provincial committee, the Beijing municipal government, and finally the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. No other discipline commission official worked alongside Wang longer.

Zhou Liang's two-decade rise through Wang Qishan's network

During Wang's tenure as a Politburo Standing Committee member and head of the Party's discipline commission, Zhou climbed steadily through the ranks of the anti-corruption apparatus. In 2013, he became deputy secretary-general of the discipline commission. By April 2015, he was executive deputy head of its organizational department. By September of that year, he had taken over as department head, effectively serving as Wang's personnel chief and controlling appointments within the anti-corruption system.

In November 2017, Zhou was appointed vice chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission. After that body merged with the insurance regulator in March 2018, Zhou continued as vice chairman of the combined entity and simultaneously took on the role of deputy chairman of the China Financial Workers' Union. In May 2023, he transferred to the newly established National Financial Regulatory Administration as vice head, the position he held at the time of his detention.

According to the regulatory administration's official website, Zhou's last known public appearance was in February 2026, when he chaired a commendation conference for the national financial regulatory system.

Chinese state media outlet Zhengzhiju previously reported that Zhou was known for keeping a notably low profile throughout his career.

**Wang Qishan's fall from anti-corruption enforcer to political target**

Wang Qishan served as head of the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection during Xi Jinping's first term as general secretary. In that role, Wang carried out an aggressive, politically selective campaign against so-called "corruption" that consolidated Xi's grip on power by eliminating rivals and their networks. The campaign was widely understood within China and abroad as a factional weapon wielded under the guise of institutional reform.

By Xi's second term, Wang's public demeanor had visibly shifted from stern authority to careful deference. In September 2018, he was moved to the largely ceremonial post of state vice president. He retired from that position in 2023. The trajectory was clear: Wang had gone from indispensable enforcer to a political figure whose very connections made him a target.

Four secretaries purged: Xi Jinping dismantles Wang Qishan's inner circle

After Wang was sidelined to the vice presidency, his former associates began falling one by one. Each case targeted a different node of Wang's influence across China's financial and political systems.

**Dong Hong: Wang's "political chief steward," convicted in 2022.** On Jan. 28, 2022, Dong Hong, a former deputy head of the CCP's Central Inspection Teams and the earliest of Wang's four known personal secretaries, was convicted of accepting 463 million yuan (approximately $63 million) in bribes and sentenced to death with reprieve, a sentence that typically converts to life imprisonment. Dong had served as Wang's secretary for six years beginning in March 2000, when Wang took over as head of the State Council's Economic Restructuring Office. Dong's conviction was the first major strike against the Wang network.

**Tian Huiyu: Wang's secretary at Construction Bank, sentenced in 2024**. On Feb. 5, 2024, Tian Huiyu, former president and Party secretary of China Merchants Bank, received a suspended death sentence. Tian entered China Construction Bank in 1987 and served as Wang's personal secretary during Wang's tenure as Construction Bank president in the mid-1990s. Tian also played a role in establishing CICC, the China International Capital Corporation, a major state-backed investment bank. His case exposed how deeply Wang's influence had extended through China's commercial banking sector.

**Fan Yifei: Wang's chief financial officer, sentenced in 2024**. On Oct. 10, 2024, Fan Yifei, a former deputy governor of the People's Bank of China (China's central bank), was sentenced to death with reprieve. During Wang's leadership of Construction Bank, Fan served as his chief financial officer. Fan's fall severed Wang's remaining reach into China's central banking system.

**Zhou Liang: Wang's personnel gatekeeper, detained in 2026**. With Zhou's detention, all four of Wang's known former personal secretaries have been eliminated from the political system. Zhou, as Wang's longest-serving and most trusted aide, represented the last thread connecting Wang to an operational network within the CCP.

Xi Jinping fears Wang Qishan enough to destroy his entire network

On March 24, an X (formerly Twitter) commentator posting as "Finding心歸何處" laid out the political logic behind Xi's methodical purge. Zhou Liang's detention carries particular symbolic weight, the commentator argued. Zhou followed Wang since the late 1990s across postings in Guangdong, Hainan, Beijing, and the discipline commission. As organizational department head within the commission, Zhou served as Wang's most trusted personnel

gatekeeper, the person who decided who got promoted within the anti-corruption apparatus. His removal means Wang's last political buffer has been stripped away. Xi is no longer leaving any margin of tolerance for Wang's former network.

Online commenters drew blunt conclusions about the CCP's internal dynamics. "Is this a CCP power redistribution? Xi has turned against the man who was once his cleanup tool?" one asked. Another wrote: "Being an official in China is now a high-risk occupation. Getting on the bus depends on your connections. Getting off the bus safely is what really matters." The observation captured the precarious reality facing CCP officials who enriched themselves under one patron only to become disposable once that patron lost favor.

On March 24, Cai Shenkun, a U.S.-based Chinese political commentator, posted on X that Wang Qishan had treated Zhou Liang like a son and deeply valued his abilities. "No one expected he would still be arrested," Cai wrote. "Xi Jinping is absolutely ruthless toward Wang Qishan, showing zero restraint. The main reason is that Xi is terrified of Wang."

Cai suggested that at this trajectory, Wang could follow the path of Zhou Yongkang, the former domestic security chief who was sentenced to life in prison in 2015 after being purged in what was widely understood as a factional power play dressed up as an anti-corruption case. If Wang meets a similar fate, it would mark the most dramatic takedown of a former Politburo Standing Committee member since the Zhou Yongkang case itself.

According to Cai, Zhou Liang had served Wang for decades and helped recruit capable officials into positions throughout the system. Wang deliberately kept Zhou away from financial dealings to shield him from vulnerability. Even when Wang was at the height of his power, Zhou reportedly sensed the danger ahead and repeatedly requested a transfer to a provincial posting. Wang refused to let him go. When Wang stepped down from the Politburo Standing Committee, he personally raised Zhou's future with Xi, and Xi agreed to make appropriate arrangements. Wang took Xi at his word. But as numerous Hunan-origin officials whom Zhou had recommended were arrested over the following years, Xi eventually discarded Zhou as well.

Online commenters speculated about what comes next. "The next step should be Wang Qishan himself. Everyone who could threaten Xi's rule will be purged. Is it possible Xi's health has seriously deteriorated, and he's clearing out all threats before a successor takes over?" one wrote. Others characterized the crackdown as part of a broad purge targeting officials from Hunan Province, Zhou's home region.

A lunar new year meeting triggered the final purge

In a follow-up post, Cai revealed what he said triggered Zhou's arrest. The detention was "expected and unexpected at the same time," Cai wrote. Expected, because Zhou was Wang's last remaining associate and Xi wanted to eliminate every root. Unexpected, because Wang had twice personally appealed to Xi to spare Zhou, promising to withdraw entirely from politics and asking for mercy. Xi agreed to Wang's face both times.

The breaking point came during the 2026 Lunar New Year period, when Wang sent an intermediary to meet with Zhou. This violated Xi's explicit prohibition on any contact between Wang and his former associates. The timing was especially sensitive. After Xi's detention of Zhang Youxia, the former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission who had been China's second-highest-ranking military officer, Xi had already antagonized virtually the entire community of revolutionary family descendants, military family descendants, and Party elders. Xi now fears that the few remaining national-level leaders who could still pose a threat might coordinate against him. His primary concern, Cai wrote, is preventing any communication between Wang Qishan and Zeng Qinghong, the former state vice president who served as chief political strategist for the late Jiang Zemin, the CCP general secretary who built the Party's previous dominant faction.

One commenter connected the crackdown to Xi's broader campaign for total symbolic and political control: "Arresting the secretaries and confidants of Party elders right now is meant as a direct warning to the elders themselves. The CCP recently shut down Mao Zedong's mausoleum in Tiananmen Square a year ahead of schedule for its once-per-decade renovation. Some analysts believe Xi thinks the mausoleum disrupts Beijing's feng shui. Could he use this maintenance period as cover to relocate it?" The commenter concluded: "One thing is undeniable: Party and state power remain firmly in Xi's hands. Xi moved against Zhang Youxia before the Fifth Plenum specifically to avoid becoming another Hua Guofeng," referring to the post-Mao transitional leader who was outmaneuvered and stripped of power by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s. The observation captured the psychology of a CCP autocrat consumed by fear yet incapable of loosening his grip on power.

## Lone Protester Hung Anti-CCP Banners in Beijing's Sanlitun District

23 March 2026, Vision Times

On March 18, 2026, a video that CCP censors had suppressed for nearly five months broke through China's internet firewall and began circulating on the X platform and TikTok.




*A protester displays anti-CCP banners and addresses the public in a busy Beijing district following the conclusion of the Chinese Communist Party's Fourth Plenum in October 2025. (Image: internet)*

The footage showed a lone man standing in the heart of Beijing's Sanlitun Taikoo Li, one of China's most famous luxury shopping streets, on Oct. 25, 2025. He had hung two large banners and was addressing passersby through a bullhorn. The date was significant: the CCP's Fourth Plenum, a closed-door meeting of the Party's Central Committee, had just concluded.

The act immediately drew comparisons to the Sitong Bridge protest of October 2022, when a man named Peng Lifa hung banners on a Beijing overpass calling for the removal of Xi Jinping, the CCP's general secretary and China's top leader, and an end to the regime's extreme "zero-COVID" lockdowns. Peng was seized by security forces and has not been seen or heard from since.

According to the video and photographs that have now surfaced, the protester displayed two banners, each carrying a distinct political message.

The first read: "The essence of the Communist Party is an anti-human, anti-humanity evil cult. It will inevitably bring endless disaster to China."

The statement distilled into a single sentence the conclusion that millions of Chinese citizens have reached after decades of political campaigns, three years of extreme "zero-COVID" lockdowns that confined hundreds of millions of people to their homes under threat of force, and the ongoing economic collapse and human rights repression under Xi Jinping's rule. By labeling the CCP an "evil cult," the protester attacked the regime's most sensitive vulnerability: the Party sustains its grip on power through ideological indoctrination, maintains control through violence and fear, and strips its subjects of freedom of thought. These are the defining characteristics of a cult, and the CCP's own censorship of the word "cult" in political contexts reveals how deeply the label threatens the regime.

The second banner displayed a remarkable level of political clarity and maturity: "Open the ban on political parties. Freedom to form parties. Freedom to compete. Freedom to choose. Build a free, humane, and law-governed new China."

If the first banner was a verdict on a criminal regime, the second was a political program for the future. This protester was articulating a concrete vision for a democratic China, one built on multiparty competition, the rule of law, and individual freedom. The demand to "open the ban on political parties" directly challenged the CCP's monopoly on political power, the single structural fact that makes all other repression possible.

The Protest Happened in One of the Most **Surveilled Spots in China**

The location of the protest amplifies its significance. Sanlitun Taikoo Li sits in the heart of Beijing, surrounded by one of the densest networks of surveillance cameras in the world. The district is one of the most heavily patrolled commercial zones in all of China. After the Sitong Bridge protest in 2022, CCP authorities stationed security guards on overpasses across Beijing and intensified surveillance at public gathering points throughout the capital.

Yet this protester still managed to hang two banners and raise a bullhorn in broad daylight. The CCP's sprawling "stability maintenance" apparatus, the domestic security system that consumes more of China's government budget than the country's military, failed to prevent an act of political protest in the most controlled city on Earth. The regime projects an image of total surveillance and omnipresent control. The Sanlitun protest reveals that image to be a facade.

The CCP calculated that by making Peng Lifa disappear, blanketing every overpass in Beijing with guards, and erasing every trace of the Sitong Bridge protest from the Chinese internet, it could crush the impulse toward open political defiance. The Sanlitun incident proved that calculation wrong.

From Sitong Bridge in October 2022 to the "White Paper" protests that erupted across Chinese cities later that same year, when young people held up blank sheets of paper to symbolize everything the CCP forbids them from saying, and now to Sanlitun in October 2025, each act of defiance has built on the last. The regime erased Peng Lifa the man, but his example has continued to inspire Chinese citizens to take extraordinary personal risks.

An ancient Chinese proverb captures the dynamic at work: "When the people no longer fear death, what use is it to threaten them with death?" As more Chinese citizens conclude that the CCP is, as the protester's banner declared, an "anti-human evil cult," the regime's primary tool of control, fear, loses its power.

**Five months of CCP censorship failed to kill the video**

The protest took place on Oct. 25, 2025. The video did not appear on overseas platforms until March 18, 2026, a gap of nearly five months. That delay illustrates the severity of the CCP's censorship and information-suppression system, which employs hundreds of thousands of people to monitor, delete, and block content that threatens the regime's narrative.

CCP authorities clearly believed that by deleting the photos, confiscating the banners, detaining the protester, and scrubbing every trace of the incident from the Chinese internet, they could make it disappear from history. For five months, they succeeded. Then the video reached someone who could get it past the Great Firewall, and the world saw what happened.

The overseas social media user who posted the footage, using the name "YiFeng Su," expressed what many viewers were thinking: "I don't know if this brave person is safe, or what charges the Communist Party has pinned on him."

We do not yet know the Sanlitun protester's real name, just as we still do not know Peng Lifa's fate and fear for his safety. Their names have already merged into a shared symbol: the awakening Chinese citizen who refuses to be silenced.

The CCP is dragging China deeper into crisis at a pace that accelerates with each passing year. The economic downturn worsens. The repression intensifies. The regime's lies grow more transparent. Yet the bullhorn in Sanlitun and the banners on the street carry a clear message: as long as there are people willing to stand in the most surveilled spaces in China and declare that the emperor has no clothes, the collapse of CCP rule is only a matter of time.

## China tightens restrictions on officials' overseas travels to manage political risk

23 March 2026, Tibetan Review

China has launched sweeping restrictions on foreign travels of serving and retired regime officials, reflecting fears in the CCP about asset flight or disclosure of politically sensitive information at a time of intensifying internal pressure and anti-corruption scrutiny, reported *theepochtimes.com* Mar 19, citing multiple internal sources.

Since January, a number of retired officials—many mid- to senior-level—have left China and cut off contact with the regime. Many had family members already settled in countries such as the United States, Australia, or across Europe, the report said.

These departures were seen as planned. "They sold off property before leaving, withdrew most of their savings, and in some cases even gave up their pensions."

The individuals were not necessarily under active investigation, but may have been motivated by fear after witnessing colleagues fall in ongoing political purges. For some, leaving China was seen as a way to secure financial assets and personal safety.

The situation was stated to have escalated following the high-profile defection of Ma Ruilin, a former senior official in the CCP's United Front Work Department—an entity that engages in overseas infiltration and espionage—who fled to the United States with his family and later gave an interview to the *CNN* on Feb 26.

In that interview, Ma confirmed the existence of detention facilities in the Xinjiang region and revealed that many officials privately resent Chinese leader Xi Jinping despite outward displays of loyalty.

"The regime fears that others with knowledge of sensitive issues could follow suit and speak out overseas," the report quoted a source in China as saying, requesting anonymity to be able to speak.

* * *

CCP has now sharply tightened approval processes for overseas travels, particularly for officials and retirees from sensitive departments such as the United Front Work Department, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of State Security.

The report cited a China-based insider as saying agencies and state-affiliated institutions of the party-state had issued internal notices requiring stricter scrutiny of passport applications and renewals. Border authorities have also reportedly increased checks, with officials being now subject to detailed reviews of their personal and family situations, including overseas ties, property holdings, and financial assets.

"If assets or income appear inconsistent, exit permissions can be denied," it has been learnt.

Personal repercussions for wrong approvals are stated to be severe, leading to a bureaucratic paralysis. It has led many in the personnel departments to delay, block, or outrightly reject applications, effectively freezing legal overseas travel for large numbers of officials.

Meanwhile, pressure from an intensified anti-corruption campaign, potentially involving retrospective investigations dating back 20 years, is stated to be driving a surge in asset liquidation among officials and move funds abroad to hedge against political risk.

"People worry constantly about when old cases might be reopened. Some even suspect they're under investigation just because they weren't promoted," the report quoted a retired official as saying.

The reported disappearances, tighter exit controls, and increased scrutiny of officials' assets are stated to point to a broader shift in how the CCP is managing political risk within the system.

## Chinese Officials Vanish Abroad as Beijing Tightens Exit Controls

19 March 2026, NTD

Disappearances of retired officials and a high-profile defection have triggered sweeping travel restrictions and heightened political anxiety in China.

A wave of unexplained disappearances among retired Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials who have traveled overseas is prompting the CCP

to impose sweeping new restrictions on foreign travel by both current and former regime personnel, according to multiple sources familiar with the matter.

The sources revealed the details to The Epoch Times on the condition of anonymity because of fears of reprisal.

Insiders say the tightening controls reflect growing fears among the CCP's leadership that officials could flee with assets—or disclose politically sensitive information—at a time of intensifying internal pressure and anti-corruption scrutiny.

Since January, several retired officials—many mid- to senior-level—have left China and cut off contact with the regime, according to a source within the CCP. Many had family members already settled in countries such as the United States, Australia, or across Europe.

"These departures appear to have been planned," the source told The Epoch Times. "They sold off property before leaving, withdrew most of their savings, and in some cases even gave up their pensions."

The individuals were not necessarily under active investigation, the source said, but may have been motivated by fear after witnessing colleagues fall in ongoing political purges. For some, leaving China was seen as a way to secure financial assets and personal safety.

A Defection That Shook the System

The situation escalated following the high-profile defection of Ma Ruilin, a former senior official in the CCP's United Front Work Department—an entity that engages in overseas infiltration and espionage—who fled to the United States with his family and later gave an interview to CNN on Feb. 26.

In that interview, Ma confirmed the existence of detention facilities in the Xinjiang region and revealed that many officials privately resent Chinese leader Xi Jinping despite outward displays of loyalty.

His remarks have deeply embarrassed the CCP and heightened concerns that more insiders could defect and speak out publicly, according to the source.

"The regime fears that others with knowledge of sensitive issues could follow suit and speak out overseas," the source said.

In response, the CCP has sharply tightened approval processes for overseas travel, particularly for officials and retirees from sensitive departments such as the United Front Work Department, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of State Security.

According to a China-based insider, the regime's agencies and state-affiliated institutions have issued internal notices requiring stricter scrutiny of passport applications and renewals. China's border authorities have also increased checks, and officials are now subject to detailed reviews of their personal and family situations, including overseas ties, property holdings, and financial assets.

"If assets or income appear inconsistent, exit permissions can be denied," the insider told The Epoch Times.

The result, insiders say, is a bureaucratic paralysis in which officials are unwilling to approve travel requests out of fear of personal repercussions.

"Whoever signs off takes responsibility," another source from within the CCP told The Epoch Times. "If a retiree leaves and doesn't return, the approver could lose their job."

This accountability system has led many personnel departments to delay, block, or outright reject applications, effectively freezing legal overseas travel for large numbers of officials, according to the source.

Asset Sell-Offs and Rising Anxiety

At the same time, pressure from an intensified anti-corruption campaign, potentially involving retrospective investigations dating back 20 years, is driving a surge in asset liquidation among officials.

Sources say many retirees are rushing to sell property and move funds abroad to hedge against political risk.

Authorities are aware of the trend and have begun targeted reviews, according to insiders.

A Beijing-based scholar told The Epoch Times that the climate of fear is spreading beyond senior ranks.

"A new round of retrospective anti-corruption efforts has reignited anxiety among officials who once believed they were safe," the scholar said.

That anxiety was echoed by a retired mid-level regime official in Taiyuan, China, who described the current atmosphere as one of extreme tension.

"Everyone is on edge," the retired official told The Epoch Times. "People worry constantly about when old cases might be reopened. Some even suspect they're under investigation just because they weren't promoted."

Taken together, the reported disappearances, tighter exit controls, and increased scrutiny of officials' assets point to a broader shift in how the CCP is managing political risk within the system, according to the sources and insiders.

## PLA Generals Missing From 'Two Sessions' Meetings Highlight Extent of Xi's Military Purge

13 March 2026, Vision Times

During the 2026 "Two Sessions" meeting of the Chinese national legislature and its overshadowing Communist Party organization, many delegates from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) were conspiciously absent in a demonstration of the tectonic purges that have ripped through the senior leadership of the Party's armed forces.

Footage broadcast on the state-run evening program Xinwen Lianbo from a March 7 meeting between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and military delegates showed only four active-duty full generals present: Central Military Commission (CMC) vice chairman Zhang Shengmin, Defense Minister Dong Jun, Eastern Theater Command commander Yang Zhibin, and Central Theater Command commander Han Shengyan.

Two retired generals, including Fan Xiaojun, former political commissar of the Northern Theater Command, and Yi Xiaoguang, a former Central Theater Command commander, also attended in their capacities as officials in the National People's Congress (NPC).

- Gen. Zhang Youxia Reportedly Detained, Signaling Deeper Xi-Led PLA Purge (Jan. 22, 2026)
- Confirmed: Xi Jinping Purges Top PLA Commanders as Military Turmoil and Taiwan War Fears Mount (Jan. 25, 2026)
- China Boosts Defense Spending at 2026 'Two Sessions' as Military Priorities Grow

Top commanders removed or under investigation

Their presence contrasted sharply with the absence of many other prominent commanders, among them some of the most powerful officers in the Chinese military establishment. They include former CMC vice chairmen Zhang Youxia, placed under investigation late this January, and He Weidong, who came under scrutiny in October 2025.

Four former members of the Central Military Commission — the body that commands China's armed forces — have already been publicly linked to investigations or removals.




*March 4, 2025 — Central Military Commission First Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia (left) and Second Vice Chairman He Weidong (right) attend the opening of China's CPPCC at the Great Hall of the People. (Image: PEDRO PARDO / AFP via Getty Images)*

Zhang Youxia, along with several other purged top commanders, were regarded as close allies of Xi Jinping, eliciting much speculation and rumors about whether Xi had perhaps lost power over the military, while other observers regarded the purges as part of the CCP head's determination to root out corruption and disloyalty throughout the ranks.

Also absent from the Two Serssions were generals Liu Zhenli, former chief of the PLA Joint Staff Department, and Miao Hua, former head of the military's Political Work Department.

According to official reports, 243 delegates from the PLA and the People's Armed Police attended the 2026 Two Sessions. That represents a 13.5 percent drop from the 281 military delegates who were present at the beginning of the current NPC term in 2023.

The decline is even more dramatic among the military's top ranks. The number of full generals among the delegation fell from 26 in 2023 to just six in 2026, suggesting sweeping upheaval in the **PLA's senior leadership.**

- Taiwan Analysts Say Economic, Political, and Security Concerns Limit PLA Operations

Other prominent commanders who have lost positions or had their NPC delegate status terminated include Li Qiaoming, former commander of the PLA Ground Force; Shen Jinlong, former commander of the PLA Navy; Qin Shengxiang, the Navy's former political commissar; Yu Zhongfu, former political commissar of the PLA Air Force; and Li Wei, former political commissar of the Strategic Support Force.

Several frontline commanders still technically listed as NPC delegates were also absent from the March 7 plenary meeting. These include former Air Force commander Chang Dingqiu, former Navy commander Hu Zhongming, and former Western Theater Command chief Wang Haijiang.

Meanwhile, in March 2026 three more senior officers — Han Weiguo, Gao Jin, and Liu Lei — had their membership in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference revoked, another sign of political trouble.

**Xi signals hardline stance on loyalty**



*(Image: Lintao Zhang via Getty Images)*

Xi Jinping's March 7 speech to the military delegation offered clues about the political logic behind the upheaval.

In his remarks, Xi stressed that the PLA must remain absolutely loyal to the Chinese Communist Party and warned that there could be no place in the armed forces for those who are disloyal.

"The military is the force that holds the gun," Xi said, emphasizing that there "must never be individuals who harbor divided loyalties" towards the CCP and himself. He also called for tighter oversight of military finances, power structures, and major defense projects, while urging

improvements in supervision of military-civil integration and weapons development.
The speech underscored Xi's long-running effort to ensure the Party's "absolute leadership" over the armed forces — a central principle of the CCP political system. Mao Zedong, the founder of Communist China, famously said that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

**Political purge or modernization push?**

Analysts say the unusually high number of absent generals suggests the PLA is undergoing one of the most sweeping leadership purges in decades.
According to New York-based political risk consultancy SinoInsider, the sharp drop in military delegates — particularly the absence of roughly 85 percent of the full generals who once represented the PLA at the NPC — cannot be explained by routine retirement or ordinary personnel changes.
Instead, the pattern suggests a far-reaching campaign to remove officials whose political loyalty or performance is in question. In particular, Xi's speech singled out political reliability as the most pressing concern.
By warning against "divided loyalty," Xi was signaling that the threat inside the military is not merely corruption but also potential factionalism, SinoInsider said.
At the same time, the Party leadership appears concerned about the effectiveness of the PLA's military modernization programs. Xi emphasized the need to monitor funding flows and ensure that "every yuan" of defense spending is used effectively — an apparent reference to corruption scandals and mismanagement in recent years, including problems reportedly uncovered within the PLA Rocket Force.

**Security overseers**

Another unusual moment during the meeting was the presence of Wang Xiaohong, China's minister of public security and a member of the Communist Party Secretariat. Wang is also reagrded as being a close ally of Xi.
Although Wang is not part of the PLA command structure, state television showed him in a close-up shot during the military delegation meeting. SinoInsider noted that Wang's appearance may indicate that civilian security organs are playing a larger role in investigating corruption inside the military. His involvement could also reflect Xi's lack of confidence in the PLA's internal disciplinary system, which would normally handle such cases.
While the purge may strengthen Xi's political control over the armed forces, it could also create practical challenges for the PLA, especially if Beijing decides to wage war or is pushed into a military conflict.
SinoInsider argues that the leadership reshuffle echoes historical campaigns such as Mao Zedong's purge of military leaders following the 1971 Lin Biao incident, when large numbers of officers were removed or sidelined following the defection, death, and official denunciation of the top general who had once helped Mao seize control over China and was even annointed his successor as CCP chairman.
Even as Xi reinforces his political authority and pours more resources into the PLA, the frequent personnel turnover could disrupt the military's chain of command and weaken morale in the short term. It may also encourage officers to further prioritize political loyalty over professional expertise, which could affect battlefield decision-making and innovation.

## China's National Defense University Emerges as Political 'Danger Zone' Amid PLA Purges

12 March 2026, Vision Times

China's National Defense University (NDU), the top academic institution for the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) military leadership, has increasingly become a focal point of political turbulence, as multiple senior figures connected to the institution have either disappeared from public view or reportedly fallen under investigation.
Observers noted that three former presidents of the university, Xu Xueqiang, Xiao Tianliang, and Zheng He, as well as former political commissar Zhong Shaojun were all absent from China's annual "Two Sessions" political meetings this year. Their disappearance adds to a growing list of senior officials tied to the institution who have encountered political trouble in recent years.
To date, four presidents and three political commissars of the National Defense University have reportedly been implicated in disciplinary investigations or political purges, prompting analysts to describe the institution as a "high-risk zone" within the People's Liberation Army (PLA).
Senior military officials absent
China's 14th Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) concluded in Beijing on March 11. According to state media outlet Xinhua News Agency, 2,059 of the 2,125 CPPCC members attended the meeting, leaving 66 members absent.
Signs of unusual absences among military delegates appeared early in the proceedings. At the CPPCC opening session on March 4, only one full general, Yi Xiaoguang, was present. Just days earlier, three generals, Han Weiguo, Liu Lei, and Gao Jin, had been stripped of their CPPCC membership and their positions on the CPPCC Standing Committee.
Among the 15 military officials serving on the CPPCC Standing Committee, nine are full generals. After accounting for those who attended or were removed, five remaining generals, Wang Ning, Zhao Zongqi, Wu Shezhou, Zhu Shengling, and Zheng He, were all absent from multiple key meetings, including:

- CPPCC Standing Committee meeting held March 1–2
- CPPCC opening ceremony on March 4
- Military and armed police delegation meeting on March 7

One of the most notable figures among them is Zheng He, who previously served as both president and political commissar of the National Defense University. Zheng also shares ties with former Central Military Commission Vice Chairman He Weidong and former Political Work Department chief Miao Hua, all of whom served in the former PLA 31st Group Army under the Nanjing Military Region.

**Breaking protocol**

According to the official website of the National People's Congress, the Chinese military currently has 243 deputies in the legislature, including 18 full generals. However, video footage broadcast by China Central Television showed that 13 generals were absent from the March 3 formation meeting and the March 7 plenary meeting of the military delegation.

Those missing included: Wang Jianwu, Ju Gansheng, Xu Xueqiang, An Zhaoqing, Li Fengbiao, Xiao Tianliang, He Ping, Yuan Yubai, Zheng Weiping, Xu Zhongbo, Ling Huanxin, Guo Puxiao, and Chang Dingqiu. Among them were two former presidents of the National Defense University, Xu Xueqiang and Xiao Tianliang.

Xu served as NDU president from August 2021 to October 2022, before becoming head of the PLA Equipment Development Department. Xiao Tianliang had previously served as Xu's deputy before being promoted to president in February 2023 and later receiving the rank of general in March 2024.

Both Xu and Xiao were already absent from the CCP's Fourth Plenary Session in October 2025, further fueling speculation about their political standing.

**A new wave of purges**

Independent political commentator Cai Shenkun reported in October 2025 that Xu Xueqiang and Xiao Tianliang had been removed from their posts, while NDU political commissar Zhong Shaojun had also been dismissed. The claim surfaced shortly after the Chinese military announced investigations into nine senior generals, many of whom were considered loyalists of Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Xu's career rise had been closely linked to Miao Hua, who served as director of the Central Military Commission's Political Work Department from 2017 to 2024. During that period, Xu was rapidly promoted, becoming lieutenant general in 2019 and later a full general.

Former NDU political commissar Zhong Shaojun, once considered one of Xi Jinping's closest aides, has also disappeared from public view. Zhong had served as Xi's personal secretary since 2002, when Xi was transferred from Fujian to Zhejiang. Over the next two decades, Zhong followed Xi through postings in Shanghai and Beijing, eventually serving within the Central Military Commission for 22 years.

In 2024, reports circulated that Zhong had been reassigned to the National Defense University as political commissar. Yet Chinese authorities never formally announced either his appointment or his removal. Later reports indicated that Lieutenant General Xia Zhihe had replaced Zhong in the role.

Political commentator Lei Ge wrote that Zhong's situation appears precarious: He has not been assigned a new position and his future remains unclear. "This is a very dangerous signal," Lei noted, suggesting it could mark the end of Zhong's political career.

The recent developments add to a broader pattern. Former NDU president Wang Xibin, who led the institution from 2007 to 2013, was formally investigated in 2017. His former political commissar Liu Yazhou has also reportedly received a life sentence. The cases now involves four presidents, Wang Xibin, Zheng He, Xu Xueqiang, and Xiao Tianliang, and three political commissars, Liu Yazhou, Zheng He, and Zhong Shaojun.

## Human Rights Lawyer Says Threats Against Shen Yun Show a Pattern of CCP Repression

16 March 2026, Vision Times



*On the afternoon of May 11, 2025, Shen Yun's New York Company gave its tenth performance of the second Paris run at the Palais des Congrès de Paris to a full house. (Image: Zhang Le/The Epoch Times)*

Human rights lawyer Wu Shaoping says the growing number of threats targeting Shen Yun performances around the world reflects Beijing's fear of the performing arts troupe's cultural influence to expose human rights abuses in China

The U.S.-based Shen Yun Performing Arts, which tours globally each year showcasing traditional Chinese culture, has recently faced a surge of violent threats spearheaded by Beijing. According to Chinese human rights lawyer Wu Shaoping, the incidents bear the hallmarks of terrorism and reflect an escalation of the Chinese Communist

Party's (CCP) campaign of transnational repression targeting Falun Gong practitioners.Speaking in an interview with Vision Times, Wu said the growing number of threats highlights Beijing's deep anxiety over Shen Yun's expanding global influence and the Falun Gong community's efforts to expose human rights abuses in China.

condemns threats

On March 1, Shen Yun issued a public statement condemning more than 150 serious threats received over the past two years, including bomb threats, threats of shootings, rape, murder of staff, and even death threats targeting performers' children.

The threats have targeted Shen Yun's headquarters, training school, family members, theaters hosting performances, and government officials who support the troupe. According to the statement, at least six national leaders, including the prime ministers of Denmark, Canada, and Australia, received similar bomb threats within the past month demanding the cancellation of Shen Yun performances.

Taiwanese police investigations have reportedly traced some threats to Xi'an, China, which coincided with letters sent by Chinese diplomats urging theaters to cancel performances. Shen Yun's statement noted that the company's performances celebrate authentic Chinese culture while also depicting the CCP's 25-year campaign of persecution against Falun Gong, including detention, torture, and allegations of forced organ harvesting.

More than 90 Shen Yun performers have family members in China who have been imprisoned or died as a result of their faith, the statement said. Despite the intimidation, Shen Yun noted that its performances remain widely attended. The troupe also pointed to growing political attention to the issue, including the passage of the Falun Gong Protection Act by the U.S. House of Representatives.

Shen Yun described the threats as an attempt by Beijing to intimidate a U.S. arts organization and democratic societies. The company called on governments to condemn the intimidation and deploy counterterrorism resources to identify perpetrators operating from China.

**Bomb threats disrupt performances**

Data from the Falun Dafa Information Center indicates that threats against Shen Yun and Falun Gong practitioners have increased sharply in recent years. Since 2024, more than 220 cases of death threats, bomb threats, and violent intimidation targeting Shen Yun theaters, performers, affiliated organizations, and supporters have been documented across five continents.

In February 2026, a bomb threat related to a Shen Yun performance prompted the temporary evacuation of the Australian prime minister's residence. Police later determined the threat was a hoax. Similar threats have been reported at venues across the United States, Canada, Europe, and Asia. Although police investigations rarely uncover actual explosive devices, the threats frequently force performances to be delayed while security sweeps are conducted.

Wu said such tactics can have real disruptive effects even if no bombs are found. "Once law enforcement receives this kind of terrorist threat, it must treat it as a real danger," he said. "Even if no device is ultimately discovered, the performance often has to be delayed or interrupted."

Shen Yun typically performs on tightly scheduled tours, with multiple shows in rapid succession. According to Wu, the resulting disruptions create logistical challenges for organizers and inconvenience audiences. "The primary goal of the people issuing these threats is to disrupt the troupe's normal performances," he said. "By creating fear and uncertainty, they can interfere with the show even without an actual explosive device."

**Why the CCP targets Shen Yun**

Wu said threats involving bombs or shootings constitute serious criminal offenses in virtually every country. "This kind of behavior is certainly a form of terrorism," he said.

However, he acknowledged that identifying perpetrators can be difficult, particularly if threats originate from overseas networks or anonymous online platforms. "If the threats are coming from abroad, or from mainland China, tracing the individuals responsible becomes far more complex," he said. Nevertheless, law enforcement agencies should investigate such cases thoroughly.

Wu believes Shen Yun's growing global influence explains why it has become a target of interference. "Since 1999, the atheistic CCP has carried out a comprehensive crackdown on Falun Gong and essentially treats it as an enemy," Wu said.

In the CCP's political logic, any independent belief group with significant social influence may be viewed as a potential threat. Wu noted that Falun Gong practitioners have spent decades documenting and publicizing human rights abuses in China. "Falun Gong has long stood on the front lines exposing the CCP's various falsehoods and abuses," he said.

He added that Shen Yun's artistic performances introduce audiences worldwide to both traditional Chinese culture and issues related to religious freedom and human rights. "Through these performances, people around the world can understand what Falun Gong really is and see the CCP's human rights persecution," Wu said.

Shen Yun emphasizes what it calls "China before communism," portraying traditional values, spirituality, and classical culture, elements that were heavily suppressed during campaigns such as the Cultural Revolution. "Falun Gong practitioners have been working to preserve traditional Chinese culture," Wu said.

**Calls for accountability**

Wu argued that the interference targeting Shen Yun should not be viewed as isolated incidents but rather as part of a broader pattern of CCP transnational repression. In recent years, Beijing has increasingly combined propaganda, legal pressure, and intimidation tactics against dissidents and religious groups overseas.

Wu urged Western governments to take such threats seriously. Law enforcement agencies, he said, should treat the threats against Shen Yun performances as serious criminal cases and work to identify those responsible. "If the perpetrators can be identified and arrested, it would deal a major blow to the CCP's plans," he said. At the same time, Wu believes the threats are unlikely to halt Shen Yun's continued growth. Despite escalating intimidation attempts, Shen Yun's international popularity continues to grow.

The company is celebrating its 20th anniversary in 2026, having performed for millions of audience members worldwide. This year's tour includes approximately 800 performances across more than 200 cities in over 20 countries spanning five continents.

In North America, Shen Yun is scheduled to perform in 36 U.S. states and Washington, D.C., as well as major Canadian cities including Toronto and Vancouver. In Asia, 33 performances in Taiwan have reportedly sold out, with congratulations issued by the island's president and lawmakers attending performances.

Across Europe, the tour spans more than a dozen countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. In France alone, 99 performances are scheduled for 2026, with tickets selling out months in advance.

## Absent Officials and Xi Health Rumors Cast Shadow Over China's Two Sessions

11 March 2026, Vision Times

China's annual "Two Sessions" political meetings in Beijing have produced an unusual series of absences and contradicting official reports, raising questions about the status of several senior officials and fueling speculation about internal tensions within the top levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Observers noted particularly unusual developments surrounding Chen Wu, a vice chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), whose presence at the meetings appeared inconsistent across official statements and televised footage. To further complicate matters, Chinese President Xi Jinping's health has also drawn scrutiny among analysts after several reports suggested he may have experienced health issues during the political gathering.

**Chen Wu's mysterious appearance**

The fourth session of the 14th CPPCC National Committee concluded on March 11, 2026. One day earlier, the CPPCC Standing Committee held its 16th meeting. According to a report from state-run Xinhua News Agency, 22 vice chairpersons of the CPPCC attended the meeting, including Shi Taifeng, Hu Chunhua, Shen Yueyue, Wang Yong, Zhou Qiang, Leung Chun-ying, and Chen Wu.

However, a closer examination of official video footage revealed discrepancies. An X platform analyst known as "Chinese Personnel Watch" noted that although the CPPCC reportedly has 23 vice chairpersons, only 21 individuals appeared seated on the rostrum in televised footage. According to the analysis, the two missing officials were Qin Boyong and Chen Wu.

The analyst wrote: "The attendance situation at the 16th Standing Committee meeting of the CPPCC is very strange. The official report says 22 vice chairpersons attended. But in the footage, only 21 appeared on the rostrum. Qin Boyong and Chen Wu were absent, and no seats were reserved for them."

"Chinese Personnel Watch" further observed that Qin Boyong had attended other major sessions of the CPPCC meetings but missed the March 10 Standing Committee meeting. Chen Wu, by contrast, had not appeared in any footage from the Two Sessions events, even though his name appeared in the official attendance report.

Interestingly, Chen Wu did appear briefly in footage from a separate leadership meeting held prior to the Standing Committee session, suggesting he may have attended in some capacity but not been seated prominently during the main meeting.

Some observers suggested health concerns may explain the unusual arrangement. One online commenter noted: "There was a nameplate next to Yang Zhen that might have been Chen Wu's seat. Perhaps he had to leave early due to health reasons and the cameras simply didn't capture him."

Others speculated that Chen Wu may have been seated at the edge of the stage to allow for easier movement if he needed to leave the meeting. As of now, it remains unclear whether Chen Wu actually appeared at the Two Sessions in person.

**Xi's policy changes**

Chen Wu's repeated absences have also revived discussion about the CCP's evolving leadership age rules. Chen Wu was born in November 1954 and became a CPPCC vice chairman in 2023 at age 68. Under the CCP's previous informal retirement rule, known as "seven up, eight down," officials generally needed to be born after January 1955 to be eligible for promotion to vice–national-level positions during the 2022–2023 leadership transition.

However, the CCP adjusted the rule in certain cases. A March 2023 report by state media Xinhua stated: "New nominees should generally be born after January 1, 1955. However, age requirements may be appropriately relaxed for certain ethnic minority officials, leaders of democratic parties,

non-party figures, representatives of ethnic or religious communities, and individuals from Hong Kong and Macau."

Because of this adjustment, Chen Wu and another official, Shohrat Zakir, were both promoted to vice–national-level roles despite exceeding the previous age limit.

According to "Chinese Personnel Watch," this change reflects Xi Jinping's influence over leadership norms and could result in more elderly officials remaining in senior positions, increasing the likelihood of absences due to health problems. "On average, the older officials are, the more likely health issues will affect their ability to perform their duties," wrote "Chinese Personnel Watch", citing Chen Wu and another senior official, Hao Mingjin, as examples.

**Hao Mingjin's continued absence**

Hao Mingjin, vice chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, has also drawn attention for repeatedly missing official events. At a February 25 meeting of the 14th NPC Standing Committee, Hao was among 13 members absent from the session. Records on the NPC website indicate that he has not attended several Standing Committee meetings since October 2025.

Meanwhile, Qin Boyong, another senior figure, also missed multiple meetings of the China Democratic National Construction Association (CDNCA), prompting speculation that both officials had "disappeared for at least 40 days." In December 2025, Qin Boyong unexpectedly reappeared at a commemorative event marking the 80th anniversary of the organization.

Hao Mingjin, however, did not attend the event. According to Hong Kong media outlet Sing Tao Daily, he remained in recovery due to health reasons.

**Rumors of Xi's declining health**

The unusual absences coincided with online rumors about Chinese leader Xi Jinping's health during the Two Sessions. Political commentator Lao Deng claimed on social media that Xi had suffered another stroke during the meetings, though the situation was reportedly stabilized after medical intervention.

According to the rumor, Xi appeared unusually fatigued during several public appearances at the meetings, with observers noting his posture sometimes looked strained.

While official explanations point primarily to health issues, the unusual inconsistencies surrounding the appearances of Chen Wu, Hao Mingjin, and Qin Boyong have left many questions unanswered. For now, though, analysts say the strange developments during the 2026 Two Sessions highlight the opaque nature of elite politics inside the Chinese Communist Party — where even the presence or absence of senior officials can become a source of speculation.

**Editorial note:** This article is based on publicly circulating reports and commentary from independent analysts. The claims described have not been independently verified by Vision Times, and relevant authorities have not publicly confirmed the allegations.

## Political Scientist: Activists Focus on "China After Xi," but Should Focus on "China After the CCP"

11 March 2026, Chinascope

An Chinese language media outside China, published an interview with political scientist Wu Guoguang discussing the prospects for political change in China after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Wu argues that China's political transformation does not necessarily need to follow the classic four-stage transition model proposed by Samuel P. Huntington, often referred to as "transplacement," which involves regime liberalization, the rise of opposition forces, authoritarian retrenchment, and eventual negotiation between the regime and opposition. Instead, Wu suggests that social and political change in China could emerge even without deliberate political liberalization initiated by the ruling authorities.

Wu emphasizes that discussions about China's future often focus on "China after Xi Jinping" rather than "China after the CCP." He argues that this perspective reflects the preferences of some political elites who may hope for a return to a relatively moderate period such as the Jiang Zemin–Hu Jintao era. However, Wu argues that genuine democratization in China cannot emerge from within the CCP leadership but would require the end of the Party's rule.

Wu identifies three key challenges facing democratic change in China. First, democratic forces must clearly articulate demands for systemic democratization rather than focusing solely on leadership changes. Second, opposition movements need stronger organizational capacity, although Wu suggests they should move beyond traditional Leninist-style hierarchical structures and explore new forms of organization suited to the internet era. Third, meaningful political transformation ultimately depends on broad public support. According to Wu, widespread social grievances in China reflect deeper demands for rights and representation, which could form the foundation for democratic aspirations.

Overall, Wu concludes that China's future political transformation could involve a complex interaction between reformist pressures and more revolutionary forces. Whether such change becomes possible, he argues, will depend on the ability of democratic forces to develop clear political goals, build effective organizational structures, and mobilize broad public support.

## Xi Jinping Moved Off Center Stage at China's 2026 Two Sessions

10 March 2026, Vision Times

At the 2026 Two Sessions, the Chinese Communist Party's annual legislative theater, Xi Jinping, the CCP's general secretary and China's top leader, broke with protocol and sat below the main stage rather than in his customary position at the center of the presidium. The change ignited a firestorm on Chinese social media, with a single video of the seating arrangement drawing nearly 800,000 views on one account alone. For a Chinese public desperate for any sign that the CCP's grip is weakening, the moment carried enormous symbolic weight.

The Two Sessions have a history of producing moments that escape the Party's carefully managed choreography. In March 2024, prime minister Li Qiang delivered his first Government Work Report and closed with the phrase "houhuiyouqi," literally "until we meet again." In Chinese, the phrase carries a far heavier connotation: it implies finality, a kind of last farewell. The remark was immediately read as an inadvertent prophecy, a verbal omen tolling the bell for the CCP regime. CCTV's cameras caught Xi in the audience, face dark with anger, unable to force even a trace of a smile.

This year, Xi himself became the main event, and it had nothing to do with anything he said.

**The internet read Xi's position as either cowardice or prophecy**

A video lasting less than two minutes showed Xi sitting below the presidium alongside other senior officials, rather than in his usual elevated position at center stage. The clip went viral instantly, and two interpretations quickly took hold.

The first: Xi is terrified of being killed. Chinese netizens concluded that the U.S. elimination of Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei had shaken him. Comments flooded in: "Scared of being taken out, so he rushed to sit below and blend in!" and "Terrified of a decapitation strike, hiding among the people for safety, using all those bodies as human shields."

The second interpretation hit harder. In Chinese, sitting "below the stage" (台下) uses the same two characters as "stepping down from power" (下台), just in reversed order. The double meaning was impossible to miss. To millions of Chinese viewers, Xi had literally placed himself in the position of a leader on his way out. Netizens connected the image directly to Li Qiang's "until we meet again" two years earlier: two omens, two years apart, both pointing toward the end of CCP rule.

**China has seen this before: the omen that foretold the Qing dynasty's collapse**

Chinese history is full of moments when an offhand remark or an unplanned gesture was later read as a sign that a dynasty's time had run out. The most famous occurred in 1908, at the coronation of Puyi, the last emperor.

Puyi was not yet three years old when the Empress Dowager Cixi, in her final decree, placed him on the throne. As he later recounted in his memoir *The First Half of My Life*, the coronation was a disaster from the start. Cixi died three days after issuing the decree. At the ceremony in the Hall of Supreme Harmony, on a bitterly cold, overcast day, the toddler was placed on an enormous throne after hours of being passed between strangers, and he lost it entirely, screaming, "I don't want to stay here! I want to go home!"

His father, the regent, knelt beside the throne drenched in sweat, physically holding the child in place as hundreds of officials performed the ritual cycle of three kneelings and nine prostrations. Puyi's wailing grew louder with each round. In desperation, his father tried to calm him: "Don't cry, don't cry. It's almost over! It's almost over!"

The officials filing out of the ceremony heard it clearly. "How could the regent say 'it's almost over'?" they whispered to one another. "And what does 'I want to go home' mean?" The mood was funereal, as though every official in the hall had glimpsed the same omen.

Puyi wrote that the officials were right to be alarmed. Within three years, the Qing dynasty collapsed. Those who "wanted to go home" did go home. The words spoken at the coronation proved prophetic in every detail.




*Chinese Premier Li Qiang attends the second plenary meeting of the 2026 session of the National People's Congress in Beijing, where lawmakers review government reports and policy priorities. (Image: CCTV/ Screenshot via Reuters)*

**Two omens, two years, one direction**

Li Qiang's farewell in 2024 and Xi's descent from the stage in 2026 both electrified Chinese social media, and both were met with excitement from a public that has lost all faith in CCP rule. The pattern is the same one that preceded the fall of the Qing: words and gestures that the regime did not intend as signals, but that the population instantly recognized as confirmation of what they already sensed.

There is a passage in the *Chunqiu Fanlu*, a classical text from the Han dynasty, that Chinese readers have cited for centuries in moments like these. It says, in essence, that when a state begins

to fail, heaven sends warnings. If the warnings go unheeded, stranger signs appear. If those are ignored too, catastrophe arrives. The purpose of the warnings is merciful: heaven does not wish to destroy people, but to give them a chance to change course.

Xi Jinping has received the warnings and ignored every one of them. Rather than abandon the CCP, he has doubled down, clinging to a regime that history has already condemned, sacrificing opportunity after opportunity to step back from the edge. Heaven, as the classical text says, does not wish to entrap people, but people entrap themselves. For Xi and the CCP, the consequences are arriving.

**Editorial note:** Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Vision Times.

## Xi Jinping Signaled More Military Purges at the 2026 Two Sessions

10 March 2026, Vision Times



*Xi Jinping, Central Military Commission, CMC, Chinese military purge, Zhang Shengmin, Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, He Weidong, Li Shangfu, Miao Hua, PLA, CCP politics, Two Sessions 2026, full generals China, lieutenant generals China, major generals China, military delegation 2026, loyalty to CCP, military leadership China, Xi Jinping purges, authoritarian control, Chinese political* oversight, military-civilian integration (Image: NOEL CELIS/AFP via Getty Images)

Xi Jinping, the CCP's general secretary and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), China's top military command body, addressed the military and armed police delegation on March 7, 2026, with language that left little doubt about his intentions. "The military carries guns," Xi told the assembled delegates. "There absolutely cannot be anyone in the military who harbors disloyalty to the Party, and there absolutely cannot be any place for corrupt elements to hide." The warning came as depleted rows of delegates and grim-faced officers made the cost of Xi's military purges impossible to conceal, even at the regime's most carefully staged annual political event.

**Only six full generals attended the military delegation session**

According to state broadcaster footage, the military officers in attendance stared at the podium with uniformly grim expressions. The six full generals present were: Zhang Shengmin, the CMC's sole remaining vice chairman; Dong Jun, the defense minister; Yang Zhibin, the Eastern Theater Command commander; Han Shengyan, the Central Theater Command commander; Yi Xiaoguang, the former Central Theater Command commander; and Fan Xiaojun, the former Northern Theater Command political commissar.

Zhang Shengmin, Dong Jun, Han Shengyan, Yang Zhibin, and Fan Xiaojun are all delegates to the rubber-stamp National People's Congress (NPC). Yi Xiaoguang serves on the standing committee of the CPPCC, the Party's political advisory body.

The active-duty lieutenant generals who attended included: Zhu Chuansheng, a deputy chief of the CMC's Joint Staff Department; Liu Di, head of the CMC's Training and Management Department; Chen Chi, head of the CMC's Logistics Support Department; Liang Ping, a deputy political commissar of the Central Theater Command; and Xia Zhihe, political commissar of China's National Defense University.

Lieutenant generals from the four military service branches and the armed police also attended: Cai Zhijun and Zhang Shuguang from the army; Zhang Zheng and Hu Yuhai from the navy; Wang Gang and Shi Honggan from the air force; Lei Kai and Zhou Jingjiong from the rocket force; and Peng Jingtang and Wang Hongbin from the armed police.

**Thirteen full generals failed to appear at the Two Sessions**

The NPC's official delegate roster still lists 243 military delegates, including Zhang Youxia, the former CMC vice chairman, and Liu Zhenli, the former CMC member, both of whom have been officially announced as purged.

Among those 243 delegates, 18 hold the rank of full general. Only five of the 18 appeared at both the delegation's formation meeting on March 3 and the plenary session on March 7. The other 13 were absent from both events.

Several of the missing generals have not been seen in public for an extended period, including Ju Gansheng, Xu Xueqiang, Guo Puxiao, and Chang Dingqiu.

The CPPCC's standing committee originally included 15 military members: nine full generals and six lieutenant generals. Of the nine generals, only Yi Xiaoguang attended the March 7 military delegation session and the CPPCC opening ceremony on March 4. Three others, the army's former commander Han Weiguo, the army's former political commissar Liu Lei, and the former head of the CMC's Logistics Support Department Gao Jin, were stripped of their CPPCC credentials at a meeting held on March 1-2. Five more generals on the CPPCC standing committee, Wang Ning, Zhu Shenglin, Zhao Zongqi, Wu Shezhou,

and Zheng He, were absent from all three key sessions.

**Xi's purges destroyed the military leadership he built**

The scale of Xi's military purges has become impossible to conceal, even at the CCP's most carefully choreographed annual political event. Since the 20th Party Congress in 2022, 36 senior military officers have been publicly stripped of their NPC delegate status. The list includes 16 full generals, 14 lieutenant generals, and 6 major generals.

The political irony is acute: nearly all 16 of the purged full generals were personally promoted and given their rank by Xi Jinping. The list reads like a roster of Xi's own creation: former CMC vice chairman He Weidong; former head of the CMC Political Work Department Miao Hua; former defense minister Li Shangfu; former rocket force commanders Zhou Yaning and Li Yuchao; former air force commander Ding Laihang; former navy political commissar Yuan Huazhi; former armed police commander Wang Chunning; former deputy director of the CMC Political Work Department He Hongjun; former armed police political commissar Zhang Hongbin; former CMC Political-Legal Affairs Commission secretary Wang Renhua; former navy commander Shen Jinlong; former navy political commissar Qin Shengxiang; former Information Support Force political commissar Li Wei; former air force political commissar Yu Zhongfu; and former army commander Li Qiaomin.

**Xi signaled the purges will continue**

Xi's language at the March 7 session left little room for interpretation. He stressed that the upcoming "15th Five-Year Plan" period must begin with strict oversight, with particular attention to the flow of funds, the exercise of power, and quality controls in major military projects. He called for strengthened supervision of military-civilian integration projects. Zhang Shengmin echoed the message at a subgroup session on March 5, calling for "deepened political rectification and anti-corruption efforts."

U.S.-based independent commentator Cai Shenkun posted on X: "In just three years, Xi has taken down two CMC vice chairmen and five CMC members. The only one left walking behind him is a trembling Zhang Shengmin. And still Xi keeps shouting: 'The military carries guns, there absolutely cannot be anyone in the military who harbors disloyalty.'" Cai added: "Xi is clearly still not at ease with the military, still does not trust it. How long Zhang Shengmin can last on that podium is anyone's guess."

Online commenters were equally blunt. "How long before Zhang Shengmin gets purged?" one asked. "The best-case scenario is that he makes it to the 21st Party Congress and retires safely," someone replied. "That's less than two years away. Hard to say."

The broader question hanging over the Two Sessions is one that Xi's critics have raised repeatedly: with so many senior commanders gone, so many seats empty, and so much institutional knowledge purged, what kind of military is left? And if the purges continue, as Xi's own words suggest they will, how does this military fight a war?

## Banned Chinese TV Host Cui Yongyuan Resurfaces to Denounce CCP Censorship

08 March 2026, Vision Times



*Cui Yongyuan, the former CCTV host who became one of China's most prominent critics of CCP censorship, in a video that circulated widely during the 2026 Two Sessions. (Image: Screenshot)*

Cui Yongyuan served two terms on the CCP's political advisory body and won over a hundred official awards before the Party erased him from public life. His reappearance during the 2026 Two Sessions, after years of banned social media accounts and enforced invisibility, has prompted overseas observers to ask whether control of China's censorship apparatus is shifting hands.

On March 7, a video uploaded to the social media platform X by the account "News Investigation" showed Cui delivering a pointed attack on the CCP's censorship regime.

"I was a member of the 11th and 12th National Committee of the CPPCC," Cui said, referring to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a rubber-stamp advisory body the Party uses to give a veneer of political participation to selected public figures. "I have received countless awards, more than a hundred. I am also a non-party patriotic figure," he continued, using a CCP designation for prominent individuals who are not Party members but are considered politically reliable. "If you silence someone like me, it is this society that is losing face. It is your government that is losing face."

"I'm fine. If you ban me, then ban me. What can you do? It is you who are embarrassed. If one day you are asked to explain this, how will you explain it? You silence whoever you want to silence. You prevent whoever you want from speaking. Whoever says something you don't like, you just remove them."

The video resonated widely. One commenter wrote: "Do the Communist bandits even fear losing face? They have no face to lose. No matter how you criticize them, everything is deleted instantly both inside and outside the Great Firewall. As long as most people inside the wall remain successfully brainwashed, the system will continue." Another user, writing under the name "Mybrooks," offered a bleaker assessment: "The CPPCC is nothing more than a chess piece. In this system, only the very top person is safe. Everyone below is unsafe. Those who refuse to play the role of a chess piece can only be erased."

**From CCTV star to censorship target**

Western readers are unlikely to recognize Cui's name, but in China he was once a household figure. He became famous in 1996 as the host of *Tell It Like It Is*, a CCTV program that was unusual for its relatively candid format. For years he operated within the system, serving two terms on the CPPCC and collecting official awards.

His relationship with the regime began to deteriorate as he grew more outspoken. In a July 2023 video, Cui described China's system as thoroughly rotten: "It's already rotten to the core. Completely rotten. Let's just enjoy this rot together." He singled out the CCP's official news agency Xinhua for fabricating stories about poverty in the United Kingdom and other developed countries. "Xinhua is talking nonsense, but no one dares to say so. If you say it, they just ban you online. They talk nonsense all day."

In April 2024, Cui attacked China's journalism education system directly. "Is what we call the broadcasting and television news major really mass communication? Let me tell you clearly: it is not. What do we actually study? We study propaganda." He drew a sharp distinction: mass communication tells the audience the real situation and analyzes it, while propaganda invents something out of nothing and makes people believe it, at any cost, including outright lies.

By this point, Cui had been largely erased from China's internet. His social media accounts were banned. His public presence was eliminated.

**The court scandal that made Cui a liability**

Cui's troubles deepened in 2018 when he publicly accused China's Supreme People's Court, the highest court in the CCP's Party-controlled judiciary, of losing critical case files. He posted repeatedly on the social media platform Weibo claiming that documents related to a billion-yuan mining rights dispute in Shaanxi province had been stolen from a court office.

The judge who handled the case, Wang Linqing, had discovered in November 2016 that both the primary and supplementary files for the second-instance trial had vanished. After reviewing surveillance footage and finding it had gone blank, the court chose not to report the theft to police and instead instructed the judge to reconstruct the missing files from memory. The Supreme People's Court eventually confirmed that Cui's claims were accurate.

U.S.-based commentator Jiang Feng, who hosts a political analysis channel, has argued that the CCP's internal factions deliberately used Cui to expose the Shaanxi case as part of a power struggle targeting the then-president of the Supreme People's Court, Zhou Qiang, and the head of the CCP's top anti-corruption body, Zhao Leji, who at the time led the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Once the factional objective was achieved, Cui was discarded. The judge who helped expose the case, Wang Linqing, was sentenced to 14 years in prison. Cui himself was banned from public life.

Jiang also cited overseas reports claiming Cui narrowly survived a poisoning attempt in August 2020, with suspicion pointing toward Ding Xuexiang, who runs the CCP's national security coordination office and is currently the director of the Office of the Central National Security Commission.

**Cui's return raises questions about who controls China's censors**

After years of enforced silence, Cui resurfaced publicly in January 2026 at the Beijing premiere of a film called *Cuihu*. He attended the event and delivered remarks without any visible interference from authorities.

The film's title itself became a subject of online speculation. The Chinese character "翠" (cui, as in the film's name) can be broken into two component radicals: "羽" (meaning "feather") and "卒" (meaning "death" or "a foot soldier who dies"). The traditional form of Xi Jinping's surname, "習," contains the same "羽" radical. Chinese internet users, skilled at constructing political messages through wordplay that evades automated censorship, read the combination as an oblique reference to Xi's death. The fact that this interpretation circulated without being scrubbed added to the sense that something had shifted.

Cui's Douyin account, which had been banned for years, has reportedly been partially restored. His videos are receiving hundreds of thousands of likes and tens of millions of views.

Jiang Feng posed the question directly: if someone who allegedly survived an assassination attempt ordered by the current leadership's security apparatus is now appearing publicly, supporting a politically charged film, and posting freely on a platform the CCP tightly controls, what does that say about who is actually running China's censorship system? He suggested that control over the internet authorities may have shifted away from Xi's inner circle.

Jiang also noted that Xi removed many officials in Shaanxi province but apparently could not or did not protect Cui, which he interpreted as evidence that Cui was never aligned with Xi's faction. Some overseas observers, Jiang said, believe Cui may be a figure left behind by the political network

associated with former CCP general secretary Hu Jintao and former prime minister Wen Jiabao.

**The Falun Gong connection in Cui's early career**

There is one further layer to Cui's story that overseas Chinese readers are aware of but Western audiences may not be. Early in his career, Cui's program *Tell It Like It Is* cooperated with CCTV in producing content critical of Falun Gong, the spiritual practice that the CCP launched a nationwide persecution campaign against in 1999. The program was supervised at the time by Chen Meng, the deputy director of CCTV's News Commentary Department. In 2001, Chen helped produce the so-called "Tiananmen self-immolation" broadcast, an incident that the CCP used as a centerpiece of its propaganda campaign against Falun Gong. On August 14, 2001, the International Education Development organization issued a statement at a United Nations meeting describing the incident as a staged event orchestrated by Chinese authorities and condemning it as an act of state terrorism. Over the past two decades, independent analysts have raised extensive questions about the broadcast's authenticity. Chen Meng later died of cancer.

Cui himself later suffered severe depression and left CCTV. His trajectory from state media insider to outspoken critic to banned figure to sudden resurgence remains difficult to read cleanly. Whether he is acting on principle, serving as a factional instrument, or some combination of both, his visibility during the 2026 Two Sessions is one more sign that the internal politics of the CCP are less stable than the regime wants the world to believe.

## Five key takeaways from an annual briefing by China's foreign minister

08 March 2026, NPR

China's foreign minister, Wang Yi, said on Sunday the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran "should not have happened" and "does no one any good."

But while Wang criticized the U.S. over the Iran war, he also offered a positive signal that an expected meeting between President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping might still go ahead at the end of this month.

Speaking to reporters on the sidelines of an annual political meeting in Beijing, Wang did not confirm a meeting date but said China is open to dialogue with the United States.

He said the world cannot afford for the two biggest economies to engage in conflict.

Here is a summary of what Wang said on five key international issues.

1. Iran war

China wants the fighting to stop and for all parties in the Iran war to return to the negotiating table.

"Might doesn't make right, and the world cannot revert to the law of the jungle," Wang said.

He said the U.S. and Israel should respect the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Iran and other countries in the Middle East.

China said it will send an envoy to the region for mediation.However, the Chinese are not impartial.

China is more strategically aligned with Iran than it is with the U.S. and Israel. China buys large amounts of oil from Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East – which have been affected by the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

2. Relations with the U.S. – and Europe

China says it wants "peaceful coexistence" and "win-win cooperation" with the United States.

"China and the U.S. are both big countries. Neither side can remodel the other, but we can choose how we want to engage," he said.

Chinese diplomats often stress that there should be mutual respect because there is a deep sense that the U.S. is out to suppress and contain China's inevitable rise. At the same time Wang tried to allay fears in Europe that China's rise will come at the expense of their core industries.

Wang said Europe has an incorrect perception of China as a competitor and should instead be regarded as a "global partner."

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"We are glad to see European friends stepping out of the 'small attic' of protectionism and walking into the 'fitness club' of the Chinese market to build their strength and competitiveness," he said.

3. Tariffs

Wang implicitly criticized President Trump's global trade tariffs, as he said pursuing trade protectionism is "akin to locking oneself in a dark room."

"It may keep out wind and rain, but it also shuts out light and air," he said.

Unlike the U.S., China has said it is opening up its own markets to global players.

Starting May 1st, China said it will fully lift tariffs on all imports from most African countries so it can "help Africa access the enormous opportunities of the Chinese market," according to Wang.

However, he did not address the sluggishness in domestic demand, which was demonstrated earlier this week when China set its lowest economic growth target since the 1990s, aiming for between 4.5% and 5% this year.

4. Japan and Taiwan

China and Japan relations are currently particularly fraught, with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggesting last year Japan might get involved if China invades Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its own territory.

Wang said it is up to Tokyo to decide what the future holds for China-Japan relations.

"Taiwan never was, is not, and will never be a country," Wang said. "Taiwan affairs are purely China's internal affairs."

He said Japan has no right to interfere in the Taiwan issue.

5. Gaza

Wang said that China supports a two-state solution for Palestine.
"Any other arrangements or new mechanisms must reinforce – rather than undermine the two-state solution," Wang said.He welcomed international efforts to enable the ceasefire, but said much of the hard work lies ahead.
China was invited to join Trump's Board of Peace but it has not participated.

## CCP Two Sessions 2026: Beijing Posts Round-the-Clock Guards on Overpasses to Prevent Protest

07 March 2026, Vision Times



*Uniformed Bridge Watchers stationed on a pedestrian overpass in Beijing during the CCP's annual "Two Sessions" political meetings. (Image: video screenshot)*

Beijing locked down under an extraordinary security blanket this week as the Chinese Communist Party convened its annual "Two Sessions" legislative meetings, with one of the most visible measures being the return of uniformed "bridge watchers" stationed on every pedestrian overpass across the city. The guards, deployed in pairs around the clock, have the authority to stop any passerby, demand identification, inspect mobile phones, and search bags. Their presence is a direct legacy of the Sitong Bridge protest of October 2022, when a lone demonstrator hung banners calling for the removal of CCP general secretary Xi Jinping just days before the 20th Party Congress.
The CCP's two main political bodies, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a Party-controlled advisory body with no legislative power, and the National People's Congress (NPC), a rubber-stamp legislature that exists to ratify decisions already made by the CCP leadership, opened their annual sessions on March 4 and March 5 respectively. The CPPCC sessions run through March 11; the NPC through March 12.
Hong Kong's RTHK reported that security in central Beijing had been visibly tightened in the days before the meetings. Multiple police vehicles were parked along Wangfujing Street, the capital's main commercial thoroughfare, with security personnel carrying shields on patrol and standing guard at fixed positions. Along Chang'an Avenue, the boulevard that runs past Tiananmen Square and the Great Hall of the People, authorities erected checkpoints with tents where they inspected identification documents and personal belongings of residents and tourists. Armed police patrols were visible throughout the area.
Central News Agency reporters who visited Beijing found hotels and restaurants displaying notices from the Beijing Public Security Bureau announcing enhanced airspace restrictions for the duration of the meetings. The order prohibited all unauthorized drone flights and banned the release of balloons, kites, or any other objects that could affect flight safety across all of Beijing's administrative territory from midnight on March 1 through midnight on March 12.



*A security guard stands at an overpass near the Sitong Bridge in Beijing on Oct. 14, 2022, where protest banners with slogans criticising the Communist Party's policies were hanged the day before, ahead of China's 20th Communist Party Congress. (Image: NOEL CELIS/ AFP via Getty Images)*

### The 'Bridge Watchers' returned to every overpass in the capital

The most striking security deployment, and the one that drew the most public attention, was the reappearance of the "bridge watchers" on Beijing's pedestrian overpasses. Ren Min Bao reported that the uniformed guards were stationed in pairs on each bridge, maintaining a vigilant watch over every person who crossed. They had the power to stop pedestrians at will, check identity cards and mobile phones, and order people to open their bags for inspection. Whether these practices had any legal basis was a question no one in Beijing dared to raise.
Recruitment videos circulating on Douyin (China's TikTok) offered a window into the program. A September 2025 posting advertised bridge watcher positions in Beijing's Dongcheng district: two people per shift, reporting at 8 a.m., two meals provided, a tent and folding stool for overnight duty, permitted to sleep after 11 p.m., 24-hour shifts, 300 yuan per day (roughly $41), applicants must be between 18 and 52 years old with no criminal record. The posting noted that large numbers of watchers were needed.
A viral video shared in recent days showed that every single overpass in Beijing had soldiers stationed in pairs. Beijing residents responded

with dark humor online. “We pay taxes so the government can hire people to babysit bridges. What an achievement,” one wrote. “Protecting His Majesty,” another quipped. “Khamenei is dead, so now they’re even more afraid,” a third observed. “Startled by every sound, seeing enemies in every shadow.”

**The Bridge Watchers exist because of one man’s act of defiance in 2022**

The bridge watcher program traces directly to October 13, 2022, when a Chinese citizen named Peng Lifa (online name Peng Zaizhou) staged a solitary protest on Beijing’s Sitong Bridge, a pedestrian overpass in the Haidian district, just days before the CCP’s 20th Party Congress.

Disguised as a construction worker, Peng hung two large banners from the bridge. The first read: “We don’t want PCR tests, we want food. We don’t want lockdowns, we want freedom. We don’t want lies, we want dignity. We don’t want the Cultural Revolution, we want reform. We don’t want a supreme leader, we want ballots. Don’t be slaves, be citizens.” The second read: “Go on strike from school and work. Remove the dictatorial traitor Xi Jinping.”

Peng set fire to materials on the bridge to create smoke that would attract the attention of motorists and pedestrians below, and used a loudspeaker to broadcast his demands. He was quickly detained by police. His act of defiance, captured on camera and shared globally, became one of the most iconic moments of political protest in Xi Jinping’s China.

Sitong Bridge instantly became a pilgrimage site. Authorities responded by removing the bridge’s name plaque, apparently fearing that petitioners and dissidents from outside Beijing would seek out the location. The regime then deployed bridge watchers on overpasses across the capital. The practice subsequently spread to cities throughout China, creating an entirely new category of security employment: professional overpass surveillance.

**The security apparatus reveals a regime that fears its own people**

Reactions on the overseas platform X (formerly Twitter) captured the political significance of the spectacle. “The dynasty is already on shaky ground. Keep burning through resources like this, and when the money and grain run out, dawn will break,” one user wrote. “That’s to prevent another Sitong Bridge hero. Safety is just an excuse.” Another observed: “The Sitong Bridge incident was caused by the Communist Party itself. They squeeze every drop of blood from the people, then spend that money on suppression. It’s beyond shameful.”

“Beijing’s main train station has already implemented double security screening, a friend told me,” one commenter reported. Others noted the economic absurdity: “So this is where the farmers’ welfare money goes, into the stability maintenance budget.” “Beijing’s pedestrian overpass ‘bridge watchers’ are another great Chinese innovation with CCP characteristics: they solve the unemployment problem and prevent incidents at the same time.”

The most cutting commentary went to the heart of the matter: “When power is obtained illegitimately, you spend every day terrified that someone will take it from you.”

## Xi warns ‘no place’ in Chinese military for those ‘disloyal’ to ruling party

07 March 2025, AA

Chinese leader attends 4th session of 14th National People's Congress, China's national legislature

Chinese President Xi Jinping on Saturday warned that there is "no place" for those who are "disloyal" to the ruling Communist Party, stressing "fully leveraging the unique strengths of enhancing political loyalty" in the military, state media reported.

"There must be no place in the military for those who are disloyal to the Party, nor any place for corrupt elements," Xi warned, while attending a plenary meeting of the delegation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the People's Armed Police Force at the fourth session of the 14th National People's Congress (NPC), China's national legislature, Beijing-based Xinhua News reported.

Stating that the fight against corruption must be "unwaveringly advanced," the Chinese leader called for "concerted" efforts to advance the modernization of national defense and the armed forces in a steady and sustained manner.

Since the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012, Xi added, the party has led the armed forces to improve political rectification and advance political loyalty in the military with unprecedented resolve and intensity, achieving "significant results."

At the very start of the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-2030), efforts must be made to establish rigorous rules for strict oversight, and closely monitor key areas such as fund flows, the exercise of power, and quality control, Xi further said.

This comes after the top two PLA generals Gen. Zhang Youxia and Gen. Liu Zhenli were under investigation for “suspected serious disciplinary and legal violations,” in January last.

US media reports have claimed Zhang stands accused of leaking nuclear secrets to Washington.

Last month, the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress removed Liu Cangli, former head of the China Academy of Engineering Physics; Luo Qi, chief engineer of the China National Nuclear Corporation; and Zhou Xinmin, former chair of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, according to the South China Morning Post daily.

The reason for their removal was not given.

## China set to release new five-year plan at National People's Congress

04 March 2026, Al Jazeera

China is set to unveil a sweeping economic agenda for the next five years during a meeting of the National People's Congress (NPC) over the next week at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

China's 15th Five-Year Plan for 2026 to 2030 will be released during the NPC, one of China's most important political meetings of the year, which starts on Thursday in Beijing and typically runs for a week, drawing 3,000 delegates from across China.

The last five-year plan was released in March 2021, as Beijing tackled the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic.

This time around, analysts say, China's leaders will need to explain their approach to new challenges, from the economic fallout of United States President Donald Trump's trade war to the stalling of consumer confidence at home.

The NPC runs in parallel to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which began on Wednesday, and together, they are known as the "Two Sessions".

The CPPCC does not have the power to pass legislation, but it can make policy suggestions, and its committees play an important role in providing feedback to the Chinese leadership.

But the NPC is known as China's "supreme organ of state power", the highest government body and though functionally separate from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in practice, the congress is guided by the CCP's policy recommendations.

According to Changhao Wei, founder of NPC Observer, an independent website monitoring the congress, this week's gathering is due to codify its relationship with the CCP in the drafting of five-year plans under a forthcoming "Law on National Development Plan".

Chinese Premier Li Qiang will also share the latest Government Work Report this week, outlining the state of China's economy over the past 12 months and upcoming growth targets.

China is expected to announce a gross domestic product (GDP) growth target of 4.5 to 5 percent for 2026, according to the International Monetary Fund, plus desired adjustments of interest rates in light of inflation, unemployment and the fiscal deficit.

*Members of the Chinese People's Liberation Army leave the Great Hall of the People amid snowfall before the opening sessions of the annual Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and National People's Congress, in Beijing, on March 4, 2026 [Tingshu Wang/ Reuters]*

**Absolute loyalty**

This year's delegate list for both events is notable for the absence of at least 19 delegates whose credentials were revoked last week, signalling they are under disciplinary action. The list of those disciplined, published last week by state media, included nine high-ranking members of the military.They are among the more than 100 military officers who have been dismissed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in recent years on various charges, including corruption.

The dismissals have been interpreted as a strategic move by Xi, who removed presidential term limits in 2018, to consolidate his leadership and remove factions within China's sprawling governance structures.

"Xi is trying to ensure the Chinese Communist Party's governance system is run by absolute loyalty to him and that no one else has enough power base independent of him to potentially challenge his authority," said William Yang, the International Crisis Group's senior analyst for Northeast Asia.

While China no longer relies on Soviet-style state planning, its tradition of five-year plans sets out a midterm roadmap for economic reform, government spending, fiscal policy, industrial and energy targets and more.

Yang told Al Jazeera that he expects "industrial self-reliance" to be at the top of the agenda as China continues to compete with the US for technological dominance.

"The Chinese government is expected to outline a series of technology and science initiatives aiming at developing key sectors, including next-generation AI, advanced semiconductor production, industrial upgrades, and further expanding its renewable energy sector," he said.

The five-year plan will address how officials can fight the problem of "involution" or excessive and self-defeating competition, said Fred Gao, who writes the Inside China newsletter from Beijing.

The practice has seen Chinese companies enter "relentless price wars, undercutting each other to grab market share while ignoring product quality and service improvement", Gao said.

"The end result is a vicious cycle of low price, low quality, and low margin that ultimately hollows out the competitiveness of entire industries," he told Al Jazeera.

Another new concept to look out for at this week's NPC will be mention of China's "low altitude economy", which refers to a plan to utilise drones and other low-altitude vehicles to expand China's delivery and logistics networks.

**Consumer-led growth**

More challenging this week will be for Chinese officials to outline how they intend to steer China's economy towards consumption-led growth.

China's economy has long been powered by sectors such as manufacturing, construction, and real estate, meaning the transition will be a long process, while consumer confidence and spending were shaken by the COVID-19 pandemic and economic slowdown.

Lynn Song, chief economist for Greater China at ING Group, told Al Jazeera he expected to see

policies targeted at domestic demand and promoting growth in China's service sector.
Gao said he will be watching how China expands consumption-focused policies and measures that will narrow the income gap between urban and rural residents, from minimum wage adjustments to higher pension payments.
Besides economic targets, the NPC also addresses social and environmental policies.
One new law that will be closely watched is the "Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress", which will codify China's approach to its 56 ethnic groups.
More than 90 percent of the Chinese population is ethnic Han who use Standard Chinese as their main language, but the vast nation is home to scores of ethnicities, languages and dialects.
NPC observer Wei said the law will require "the abandonment of ethnic privilege and distinction, and the proactive forging of a common culture, consciousness, and identity", which could likely see further ethnic, social, and political assimilation.

## China's 'Two Sessions' Open Amid Unusual Absences as Internal Tensions Surface

04 March 2026, Vision Times

As China's annual 'Two Sessions' political meetings kick off in Beijing, declining delegate numbers, recent purges of senior officials, and reports of absences have drawn attention to tensions and rifts within the country's top leadership
China's annual "Two Sessions," seen as the country's most important political gatherings, officially opened in Beijing on March 4. However, the dwindling number of delegates attending this year's meetings has drawn attention, with several lawmakers absent amid an ongoing purge of senior officials.
According to official data, the 14th National People's Congress (NPC), China's top legislative body, currently has 2,878 delegates. As of March 3, 2,773 representatives had registered with the conference secretariat, and 2,761 delegates attended the preparatory meeting held on the morning of March 4.
Chinese state media acknowledged that 117 delegates were absent, while emphasizing that the number of attendees still met the legal quorum required to proceed. The figures have sparked ongoing concerns among observers over whether political pressure and recent anti-corruption campaigns are influencing attendance.
According to China's state-run Xinhua News Agency, the fourth session of the 14th Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) opened on March 4 and will conclude on March 11. The fourth session of the 14th National People's Congress is scheduled to begin on March 5 and close on March 12.
Ahead of the official opening, the NPC held a preparatory meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Zhao Leji, chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, presided over the session. Other senior officials attending included NPC vice chairpersons Li Hongzhong, Wang Dongming, Xiao Jie, Zheng Jianbang, Ding Zhongli, Cai Dafeng, He Wei, Wu Weihua, Tie Ning, Peng Qinghua, Zhang Qingwei, Losang Jamcan, and Shohrat Zakir. Liu Qi served as secretary-general.
During the meeting, delegates approved the agenda for the upcoming legislative session and elected the presidium and secretary-general responsible for organizing the conference. The presidium consists of 167 members, with Li Hongzhong serving as secretary-general.
The conference is expected to review several major policy documents, including the government work report and the proposed outline for China's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030). Delegates will also examine reports on China's economic and social development plans, as well as central and local government budget proposals for 2026.

**Sweeping purges slashing numbers**

Observers note that the number of representatives participating in this year's Two Sessions has already declined significantly due to recent removals. On Feb. 26, China's NPC Standing Committee announced the termination of 19 delegates, including nine military representatives, five of whom held the rank of general.
Unofficial estimates suggest that around 36 military delegates have been removed from the National People's Congress over the past two years. As a result, the number of military representatives in the legislature has reportedly fallen to 243. Similar changes have also occurred within the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), another key advisory body.
On March 2, the CPPCC Standing Committee announced the removal of three generals, including Han Weiguo, and former State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense director Zhang Kejian from their positions.
The committee also confirmed the expulsion of 10 officials previously investigated for corruption, including Wang Xinghuan, Zhang Dongchen, Cao Jianguo, Liu Guoyue, Ma Zhengwu, Fan Youshan, Zeng Yi, Yu Peigen, Tian Xuebin, and He Song.

**A rare decline in representation**

When the current NPC was first formed, it included 2,977 delegates. The current total of 2,878 members represents a reduction of 99 seats, which analysts say may be the largest decline in representation since the Cultural Revolution. Even with the reduced membership, attendance at the preparatory meeting did not reach full participation.

As of March 3, only 2,773 delegates had registered, leaving dozens absent before the meeting officially opened. The CPPCC has also seen a reduction in membership. The body originally included 2,169 members, but current estimates suggest the number has fallen to roughly 2,100, though Chinese authorities have not released an official updated figure.
Political observers say that the Chinese government's opaque disciplinary system often results in officials disappearing from public view without explanation. Ahead of this year's Two Sessions, former Shanghai entrepreneur Hu Liren, now based in the United States, claimed on social media that many Chinese officials were reluctant to travel to Beijing.
According to Hu, some delegates were reportedly concerned about the risk of investigation or political missteps during the meetings. He suggested that some officials were deliberately avoiding attendance by citing illness or hospitalization in order to request leave from the conference.

## Generals stripped of CPPCC roles as China's corruption clean-up continues

03 march 2026, SCMP

China has revoked the political advisory seats of three generals, including two who previously held key positions in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) ground force, as the anti-corruption drive continues within the top brass and defence industry.
Han Weiguo, Gao Jin and Liu Lei were removed from membership of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and their respective roles in its Standing Committee and relevant special committees, the political advisory body said on Monday.
The authorities gave no explanation for the removals, but such adjustments often relate to changes in status, investigations or political disgrace. The announcement came after last week's sacking of nine military officials by the National People's Congress (NPC), China's top legislature.The official dismissal provided the first confirmation of the downfall of Han, who served as commander of the PLA ground forces from August 2017 to June 2021.
Han was appointed as first commander of Central Theatre Command when it was established in 2016. In this capacity, he directed the high-profile Zhurihe military parade in July 2017, shortly before his promotion.
The event, at the military training ground in northern China's Inner Mongolia autonomous region, was the first of its kind to be held marking the founding of the PLA, which celebrated its 90th anniversary that year.
Gao was inaugural commander of the now-disbanded Strategic Support Force. Created in 2016, it was the PLA's first division to oversee the military's space, cyber, electromagnetic and psychological warfare capabilities.
Between 2019 and 2022, Gao headed the Central Military Commission's Logistical Support Department, where he was responsible for the PLA's logistics and critical resources, including barracks, housing, supplies and medical facilities.
Liu, political commissar of the PLA ground forces from 2015 to 2022, spent most of his military career in the country's northwestern provinces, holding key political commissar positions across Gansu, Shaanxi and Xinjiang.
Also removed from the CPPCC was Zhang Kejian, a senior figure in China's defence industry and research projects who came under investigation last year.
Zhang, former director of the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence, was responsible for the oversight of military research and project reviews. He reportedly "turned himself in" for corruption in May 2025.
But his formal removal from the advisory body was only finalised this week, as the CPPCC National Committee convened to review memberships ahead of the annual session, which begins this week.
The annual "two sessions" of the NPC and CPPCC are among Beijing's most important political meetings. The CPPCC will start on Wednesday. Ahead of the NPC's opening on Thursday, five full generals, one lieutenant general, and three major generals have been disqualified as delegates.
The disqualifications follow a string of high-profile cases involving top military leadership, including previously reported investigations into high-ranking generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli.
Zhang is the former vice-chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission, while Liu was chief of its Joint Staff Department.

## Inside Xi Jinping's new guide to promoting Communist Party officials

01 March 2026, SCMP

For a book on performance appraisals, it contained some surprising language – especially given its author, President Xi Jinping.
The volume, published by the Central Party Literature Press, coincided with the launch of an overhaul of the Communist Party's promotion system that will continue in the run-up to next year's leadership transition.
Among the raft of speeches and instructions from Xi since November 2012 is a blunt warning to cadres about pursuing debt-laden white elephant projects.
"Some officials probably didn't even think about repaying the debt when they raised it. When will it be their turn to pay it?" Xi says in an excerpt of a

speech given at the party's annual central economic work conference in 2013.
"By the time the debt matures, these officials will no longer be in the same positions!

"We cannot allow some officials to burden the government with an a***load of debt in order to achieve political achievements, tap their backsides and walk off and then get promoted all the way up."
The Chinese phrase "tap one's backside and walk off" describes someone who creates a problem then leaves as if nothing happened.
The warning reflects the book's broader message that the promotion system is changing and the days of "two-faced people" who seek quick returns and personal advancement at the expense of national interests are gone.
"During the leadership transition, we must keep our eyes peeled and promote truly loyal, reliable and responsible cadres, ensuring that no 'two-faced' officials are allowed to pass," Xi said at a meeting in January.
The excerpts, some made public for the first time, flesh out Xi's vision for revamping the appraisal system, playing up political loyalty while pivoting away from the traditional focus on gross domestic product in promotion decisions.
In January, he called for a more reasonable and suitable evaluation system to promote local development and "prevent a vicious cycle of promotion based on numbers".
The focus now is on governance based on local conditions and tackling problems as they arise.
Several passages underscore the need for policy consistency before and after the power transition, requiring officials to adopt a long-term, national perspective on governance.
In January, Xi told the party's anti-corruption watchdog, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), to be on alert for officials who "do nothing but wait for a power transition".
He also warned against those who pursued quick success after a leadership reshuffle by "flipping the pancake", or making drastic changes to a predecessor's policies.
The campaign and compilation of Xi's speeches come at a critical time in China's political calendar, with power transitions under way at the local and provincial levels and Beijing preparing to endorse a new five-year plan.
The personnel changes will pave the way for the 21st party congress in autumn next year. The gathering will determine the new line-up for the party's top echelons, including the Politburo and Central Committee.
The excerpts also revealed Xi's repeated calls to create appraisal systems tailored to local needs. In one speech in 2014, for instance, he suggested water conservation metrics be included in the performance evaluations of officials in areas facing water scarcity.

Many provinces have already responded to the new directives. At a meeting last Tuesday, several provinces, including Zhejiang and Hubei, proposed training on appraisals to improve the quality of cadres and performance evaluation methods.
Zhejiang's provincial party committee claimed success in improving evaluation methods last year, according to Zhejiang Daily, the official mouthpiece of the eastern province.
The report said the province was looking into whether officials had tried to meet assessment targets by building white elephant projects or staging "sprints" – wasteful activities that use up resources and labour.
Zhejiang has also cut the number of assessment criteria by just under a third compared to 2024.
When evaluating the development of cities and counties, factors such as technological innovation, investment, public services and income levels would carry more weight, the newspaper reported.
The province has also incorporated environmental indicators into its performance evaluations and shifted from a single year-end review to daily assessments.
In January, the CCDI singled out local governments and departments for deviating from governance standards.
Henan's provincial commerce department, for example, demanded annual growth in investment from outside the province despite already using inflated baseline figures.
To meet these targets, some local officials required companies to provide false documentation, or even fabricated data on their behalf, resulting in distorted figures.

# PROTESTS, DETENTIONS AND OTHER NEWS FROM TIBET AND THE PRC

## Venerable Ugyen Jangchub Arrested and Subjected To Beatings

29 March 2026, Tibet Times



*Venerable Ugyen Jangchub Arrested and Subjected To Beatings. Photo:Tibettimes.net*

The Chinese authorities have surrounded and continue to impose restrictions on the late His Eminence Choktrul Hung Kar Dorje Rinpoche's Lung Ngon Monastery.

From March 27th to 30th, as the funeral rituals and prayer congregation are being carried out for the late His Eminence Choktrul Hungkar Dorje Rinpoche at the Lung Ngon Monastery in Gade County, Golog, Chinese police and military personnel have surrounded the monastery complex and continue to intensely restrict the movement and activities of the local Tibetans. Furthermore, on March 27th, the Chinese authorities arrested Venerable Ugyen Jangchup without providing any clear reasons. Even though he was later released at midnight, he was subjected to inhumane physical beatings while being detained at the Gade County police station and issued directives to come to the local detention centre after three days. Due to the ongoing restrictions, no clear information is available.

On the first day of the funeral rites and prayer services, Chinese police intervened, forcefully ordering the removal of all English-language tribute posters and signboards dedicated to the late Rinpoche. Additionally, they demanded the immediate take-down of all Buddhist aphorisms and sacred inscriptions displayed around the doorways. The Chinese authorities continue to issue strict directives prohibiting the monks of the monastery and local Tibetans from sharing and publicising images and videos on the internet, while subjecting them to intense harassment. A Tibetan source, related to the incident, informed this Tibet Times correspondent, " Currently, I am more afraid to live than to die! This time, the Chinese government has caused us great trouble!"

Yet another Tibetan source went on to state, " Venerable Ugyen Jangchub was forcefully abducted and was slapped and subjected to physical beatings. Besides that, many of his personal belongings in his quarters were destroyed. His phone and computer were forcibly confiscated and searched. Authorities also confiscated a portrait of His Holiness the Dalai Lama that Ven. Ugyen had been keeping. There is a growing concern about his safety and condition because the authorities claim that they carried out a thorough search of both the interior and exterior of his monastic quarters and that he will be at least detained for a month or potentially even longer."

The Chinese government accused the late His Eminence Hungkar Dorje Rinpoche of failure to provide an elaborate welcome reception to the Chinese state-appointed Panchen Lama, Gyaltsen Norbu, who was visiting the Golog region in August, 2024. The authorities also levied accusations of inciting trouble against Rinpoche for establishing numerous monasteries and schools and advocating for the rights of the poor. Following such persistent harassment, he disappeared for a period of time. On March 28, 2025, the Chinese government informed key figures at Lungngon Monastery in Gade County, Golog, that Rinpoche had passed away at Vinmec Central Park International Hospital in Vietnam, though no clear explanation was provided. Subsequently, five monks representing the monastery travelled to Vietnam to investigate; however, on the afternoon of April 10, they were permitted to see only Rinpoche's face. The representatives' movements and activities were strictly controlled to prevent any information from leaking out. On April 20 of that year, his remains were secretly cremated in Vietnam.

H.E. Tulku Hungkar Dorje was the son of the renowned Tulku Pema Thumpo, founder of Lungngon Monastery in Tibet. In 2004, he established the Tsongon Gesar Philanthropic Foundation, dedicating himself to preserving Gesar's cultural heritage. With the formal approval of the Golog Prefecture government and education department in 2007, he founded the Hungkar Dorje National Vocational High School, which today supports approximately 1,000 students and staff. Furthermore, he established around 14 primary and secondary schools offering free education to thousands of children from Tibet's rural and nomadic regions. By also constructing numerous monasteries and monastic institutes, he made profound contributions to the revitalisation of Tibetan religion, culture, and language—endeavours that drew repeated political accusations from Chinese authorities.

## The value of imports and exports through Zhangmu Port increased by 43.79% year-on-year in January and February.

26 March 2026, China Tibet News Network

Import and export trade at the Zhangmu Port in Tibet has continued to pick up this year. According to Lhasa Customs statistics, the port's import and export value reached 470 million yuan in January and February, a year-on-year increase of 43.79%, marking a strong start to the year.

At the Zhangmu Port customs clearance site, Gesang Wangmu, head of Tibet Huisheng International Logistics Co., Ltd., was busy coordinating the loading of a batch of general merchandise for export. "This year's orders have increased significantly compared to the same period last year!" she said, pointing to the van being loaded. "Our Nepalese customers are particularly satisfied with the customs clearance efficiency at Zhangmu Port, and word-of-mouth has brought repeat customers. With Holi approaching, we are preparing goods in advance to seize the holiday consumer market."

As they spoke, under the supervision of customs officers from Nyalam Customs, a branch of Lhasa Customs, a series of domestically produced new energy vehicles drove out of the country. In the first two months, Zhangmu Port exported 771 new energy vehicles, a year-on-year increase of 38.92%, becoming a "new growth point" for the port's foreign trade.

Behind these impressive results lies the continuous upgrading of customs supervision and services. Nyalam Customs has built a foundation for export channels, creating a tailored "green channel" for domestically produced new energy vehicles and agricultural products. In the first two months, agricultural product exports reached 35.0734 million yuan, a year-on-year increase of 81.98%. Simultaneously, it has significantly expanded the reach of platforms such as "Customs Directors Delivering Policies to Enterprises' Doorsteps" and "One-on-One Customs-Enterprise Liaison," ensuring that preferential policies reach the front lines and facilitating the two-way flow of "high-quality products entering Tibet" and "high-quality products leaving Tibet." Furthermore, it has fully implemented the "land port declaration, local inspection, and direct port access" operation model, coupled with facilitation measures such as "advance declaration, pre-review of documents, and immediate inspection upon arrival," making customs clearance faster.

Next, Nyalam Customs will continue to deepen its collaboration with port inspection units to promote distinctive products such as "Tibetan Good Water" and "Highland Barley Processing," as well as more "Made in China" products, from Zhangmu Port to the world, helping Tibet to deeply integrate into the "Belt and Road" initiative

and serving the high-level opening up of the plateau.

## Revered Tibetan Buddhist Teacher Kyabje Chime Rinpoche Has Died at 85

26 March 2026, Buddhist Door



Kyabje Chime Rinpoche, a beloved and well-known Tibetan Buddhist lama who played a formative role in establishing Vajrayana Buddhism in the West and guiding students for decades, passed away on 24 March. He was 85.

A statement released by the Trustees of the Dharma Trust at Marpa House, his primary center in England, announced:

It is with unbearable sorrow and deep regret that we inform you of the passing of our beloved teacher. Rinpoche passed into Parinirvana this morning, 24th March 2026 . . . Although physically unwell for some time, Rinpoche's mind remained lucid and clear to the end."

## Tibet's New Medical Mystery: Healthy Young Monk Dies After Arrest

25 March 2026, Bitter Winter

The death of a young Tibetan monk named Samten has once again revealed the violent forces that control religious life in Tibet. His body was returned to his monastery in early December, with a familiar narrative: he had "fallen suddenly ill," according to the authorities, and despite emergency treatment, he could not be saved. No details about the illness, the hospital, or the circumstances of his detention were shared. What was given instead was a warning. The monks were told not to talk about what had happened.

In Tibet, silence is not a request. It is an order. But now, in March, somebody is speaking.

Samten was around twenty-five years old. He was part of Dhitsa Geden Tashi Chöding Ling, one of the four main monasteries in Palung County in the northern Amdo region. Founded by the first Je Shamar Pandita, the monastery has long been a center for Tibetan-language education and monastic scholarship. It is home to about four hundred monks, many of whom have already felt the tightening grip of state surveillance.

Dhitsa Geden Tashi Chöding Ling is known for preserving the Tibetan language. Its monks helped create early woodblock prints for modern Tibetan textbooks and took part in language preservation efforts. In the eyes of the authorities, this alone makes the monastery politically suspicious. In Tibet, culture itself is seen as a threat.

In 2021, police expelled dozens of underage monks from Dhitsa and nearby Jhakhyung Monastery as part of a broader effort to weaken monastic communities and disrupt the passing of religious education to younger generations.

That same year, Samten was detained for the first time. His offense was minor by most standards but significant under China's rules: he had shared images and information on WeChat about the elections of the Central Tibetan Administration, the elected government-in-exile formed by Tibetans living abroad. As a result, he was placed under surveillance. Local security personnel monitored him closely, and the monastery itself became a site of constant observation. In Tibet, even the smallest sign of connection to the Dalai Lama or the exile community is seen as a political crime.

The second arrest was different. This time, Samten did not come back alive.

Sources inside the monastery reported that he died after being severely beaten during interrogation. The police did not acknowledge this, of course. They returned his body along with their official explanation and instructed the monks to remain silent. The fate of his family is unknown. Whether they were informed, pressured, or silenced is hard to confirm. In Tibet, families of detainees often vanish into the same cloud of intimidation that surrounds the victims.



*Dhitsa Geden Tashi Chöding Ling monastery.*

Samten's death reflects a pattern that has become noticeable in the months leading up to the Dalai Lama's 90th birthday. Monasteries have faced raids, images of the Dalai Lama have been confiscated, senior monks have disappeared, and the state has intensified political education sessions. In one case, a respected scholar took his own life after being forced to denounce the Dalai Lama in front of his students. The campaign is coordinated, ideological, and relentless. It aims not only to control Tibetan Buddhism but to

transform it into something unrecognizable, something loyal to the Chinese Communist Party rather than its own tradition.

The circumstances of Samten's death are disturbingly familiar. Tibetans detained for political or religious reasons often die in custody, their bodies returned with vague explanations and strict orders not to ask questions. The pattern is so consistent that it has become a grim ritual: arrest, silence, death, denial, and forced forgetting. The authorities rely on fear to ensure that the story ends there.

But stories do not finish just because a government orders them to. They live on in whispers, in memories, in the quiet determination of monks who refuse to let a fellow practitioner disappear without a trace. They persist because Tibetans know that what happened to Samten could happen to any of them. They endure because the truth, even when buried, has a way of coming back to light.

Samten's death serves as a warning about the rising repression in Tibet, where the state's obsession with control has reached a level where even a young monk sharing information on a messaging app can be seen as a security threat. It is a reminder that the campaign against Tibetan Buddhism plays out on bodies—young bodies, unarmed bodies, bodies that enter police custody alive and leave as corpses.

The authorities may claim that Samten died of a sudden illness. They may threaten those who talk about him. They may hope that fear will erase what happened. But the monks of Dhitsa Geden Tashi Chöding Ling know the truth. And in Tibet, truth has a way of surviving even when those who carry it do not.

## Tibet Airlines plans to add and increase the frequency of these routes.

24 March 2026, Tibet Daily

The 2026 civil aviation summer/autumn flight season will officially begin on March 29. In the new season, Tibet Airlines will add 15 new routes, planning to operate 105 routes covering 65 destinations. Of these, 59 are high-altitude/plateau routes, accounting for 56% of the total, and 52 of these routes involve Tibet, accounting for approximately 50%.

Tibet Airlines closely follows the travel needs of passengers within the region, implementing a differentiated and precise route network strategy. It strengthens the radiation effect of the Lhasa hub, increasing Lhasa routes to 39, with an average of approximately 68 flights per day. Regarding core corridors, routes from Lhasa to Chengdu Shuangliu, Chengdu Tianfu, Chongqing, Xi'an, and Xining maintain high-frequency operation, with approximately 5 flights daily from Lhasa to Chengdu Shuangliu, ensuring unimpeded access to and from Tibet. Routes from Lhasa to Beijing Capital, Shanghai Hongqiao, and Guangzhou operate stably, meeting the rigid demand for government and business travel. Routes in the Ngari region continue to increase frequency, with the Lhasa-Ngari Kunsha route maintaining a high frequency of 3 flights daily, the Lhasa-Ngari Pulan route increasing to 1 flight daily, and the Ngari-Kashgar-Xining route continuing with 2 flights per week. Airports in Changdu, Shigatse, and Nyingchi maintained stable operations. Changdu operated four routes covering destinations such as Chengdu, Xi'an, Chongqing, and Beijing; Shigatse operated three routes covering Chengdu, Xi'an, and Chongqing; and Nyingchi fully utilized its airport slot resources to maintain routes to Chengdu, Chongqing, Xi'an, and Mianyang. Overall, all eight airports in the region achieved full coverage of routes and guaranteed flight frequencies. Capacity was further upgraded in the new flight season, with Lhasa Gonggar International Airport increasing its overnight capacity to 14 aircraft, providing stronger support for high-frequency operations and improved flight regularity within the region.

Regarding the network of routes outside Tibet, three new destinations—Baoshan, Bazhong, and Yichang—have been added. Three new routes have also been launched: Xi'an to Baoshan, Lhasa via Bazhong to Changsha, and Lhasa via Yichang to Xuzhou. By stopping in cities such as Mianyang, Yibin, Luzhou, Xining, and Xi'an, the Lhasa market will be extended to eastern and southern regions including Shenzhen, Changzhou, Wenzhou, and Jinan. For international and regional routes, the Yuncheng, Shanxi to Hong Kong route will maintain stable operation with three flights per week, further developing the tourism and business market in the Greater Bay Area. The Lhasa via Chengdu Tianfu to Hong Kong route is planned to resume mid-season. International routes will continue to operate on the Chengdu Tianfu to Phu Quoc Island, Vietnam route, with adjustments made based on market dynamics, continuously building an efficient and convenient cross-border air bridge for domestic and international travelers. (Source: Tibet Business Daily)

## Tibetan monk released after six-month detention, faces serious health issues and ongoing surveillance

23 MARCH 2026, PHAYUL

Ven. Zega Gyatso, a Tibetan monk from Tsang Monastery in Ba County, Tsolho (Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture), has reportedly been released after six months of detention by Chinese authorities. However, he continues to suffer from deteriorating health and strict state surveillance, according to a Dharamshala-based Tibetan media outlet, Tibet Times.

The 48-year-old monk, a native of Sog County in Malho (Huangnan), was detained around July 2 last year on allegations of sending money abroad. At the time of his arrest, he had traveled to Xining city to seek treatment for an existing health condition. Sources state that Chinese police apprehended him there and forcibly took him away, after which he was held incommunicado and subjected to extended interrogation for nearly six months before being released on January 2 this year.

According to the report, his health has significantly worsened during his detention. He is reportedly suffering from joint pain, knee problems, and severe deterioration in his eyesight. While he had no prior history of vision issues, it is believed that prolonged exposure to intense electric lighting during detention contributed to the damage to his eyes. Despite his condition, access to detailed medical information remains limited due to ongoing restrictions.

Following his release, authorities have imposed stringent surveillance measures on the monk, closely monitoring his movements and daily activities. Just three days after returning home, he was summoned again to Xining, where he was reportedly compelled to sign a document pledging that he would not engage in any activities deemed contrary to the interests of the Chinese government.

Although Zega Gyatso is said to have returned to his monastery after the Tibetan New Year (Losar), his current condition and circumstances remain unclear. Sources cite the pervasive climate of fear and tight restrictions as major obstacles preventing further information from emerging.

The monk's family has long been under scrutiny by Chinese authorities. Since the detention of his cousin, Khedrup Gyatso, in 2008, several relatives and associates have been subjected to heightened surveillance, repeated interrogations, and warnings over alleged contact with individuals abroad. They have also faced ongoing harassment, including arbitrary summons to local police stations.

Zega Gyatso, the eldest of six siblings born to his father, Sowang, and mother, Tashi, traveled to India in 2002, where he studied for approximately a year at Sera Monastery before returning to Tibet in 2003. He later continued his education at Ragya Sherig Norling School. Prior to his detention, he served as a Tibetan language teacher at the Tsang Monastery's Lekshe Ling School, an institution dedicated to the study of the Five Major Sciences.

## China returns Tibetan monk's custodial dead body to monastery in Qinghai

23 March 2026, Tibetan Review

Chinese police in a northeastern part of Qinghai province had returned the body of a young Tibetan Buddhist monk to his monastery on Dec 8, 2025 after having taken him away previously on an unspecified date and for unknown reasons amid allegations that he had been tortured to death during custodial interrogations, according to the Tibetan language *tibettime.net* and Tibet monitoring group*tibetwatch.org* Mar 18 and 17 respectively.

The monastery, Ditsa Geden Tashi Choeding ling, located in Shongshan Township and stated to be one of the four major Tibetan Buddhist religious centres in Palung (or Bayan, Chinese: Hualong) County of Tsoshar (Haidong) prefecture-level City, has reportedly been warned not to talk or share information about the deceased monk, the 25-year-old Samten.

Police have told the monastery that the monk died while being taken to hospital after he suddenly fell ill, with no explanation on the cause of his death.

Monk Samten had previously been detained in 2021 for allegedly sharing news and photos about exile Tibetan elections which took place that year over the social media platform *WeChat*. He and the monastery had since been under police surveillance.

In Oct 2021, local police expelled 50 monks from Ditsa monastery for being aged below 18, and 30 from Jhakhyung Monastery located in the same county, said the *tibetwatch.org* report.

Ditsa Geden Tashi Choeding ling Monastery is said to have about 400 resident monks.

## China establishes the world's largest water infrastructure network, covering 80.3% of the country's land area

22 March 2026, Global Times

China's Ministry of Water Resources announced on Sunday, marking the 34th World Water Day, that the country has established the world's largest and most comprehensive water infrastructure network, covering 80.3 percent of the country's land area and supporting water allocation, flood control and ecological protection, the Global Times learned from the ministry's website.

Regarding rural water supply, China has completed 82,900 rural water supply projects, improving water access for 495 million rural residents. Rural tap water coverage has reached 96 percent and large-scale water supply systems are now serving 71 percent of the rural population, according to a statement from the Ministry of Water Resources.

Meanwhile, the number of water projects in China has hit a new record, with about 95,000 reservoirs and dams nationwide and a total storage capacity exceeding 1 trillion cubic meters, making China the country with the largest number of reservoirs, the largest number of high dams, and the most complete range of dam types in the world, China Central Television (CCTV) reported on Sunday.

While ensuring development, China has continued to lead in water use efficiency. Despite major increases in economic output and consecutive years of rising grain production, the country's total annual water consumption has consistently been kept below 610 billion cubic meters, according to CCTV.

China's water conservation has shifted from a passive response to water scarcity to a proactive, strategic priority aimed at ensuring water security for Chinese modernization, according to the ministry.

In addition, China's national water network now links southern and northern regions. Over 87 billion cubic meters of water have been diverted north through the first phase of the eastern and middle routes of China's South-to-North Water Diversion Project, benefiting 195 million people, according to the ministry.

During the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-25), China added over 53 million mu (3.53 million hectares) of irrigated farmland. By the end of 2025, 6,924 medium- and large-sized irrigation districts had been completed, and the total irrigated farmland nationwide exceeded 1.09 billion mu. Grain production from irrigated farmland accounts for 80.76 percent of the country's total grain output, providing a solid water infrastructure foundation for national food security, CCTV reported.

Since 2022, China has selected 88 rivers and lakes across the country to promote the river revitalization initiative. Tailored management and protection plans have been developed for each river and lake, achieving significant results, with previously dry rivers flowing again and shrinking lakes being restored, according to the ministry.

By restoring river and lake ecosystems, the condition of fish has also significantly improved. In the Yangtze River Basin, since 2011, the water authorities have conducted ecological regulation experiments to promote natural fish reproduction in the Three Gorges Reservoir for 15 consecutive years. In 2025, two ecological regulation operations were carried out in the Three Gorges Reservoir to support fish spawning. Combined with a 10-year fishing ban and water pollution prevention measures, these efforts have significantly improved the aquatic ecology and water environment of the Yangtze River, according to the ministry.

China has digitized 26 million water objects, including rivers, lakes, and hydraulic projects, using satellites, radars, and monitoring stations, creating a digital twin system that serves as a smart "brain" for water network management, according to CCTV.

By coupling real-time sensing data with hydrological models, the system provides four key forecasting functions - prediction, early warning, simulation, and contingency planning - for integrated water network management. In recent years, it has played a key role in flood control in the Haihe River Basin, water supply security in the Taihu Lake Basin, and ice-season water delivery for the middle route of China's South-to-North Water Diversion Project, CCTV reported.

In the future, China plans to enhance its digital twin water system, making the national water network smarter and fully digital to ensure water security in key regions including the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, according to CCTV.

## China arrests Tibetan father for refusing to send his child to Chinese boarding school

20 March 2026, The Tibet Post

At a time when the Chinese government was placing millions of Tibetan children in colonial-style boarding schools with the aim of assimilating them into Chinese culture, language and ideologies. Tibetan parents feared their children would become like the Chinese, but they were forced to send them to these schools. One Tibetan father refused to send his son to the boarding school and was detained by the Chinese authorities.According to the source, a Tibetan father from the Yurag Village (ཡུལ་རག་སྡེ་བ), Hogyal Town (ཧོ་རྒྱལ), in the Yazi County,north-eastern Tibet , was detailed by the Chinese police in Yazi County (Ch:Xunhua), on March 12, 2026. Afer refusing to send his child to the colonial style boarding school (Hogyal Middle School) in the Yazi County.

Since September 2025, the father has refused to send his child to Hogyal Secondary School in Yazi County. However, according to the source, the Chinese police have visited his home and forcibly taken the child to school on several occasions.

After the winter holiday in February and March 2026, the Tibetan children were due to return to state schools. But the father once again chose not to send his child to school, prompting the Chinese police in Yazi County to visit his home. The father told the police that the child had run away from home, but the police eventually managed to find the child and forcibly took him back to school, then placed the father in detention for 15 days, subjecting him to warnings and brainwashing sessions.

Tibetan parents are deeply concerned that their children will end up becoming like the Chinese after sending their children in the to colonial-style state boarding schools in Tibet. However, the Chinese authorities force them to send their children to state boarding schools in Tibet, where only the Chinese language and culture are taught, along with the communist ideologies of the Chinese leadership. Tibetan children are thus cut off from Tibetan religion and culture, which are based on compassion and kindness.

This is a worrying and frightening situation for many Tibetan parents, as the Chinese authorities are threatening to withdraw the aid they need if they do not send their children to school, and even to arrest them if need be. Parents therefore have no choice but to send their children to the colonial-style state boarding schools in Tibet.
Their worries became the reality in the Tibet these days; when Tibetan children returned home for the holidays after attending colonial-style state boarding schools, they spoke only Chinese amongst themselves and used very little Tibetan with their parents; they were also afraid to visit Tibetan monasteries, as their teachers and Chinese staff had warned them against doing so before the holidays.

## Tibetan Monk Dies in Policy Custody

17 March 2026, Tibet Watch

Chinese police authorities tortured a young Tibetan Buddhist monk so severely that he died in custody before returning his body to his monastery and ordering the monks not to disclose information about his death. His death follows a pattern of escalating repression targeting Tibetan Buddhist monasteries.
In December last year, police authorities of Shongshan Tibetan Township (གཤོང་ཤན་སོང་རིགས་ཞང་།) returned the remains of 25-year-old Samten to Ditsa Monastery, according to a Tibet Watch source. The authorities claimed he had suddenly fallen ill and died after an unsuccessful emergency transfer to a hospital. The name of the hospital was not specified, and the date of his detention remains unclear.
Samten had been under police surveillance since 2021, when he was detained after local police accused him of sharing photographs over the messaging application WeChat about the election of the Central Tibetan Administration in exile. Tibetans living in 27 countries outside Chinese-ruled Tibet elect their leaders democratically for the exile administration, founded by the Fourteenth Dalai Lama following the 1959 Tibetan Uprising.
Samten's monastery was under surveillance in the same year of his detention. In October 2021, local police expelled 50 monks from Ditsa monastery who were aged below 18, and a further 30 from Jhakhyung Monastery located in the same county of Palung (Tibetan:དཔལ་ཡུང་རྫོང་ ;Chinese: Hualong) in Tsoshar Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Amdo's north-eastern region.
The death of Samten came to light after a series of incidents that point to an intensified, coordinated campaign of surveillance and oppression at Tibetan Buddhist institutions and their leaders in the lead-up to the Dalai Lama's 90th birthday last year. These include the disappearances of senior monks, raids on prominent monasteries to confiscate images of the Dalai Lama and other exiled religious leaders. In one instance, mandatory "political education" sessions to denounce the Dalai Lama drove a respected Buddhist scholar to suicide.
This pattern falls within China's most comprehensive assimilation campaign to date. Xi Jinping has imposed a systematic programme of 'Sinicisation', attempting to bring Tibetan cultural and religious identity into uniformity with the Han majority. This includes relegating Tibetan to only a language subject in state-run boarding schools and outlawing the tradition of monastic education for children.
The lack of culturally grounded education in Tibetan has previously led university students to run informal classes at monasteries in Palung County – a move that China has forbidden since 2021 under 'Double Reduction policy', which states that the reasons for the restrictions are to reduce pressure from homework and off-campus tuitions.
Ditsa Geden Tashi Choeding Ling Monastery, founded in 1903, belongs to the Gelugpa school of Tibetan Buddhism and has played a pivotal role in Tibetan-language education since the 20th century. Its monks were historically known for producing one of the earliest known woodblock-prints for modern Tibetan textbooks and joining a Tibetan language preservation group, founded in December 2009 by a monk at Kangtsa Monastery who had returned from India.

## Hong Kong's first chartered tourist group arrives in Shannan, Tibet!

13 March 2026, Tibet News Network




At 11:30 PM on March 11th, Lhasa Gonggar International Airport was brightly lit. Chen Xingbi, a member of the Party Committee and Deputy Director of the Shannan Municipal Bureau of Culture and Tourism, along with members of the Shannan Tourism Investment Company and the Gonggar County Art Troupe, dressed in vibrant ethnic costumes, were already waiting there. Holding "Chema," a symbol of good weather and abundant harvests, and cradling white hadas

(ceremonial scarves), they awaited the safe arrival of the first Hong Kong charter flight to Tibet.
As the first group of Hong Kong tourists stepped out of the airport, melodious singing instantly filled the air. Members of the art troupe stepped forward to present hadas (traditional Tibetan scarves) to each compatriot who had traveled from afar. That night, the distance between "Shannan, the Source of Tibetan Culture" and "Pearl of the Orient" was warmly bridged.
For tourists on Hong Kong tour groups, this was a journey across mountains and rivers. For Shannan Culture and Tourism, however, it was a long-awaited "reunion.""We have done a lot of work to ensure the smooth landing of this day," Chen Xingbi told reporters. Over the past two years, Shannan City has twice gone to Hong Kong to carry out cultural and tourism promotion activities for Shannan, Tibet. Characterized by high-level docking, in-depth cooperation and wide-ranging dissemination, the activities have comprehensively promoted Shannan's high-quality cultural and tourism resources, and continuously promoted mutual tourist exchanges and market co-construction. The activities have achieved remarkable results and have laid a solid foundation for the successful landing of this chartered flight group to Hong Kong.
"Nearly 3,000 more Hong Kong tourists will arrive in Shannan in batches. This is not only a breakthrough in numbers, but also an important milestone in Shannan's development into a top tourist destination for travelers from the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, serving as their 'first stop for entering Tibet and their preferred destination for in-depth exploration'," said Chen Xingbi.
Outside Yumbulagang, Mr. Yao and Ms. Zhang, a family of three from Sha Tin, Hong Kong, chatted and laughed. The couple, holding their daughter's hand, looked on with wonder and awe. "The history in books is now right here at our feet," Mr. Yao's daughter said happily."We have done a lot of work to ensure the smooth landing of this day," Chen Xingbi told reporters. Over the past two years, Shannan City has twice gone to Hong Kong to carry out cultural and tourism promotion activities for Shannan, Tibet. Characterized by high-level docking, in-depth cooperation and wide-ranging dissemination, the activities have comprehensively promoted Shannan's high-quality cultural and tourism resources, and continuously promoted mutual tourist exchanges and market co-construction. The activities have achieved remarkable results and have laid a solid foundation for the successful landing of this chartered flight group to Hong Kong.
"Nearly 3,000 more Hong Kong tourists will arrive in Shannan in batches. This is not only a breakthrough in numbers, but also an important milestone in Shannan's development into a top tourist destination for travelers from the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, serving as their 'first stop for entering Tibet and their preferred destination for in-depth exploration'," said Chen Xingbi.
Outside Yumbulagang, Mr. Yao and Ms. Zhang, a family of three from Sha Tin, Hong Kong, chatted and laughed. The couple, holding their daughter's hand, looked on with wonder and awe. "The history in books is now right here at our feet," Mr. Yao's daughter said happily.
Mr. Chen, from the New Territories of Hong Kong, stood for a long time, gazing at the Yalong River Valley. He remarked to the reporter, "Everyone says Tibet has a high altitude, but the journey from Hong Kong was exceptionally smooth. The staff in Tibet provided us with excellent support. Seeing the scenery of Tibet in person is far more breathtaking than anything I've seen on TV or online!"Standing before the precious pearl Thangka at Changzhu Monastery, Ms. Zhen from Tuen Mun, Hong Kong, examined it with particular care. "Traveling elsewhere can be tiring, but here, my fatigue is washed away by the unique cultural charm of Tibet," she said emotionally. "Coming to Tibet, I discovered that the culture here is not only profound, but the people's lives are also exceptionally happy." Ms. Zhen paused, then added, "I am also particularly grateful for the strength of our motherland. When I return home, I will definitely promote Tibet to more people in Hong Kong, hoping that Hong Kong and Tibetan compatriots can engage in more exchanges and interactions like this."
"From the spectacular light show at last year's promotional event in Hong Kong to the bustling crowds upon the arrival of the chartered flight, Shannan is gradually becoming a cultural window for Hong Kong compatriots to understand Tibet and the border region. This also marks the official transition of Shannan's cultural tourism from one-way promotion to a period of market harvest," said Chen Xingbi. He added that as more and more Hong Kong tourists set foot on the land of Tibet, he believes that the story of the snowy plateau will surely be sung even more widely on the banks of the Xiangjiang River.

## A Genetic Mutation Found in Yaks Boosts Myelin Repair

13. March 2026, The Scientist



*The mutation is found in animals that thrive at high altitudes, like the yak.*

Scientists showed that a mutation in animals that live at high altitude promotes myelin regeneration, informing potential new therapies for multiple sclerosis.

Myelin is a lipid sheath that insulates nerve fibers carrying signals throughout the brain and body. When this sheath becomes damaged, the passage of these crucial signals is disrupted, leading to neurological disorders.

Now, researchers have identified a genetic mutation that helps some animals repair their myelin. The team, reporting in the journal *Neuron*, hopes their findings could accelerate the regeneration of damaged myelin in humans.1

Myelin Damage in Disease

Damage to myelin underlies several neurological conditions. In multiple sclerosis (MS), autoimmune attacks degrade myelin, causing problems with cognition and movement. In cerebral palsy, myelin is damaged during development, frequently leading to lifelong movement and cognitive disabilities. In old age, impaired blood flow can also wound myelin, adding to the disease burden of conditions like vascular dementia and cerebral small vessel disease.

An environmental factor that can easily damage myelin is hypoxia. Researchers have long wondered how some animals thrive in low-oxygen environments, such as the Tibetan Plateau. Here, the average elevation is a lofty 14,700 feet, but this doesn't seem to bother beasts like the yak or the Tibetan antelope.

Previous research had identified that these animals have a mutation in a gene called retinol saturase (*Retsat*).2 This gene encodes a protein linked to lipid metabolism. Researchers suspected this mutation might be key to how high-altitude animals maintain myelinated brain signaling even in hypoxic environments.

A Naturally Occurring Restorative

In the new study, researchers tested the role of the *Retsat* mutation by exposing newborn mice with and without the mutation to hypoxic conditions that mimicked an elevation of 13,000 feet. After a week of exposure, they tested their mice on learning, social behavior, and memory tasks. Mice that carried a *Retsat* mutation performed better in all of these tests. Subsequent analysis showed that these mice had higher levels of myelin in their brains.

The team also studied how mice with the *Retsat* mutation responded to myelin damage mimicking that seen in MS. Compared to control mice without the mutation, these mice's myelin sheaths regenerated faster and more completely after injury. The injury sites also contained a greater number of myelin-producing mature oligodendrocytes.

The team found that mice with the *Retsat* mutation had higher levels of a brain metabolite called all-trans-13,14-dihydroretinol (ATDR). This chemical, derived from vitamin A, appeared to promote the production and maturation of these oligodendrocytes.

The researchers noted that most current treatments for MS work by suppressing the immune system rather than by exploiting endogenous processes. "ATDR is something everyone already has in their body. Our findings suggest that there may be an alternative approach that uses naturally occurring molecules to treat diseases related to myelin damage," said Liang Zhang, a study coauthor and neuroscientist at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, in a statement.

When the researchers gave ATDR to mice with a disease that mimics MS, their symptoms decreased and their motor function improved.

The team hopes that future genetic studies could reveal other ways to help the body fight disease. "Evolution is a great gift from nature, providing a rich diversity of genes that help organisms adapt to different environments," said Zhang. "There is still so much to learn from naturally occurring genetic adaptations."

## Ven. Palden Yeshe's brother Also Subjected to Interrogation and Beatings for A week

06 March 2026, Tibet Times



*Ven. Palden Yeshe , teacher at Kardze Monastery in Drung Nga Township, Kardze County. Photo Source: Voice of Tibet*

The Chinese authorities have sentenced Venerable Palden Yeshe to six years' imprisonment without providing any justification whatsoever. Furthermore, one of his brother was detained for a week and subjected to interrogations and beatings. Reports have also emerged indicating that his family members have been repeatedly harassed and intimidated.

On May 17th, 2021, the Chinese government arbitrarily detained and arrested Palden Yeshe, a teacher at Kardze Monastery in Drung-nga Township, Kardze County, without providing any justification.News has only now emerged that he was sentenced to six years in prison and is currently being held in Chushur Prison in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).

Following his arbitrary arrest, although Palden Yeshe's family and associates contacted the authorities four times to inquire about his whereabouts and condition, the government

refused to provide any clear information. It was only recently his six-year sentence came to light after he disclosed it himself. Until that moment, the sentence had not even been communicated to his family.

A Tibetan source related to the incident informed this correspondent, “The Chinese government has yet to provide any clear justification for the six-year sentence handed to Ven.Palden Yeshe. However, during his time as a teacher at the monastery, he frequently held Tibetan language tuition classes for students during their school breaks. Because of this, the Chinese authorities long maintained an antagonistic stance toward him, subjecting him to persistent harassment. To this day, there is still no clear information regarding the specific charges or the alleged crime that led to his arrest.”

Following Ven.Palden Yeshe’s sudden and arbitrary detention, his family petitioned the Chinese government four times to inquire about his condition. Instead of providing clarity, the authorities subjected them to persistent harassment and intimidation. Moreover, one of his brother was forcibly detained for a week, during which they were subjected to interrogations and beatings., Palden’s father, Sonam Tsewang, suffered prolonged emotional distress due to the arrests and tragically passed away on September 29, 2022.

Ven.Palden Yeshe is the son of Sonam Tsewang and Lujin Tsang Tenga, from Drung-nga Township in Kardze County. He is currently 52 years old and has three brothers. In addition to serving as a teacher at Kardze Monastery, he also provided tuition classes for Tibetan languageand other subjects to students during their summer and winter breaks.

# PRC

## Xi urges whole society to plant trees

31 March 2026, China Daily



*President Xi Jinping plants a tree with children during a voluntary planting activity in Changping district of Beijing on Monday. YAN YAN/XINHUA*

Sustained and solid efforts required to build a beautiful China

President Xi Jinping called for mobilizing the whole society to participate in afforestation on Monday, urging sustained efforts to build a beautiful China and contribute to Chinese modernization.

Xi, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, made the remarks while joining Beijing residents in a voluntary tree-planting activity in the capital's Changping district.

He stressed that a sound ecological environment is shared by all and requires the joint efforts of all.

This year marks the 45th anniversary of the nationwide voluntary tree-planting campaign. Xi has participated in the activity in Beijing every year since 2013.

By taking part in such activities, he encourages the whole society, especially young people, to promote ecological advancement so that China's environment improves further.

While planting saplings of different types of trees, Xi spoke with students taking part in the event and asked the children about their studies, daily lives, participation in labor and sports, and involvement in tree-planting activities.

Emphasizing that young people, like saplings, are full of vitality and hope, he encouraged them to set ambitious goals from an early age, love knowledge, labor and nature, and strive for well-rounded development with sound moral grounding, intellectual ability, physical vigor, aesthetic sensibility and work skills.

While speaking on-site to officials and members of the public, Xi noted that since the 18th CPC National Congress, China has seen sustained increases in both forest area and stock volume, as

well as continuous reduction in desertified and sandy land areas. This has made it the country with the largest and fastest increase in greening in the world.
Blue skies, green lands and clear waters have become the norm, he said, adding that the recent enactment of the Ecological and Environmental Code has further solidified the legal foundation for building a beautiful China.
Noting that afforestation is a crucial task in building a beautiful China, Xi urged sustained efforts to ensure the success of this initiative, which is beneficial to the nation and its people.
This year marks the start of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) period. Xi said that under the new circumstances, advancing national land greening requires a greater focus on improving quality, fostering industry and benefiting the public.
This involves a coordinated approach to tree planting and management, allowing ecological conservation and industrial development to reinforce each other, and fostering harmony between humanity and nature, he added.
Xi called for utilizing green spaces in a coordinated manner, with planting tailored to local conditions.
Greater efforts are needed to enhance management and protection, conduct sustainable forest operations, effectively promote grassland conservation and restoration, and comprehensively improve the quality and function of forests and grasslands, he said.
He underlined the need to facilitate channels for realizing the value of ecological products, strengthen the forest and grassland industries, and simultaneously enhance both economic value and ecological benefits.
It is also essential to advance urban and rural greening and beautification in tandem and make use of every available space to increase green areas in communities, so that the public's sense of ecological well-being is enhanced, Xi said.

## China, Police Block "Parade of the Gods" in Guangdong

26 March 2026, Bitter Winter

Villagers in Wuchuan were prevented from carrying out a centuries-old ritual as authorities tighten control over grassroots spiritual life.
On March 22, in Nalu Village, Tanba Town, Wuchuan City, Guangdong Province, a small rural community faced a growing national trend. Police officers sealed the gates of the local temple to stop the annual "Parade of the Gods" (You Shen), a ritual that marks the arrival of spring and seeks protection for the village.
Villagers were shouting "Bless the Gods" and "We want to worship the Gods," while officers responded with a firm "No worship." With the temple blocked and the procession canceled, residents had to bow and offer incense from outside, in front of the uniformed police.
What happened in Nalu is not an isolated event. Across China, especially in the southeast, authorities have increased restrictions on folk religion, targeting temple fairs, processions, and community-run rituals that have lasted for centuries. Officials often label these events as "superstition," but they remain vital to the cultural and spiritual life of rural communities.
In Guangdong and Fujian, the "Parade of the Gods" processions rank among the most important rituals of the year. They are believed to protect the village, bless the land before planting, and strengthen the community's bonds.



*Believers were compelled to worship from outside the temple.*

The timing is significant. Early spring is when many villages bring their deities out of the temples and through the streets, symbolically cleansing the community and inviting good fortune. These processions are central to local identity. However, their very nature—large gatherings, independent organization, and strong local ties—makes them increasingly uncomfortable for a political system that insists on controlling all forms of collective expression. The confrontation in Nalu Village clearly illustrates this tension. Villagers were not protesting or challenging state authority; they were attempting to perform a ritual their ancestors had practiced for generations. The police blockade and the villagers' efforts to worship despite it show the shrinking space for cultural practices that fall outside state-approved religious frameworks.
As similar incidents continue to arise, they reveal a deeper struggle over who defines the boundaries of cultural life in China. For many rural communities, the "Parade of the Gods" is a reaffirmation of identity and continuity. For the authorities, it is increasingly viewed as something to be managed, restricted, or eliminated. The scene in Nalu—villagers pleading to worship while police stand firm—provides a stark glimpse into the future of religion in China under tightening ideological control.

## China's New Retirement Plan for Dissidents: Work, Prison, Repay, Repeat

24 March 2026, Bitter Winter

New research shows how authorities have found a new way to punish prisoners of conscience by taking away their earned pensions.




*The seven dissidents whose cases were investigated by CHRD. Source: CHRD.*

The Chinese government has long been creative in disciplining those who think, speak, or worship outside official norms. But new research from Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) reveals that authorities have developed a refined form of post-prison retaliation: leaving elderly prisoners of conscience in poverty by denying them the pensions they worked a lifetime for. As CHRD states, Chinese authorities are denying retirement-age prisoners of conscience their pension benefits following their release from wrongful detention, a practice that has led some to financial ruin and left others struggling.

The logic is straightforward. First, imprison individuals for exercising their rights—writing articles, petitioning, practicing religion, or proposing amendments to the laws. Then, after they spend years or decades in prison, inform them that the pension payments they received while incarcerated were a serious administrative error. They must now return the money, even if this means they cannot pay for food or housing. Alternatively, if they reached retirement age after release, authorities claim that the contributions they or their families made while they were imprisoned don't count. Why? Because time in prison, according to the social security system, seems to suspend not only freedom but also the passage of time.

Consider the case of activist Xu Qin, 64, who returned home in 2025 after four years in prison for "inciting subversion of state power"—essentially, for researching, writing, and supporting other human rights defenders. UN experts had warned that her detention might be arbitrary and that she had been tortured. However, the Gaoyu Social Security Bureau had its own issues: Xu continued to receive her pension while in prison. She was informed that this was unacceptable. Her monthly benefits would now be cut until she repays the full amount. She filed a complaint and then a lawsuit because, apparently, the only thing more exhausting than four years in prison is the bureaucratic struggle that follows.

Retired engineer and Communist Party member Dong Hongyi, 80, faced a similar predicament. After serving 1.5 years for "picking quarrels and provoking trouble"—a charge so vague it could apply to nearly anyone—he found that his pension was quietly being taken to repay the benefits he received while incarcerated. Dong, who has no home or income, appealed to local authorities and even sought the legal basis for this policy. One suspects that any response he might receive will be as enlightening as a blackout.

Falun Gong practitioners Xia Huiqiong, 70, and Guo Bing, 65, learned in Sichuan that their pensions had been suspended because they had served prison sentences. After months of petitions, the authorities kindly agreed to reinstate their benefits—at a lower level. Naturally, the difference would be kept as repayment. In other words, the state generously returned part of what it had taken while keeping the rest as a fee for the inconvenience of imprisoning them.

Then there is Hua Xiuzhen, 79, a retired university teacher who began petitioning after an unapproved rabies vaccine disabled her daughter. For this, she was imprisoned twice. Her pension was canceled, and she was ordered to repay the 140,000 RMB she had already received. Unable to pay, she continued petitioning, which led to yet another prison sentence. It creates a perfect cycle: petition, be imprisoned, lose pension, petition again, be imprisoned again. It's a perpetual-motion machine, Chinese-bureaucracy style.

Pastor Yang Rongli of Linfen Golden Lampstand Church, serving a 15-year sentence for collecting church donations, had her pension suspended years earlier due to a prior prison term. Her case demonstrates that once a pension is revoked, it tends to stay revoked—religious devotion may be eternal, but so is administrative punishment.

For others, the cruelty appears in different ways. Activist Chen Shuqing, 60, found out after completing a 10.5-year sentence that only 9 years and 10 months of his 24 years of contributions were acknowledged. The rest had vanished into bureaucratic limbo. He must now apply for a refund of the "ineligible" contributions and then repay them over time, a process that resembles being forced to buy back one's own stolen property. As Chen stated, "The judgments in my two sentences only deprived me of my personal liberty and political rights… but they did not deprive me of my socio-economic rights." The social security office seems to disagree.

Pro-democracy writer Chen Xi, 71, was told that only eight of the 18 years he and his family paid into the system were valid. He must contribute another seven years before receiving a pension—

an impressive requirement for a man in his seventies. Christian writer and former doctor Xu Yonghai, who made catch-up payments in 2020, was denied benefits entirely because he had once been imprisoned. He has been petitioning for the return of his pension since 2024, a process that may well take longer than Xu's remaining lifetime.
CHRD notes that these cases likely represent just the tip of an iceberg. Given how opaque China's social security system is and the large number of people imprisoned for political or religious reasons, the actual scale of pension stripping may be much broader. The practice serves two purposes: it punishes former prisoners of conscience long after their release and sends a warning to anyone considering dissent. In China, even retirement can be revoked for political missteps.
The state not only imprisons your body, but it also reserves the right to impoverish your old age. And if you dare to complain, well, there is always room for one more petitioning-related conviction.

## Chengdu Implements Tiered Surveillance System Targeting "Persons of Concern"

23 March 2026, ChinaScope

Authorities in Chengdu, China have established a classified surveillance system targeting specific population groups, according to reports first circulated on the overseas social media platform X and subsequently verified by journalists through multiple local sources.
The system, executed at the neighborhood and police station level, categorizes residents into four alert tiers — red, orange, yellow, and blue — with red designating the highest level of monitoring. Six broad categories of people have been labeled "unreliable persons," including Tibetans, Uyghurs, Christians, unemployed individuals, Han Chinese who have worked in Xinjiang or Tibet, and those with mental illness, criminal records, or a history of petitioning the government. Officials have also expanded the classification in recent years from "three-loss-one-deviation" to "five-loss-one-deviation" groups, reflecting a widening net.
Sources familiar with the situation noted that enforcement intensifies during politically sensitive periods such as the annual National People's Congress session in March, when local governments enter a heightened stability-maintenance mode. During such periods, individuals on the watchlist may face home visits, restrictions on movement, or pressure channeled through landlords to vacate their residences.
The surveillance does not end when a person relocates. According to accounts gathered by journalists, individuals who move to other cities continue to be tracked for months, with authorities conducting follow-up checks at new addresses and monitoring travel records. Hotels in Chengdu are also required to report guests from Tibet and Xinjiang to the local police station — a practice said to have been in place for many years.
Members of unregistered Christian congregations, such as the Qiu Yu Covenant Reformed Church, reported that believers have long faced pressure to join state-sanctioned churches, with some detained or barred from gathering. Observers noted that similar surveillance practices are not unique to Chengdu but reflect a broader national trend of tightening control over designated population groups.

## Daughters of Political Prisoners Speak Out Against CCP

21 March 2026, NTD News Room

The daughters of political prisoners are speaking out against the Chinese Communist Party's persecution of their families.
At a press conference hosted by the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party on March 19, Grace Drexel explained how her father, Pastor Ezra Jin, was detained for his Christian ministry. Her father and 17 others in his church remain imprisoned.
Claire Lai is the daughter of imprisoned Hong Kong publisher Jimmy Lai, who was just handed a 20-year sentence for what human rights activists are calling a "direct attack on press freedom."
She calls her father's imprisonment a "death sentence."
Claire described the harsh punishment her father endures in solitary confinement.

## The Campus Front for Xi's World Vision

20 March 2026, Singua Sinica

A little-known academic network run by China's top communication university is looking to export Xi Jinping's vision of a new world order, one overseas campus at a time.



*Jean-Christophe Bas, founder and CEO of The Global Compass and director of the Institute for a Community with Shared Future in Germany, receives a certificate from Liao Xiangzhong, president of the Communication University of China, at a ceremony marking the launch of CUC's new Institute for a Community with Shared Future in Beijing, November 29, 2019.*

In early September 2025, 26 foreign leaders from around the world descended on Beijing for its Victory Day Parade, marking the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Asia. The week was packed with diplomatic festivities positioning China as the leader of a new multipolar world, including the 2025 summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Tianjin.

But one diplomatic development on the schedule evaded international media attention. That week, Cuba's ambassador to China, Alberto J. Blanco Silva, signed a wide-ranging joint media cooperation program with China — covering journalist training, academic exchanges, and documentary production — called the "Media Action Plan for Jointly Building a Sino-Cuban Community with a Shared Future." The plan was signed not as bilateral agreements generally are, with a Chinese government ministry or state media authority, but with the Communication University of China (CUC), an institution that has shaped generations of journalists for Chinese state media.

A readout released by CUC said the action plan, a roadmap for deeper media cooperation, would build media talent and capacity in Cuba through a series of programs, including the "Global South Media Development Summer School" and a "Sino-Cuban Media Young Scholars Program." Rather than centering on journalism, however, the mutual goals were defined as "deepening the cooperation [of] China and Cuba and telling a compelling story about a community with a shared future for mankind."



*Officials from Malaysia's UTAR (Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman) pose with faculty from the Communication University of China's Institute for a Community of Shared Future during a visit to the Beijing campus on October 27, 2025. SOURCE: CUC.*

This phrase, combining one of China's top slogans for global propaganda with a core Xi Jinping foreign policy concept, perfectly captures the dual mission of a little-known academic institute that is quietly building a worldwide network of university partners to legitimize China's vision of global governance. The initiative has a familiar antecedent in China's network of Confucius Institutes, state-funded Mandarin teaching programs embedded in universities around the world that have come under intense scrutiny in recent years. But by contrast, the fast-developing network of the CUC's Institute for a Community of Shared Future (ICSF) has largely flown under the radar.

**Who Needs Confucius?**

Established in 2019, the CUC's Institute for a Community of Shared Future (人类命运共同体研究院), or ICSF, is tasked with promoting the international acceptance of Xi Jinping's chief foreign policy and global governance concept, the "community of shared future for mankind," a proposed normative framework that for all of its apparent interest in shared human benefit is a Trojan Horse of foundational authoritarianism — placing the sovereignty of regimes above the rights of individuals. At its core, the concept suggests that all nations should submit to a China-led vision of global harmony in which development, security, and "civilizational" coexistence replace the liberal international order's emphasis on human rights, democratic governance, and rule of law.

Through its growing global academic network, the CUC's Beijing institute is serving as a launchpad, spreading Chinese state framing and talking points under the auspices of academic exchange — and developing a global cohort of young journalists and thinkers more amenable to this vision.

Since 2019, the ICSF has opened 23 Research Centers for Community with a Shared Future, or RCCSFs, across five continents, with the most active in countries such as Pakistan, Venezuela, Ethiopia, and Malaysia that are members of Xi Jinping's signature Belt and Road, a global trade and infrastructure development initiative.

Most of these are located within media and communication studies or China studies departments of universities and are headed by a single local faculty member. In some cases — such as in Ethiopia and South Korea — the center is established with a state media authority, providing a more direct channel to international media cooperation. The ICSF also offers an English-taught doctoral program in international communication and governance and claims an "international academic network for a community with shared future" with nine member institutes.

## China: Children Barred from Church Doors. A Mother Speaks Up

20 March 2026, Bitter Winter

Regulations prohibiting minors from entering churches are now strictly enforced.

We often say that children represent the future of both the country and the Church. In Matthew 19:14, Jesus said, "Let the little children come to me, and do not hinder them, for the kingdom of heaven belongs to such as these." Deuteronomy 6:7 instructs parents: "Impress them on your children. Talk about them when you sit at home

and when you walk along the road, when you lie down and when you get up." Many believers hope their children will grow up knowing the Lord's truth from an early age and learn to follow the right path.

However, under the updated Regulations on Religious Affairs, United Front Work Departments and Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureaus in several Chinese provinces—including Shandong, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and Henan—have issued rules enforcing a strict separation between religion and minors. These rules clearly ban anyone under 18 from entering religious venues to attend Mass or worship services. They also prohibit churches and religious groups from organizing youth training programs, summer camps, or winter camps. Community centers are not allowed to let children participate in any religious ceremonies or discussions. Believers who attend church gatherings must arrange childcare beforehand. Many Three-Self Patriotic Churches prominently display signs at their entrances that read "No entry for those under 18." While similar rules existed before, the new regulations are now strictly enforced.

My daughter showed a genuine love for the Lord from a young age. After hearing us share Bible stories at home, she would imitate adults, softly calling out "Oh, Lord Jesus," or humming simple hymns.

I still clearly remember the day we took her to a Sunday service. We were stopped at the church entrance and told, "Government regulations prohibit children from entering the church, and surveillance equipment is installed inside. Brothers and sisters who want to attend must first find someone else to care for their children." In that moment, our whole family felt a deep sense of helplessness and sorrow.

The church is the body of Christ and the Lord's home, yet one notice kept us from bringing our children inside. This not only places a heavy burden on many believers with young children but also leaves countless parents in a state of regret. Authorities may argue that these measures are in place to maintain order, but when we see the innocent eyes of children searching for truth, we feel profound sadness and can only pray for them.

May the shining beacon, the blessed cross, and the Father's warm house once again fill with the clear laughter and songs of children.

## Liu Guozhi, former top PLA scientist and nuclear test commander, delisted from CAS website

18 March 2026, SCMP

A former top-ranking scientist in the Chinese military and one-time nuclear test site commander, Liu Guozhi, has been removed from the website of the country's top national research institute.



In 2016, Liu was named head of the science and technology commission of the Central Military Commission – China's top military decision-making and command body – a position he is believed to have held until the early 2020s.

Liu, 65, was elected to the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in 2009. Some Chinese bloggers on Thursday noted that his profile was no longer listed on the site.

Liu is a high-power microwave weapon expert, according to his profile on the Tsinghua University alumni association. He graduated from Tsinghua's engineering physics department in 1983, and received his master's and doctoral degrees from there in 1986 and 1992.

Between 1986 and 2002, he worked at the Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology, an institute in Xian, Shaanxi province, where he rose through the ranks to become director.

What China's swift ousting of two top military generals means for the PLA

The multidisciplinary applied physics research institute was established in 1963, with a focus on nuclear science and technology. Its main research directions include radiation detection, radiation effects, pulsed power technology, electromagnetic field and electromagnetic wave technology, laser technology and explosion shock dynamics.

In 2010, when his profile was posted by Tsinghua, Liu was the commander and a researcher at China's only nuclear testing site at Lop Nur in Xinjiang.

"He has long been engaged in research and system development of pulsed power and high-power microwave technology," it said. "His research has resulted in notable achievements, including a practical GW [gigawatt] high-power microwave source and system."

His removal from the top research body comes as Beijing steps up its long-running campaign against corruption in the military and defence industry.

The profile of the J-20 stealth fighter jet's chief designer, Yang Wei, has also been removed from the CAS site, as discovered on Monday.

Days earlier, three top nuclear weapons, radar and missile experts, all members of the Chinese

Academy of Engineering, were scrubbed from the academy's website.
These removals were noted by Chinese media outlets.
Liu visited Tsinghua's physics department in his capacity as a general and deputy minister of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Armaments Department, according to a 2011 Tsinghua post. The post documented the unveiling of a plaque on the wall for academicians to honour Liu. The department was replaced by the Equipment Development Department in 2016.
The post said Liu had talked to students about how to conduct fundamental research aligned with national defence needs, convert basic research findings into defence technologies and inspire students to dedicate themselves to the national defence endeavour.
He spoke at the Beijing Computational Science Research Centre in 2023 about advances in terahertz biophysics research, according to the centre, which gave his title as chief scientist of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences.
"In recent years, [Liu's] research has concentrated on terahertz biophysics and complex systems science. He has put forward several conjectures on the physical mechanism of biological nervous systems and has actively promoted the new research field of terahertz biophysics," it said of Liu's work.THz waves or T-waves are electromagnetic waves located between microwaves and infrared rays on the electromagnetic spectrum.
THz radiation underpins fundamental studies and applications, including "spectroscopy, imaging, sensing and wireless communications in physics; probing hydration dynamics, hydrogen bonding, molecular vibrations and phase behaviour in chemistry; and investigating biological systems from molecules and macromolecules to cells and organs", according to a 2025 review article published in the peer-reviewed journal Research by scientists in China and the US.

## Quan Shixin hoped to return home after serving her sentence. Only, there was no home left.

17 March 2025, Bitter Winter

When Beijing activist Quan Shixin stepped out of prison at the end of 2025, she carried just the clothes on her back and the hope that her old village home, a humble place she had inherited and legally owned, would still be standing. Instead, she found a construction site. The house where she grew up and had defended for years with petitions and public complaints was quietly flattened while she served her sentence. The woman who had been jailed for defending her land rights had lost her land because she had been jailed.



*Quan Shixin protesting her home's demolition. Social media.*

Quan had been detained after talking to foreign media about the surveillance she faced. The official charges were unclear, but the message was obvious. She spent nearly three years in detention, which included hunger strikes and forced feeding. However, nothing in prison prepared her for the shock of returning to a place that no longer existed. She walked around in disbelief, trying to match the new landscape of cranes and mud with her childhood memories. "I thought I had taken the wrong road," she said later. "Then I realized the road was right. Everything else was gone."
The demolition happened months after her arrest. Notices were posted while she was already in custody. No one informed her family, and no one stored her belongings. Even her spare clothes disappeared with the rubble. The house had long been part of a "green buffer zone," a label that officials used for years to delay any formal decision. But once Quan was safely behind bars, the process sped up. By the time she was released, the village committee had been dissolved, the administrative structure changed, and the only entity anyone pointed her to was the demolition company itself.
Her attempts to get an explanation turned into a familiar bureaucratic journey. On March 4, 2026, in sleet and freezing rain, she traveled from the municipal petition office to the district office to the township office. Each redirected her to the next with the smooth efficiency of a system designed to avoid responsibility. The city claimed the district was in charge. The district said the township was in charge. The township stated that the village no longer existed as an administrative unit. The "project preparation committee" told her to negotiate directly with the demolition company, as if a private contractor had assumed the state's authority.
For Quan, the absurdity was almost as painful as the loss. "I am a registered rural resident," she said. "They demolished my home without a word. Now the government tells me to talk to a company. Since when does a company decide citizens' rights?"
She now lives with a chronic illness, no income, and no roof over her head. Yet her voice has only

grown stronger. She has publicly accused the demolition company of illegal land occupation and collusion with local interests. She has challenged authorities to arrest her again, explaining that prison at least provides a bed and meals. "I have no house, no money, and no health," she said. "If they want to jail me again, I won't resist. It would save me the trouble of surviving out here."

Her story starkly illustrates how punishment can go far beyond a prison sentence. When power and profit align, a dissident's absence becomes an opportunity. A home can be erased as easily as a file in an office drawer. And when the victim returns, the system presents only a maze of closed doors and vanished institutions.

## The Battle of Lufeng: A City Revolts Against a Ban on Religious Fireworks

12 March 2026, Bitter Winter

Scooters, faith, and the smartphone rebellion: how a Guangdong city successfully defied the police.



*Protesters launch fireworks, defying the ban.*

In China, fireworks serve as a political tool. The government celebrates itself with dazzling displays during Party anniversaries and state ceremonies. However, these same authorities frequently restrict or ban fireworks during religious events or local traditions. This contradiction is widely disliked, and in early March, it sparked an unexpected revolt in Lufeng, Guangdong. Thousands of residents faced off against police, using their most powerful tool: the smartphone. They recorded every confrontation, threatening to reveal the repression both within China and beyond. What began as a ban on firecrackers became a rare instance of collective resistance.

Lufeng's Youshen, or the Parade of the Gods, is the city's most significant annual folk celebration. Every Lunar New Year, villagers greet visiting deities with heaps of firecrackers and fireworks. The streets fill with smoke, noise, and a sense of communal spirit. Locals describe this ritual as a "battlefield" of blessings, offering prayers for a life that thrives and is prosperous. In 2026, however, authorities imposed a sweeping ban on firecrackers during the festival. They ignored strong opposition from residents who viewed the ban as an attack on their identity and a clear example of the state's selective tolerance: fireworks for the Party, silence for the gods. Fireworks are the very center of the Youshen festival: no fireworks, no festival.

The first spark ignited on March 5. Young people, refusing to accept the ban, rode through the city on electric scooters, launching fireworks in open defiance. Several were detained, but the arrests only fueled the anger. Videos of the detentions spread quickly, delivering a clear message: if authorities used force, the entire country would see it.



*A young protester is detained by the police.*

On March 6, the night before the festival's grand finale, the government sent hundreds of police officers to the city center to try to stop further resistance. Instead, even more young people flocked to Donghai Subdistrict, home to the City God Temple.

They carried fireworks in backpacks and baskets, weaving through the streets on scooters.



*Protesters challenge the police on their scooters.*

Some followed police cars, igniting firecrackers behind them as a challenge. Police made additional arrests, but crowds responded by blocking roads, building barricades, and surrounding police vehicles to prevent officers from taking detainees away.

Shortly after midnight on March 7, tensions peaked. When police tried to grab a man who was rallying the crowd, residents pushed back. In other areas, officers seeking to detain citizens found themselves surrounded by hundreds of people.

Overwhelmed and outnumbered, the police retreated from the city center.

What followed was a spontaneous explosion throughout the city. Residents unveiled their hidden fireworks stashes. For hours, the sky lit up with color and noise. Firecrackers echoed from every alley and rooftop. Lufeng transformed into a single, continuous wave of defiance.

The fireworks continued until 8:00 a.m., when the festival's peak arrived: the City God was carried out of the Chenghuang Temple. He began his solemn procession through the streets, accompanied by the very thunderous soundtrack the authorities had tried to ban.

Activists or political groups did not lead the Lufeng uprising. It was an unplanned defense of tradition, dignity, and local self-rule. Its most powerful tool was the smartphone.

Residents recorded every arrest, every clash, every retreat. The threat of exposure became a shield, and the regime's attempt to silence a ritual ultimately intensified it



*The City God is carried through the streets.*

Lufeng's rebellion raises a broader question: was this an isolated spark, or the first sign that China's strict control over local traditions is reaching its limits?



*The festival was not stopped: citizens celebrate their "victory."*

## The Great Broadcasting Retreat

12 March 2026, CMD

Sometimes "streamlining" is just another name for deep and painful attrition. Over the past two years, this and other euphemisms — like "optimization" and "transformation" — have swept like a wildfire across China's local broadcast sector. Taken together, they tell a simple story about the rapid contraction of local television and radio under a barrage of cost-cutting directives from the central government. The goal is two-fold: cutting costs, and shifting resources toward newer forms of digital production — part of a broader rebuilding of China's media infrastructure that the China Media Project has called "Centralization+."

Announcing the closure of two of its local channels this month, the top state-run broadcasting group in the municipality of Chongqing spoke of "optimizing and integrating




media resources" and "adapting to new trends in media convergence." In practice, this meant shutting down channels the government considers redundant and shifting resources — money, staff, and content — away from traditional broadcast and onto the internet and digital products. The announcement, released by China's main broadcasting authority, SARFT, makes clear that Chongqing is following directives from the government and national work conferences. This isn't a local editorial choice but a centrally directed plan.

Chongqing is not an isolated case. It is part of a nationwide wave of broadcast closures that has been accelerating since 2023, when SARFT launched its campaign to "streamline and specialize" China's radio and television landscape. According to the Chinese industry tracker website Shexiangren Wang (摄像人网), at least 51 TV channels were shut down across China in 2024, and in 2025 that number jumped to at least 75, hitting provincial-level broadcasters in Shanghai, Gansu, Shaanxi, Jiangxi, Xinjiang, and Hunan, among others. Guiyang, the capital of Guizhou province, became the first provincial capital in the country to be reduced to a single television channel in 2025. A separate report from SARFT's research center confirmed that 79 channels and frequencies were formally eliminated in 2024.

Part of the story is how uncompetitive local channels have become, owing both to technological change and to institutional inertia:

CCP-run media tend to be inflexible and formulaic, shaped by the bureaucratic structures that govern them. Shexiangren Wang notes that education channels offered little beyond policy meetings. TV shopping, with its long-duration pitches and infrequent purchases, could not match the speed and scale of e-commerce — what Shexiangren Wang called the "short, fast, and flat" model of online retail. Movie and drama channels, meanwhile, were stuck with aging content and shrinking advertising revenue. The closures have targeted public channels, education channels, shopping channels, and movie and drama channels — categories the government considers redundant or uncompetitive with internet platforms, all outpaced by digital offerings delivering the same content faster and on demand.

The campaign of attrition at local broadcasters does not seem to be slowing down. The Shexiangren Wang report indicates that Guangdong, Sichuan, and Shenzhen are all expected to close or merge additional channels in 2026. The broader pattern is clear: the government is shrinking traditional broadcast — meaning fewer channels and fewer editorial voices — while redirecting money, talent, and content toward digital offerings.

Rather than a simple retreat from broadcast, the closures reflect a deliberate reorientation. The Chongqing announcement calls on the group to "fortify the main position of internet communication" (筑牢互联网传播主阵地) — language drawn from a broader Party framework that treats media platforms as ideological territory to be held and defended. It also calls for "systematically transforming mainstream media" (推进主流媒体系统性变革) — a phrase that carries specific weight in the Chinese context, where "mainstream media" refers to Party-run outlets tasked with setting the public agenda and shaping opinion. A 2025 *People's Daily* article used the same language to describe Party media's role as the frontline of ideological control, calling on mainstream state outlets to "advance onto the internet main battlefield" (挺进互联网主战场) as a "main force" (主力军).

The imperative is to remake those outlets into something citizens will actually use. That is a hard sell in a media landscape dominated by platforms like Bilibili, a video site built on user-generated entertainment, and Xiaohongshu, known outside China as RedNote, a lifestyle and social commerce platform where hundreds of millions of users go for content that is personal, playful, and not entirely oriented around the ideological goals of the party-state.

Rather than a simple retreat from broadcast, the closures reflect a deliberate reorientation.

While real success in the media market will likely remain a challenge, the authorities seem encouraged by the numbers for new state-led digital offerings. Provincial state media app downloads grew by an average of nearly 35 percent in 2024 — 34.9 percent in downloads and 45.2 percent in registered users — according to SARFT's research center's annual report. Platforms like Mango TV (芒果TV), a video streaming platform under the state-run Hunan Broadcasting System; Elephant News (大象新闻), an app-based news product from Henan's provincial broadcaster; and Touch News (触电新闻), the digital product from Guangdong's provincial broadcaster, each crossed 100 million downloads, with 28 provincial apps surpassing 10 million.

The closures and the digital push are, in the end, two sides of the same coin: a leaner broadcast sector that costs less to maintain, and a rebuilt online presence the Party hopes will keep it not just relevant, but dominant, where the public's attention has shifted.

One issue conspicuously absent from the official framing of these closures is what happens to the people who worked there. The announcements speak of "optimizing resources," but say nothing about how employees at Chongqing Economic Radio or the Fashion Shopping Channel — the outlets impacted by the most recent restructuring in Chongqing — might have been affected. Precise figures on job losses across the sector are difficult to come by. Official announcements are silent on the question, and broadcasters do not typically publish staff counts. The data that does exist points in one direction. Beijing's broadcast sector alone shed more than 2,600 jobs in 2024, according to an annual statistical report from its city-level broadcast authority. The nationwide toll, across more than 125 channels closed in 2024 and 2025, is almost certainly substantial.

## China, Zhonggong Was Supposed to Be Dead—But Keeps Being Arrested

03 March 2026, Bitter Winter

Two months after a court verdict in Shanxi, repression continues. It reveals something Beijing does not want to admit: Zhonggong is alive.

For a movement the CCP proudly declared "eradicated" in 2016, Zhonggong has an uncanny habit of reappearing in police bulletins. The latest example arrived in February 2026, when the China Anti Xie Jiao Association triumphantly published a long report celebrating the downfall of a "criminal cult" in Shanxi. The propaganda tone was familiar; the details, however, told a different story. Once again, the Party was forced to acknowledge—indirectly and with great irritation—that Zhonggong continues to exist, to organize, and to worry the Ministry of Public Security.

The case centers on Yang Dongmei, a 70-year-old woman from Changzhi, sentenced in November 2025 to seven years in prison for "using superstition to undermine the implementation of

the law," the standard charge applied to members of xie jiao, an expression translated as "evil cults" but that in fact means "organizations spreading heterodox teachings." The verdict was final, yet the propaganda machine waited two months before publicizing it—an unusual delay that suggests the authorities wanted to package the case as a model victory in the ongoing campaign against Zhonggong.

The official narrative is predictable: Yang allegedly rebuilt a "criminal pyramid," invented "superstitious healing rituals," and extracted money from gullible followers. The report describes a three-tier structure, 200 members, and a "cultural hall" confiscated as illegal property. This "cultural hall" was in fact the "Ancestor Culture Museum" (始祖文化馆)—a modest building that, according to the CCP, was an "illegal temple" but, according to locals, was little more than a community space where Qigong practitioners met. Its dramatic seizure and publicized demolition were clearly meant to symbolize the state's victory over a movement it insists no longer exists.



*Inside the "Ancestor Culture Museum." Screenshot.*

But beneath the slogans, the story reveals something far more significant.

Zhonggong, founded in 1987 by Zhang Hongbao, was once one of the largest Qigong movements in China, with tens of millions of followers and support from high-ranking Party officials. After Zhang fled to the United States in 2000 and died in 2006, Beijing insisted the movement had been dismantled. In fact, it had reorganized abroad under Zhang's secretary, Zhang Xiao, who rebuilt a clandestine network inside China under various names. During the COVID-19 pandemic, her anti-COVID Qigong exercises spread widely, prompting renewed alarm within the Ministry of Public Security.

The 2021 prosecution of Sun Xuhui, leader of another Zhonggong faction in Shandong, already showed that the movement had not disappeared. The new Shanxi case confirms that the CCP's "success story" was largely fictional.




*Yang Dongmei's police ID. Screenshot.*

The propaganda report unintentionally provides the evidence. It describes a network operating across several provinces, with coordinated gatherings, printed materials, badges, and a hierarchy of organizers. It claims that police intercepted 31 people traveling to a "traditional culture study meeting" in 2022—an event that, according to the CCP, should not have been possible if Zhonggong had truly been eliminated. It also notes that Yang had previously been imprisoned in 2005 for leading a Zhonggong-related group. Yet, after her release, she was able to reconnect with a national network and rebuild a local structure.

This is not the profile of a movement that vanished twenty years ago. It is the profile of a group that survived underground, adapted, and continues to attract followers despite relentless repression.

The CCP's accusations follow the standard template: "superstition," "fraud," "pyramid structure," "mental control," "family destruction," and "social instability." These are the same charges used against Falun Gong, The Church of Almighty God, and every other banned religious or spiritual group. Rather than descriptions of actual crimes, they are ideological labels designed to justify harsh sentences. The report's insistence that Yang "forced members to donate" or "sold cosmic energy cards" is part of the ritualized language of anti-xie jiao propaganda, not evidence.

What the report does not explain is why hundreds of people—mostly elderly, according to the police—would risk arrest to attend Qigong gatherings, or why Zhonggong continues to attract followers decades after its founder's exile and death. The answer, of course, is that the CCP has never been able to eliminate the demand for alternative spiritual practices, especially those that promise health, meaning, and community in a society where traditional structures have eroded. The Party offers only ideology and surveillance.

The repression of Zhonggong is not a story about "protecting the people," as the propaganda claims. It is a story about a government terrified of any organization it does not control. The report, intended as a victory lap, instead reads like an admission of failure: Zhonggong is still there, still organizing, still attracting followers, and still provoking the CCP's fear.

If the movement had truly been eradicated, Beijing would not need to keep arresting its members—or writing long articles insisting that the job is done.

## China's secret Liuzhi detention used on more than 200,000 cases

03 March 2026, Safeguard Defenders

This weekend, on Saturday, February 28, the Party's feared internal police organ, the CCDI

(Central Commission for Discipline Inspection) made its annual work report public. Like its previous reports covering 2023 and 2024, it includes data on the acknowledged number of cases in which the *Liuzhi* system has been employed, showing a record-breaking 47,000 cases in 2025.

The new work report shows a staggering 24% increase in 2025 from a year earlier in the number of people placed in *Liuzhi* , which is essentially a system of extra-legal black jails used to detain Party members and state functionaries for up to six months, at secret locations and without any legal remedy. The system, like the CCDI itself, exists outside the State and is not a law-enforcement body. As the tables below show, this year's work report contains less detailed data compared with previous years, but it does indicate an increase in the number of investigations launched (up 15.4%) and punishments issued (up 10.6%).

| Investigations, punishments and Liuzhi usage | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| # of investigations | 638.000 | 619.000 | 618.000 | 631.000 | 596.000 | 626.000 | 877.000 | 1.012.000 | 5.617.000 |
| # of punishments | 621.000 | 587.000 | 604.000 | 627.000 | 592.000 | 610.000 | 889.000 | 983.000 | 5.513.000 |
| # of Liuzhi | 24.840 | 23.480 | 24.160 | 25.080 | 23.680 | 26.000 | 38.000 | 47.000 | 232.240 |

The number of investigations launched and punishments meted out now surpasses 5 million for the period 2018–2025, while the number of *Liuzhi* cases now far exceeds 200,000 (232,240). Each use of *Liuzhi*, as prior reporting from several groups—including Human Rights Watch—has shown, involves a high prevalence of torture inside the system. These detentions are, in effect, arrests and imprisonment at secret locations by an internal political Party organ, not a law-enforcement entity. Every single use of *Liuzhi* constitutes arbitrary detention and, in most cases, enforced disappearance, with solitary confinement used as a tool to isolate the target.

While the data on the use of *Liuzhi* for 2018–2022 are internal SD estimates—since no such national-level data were previously available, aside from limited provincial figures published earlier by SD—data from 2023 onward come directly from the CCDI. These show significant growth from 26,000 cases in 2023 to 47,000 cases in 2025.

**CCDI** — The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) is tasked with ensuring compliance, political correctness, and loyalty among the Party's 95 million members. Most of its work is carried out by Discipline Inspection Commissions (CDIs) at the provincial level and below.

**Liuzhi** — "Retention in custody" is part of an internal CCP system for detention and investigation and is not part of the State's criminal justice system. While in Liuzhi, which is ordered solely by the CCDI without any external oversight or approval, the detainee must, by regulation, be




held in solitary confinement, denied access to legal counsel (as this is not a legal process), and prevented from any form of communication. The target is, by design, held incommunicado. Locations vary—from custom-built facilities to Party-run hotels, guesthouses, and offices—and must not be disclosed, meaning the person is, by any definition, disappeared. Detention can last up to six months. There is no external appeal mechanism.

As noted above, the new work report does not include a breakdown of the "four forms" of punishment, but the table below provides this breakdown for previous years and explains what the "four forms" entail.

| # Form 3 and 4 vs Liuzhi use | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| # of Form 3 and 4 punishments | 137.000 | 140.000 | 139.000 | 144.000 | 128.000 | 130.000 | 145.000 | N/A | 963.000 |
| # of Liuzhi | 24.840 | 23.480 | 24.160 | 25.080 | 23.680 | 26.000 | 38.000 | 47.000 | 232.240 |
| % of Form 3 and 4 using Liuzhi | 18.13% | 16.77% | 17.38% | 17.42% | 18.50% | 20.00% | 26.21% | N/A | N/A |
| % of all punishments using Liuzhi | # of Liuzhi based on 4% estimate | | | | | 4.26% | 4.27% | 4.78% | N/A |

The table below, drawing on official data for 2023–2025 and SD estimates for 2018–2022, also shows an increase in how often the *Liuzhi* system is used during the investigatory phase, rising from 4.27% in 2024 to 4.78% in 2025.

| # Punishments by class | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Form 1 (minor misconduct, criticism) | 1.104.000 | 1.246.000 | 1.330.000 | 1.487.000 | 1.232.000 | 1.096.000 | 1.248.000 | N/A | 8.743.000 |
| Form 2 (light punishment, position adjustment) | 495.000 | 463.000 | 485.000 | 494.000 | 478.000 | 492.000 | 756.000 | N/A | 3.663.000 |
| Form 3 (heavy punishment, major position adjustment) | 82.000 | 72.000 | 71.000 | 70.000 | 64.000 | 64.000 | 72.000 | N/A | 495.000 |
| Form 4 (serious cases, criminal investigation, prosecution) | 55.000 | 68.000 | 68.000 | 74.000 | 64.000 | 66.000 | 73.000 | N/A | 468.000 |
| Total | 1.736.000 | 1.849.000 | 1.954.000 | 2.125.000 | 1.838.000 | 1.718.000 | 2.149.000 | N/A | 13.369.000 |

Given the irrefutable data and the very design of the system—which constitutes enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention, as it is not part of any legal process—combined with the UN General Assembly's position that prolonged solitary confinement (more than two weeks) used for investigatory rather than disciplinary purposes constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture,

which the PRC has ratified) and torture (Article 1), we call on the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to, as they did with the similar RSDL system in 2018, forcefully and directly condemn the *Liuzhi* system on these grounds.

# TIBET'S ECOLOGY & RIVER WATERS

## China reveals new key mineral discoveries

19 March 2026, KangbaTV

China has announced new mineral discoveries, including rare earth and other key deposits that have recently been identified in southwestern and northwestern regions, according to the Ministry of Natural Resources.

Rare earth elements, fluorite, barite and antimony were identified in Mianning county, Sichuan province, and Dangchang county in Gansu province, the ministry said on Wednesday.

The findings mark the latest progress in China's new round of mineral exploration efforts. During the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021–25), the campaign has delivered remarkable results, including the discovery of 10 oil fields, each with reserves exceeding 100 million metric tons, and 19 large gas fields, the ministry said.

Reserves of key minerals such as uranium, copper, gold, lithium and potash have also increased substantially. A number of world-class resource bases have emerged in recent years, including a copper deposit exceeding 100 million tons in Xizang autonomous region, a super-large gold mine in Laizhou, Shandong province, and Asia's largest single lithium deposit in Yajiang, Sichuan province, the ministry said.

## China's First National Ecological and Environmental Code, Explained

13 March 2026, Sixthtone

The code provides a systemic legal framework for farm fires, pollutants, and human-wildlife conflicts, as well as carbon markets and environmental rights.China's National People's Congress approved the nation's first Ecological and Environmental Code on Thursday, the final day of the annual Two Sessions political meetings in Beijing.

The code, which will take effect on Aug. 15, replaces 10 existing environmental laws and establishes a legal framework for areas previously lacking dedicated legislation, including climate change, carbon neutrality, and the green transition, addressing tensions between economic development and environmental protection.

The goal of building a "climate-resilient society" is now enshrined in national law for the first time, as climate disasters have prompted stronger early-warning systems and improved disaster response.

After adopting its first comprehensive code on civil affairs in 2020, China began drafting a second code on ecological and environmental protection in 2023. According to legal analysts, the code's real impact will depend on coordination among government agencies and how supporting regulations evolve.

Here are some of the highlights.

**New pollutants**

China's existing regulations primarily target traditional pollutants. The new code adds provisions targeting "persistent organic pollutants," such as perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), a group of hard-to-degrade chemicals known as "forever chemicals" that once polluted tap water in cities along the Yangtze River.

The code also says national authorities will curb rising light pollution by setting brightness limits for products such as outdoor displays and traffic lighting.

**Farm fires**

Experts have for years debated whether to relax China's longstanding ban on burning crop stalks. The burning helps clear pests and improve soil fertility, but also causes air pollution, and the ban has placed heavy pressure on local officials.

In response, the new code loosens the ban, limiting it to populated areas, transportation hubs, and other designated zones and timeframes.

"One of the code's key contributions is providing a stable, clear, and predictable legal framework for grassroots governance," Yuan Fangcheng, a professor at the School of Government at Shenzhen University, told Sixth Tone. Areas where burning remains prohibited, he said, require "more supporting policies to build a chain for utilizing crop stalks, including storage and transport systems, market-based consumption channels, and fiscal subsidies."

Yuan added that the drafting of supporting local policies should take into account different crop structures and climate conditions, and introduce education measures for farmers who commit minor violations.

New balance

After decades of wildlife protection efforts, recovering animal populations have in recent years increasingly wandered into villages, onto high-speed rail tracks, and even into milk tea shops across China. Such incidents have led authorities to revise the list of protected species, deploy wild boar hunters, and set up food banks for elephants to lure them away from crops.

The new code now seeks to balance the protection of human life and property with biodiversity conservation, legally requiring local authorities for the first time to consider the "reasonable survival and breeding needs of wildlife" when setting livestock capacity limits on grasslands.

It also incorporates a 2023 revision to the Wildlife Protection Law, exempting people who harm protected wildlife "in emergencies that threaten personal safety" from legal repercussions.

**Carbon market**

The new code highlights standalone sections on "pollution control," "ecological conservation," and "green and low-carbon development," with legal analysts emphasizing that the former two goals are not mutually exclusive, but rather, can work together to support future development.

The green and low-carbon development section establishes overarching provisions for areas that previously lacked dedicated laws, such as climate change, the green transition, and carbon markets, where companies buy and sell carbon emission permits.

"This marks a substantive leap in China's carbon market, shifting it toward law-based governance," Hu Min, director and co-founder of the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress, told Sixth Tone.

The code emphasizes that "the goals of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality should be fully integrated into national development planning" as part of efforts to mitigate climate change.

China aims to peak its carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. The code highlights the role of both the mandatory national carbon market and voluntary greenhouse gas market in achieving its objectives.

The carbon trading market was launched in 2021, targeting the power sector, and expanded in 2025 to include the steel, cement, and aluminum industries, increasing emissions coverage from about 40% to more than 60%. Meanwhile, the voluntary greenhouse gas emission trading market, in which companies can use credits to fulfill their own carbon-neutrality commitments or sell them to companies in the compliance market, began operating in 2024.

**The green transition**

China is the world's largest solar power market, with a total installed solar power capacity of 1.2 billion kilowatts. Most solar panels have a lifespan of only about 30 years, and by 2050, around 20 million tons of panel waste is anticipated to have accumulated in the country.

The country's booming EV industry faces a similar challenge. By 2027, retired EV battery waste is projected to exceed 1 million tons, while unauthorized dismantling of e-bike batteries has caused deadly explosions that have shocked the country.

The new code calls for stronger pollution controls on retired solar panels, power batteries, and decommissioned wind turbine blades, requiring safe dismantling and disposal.

A series of tokamak clean-energy projects has also made headlines in recent years. These "artificial sun" reactors replicate the nuclear fusion reactions that power the sun and are designed to advance China's long-term green ambitions.

The code also calls for a radioactive pollution control system for such nuclear fusion facilities.

**"Ecological and environmental rights"**

Experts have also highlighted that the code entitles citizens to "ecological and environmental rights" in its first article.

Gao Lihong, a law professor at Zhongnan University of Economics and Law and vice chair of the Chinese Society of Environmental and Resources Law, explained that these include the

right to clean air, safe drinking water, and a healthy environment; the right to information, participation, and supervision on environmental matters; and the right to seek remedies for environmental damage.

**Toward integration**

Finally, the code's name — which places "ecological" before "environmental" — reflects a shift in China's governance philosophy, according to legal experts.

"By emphasizing 'ecology' rather than simply 'environment,' the legislation has moved from regulating natural elements separately to a more systemic and coordinated model of protection," Gao told Sixth Tone.

China's environmental legal framework was previously structured around individual natural elements, such as the ocean and the atmosphere, as well as specific regions, including the Yellow River and the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, resulting in inconsistent penalties for comparable violations.

Yuan, the Shenzhen professor, added that the code also addresses longstanding governance challenges in rural areas, such as unreliable monitoring data and gaps in enforcement. One key change is that county-level environmental authorities are now formally granted enforcement powers, which may help to improve regulatory efficiency.

Gao also noted that the code "leaves room for sector-specific laws and local legislation to evolve and respond to changing environmental conditions"; once it takes effect, existing environmental laws can be repealed or revised, while new legislation for emerging areas will be developed.

"The code is not the final step in China's environmental legislation, but the beginning of building an environmental legal system," she said. "It is a summary of the past, and the start of a new chapter."

## China's solar power projects in Tibet seen as grey zone warfare installations

04 March 2026, Tibetan Review

More than just clean energy sources, China's sprawling solar farms in Tibet may be vital military strategic assets, going by their tell-tale locations across India's border, according to a *moneycontrol.com* opinion piece Mar 4.

Tibet Autonomous Region, the western half of Tibet proper, now hosts over 200 solar plants and farms of varying scales, the piece said, citing a recent geospatial research by the Takshashila Institution. The total installed solar capacity of projects above 20 MW alone stands at over 9,300 MW, with 74 operational and 20 more to come. In 2025 itself, the region added 2,600 MW from just two project.

These include the world's highest photovoltaic station which China has commissioned at 5,200 metres above sea level, generating 150 megawatts from panels engineered to work where most equipment fails. And what looks on paper like a renewable energy programme appears on a map like something else entirely, the piece pointed out.

Tibet's capital Lhasa alone accounts for over 100 documented solar installations. The region receives solar radiation between 5,852 and 8,400 MJ/m² per year, placing it alongside the Atacama and Sahara deserts as one of the sunniest places on Earth. China has clearly grasped what this means.

While these are impressive figures, the more revealing story lies not in capacity figures but in the strategic places where these installations are located. Satellite imagery and spatial analysis show that a significant number of solar projects are located near military airfields, listening posts, radar stations, highways, and railway lines, Prof Nithiyanandam Yogeswaran of the Takshashila Institution, who wrote the opinion piece, has pointed out.

Around Shigatse Peace Airport, a facility that began life as a military base in 1973, three solar farms covering nearly three square kilometres have come up since 2020, he has noted. In Gar County, a 30 MW solar farm sits just three kilometres from a Circularly Disposed Antenna Array, a sophisticated military listening post with two rings of 11 antennas each. The farm was built from ground clearance to full operation in under three months. Near Pangong Tso, compact solar arrays have been installed within fenced compounds to power radar equipment on a militarised mountain slope.

Employing technological prowess to overcome natural challenges, these projects deploy bifacial panels, AI-driven monitoring systems, grid-integrated battery storage, and thermal energy storage pits to counter seasonal variation.

Prof Yogeswaran has noted that Near Shigatse, a newly built solar farm features what appears to be a 100-metre-by-100-metre thermal energy storage reservoir, designed to store heat and address winter shortfalls. Battery storage units at sites like Mahang ensure an uninterrupted supply even when snow blankets the panels in December. These are not experimental fixes. They are operational solutions, deployed at scale, in some of the harshest conditions on the planet, he has pointed out.

* * *

According to him, what China is doing in Tibet fits squarely within the definition of grey zone warfare: the use of tools and activities that fall below the threshold of conventional military conflict but steadily alter the strategic balance.

What makes these renewable energy infrastructure strategic is the fact that they are systematically co-located with military installations, that they enable year-round habitation in previously seasonal border settlements, that they power the expansion of permanent towns within striking distance of

Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh, and that the electricity they generate feed into transmission corridors that could eventually supply other regions. According to Prof Yogeswaran, the cumulative effect is strategic, not environmental.
What also makes these projects a matter of geostrategic concern is the fact that they have been built with urgency to meet emergency needs. For example, the Gar County solar farm was built in under 90 days, with the infrastructure being hardened against disruption, because solar and battery systems do not depend on fuel convoys across mountain passes.
While India tends to discuss China's activities in Tibet through the lens of hydropower and dam-building on the Yarlung Tsangpo, the solar expansion deserves equal, if not greater, scrutiny. It is quieter, faster, more dispersed, and harder to contest diplomatically, the piece said.

## China begins operating Eiffel Tower-tall hydroelectric power station in eastern Tibet

02 March 2026, Tibetan Review

China has just switched on a new giant hydroelectric power station in eastern Tibet that could generate about 11 billion kilowatt hours of electricity every year. The Lianghekou hydropower plant now ranks as the PRC's highest-altitude mega hydropower station, with a dam almost as tall as the Eiffel Tower and a power output of 3,000 megawatts, reported the *scmp.com* Mar 1.
The hydropower plant is also part of an ongoing, 4.2-GW hybrid project, the world's largest pumped hydro energy storage facility which China is about to complete. The final aim is to combine large dams, solar farms, wind parks and pumped storage for a new demonstration zone in the area.
Meanwhile, the report cited officials as saying the hydropower project could cut raw coal use by more than 13 million tons and avoid about 21 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions each year, compared with equivalent coal generation.
Lianghekou sits on the main stem of the Yalong River in Yajiang County (Tibetan: Nyagchu Dzong), within the Garze (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, formerly part of eastern Tibet's Kham province but now part of Sichuan Province of the PRC. The Yalong is a key tributary of the Yangtze River and one of China's most important hydropower corridors, the report noted.
The dam rises about 295 metres and holds back a reservoir designed to store roughly 10.8 billion cubic metres of water. Construction began in 2014 and the final turbine was connected to the grid in Mar 2022, after an investment of around 66.5 billion yuan, roughly 10.5 billion US dollars, the report noted.
The dam project entailed the relocation of over 4,900 residents during its construction, according to a report cited by a *Wikipedia* report.
The water from the dam does more than spin turbines, with the station helping to regulate flows for a chain of downstream dams, which boosts overall power generation and reduces flood risk in the wider Yangtze basin, the report noted.
Hydropower plants like Lianghekou are sometimes described as the "anchor" of the grid. Unlike solar farms that rely on sunshine or turbines that wait for wind, a big dam can usually deliver power at any hour, then ramp up or down as demand changes, the report noted.
The report cited Chinese planners as saying the station's 11 billion kilowatt hours of annual output will support economic hubs such as the Chengdu Chongqing region and help stabilize power supplies in Sichuan, a province that has struggled with summer blackouts during heat waves.
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The project is also part of a wider clean energy buildout along the Yalong. The developer, Yalong River Hydropower Development Company Ltd., is stated to aim to turn the basin into a massive demonstration zone that combines large dams, solar farms, wind parks and pumped storage.
Lianghekou is already working hand in hand with one of the world's largest high-altitude solar plants. About 50 kilometres away, the Kela photovoltaic project, also located in eastern Tibet's Yalong River Basin, adds one gigawatt of solar capacity and can produce around two billion kilowatt hours of electricity per year.
During bright, dry months when reservoirs are relatively low, the solar plant picks up the slack. In the rainy season, when the river is roaring, hydropower does most of the heavy lifting and the dam can dial back to accommodate changes in solar output, the report noted.
The report cited a recent study of the Yalong basin as saying solar tends to peak in the dry season while hydropower peaks in the wet season, creating a natural seasonal "handshake" between the two technologies.
Lianghekou can therefore act a bit like giant water battery, storing energy in the form of water when solar and wind are plentiful and releasing it when the sun sets, the wind drops, or millions of people arrive home and switch on lights, stoves and phone chargers at once.
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Researchers who evaluated the "water footprint" of nineteen hydropower stations on the Yalong are stated to have found that the basin's projects use water more efficiently than many dams worldwide and that overall development has not pushed river flows beyond environmental limits, at least from that specific perspective.
This was apparently stated in view of the fact that other scientists warn that cascades of dams have changed flow patterns and disrupted fish habitats

along parts of the river, reducing what they call river connectivity.

Social costs are also significant. Building Lianghekou involved relocating nearly five thousand residents from the future reservoir area, a pattern seen at many mega dams. How those communities fare over time is part of the real sustainability test, well beyond the engineering drawings, the report noted.

## China has just launched a hydroelectric "beast" in Tibet that generates 11 billion kWh per year, and whose dam, at 295 meters high, is almost as tall as the Eiffel Tower

01 March 2026, Eco News

High in the thin air of the Tibetan Plateau, China has switched on a new giant that could generate about 11 billion kilowatt hours of electricity every year. The Lianghekoun hydropower plant now ranks as the country's highest-altitude mega hydropower station, with a dam almost as tall as the Eiffel Tower and a power output of 3,000 megawatts.

For a country still heavily reliant on coal, that much steady, renewable power is a big deal. Officials say the project can cut raw coal use by more than 13 million tons and avoid about 21 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions each year, compared with equivalent coal generation.

So is China really saying goodbye to solar and wind, as some headlines claim? Not quite. The story on the ground is more complicated, and more interesting.

**A mega dam in the mountains**

Lianghekou sits on the main stem of the Yalong River in Yajiang County, within the Garze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan Province. The Yalong is a key tributary of the Yangtze River and one of China's most important hydropower corridors.

The dam rises about 295 meters and holds back a reservoir designed to store roughly 10.8 billion cubic meters of water. Construction began in 2014 and the final turbine was connected to the grid in March 2022, after an investment of around 66.5 billion yuan, roughly 10.5 billion US dollars.

That water does more than spin turbines. Because the reservoir is so large relative to the river's flow, engineers can smooth out big swings between wet and dry years. The station helps regulate flows for a chain of downstream dams, which boosts overall power generation and reduces flood risk in the wider Yangtze basin.

Base load power for a solar and wind superpower

Hydropower plants like Lianghekou are sometimes described as the "anchor" of the grid. Unlike solar farms that rely on sunshine or turbines that wait for wind, a big dam can usually deliver power at any hour, then ramp up or down as demand changes.

Chinese planners say the station's 11 billion kilowatt hours of annual output will support economic hubs such as the Chengdu Chongqing region and help stabilize power supplies in Sichuan, a province that has struggled with summer blackouts during heat waves.

Anyone who has ever watched their air conditioner fight through a sticky August night knows how precious reliable electricity can feel.

At the same time, the project is part of a wider clean energy buildout along the Yalong. The developer, Yalong River Hydropower Development Company Ltd., aims to turn the basin into a massive demonstration zone that combines large dams, solar farms, wind parks and pumped storage.




*Map of the Yalong River basin highlighting major hydropower stations such as Lianghekou Dam and nearby photovoltaic fields that support integrated renewable energy development.*

**Not a farewell to solar and wind**

Far from sidelining other renewables, Lianghekou is already working hand in hand with one of the world's largest high-altitude solar plants. About 50 kilometers away, the Kela photovoltaic project adds one gigawatt of solar capacity and can produce around two billion kilowatt hours of electricity per year.

During bright, dry months when reservoirs are relatively low, the solar plant picks up the slack. In the rainy season, when the river is roaring, hydropower does most of the heavy lifting and the dam can dial back to accommodate changes in solar output.

A recent study of the Yalong basin found that solar tends to peak in the dry season while hydropower peaks in the wet season, which creates a natural seasonal "handshake" between the two technologies.

In practical terms, that means dams like Lianghekou can act a bit like giant water batteries. They store energy in the form of water when solar and wind are plentiful and release it when the sun sets, the wind drops, or millions of people arrive home and switch on lights, stoves and phone chargers at once.

**Environmental gains, and real trade offs**

Hydropower is low-carbon compared with coal or gas, but it is not impact free. Reservoirs release some greenhouse gases, especially in tropical

regions, and large projects require vast quantities of concrete and steel.

On the Yalong, researchers who evaluated the "water footprint" of nineteen hydropower stations found that the basin's projects use water more efficiently than many dams worldwide and that overall development has not pushed river flows beyond environmental limits, at least from that specific perspective.

Other scientists, however, warn that cascades of dams have changed flow patterns and disrupted fish habitats along parts of the river, reducing what they call river connectivity.

Social costs are also significant. Building Lianghekou involved relocating nearly five thousand residents from the future reservoir area, a pattern seen at many mega dams. How those communities fare over time is part of the real sustainability test, well beyond the engineering drawings.

**A glimpse of the next energy system**

For the most part, Lianghekou shows what a high renewables grid might look like when it leans on several tools at once instead of a single "silver bullet." Big flexible dams, large solar arrays, pumped storage and smarter operation of river cascades all work together to cut coal use while trying to limit impacts on water and ecosystems.

At the end of the day, this is about more than one dam in one remote valley. It is about how fast major economies can move away from fossil fuels without sacrificing grid stability or leaving communities and rivers behind.

The scientific study was published in *Frontiers in Energy Research*.

## China close to completing world's largest pumped hydro energy storage system in eastern Tibet

01 March 2026, Tibetan Review

China is one step closer to running the world's largest pumped hydro energy storage facility as its 4.2-GW hybrid project at Lianghekou – which combines conventional hydropower and pumped storage – nears completion, reported *scmp.com* Feb 28. The project is located in Nyagqu Dzong (Chinese: Yajiang County) of Kardze (Ganzi) prefecture in the formerly eastern Tibetan province of Kham (or Dotoe) but now part of the PRC's enlarged Sichuan province.

The Lianghekou Dam (meaning "mouth of two rivers"), which is part of the project, entailed the relocation of over 4,900 residents during its construction, according to a *Wikipedia* report on the dam. It said the 295-metre-tall (968 ft) dam is the highest embankment dam in the PRC and supports a 3,000 MW power station.

The storage project being built at the Lianghekou Dam will have four units of 300 megawatts (MW) each when completed, making it the largest facility of its kind, said the *scmp.com* report.

The project is stated to house a conventional hydropower plant in addition to a pumped hydro energy storage facility. Pumped hydro works by moving water uphill when excess energy is being generated. When that energy is later needed, the water is released to flow downhill, spinning a turbine to create electricity in the process, the report noted.

The hydropower plant and the pumped hydro facility will together have a capacity of 4.2 gigawatts (GW), amounting to "the world's largest hybrid pumped hydro storage system," a recent report from *Interesting Engineering* was cited as saying. "The pumped hydro facility is designed to absorb green energy from the 7 GW of renewable energy plants being built on the plateau, making it the 'super power bank' of the region," the article was stated to have noted.

Pumped hydro is a relatively simple technology with a long history in China. It's a proven technology with long-term storage potential, making it indispensable in China's increasingly electrified economy.

However, the technology also has its downsides, the report noted. Environmentalists often take a negative view of hydro megaprojects, as dams are extremely disruptive to ecosystems. And hydro systems are vulnerable to climate change, as drought can severely impact their output – as seen in Sichuan in 2022. But the Chinese government clearly feels that the benefits outweigh the risks, the report added.

Besides, being at the forefront of energy storage development and deployment is a key part of China's bid to become the world's first electrostate, the report said.

On a global level, the energy storage sector is seeing a meteoric rise, driven in large part by demand from utilities and data centers and the rapid growth of variable energies including wind and solar, and is gearing up to be "clean energy's next trillion-dollar business."

While the current energy storage landscape is dominated by lithium-ion batteries, this technology has some major drawbacks, including geopolitically fraught value chains (also dominated by China) and short energy storage duration, the report pointed out. lithium-ion batteries can hold onto energy for a matter of hours only. However, balancing energy flows from wind and solar will require storage systems that can hold onto excess energy for full days and even full seasons.

Long-term energy storage, such as pumped hydro, will therefore be increasingly indispensable in the coming years as the global clean energy transition continues to pick up steam, the report said.

# MILITARY AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

## Military vehicles en route to designated training area

27 March 2026, People's Daily



*Military vehicles attached to a regiment under the Chinese PLA Xinjiang Military Command are en route to the designated area during a plateau driving training exercise at an altitude of more than 4,000 meters. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Ma Tailang)*

## China Prepares for Submarine Warfare Under the Guise of Deep-Sea Mining Research

25 March 2025, Domino Theory

China's research fleet spends minimal time in its own mining exploration areas, vessels frequently 'go dark' while operating in militarily strategic waters

Chinese research vessel Da Yang Hao arrives at Avatiu harbor in the Cook Islands on November 8



*last year as part of a mission to support research into potential deep-sea mining. (Photo: Johnny Beasley/AFP)*

- A Mongabay and CNN investigation found the eight Chinese state-owned ships that conduct deep-sea mining research in China's mining areas allocated by the International Seabed Authority actually spent little time in these exploration areas, while spending much of their remaining time operating in militarily strategic waters.
- Many of these vessels are linked to the Chinese Navy, have regularly called on military-connected ports, encroached on other countries' coastal exclusive economic zones and turned off their AIS location

beacons. While none of this proves the vessels serve military roles, it suggests the ships may serve dual-use purposes, having a strategic military role as well as a scientific one.

- With China positioning itself as a leader in deep-sea mining, the U.S. is accelerating its own push to access seabed areas and counter China's dominance in critical mineral supply chains. The Cook Islands is one hotspot where U.S-China competition is intensifying.
- As competition heightens between China and the U.S., critics of the industry warn deep-sea mining could cause irreversible harm to marine ecosystems, raising fears that the environment could be the main casualty in this geopolitical rivalry.

This article was produced in partnership with CNN with support from the Pulitzer Center's Ocean Reporting Network, where Elizabeth Claire Alberts was a fellow.

In June 2025, the Xiang Yang Hong 01, a chalky white vessel loaded with oceanographic equipment, cruised the Northwest Pacific until it reached a section of the seafloor rich in polymetallic nodules — potato-shaped rocks that contain valuable metals such as manganese, nickel, cobalt and copper. The ship zigzagged over the site, conducting research in the area miners could eventually exploit through deep-sea mining, a controversial industry that experts warn could irreparably harm marine ecosystems.

Since entering service in 2016, the Xiang Yang Hong 01, which translates as Facing the Red Sun 01, has gone on several deep-sea mining research expeditions in the Northwest Pacific. Yet, over the past five years, the Chinese state-owned ship spent far more time outside designated deep-sea mining exploration areas and logged extensive trips in militarily strategic waters. This vessel has also gone "dark" numerous times over the past five years, possibly disabling its automatic identification system, or AIS, while operating in strategically sensitive ocean areas, according to New Zealand-based Starboard Maritime Intelligence.

"These gaps are significant," Mark Douglas, an analyst for Starboard Maritime who is also in the New Zealand naval reserves, told Mongabay and CNN in an email. He said the Chinese ship "demonstrates a deliberate pattern of operating in sensitive areas, outside the view of traditional tracking systems."

The result is a pattern that, experts say, shows the ship may be more interested in mining military intelligence than deep-sea minerals.

A spokesperson for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not address questions about the activities of the Xiang Yang Hong 01 or the potential military uses of its oceanographic research vessels. In a statement to Mongabay and CNN, the ministry said, "Within the framework of the International Seabed Authority, or ISA, China conducts activities in deep-sea exploration, scientific research, and environmental protection, assisting a host of developing countries in effectively strengthening their deep-sea capacity building. This is in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." It added that China "highly values deep-sea environmental protection."

Mongabay and CNN tracked eight Chinese research vessels that have undertaken deep-sea mining exploratory missions over the past five years. During that period, the ships spent just around 6% of their total open water time in or near areas reserved by Chinese companies for deep-sea mining exploration, according to an analysis of data from MarineTraffic, a ship tracking provider, and the data platform Deep Sea Mining Watch.

The exploration areas are licensed by the ISA. Although the body has not yet finalized international regulations for deep-sea mining and commercial extraction has yet to begin, China has positioned itself as a global leader, holding five of the 31 exploration contracts issued by the ISA and serving as its largest financial contributor. The ISA told Mongabay and CNN by email that the "amount of contribution by a member State is not relevant to the number of the exploration contracts signed or sponsored by the member State."

Many of the ships tracked by Mongabay and CNN are tied to state-affiliated entities with links to the Chinese Navy, known as the People's Liberation Army Navy, and regularly call on military-connected ports. Some have also visited other countries' exclusive economic zones, possibly to conduct surveillance, often without permission. Others have displayed patterns suggesting attempts to avoid detection, including "going dark" by failing to transmit their mandatory AIS signals that broadcast a vessel's identity and position, possibly intentionally.

While none of this proves the vessels serve military roles, it suggests the ships may serve dual-use purposes, having a strategic military role as well as a scientific one. This thesis was supported by more than a dozen naval and military experts interviewed for this story. Mongabay and CNN reached out to multiple Chinese agencies and institutions, but none responded to questions about dual-use activities by China's oceanographic research vessels.

"They want to know what's going on at the bottom of the sea, where U.S. submarines might go, where their submarines might go, where other submarines might go," Raymond Powell, a retired U.S. Air Force colonel and executive director of SeaLight, a nonprofit that focuses mainly on China's maritime military activities, told Mongabay and CNN. "Mapping the seafloor in those places is going to be of intense interest to them."

These alleged dual-purpose vessel missions appear to align with China's broader pursuit of "maritime power" — a goal Chinese leader Xi Jinping (習近平) first articulated in 2012, shortly after taking office, and reiterated over the years. Some analysts say China views the deep seabed, and the exploitation of its minerals, as its next frontier. In response, the U.S. is rushing to mine the deep seabed, with a stated goal of countering China's dominance in the sector. The U.S. is backing up the move with a $12 billion investment fund to spur mining and boost the nation's hold on critical minerals.

Alexander Gray, who served in the first administration of U.S. President Donald Trump as a deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff of the White House National Security Council, said the U.S. government has "a very real concern" about the potential dual uses of China's research vessels. While previous administrations have been worried about these developments, he said the Trump administration is particularly focused on them.

Gray told Mongabay and CNN that the U.S. government is also concerned about China's attempt to monopolize critical minerals.

"China [is] using critical minerals as a tool of economic coercion against the United States," Gray said, adding that the U.S. should "diversify supply through deep-sea mining" to generate "resilience" to withstand China's actions. "That, I think, very much justifies this speeding forward on this development," he said.

The U.S. Department of State did not respond to questions seeking further detail on how competition with China is influencing the United States' pursuit of deep-sea mining. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs also did not respond directly to questions about U.S.-China competition for deep-sea minerals.

As both China and the U.S. pursue deep-sea mining, critics of the industry, including government officials, scientists and environmentalists, warn the marine environment could be the loser in this race to the bottom of the ocean.

**China's growing influence in the ocean**

To examine China's deep-sea mining activities, Mongabay and CNN, with the support of the Pulitzer Center, tracked eight Chinese vessels that have undertaken deep-sea mining exploratory missions during the five years, from January 2021 to January 2026. These are the only Chinese research ships that have visited China's ISA-designated mining areas since 2021, the period most relevant to current geopolitical tensions and developments in deep-sea mining.

There are at least 32 additional vessels in China's oceanographic research fleet that have traveled across the global ocean, from the poles to the tropics, according to the China Maritime Studies Institute, a research center at the U.S. Naval War College in Rhode Island. The experts Mongabay and CNN interviewed for this story say this broader oceanographic fleet not only studies oceanic phenomena but also undertakes missions that serve China's military and strategic objectives. This research fleet is considered to be the largest in the world, although other countries, such as the U.S., also have sizable research fleets.

Most of the ships in China's research fleet are owned and operated by state agencies, including the Ministry of Natural Resources. All rely on state funding, which includes initiatives that focus on deep-sea exploration, minerals and Chinese national security.

While China's research fleet has traversed the world's oceans, conducting bathymetric surveys to map the seafloor, China has contributed relatively little data to the public. Chinese organizations and research institutions contributed 41 data sets to a public data sharing effort on the world's seas known as the General Bathymetric Chart of the Oceans, or GEBCO, according to Pegah Souri, the head of external relations of Seabed 2030, a collaborative project between GEBCO and The Nippon Foundation. This accounts for roughly 0.7% of the total contributions to the global seabed mapping initiative. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond to questions about its contributions.

The locations analyzed for this story include China's five areas licensed to three Chinese state-controlled entities: China Minmetals Corporation, Beijing Pioneer Hi-Tech Development Corporation Ltd. and China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association, or COMRA. These five licensed areas give China more ISA contracts than any other member state, covering approximately 225,000 square kilometers, roughly three times the size of Ireland.

The analysis also includes a roughly 74,000-square-kilometer reserve area in the Pacific. Beijing Pioneer was required to conduct surveys and submit the resulting data to the ISA in 2018. The following year, in 2019, it gave this reserve area to the ISA to benefit developing nations in the future. But despite the transfer, Chinese vessels have remained active in and around this area, even though it is no longer required to submit data.

Over a five-year period, these eight Chinese ships spent a combined 814 days operating in or near these areas licensed or reserved for exploration by the ISA.

Within these areas, the vessels traveled a combined 102,000 kilometers — more than twice the circumference of the Earth. News coverage and corporate documents confirm these ships were conducting deep-sea mining-related research while visiting these ISA areas, including collecting samples of sediment and organisms. COMRA, Beijing Pioneer and China Minmetals did not respond to questions about the scope of their research.

Other countries and companies hold an additional 26 exploration contracts covering a combined 1.2 million square kilometers. There are also 890,000 square kilometers that the ISA keeps on reserve for possible future exploitation by developing countries.

In the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, or CCZ, a region about as wide as the continental United States, located between Hawaii and Mexico and known to harbor vast quantities of nodules, the ISA established "areas of particular environmental interest," where no mining can take place. They add up to about 1.9 million square kilometers. Separately, the U.S. has issued an exploration license to defense company Lockheed Martin for a total of 232,000 square kilometers in the CCZ, using the authority of a 1980 law known as the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, which established a legal framework for U.S. citizens to pursue deep-sea mining activities in international waters. Over the past year, other companies have announced that they have applied for similar licenses.

**Chinese ships sail far to French, Polish and other mining sites**

The eight Chinese exploration ships are not going just into areas contracted to Chinese companies — they are also spending time in places that the ISA licensed to non-Chinese companies and governments and reserve areas. This is permitted under international law.

For instance, in December 2023, the Shen Hai Yi Hao — a vessel that was built to carry the Jiaolong, one of China's biggest manned submersibles — began a journey of more than 25,000 kilometers from eastern China to the North Atlantic. The vessel appeared to conduct oceanic exploration along the journey. Some missions stand out: During March and April 2024 it operated around three ISA areas contracted separately to France's research institute IFREMER, Poland and Russia. In November 2025, the same vessel lingered in a swath that the ISA licensed to South Korea.

Representatives from IFREMER, Poland and South Korea said the research activity is allowed under international law. IFREMER and Poland representatives also confirmed they had been notified ahead of the Shen Hai Yi Hao's visit. Russia did not respond to a request for comment.

The ISA said it had no information whether the Shen Hai Yi Hao was passing through these areas or if they conducted surveys.

The National Deep Sea Center of China, which owns and operates the Shen Hai Yi Hao, did not respond to questions about this voyage.

Darshana Baruah, an expert in Indo-Pacific defense and strategy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), told Mongabay and CNN that Chinese vessels gather more than scientific data. She said they go to other ISA areas for strategic information.

"The scientific data that you pick up in the underwater domain can be applied across different areas," Baruah said. "Being present in those waters would give them a far broader understanding of the geopolitics of the region, the logistics of sailing, the logistics of maintaining that presence, if they wish to."

China has also spent time conducting deep-sea mining research in other waters. For instance, in 2021, China tested a nodule collection system in the East China Sea and South China Sea. In 2025, China also announced plans for constructing a laboratory capable of operating roughly 2,000 meters beneath the South China Sea. The research station, due for completion in 2030, will focus on cold-seep ecosystems — critical for understanding energy resources including hydrocarbon and gas hydrate reservoirs — while also reinforcing Chinese reach in one of the world's strategically contested maritime regions.

While deep-sea mining exploration is ongoing, neither China nor any other nation has begun deep-sea mining on a commercial scale. In the international sphere, this is largely due to the fact that the ISA has yet to adopt regulations that would allow exploitation to proceed in areas beyond national jurisdiction. In addition, nodule processing at a commercial scale is still in its infancy.

**U.S. accelerates plans to mine the deep sea**

The U.S., meanwhile, is pressing forward with its ambitions to begin undersea mining in international waters.

Representatives from China and other nations, as well as the ISA, have said the U.S. would be violating international law. A spokesperson from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Mongabay and CNN that "according to international law, the international seabed area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind, and no country may bypass the ISA to independently authorize exploration or development activities."

"China urges the United States to heed the voices of the international community, to pull back before it is too late, change course, respect the international seabed system, and uphold the overall interests of the international community," the spokesperson added.

The U.S is not a member of the ISA and has not ratified the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It is classified by the ISA as only a nonvoting observer. The U.S. State Department said in a statement to Mongabay and CNN that it is "committed to the responsible development of seabed mineral resources" and that the UNCLOS "framework for deep seabed mining does not apply to non-parties like the United States, carries no weight under customary international law" and claimed it "has become a tool of malicious actors."

Since Trump returned to the presidency in 2025, the U.S. government has argued that it needs

deep-sea minerals for its national security and to counter Chinese mineral dominance.

In April 2025, Trump signed an executive order titled "Unleashing America's Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources" that calls for accelerating the industry in both domestic and international waters.

On Jan. 21, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or NOAA, approved a controversial rule that would expedite licensing and permitting.

The U.S. is pressing forward on other fronts. In its territorial waters, the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management has advanced efforts to pursue deep-sea mining near American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands and off the coasts of the U.S. states of Virginia and Alaska, including the Aleutian Islands, prompting local and environmental opposition. The U.S. also partnered with Japan to test the extraction of deep-sea muds rich in rare earth elements — crucial minerals for weapon systems — around Minamitori Island, which lies in Japan's EEZ and serves as a military base. China currently dominates the global market share of production and processing of rare earth elements.

Many of these places, especially in the Pacific, carry strategic significance for U.S. military competition with China. Neither the U.S. State Department nor the White House responded to questions about whether pursuing mining in these areas was also about mineral dominance, in addition to seabed resource extraction. China also did not respond to questions regarding this matter.

While some ships in NOAA's fleet have supported the U.S. Navy and broader national security interests through data sharing and collaborative research, it is unclear whether vessels involved in deep-sea mining track Chinese submarines or perform similar military work. Experts interviewed for this story said they found no evidence that U.S. deep-sea mining ships conduct surveillance missions. The U.S. Navy operates vessels specifically designed for maritime surveillance. Neither NOAA nor the U.S. Navy responded to questions for this story.

**'Inviting environmental disaster'**

As plans to mine the ocean floor progress, a growing number of scientists, environmentalists, companies and nations warn that mining could irreparably damage ecosystems that have evolved over millions of years and host an extraordinary kaleidoscope of life forms.

A Chinese-led research project, which utilized China's deep-sea submersible Fendouzhe in 2021, identified 7,564 species of hadal prokaryotic microorganisms — tiny organisms that play a crucial role in the marine food web by cycling nutrients. Nearly 90% of these species were previously unknown.

Meanwhile, a study published in March 2025 in *Nature* found that 44 years after a mining test, biodiversity had still not fully recovered.

Another study, published in December 2025 in *Nature Ecology & Evolution*, estimated that industrial-scale deep-sea mining tests done in 2022 caused a 37% reduction in animal abundance within the directly mined areas of the Pacific's CCZ.

Critics of deep-sea mining also point out that very little is known about the deep sea and its marine life.

Emily Jeffers, senior attorney at the Arizona-based nonprofit Center for Biological Diversity, said U.S. plans to fast-track the start of deep-sea mining were "inviting an environmental disaster."

She is not alone worrying about the ecological toll. Environmental attorney Lori Osmundsen, based in Oregon, said she doesn't have confidence the Trump administration will adhere to environmental laws.

Isaac Kardon, a senior fellow for China studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said he believed China has a similar stance.

"China says nice things about the environment, but it's very obviously committed to pushing forward," Kardon said. "They're not going to accept environmental impact reports or whatever that are not supportive of proceeding with drilling."

Those in favor of deep-sea mining say minerals are desperately needed for a modern society. They argue that certain minerals found on the ocean floor are harder to procure on land, such as nickel and cobalt, and that deep-sea mining would be less destructive to the environment and human rights. They also advocate the many uses of deep-sea minerals — from renewable energy technologies such as electric vehicle batteries to a wide range of military applications.

**More than a mineral race?**

But the ships followed by Mongabay and CNN appear interested in more than deep-sea mining, according to more than a dozen naval, civil and academic experts.

Mongabay and CNN's data analysis found the eight vessels only spent 6% of their sea time in ISA-designated deep-sea mining areas. The rest of the time, they were circumnavigating large swaths of the ocean, transiting through politically sensitive areas such as waters near Guam or China's overlapping claim with Taiwan. The majority of analysts interviewed for this story said they believed these vessels were collecting information that could include military intelligence. The ships may have been gathering information that might be used in warfare, such as locating telecommunications cables that could be severed and gathering information to track another country's submarines, the analysts said.

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## Natural barrier turned into a thoroughfare

25 March 2026, China Tibet News Network



*The photo shows one side of the Jueba Mountain Tunnel (towards Dengba Village, Qudeng Township, Mangkang County). Photo by Wen Kaipingcuo Langjia.*

The warm winter sun shines on the lush pine and cypress forests of Jueba Mountain in Mangkang County, Changdu City, casting dappled shadows on the empty road. Previously, the mountaintop viewing platform was bustling with people selling local specialties; now, only a huge rock inscribed with the words "Jueba Mountain" stands alone.

After the Juebashan Tunnel on National Highway 318 opened to traffic in June 2024, the once bustling scene of more than 2,000 vehicles passing through Juebashan every day was no longer seen.

Jueba Mountain, straddling Mangkang County and Zogang County, is a notorious treacherous section of National Highway 318. Although the mountain is only 3,900 meters above sea level, the elevation difference from Rumei Town in Mangkang County on the banks of the Lancang River to cross it is over 1,500 meters, with a winding mountain road stretching for 29 kilometers. This makes it a notoriously accident-prone section of the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, and drivers and passengers passing by are invariably terrified at the mere mention of the mountain.

Fortunately, with the official opening of the Juebashan Tunnel, this treacherous terrain has been transformed into a smooth road.

Super projects along the Sichuan-Tibet Highway

"The Jueba Mountain Tunnel is currently the longest single-bore two-way highway tunnel in Tibet. The entire project includes a 6,995-meter-long main tunnel, a 6,940-meter-long pilot tunnel, a 327-meter-long Jueba Mountain Bridge, and 10 kilometers of Class III highway, with a total investment of 2 billion yuan," Chen Linjie, Minister of the Planning and Contract Department of the S521 Project of Tibet Transportation Development Group Co., Ltd., and former Minister of the Jueba Mountain Tunnel Project Command, told reporters.

According to Chen Linjie, the Juebashan Tunnel project started in 2018 and, after six years of hard work, was officially opened to traffic on June 30, 2024. The tunnel passes through two fault fracture zones and four water-rich areas, overcoming world-class technical challenges posed by low oxygen and low temperature environments to long-distance tunnel excavation, ventilation and smoke extraction, and reverse slope drainage.

Among them, the "Key Technologies for Construction of Extra-Long Tunnels in Deep Water-Rich Compression Fault Fracture Zones in High-Altitude and Cold Regions" successfully developed by the project team has been identified as reaching the international advanced level and won the second prize of the Science and Technology Progress Award of China Highway Construction Industry Association, accumulating valuable experience for tunnel construction in similar extreme environments in my country.

“In the past, crossing the Jueba Mountain took more than an hour, even for off-road vehicles. Now, it only takes 10 minutes through the tunnel, which has significantly improved travel conditions on the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, reduced transportation costs, and decreased safety hazards,” Chen Linjie said proudly.

**A smooth journey makes for a good start**.

Standing in front of the Juebashan Bridge, vehicles whiz by on average less than a minute apart, the echoes reverberating through the tunnels telling the story of the bustling Sichuan-Tibet Highway. Meanwhile, on the old road leading uphill to the right of the bridge, not a single car or person can be seen for hours.

Old Feng, from Henan, has been driving the Sichuan-Tibet Highway for over 20 years. With gray hair and full of energy, he is currently parking his vehicle on an open space by the bridge, tidying up the goods and checking the vehicle's condition with his wife, preparing for the next leg of the journey.

“I used to dread seeing that road up the mountain,” Lao Feng said with a smile. “Just this section of the road over Jueba Mountain takes more than 6 hours for a large truck, and the fuel cost alone is about 800 yuan. There are many sharp bends that require several reversals to get through, and it is even more difficult to pass oncoming vehicles.”

Old Feng said that besides being time-consuming, laborious, and expensive, the biggest problem with the Jueba Mountain Old Road is the numerous safety hazards, especially in winter when the road surface is covered with snow and ice, making it particularly dangerous for vehicles to drive.

"Thanks to the Party and the government for rebuilding this road, making everyone's travel safer and more convenient, and making us, who frequently travel this route, very happy," said Lao Feng.

**Old Lu's final mission**

Not far from the viewing platform, there is another branch of the old road to Jueba Mountain, which

leads to Qudeng Village, the seat of the Qudeng Township Government in Mangkang County—this is currently the main purpose of this road.
“However, with the opening of the first phase of the Provincial Highway 521 Rumei to Quzika section in 2027, going to Qudeng Township will only require heading south along the Lancang River, without having to cross the Jueba Mountain anymore. At that time, apart from forest rangers patrolling, there will basically be no cars driving up the mountain,” Chen Linjie said.
At the forest ranger rest station at the fork in the road, the reporter met Nima, a forest ranger from Dengba Village, Qudeng Township.
"You are the first group of people I have met this morning," the old man said excitedly. "Before, there were all kinds of people on this mountaintop, including truck drivers, tourists, and business people. It was more lively than the village. We forest rangers loved to come up and chat with everyone."
Although there are fewer people, the responsibility of forest protection cannot be neglected. Nima continues to go up the mountain every day to stick to his post, sometimes spending the whole day alone on the mountain.
The old man was a little disappointed when he heard that this road would no longer be used to get to Qudeng Township, as there would be even fewer cars and people coming here. However, he quickly recovered: "If there are fewer cars on the mountain, it means there are more cars coming down the mountain. It will be more convenient to get from our township to Mangkang County in the future."
Yes, what silenced this road was precisely the prosperity of this era.

## China Highlights Combat Capabilities of Type 055 Destroyers

21 March 2026, ChinaScope

China’s Ministry of National Defense reported that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s Type 055 guided-missile destroyers have developed large-scale, system-level combat capabilities. The Type 055, often referred to as a “10,000-ton-class destroyer,” is considered a milestone in the modernization of China’s naval forces, with a full-load displacement exceeding 12,000 tons.
According to the report, the warship is equipped with an advanced universal vertical launch system (VLS) capable of deploying multiple types of missiles, providing robust capabilities in air defense, anti-ship, anti-submarine, and land-attack operations. The platform is designed to serve as a core component of carrier strike groups and to support integrated naval operations, reflecting China’s growing emphasis on modern, network-centric warfare.
The article highlights that Type 055 destroyers have entered scaled deployment and operational integration, signaling a transition toward more mature and coordinated naval combat power. Notably, two new “10,000-ton-class” destroyers, hull numbers 109 and 110, have recently begun combat-oriented training, further underscoring the PLA Navy’s expanding operational capabilities.

## The Chinese Communist Party is conscripting soldiers throughout Tibet, forcing Tibetan youths to leave their homes and their own culture.

20 March 2026, VOT



Recently, the Chinese Communist Party authorities launched a "spring conscription" in Gar County, Ngari Prefecture, Tibet, resulting in a large influx of Tibetan youths into the army. Sources told this station that these young Tibetans are being forced to leave their parents and distance themselves from their ethnic culture and traditions. Tibetan parents are worried that their children will lack a sense of national identity and the behavioral norms appropriate to Tibetan culture.
The Chinese Communist Party authorities recently launched a "spring conscription" campaign in Gar County, Ngari Prefecture, Tibet, and it is reported that a large number of local Tibetan youths have enlisted.
Sources told Voice of Tibet that several years ago, the Chinese authorities began sending notices to families in Ngari County, requiring eligible young people to enlist in the army. It is understood that approximately 20 Tibetan youths from each township enlist annually and are sent to different regions of China for military training.
Sources say these Tibetan youths were forced to leave their parents and distance themselves from Tibetan Buddhist culture and traditions. Tibetan

parents worry that their children will lack a sense of national identity and the behavioral norms appropriate to Tibetan culture.
This conscription plan has been implemented in Quxu County and Duilongdeqing County in Tibet, as well as in various Tibetan areas that have been incorporated into Yunnan and Sichuan provinces. It is understood that the conscription primarily targets university students, and the authorities are using various incentives to entice Tibetans to join the army.
In addition to enticing Tibetan youths of military age to join the army, the CCP began sending troops to boarding primary and secondary schools throughout Tibet several years ago to provide Tibetan children with so-called "military training" and instill patriotism, raising concerns from all sides.

## Female soldiers shine brightly- A Profile of Lhasa Special Police Officer Lü Xiaolin

20 March Tibet China News Network

Special police officers are the steel Great Wall protecting peace; athletes are fearless warriors striving on the field. In Lhasa, there is such a policewoman. She was once a national-level athlete who competed on the field, and now she is a combat elite guarding the peace of the plateau. She is both a special police officer who charges ahead and a police combat instructor who imparts knowledge and skills. She is Lü Xiaolin, instructor of the Third Assault Team of the Special Police Detachment of Lhasa Municipal Public Security Bureau.
**Cross-border pursuit of dreams:**
From sports champion to special police officer in the snowy plateau
On the training ground of the Lhasa Municipal Public Security Bureau's Special Police Detachment, slogans resounded powerfully. Lu Xiaolin, dressed in her training uniform, stood tall and focused, personally guiding officers in practical skills training. "Pay attention to your center of gravity, move faster!" "Defense must be stable, attacks must be accurate!"... She demonstrated the key points of the movements while loudly reminding them of the training details, strictly demanding and patiently correcting every posture and every step. Sunlight shone on the training ground, reflecting on her focused and resolute face. The solid foundation of a former wrestling champion blended seamlessly with the professional competence of a current combat instructor, showcasing the heroic spirit of a new generation of female police officers in the snowy plateau.
Lü Xiaolin, 37, is from Handan, Hebei Province. During her university years, she aspired to dedicate herself to serving the border regions and Tibet. In July 2013, driven by her ideal of contributing to the development of Tibet, she was specially recruited as a professional into the Lhasa Municipal Public Security Bureau's Special Police Detachment. Since then, she has been rooted in the snowy plateau for over a decade. From a Chinese wrestling athlete to a special police officer, from competing on the field to steadfastly serving in the police force, she has integrated her athletic tenacity and exceptional skills into the high-altitude public security work.
The Tibetan Plateau is a harsh environment with a severe climate, but Lü Xiaolin has never wavered. "Back in college, I resolved to dedicate myself to serving the border regions and Tibet," Lü Xiaolin said, her eyes shining as she gazed into the distance. After starting her job, facing altitude sickness, work pressure, and life challenges, she always rose to the occasion with the fighting spirit of an athlete. She proactively learned Tibetan, built closer relationships with local police officers, and upheld her solemn oath of "People's Police for the People" with dedication and responsibility.
“Training as an athlete was simple and focused, while the work of a special police officer is comprehensive and diverse. I need to be proficient in tactical skills, as well as coordinate daily management, write plans and programs, and conduct ideological work.” Lü Xiaolin frankly admitted that this cross-disciplinary experience helped her grow rapidly. She always adheres to the principle that “having many skills is never a burden” and has honed her comprehensive qualities in multiple positions and tasks, achieving a remarkable transformation from an athletic champion to an all-around special police officer. With her solid professional abilities, she serves as a police combat instructor at both the Tibet Autonomous Region Public Security Department and the Lhasa Municipal Public Security Bureau, and in 2021, she was successfully selected into the Ministry of Public Security's expert talent pool.
Sharpening the Sword on the Plateau:
Rigorous training and practical work forge elite combat soldiers
The high altitude, lack of oxygen, and unique climate make conducting practical training in the snow-covered region far more difficult and challenging than outside the area, posing a tremendous test to the physical and mental strength of the police officers. However, Lü Xiaolin consistently rises to the challenge with the fighting spirit of an athlete, bringing the rigorous standards of the competition to police training, honing the practical skills of each officer with professionalism and dedication.
In 2018, Lü Xiaolin led a three-month intensive training program for new police officers. The long hours and high intensity of training put a lot of pressure on the officers, both physically and mentally. She was strict in her training, meticulous in her attention to detail, and uncompromising in her adherence to standardized procedures. At the same time, she warmed hearts and fostered team cohesion. She used her rest time to celebrate the

officers' birthdays, and in a relaxed atmosphere, she talked and communicated with them to relieve their stress. This not only honed the team's combat capabilities but also strengthened their belief in staying committed to the plateau region. This warm yet challenging period became one of the most unforgettable memories of her police career.

New police officer Gao Fulin worked and trained with Lü Xiaolin for three months and was deeply moved by her work ethic: "Instructor Lü is conscientious, responsible, meticulous, and rigorous in her work, handling every task with utmost care. She is highly skilled, always at the forefront of training, duty, and handling emergencies. Her strong professional abilities inspire confidence. She is also exceptionally responsible and compassionate, like a leader and family member to me, providing warmth and touching my heart." In Gao Fulin's mind, Lü Xiaolin is a trusted instructor and a role model for him.

Having served in the police force for many years, Lü Xiaolin has been awarded the Third-Class Merit Citation multiple times and was named an Outstanding Instructor. In 2016, at the 7th National Police Sports Triathlon Competition, she represented Tibet, competing against five or six hundred top athletes from across the country. With her tenacious perseverance, she won the Best Fighting Spirit Award. The calluses on her hands and the sweat she shed on the field are the best testament to the inheritance of the athlete's spirit in the police force.

**Youthful Dedication:**

The police camp in the snowy plateau demonstrates loyalty and dedication.

As a grassroots instructor, Lü Xiaolin has always adhered to the original aspiration and mission of a Communist Party member, engraving loyalty to the Party into her blood and integrating it into her actions, thus forging the most distinctive political character. With her unique feminine sensitivity and tenacious character, she has deepened and solidified the work of treating police officers with preferential treatment, becoming a trustworthy "leading goose" in the hearts of her comrades.

Lü Xiaolin joined the police force through a special talent recruitment program and is recognized as a top-notch professional in the industry, yet she always maintains a humble and low-key style. In daily duty and training, she leads by example and takes the lead, setting a benchmark for all police officers and auxiliary police officers with her actions. Huang Jiang, a colleague who has worked with her for 12 years, sincerely said: "Instructor Lü's professional skills are outstanding. She is strict and meticulous in her work, but warm and considerate in her personal life. Whenever a colleague encounters difficulties or emergencies at home, as long as it is within the regulations, she will do her best to help. We all admire her from the bottom of our hearts."

At work, Lü Xiaolin consistently leads by example, meticulously mentoring and guiding each young police officer, wholeheartedly nurturing and cultivating them to help them grow and succeed quickly. In her personal life, she is gentle yet firm, optimistic and positive, showcasing the responsibility and style of a new-era female police officer with a vibrant attitude. With her outstanding professional skills, she was successfully selected for the Ministry of Public Security's expert talent pool. Lü Xiaolin stated that this honor is not only an affirmation of her personal abilities but also a testament to the organization's careful cultivation and high trust. She expressed that she will always be grateful and will transform this recognition into motivation for fulfilling her duties, focusing on her teaching and honing her skills, safeguarding the peace of the community with practical actions, and striving to earn the organization's trust and the public's satisfaction.

For over a decade, Lü Xiaolin has been rooted in the plateau region, steadfastly serving on the front lines. She firmly believes that women are no less capable than men, possessing unique advantages in meticulousness, patience, and resilience. With unwavering faith and dedicated effort, she believes women can shoulder heavy responsibilities and achieve remarkable success on the front lines of public security. She often inspires those around her with her own experiences and the outstanding performances of female special police officers in major missions such as the National Special Police Challenge, interpreting her faith through perseverance and fulfilling her mission through dedication. For over a decade, she has quietly cultivated her talents, blossoming in the snowy plateau police force, writing a new chapter of responsibility and commitment for female public security officers in the new era—loyalty to the Party and service to the people.

**Lü Xiaolin:**

On the snowy plateau, a strong and resilient woman, skilled in both literature and martial arts.

When I first met Lü Xiaolin, what struck me most was her hearty, infectious laughter. With her genuine and bright personality, when she talked about her beloved special police career, her gaze became firm and her spirits soared, her words brimming with undisguised love, pride, and sincerity.

When asked why she chose to come to the plateau, the smile on her face instantly turned into a deep seriousness, and her gaze into the distance was particularly firm: "I have been determined since I was in college to come to the border areas and to the grassroots level. This is my sincere choice." A simple but resounding sentence reveals the original aspiration and belief of this young policewoman to take root in the snowy plateau.

During the interview, when speaking of the Sichuan female special police officers who shone brightly at the 2025 National Public Security

Special Police Challenge, Lü Xiaolin expressed her sincere admiration and great excitement: "Female special police officers can also be at the forefront and shoulder heavy responsibilities." She stated that women's unique sensitivity, focus, and resilience are unique advantages in actual combat and competitive events. New-era female special police officers are not defined by labels or limited by gender; by finding their strengths and giving their all, they can also shine in the police force and fulfill their mission with a spirit no less than that of their male counterparts.

From a young woman with a heart full of patriotic dreams to a highly skilled special police officer; from fighting bravely on the field to upholding her mission on the snowy plateau, Lü Xiaolin vividly interprets the loyalty and style of a new era policewoman with a combination of strength and gentleness, and both literary and martial prowess.

A salute to every female hero like Lü Xiaolin, who steadfastly guards the snowy plateau and fights on the front lines of the police force. They shoulder the heavy responsibility of maintaining peace and security with their strength and dedication, protecting the lights of countless homes with their youthful passion. They are the most dazzling and fearless "iron roses" on the plateau! (Reporters: Ciji, Gongqu Luojie)

## China's PLA reveals AI-assisted aerial refuelling tech days after US military tanker crash

19 March 2026, SCMP

PLA Air Force details streamlined operations that pair tankers and fighters, with real-time recommendations for pilots.

The People's Liberation Army has announced a new AI-assisted task dispatch system for China's aerial refuelling tankers, days after a US military tanker crashed in the Middle East.

According to the official PLA Daily, the Chinese air force has streamlined its aerial refuelling operations with a smart artificial intelligence (AI) system to improve efficiency and safety.

The report on Monday came just days after a US Air Force Boeing KC-135 "Stratotanker" aerial refuelling tanker crashed in western Iraq during America's Operation Epic Fury against Iran.

According to the PLA Daily report, the "aerial refuelling area management system" – developed by technicians from the PLA Air Force – was first introduced during training at the end of last year.

The system monitors real-time airspace situations and employs built-in algorithms to automatically calculate real-time fuel levels for all participating aircraft within the area.

Based on the fuel levels, airspace capacity and flight duration of each aircraft, the system generates the most optimised pairing plans between tankers and fighters, issuing recommendations to pilots.

"The 'smart task assignment' programme recommends scientifically sound and highly efficient solutions, enabling the maximisation of aerial refuelling effectiveness," the PLA Daily quoted Yu He, an Air Force officer involved in the programme, as saying.

In the past, the pairing process was like a "blind choice", Yu said. Tankers would simply loiter passively in the air, while fighters tended to select the nearest available tanker. This often created operational bottlenecks, with some tankers becoming overloaded as others nearby remained idle.

"The old random refuelling-receiving model had become a critical weakness limiting combat effectiveness and was ill-suited to the demands of future battlefields," the report said. "Thanks to the new system, aerial refuelling efficiency has been further improved."

The KC-135 crash last Thursday killed all six crew members. The Pentagon denied the involvement of any hostile or friendly fire, although a pro-Iranian militant group claimed responsibility for downing the aircraft.

Initial reports suggested the crash resulted from a mid-air collision with another KC-135 that sustained damage but landed safely.

The US KC-135 fleet, built in the 1950s and 1960s, is too old and poorly maintained, Du Wenlong, a military analyst, said on Chinese state broadcaster CCTV.

"Frequent long-distance deployments to hotspot regions place additional stress and fatigue on the aged airframes as well as the crew, which could lead to certain issues," he said.

Du, a retired PLA senior colonel, cited a 1966 incident in which a KC-135 collided with a B-52 that was receiving refuelling in-flight, resulting in the bomber dropping its hydrogen bombs and triggering radioactive contamination.

## Track-laying operation for Yunnan section of Chongqing-Kunming high-speed railway starts

19 March 2026, People's Daily online

A drone photo taken on March 18, 2026 shows a view of the track-laying operation at the construction site of the Chongqing-Kunming high-speed railway in Songming County of Kunming, southwest China's Yunnan Province.

The first pair of 500-meter-long steel rails was steadily placed on the track on Wednesday, marking the official start of track laying for the Yunnan section of the Chongqing-Kunming high-speed railway.

Upon the full completion of this high-speed railway, travel time between Chongqing and

Kunming will be significantly reduced. (Xinhua/Hu Chao)
Workers are pictured during the track-laying operation at the construction site of the Chongqing-Kunming high-speed railway in Songming County of Kunming, southwest China's Yunnan Province, March 18, 2026.

## PLA Air Force Employs "Smart Dispatch" System in Aerial Refueling Operations

March 16, 2026, ChinaScope




According to a report by *People's Daily*, during a recent People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force exercise involving Y-20 tanker aircraft for aerial refueling operations, several fighter jets—located at similar distances—chose to refuel from the same tanker. This resulted in a queue forming near that aircraft, while other tankers in adjacent airspace remained largely underutilized.
To address this imbalance, a "smart dispatch" system was introduced to assist with operational coordination. The system processes real-time data, including aircraft fuel status, mission requirements, and airspace conditions, to generate optimized refueling plans and allocate tanker resources more efficiently.
The report states that the system enables faster decision-making and improves coordination during refueling operations, allowing multiple aircraft to carry out their missions more effectively.

## Serbia Confirms Purchase of Chinese Supersonic Missiles

15 March 2026, ChinaScope

According to a report by Sputnik News, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić confirmed that Serbia has purchased Chinese CM-400AKG supersonic air-to-ground ballistic missiles as part of a broader military modernization program. The announcement followed the release of media photos showing Serbian fighter jets equipped with the Chinese missiles. Vučić said the weapons were recently acquired for Serbia's air force and are part of a national defense upgrade plan valued at about $17 billion.
The missiles are reportedly mounted on Russian-made MiG-29 fighter jets, which currently form the backbone of the Serbian Air Force. The CM-400AKG, developed by China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), can carry a 150-kg explosive warhead or a 200-kg penetrator warhead and has a maximum range of about 400 kilometers. Vučić said Serbia already possesses a significant number of these missiles and may purchase additional units, describing them as expensive but highly effective.
Serbian officials say the defense upgrade is partly driven by perceived regional security threats. Vučić referenced what he described as a growing military alignment among Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo, which Serbia views as a potential challenge to its security environment. While emphasizing that Serbia does not intend to attack NATO members, Vučić suggested the country is strengthening its defense capabilities in response to regional tensions and uncertainty.

## Xi Jinping Outlines China's Maritime Ambitions in Party Journal

15 March 2026, Chinascope

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has published a signed article in the Communist Party journal *Qiushi* calling for China to become a strong maritime power through the high-quality development of its ocean economy. According to Xinhua, the article — titled "Promoting High-Quality Development of the Marine Economy" — is scheduled for official publication tomorrow.
Xi argued that advancing "Chinese-style modernization" requires the "efficient development and utilization of the ocean," and that China must forge its own path toward maritime strength with distinctly Chinese characteristics. He emphasized the importance of "cooperative, win-win" engagement with global ocean governance, peaceful joint use of marine energy resources, and a firm defense of China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights.

The article lays out six priority areas for concrete action:

- First, Xi called for stronger top-level policy planning, including drafting a 15th Five-Year Plan for the marine economy and encouraging private capital investment in the sector.
- Second, he stressed the need to boost independent innovation in marine science and technology, including cultivating leading maritime tech enterprises.
- Third, Xi urged the expansion and strengthening of marine industries, spanning offshore wind power, modern deep-sea fishing, marine biopharmaceuticals, ocean-themed tourism, shipbuilding, digital maritime infrastructure, and the shipping industry.
- Fourth, he called for integrated planning of major bays and the green and smart transformation of key ports.
- Fifth, the article emphasized protecting the marine ecological environment, including risk prevention, comprehensive governance of key sea areas, and exploring carbon sink accounting in ocean regions.
- Sixth, Xi called for deeper participation in global maritime governance, including cooperation in ocean research, disaster reduction, and the blue economy — and specifically advancing the construction of a "Belt and Road" International Port Alliance.

## More Defense Industry Purges Tied to the PLA

15 March 2026, Centre for China Analysis

In mid-March, China's defense-industrial and military research organizations saw a series of high-profile personnel changes. Three academicians with defense backgrounds—Wu Manqing (吴曼青), Zhao Xiangeng (赵宪庚), and Wei Yiyin (魏毅寅)—were removed from the official roster of the Chinese Academy of Engineering (中国工程院), with their names and profiles no longer publicly listed. The academicians—an elite honorific awarded to elected fellows of China's top scientific institutions—were associated with radar and electronic information systems, nuclear engineering, and missile guidance and aerospace technology, respectively.

Two days after the event, the profile of Yang Wei (杨伟), the chief designer of the J-20 fighter, also disappeared from the Chinese Academy of Sciences website, and he had reportedly not appeared in public for over a year. Yang previously led development work on both the J-10 and J-20 and held a senior executive role at Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC, 中国航空工业集团有限公司).

At the same time, the corruption case against Tan Ruisong (谭瑞松), former AVIC Chairman, concluded on March 25. Tan was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, along with full confiscation of personal assets. Charges against Tan include bribery, embezzlement, insider trading involving more than US$89 million, and the disclosure of confidential information over a long period. Official statements reported that he used restructuring, project contracting, and personnel or resource arrangements in the defense sector for private gain.

**CCA Analysis:** The current wave of scrutiny reflects a continued expansion of investigations into Chinese academics involved in the research and engineering of PLA weapons systems. Earlier rounds have already swept through the Rocket Force and major defense-industrial firms, with multiple senior figures removed and at least nine academicians stripped of their titles in recent years.

The Tan Ruisong case further illustrates the deep integration of China's defense sector with capital markets and resource allocation. These enterprises could become financial hubs for senior officials, who can leverage their political authority to engage in rent-seeking during R&D, procurement, and export. However, extending state discipline to elite scientists and chief designers introduces a risky trade-off between political control and technical autonomy. This tension embodies economist Barry Naughton's "impossible trinity," which suggests the state cannot simultaneously achieve firm autonomy, strict oversight, and policy-driven goals. Therefore, the future of PLA modernization depends on the nature of this scrutiny. More targeted interventions may improve institutional coordination without stalling progress. Conversely, broad or sustained crackdowns risk destabilizing the concentrated expertise and long-term leadership required for defense innovation, weakening the very program execution and system integration China seeks to perfect.

**Type 055 Destroyers Debut in the Eastern Theater Command**

Recently, two newly commissioned PLA Navy Type 055 destroyers assigned to the Eastern Theater Command (ETC) Navy—the *Dongguan* (东莞) and *Anqing* (安庆)—began their first public round of post-commissioning training in the East China Sea.

Their disclosed training included air defense, anti-surface strike, anti-submarine warfare, and multi-domain coordination. Reporting also emphasized operations under complex electromagnetic conditions, including target detection, data-link sharing, and fire control coordination. Anti-submarine drills involved towed sonar, unmanned shipborne helicopters, and sonobuoys to hone

undersea warfare capabilities. Later releases showed live-fire activity involving countermeasure deployment and formation maneuvering, though the locations of the drills, the munitions used, and detailed performance results were not disclosed.

Beyond the operational details, official coverage framed the exercises within a broader political narrative. References to deterring "Taiwan independence" and safeguarding maritime security were presented alongside the training, linking capability development to cross-strait signaling.

Since 2020, including the two newly commissioned vessels, a total of 10 Type 055 destroyers have entered service. As a key surface combatant in the PLA Navy, the platform continues to undergo incremental upgrades and weapons testing. A recent example was the finalization test of a hypersonic anti-ship missile, which we covered earlier this January.

**CCA Analysis:** The speed with which *Dongguan* and *Anqing* have been integrated into the theater commands is noteworthy. Their assignment to the Eastern Theater Command is particularly notable given its focus on the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea contingencies. Deploying advanced surface combatants to the ETC strengthens air defense, anti-submarine warfare, and command capabilities in scenarios most directly tied to cross-strait operations.

Official coverage also emphasized the Type 055's role as a high-end operational node capable of operating in contested electromagnetic environments, sharing targeting data across platforms, and integrating unmanned systems into anti-submarine operations. Together, these elements point to a "system-of-systems" combat approach featured prominently in PLA discussions of modern warfare.

Meanwhile, the political framing is equally notable. By pairing the ships' commission and training with messaging directed at Taipei, official narratives connect naval modernization more directly to Taiwan-related deterrence, reinforcing that capability development is not only a signal of military modernization but of sustained day-to-day cross-strait deterrence.

## CCP Military Budget Rises 7% Even as China's Economic Growth Hits a 30-Year Low

12 March 2026, Vision Times

The CCP military budget will climb 7 percent in 2026, reaching approximately 1.9 trillion yuan,

even as the communist regime lowered its economic growth target to the slowest pace in roughly three decades. Analysts in Taiwan, Europe, and the United States say the gap between the two




*Chinese military vessels on exercise. The CCP's 2026 defense budget of 1.9 trillion yuan represents a 7 percent increase despite a slowing economy. (Image: Getty Images)*

figures reveals a regime that prioritizes military power over economic recovery and regime survival over public welfare.

On March 5, the CCP's finance ministry submitted a budget proposal to the annual session of China's rubber-stamp legislature showing a 7 percent increase in military spending. The same day, prime minister Li Qiang announced that China's GDP growth target for 2026 would fall to a range of 4.5 to 5 percent, down from 5 percent the year before. That is the lowest target Beijing has set in approximately thirty years.

Li's government work report described the military buildup in regime-standard language, calling for efforts to "enhance strategic capabilities for safeguarding national sovereignty, national security, and development interests" and to "advance major defense development projects."

A draft five-year plan released alongside the report called for "accelerating the development of strategic deterrent capabilities to maintain global strategic balance and stability," language that refers to nuclear weapons and is primarily aimed at the United States.

Western analysts say China's published military budget hides the true scale of spending

Western defense establishments have long questioned the credibility of China's officially reported military spending. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* reported that Western military analysts believe a substantial "shadow budget" funds programs like nuclear weapons development that are excluded from the headline figure.

China's nuclear buildup has accelerated. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) projects that China will possess more than 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035.

Although the nominal growth rate dipped 0.2 percentage points compared to prior years, that does not indicate a softer military posture. To the contrary, Beijing's language on Taiwan has grown sharper. Li Qiang's 2026 government work report pledged to "resolutely crack down on separatist forces seeking Taiwan independence," an escalation from the previous year's formulation, which spoke of "resisting" such activities.

CCP state media framed the seven percent increase as a sign of "responsible restraint by a major power." The Swiss newspaper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* noted, however, that state media omitted the fact that China's real military spending has more than tripled over the past fifteen years. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reported that China's share of total military spending among Asian nations rose from 37 percent in the 2010 to 2020 period to 44 percent in 2025. China's military budget is the second largest in the world, behind only the United States.

Taiwan defense analyst: the real spending increase is larger than the official number

Shen Mingshi, a researcher at Taiwan's Institute for National Defense and Security Research, said the gap between China's 5 percent economic growth and seven percent military spending increase reveals Beijing's determination to expand its defense capabilities regardless of economic conditions. "Given that China is actively building a fourth aircraft carrier and expanding its nuclear warhead inventory, the actual spending increase is almost certainly larger than the published figure," Shen said.

Huang Dawei, a U.S.-based economist, said the military budget growing faster than GDP means the CCP is treating arms spending as a higher priority than economic recovery. This amounts to "military-first politics," he said, and reflects a regime that views political survival as more important than economic development.

Shen Youzhong, deputy minister of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, warned on March 10 that Beijing's decision to increase military spending while cutting its growth target signals that the CCP will intensify military exercises and gray-zone coercion directed at the First Island Chain.

Speaking at a forum on the post-"Two Sessions" security outlook, Shen noted that multiple economic warning signs, including destructive internal competition, high unemployment, and severe local government fiscal deficits, confirm that the Chinese economy faces serious structural problems. Yet Beijing allocated 1.9 trillion yuan to the military, maintaining seven percent growth, a sum exceeding Taiwan's entire defense budget by a factor of eleven.

Shen said this pattern "foreshadows the CCP's continued military exercises and gray-zone operations targeting the Indo-Pacific region, particularly the First Island Chain, as Beijing attempts to use military pressure to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and the broader region."

The United States and Indo-Pacific allies have built a shared defense consensus

Shen Youzhong argued that democratic nations across the Indo-Pacific have reached a shared conclusion: unilateral concessions to authoritarian powers do not produce stability. Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia have all significantly increased their defense budgets. The emerging consensus is that only credible deterrence, backed by multilateral defense cooperation, can counter authoritarian expansion and preserve peace.

"This trend of maintaining peace through strength is a direct response to the CCP's attempts to unilaterally destroy the status quo and challenge security red lines," Shen said.

On economic policy, Shen urged Taiwanese businesses to carefully evaluate the risks of investing in mainland China, which now carries both economic and political dangers. On defense, he called on the Taiwanese public to support national defense spending. On diplomacy, he cautioned against the stance of "not choosing sides," arguing that such positioning weakens international support for Taiwan. "Taiwan stands on the side of freedom and democracy, always," he said.

Shen Youzhong also warned that the CCP's insistence on the so-called "1992 Consensus" is, in substance, a demand for the elimination of the Republic of China. He urged all Taiwanese political parties, organizations, and individuals engaged in cross-strait exchanges to recognize the CCP's intensifying efforts at infiltration and division.

"The government has never given up on dialogue with the CCP on the basis of equality and dignity," Shen said, "but we will not lower our defenses or hand national sovereignty to others as a gesture of compromise. Only by demonstrating the will to defend ourselves, strengthening national defense, and deepening cooperation with democratic allies can Taiwan secure its footing in a changing world and ensure that future generations continue to enjoy democratic freedom."

## Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing's Links to Defense Industry and Iran Cooperation

12 March 2026, Chinascope

A report by *The Epoch Times* suggests that Zhang Guoqing, China's Vice Premier, may play a key role in China's defense industry exports to Iran and the broader Middle East. According to sources familiar with China's political system, Zhang is not a typical technocratic official but has deep ties to the country's military-industrial sector. He previously held senior positions within China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO), a major state-owned defense conglomerate responsible for exporting weapons and related technologies. Because of this background, some observers view him as an important representative of China's defense industry within the country's top leadership.

The report states that Zhang has played a role in maintaining China's military-industrial cooperation with Middle Eastern partners,

particularly Iran. Following rising tensions involving Iran, Zhang was reportedly tasked by Xi Jinping with coordinating relevant supply chains and maintaining technical and industrial links with regional partners. According to individuals familiar with the defense sector, Iran has requested Chinese components related to drones, unmanned vessels, and smart naval mines that could potentially be assembled domestically.

The report also suggests that cooperation between China and Iran extends beyond weapons-related components to include communications infrastructure and surveillance technologies. Technology firms from several Chinese provinces have reportedly participated in the development of Iran's telecommunications networks and monitoring systems. This combination of military technology, infrastructure development, and security systems has strengthened strategic ties between China and Iran while expanding Beijing's influence in the region.

## China urged to build underground great wall of defence in crisis-hit world

08 March 2026, SCMP

China should build an underground network across its western region to protect key energy and defence facilities, securing long-term reserves while boosting national security and crisis resilience, energy experts have said.

Zhang Shishu, chief technical expert at Power Construction Corporation of China (PowerChina), a state-owned energy and infrastructure giant, called for critical facilities to be embedded deep beneath the Earth's surface at a safer, less detectable level.

In an article for the Bulletin of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Zhang said that strategic sites – such as the southwestern hydropower hubs and the northwestern oil and gas fields – were ideal for subterranean facilities to store oil, natural gas and rare metals.

"Major national projects should prioritise relocating essential facilities below ground to shield them from potential attacks and make them less visible," the article said."Moving critical infrastructure underground and building concealed strategic tunnels with backup systems would significantly reinforce national defence and border security."

The article, published in February, was written by a team of PowerChina engineers led by Zhang.

Their suggestions come amid China's push to establish strategic hinterlands and backups for key industries in interior regions, a move seen as crucial for Beijing to counter external complications amid heightened rivalry with the United States.

"The western region has a long border and a complex geopolitical environment," the article noted.

"The underground placement of critical infrastructure and the construction of an 'underground strategic corridor and covert support system' can strengthen national defence security and border control."

The article suggested that border areas in Tibet and Xinjiang should host underground defence infrastructure to bolster national security.

Smaller storage facilities should be built in regional cities and along key energy routes, it said, to create a "tiered network" connecting central hubs, regional centres and border facilities.

In regions vulnerable to geological disasters and along sensitive border areas, underground emergency shelters and rescue passages could be developed to form an integrated emergency support system encompassing monitoring, early warning and rescue operations.

Underground spaces offer major national security benefits by strengthening the resilience and survivability of vital infrastructure against physical, natural and hi-tech threats.

The drive to create such spaces ties into Beijing's broader strategy of shifting critical facilities away from the country's densely populated eastern hubs to the less-developed western hinterlands, having them act as strategic buffers and resource bases.

Shifting more industrial, energy and defence infrastructure inland – away from the vulnerable eastern coast – aims to mitigate risks from external disruptions such as trade blockades, supply chain decoupling or military contingencies involving the United States and its allies.

The ongoing conflict in Iran has also underscored the vulnerability of above-ground infrastructure in wartime, lending urgency to calls to relocate critical facilities underground for increased resilience and security.

In 2024, at a pivotal Communist Party policy meeting known as the third plenum, the leadership emphasised the need to "develop China's strategic hinterland and establish backup plans for key industries" as part of a broader drive for economic self-sufficiency.

Major economic and technological hubs such as Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, all located in eastern China, are considered vulnerable to disruption, particularly in the event of war.

But while western China has some advantages in individual underground energy-related projects, development in the region is viewed as lacking "strategic coordination" – such as integrating projects into a comprehensive energy storage network and unified strategic reserve system.

"The facilities [in the area] are scattered and too small to create meaningful strategic impact," the article noted.

Developing underground space in western China would also minimise surface ecosystem disturbance, as the region's high-altitude grasslands, wetlands and river valleys are ecologically fragile and easily damaged by surface construction.

However, building underground facilities in this difficult terrain requires overcoming major technical challenges and revising the legal framework – as most Chinese laws and regulations are decentralised, designed for implementation only at the municipal level.

The geological conditions in these regions are prone to high stress, water pressure and temperatures, which can lead to rock bursts, collapses and other structural issues.

To address these risks, Zhang stressed the importance of constant and comprehensive monitoring technologies that can manage complex underground networks and provide effective risk detection and early disaster warnings.

Thanks to advances in ultra-deep drilling technology, engineers can now explore geological conditions as deep as 3,000 metres (about 9,850 feet) below the surface, according to Zhang.

"When this is paired with advanced data fusion techniques for geological forecasting, it provides a detailed understanding of the subsurface conditions."

## China Expands Airfield in Xinjiang

08 March 2026, Resonant News




China is rapidly expanding a secretive remote airbase deep in the desert of **Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region**, signaling intensified efforts to advance its next-generation aviation capabilities. This facility, located near the historic **Lop Nur** nuclear test site, has emerged as a key hub for testing China's cutting-edge sixth-generation fighter jets.Satellite imagery from late 2025 reveals significant developments at the site, with coordinates approximately **40.771523, 89.283096**. Often informally compared to the U.S. "Area 51" and sometimes dubbed the "Chinese Zone No. 51," the base features one of the world's longest runways—stretching about **5 kilometers**—along with **expanded aprons, newly constructed aircraft shelters, hangars, and dozens of additional infrastructure buildings**. Construction activity accelerated notably in the first half of 2025, with major expansions to parking areas and dedicated structures for advanced aircraft.

The strategic importance of this isolated desert airfield became evident when satellite observations in mid-to-late 2025 captured both of China's sixth-generation fighter prototypes—the larger, tailless **Chengdu J-36** (sometimes referred to as Jian-36) and the smaller **Shenyang J-50** (or Jian-50/J-XDS)—parked at the facility. These sightings, first highlighted in commercial imagery analyzed by outlets like *The War Zone* in November 2025, marked the initial confirmation of the two designs appearing together at the same test site, moving beyond earlier separate appearances at their respective manufacturer airfields.

The J-36, characterized by its massive modified delta-wing design and distinctive splinter camouflage, and the J-50, a tailless platform optimized for enhanced stealth, represent Beijing's ambitious push into sixth-generation technology. These aircraft emphasize superior all-aspect stealth, long-range operations, and integration with future networked warfare concepts—features intended to challenge or surpass current fifth-generation fighters like China's own J-20 or the U.S. F-35.

The ongoing expansion—new shelters, enlarged aprons, and supporting buildings—**points to a deliberate buildup of testing capacity.** It suggests preparations not only for extended flight evaluations but potentially for **broader integration and eventual deployment of these advanced platforms.** As part of China's broader aerospace ecosystem, the base plays an increasingly central role in accelerating development timelines, with prototypes already progressing through multiple iterations and joint testing phases since late 2024.

This activity underscores China's determination to maintain momentum in the global race for air superiority, narrowing technological gaps with leading powers through secretive, high-priority facilities like this one in the remote Xinjiang desert.




Source: *Kyodo News*, March 12, 2026

## China's Military Issues New Reserve Personnel ID Cards

03 March 2026, Chinascope

Starting March 1, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) began issuing a new unified identity document — the "PLA Reserve Personnel Certificate" — following approval from the Central Military Commission.

According to *China Central Television's* military channel, the new certificate serves as an official form of identification for reserve personnel. Each card carries a unique, system-generated identity number and is issued to reserve officers, sergeants, and soldiers who are serving in the PLA under the country's Reserve Personnel Law.

Zhang Yaokui, a professor at the PLA's National Defense University Joint Operations College, explained that the new certificate formally recognizes the status of reserve personnel by both the Chinese government and military. It provides unified proof of enrollment in reserve forces and replaces the previously issued "PLA Reserve Officers Certificate," which has now been officially abolished.

Zhang noted the certificate serves practical purposes in both peacetime and wartime. In peacetime, it facilitates participation in military training, readiness duties, and non-combat military operations. In wartime, it enables the swift mobilization and deployment of reserve personnel. It also helps reserve members access relevant welfare benefits, compensation, and preferential treatment as provided by law.

Zhang further emphasized that PLA reserve personnel hold a dual identity — they are both civilians and soldiers. In ordinary times, they work across various sectors of society as regular citizens. However, when called upon, they are required to put on their uniforms and fulfill their military obligations.

The rollout of this new credential is seen by analysts as a meaningful step in streamlining the mobilization process and strengthening the institutional framework governing China's reserve forces.

## China's Military Warns of Internal Espionage Threats Following Iran Strike

03 March 2026, ChinaScope

The assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei by a joint U.S.-Israeli operation has sent shockwaves through Beijing, prompting China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) to issue a series of stark warnings about the dangers of foreign infiltration and espionage.

On March 2, the *PLA Daily*'s official commentary studio, "Junzhengping," published a piece on Weibo titled "The Silent Shadow War: Everyone Must Stay Vigilant." The commentary argued that as global competition intensifies, methods such as infiltration, intelligence theft, and subversion have become standard tools of "certain forces" seeking to sow instability from within. The piece drew a direct lesson from Iran's downfall, stating that "the most fortified strongholds are often breached from the inside."

The commentary warned Chinese citizens against complacency in everyday interactions, noting that casually mentioning sensitive information could hand adversaries the missing piece of an intelligence puzzle, accepting minor gifts or favors could open the door to manipulation, and taking seemingly friendly conversation at face value could allow bad actors to map out vulnerabilities.

China's Ministry of State Security, the piece noted, publishes new cases of foreign espionage activity almost daily. The article urged every citizen to "stay alert, hold the line, and distinguish right from wrong," so as to weave a security network that is "round-the-clock and without blind spots," leaving no room for infiltration or subversion to take hold.

This followed an earlier *PLA Daily* commentary published on February 28, which called on "every Chinese son and daughter" to internalize the principle of never forgetting danger in times of peace. Only by "staying attuned to risk and preparing before the storm arrives," it said, can China safeguard the hard-won stability it has achieved.

## China Makes Waves with New Nuclear-powered Submarine

03 March 2026, Asia Society

Commercial satellite imagery dated February 9 showed what analysts believe to be the first Type 095 nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) at Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry (BSHIC) in Huludao, Liaoning. Additional imagery dated February 13 indicated that the Type 095 hull had been moved into a launch bay or flooded drydock at the same facility.

The clearest change analysts noticed from imagery is the SSN's new hull and tail design, increasing its stealth capabilities. This includes a new "X-tail" rudder configuration — a first Chinese SSN — as well as improved underwater maneuverability and hydrodynamics. These design features will significantly reduce acoustic noise and increase survivability.

Based on satellite-derived estimates, the Type 095 is roughly 110 meters long, with a beam of approximately 12–13 meters and a displacement of 9,000 tons. Open-source assessments suggest the Type 095 may include vertical launch systems (VLS) for cruise missiles and torpedoes, which would enhance the PLA Navy's land-attack and anti-ship capabilities. All indications suggest the Type 095 has similar capabilities to the U.S. Virginia-class SSN and Russian Yasen-class SSN.

The Type 095 is likely to be fully operational by 2029.

**CCA Analysis:** The Type 095's appearance is notable for several reasons. First, it will likely be much quieter and more survivable compared to older models. An Office of Naval Intelligence assessment highlighted how the Type 094's noise made it easier to track. Acoustic noise reduces a submarine's survivability, thereby limiting China's sea-based deterrence credibility and range.

Second is the implications for regional deterrence. When operationally deployed, the Type 095 will provide the PLAN with an enhanced deterrence posture beyond the first island chain. China's existing SSNs have a limited range due to noise and stealth limitations. This new variant will allow China to operate farther out into the Pacific and Indian Oceans, bringing nations such as Australia and India into range. The U.S. Navy (USN) is the only military power in the region that can match the PLAN in quantitative and qualitative capabilities. As a result, allies and partners will rely even more than before on USN undersea capabilities to offset the threat from China's burgeoning SSN assets.

Finally, the Type 095's appearance at BSHIC in Huludao suggests an accelerated operational timeline surpassing regional expectations. According to an IISS analysis, from 2021 to 2025, China's nuclear submarine launches and aggregate tonnage exceeded U.S. totals. This will compel the U.S. and key allies to plan against a larger and faster-growing undersea inventory, with rising ASW demand under shorter force-planning timelines.

# CYBER INTELLIGENCE

## Espionage campaign targets telecom with stealthy Linux-based backdoor

27 March 2026, Cybersecurity Dive

A sophisticated China-nexus threat actor has embedded digital sleeper cells into the networks of telecom firms in multiple countries, according to a report released Thursday from cybersecurity firm Rapid7.

The adversary, tracked as Red Menshen, has used a stealthy, Linux-based implant called BPFdoor that is designed to function within the operating system kernel.

The goal is to run an espionage campaign against critical industry segments and government agencies, maintaining a long-term presence inside these networks, Rapid7 researchers said. There are similarities to campaigns previously launched by other China-nexus actors, including Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon, but the mechanisms have evolved and the strategic objectives of these attacks have a longer tail.

"Based on what we've observed, the strongest evidence points to intelligence collection and long-term access, not immediate disruption," said Christiaan Beek, vice president of cyber intelligence at Rapid7. "In telecom networks, that can mean visibility into signaling systems, subscriber-related data, communications metadata, and other high-value infrastructure functions."

The backdoor is a malicious version of Berkeley Packet Filter that operates like a trapdoor built into the operating system.

The BPFdoor functionality allows the attackers to operate at a stealth mode that avoids using visible command-and-control channels and does not expose listening ports, according to Rapid7. This enables the threat actor to maintain a long-term presence inside an organization without triggering most detection systems.

The threat activity follows prior China-nexus activity linked to Volt Typhoon, which involved hackers gaining persistent access onto U.S. networks in preparation for a diversionary attack if the People's Republic of China engaged in military actions against Taiwan.

Salt Typhoon, a separate China-nexus actor, was capable of embeding itself inside the networks of major U.S. telecom firms for years. The group was able to gather data about communications of telecom customers, with a focus on high-profile political and military figures.

Rapid7 said it has worked closely with government partners and various national Community Emergency Response Teams to share findings on the research.

Security teams need to focus on improving visibility beyond the traditional perimeter, Beek said.

"Organizations should hunt for unusual raw socket activity, anonymous packet-filtering

behavior and service masquerading on critical Linux systems," Beek told Cybersecurity Dive.
Telecom firms and other critical infrastructure providers also need to focus on exposed edge devices, containerized environments and signaling-related traffic, Beek added.

## China Upgrades the Backdoor It Uses to Spy on Telcos Globally

27 March 2026, Dark Reading

Chinese APT Red Menshen's super-advanced BPFdoor malware defeats traditional cybersecurity protections. All telcos can do, really, is try hunting it down.
Chinese threat actors have been tinkering with a state-of-the-art backdoor called "BPFdoor," modifying it to more stealthily maintain persistence inside of the most sensitive parts of global telecommunications systems, plus other high-level government and critical infrastructure networks.
BPFdoor was already one of the world's most sophisticated malware implants before it was upgraded. Its signature trick was to lay dormant inside of a Linux kernel, doing nothing interesting or even observable, while passively using the Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) to inspect incoming network traffic for a specially crafted activation message.
Researchers at Rapid7 now report that the Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) behind BPFdoor, Red Menshen, has modified that listening system. Since around last November, it's also tacked on a few more stealthy tricks to help BPFdoor stay even quieter, and get closer to the heart of telecommunications subscriber traffic worldwide.
In addition to known targets in the Middle East and Africa, "We have confirmed victims in the Asia-Pacific (APAC) and in Europe — I dare say this is definitely global," Christiaan Beek, vice president of cyber intelligence at Rapid7, tells Dark Reading. He adds that, perhaps due to the malware's runaway success, "where we thought initially it was mostly focused on telcos, we also now have confirmation from [victimized] government networks, critical infrastructure networks, and defense networks."

**An Ultra-Advanced Telecom Backdoor**

Even BPFdoor's remarkably subtle and efficient BPF listening technique isn't good enough for Red Menshen anymore. Now, instead of looking for a magic packet in any sort of network packet, the malware only looks for its trigger phrase in innocuous Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) requests.
"They are actually weaponizing our firewalls against us, and we're letting the traffic through," Beek concedes. Firewalls and traffic inspection tools can't reasonably block HTTPS, and even when the request is decrypted, it'll look normal to a human observer or security tool. "So that was a really smart move on [their part] — hiding themselves in that kind of Transport Layer Security (TLS) traffic, so the moment you unpack it, it will actually pass through easily," he says.
BPFdoor is also specially tuned to know when malicious message lies are coming through. It looks specifically for the 26th byte offset in the incoming request, and if its trigger appears at that specific location, then it knows it's being summoned.
The trigger phrase is arguably not even BPFdoor's most subtle, highly controlled trick. At an even more granular level, Red Menshen can direct orders to specific instances of its malware within a network, using a lightweight Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) control channel.
It works like this: Let's say that Red Menshen has compromised more than one server in a target network. It could connect and forward instructions to each individual server using a command-and-control (C2) setup, but that would be loud. Theoretically, they could also include data in the activation packet that routes instructions to the desired instance, but that would make the packet more bloated and potentially detectable. So, instead, the malware uses the innocuous ICMP pings to transmit instructions between infected machines, using a specific value — 0xFFFFFFFF — to indicate which machine should terminate the propagation and actually execute an action.
"No matter how many hops there are in a network, they know exactly where their next implant in the network is, and they could actually send a command specifically [to any implant] in the traffic," Beek explains. By way of an analogy, he says, "Let's say you have BPFdoor in your living room. and you have BPFdoor in your kitchen. The actor could actually instruct the BPFdoor in the living room that a command is actually intended for BPFdoor in the kitchen."
He adds, "That's unbelievable. It's fascinating — how to hide yourself in ping traffic. They knew exactly where there is some space in the network traffic, where you can put in your [malicious] packets. With all due respect, nobody's tracing how much ping traffic goes beyond the host, or outside of the network," he says.

**China vs. Telcos: An Unfair Cyber Fight**

Red Menshen attacks are characterized by an unusual diligence and knowledge of their targets' infrastructure.
Beek thinks that "they do an extremely good job at reconnaissance in their victims' networks. And they know so much about the inner workings of telco infrastructure. So the moment they are inside, and they find certain equipment, they know exactly how it works. And that it's interconnected, and then they can move really fast [to other parts of the network]. We found custom sniffers, custom tooling to intercept usernames and passwords — very highly sophisticated operations."

The detail with which the attackers understand and adapt to their targets' systems is exceptional. For instance, cyber researchers call it "advanced" when malware mimics ordinary system processes to try to evade detection. Red Menshen goes a step further. It knows that telcos, particularly in Europe and Asia, are known to use HPE ProLiant servers, and that telcos worldwide are increasingly using Kubernetes to serve 5G. So nowadays BPFdoor disguises itself using legitimate service names and process behaviors associated with HPE ProLiant servers, or Kubernetes, as applicable.

Between the passive listening, the covert messaging, the process mimicking, and more, BPFdoor is a league beyond what most cybersecurity solutions can hope to detect and stop. Beek's suggestion, instead, is that operators need to just go out and hunt this thing down.

The first step in that process, of course, is actually knowing about its existence. Surprisingly, even though the malware is some years old now, it isn't as famous as it deserves to be.

"Honestly, when I spoke to different telcos, they were quite unaware of this threat, and also the implications of it," Beek says. "I think that the bigger picture here is: Are you really anticipating these threats?"

## Chinese Hackers Caught Deep Within Telecom Backbone Infrastructure

26 March 2026, SecurityWeek

A China-linked state-sponsored threat actor has deployed kernel implants and passive backdoors deep within telecommunication backbone infrastructure worldwide for long-term persistence, Rapid7 reports.

The stealth digital sleeper cells have not been attributed to any known APT but are meant for high-level espionage, including against government networks, the cybersecurity firm says.

The persistent tools were deployed as part of apparent discreet breaches that are characterized by recurring elements, suggesting an ongoing operation aimed at “embedding stealthy access mechanisms deep inside telecom and critical environments” for extended access.

As part of its investigation, Rapid7 uncovered passive backdoors and kernel-level implants that have been used in combination with credential harvesters and cross-platform command frameworks.

“Together, these components form a persistent access layer designed not simply to breach networks, but to inhabit them,” the cybersecurity firm warns.

One of the central pieces of the campaign is BPFdoor, a stealthy Linux backdoor that was publicly detailed in 2021, and which uses Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) functionality for packet inspection within the kernel, reacting to specific packets only.

As part of the analyzed intrusions, public-facing applications and valid accounts were abused for initial access. The state-sponsored hackers targeted Ivanti, Cisco, Fortinet, VMware, and Palo Alto Networks appliances, as well as Apache Struts and other web-facing platforms.

At the next step, the hackers deployed Linux beacon frameworks such as CrossC2, a Cobalt Strike-derived beacon often used by Chinese APTs for staging, command execution, and lateral movement.

For persistence, the intruders often deploy the open source passive backdoor framework TinyShell. SSH brute-forcers and custom keyloggers are also deployed, along with “brute-force utilities containing pre-populated credential lists tailored for telecom environment,” Rapid7 says.

The BPFDoor, which had its source code leaked online in 2022, is deployed in the Linux kernel and remains dormant, inspecting network traffic using the BPF filter. When a specific magic byte sequence is received inside a crafted packet, the backdoor spawns a bind shell or reverse shell.

Rapid7 observed several BPFdoor samples used in the wild, all ELF files, although Solaris variants also exist, and released a scanner to help defenders identify potential infections.

Some BPFdoor samples, the cybersecurity firm says, can mimic bare-metal infrastructure, posing as legitimate enterprise platforms to blend into operational noise. Others were seen spoofing core containerization components.

In newer variants, the backdoor trigger is embedded within seemingly legitimate HTTPS traffic, and the attackers are carefully padding the request so that their marker always “lands exactly at the 26th byte offset of the inspected data structure,” which the implant checks.

“The updated variant combines encrypted HTTPS triggers, proxy-aware command delivery, application-layer camouflage techniques, ICMP-based control signals, and kernel-level packet filtering to bypass multiple layers of modern network defenses,” Rapid7 notes.

The cybersecurity firm underlines that BPFdoor’s capabilities make it more threatening than a typical, stealthy backdoor, turning it into an access layer to telecom backbone infrastructure.

“Rather than targeting individual servers, the operators appear to focus on the underlying platforms that power modern telecommunication networks: bare-metal systems running telecom workloads, cloud-native Kubernetes environments hosting Containerized Network Functions, and the signaling protocols that coordinate subscriber identity, mobility, and communication flows,” Rapid7 notes.

This is not the first time Chinese hackers have been caught deep inside critical infrastructure. In early 2024, CISA confirmed that Volt Typhoon had

been “pre-positioning” across US organizations, only months after Mandiant warned of the hacking group being “clearly dug in”.
In 2024, the networks of nine US telecom firms were hacked by Salt Typhoon, a Chinese state-sponsored group that continued targeting telecoms providers in 2025.

## China prepares to open university exclusively dedicated to cybersecurity

23 March 2026, MUGGLEHEAD

China is launching its first standalone university dedicated exclusively to cybersecurity, a strategic move to build high-level talent amid escalating digital threats and AI advancements.
The future institution in Wuhan, Hubei Province, was approved by the Ministry of Education on Mar. 12 and will open enrolment this fall. News of the development emerged from the provincial government’s WeChat social media account.
The school aims to train strategic, high-end professionals for government agencies, critical infrastructure operators and central state-owned enterprises. It intends to supply talent and technology to safeguard national cybersecurity and support economic growth. Establishing the institute is part of the National Cybersecurity Talent and Innovation Base initiative in Wuhan that has been ongoing since 2017.
The university will initially offer four undergraduate majors: artificial intelligence; data science and big data technology; software engineering; and computer science and technology.
As specified by the Hubei Fabu WeChat channel, partnerships with leading local firms such as **360 Security Technology Inc** (SHA: 601360) and Sugon will create 13 specialised laboratories and 28 internship bases.
This dedicated university marks a shift from earlier models where cybersecurity programs existed only as subunits within larger domestic institutions.
Recent Chinese cybersecurity developments further illustrate Beijing’s comprehensive push. Currently, the People’s Liberation Army is rapidly acquiring AI systems for algorithmic warfare to gain information supremacy, detect U.S. naval assets and support faster decision-making. China has publicly accused the United States of fuelling global cyber instability by embedding AI-powered reconnaissance tools against its power grids and critical networks.
China is renowned for its Great Firewall, which remains one of the world’s most sophisticated internet censorship and control systems. Operated under the Cyberspace Administration of China, it blocks or restricts access to hundreds of thousands of foreign domains. These include major platforms like Google, Facebook, YouTube and many news sites. It enforces strict domestic content monitoring to maintain information control and cyber sovereignty.
Market analysts have agreed that China’s cybersecurity sector will expand with approximately 10 per cent compound annual growth and reach a valuation around US$19.5 billion by 2030.

## Chinese cybersecurity lab builds "digital shield" for connected vehicles on road

21 March 2026, Bastille Post

As intelligent connected vehicles (ICVs) reshape the future of mobility, a dedicated Chinese lab is working to shield them from cyber vulnerabilities, highlighting China's commitment to balancing innovation with security in the new energy vehicle sector.
The promise of smarter, more connected vehicles inevitably brings along heightened cybersecurity risks. Addressing this challenge head-on is the Cyber Security Research Center of CATARC, also known as the NASI Lab, located in north China's Tianjin Municipality.
Established by the China Automotive Technology and Research Center (CATARC) in 2022, a leading science and technology research body in the automotive sector, the NASI Lab serves as a national hub for automotive cybersecurity research and testing.
A critical asset of the lab is its security vulnerability database for connected vehicles, the only national-level vulnerability repository dedicated to the automotive industry in China.
Paired with vast streams of threat intelligence, the database enables monitoring of potential cyber risks to intelligent vehicles around the clock. Whenever a new vulnerability, attack pattern, or threat event is detected, the center can rapidly issue alerts and coordinate responses, effectively creating a robust "digital shield" for smart cars on the road.
Inside the lab's vulnerability analysis center, researchers conduct controlled "attack-defense" experiments to expose real-world risks. In one striking demonstration, a test expert disabled a vehicle in motion, visibly illustrating to drivers the tangible risks posed by cyber vulnerabilities.
"This is a new energy vehicle currently in motion, and the screen displays the driver's real-time operation of the accelerator pedal. What we are demonstrating now is a malicious cyberattack in which a hacker exploits a network vulnerability to cut power to the entire vehicle. As you can see, the wheels are now coasting solely by inertia. The driver can no longer accelerate or control the vehicle by pressing the accelerator pedal. Under high-speed driving conditions, this type of scenario could easily lead to serious traffic accidents," said Zhou Boya, a test expert at the center.

Another experiment highlighted risks in car key systems.

"Here, we have two vehicles of the same batch and identical model. A hacker can maliciously intercept the signal from a car key fob by exploiting a vulnerability, and then use a corresponding device to replay that signal. This technique enables remote, batch unauthorized access to vehicles," said Zhou.

Beyond threat detection and testing, the NASI Lab fosters a collaborative ecosystem through its "white hat" community. In the cybersecurity field, "white hats" are ethical security researchers who work to identify and fix vulnerabilities, standing in contrast to malicious hackers.

Each year, the center hosts multiple information security challenges, bringing together top-tier white-hat experts and industry professionals from across China. These competitions not only sharpen defensive capabilities, but also help channel cutting-edge research into practical vulnerability prevention, strengthening the industry's security foundation from the ground up.

## Styx Intelligence Launches First Cybersecurity Technology to Detect and Stop Disinformation

20 March 2026, EIN Press Wire

As cyber attacks shift from hacking systems to manipulating humans, Styx Intelligence helps protect brands, executives, and customers from disinformation Styx Intelligence, a leading global SaaS cybersecurity organization, today announced the launch of Disinformation Security, a new module within its unified External Digital & Cyber Risk Protection platform. This technology enables enterprises to continuously monitor, assess, and react to disinformation campaigns targeting their brand, executives, and customers.

Disinformation has emerged as one of the most consequential and least-addressed risks in enterprise cybersecurity, with the 2026 World Economic Forum ranking it among the top short-term global technological risks.

“The most dangerous attacks today don’t target infrastructure — they target belief,” said Karim Ladha, CEO of Styx Intelligence. “They spread faster than organizations can respond and create real-world consequences in hours. Every company is now exposed. Being the first to market with Disinformation Security, we’re giving teams the ability to detect and act before those narratives take hold.”

**The Growing Risk of Disinformation**

Disinformation campaigns follow a predictable pattern: a false narrative is seeded, amplified by coordinated accounts or bots, and quickly believed — often within a 12-24 hour window. What starts as a single post can rapidly escalate into widespread confusion, reputational damage, or financial loss.

Examples include:

– Election-related campaigns where false candidate information or misleading voting guidance is spread to create confusion

– Targeted efforts to discredit brands, products, or services, often driven by coordinated or ideologically motivated actors

Until now, organizations have had limited abilities to identify and address threats that originate entirely outside their perimeter.

A New Layer of Cybersecurity: Catching **Disinformation Early**

Disinformation Security brings a threat intelligence framework to monitoring public channels — making Styx Intelligence the first cybersecurity platform to treat disinformation as a measurable, actionable risk.

The module integrates directly into the StyxView platform, further enhancing Styx Intelligence’s “External Digital & Cyber Risk Protection” solution that includes brand protection, executive protection, third party risk, dark web monitoring, and attack surface management.

It mitigates threats early by:

– Identifying abnormal activity through a dynamic Disinformation Risk Score

– Tracking how narratives spread and evolve across channels

– Detecting coordinated activity, including bot networks and amplification patterns

– Providing clear evidence to help teams assess risk and respond quickl

When threats are identified, Styx Intelligence enables rapid response by alerting internal teams and initiating automated takedown workflows, accelerating what is typically a slow, manual process.

“Disinformation is not only a reputation issue,” said Santosh Nair, CTO of Styx Intelligence. “When attackers impersonate people and misuse a brand’s identity, they can redirect customers to the wrong place, trigger scams, and create confusion inside the company. Teams need visibility early, with proof, so they can act with confidence.”

Trusted across all major global market sectors including government, finance, retail, health and technology, Styx Intelligence helps teams detect, prioritize, and remediate external digital threats before they escalate.

**About Styx Intelligence**

Styx Intelligence is a leading global SaaS-based cybersecurity organization, offering a unified, AI-driven External Digital & Cyber Risk Protection platform that protects an organization’s brand, people, and external digital infrastructure from cyber threats. Built on a proprietary framework, Styx Intelligence provides the ability to monitor, detect, and act on brand and executive impersonations, phishing attacks, disinformation campaigns, data leakage, and third-party risks

across the open web, social media, and the dark web.
Brad Ball
Styx Intelligence

## China: Cybercrime Bill Entrenches Censorship, Surveillance

17 March 2026, Human Rights Watch

The Chinese government's proposed law to combat cybercrime extends far beyond addressing legitimate legal concerns and contains sweeping provisions that pose a significant threat to human rights, Human Rights Watch said today.
China's Ministry of Public Security on January 31, 2026, published a 68-article Draft Law on Cybercrime Prevention and Control. If enacted, the bill would bring together rules that govern China's telecommunication, internet, and banking systems under a single framework, strengthening authorities' ability to trace user activity across platforms. The bill also expands police and other authorities' ability to suspend access to financial accounts and communication services and bar people from leaving the country in cybercrime-related cases without meaningful oversight or redress provisions. Notably, the draft law has problematic extraterritorial reach.
"The draft cybercrime law reflects President Xi Jinping's broad efforts to restrict digital and physical spaces by allowing state security to expand and tighten social controls, including beyond borders," said Yalkun Uluyol, China researcher at Human Rights Watch. "The law would further undermine online anonymity, chill free speech, and restrict access to information."
Many of the bill's restrictive regulatory practices already exist under Chinese law, such as the Cybersecurity Law of 2016 and Data Security Law of 2021. However, the draft law consolidates and further formalizes them. The provisions address legitimate law enforcement concerns such as criminal activities online, including fraud, child pornography, and illicit financial transactions. However, they also threaten internationally protected rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and access to information.
The vague and overbroad nature of many of the offenses—such as "disrupting online order," harming "national security" and "public interest," "disrupting the real-name management system," and "disseminating false information"—allows the government to punish legitimate speech and activities. Although such vague terminology is not new under Chinese law, its use in the draft cybercrimes law poses a significant threat to basic freedoms.
The draft law consolidates and reinforces existing mandatory real-name registration across telecommunication, internet, and banking systems services (articles 11 to 13). While such requirements already exist in Chinese law, the bill requires ongoing or "dynamic" reverification of identity when these platforms are handling accounts in high crime areas or during high crime periods, or when they notice "abnormal operations" of the accounts, suggesting automated or algorithmic-based identity checks (动态身份核验, article 16). China's real-name registration requirement allows the authorities to identify online commentators or tie mobile use to specific individuals, limiting anonymous expression, infringing on privacy rights, and chilling free speech.
Articles 19 to 33 list conduct prohibited under the "governance of the cybercrime ecosystem," which include vague terms such as "publishing information that goes against social order and good custom for the generation of … advertising revenue" (article 28(4)). These articles also contain undue restrictions on legitimate cybersecurity research (articles 24 and 25). Such provisions risk criminalizing legitimate activities, such as those carried out by journalists, human rights defenders, and security researchers.
Article 62 also allows the police and other administrative authorities to "record in the credit files of individuals" who violate the draft law. And article 57 allows the police to "blacklist" people from using basic services such as opening a sim card without a clear removal mechanism, transparency, or redress mechanisms, practices that may be used to punish dissidents.
Articles 34 to 51 list provisions outlining extensive obligations of telecommunication, internet, and banking service providers in China to constantly monitor user behavior, and report broadly problematic behaviors such as artificial intelligence-generated "rumors" (article 40(10)) to public security organs and other relevant authorities. Article 51 also requires these service providers to provide technical assistance and decryption to the police for broad purposes to "safeguard national security" and "investigate terrorist activities."
The 2018 report of the United Nations special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression states that governments should not impose "laws or arrangements that would require the 'proactive' monitoring or filtering of content, which is both inconsistent with the right to privacy and likely to amount to prepublication censorship." Compelled decryption without safeguards also raises mass surveillance risks. The authorities may "block illegal information that originates outside the territory of the PRC [People's Republic of China]" and network operators should promptly block them and report them to public security organs (article 44).
The draft law also prohibits tools and services that enable people to obtain or spread such information. While China already blocks foreign information through practice such as with the "Great Firewall" and bans the unapproved

provision of virtual private networks to circumvent such restrictions, the bill embeds such prohibitions into the cybercrime law framework.

Such provisions contravene the right to seek, receive, and impart information "regardless of frontiers" under article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose provisions are considered reflective of customary international law, and article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which China has signed but not yet ratified.

The draft law not only extends this abusive cybercrime regime to citizens abroad (article 2) but also to "overseas individuals and organizations providing internet service … to users in the PRC" (article 53). The law would also allow relevant authorities to punish these foreign entities for producing or disseminating information that "harms the interests" of the Chinese government by freezing their funds and investments in China and barring them from entering China (article 55).

The draft law provisions allow for up to 5,000,000 Chinese yuan (US$725,000) fines and 15 days in detention for "serious" violations related to cybercrimes. The authorities may also restrict "Chinese citizens … from leaving the country for six months to three years after their punishment is completed" (article 56), which violates their right to freedom of movement, protected under international human rights law. China's Criminal Law already punishes cybercrimes under articles 285, 286, and 287, which includes detention, imprisonment, and fines; it also includes extensive punishments for peaceful speech and activities.

The draft law on cybercrime is inconsistent with China's international human rights law obligations and violates the rights of internet users in China and abroad, Human Rights Watch said.

"The draft cybercrimes law is part of the Chinese government's 'digital authoritarianism,' through which the authorities are weaving a set of laws to restrict the remaining pockets of freedom that people once enjoyed in cyberspace," Uluyol said. "Concerned governments should press the Chinese government to scrap the proposed law."

## China-Linked Hackers Hit Asian Militaries in Patient Espionage Operation

16 March 2026, Security Week

Southeast Asian military organizations have been targeted in a China-linked cyberespionage campaign running for years, Palo Alto Networks reports.

Likely ongoing since at least 2020 and attributed to a state-sponsored threat actor tracked as CL-STA-1087, the activity shows a high degree of patience, as the attackers stayed dormant in the compromised environments for months.

"The attackers behind this cluster actively searched for and collected highly specific files concerning military capabilities, organizational structures, and collaborative efforts with Western armed forces," Palo Alto Networks notes.

As part of the observed intrusions, the hackers deployed custom tools, such as the AppleChris and MemFun backdoors and the Getpass credential stealer, and executed malicious PowerShell scripts remotely on multiple infected systems.

While the initial infection vector has not been identified, Palo Alto Networks determined that, in at least one instance, CL-STA-1087 had access to an organization's environment for months before resuming its operations.

The attackers deployed PowerShell scripts designed to create reverse shells to a command-and-control (C&C) server and used the access to drop the AppleChris backdoor. Next, they relied on WMI and native Windows .NET commands to infect domain controllers, web servers, IT workstations, and executive-level systems.

As part of the renewed activity, the Chinese spies created a new service for persistence and payload execution, and stored a malicious DLL in the System32 folder, abusing DLL hijacking to load it via a shadow copy service.

Following lateral movement, the hackers started searching for sensitive files such as official meeting records, assessments of operational capabilities, and details of joint military activities.

"The attackers showed particular interest in files related to military organizational structures and strategy, including command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems," Palo Alto Networks explains.

CL-STA-1087's tools and the China connection

The threat actor deployed multiple variants of the AppleChris backdoor: an earlier development iteration that used a Dropbox account and a Pastebin as the dead drop resolvers, and a Tunneler variant relying only on Pastebin but adding advanced network proxy capabilities.

The backdoor dynamically resolves its C&C server's IP address to receive commands, allowing it to enumerate drives, list directories, download/upload/delete files, enumerate processes, execute shell commands remotely, and create processes.

In addition to AppleChris, the hackers deployed MemFun, a multi-stage malware family that relies on reflective DLL loading for the execution of the main backdoor.

Furthermore, they were seen deploying Getpass, a custom version of Mimikatz targeting 10 specific Windows authentication packages for credential harvesting.

Based on Pastebin creation dates and the compilation timestamps of the analyzed malware, Palo Alto Networks believes that the espionage group has been active since at least 2020.

"Our analysis suggests that the attackers maintained communication with multiple compromised networks over an extended period, leveraging Pastebin and Dropbox for C&C distribution. Evidence suggests the threat actor

behind the activity cluster continues to update their Dropbox account with updated infrastructure files," the cybersecurity firm notes.
Palo Alto Networks' investigation also revealed that the attackers' operational schedule aligns with a UTC+8 time zone schedule, which represents the typical office hours across China and other Asian regions.
The targeting of military organizations in Southeast Asia, the use of China-based cloud network infrastructure, and the use of Simplified Chinese on a login page for a C&C server suggest that the state-sponsored group behind this campaign is likely operating out of China, Palo Alto Networks says.

## China political adviser calls for more focus on AI, security

16 March 2026, Coin Geek

A leading national political adviser to the People's Republic of China (PBoC) has called for greater focus on artificial intelligence (AI) agents to drive further AI industrial growth, as well as enhanced AI-driven defenses to safeguard enterprises amid rising cyber threats, including those from other AI systems.
Zhou Hongyi, founder of Chinese internet security company Qihoo 360 and a member of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference—the meeting of the state's top political advisory body—outlined what he called a "six forces model" for China's AI industry, according to a report from local outlet China Daily.
Speaking at this year's "two sessions"—the yearly meetings of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the National Committee of the political advisory body, which serve five-year terms and convene each March—Zhou said electricity, computing power, intelligence, talent, security and productivity must all work together to lay a solid foundation for the application of AI across more sectors.
Specifically, he also stressed the importance of AI agents, saying, "It is the AI agents that consume inference computing power that can transform general model capabilities into specialized intelligence."
For this reason, he urged a focus on inference computing, intelligent agent platforms, and AI-powered security solutions.
"Only by transforming large models into AI agents, and into digital experts and digital interns, can it be integrated with the business of enterprises," Zhou said.
The political advisor's call comes at a boom time for AI development in China. Based on recent data from Stanford University's Global AI Vibrancy Tool, which aggregates dozens of indicators of national AI performance, including research output, investment, talent attraction, and governance frameworks, China is second in the world in AI competitiveness, after only the United States.
It is the political, cultural, and technological rivalry with this latter powerhouse that has almost certainly spurred Chinese lawmakers to intensify their AI efforts over recent months and years.
In this regard, China's Minister of Industry and Information Technology, Li Lecheng, who also spoke at the meeting of the "two sessions," noted how AI has become a powerful driver of high-quality economic development, and that more than 30% of China's large-scale industrial enterprises had already adopted AI technologies by the end of last year.
"You can see that unmanned production is such that human-machine collaboration is becoming a common scene in workshops and factories, and covers areas such as improving designs, manufacturing, efficiency improvement, quality inspection and other aspects," Li said, as reported by RTHK News.
However, Zhou, who is also the founder and CEO of an internet security firm, warned that the security landscape is facing multiple AI-related security challenges, and that this is another area in which China should capitalize on its substantial investment in AI technology.
"This year I would like to first focus on 'AI plus' security, which means we must use AI's abilities to solve traditional security issues," Zhou said, as reported by Hong Kong outlet Bastille Post on Thursday. "For example, we can simulate an attack to an enterprise's network, identifying its vulnerabilities and then fix them."
He suggested that AI agents would be a key factor for the 'AI plus' security to be implemented into various industries, "because large models have their own limits."
For example, he outlined how traditional security systems lack intelligent capabilities and highlighted the rise of "hacker agents," which have transformed cyber warfare and introduced new risks. Zhou reportedly said the security industry urgently needs to transform by accelerating the use of AI to govern AI.
Therefore, he recommended supporting enterprises with both security and AI capabilities to develop a range of security agent products for vulnerability handling and attack traceability analysis. These, Zhou said, should be deployed in key areas such as critical information infrastructure and industrial internet to promote scenario-based applications.
In order for artificial intelligence (AI) to work right within the law and thrive in the face of growing challenges, it needs to integrate an enterprise blockchain system that ensures data input quality and ownership—allowing it to keep data safe while also guaranteeing the immutability of data. Check out CoinGeek's coverage on this emerging tech to learn more why Enterprise blockchain will be the backbone of AI.

## Report Claims CCP Bot Network Exploits X Algorithm to Suppress Dissident Voices

12 March 2026, ChinaScope

On March 7, a Chinese blogger living in Canada described what he believes to be a coordinated online attack by Chinese Communist Party (CCP)–linked "internet trolls" targeting his account on the social media platform *X*. According to the blogger, the tactic does not involve directly banning accounts but instead exploits weaknesses in the platform's recommendation algorithm to restrict the reach of targeted users.

The blogger, who posts under the account name "Finding心归何处," began operating the account in January 2026 and gradually gained followers by sharing personal experiences after leaving China and commenting on political issues. His follower count grew from about 2,800 on February 14 to 7,800 by March 7, with some posts reaching as many as 870,000 views. However, he soon noticed suspicious activity and described the alleged attack as unfolding in three stages. First, large numbers of bot accounts with no profile photos, posts, or followers suddenly followed him. Second, these accounts remained in his follower list for a period of time, potentially causing the platform's algorithm to associate his account with a low-quality social network profile. Third, when his politically sensitive posts began gaining traction, the same accounts simultaneously unfollowed and blocked him, often during Beijing working hours.

The blogger argues that this coordinated activity manipulates the platform's recommendation system. When many followers abruptly leave while a post is trending, the algorithm may interpret the content as offensive or misleading, triggering automated mechanisms that limit further distribution to new users. In addition, large numbers of blocks within a short period can reduce an account's credibility score and may even place it in a search blacklist, making it difficult for others to locate the account. Because unfollowing and blocking are normal user actions, the tactic is difficult for platforms to classify as malicious behavior. A well-known political commentator also said he has observed similar tactics for years and believes CCP has studied platform algorithms to suppress anti-CCP voices while simultaneously amplifying pro-government narratives.

## CHINA: 'THE STATE IS USING GENERATIVE AI TO ENGINEER REALITY THROUGH INFORMATIONAL GASLIGHTING'

12 March 2026, Civicus Lens

**What AI systems is China developing?**

Based on our research, China is rapidly developing a multi-layered AI ecosystem designed to expand state control.

Tech giants are building multimodal large language models (LLMs) such as Alibaba's Qwen and Baidu's Ernie Bot, which censor and reshape descriptions of politically sensitive images. Hardware companies including Dahua, Hikvision and SenseTime supply the camera networks that feed into these systems.

The state is building what amounts to an AI-driven criminal justice pipeline. This includes City Brain operations centres such as Shanghai's Pudong district, which process massive surveillance data, as well as the 206 System, developed by iFlyTek, which analyses evidence and recommends criminal sentences. Inside prisons, AI monitors inmates' facial expressions and tracks their emotions.

AI-enabled satellite surveillance, such as the Xinjiang Jiaotong-01, enables autonomous real-time tracking over politically sensitive regions. Additionally, AI-enabled fishing platforms such as Sea Eagle expand economic extraction in the exclusive economic zones of countries including Mauritania and Vanuatu, displacing artisanal fishing communities.

**How does China use AI for censorship and policing?**

China relies on a hybrid model of censorship that fuses the speed of AI with human political judgement. The government requires companies to self-censor, creating a commercial market for AI moderation tools. Tech giants such as Baidu and Tencent have industrialised this process: systems automatically scan images, text and videos to detect content deemed to be risky in real time, while human reviewers handle nuanced or coded speech.

In policing, City Brains ingest data from millions of cameras, drones and **Internet of Things** sensors and use AI to identify suspects, track vehicles and predict unrest before it happens. In Xinjiang, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform aggregates data from cameras, phone scanners and informants to generate risk scores for individuals, enabling pre-emptive detention based on behavioural patterns rather than specific crimes.

On platforms such as Douyin, the state does not just delete content; it algorithmically suppresses dissent while amplifying 'positive energy'. AI links surveillance data directly to narrative control and police action.

**What are the human rights impacts?**

These AI systems erode the rights to freedom of expression, privacy and a fair trial.

Historically, online censorship meant deleting a post. Today, generative AI engages in 'informational gaslighting'. When ASPI researchers showed an Alibaba LLM a photograph of a protest against human rights violations in Xinjiang, the AI described it as 'individuals in a public setting holding signs with incorrect statements' based on

'prejudice and lies'. The technology subtly engineers reality, preventing users accessing objective historical truths.

AI also undermines the right to a fair trial. In courts that lack judicial independence, AI systems that recommend sentences or predict recidivism act as a black box that defence lawyers cannot scrutinise.

Pervasive surveillance changes behaviour even when not actively used, so its chilling effect may be as significant as direct deployment. Knowing their conversations may be monitored, people self-censor online and in private messaging. Emotion recognition in prisons takes this further: people can theoretically be flagged for their internal states of mind. It's not just actions that are punished, but also thoughts.

**Which groups are most affected?**

While AI-enabled surveillance affects all people, ethnic minorities such as Koreans, Mongolians, Tibetans and Uyghurs are disproportionately targeted.

Mainstream LLMs are trained primarily in Mandarin, leaving little commercial incentive to develop AI for minority languages. The Chinese state, however, views those languages as a security vulnerability. State-funded institutions, including the National Key Laboratory at Minzu University, are building LLMs in minority languages, not for cultural preservation, but to power public-opinion control and prevention platforms. These scan text, audio and video in Tibetan and Uyghur to detect cultural advocacy, dissent or religious activity.

Feminist activists, human rights lawyers — particularly since the **709 crackdown** in 2015 — labour activists and religious minorities including Falun Gong practitioners face disproportionate targeting. Chinese models consistently adopt state-aligned narratives about such groups, labelling Falun Gong a cult and avoiding human rights framing. Since 2020, Hong Kongers have also been subject to National Security Law surveillance using many of the same tools deployed on the mainland, a reminder that this infrastructure can be rapidly extended.

**How can activists in China protect themselves?**

Protecting oneself inside China is increasingly difficult. AI leaves very few blind spots. But the system is not perfectly omniscient.

Activists have historically relied on coded speech, euphemisms and satire, the classic example being the use of 'Winnie the Pooh' to refer to President Xi Jinping. Because AI struggles with cultural nuance and evolving memes, new linguistic workarounds can temporarily bypass automated filters. But this is a relentless game of Whac-a-Mole: Chinese tech companies employ thousands of human content reviewers whose only job is to catch new memes and feed them back into the AI.

The most practical steps are to use VPNs to access blocked platforms, secure communications apps such as Signal and separate devices for sensitive work. None of these are foolproof. VPN use is technically illegal and increasingly detected and Signal can only be accessed via VPN. It helps to keep a minimal digital footprint and communicate face-to-face on sensitive matters. For activists in Xinjiang, however, surveillance is so pervasive that individual precautions offer little protection. Strong international networks and rigorous documentation practices are essential.

**Is China exporting these technologies?**

China is the world's largest exporter of AI-powered surveillance technology, marketing these systems globally, particularly to the global south.

The Chinese state is purposefully expanding its minority-language public-opinion monitoring software throughout Belt and Road Initiative countries, effectively extending its censorship apparatus to monitor Tibetan and Uyghur diaspora communities abroad. Chinese companies including Dahua, Hikvision, Huawei and ZTE have deployed surveillance and 'safe city' systems across over 100 countries, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates among the most significant recipients. Critically, these companies operate under China's 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires cooperation with state intelligence, meaning data flowing through these systems could be accessible to Beijing as well as to purchasing governments.

China is also exporting its governance model through the open-source release of its LLMs, embedding Chinese censorship norms into foundational infrastructure used by developers worldwide.

**What should the international community do?**

The international community must recognise that countering this requires regulatory pushback.

First, democratic states should set minimum transparency standards for public procurement. This means refusing to purchase AI models that conceal political or historical censorship and mandating that providers publish a 'moderation log' with refusal reason codes so users know when content is restricted for political reasons.

Second, states should enact 'safe-harbour laws' to protect civil society organisations, journalists and researchers who audit AI models for hidden censorship. Currently, doing so can breach corporate terms of service.

Third, strict export controls should block the transfer of repression-enabling technologies to authoritarian regimes, while companies providing public-opinion management services should be excluded from democratic markets. Existing targeted sanctions on companies such as Dahua and Hikvision for their role in Xinjiang should be enforced more rigorously.

Finally, the international community must recognise that Chinese surveillance extends beyond China's borders. Spyware targeting Tibetan and Uyghur activists in exile is well-documented, as is pressure on family members remaining in China. Rigorous documentation by international

civil society remains essential for building the evidentiary record for future accountability.

## Japan Warns Firms Over Huawei 5G Risk in Ukraine Reconstruction

12 March 2026, China Scope

The Japanese government has issued a warning to Japanese companies interested in supporting Ukraine's postwar reconstruction, cautioning them about the security risks associated with using 5G telecommunications infrastructure built on technology from Chinese tech giant Huawei. The warning reflects growing concern in Tokyo over the potential for technical and sensitive information leakage through Huawei-equipped networks.

The alert comes after a major Ukrainian mobile operator conducted 5G pilot tests with Huawei in several cities last year. The Ukrainian government subsequently allocated 5G frequency bands to that operator. Japan's Rakuten Group had also applied to participate in Ukraine's 5G market but was not selected as a candidate.

According to Japanese government documents obtained by *Kyodo News*, officials flagged serious concerns about the spread of Huawei 5G infrastructure in major cities including the capital Kyiv. The documents specifically warned that investment in critical infrastructure — including the energy sector — carried significant risks for Japan, the United States, and European nations. Officials also expressed concern that Chinese-made equipment could enter the Ukrainian market indirectly, through Turkish intermediary companies, even without direct involvement from Chinese firms.

Huawei has long been identified as a security vulnerability by U.S. authorities and remains subject to American sanctions. Japan's decision to issue this kind of economic security warning to private firms is considered an unusual step, underscoring how seriously the government views the risk of Huawei technology proliferating in strategically important regions. The move signals that Tokyo is prepared to take a more active role in guiding Japanese corporate behavior abroad when national and allied security interests are at stake.

## New China-linked cyberespionage campaign exploits Windows, Google Drive

05 March 2026, SC World

China-linked threat operation Silver Dragon, which is believed to be operating within the APT41 umbrella, has weaponized legitimate Windows services and Google Drive in a new cyberespionage campaign aimed at government entities and public sector organizations, Cybernews reports.

Aside from hijacking Windows Update, .NET utilities, and Bluetooth components with malware to ensure persistence and stealth, Silver Dragon has leveraged a dedicated Google Drive account as command-and-control infrastructure for its GearDoor backdoor, with the use of a trusted cloud platform curbing detection, according to a Check Point Research analysis. Other tools, including the screenshot-capturing SilverScreen and remote command-executing SSHcmd, have also been harnessed by the hacking group.

"Silver Dragon utilizes different initial access vectors, hiding inside trusted Windows services and widely used platforms like Google Drive. This research shows that security can no longer treat cloud traffic and core operating system components as inherently safe," said Check Point Software Threat Intelligence Group Manager Sergey Shykevich.

## China through the Lens of Italian Intelligence

05 March 2026, Decode39

The **2026 Annual Report of Italian Intelligence** outlines an analytical assessment of China as a leading actor in global geopolitical and technological competition. Beijing is described as a strategic player capable of long-term planning and increasingly reliant on hybrid instruments to expand its influence. Below is a synthesis of the main areas of concern highlighted in the report.

**Hybrid Threats and Influence Strategies.** Italian intelligence identifies China as one of the principal actors behind hybrid threats targeting democratic societies.

- **Whole-of-Government Approach:** Beijing deploys economic, diplomatic, and informational tools in an integrated manner, all under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to expand its influence and conduct industrial espionage.
- **European Dynamics:** Toward the European Union, China pursues a dual-track approach. On the one hand, it maintains diplomatic dialogue to avoid an excessive alignment between the EU and the United States.
    - On the other hand, it seeks to intensify bilateral relations with individual member states to exploit and amplify internal divergences within the Union.
- **Information Manipulation:** China's strategy in the information sphere aims to promote positive narratives about the country while suppressing critical voices.
    - This effort leverages national media outlets, think tanks, and social media platforms. Recently, analysts have also detected targeted critical narratives aimed specifically at NATO and the United States.

**Technological Sovereignty and Cybersecurity.** China is viewed as a systemic challenger in the race for dominance in emerging technologies.

- **Cyber Espionage:** For the first time, Italian intelligence publicly attributed a global cyber espionage campaign to China, carried out by the group known as "Salt Typhoon."
- **Technological Leadership:** Beijing holds strong positions in several critical sectors:
- **Semiconductors:** China's share of global manufacturing capacity is expected to rise to 30% by 2030.
- **Quantum Technologies:** China leads the sector in patent filings, with 7,308 patents in 2024, projected to reach 14,267 by 2030.
- **Artificial Intelligence:** Unlike the United States—where innovation is largely private-sector driven—China's AI development is heavily supported by state investment, which reached $22.5 billion in public funding in 2024.

**Economic Warfare and Critical Raw Materials.** China increasingly transforms economic interdependence into a strategic instrument of pressure.

- **Rare Earths:** Beijing controls more than 90% of the global rare-earth supply chain, materials essential for both defence production (such as components used in the F-35 fighter jet) and the energy transition. The intelligence report highlights the use of export restrictions as a geopolitical lever.
- **Greenfield Investments:** A shift in China's investment strategy in Europe is also emerging. Instead of focusing primarily on acquiring existing companies, Chinese firms are increasingly building new industrial facilities (greenfield investments) — particularly in the electric vehicle and battery sectors—partly to circumvent trade tariffs.

**Indo-Pacific Theatre and Maritime Security.** Italian intelligence is closely monitoring regional tensions involving China.

- **South China Sea:** In 2026, the greatest risks to Asian security are expected to concentrate in this area, where incidents between the Chinese navy and regional actors—such as the Philippines—remain a possibility.
- **The Taiwan Question:** Although a military escalation is considered unlikely before 2027, Beijing continues to promote the goal of "peaceful reunification," while closely monitoring Taiwan's internal political dynamics ahead of the **2028 elections**.
- **Undersea Domain:** China is rapidly expanding its underwater industrial and prototyping capabilities, including shipyards, deepwater ports, and seabed mining projects. However, it still controls only 5–10% of global undersea cable capacity.

## JUST IN: Agentic AI a 'Force Multiplier' for China's Cyberattacks, Report Says

03 March 2026, National Defence Magazine

Artificial intelligence is heightening certain national cybersecurity risks as agentic AI — designed to carry out complex tasks with minimal human oversight — enables adversaries such as China to automate attacks and learn from failed attempts quickly and cheaply, according to a new report released March 11.

The technology is a "force multiplier for the modern adversary," said the "2026 Global Threat Intelligence Report" by Flashpoint, a cyber threat intelligence company.

"For national security organizations and critical infrastructure operators, the risk is not just individual intrusions but the industrialization of access, where adversaries can identify and exploit entry points across networks at machine speed," said Ian Gray, Flashpoint's vice president of intelligence, in an email interview.

Some instances were linked to Chinese advanced persistent threat groups, which are hacking organizations affiliated with the People's Liberation Army and Ministry of State Security. The groups targeted platforms "widely deployed across government agencies, multinational enterprises and defense contractors," Gray said.

More than 1.5 billion illicit discussions and criminal activities related to AI occurred in 2025, peaking significantly in December and signaling "a rapid transition from criminal curiosity to the active development of malicious frameworks," the report said.

Flashpoint reported an increase of more than 12 percent year over year in software vulnerability disclosures, reaching a total of more than 44,000, the report said.

Multiple vulnerabilities that were exploited indicated "a level of preparation and resourcing that is typically associated with state operations rather than opportunistic cybercrime," Gray said.

"It is clear that state-sponsored and financially motivated actors are prioritizing the compromise of the modern development and AI pipeline to achieve maximum reach," the report said.

Meanwhile, organizations like the Defense Department and its contractors are integrating agentic AI into their workflows for efficiency's sake "at a pace that outstrips their ability to understand its components or downstream risk," the report said.

It is imperative that the department balance speed "with control over how automation interacts with sensitive systems and data," Gray said. That means Pentagon officials must understand the extent of newly introduced AI systems — particularly what they can access and execute on command.

"Without that governance layer, automation can unintentionally expand the attack surface," Gray wrote.

The Pentagon is “a high-value target for both state and criminal actors,” and adversaries often attempt to gain access through the department's contractors, vendors, software or adjacent platforms, Gray said.

Insider cyber threats are on the rise in general, with Flashpoint finding more than 91,000 instances of advertisements and attempts to recruit malicious insiders and discussions of insider-related illicit activity in 2025.

“It is cheaper to recruit an insider to circumvent multi-million dollar security stacks than it is to develop a complex exploit from the outside,” the report said.

Examples included “military contractors being bribed by threat actors to pass confidential information,” as well as “North Korean threat actors posing as legitimate employees to steal funds and proprietary information,” the report said.

Gray advised defense contractors — which “often serve as entry points into larger defense and government ecosystems” — to ensure strong employee authentication, minimal access to sensitive information and behavior monitoring across accounts.

Likewise, the Defense Department must defend against insider attacks via monitoring, vetting, authenticating and restricting crucial information access, he said.

“Ultimately, insider recruitment works because it exploits trust rather than technical weaknesses,” Gray said. “The organizations that manage this risk best are those that combine strong technical controls with active monitoring of both internal behavior and external threat actor activity.”

Beyond workflows, AI-driven systems are also becoming common on the battlefield where modern conflicts showcase the advantages of drones and other uncrewed systems.

Many similar cyberattack possibilities apply to these technologies, “particularly when those systems are connected to broader digital infrastructure,” Gray noted. “The core issue is not the AI model itself but the software, identity and supply-chain dependencies that surround it.”

Adversaries tend to seek weak points in the ecosystem supporting an autonomous vehicle, weapon or otherwise — including supply chain, software updates and data pipelines — instead of the platform itself, Gray said.

“As AI-enabled platforms become more integrated into military operations, securing those supporting systems will be just as important as protecting the hardware on the battlefield,” he said.

## 'Large-scale, resource-intensive, and sustained': OpenAI reveals China's operation to silence dissidents on social media

03 March 2026, Business Insider

'Large-scale, resource-intensive, and sustained': OpenAI reveals China's operation to silence dissidents on social media

This is how OpenAI uncovered China's "cyber special operations" targeting political dissidents in China and abroad, after the company found and removed an account owned by the Chinese government that uploaded periodic status reports to ChatGPT and asked them to be polished.

In OpenAI's "Disrupting Malicious Uses of AI" report published on Wednesday, a third of the document detailed China's tactics to silence and intimidate critics across social media platforms owned by American tech giants.

"This effort appears to be large-scale, resource-intensive and sustained, counting at least hundreds of staff, thousands of fake accounts across scores of platforms, the use of locally deployed AI models, and a playbook of dozens of tactics," OpenAI wrote.

"The targets are not just people in China, but also dissidents around the world and representatives of foreign countries, up to and including the prime minister of Japan," OpenAI added.

OpenAI's report documented instances in which operatives for China forged US county court documents and submitted them to social media platforms in an effort to have certain posts removed.

Online operatives with thousands of fake accounts also collectively submitted abusive reports on dissidents to social media platforms to intentionally trigger false account bans and content restrictions, according to OpenAI. Many of these false reports, OpenAI said, include AI-generated images posing as screenshots of conversations and comments.

Some of the largest accounts on X have been targeted, according to OpenAI. That includes the handle @whyyoutouzhele, better known as "Teacher Li is not your teacher," which has the fifth-largest overall traffic share on X as of January, with more than 2.1 million followers. The account mainly posts videos from inside China, often documenting instances of corruption and human rights abuses.

"We hope social platforms like X, YouTube, and Bluesky realize that your content moderation system is being used by the Chinese Communist Party as a weapon," the team behind the Teacher Li account wrote in a post on X on Wednesday.

"We also call on the entire AI industry to take this matter seriously," the team added in the original post written in Chinese. "When your technology is being used to systematically oppress human rights, to say that 'we're just makers of a tool' is not an acceptable answer."

Other social media platforms have observed similar patterns and have taken action to curb these activities. Aaron Rodericks, head of trust and safety at Bluesky, told Business Insider that the

platform has invested in its capabilities to identify and disrupt influence operations like those described in the OpenAI report, including hiring specialized investigative staff and expanding monitoring systems.
"As part of this ongoing work, the team recently removed a small number of accounts, consistent with those described in the report, that were engaged in inauthentic coordinated activity in violation of our Community Guidelines," said Rodericks.
A person familiar with the matter told Business Insider that Meta includes activities that OpenAI described in its regular adversarial report, and takes action against accounts found to be violating platform policies.
X and China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

## Google Disrupted Chinese GRIDTIDE Cyber Espionage Operation Active Since 2017

02 March 2026, CPO Magazine

A long-term Chinese cyber espionage operation that has been active since at least 2017 and has a count of at least 53 victims has been substantially disrupted, according to the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant.
Working with other security partners, the Google and Mandiant teams were able to disable all of the group's known infrastructure and revoke access to Google accounts and API calls that they were making use of. The teams have also published a set of IOCs linked to UNC2814 infrastructure that has been in active use since at least 2023. The group is referred to as GRIDTIDE for the name of a unique backdoor that it deploys, and is suspected in attacks in at least 62 countries during its lengthy run.

**Cyber espionage group known for abusing legitimate functionality of Google Sheets API**

Google and Mandiant stress that the threat actor (UNC2814) does not share any apparent overlap with other big-name groups of Chinese hackers in the news recently, such as Silk and Salt Typhoon. However, the group has been in that same general cyber espionage strata in terms of capability and sustained success as it has run freely through mostly government agencies and telecommunications companies in dozens of countries for nearly 10 years.
One of the attacker's key tactics, at least in recent years, is to abuse the legitimate functionality of the Google Sheets API to disguise its command-and-control traffic via a series of purchased cloud services arranged to look like normal business activity. Google says that they did not make use of any vulnerability in this process, rather just simply deployed the free spreadsheet app's normal API functions in a clever way as a cloaking technique.
The Google Threat team notes that while it did not directly observe the group stealing sensitive information during its campaign, its targeting and breach of telecom companies mirrors numerous known China-backed attacks dedicated to dwelling for as long as possible and extracting as much information of interest as possible. The group was observed dropping the GRIDTIDE backdoor in a victim endpoint known to contain an assortment of sensitive PII including national and voter ID numbers and dates and places of birth.
In total the threat hunters suspect UNC2814 of intrusions in about 70 countries, and have confirmed 53 breaches across 42 nations since 2018. Steve Cobb, Chief Information Security Officer at SecurityScorecard, provides some insight into the group's tactics and what likely targeted organizations can do to prepare themselves: "When 53 organizations across 42 countries are confirmed victims, with suspected infections in at least 20 more, it signals a coordinated effort to gain strategic footholds rather than execute quick hit operations. Targeting telecommunications providers in particular reflects a calculated move. Access at that layer creates visibility across vast networks of government and enterprise communications, allowing adversaries to expand their reach without triggering immediate disruption. It is a quiet but powerful way to accumulate intelligence and maintain optionality for the future. This activity reinforces a larger supply chain challenge. Telecom providers are connective tissue between sectors, and that level of concentration introduces systemic risk when compromised. Persistent access inside a core service provider can remain undetected while delivering ongoing strategic advantage to an adversary. Organizations cannot rely on annual assessments or passive oversight of critical vendors. Continuous monitoring and the ability to rapidly investigate anomalies across third party environments are now baseline requirements. In an environment shaped by nation state actors, resilience depends on how quickly you can detect and respond across your entire ecosystem, not just within your own walls."

**UNC2814 deploys unique tactics**

The threat actor generally targets exposed edge devices and web servers as its initial point of compromise, something not at all unusual for the Chinese cyber espionage groups. Nearly all of these groups focus heavily on scouting for and exploiting known but unpatched vulnerabilities, particularly in low-visibility areas. The Google report outlines actions taken by the threat actor on a CentOS server, where Mandiant first responded to reports of suspicious activity.
As mentioned, the researchers did not directly observe exfiltration of data by this group. However, similar prior Chinese espionage campaigns against telcos have generally targeted the call data records and SMS messages of specific

persons of interest. Activity is often limited to relatively few targets so as to preserve access for as long as possible, despite often having a very broad ability to steal customer records. In the case of the breach of all the major US telcos by the assorted "Typhoon" groups, the attackers were also interested in the built-in "lawful intercept" system used when law enforcement agencies have a valid court order to monitor a suspect's communications.

As to the technical aspects of the use of Google Sheets for cloaking, the GRIDTIDE malware will drop a 16-byte cryptographic key on the target that is used to decrypt Google Drive configuration data. This configuration data contains the service account associated with UNC2814's Google Sheets document, and a private key for the account. GRIDTIDE connects to the malicious command-and-control spreadsheet using the Google Service Account for API authentication. It then sanitizes the spreadsheet and copies key details about the victim endpoint to it: username, endpoint name, OS details, local IP address, and environmental data such as the current working directory, language settings, and local time zone.

Though this is a substantial blow to UNC2814's operational capability, Chinese cyber espionage is well-funded and persistent and the researchers believe the group will be immediately working to re-establish its prior capability. It may well be diminished for years, but China has many other hacking tentacles out there with much of its activity now outsourced to assorted private companies in the country. Chinese hacking groups are thought to be behind the recent campaign involving exploitation of a zero-day in Dell RecoverPoint software, as well as another long-term campaign involving VPN flaws in Ivanti's Pulse Secure.

# International and CTA

TIBET IN EXILE

## Along with Senate resolution, new Czech Chamber of Deputies revives its Tibet group

30 March 2026, Tibetan Review



The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic has set up a Parliament Tibet Support Group following the election held in early Oct 2025, said the Central Tibetan Administration on its *Tibet.net* website Mar 26. It will continue the work of the Tibet Support Group in the previous lower chamber of the Czech parliament.

The Office of Tibet, Geneva, said the group was set up during a three-day visit of its Representative and advocacy office which ended on Mar 26, calling it one of their most significant achievements.

The report said members from a "wide range of political parties" actively took part in and supported the event, calling it "both strong and inspiring".

"It reflects the Czech Republic's longstanding dedication to the principles of human rights, freedom, and justice. Such unity across political lines demonstrates a deep and enduring moral responsibility toward the Tibetan cause," the office said.

"the re-establishment of this support group symbolises not only political solidarity but also a continued commitment to advocating for the rights and freedoms of the Tibetan people on the global stage," the office further said.

Support for Tibet is also strong in the Czech Senate. On Mar 27, the Chinese embassy in Prague expressed anger over the Czech Senate's Mar 25 resolution on Tibet. That resolution condemned, among other things, China's move to appoint its own reincarnate-successor to the current Dalai Lama and its recently adopted law

on ethnic unity and progress as a threat to Tibetan culture and identity.
The resolution specifically recommended that the Czech government, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, support the Tibetan people's free choice of the 15th Dalai Lama, noted *Reuters* Mar 27.

## Small in Number, Strong in Voice: Tibetan Youth in the Netherlands Renew Commitment to Their Cause

30 March 2026, CTA



*Small in Number, Strong in Voice: Tibetan Youth in the Netherlands Renew Commitment to Their Cause*

A small yet determined group of Tibetan youth gathered in Amsterdam on Saturday, demonstrating that even limited numbers can generate meaningful momentum for a global cause. The meeting, organised by the Office of Tibet, Brussels in collaboration with VTAG Netherlands, focused on exploring new ways to strengthen advocacy efforts for Tibet.
The gathering brought together five Tibetan youths and a supporter, highlighting a growing sense of responsibility among younger generations in exile. Despite its modest size, the event carried a clear purpose: to sustain awareness and engagement on Tibet-related issues within the Netherlands.
Tenzin Phuntsok, EU Advocacy Officer from the Brussels office, attended the session and guided participants through key aspects of the Tibetan movement. The program featured a screening of the documentary *"A Liberation That Never Was: 70 Years of Occupation and Repression in Tibet,"* produced by the Tibet TV section of DIIR, which set the tone for deeper discussion.
Phuntsok also introduced attendees to the structure and functions of the Central Tibetan Administration, emphasising the importance of understanding institutional efforts and the role of the Brussels-based Office of Tibet. The session concluded with an interactive question-and-answer segment, encouraging participants to engage critically with the issues presented.
Adding a personal dimension to the discussions, Tenzin Dolkar shared her experiences from the Youth Empowerment Program in Italy. Her reflections highlighted the value of such initiatives in nurturing informed and proactive advocates, and she encouraged fellow participants to seek out similar opportunities in the future.
The meeting also welcomed a new supporter, Arun Pawan Kumar, who joined as a Blue Book member, an initiative aimed at strengthening solidarity between Tibetans and their allies.
Participants further exchanged ideas on innovative awareness campaigns, particularly focusing on the case of the 11th Panchen Lama, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, who has remained missing since 1995. Discussions drew on updated materials from DIIR's publication *"Tibet's Stolen Child,"* reinforcing the urgency of keeping his story visible on the international stage.
The meeting concluded with a shared commitment to expand their network and sustain regular engagement in the Netherlands. While small in number, the group's resolve underscored a broader truth: youth-led initiatives continue to play a vital role in preserving Tibet's voice globally.
As this gathering demonstrated, impact is not always measured in size, but in dedication, clarity of purpose, and the willingness to act.

## Tibetan Representatives Warn of Expanding Controls Under China's Ethnic Law in Prague

28 March 2026, CTA

On 26 March 2026, Representatives Thinlay Chukki, accompanied by UN Advocacy Officer Phuntsok Topgyal, held a meeting with Sinopsis, where they discussed several key issues concerning Tibet, as well as possibilities for future research collaboration.
Later, they met with officials from the U.S. Embassy's Political Affairs Section in the Czech Republic. The discussions focused on the current situation of Tibetans inside Tibet and the recent Czech Senate resolution. The U.S. Embassy representatives stated that they support all necessary measures on the Tibet cause from their side.
Following this, the Representative met with MP Hayato, Chairman of the Parliament Tibet Support Group from the Chamber of Deputies. The meeting addressed the re-establishment of the Tibet Support Group within the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic. During the discussion, representative Thinlay Chukki provided updates on the current situation in Tibet, including developments related to the newly introduced ethnic law.

Particular attention was given to the implications of this ethnic law, which is seen as further consolidating centralised control over ethnic minority regions, including Tibet. The representatives highlighted concerns that the law may accelerate policies of cultural assimilation, including restrictions on the use of the Tibetan language in education and public life, increased state oversight of religious practices, and limitations on the preservation of Tibetan cultural identity. They also noted concerns about expanded surveillance measures and administrative controls that could affect local governance and community life, as well as potential mechanisms to monitor and influence Tibetan communities living outside China.

On the following day, the delegation met with Czech foreign affairs officials. In this meeting, the representatives elaborated further on the newly introduced ethnic law, including its broader scope and potential extraterritorial implications. They raised concerns that the law could enable increased monitoring and influence over Tibetan communities abroad, alongside reinforcing assimilation policies within Tibet. The discussion emphasised how these measures may impact cultural preservation, religious freedom, and the autonomy of Tibetans both inside Tibet and in the diaspora.

The delegation also provided a comprehensive briefing on the current human rights situation inside Tibet, including restrictions on freedom of expression, religion, and movement.

-Report Filed by Office of Tibet, Geneva

## China vents spleen on Czech senate resolution on Dalai Lama succession, Tibetan identity issues

27 March 2026, Tibetan Review

China has on Mar 27 expressed anger over the Czech Senate's Mar 25 resolution on Tibet. The resolution condemned, among other things, China's move to appoint its own reincarnate successor to the current Dalai Lama and its recently adopted law on ethnic unity and progress as a threat to Tibetan culture and identity.

The resolution specifically recommended that the Czech government, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, support the Tibetan people's free choice of the 15th Dalai Lama, noted *Reuters* Mar 27.

"China urges certain Czech senators to fully recognize the anti-China and separatist nature of the Dalai clique, stop interfering in Xizang-related issues, stop sending any wrong signals to 'Xizang independence' forces in any form, and take concrete actions to safeguard the sound and steady development of China-Czech relations, China's official *globaltimes.cn* Mar 27 quoted a spokesperson from the Chinese Embassy in the Czech Republic as saying in a statement, using the Sinicized name "Xizang" for Tibet.

The statement has taken note of the fact that "the so-called 'Geneva representative of the Tibetan government-in-exile' attended the Czech meeting.", referring to the presence of Ms Thinlay Chukki, Representative at the Office of Tibet, Geneva, during the senate discussion of the resolution.

The statement has claimed that the resolution "wantonly interfered in China's internal affairs", that "Xizang is an inalienable part of China's territory, and Xizang-related affairs are purely China's internal affairs, which brook no interference from any external forces."

Underlining the goal of its Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law, the statement has maintained, "neither the Dalai Lama nor the so-called 'Tibetan government-in-exile' has any right to represent the people of Xizang, still less to decide Xizang's future and destiny."

"The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law is intended to promote ethnic unity and progress and to prohibit acts that undermine ethnic unity or incite ethnic division," the spokesperson has added.

## Representative Thinlay Chukki Participates in Prague Conference Condemning Sinicization of Tibet, Highlights Ongoing Challenges

26 March 2026, CTA



*Representative Thinlay Chukki Participates in Prague Conference Condemning Sinicization of Tibet, Highlights Ongoing Challenges*

A conference on "The Sinicization of Tibet," was organised by Member of Parliament Helena Langšádlová in cooperation with the Sinopsis Project and the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences in Senate Building, Czech Republic. The event brought together parliamentarians, scholars, journalists, and Tibetan representatives to discuss the political and cultural situation in Tibet under Chinese control. The opening session featured remarks by Senator

Langšádlová, Martin Hála, Director of the Sinopsis Project, and Thinlay Chukki, Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama from the Office of Tibet in Geneva.

The conference began with a panel focusing on Tibet's international and strategic significance. Senator Břetislav Rychlík discussed the experiences of the first Czech parliamentary delegation to Dharamshala and reflected on Tibet's ongoing struggle for freedom. David Gards, a Sinologist and Tibetologist affiliated with the Sinopsis Project, analysed Tibet as a crucial factor in Beijing's domestic and international ambitions. Jarmila Ptáčková, Sinologist and Tibetologist at the Oriental Institute, explored the Sinicization of Tibet and highlighted the region's strategic importance for the spread of Chinese influence. Collectively, the panel emphasised Tibet's centrality to China's broader geopolitical and domestic strategies.

The second panel examined Tibetan culture, religion, and life in exile. Zuzana Ondomisiová, an ethnographer, highlighted the importance of His Holiness the Dalai Lama's reincarnation for the preservation of Tibetan cultural identity. Representative Thinlay Chukki shared the experiences of Tibetans living in Europe, emphasising the ongoing repression they face even outside their homeland. Alexander Neumann, journalist, reflected on Czech support for Tibet and the enduring legacy of Václav Havel, while Tomáš Etzler discussed the difficulties of reporting from Tibet. Pavel Zácek, MP of the Czech Socialist Party, concluded the panel by sharing his experiences working with the Tibetan government-in-exile.

Representative Thinlay Chukki also spoke on the transnational repression Tibetans continue to face in the Europe. She detailed systemic control within Tibet, including the destruction of over 6,000 monasteries, arbitrary detention, restrictions on religious practice, and enforced disappearances. Beyond Tibet, Chinese authorities extend their influence through transnational repression, employing digital surveillance, harassment, and even leveraging family members to intimidate Tibetan activists in Europe. The death of Tulku Hunkar Dorje Rinpoche in Chinese-Vietnamese custody in 2025 underscored the lethal risks involved. She called on European governments to recognise this repression, understand its historical and political roots, and use their sovereign powers to protect Tibetan citizens.

The conference was attended by prominent Czech lawmakers, including MP Helena Langšádlová, former Minister for Science and Research of the Czech Republic and Member of the Chamber of Deputies representing TOP 09; MP Jakub Krainer, Member of the Chamber of Deputies for STAN (Mayors and Independents); MP Hayato Okamura of the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party; and MP Pavel Žáček, Member of the Chamber of Deputies for the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). Other attendees included Přemysl Rabas, Senator for Senate District 5 (Chomutov), and Břetislav Rychlík, Senator for the Brno-město district (Senate constituency 59). In total, approximately 50 participants from diverse academic and professional backgrounds contributed to the discussions, including Phuntsok Topgyal, UN Advocacy Officer at the Office of Tibet in Geneva, as well as numerous young participants.

Overall, the conference highlighted the urgent need for international awareness of Tibet's situation, the ongoing process of Sinicization, and the importance of safeguarding Tibetan cultural and political freedoms both within Tibet and in exile.

-Report Filed by Office of Tibet, Geneva

## Representative Dr. Tsewang Gyalpo Arya briefed Japanese lawmakers on China's Ethnic Unity and Progress Law

26 March 2026, CTA




*Chairperson Eriko Yamatani, MP Ishikawa, Rep. Dr. T.G. Arya, and Secretary Tashi Yangzom*

Representative Dr. Tsewang Gyalpo Arya of the Liaison Office of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama met with lawmakers Eriko Yamatani and Akimasa Ishikawa, Chairperson and the former General Secretary, respectively, of the Japan Parliamentary Support Group for Tibet, today at the Japan Parliament building in Nagatacho, Tokyo.

Representative Arya updated the two lawmakers about the recent Chinese law on "Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress", which is scheduled to be effective from 1 July. He submitted a summary of the law and explained that the motive behind the CCP's law is to legitimise the regime's policy to destroy and assimilate the minority nationals' identity, language, and culture, and the criminalisation of activities resisting this assimilationist drive.

Presenting a copy of the resolution passed by the Japan Tibet Support Group on 28 February, Dr.

Arya requested the lawmakers to follow up on the three points mentioned in the resolution with the government and the parliament. The three points are the issuance of a strong statement condemning the CCP regime for human rights violations in Tibet; establishing a human rights monitoring desk; and urging the CCP regime to stop interfering in the Tibetan religious matter, including the selection of reincarnation of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama.

Representative Arya informed the lawmakers of the International Tibet Support Group conference in Dharamshala, where six members from Japan and two from South Korea participated. He updated them on the celebration of the Year of Compassion and the photo exhibitions on the life and four missions of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama.

Lawmakers Yamatani Eriko and Ishikawa Akimasa appreciated the updates and lamented the continued Chinese repression and expressed shock at the Chinese Ethnic Unity law and the colonial boarding schools. The Japanese version of the latest report on the colonial boarding schools was presented, and the two lawmakers promised to share the updates with their fellow parliamentarians at the earliest.

Tashi Yangzom, Secretary of the Tibet House Japan, accompanied Representative Arya at the meeting.

– Report filed by Office Of Tibet, Japan

## US lawmakers from both parties sent a joint letter urging the Special Coordinator on Tibet to advance US policy toward Tibet.

24 March 2026, VOT



A joint letter from bipartisan U.S. senators to the newly appointed Special Coordinator for Tibet issues urges him to continue promoting dialogue between Tibet and China and to prevent the Chinese Communist Party from interfering in the Dalai Lama's reincarnation. Meanwhile, the International Campaign for Tibet issued a statement thanking the two senators for their strong support of Tibetans and calling on the United States and the international community to continue defending the human rights and democratic freedoms of Tibetans and to stop the Chinese Communist Party's repression of Tibet.On March 22, Democratic Senator Jacky Rosen and Republican Senator John Curtis jointly sent a letter congratulating Riley M. Barnes, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Affairs, on her appointment as Special Coordinator for Tibet Issues, and urging Barnes to intensify efforts to advance U.S. policy toward Tibet.

U.S. Democratic Senator Jackie Rosen published the contents of a joint letter on his website. In the letter, the two senators stated that the position of Special Coordinator for Tibet reflects the long-standing and unwavering bipartisan support for Tibetans' struggle for human rights and democratic freedom.

The joint letter urged Barnes to implement the relevant laws and appropriations passed by Congress, promote a peaceful resolution to the Tibet issue, and continue the U.S. government's consistent and unwavering support for Tibet. The lawmakers specifically called on Barnes to facilitate the resumption of dialogue between the Chinese Communist Party and the Dalai Lama's special envoys; to prevent Chinese interference in the Dalai Lama's reincarnation; and to increase the U.S. government's support for the Tibet movement, as well as to effectively implement the numerous Tibet-related laws passed by Congress in recent years, including the Reciprocity of Travel to Tibet Act, the Tibet Policy and Support Act, and the Tibet Resolution Act.

Following a joint letter from bipartisan senators to the Special Coordinator for Tibet, the International Campaign for Tibet issued a statement thanking Senators Rosen and Curtis for their active support of Tibetans and calling on the United States and the international community to continue to defend the human rights and democratic freedoms of Tibetans and to stop the Chinese Communist Party's repression of Tibet.

## The 2026 Freedom House report once again ranks Tibet as the least free region in the world

24 March 2026, Tibet Post

Freedom House released its "Freedom in the World 2026" report on Thursday and ranked Tibet among the world's least free countries with zero (0) in political and civil liberties. The report said that "CCP authorities control news media in Tibet even more strictly than in other areas of the country. Tibetans are unable to establish and operate nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) without facing punishment by the Chinese authorities. Private and monastery schools have been shut down in recent years in an effort to force students into government-run schools."Freedom House, an independent organisation dedicated to promoting freedom around the world, released its annual report, "Freedom in the World 2026: The Growing Shadow of Autocracy," on March 19, 2026. Tibet

has been ranked the least free country in the world, with zero (0/100) in political (-2/40) and civil liberties (2/60) in 2025, Tibet has been ranked as the least free countries since 2015.

“Even as 2026 has brought new opportunities for those living under authoritarian rule from Venezuela to Iran, the last 20 years have been a dark period for global freedom,” said Jamie Fly, chief executive officer of Freedom House. “Armed conflict, coups, attacks on democratic institutions, and crackdowns on rights by authoritarians have now resulted in two full decades of decline. Those who still enjoy the blessings of freedom must do more to counter authoritarianism and provide more effective support for the democratic aspirations of people standing up to repression around the world, or this persistent decline will continue.”

Freedom in the World 2026 report includes scores and country reports on political rights and civil liberties in 195 countries and 13 territories around the globe. A total of 54 countries experienced deterioration in their political rights and civil liberties during the year, while only 35 countries registered improvements.

The Freedom House report states that 40% of the population across the 195 countries and territories surveyed live without freedom. Tibet ranked among the countries with the lowest overall scores in political rights (-2/40) and civil liberties (2/60), with an overall score of zero. Since 2005, Tibet has been among the lowest-ranked countries and territories in the “Freedom in the World” report.

The report of Freedom House states, "CCP authorities control news media in Tibet even more strictly than in other areas of the country. Individuals who use the internet, social media, or other means to share politically sensitive news or commentary face arrest and heavy criminal penalties. Dozens of Tibetans have been arrested for phone- and internet-related offenses in recent years, such as sending photos to people outside of the TAR and keeping “banned content”—like references to Tibetan religious practices—on their devices. Use of the Tibetan language is banned on a range of social media applications, particularly those that feature streaming and live communication services."

"Chinese authorities severely restrict freedom of assembly as part of the government’s intensified “stability maintenance” policies in Tibet. Control and surveillance of public gatherings extend beyond major towns to villages and rural areas. Even nonviolent protesters are rapidly and often violently dispersed and harshly punished. Despite the restrictions, Tibetans continue to express their views on government policies through sporadic solitary or small-scale protests in public places, though they are usually arrested immediately by police," it added.

The report states, "Tibetans are unable to establish and operate nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) without facing punishment by the authorities. Even seemingly apolitical social and community engagement is not tolerated. Many Tibetans working for environmental protection or Tibetan language preservation, for example, have been imprisoned. Foreign NGOs are generally not allowed to operate in Tibet."

Regarding the freedom of expression and belief in Tibet, the report of freedom house said, "Religious practice is carefully managed and restricted in Tibet. Chinese authorities view Tibetan reverence for the Dalai Lama and adherence to the region’s unique form of Buddhism as a threat to CCP rule. In recent years, the Chinese government has asserted that only the CCP has the power to choose the next Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama has rejected this claim, saying only a trust that he created will have the authority to identify the next Dalai Lama, who, according to Tibetan Buddhist beliefs, will be a reincarnation of the current leader. Tibetan Buddhist clergy and lay believers are forced to denounce the Dalai Lama, pledge their loyalty to the CCP and socialism above their religious beliefs, and attend political reeducation sessions. People who possess Dalai Lama–related materials, especially in the TAR, are routinely detained and at times criminally prosecuted."

"In April 2025, a monastery affiliated with highly respected Tibetan Buddhist leader Tulku Hungkar Dorje announced that he had died in custody in Vietnam the previous month. Hungkar Dorje had reportedly gone missing eight months prior to his death after publicly promoting Tibetan language and culture. International rights groups and members of the Tibetan diaspora called for an independent investigation into his disappearance and death; in August, a group of UN experts sent communications to the governments of China and Vietnam, expressing concern and requesting additional information about the case. The circumstances of Hungkar Dorje’s arrest and death remained unclear at year’s end," it continued.

The report added by saying, "University professors and schoolteachers cannot address certain topics, and many must attend political indoctrination sessions. The government restricts course materials to suppress unofficial versions of Tibetan history and has phased out the use of Tibetan as the language of instruction in schools. Private and monastery schools have been shut down in recent years in an effort to force students into government-run schools—many of them boarding schools—where Mandarin is the only language of instruction."

"Freedom of expression, including in private, is severely limited by factors including authorities’ monitoring of electronic communications, a heavy security presence, recruitment of informants, regular ideological campaigns in Tibetan areas, and harsh punishments for those who post social media content on sensitive subjects. The authorities in Tibet make use of an invasive security and censorship system featuring nearly ubiquitous video cameras, facial-recognition

technology, “smart” identity cards, and integrated surveillance systems that allow tracking of residents and tourists in real time. Hundreds of “security centers” operate across the region, with more than 130 in Lhasa alone. Tibetans are regularly detained or imprisoned for expressing support for Tibetan independence, sharing images of the Dalai Lama, sending politically sensitive information abroad, or engaging in other forms of cultural expression," the report stated.

The freedom report stated," Tibetans are systematically denied due process in criminal matters. Among other abuses, they are subjected to arbitrary arrest, denial of family visits, long periods of enforced disappearance, solitary confinement, and illegal pretrial detention. Authorities often fail to inform families of the detention, whereabouts, and well-being of loved ones and threaten them with punishment for revealing information. Tibetans have even less access to legal representation of their choice than Han Chinese; lawyers seeking to defend them are routinely harassed, denied access to their clients, blocked from attending relevant hearings, and in some cases such attorneys have been disbarred in retaliation for their efforts. Trials are closed if state security interests are invoked, which sometimes occurs even when no political crime is listed. Hundreds of political or religious prisoners are believed to be detained in the TAR or adjacent Tibetan areas."

While reporting situation of Tibetan political prisoners, the report states,"Detained suspects and prisoners are subject to torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Many Tibetan prisoners of conscience die in custody under circumstances indicating torture, and others are released with severe injuries and in extremely poor health, apparently to avoid deaths in custody. Many of the latter subsequently succumb to their injuries."

The Freedom House report declares,"Ethnic Tibetans face a range of socioeconomic disadvantages and discriminatory treatment by employers, law enforcement agencies, and other official bodies. The dominant role of the Chinese language in education and employment limits opportunities for rural Tibetans, 80 percent of whom have no or limited Mandarin language skills. Increased Mandarin language testing for employment has disadvantaged ethnic Tibetans seeking more lucrative positions. While Tibetans are supposed to receive preferential treatment in university admission examinations, Tibetan students often face insurmountable obstacles when seeking admission to top-tier national-level secondary schools. Tibetans who apply for public-sector jobs are required to denounce the Dalai Lama, renounce their religious beliefs, and demonstrate their political loyalty in ways that fundamentally negate their ethnic and cultural identity."

"While Han Chinese tourists can travel to Tibet, the movements of foreign tourists, journalists, diplomats, and others are tightly controlled, and they are often denied entry. Tibetans face nearly insurmountable hurdles in acquiring a passport for foreign travel, and the authorities have been known to arbitrarily confiscate valid passports from those who have been able to obtain them. Foreign nationals of Tibetan origin face enormous challenges when seeking a visa to visit Tibet, often waiting for years only for their request to be denied," it continued.

"Increased China-Nepal cooperation and heightened security along the countries’ shared border has made it difficult for Tibetans to cross into Nepal. Some Tibetan pilgrims who travel abroad face detention upon return to China," it added.

The report further said,"In recent years, the Chinese government has imposed policies of mandatory boarding for Tibetan students. Increasingly young children are coerced into a system of politicized educational indoctrination that displaces the children’s native language, culture, and religion. Authorities regularly use fines and the threat of arrest or denial of services to coerce parents into sending their children to the government boarding schools. In many cases, children as young as four are forced to spend five days a week at boarding school, away from their families, where they learn in an unfamiliar linguistic and cultural setting. This state-driven linguistic dispossession creates a language barrier between many children and their parents and grandparents, harming Tibetan family life and cultural foundations."

"Exploitative employment practices are pervasive in many industries, as is the case across China, though ethnic Tibetans report additional disadvantages in hiring and compensation. Human trafficking that targets Tibetan women can lead to forced prostitution or exploitative employment in domestic service and other economic sectors elsewhere in China. The herders, farmers, and other Tibetans who are forced off their rural land and resettled in towns and cities are extremely vulnerable to exploitation by public and private employers alike," the report of Freedom House concluded.

## The 43rd Sakya Trizin Kyabgon Gyana Vajra Rinpoche Receives Warm Welcome in Canberra

24 March 2026, CTA

The 43rd Sakya Trizin, Kyabgon Gyana Vajra Rinpoche, arrived in Canberra yesterday and was warmly welcomed at the newly constructed Sakya Temple of Peace by Lama Choedak Rinpoche, Spiritual Director of the Tibetan Buddhist Society, along with Representative Karma Singey from the Office of Tibet, members of the Tibetan Buddhist Society, and the ACT Tibetan community.



The president of the Tibetan Buddhist Society, Rachel Weis, and Lama Choedak Rinpoche delivered welcome addresses, followed by the *Mendrel Tensum* offering by Lama Choedak Rinpoche and Representative Karma Singey.
During this visit, Kyabgon Gyana Vajra Rinpoche will lead a series of sacred teachings and empowerments, including the Vajrakilaya Torma Empowerment, Amitayus and Hayagriva Long-Life Empowerments, as well as the consecration of the new Sakya Temple of Peace.
Earlier in his Australian tour, the Rinpoche visited the SIBA Retreat Centre in Victoria, where he bestowed empowerments including Vajrasattva, Green Tara, and Hevajra.
– Report filed by Office of Tibet, Canberra

## Representative Rigzin Genkhang Meets President Emmanuel Macron of France

24 March 2026, CTA

Rigzin Genkhang, Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, took part in the prestigious inauguration of the "Byblos" exhibition at the renowned Arab World Institute (IMA) in Paris, marking a notable moment of cultural diplomacy. The invitation was extended by the institute's president, Anne-Claire Legendre.
The ceremony was also attended by President Emmanuel Macron, whose presence elevated the occasion into a significant cultural and political gathering. The inauguration celebrated the historical legacy of Byblos- one of the world's oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world- and its enduring role in the history of the Mediterranean region.
Representative Genkhang's participation drew particular attention as a meaningful expression of cultural presence on the global stage. Engagement of this nature is widely regarded as an opportunity to enhance cultural visibility and foster dialogues across regions.
During the brief exchange, President Macron conveyed his profound respect for His Holiness the Dalai Lama, evoking with evident warmth the memory of his prior meeting with His Holiness.



In her opening remarks, Anne-Claire Legendre underscored the importance of safeguarding this millennia-old heritage against erasure, particularly in the context of ongoing conflict in Lebanon.
President Emmanuel Macron reaffirmed France's support for Lebanon, calling for an end to the continuing bombardments. Beyond diplomatic considerations, President Macron reflected at length on the symbolic significance of the exhibition, presenting Byblos as an illustration of Lebanon's destiny.
The event brought together prominent figures including French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot, Culture Minister Catherine Pégard, Lebanese Culture Minister, Ghassan Salamé, alongside diplomats, scholars, and cultural figures from across the Arab world, Europe, and beyond.
-Report filed by Office of Tibet, Brussels

## Moolenaar Sends Letters to President Trump, Secretary Rubio on Prisoners of Conscience and Hong Kong Officials

24 March 2026, Select Committee on China

Select Committee on China Chairman John Moolenaar has sent letters to President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio urging them to advocate for the release of Chinese dissidents and sanction key Hong Kong officials.
In the letter to Trump, Moolenaar advocated for the release of China's prisoners of conscience—those jailed for their defense of human rights and religious freedom.
"China detained thousands and convicted 1,545 prisoners of conscience between January 2019 and December 2024. This staggering number

includes 1,422 prisoners of conscience in mainland China, which includes Tibet and Uyghur regions, and 123 individuals in Hong Kong. Three of these captives were even sentenced to death; two to life in prison, and eight were given sentences of a decade or more," **wrote Moolenaar**. "CHRD data also shows how these two-thirds of the 700 older captives were women. In many if not all of these cases, the CCP's persecution of prisoners of conscience continues well after they serve their unjustified prison sentence through means that deprive them of their rights, including surveillance, harassment, and other forms of intimidation."

"Standing up for American values is a critical domain for strategic competition. As the CCP has made clear in its internal documents, the Party sees itself in a long-term ideological struggle with the United State and views foundational American values—specifically liberal democracy, freedom of speech, individual rights, and the rule of law—as existential threats to its authoritarian rule and ideological legitimacy," **he concludes.** "To maximize its benefits to our national interests and values, I urge you to call for the release of China's prisoners of conscience in your discussions with Xi Jinping."

In the letter to Rubio, Moolenaar asked for sanctions on four key Hong Kong police and judicial officials responsible for the city's draconian national security crackdown and unjust sentencing of Jimmy Lai. Moolenaar also reinforced the need to free Lai after his sham sentencing this February.

"I write to recommend in the strongest terms that, in light of the recent sentencing of Hong Kong pro-democracy activist Jimmy Lai, your department determine whether certain Hong Kong police and judicial officials meet the criteria for sanctions pursuant to the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, and Executive Order 13936," **said Moolenaar.**

"The United States must not let the injustice against Mr. Lai go unanswered. In October 2025, President Trump raised Mr. Lai's case directly with General Secretary Xi Jinping, and you yourself, Mr. Secretary, noted the 'extraordinary lengths' the CCP will go 'to silence those who advocate fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong.' Likewise, here in Congress there is strong bipartisan and bicameral support calling for Mr. Lai's humanitarian release, and for action to be taken against those responsible for his sham trial," **noted the chairman.**

## ICT condemns China's repression in Tibet, troubling "Ethnic Unity" law at the 61st Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council

20 March 2026, ICT

The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) actively engaged in the 61st session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) from February 23 to March 31, 2026, in Geneva. Through oral statements on behalf of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, meetings with UN Special Procedures, and diplomatic outreach, ICT highlighted ongoing human rights violations in Tibet and raised concerns regarding China's assimilationist policies targeting Tibetan identity, language and culture.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights raises concerns about Tibet

During his Global Update to the HRC on February 27, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, called on Chinese authorities to stop using vague criminal, administrative and national security provisions to suppress the peaceful exercise of fundamental rights. He also urged China to release individuals arbitrarily detained and expressed concern about labor issues as well as restrictions on religious and cultural freedoms affecting Tibetans and others.

In a tweet on March 13, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights also expressed concern regarding the adoption by China's National People's Congress of the "Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress". Türk warned that the law risks entrenching assimilationist policies, restricting "minority-language education," limiting the free practice of religion and cultural freedom and potentially penalizing the peaceful exercise of minority rights.

Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on torture

During the March 3 Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on torture, Dr. Alice Edwards, ICT's EU Policy Director Vincent Metten delivered an oral statement on behalf of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights highlighting Beijing's systemic pattern of torture and ill-treatment in Tibet resulting in custodial deaths or deaths shortly after release.

The statement raised several cases illustrating this pattern, including the death of Norsang in detention in 2019 and the case of Gonpo Namgyal, a village leader detained in May 2024 for promoting the Tibetan language and who died shortly after his release from detention.

The statement also drew attention to the case of Zhang Yadi, a young human rights defender advocating for Tibetan rights who has reportedly been held incommunicado since July 2025 and faces a serious risk of torture or ill-treatment.

Metten called on Chinese authorities to end the practice of incommunicado detention and to conduct prompt, independent and impartial investigations into all custodial deaths and allegations of torture.

HELSINKI FOUNDATION for HUMAN RIGHTS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Human Rights Council
Sixty-first Regular Session

March 2, 2026

**Item 3: ID With the Special Rapporteur on torture**

*Statement delivered by Vincent Metten on behalf of the Helsinki Foundation for HumanRights*
*Check against delivery*

Mr. President,

We thank the Special Rapporteur for her report.

In Tibet, we continue to observe a systemic pattern of torture and ill-treatment resulting in deaths in custody or shortly after release. Since 2014, at least fifteen Tibetans have died in such circumstances. These cases consistently involve incommunicado detention, denial of access to legal counsel and family members, beatings, and the withholding of adequate medical care. No independent investigations are known to have been conducted; families are routinely denied information and access to autopsies.

In 2019, Norsang, a 36-year-old father of six, died in detention after refusing so-called political re-education. Gonpo Namgyal, a village leader detained in May 2024 for promoting the Tibetan language, was released on 18 December 2024 in critical condition and died three days later. These deaths were foreseeable and remain uninvestigated.

We are also deeply concerned about Zhang Yadi,[1] a 22-year-old human rights defender who advocated for Tibetan rights. Detained since 31 July 2025 and charged with "inciting separatism," she faces up to 15 years imprisonment. She is reportedly held incommunicado in a detention centre in her hometown of Changsha. Without access to her family or a lawyer, she is at serious risk of torture and ill-treatment.

We call on China to end the practice of incommunicado detention and conduct prompt, independent and impartial investigations into all custodial deaths and all allegations of torture. We urge States to ensure accountability for these violations.

Thank you.

[1] FIDH, 12 February 2026, "China: Incommunicado detention and possible sentencing of Ms Zhang Yadi, young defender of Tibetan rights", https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/china-incommunicado-detention-and-possible-sentencing-of-ms-zhang.




*Oral statement under the the ID with the Special Rapporteur on torture delivered by Vincent Metten on 3 March.*

**Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights**

On March 4, ICT's Policy and Advocacy Officer Mélanie Blondelle delivered a video statement on behalf of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights during the Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights.

The statement highlighted concerns that Chinese policies are systematically undermining Tibetan culture, language and religion. ICT referenced findings by UN experts indicating that the state-run boarding school system implemented by China in Tibet aims to erode Tibetan language and identity.

The intervention also recalled recent warnings by UN experts regarding allegations of forced labor and large-scale relocation programs affecting Tibetan communities, which may amount to forcible transfer or enslavement as crimes against humanity.

ICT called on the HRC and its members to urge China to end policies that undermine Tibetan cultural rights and to ensure that Tibetans can freely enjoy their cultural identity in accordance with international law.




*Oral statement under the ID with the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights delivered via vItem 4 General Debate: Human rights situations that require the Council's attention*

During the General Debate under Item 4, ICT, on behalf of Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, raised concerns about China's recent adoption of the adopted "Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress." The statement warned that the law consolidates and accelerates the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s policy of forced assimilation, particularly in Tibet.

ICT highlighted that the law includes restrictions on the use of Tibetan language in schools and public life and may expand criminal liability for actions deemed to undermine "ethnic unity," potentially including activities carried out outside China's territory.

The statement called on the HRC to address how these measures violate China's international human rights obligations.

Several states raised Tibet during this debate, including Australia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, as well as the European Union.

**Meetings with UN Special Rapporteurs**

During the HRC session, Vincent Metten met several UN Special Procedures mandate holders — independent human rights experts who report on thematic or country-specific issues. Discussions focused on the preservation and transmission of Tibetan culture and language, the impact of the boarding school system on Tibetan identity and the implications of China's new Ethnic Unity Law. ICT also shared information on recent research and individual cases concerning Tibet.

ICT also had the opportunity to engage with the UN Special Rapporteur on torture, Dr. Alice Edwards, following a side event dedicated to the launch of a Charter on the rights of victims and survivors of torture. The exchange addressed ICT's



HELSINKI FOUNDATION for HUMAN RIGHTS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
**Human Rights Council**
Sixty-first Regular Session
March 16, 2026

**Item 4: General Debate - Human rights situations that require the Council's attention**

*Statement delivered by Mélanie Blondelle on behalf of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights*
*Check against delivery*

Mr. President,

We welcome the recent statements by UN experts and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights[1] expressing their deep concern about policies by the Chinese government "aimed at erasing the Tibetan language and identity", labour issues and religious and cultural freedoms in Tibetan areas, and forced resettlement.

At the same time, the Chinese National People's Congress has passed a "Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress"[2] that cements and accelerates the Chinese Communist Party's policy of forced assimilation, particularly in Tibet. One example in the law is the severe restrictions on the use of the Tibetan language in schools, government settings, and many other contexts. This constitutes a flagrant violation of the cultural rights of Tibetans - rights that China has also committed to uphold, inter alia under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Beyond its impact on the Tibetan language, the law's extraterritorial reach is troubling, as it foresees potential criminal liability for actions committed outside China's territory that are vaguely deemed to undermine "ethnic unity." This will exacerbate China's transnational repression, as it could for example criminalize this very statement.

The Human Rights Council, its member and observer states, must therefore call out how the new law and China's ongoing policies in Tibet violate China's international human rights commitments and protect those who dissent, here and in Tibet.

Thank you.

[1] See *UN experts alarmed by reports of forced labour of Uyghur, Tibetan and other minorities across China*, OHCHR, 22 January 2026; and Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues Nicolas Levrat, "Addressing minority issues through their root causes "A/HRC/61/41.
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-set-pass-new-ethnic-minority-law-prioritise-use-mandarin-language-2026-03-12/

concerns regarding deaths in custody in Tibet and ICT's submission documenting such cases.

**Engagement with diplomats and civil society**

On the margins of the session, ICT also met with diplomats from several states and civil society organizations working on human rights issues related to China and Tibet.

These discussions focused on recent developments in Tibet, the role of the Human Rights Council in addressing serious human rights violations and opportunities for continued advocacy and collaboration.

**Side Event on transnational repression**

On March 3, the Society for Threatened Peoples organized an HRC side event focused on the growing threat of transnational repression. The event brought together representatives from affected communities, including Tibetan, Uyghur, and Chinese dissident voices, to highlight how states extend repression beyond their borders. Speakers, including the Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Ms. Thinlay Chukki, detailed practices such as surveillance, intimidation of family members, cyber harassment and attempts to silence activists abroad. Particular emphasis was placed on the Tibetan case, where exile communities face systematic pressure through both digital and physical means.

Participants also underscored the limitations of existing international mechanisms in holding perpetrators accountable. Organizers further called on states and the UN to strengthen protections for human rights defenders and formally recognize transnational repression as a serious violation of both sovereignty and human rights.

**China's right to reply**

On March 12, the Chinese delegation exercised its formal right of reply and attempted to rebut the wave of criticism from civil society. China accused critics of "fabricating and spreading false information in the name of human rights to attack and smear China's human rights situation" and said that such "actions should be condemned by the international community." The Chinese delegation also asserted that Tibet enjoys social and economic stability, ethnic unity and religious harmony. This combative stance underscored China's continued resistance to international scrutiny, its rejection of UN recommendations and its refuse to adhere to its international human rights commitments. It also demonstrates the importance of raising CCP policies in Tibet in international fora, such as the HRC.

## The European Parliament Honours the Global Legacy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama

19 March 2026, CTA

Hosted by MEP Leoluca Orlando, the Office of Tibet Brussels in association with Mind and Life Europe organised a conference titled *"Compassion in Action: A Global Ethic of Care for Life"* in the European Parliament to honour the legacy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.The event brought together policymakers, scholars, and spiritual practitioners for a timely reflection on the role of compassion in shaping for a more sustainable and humane future. It highlighted His Holiness' lifelong commitment to promoting universal responsibility, interdependence, and a culture of care that transcends political, cultural, and religious boundaries.

MEP Orlando in his welcoming remarks expressed his deep respect for His Holiness the Dalai Lama and recalled his time as the Mayor of Palermo when he was able to confer on His Holiness, the citizen of honour of his city in 2017. He further added, he was honoured to host this conference at a time when the world is in so much turmoil.

In her remarks, Rigzin Genkhang, Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, expressed gratitude to MEP Orlando for and Mind and Life for their collaboration in bringing this extremely important event to life ensuring that the legacy of His Holiness rooted in compassion and his vision for a more just world is shared at the very heart of European democracy.

Representative Genkhang further noted that the event carries a particular significance because it is being held during the Year of Compassion in honour of His Holiness' 90th birth anniversary. Ms Amy Cohen Varela, Chairperson of Mind and Life



*From L to R: Mr Gabor Karsai, Managing Director, Mind and Life Europe, Representative Genkhang, MEP Leoluca Orlando & Mr Carlo Luyckx, Vice-President, European Buddhist Union*

Europe, recalled the foundational connection between Mind and Life and His Holiness.
She highlighted how the Mind and Life from the initial 1987 dialogue organised by Francisco Varela and Adam Engle. This collaboration was built to bridge the "inner science" of the mind with the "outer science" of the material world.
Mr Carlo Luyckx, Vice-President of European Buddhist Union and President of Belgian Buddhist Union, also welcomed the conference. He emphasised the significance of His Holiness the Dalai Lama's vision for peace and compassion.
Moderated by Mr Gabor Karsai, the conference was explicitly divided into five key areas with presentations and discussions led by various speakers reflecting His Holiness the Dalai Lama's lifelong dedication to universal human values and global peace.
Secular ethics and encouraging interreligious harmony, with Dr Martijn van Beek, Common humanity and promoting fundamental human values with Dr Andreas Roepstorff, Contemplation and ecology: preserving Tibetan Buddhist Culture and environment with Geshe Tenzin Dhamchoe, Mind and Life: fostering dialogue between science and Buddhism with Dr Marieke van Vugt and Contemplative education: SEE Learning with Chiara Mascarello.
Speakers emphasised that compassion is not a passive sentiment but an active force, one that can inform decision-making, inspire collective action, and foster resilience in the face of complex crises. Several contributors underscored the importance of integrating scientific insight, contemplative practice, and policy innovation to cultivate systems that prioritise well-being for people and the planet alike.
The event also served as a platform for dialogue between different disciplines and traditions, reflecting the spirit of collaboration that has characterised the His Holiness Dalai Lama's engagement with the global community. Attendees were encouraged to consider how institutions, including those at the European level, can embed a more holistic ethic of care into their frameworks and initiatives.
The conference was well attended, with a diverse audience reflecting the broad relevance of its theme. Participants explored how compassion can serve not only as a personal value but also as a guiding principle for public policy and global cooperation.
Concluding on a note of optimism, the conference reaffirmed that compassion when translated into action can be a transformative force in addressing the interconnected challenges of our time. It called for continued engagement across sectors to advance a global ethic rooted in empathy and responsibility.
The conference was followed by a reception, offering participants an opportunity to continue discussions in a more informal setting. The gathering facilitated meaningful exchanges, networking, and the strengthening of connections among attendees committed to advancing compassion-driven approaches in their respective fields.

## Australia and New Zealand held a 2+2 ministerial meeting to express concerns about human rights issues, including Tibet.

19 March 2026, VOT

Australia and New Zealand held their third Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultation in Canberra on March 17, where both countries expressed serious concerns about human rights issues in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.On March 17, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles and Foreign Minister Penny Wong met with New Zealand Minister for Defence Judith Collins and Minister for Foreign Affairs Winston Peters in Canberra for the third Australia-New Zealand Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultation (ANZMIN 2+2).
Following the consultations, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade published a joint statement on its website. The statement mentioned that the Australia-New Zealand alliance will continue to maintain peace in the Indo-Pacific region through defense cooperation and building shared values, and also expressed concern about the issue of human rights in Tibet.
In a joint statement, the two ministers reiterated their serious concern over the systematic persecution of Xinjiang by the Chinese Communist Party and expressed deep concern about the CCP authorities' continued erosion of Tibetan religious beliefs, cultural heritage, educational rights, and freedom of Tibetan language use.

Meanwhile, the ministers from Australia and New Zealand also emphasized in a joint statement that they were deeply concerned about the Chinese Communist Party authorities' continued efforts to shrink Hong Kong's democratic space, suppress dissidents, and deprive Hong Kong people of their freedom and rights.

## Tsering Dhongthog becomes first Tibetan-American Deputy Assistant Secretary at U.S. State Department

17 March 2026, Phayul



Tsering Dhongthog has been appointed as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade Policy and Negotiations at the United States Department of State, marking a historic milestone as the first Tibetan-American to hold a senior position within the department.

Serving in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, she will play a key role in shaping U.S. global trade policy and advancing negotiations on international economic agreements. Her responsibilities include overseeing coordination on global supply chains and engaging with major international institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In this capacity, she will work closely with partner countries and U.S. agencies to promote American economic and commercial interests abroad.

Prior to assuming this role, she served at the White House as Senior Advisor for International Trade at the National Economic Council and as Director for the International Economics Directorate at the National Security Council. Her extensive experience in trade policy also includes nine years at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, where she served as Deputy Assistant USTR for China and contributed to portfolios covering WTO and multilateral affairs, Southeast Asia and Pacific affairs, as well as assignments with the American Institute in Taiwan.

She further served as Senior Advisor and Bilateral Affairs Director in the State Department's Office of China Coordination, reflecting her deep expertise in U.S.-China economic relations. She began her government career at the United States Department of Energy in its International Affairs Office, focusing on China, Japan, and South Korea, and later worked at the United States Department of Commerce in the Office of the Chief Counsel for International Commerce. Before entering public service, she gained experience in the private sector in international law and government affairs.

Academically, she holds a Juris Doctor from the University of Michigan Law School, where she was awarded the Fiske Fellowship for government service. She also earned a Master's degree in China Studies from Columbia University and a Bachelor's degree in Political Science and International Studies from the University of Washington.

A native of Seattle, Washington, she has lived and travelled extensively across Asia and is fluent in Tibetan and Mandarin Chinese. Her appointment is widely seen as a significant achievement for the Tibetan diaspora and a testament to the growing representation of Tibetan-Americans in senior policy-making roles within the United States government.

## 883 Town Halls in the Czech Republic, 765 in France, Belgium, Luxembourg raised Tibetan flag on 67th Tibet uprising day

13 March 2026, Tibetan Review

A total of 765 Town Halls in France, Belgium, and Luxembourg raised the Tibetan national flag to show solidarity with the Tibetan people on the 67th anniversary on Mar 10 of their national uprising against China's armed occupation of their homeland, said the Office of Tibet, Brussels, of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), on the *tibet.net* website Mar 13.

This was apart from the hundreds of cities, towns, and districts across Germany, and 883 town halls and municipal buildings and 106 schools in the Czech Republic that also raised the Tibetan flag. A number of political and other leaders took part in commemoration events throughout Europe, said other *tibet.net* reports Mar 12-13.

In France, a total of 671 municipalities participated in the annual event, holding ceremonies to raise the Tibetan flag as a reminder of the ongoing challenges faced by Tibetans inside Tibet, including restrictions on religious freedom, language, and cultural expression. Local representatives and Tibet supporters reaffirmed their commitment to promoting human rights and peaceful dialogue.

In Belgium, a total of 54 municipalities joined the global commemoration of the Tibetan National Uprising Day by holding ceremonies to raise the Tibetan national flag.

And in Luxembourg, 40 municipalities held a similar ceremony for the people of Tibet.

The Office of Tibet, Brussels, said some of the municipalities have been flying the Tibetan national flag all year round.
The office said these gestures send a clear message that the international community continues to stand with the Tibetan people in their pursuit of justice, freedom, and the preservation of their culture.
* * *
Meanwhile, the Mar 10 event in Italy's capital Rome, organized by Tibetan Community and the Tibetan Women's Association, saw participation, with expressions of solidarity, by Matteo Angioli, advisor to Senator Giulio Terzi; Luciano Nobili, Regional Councillor of Lazio; Andrea Presutto, General Secretary to Senator Andrea De Priamo; and Nicola Massiani, Regional Councillor of Emilia-Romagna.
In the French Capital Paris, the guests at the gathering at Place de la République included François Bechieau, Adjoint Mayor of Paris 19; Geneviève Garrigos, Councillor of the City of Paris; and representatives from Tibet support groups.
In the French city of Toulouse, the Tibetan flag was raised and a speech delivered by Bernard Carayon, Mayor of Lavaur, joined by several of his colleagues, in an event organised by Institut Vajra Yogini, Nalanda Monastery, and the local Tibetan community.
In Amiens, France, the gathering of Tibet support groups and the Tibetan community was addressed by the Deputy Mayor Madam Nedjma Ben Mokhtar on behalf of the Mayor Hubert de Jenlis. Jean-Luc Jeugniaux, Mayor of Vers-sur-Selle, also delivered a speech.
At the Potsdam City Hall in the German capital Berlin, the uprising anniversary was addressed by Brigitte Meier, the city's Councillor for Order, Security, Social Affairs, and Health.
In the Swiss city of Zurich, the gathering was addressed by Mr Mario Fehr, the President of the Government Council of the Canton of Zurich. Some 45 Chinese supporters were among the 800 people who carried out a protest march from Werdmühleplatz, where the gathering took place, to the Chinese Consulate.
In UK's Capital London, those who took part in the flag raising ceremony in the Greenwich Town Hall included the Mayor of the Royal Borough of Greenwich, Councillor Linda Bird, the Deputy Mayor Councillor David Gardner, the Deputy Leader of the Council Averil Lekau and Cllr. Mariam Lolayar.
In its official social media page, the Royal Borough of Greenwich said: Today we raised the Tibetan flag inside Woolwich Town Hall to mark Tibetan Uprising Day. Showing solidarity here in Royal Greenwich with those marking the day around the world to remember the events of 1959 and the resilience of Tibetan communities."
In the Belgian and European Union capital Brussels, the gathering at the entrance of the Parc du Cinquantenaire heard messages of support sent by MEP Heide Hannes, Co-Chair of Inter Parliamentary Group for Tibet in the European Parliament, and Ms Els Van Hoof, MP, Chair, Foreign Affairs Committee, Belgian Federal Parliament. They could not attend the event in person due to the plenary session in Strasbourg and a mission abroad.
In Austria's capital Vienna, Tibetans were joined by Chinese dissidents as they demonstrated in front of the Chinese Embassy and later staged a peace march through the inner city area.

## Tibetans and Chinese Rally Together in Austria's Capital on Tibetan National Uprising Day

13 March 2026, CTA




*Tibetans and Chinese Rally Together in Austria's Capital on Tibetan National Uprising Day*

On 10 March 2026, Vienna witnessed a significant gathering as Tibetans and Chinese activists united to mark the 67th Tibetan National Uprising Day. This day, remembered worldwide, symbolises the enduring struggle of the Tibetan people for freedom, justice, and the preservation of their cultural identity. The protest in Vienna began at the Chinese Embassy, where demonstrators expressed their demands for human rights and an end to oppression in Tibet. Their presence served as a powerful reminder of the international dimension of the Tibetan cause.
After the initial demonstration, the participants marched peacefully through Vienna's inner city. Their route, through bustling streets and prominent city areas, attracted public attention and fostered dialogue about Tibet's ongoing challenges. The march culminated in a continued demonstration in front of St. Stephen's Cathedral, one of Vienna's most iconic landmarks, reinforcing the visibility of their message and the peaceful nature of their protest.
The event was supported by multiple Tibetan and non-Tibetan organisations dedicated to human rights and the Tibet cause. These included the regional chapter of Voluntary Tibet Advocacy Group, Save Tibet, Students for a Free Tibet (SFT), Youth for Human Rights Austria, Chinese

democratic activists, and the Tibetan Community of Austria. Their collective efforts underscored the solidarity among diverse groups advocating for freedom, democratic values, and respect for human rights.

The Tibetan Community of Austria expressed heartfelt gratitude to all participants, volunteers, and supporters who joined the demonstration. Their contribution highlighted the importance of civic engagement and international solidarity in keeping the Tibetan cause in global awareness. Demonstrations like this not only honor the resilience of the Tibetan people but also reaffirm the commitment of activists and communities worldwide to the principles of justice and human dignity.

The 67th Tibetan National Uprising Day in Vienna was thus both a commemoration of history and a renewed call to action. It illustrated the ongoing struggle for Tibet's freedom and the unity of those who stand in support of human rights, ensuring that the Tibetan voice continues to resonate across borders.

## Tibetans and Supporters Gathered at Potsdam City Hall in Berlin to Commemorate the 67th Tibetan National Uprising Day

13 March 2026, CTA



*Tibetans and Supporters Gathered at Potsdam City Hall in Berlin to Commemorate the 67th Tibetan National Uprising Day*

During the 67th anniversary of Tibetan Uprising Day, Tibetans and supporters of Tibet gathered at Potsdam City Hall, where the Tibetan flag was officially hoisted alongside the German and city flags.

Brigitte Meier, Councillor for Order, Security, Social Affairs, and Health, shared her experience meeting His Holiness the Dalai Lama in 2001. She recounted the diplomatic obstacles from China when trying to invite His Holiness to Munich, the efforts of the Munich SPD to proceed with the event, and the overwhelming public interest. She described His Holiness the Dalai Lama as wise, intelligent, and politically astute, and emphasised the importance of preserving Tibetan culture, religion, and the Dalai Lama institution. She concluded by expressing her support in hoisting the Tibetan flag.

Representative Thinlay Chukki of the Tibet Bureau in Geneva addressed the 67th Tibetan Uprising Day, honouring Tibetans who lost their lives during China's occupation. Speaking on behalf of Tibetans inside and outside Tibet, she thanked the City of Potsdam, its leaders, and supporters for organising the event. She highlighted ongoing repression, including restrictions on culture, language, religion, family contact, and the placement of over a million children in boarding schools. UN reports also note forced labor and cultural suppression. Despite this, Tibetans continue to show resilience. Representative Chukki expressed gratitude to global supporters and hoped for a peaceful resolution of the Tibet issue under His Holiness the Dalai Lama's guidance.

Tibetan Initiative Deutschland (TID) started the Tibetan flag hoisting initiative in 1996, and this year marks 30 years of hosting the Tibetan flag in Germany. Tenzyn Zöchbauer, Executive Director of Tibet Initiative Deutschland (TID), presented an appreciation certificate to Meier in recognition of her many years of hosting the Tibetan flag in her city.

Later in the afternoon, a peaceful rally marched from the Weltzeituhr at Alexanderplatz to the Chinese Embassy in Berlin. The event brought together various organisations and supporters, including members of the Church of Almighty God, the Association for the Defence of Human Rights and Religious Freedom (ADHRRF), the Federation for a Democratic China, Students for a Free Tibet, representatives from the World Uyghur Congress, Hongkongers, and Tibetans from across Germany. The rally was organised by the Tibetan community in Germany and Tibetan Initiative Deutschland to remember the historic uprising of 1959.

During the gathering, Representative Thinlay Chukki read the Kashag statement and addressed participants. She recalled that on 10 March 1959, Tibetans from all walks of life gathered in Lhasa to protect His Holiness the Dalai Lama and to protest against the Chinese Communist Party's occupation of Tibet. She emphasised that Tibetans around the world continue to remember the sacrifices made by those who lost their lives and livelihoods for Tibet.

In her speech, she highlighted ongoing human rights concerns in Tibet, stating that millions of Tibetans continue to suffer under Chinese rule. She mentioned reports that over one million Tibetan children are placed in residential schools where they cannot freely learn their language, culture, or religion, and that many Tibetans are restricted from possessing images of the Dalai Lama. She also referred to allegations of forced labor, cultural suppression, and environmental destruction on the Tibetan plateau.

Representative Thinlay Chukki noted that concerns about these issues are also raised by international experts, including United Nations specialists and scientists studying environmental changes in Tibet. She called on the Chinese government to resume genuine dialogue for a peaceful resolution of the Tibet–China conflict. She also urged the German government and the international community to address Tibet in diplomatic discussions with China and to ensure that Tibetan voices and human rights concerns are not ignored. The speech concluded with gratitude to supporters and a message that supporting Tibet means supporting justice, truth, and international law.
– Report filed by Office of Tibet, Geneva




## Office of Tibet, London Hosts University of Westminster Students for Discussion on Tibet

11 March 2026, CTA



The Office of Tibet in London hosted a group of ten undergraduate and postgraduate students from the University of Westminster for a 90-minute interactive session focusing on the political and diplomatic outreach of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) aimed at resolving the Sino-Tibetan conflict, the resilience of Tibetans living inside occupied Tibet, and the strategic importance of the Tibetan Plateau as a major source of minerals driving China's renewable energy transition.
Representative Tsering Yangkey welcomed the students and expressed appreciation for their interest in Tibet. Using a series of pictorial slides, she outlined the democratic evolution of the CTA and highlighted key elements of the Tibetan government-in-exile, including transparency, institutional continuity, and systems of checks and balances. She also explained the mechanisms of the Tibetan democratic election process.
Secretary Tenzin Kunga provided an overview of Tibet's contemporary history, the Tibetan experience in exile, and the global diplomatic outreach carried out through the 13 Offices of Tibet worldwide, as well as the role of the Tibetan diaspora. Referring to concepts such as "extractive colonialism" and "green colonialism," he spoke about China's aggressive mining activities in Tibet's sacred mountains to extract minerals essential for its green energy industry. He noted that these practices have resulted in ecological degradation, natural disasters, and river pollution.
He further explained that large-scale mining projects are often accompanied by the forced displacement of Tibetan communities, particularly nomads who are relocated from their traditional pasturelands to make way for resource extraction.
Following the presentations, the students engaged actively in a question-and-answer session. Their questions ranged from how the next 14th Dalai Lama would be identified, whether Tibetans inside Tibet had separate Tibetan army units, the symbolism and design of the Tibetan national flag, and how urbanisation in Tibet affects Tibetan culture. Students also asked about the potential implications if countries such as the United Kingdom were to recognise the Sino-Tibetan conflict as an unresolved international issue, and requested personal reflections on the experience of escaping from Tibet.
The Representative and staff addressed the questions by providing historical context and practical examples. They encouraged the students to remain curious about Tibet and to critically examine official narratives presented by the China regarding Tibet.
The student visit was organised by Audrey Lupfer, an intern at the Office of Tibet and an MA student at the University of Westminster, who had also participated in a student visit to Tibet House in November last year.
As an alumnus of the University of Westminster, Secretary Tenzin Kunga has continued to strengthen collaboration between the Office of Tibet and the university's MA Diplomacy programme coordinator. Through this partnership, successive groups of interested students—particularly those studying politics and international relations—are invited to the Office of Tibet for informal sessions on Tibet, complementing their academic studies with

practical insights into Tibetan diplomacy and contemporary issues.
-Report filed by Office of Tibet, London

## TIBETAN UPRISING COMMEMORATIONS HARASSED BY DISRUPTERS

10 March 2026, New Bloom

**TIBETAN UPRISING DAY** was commemorated in Taipei on Saturday, March 7th outside of the Zhongxiao Fuxing SOGO. Tibetan Uprising Day is commemorated annually to memorialize a protest by around 10,000 Tibetans on March 10th, 1959 to demonstrate against the CCP's annexation of Tibet. The protest was subsequently cracked down on by Chinese military forces. This year marked the 67th anniversary of Tibetan Uprising Day.
Tibetan Uprising Day, then, as an annual event, serves to gather much of Taiwanese civil society each year. As with preceding years, Tibetan Uprising Day commemorations were preceded by a cycling activity intended to raise awareness of the situation faced by Tibetans. As this year's demonstration for Tibetan Uprising Day did not take place on the actual date of March 10th, a candlelight ceremony was held in Liberty Plaza on March 10th, while March 7th took the form of protest march that moved through Taipei.
In comments, organizers were critical of the continued oppression faced by Tibetans at the hands of the CCP. As such, self-immolations still continue to take place in Tibet as a form of protest. As many Tibetans in Taiwan are from the Tibetan diaspora communities who live in exile, some participants also highlighted that because of the CCP's political control, they had never lived in their homeland.
Likewise, participants were critical of the CCP's attempt to subordinate Tibetan Buddhism to religious control. The Panchen Lama, as the second most important figure in Tibetan Buddhism, was kidnapped by the CCP and his whereabout remain unknown. Instead, the CCP appointed its own Panchen Lama, who is consequently not acknowledged as a genuine religious authority by many Tibetans.
To this extent, with it expected that the Dalai Lama will pass away in coming years, it is thought that the CCP will attempt to control the selection process to determine the Dalai Lama's reincarnation. As such, it is believed that the CCP will eventually put forward its own Dalai Lama to try and claim legitimacy over Tibetan Buddhism.
Other actions by the Chinese government directed toward Tibetans are in line with its broader colonialism. This includes the attempt to stamp out the Tibetan language and culture through the use of boarding schools, the destruction of religious sites such as temples, and dam construction that displaces local communities. Moreover, the DNA of Tibetans has been collected by the CCP for invasive research purposes, as has often occurred to Indigenous people across the world.
It remains to be seen how to raise awareness of the situation faced by Tibetans among Taiwanese, then. Notably, over the past decades, it has sometimes been difficult to remind the public that the atrocities faced by Tibetans have not faded but continue. Similarly, Tibetans are sometimes at the receiving end of harassment from pro-CCP political actors in Taiwan. This was the case this year as well, with a man throwing firecrackers during the vigil at Liberty Plaza. Such incidents point to how the harassment of Tibetans extends to within Taiwan.

## Australian Parliament Condemns China's Repressive Policies in Tibet and Reject Interference in His Holiness 14th Dalai Lama's Reincarnation

10 March 2026, Creek City Times



On 10 March 2026, marking the 67th anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising Day, Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) Co-Chair Senator Deborah O'Neill (Labour), introduced a cross-party motion on Tibet in the Australian Senate, highlighting growing and international concern over human rights in Tibet and the protection of Tibetan cultural and religious identity. An identical motion was also passed in the House of Representatives.The initiative marks Australia as the first country within the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) network to introduce a parliamentary motion on Tibet following the Alliance's unanimous agreement at the IPAC Brussels Summit 2025 to pursue coordinated parliamentary action on Tibet.
The motion was co-sponsored by senators from multiple political parties, reflecting strong cross-party consensus in the Australian Senate on the importance of protecting Tibetan human rights and safeguarding religious freedom. The motion reads as follows:
That the Senate—
extends well-wishes to the Dalai Lama on his 90th birthday and commends his lifelong commitment and contribution to the promotion of oneness of humanity, nonviolence, human rights, interfaith harmony, environmental awareness and

democracy;
reiterates that governments should not interfere in the selection of religious leaders, and that includes the reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama;
expresses deep concern over the Chinese Government's repressive policies in Tibet aimed at eradicating the distinct cultural and religious identity of the Tibetan people, including plans to interfere in the centuries-old spiritual tradition concerning the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama; and
urges the Chinese Government to recognise the fundamental human rights of Tibetan people and to enter into genuine dialogue, without precondition, with His Holiness the Dalai Lama with a view to achieving long-term peace and freedom in Tibet.

## Annual Taipei march marks Tibetan uprising, warns Taiwan of China threat

07 March 2026, Focus Taiwan



Around 300 people joined an annual march in Taipei on Saturday to commemorate the 1959 Tibetan uprising, with organizers warning that China's "expansion of authoritarian rule will not stop in just one place."
"Tibet's story is also a reminder to the world, especially Taiwan," said Kelsang Gyaltsen Bawa, chairman of the Tibet Religious Foundation of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, before the march began on Saturday afternoon.
"The expansion of authoritarian rule will not stop in just one place," he said, adding that China's influence has already reached Uyghurs, Southern Mongolians, Hong Kong and other parts of the world through "transnational repression, united front infiltration and long-arm jurisdiction."
Against that backdrop, Kelsang Gyaltsen Bawa said it is important to commemorate Tibetan Uprising Day in Taiwan so that calls from the island country to defend Tibet's dignity and democracy can be heard around the world.
The Tibetan Uprising Day he referred to falls on March 10, commemorating the day in 1959 when an estimated 10,000 Tibetans gathered in Lhasa to protest Beijing's tightening control.
The uprising was brutally suppressed, leading to the Dalai Lama's exile to India and around 150,000 Tibetans fleeing into exile overseas, according to the Human Rights Network for Tibet and Taiwan.
Since 2004, Tibetans in Taiwan and local NGOs have held an annual march in Taipei in early March to commemorate Tibetan Uprising Day.
Also joining the march, Yeh Ta-hua (葉大華), a commissioner at Taiwan's National Human Rights Commission, said Taiwanese had, over the past 67 years, seen how Tibetans had "fearlessly resisted" the "brutal rule" of Chinese authorities while steadfastly defending their freedom and faith.
"Supporting Tibet means supporting Taiwan's own democracy and freedom," Yeh said, adding that Taiwanese society should stand with Tibetans to "safeguard the autonomy of religious reincarnation and resist transnational repression," the theme of



*Taiwan-based Tibetan and secretary-general of the Human Rights Network for Tibet and Taiwan Tashi Tsering marches on Saturday with his mouth sealed by tape bearing the design of the Chinese flag. CNA photo March 7, 2026*

Voices from participants this year's march.
Among the crowd chanting "Free Tibet," university student Jacky Ling told CNA that Taiwanese could learn from Tibetans about identity, noting that they firmly identify themselves as Tibetan and preserve their own religion, language and clothing.
"In matters of national identity, if you do not have a clear sense of who you are, it becomes very easy for outside voices to define you, and you end up becoming whatever they say you are," he said, referring to China's efforts to reshape how Taiwanese see themselves.John Isom, a retired geography lecturer from the University of California, Berkeley, said he had taken part in similar Tibet-related commemorative events in the United States and was pleased to see one held in Taiwan as well.
Having lived in Taiwan for a year to make it easier to travel to Nepal and India for work related to Tibetan issues, Isom said Tibetans in Nepal, which borders Tibet, cannot hold similar commemorative events or "speak these truths because of transnational repression."

"Taiwan respects people's right to self-expression, to freedom of assembly, and to be able to tell others their history without fear from police or from coercion," he added.
Following the march on Saturday, which organizers said drew 300 attendees, a candlelight vigil will also be held at 7 p.m. Tuesday at Liberty Square.

## US annual report red-flags continuing genocidal religious violations in Tibet

06 March 2026, Tibetan Review



Documenting a continuing and severe deterioration of religious freedom in Tibet throughout 2025, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has condemned the Chinese government's intensifying "Sinicization" campaign there, characterizing it as a "cultural genocide" aimed at dismantling Tibetan Buddhist identity, releasing its annual report on Mar 5.
Alleging cultural and linguistic erosion in Tibet, the report notes the "alarming transformation" of the Tibetan language, including its removal as a core subject for college entrance exams starting in 2026.
Condemning the policy of Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism, the report accuses the Chinese government of having persisted in restricting religious activities, including by banning new monks at certain monasteries and prohibiting traditional festivals like Saga Dawa (marking the birth, enlightenment and passing of the Buddha) in Tibet's capital Lhasa.
The report says the Chinese government continues to treat Tibetan Buddhism as a political threat and keeps strict control over monasteries, clergy, and religious activities. Authorities require monasteries and monks to follow Communist Party directives and political education campaigns.
The religious control measures include government supervision of monasteries, restrictions on religious teaching and training, and mandatory "patriotic education" for monks and nuns.
In this context, the report also accuses China of carrying out a forced assimilation policy in Tibet, highlighting the transfer of approximately one million Tibetan children into a state-run colonial boarding school system to forcibly assimilate them into Han Chinese culture.
Apart from that, China has closed or imposed restriction on Tibetan monastic schools, and reduced use of Tibetan language in education and religious instruction, the report says.
The report also refers to the issue of transnational repression and finds the Tibetan diaspora being subjected to surveillance, blackmail, and threats against their families living under Chinese rule.
On another particularly concerning issue, the report says that the Communist Party of China continues to assert authority over the succession process of the Dalai Lama, attempting to "seize control of religious leaders" through state-controlled associations.
Displaying his image or publicly supporting him can lead to detention or punishment. Authorities also attempt to delegitimize his influence over Tibetan religious life. This is part of China's attempt to control future reincarnations of Tibetan Buddhist leaders, including the Dalai Lama, the report says.
Tibetans are also subjected to surveillance, arrests, and intimidation. They face intensive surveillance and security monitoring, particularly around monasteries and religious events. Authorities monitor religious gatherings and detain monks or laypeople accused of "separatism". They also punish Tibetans for communicating with exiled communities abroad. These actions contribute to an environment where many Tibetans practice religion under fear of government reprisals, the report says.
* * *
In view of these and other finding of particularly serious violations of religious freedom, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom 2026 Annual Report recommends that the US government redesignate China as a "Country of Particular Concern" (CPC) for its systematic and egregious violations.
In particular, it calls on the United States to work with international partners to sanction Chinese officials involved in religious persecution and interference in the Dalai Lama's succession.
Overall, the report highlights key global developments and trends related to international religious freedom in 2025, including countries that do not meet the criteria for being listed in CPC or SWL (Special Watch List). In addition, it provides country-specific and overarching policy recommendations to the President, the US Department of State, and Congress aimed at advancing freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) abroad.
The USCIRF's annual report recommends that the Secretary of State designate 18 particularly severe violators as CPC, and 11 for SWL.
The USCIRF is an independent, bipartisan federal government entity established by the US Congress to monitor, analyze, and report on religious

freedom abroad. It makes foreign policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, and Congress intended to deter religious persecution and promote freedom of religion and belief.

## USCIRF decries PRC campaign against Tibetan Buddhism in annual report

06 March 2026, ICT

The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) is deeply concerned about the Chinese government's egregious and ongoing violations of religious freedom in Tibet as documented by the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) in their 2026 report, which was released on March 4, 2026.

Asserting that the Chinese government "perpetuated particularly severe violations of religious freedom" during 2025 and urging the US State Department to again designate the PRC as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC), the report recommends sanctioning Chinese government agencies, entities and officials including the United Front Work Department and the security apparatus who are responsible for the repression of religion.

"The 2026 USCIRF report lays bare the repression that Tibetans endure under a government that sees Tibetan Buddhism as a threat and denies the basic fundamental right of religion or belief to Tibetans every day," said ICT President Tencho Gyatso. "I ask the international community to do more to pressure Beijing to end its campaign to destroy Tibet's unique religious heritage."

USCIRF further asks the US Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute Chinese government actors who engage in transnational repression of religious minorities and activists. The US government should allocate funds to programming that documents religious freedom violations in China, e.g. Radio Free Asia and the National Endowment for Democracy, the report urges, and export controls should be tightened on surveillance and related technologies that enable the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s denial of religious freedom.

The report documents the CCP's pervasive "Sinicization of religion" policy and notes President Xi Jinping's touting of its success during his 2025 visit to Tibet. Detailing PRC crackdowns on Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and on monks who publicly or privately honor the Dalai Lama, USCIRF notes the intentional destruction of 300 Tibetan Buddhist stupas and statues in eastern Tibet and spotlights the CCP's continued enforced disappearance of the 11th Panchen Lama and explicit intention to interfere in the Dalai Lama's succession.

USCIRF calls on Congress to ban lobbying on behalf of CPCs and in particular "agents representing the Chinese government and its state-affiliated commercial entities that undermine religious freedom."

In a positive development outside of Tibet, the US State Department implemented USCIRF's 2025 and 2026 recommendation to appoint a US Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, Assistant Secretary of State Riley M. Barnes. USCIRF specifically recommends that the Special Coordinator "address Tibetan religious freedom issues and combat China's attempts to interfere in the Dalai Lama's succession."

The full text of the USCIRF 2026 annual report can be found here. USCIRF maintains a separate fact sheet on China's persecution of religious leaders here. The USCIRF, an independent and bipartisan US federal government commission established by the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act, monitors global religious freedom violations, advises the US President, Secretary of State, and Congress and recommends policy to defend freedom of religion or belief abroad.

## Tibetans, supporters in Berlin, Taipei, Canberra gear up for 67th Tibet uprising anniversary rallies, take off on peace march in Bern

05 March 2026, Tibetan Review

Tibetans and supporters in Berlin (Germany), Bern (Switzerland), Taipei (Taiwan), and Canberra (Australia) have announced plans or started protest rallies, peace marches and other forms of actions to highlight the issue of Tibet ahead of the 67th anniversary of the Mar 10 Tibetan National Uprising against Chinese occupation rule in the Himalayan territory.

In Berlin, Tibet Initiative Deutschland said Feb 27 that it will commemorate the event with its nationwide campaign of "Hoist the Flag for Tibet" for the 30th year in a row.

Since 1996, hundreds of cities, towns, and districts across Germany have raised the Tibetan flag on town halls and public buildings on the anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan People's Uprising. Numerous private individuals have also supported the campaign for decades, showing publicly their support for human rights and their solidarity with the Tibetan people, said the group in a press statement.

What began three decades ago with 21 pioneering municipalities has since become one of the largest municipal human rights actions in Germany, the group said.

The statement quoted Dr. Sußmann, Mayor of Stuttgart city, as saying: "From the very beginning, Stuttgart has supported this human rights campaign. The 21 pioneers of 1996 have now been joined by more than 450 municipalities. That gives hope. Inspiring courage is the goal of the patronage Stuttgart is taking on in this anniversary year. Unfortunately, the situation in Tibet has not

fundamentally improved over the past 30 years. Therefore, we will stand up for our shared values and raise the flag for human rights, cultural identity, and self-determination in Tibet."

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In Bern, the Tibetan Community of Switzerland and Liechtenstein inaugurated on Mar 4 a week-long peaceful rally and solidarity walk from the Swiss Federal Parliament (Bundeshaus) in Bern. The walk will culminate on Mar 10 before the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Zurich.

Around 15 Tibetans, aged 35 to 75, are taking part in the march, which set off after an address by the Central Tibetan Administration's Geneva Representative Thinley Chukki and Member of the National Council of Switzerland Katharina Prelicz-Huber.




*In Bern, the Tibetan Community of Switzerland and Liechtenstein inaugurated on Mar 4 a week-long peaceful rally and solidarity walk from the Swiss Federal Parliament (Bundeshaus) in Bern. The walk will culminate on Mar 10 before the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Zurich. (Photo courtesy: Tibet.Net)*

The latter delivered to the Tibetans a message of solidarity to be read on Mar 10, signed by leaders of the Swiss Parliamentary Group for Tibet that included Councillor of States Diana Moser and Maya Graf; and National Councillors Leonore Borges, Nick Gucker, and Fabian Molina.

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In Taipei, it was announced Mar 4 that the annual march to commemorate the event will take place on Mar 7, with plans to highlight the issues of China's meddling in the Tibetan Buddhist reincarnation system, denial of autonomy for Tibet, and perpetration of transnational repression.

"Autonomy over reincarnation is not merely a religious matter, but lies at the core of Tibetans' freedom of belief and national dignity," the *CNA* news agency Mar 4 quoted Kelsang Gyaltsen, chairman of the Tibet Religious Foundation of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, as saying at a news conference outside the Legislative Yuan in Taipei.

Since 2004, Tibetans in Taiwan and local NGOs have held an annual march in Taipei in early March to commemorate Tibetan Uprising Day. This year's march is set to gather at MRT Zhongxiao Fuxing Station at 1 pm Saturday, pass by the Taipei branch of the Bank of China and end at Taipei 101, the report said.

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In Canberra, the Australia branch of Amnesty International on Mar 5 called on the public to show up in solidarity on Mar 10, when the Tibetan community will gather at Parliament House to mark the 67th anniversary of Tibetan Uprising Day. The group took note of the fact that one of the greatest threats to Tibetan identity is the boarding school system, where Tibetan children (some as young as four) are forcibly separated from their families and taught only in Mandarin, cutting them off from their language and culture.

"We cannot stay silent while a generation of Tibetan children is taken from their language, culture, and community. This is a community-led rally that we are proud to endorse and support," the group said on its *amnesty.org.au* website.

## 15 Tibetans begin peace march to raise human rights concerns in Tibet

05 March 2026, The Tibet Post




The Tibetan community in Switzerland and Liechtenstein has launched a week of peaceful rally and solidarity walk from the Swiss Federal Parliament (Bundeshaus) in Bern to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Zurich, from March 4 to 10, 2026. The aim is to raise public awareness of human rights issues in Tibet and to call the Chinese government for transparency, respect for human rights, and compliance with legal standards in Tibetan regions.According to the Office of Tibet, Geneva, on March 4, 2026, the Tibetan Community of Switzerland and Liechtenstein has inaugurated a week-long peaceful rally and solidarity walk in Bern, they will walk till march 10th, 2026, the Tibetan National Uprising Day, from the Swiss Federal Parliament (Bundeshaus) in Bern to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Zurich.

Around 15 participants, aged between the ages of 35 and 75, represent intergenerational commitment and unity. This event, based on non-violence, dignity, and constructive dialogue, aims to raise public awareness of humanitarian concerns in Tibet and call for transparency, respect

for human rights, and compliance with legal standards in Tibetan regions.
Representative Thinley Chukki, the Office of Tibet, Geneva, addressed the participants at the launch and she saud,''Today, as we gather in front of the Swiss Parliament, I thank our guest of honour, a Member of Parliament, for inaugurating this peace march. This march coincides with the 90th birthday of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and seeks to draw global attention to the suffering of Tibetans in Tibet. Over one million Tibetan children face forced residential schooling, and in 2024 alone, around 650,000 Tibetans were effected by the forced labour programmes according to the UN reports. Infrastructure projects and dams have displaced nearly one million Tibetans, depriving them of their livelihoods."
"We call on the international community to recognise these violations and extend their support. I thank all participants for dedicating seven days of their lives to this cause. May our efforts advance freedom in Tibet, a peaceful resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict, and the long life of His Holiness the Dalai Lama," she added.
Katharina Prelicz-Huber, Member of the National Council of Switzerland, expressed her support, conveying the solidarity of the Tibetan Parliamentary Group and providing a message to be delivered on 10 March, 2026, marking the 67th anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising Day. The letter was signed by co-presidents Councillor of States Diana Moser, National Councillor Leonore Borges, National Councillor Nick Gucker, National Councillor Fabian Molina, and Maya Graf, Councillor of States.
According to the report, beyond Tibet, the march carries a universal message: in a world affected by war, conflict, and human suffering, peace, dialogue, and non-violence remain essential. Inspired by His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, the Tibetan Community emphasises that lasting solutions come through respect, understanding, and peaceful negotiation.
They said that the march from Bern to Zurich stands as both a call for justice in Tibet and a symbolic gesture of solidarity with all peoples affected by war and instability worldwide.

## Representative Thinley Chukki Meets Rimini Officials and Addresses Documentary Premiere on Giuseppe Tucci in Italy

02 March 2026, CTA

On the second day of her official visit to Italy, Representative Thinley Chukki of the Office of Tibet in Switzerland met with Dr Jamil Sadegholvaad, President of the Province of Rimini, along with Deputy Mayor and Tibetologist Chiara



*Representative Thinley Chukki Meets Rimini Officials and Addresses Documentary Premiere on Giuseppe Tucci in Italy*

Bellini and Alice Parma, Member of the Emilia-Romagna Regional Council.
On the morning of 28 February at around 11:00 am, Representative Thinley Chukki, accompanied by Claudio Cardelli, President of the Italy-Tibet Friendship Association, and Elio Marini, visited the Rimini City Hall for a meeting with the officials. Sangay Kyab, Europe-China Relations Officer of the Office of Tibet in Switzerland, also accompanied the Representative.
During the meeting, the Representative briefed the officials on the current situation inside Tibet and the global peace initiatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, while recalling His Holiness's previous visit to the city. Dr Jamil Sadegholvaad expressed admiration for His Holiness's work and discussed the need for future collaborative efforts, conveying his openness to strengthening such initiatives.
Following the discussion, the Representative presented ceremonial scarves and biography books of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Dr Sadegholvaad, Chiara Bellini, and Alice Parma.
Later that day at 5:00 pm, the Representative travelled to Macerata to attend the premiere of the documentary film *"Meditation on the Summit"* dedicated to the renowned Tibetologist Giuseppe Tucci, where she delivered remarks.
In her address, she highlighted the deep-rooted historical ties between Italy and Tibet fostered through the dedication of early Italian Tibetologists such as Tucci and successive generations of scholars. She noted that this bond has been further strengthened by the leadership and grace of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Expressing particular honour to attend the screening in Tucci's birthplace, she praised his significant contribution to introducing Tibet and Tibetan culture to the Western world.
The event was also attended by Riccardo Sacchi, Tourism Councillor of Macerata, and Adolfo Morganti, both of whom delivered remarks.
At the conclusion of the programme, the Representative presented ceremonial scarves, biography books of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and photo albums to the speakers.

# Domestic and CTA

## Over 60 Tibetan activists call on China to stop force assimilation in Tibet

31 march 2026, The Tibet Post




Tibetan Youth Congress organised a peace march titled the "Black Hat March," setting out from Dharamsala, with the participation of 65 Tibetan activists. They call upon the Chinese government to put an end to the policies of forced assimilation in Tibet, carried out under the "Law on Ethnic Unity." They also denounce the government's ongoing repression of Tibetan identity, culture, and language, as well as the systematic destruction of Tibet's environment and heritage.The Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) organised the peace march to raise global awareness on Tibet and to oppose the ongoing genocide in Tibet. The march began on March 31, 2026, at Lhagyal Ri in Dharamsala, to commemorate the day when His Holiness the Dalai Lama, accompanied by the Tibetan Cabinet and nearly 80,000 Tibetans, stepped onto Indian soil in exile in 1959; it will conclude in New Delhi on April 25, 2026, to mark the birthday of Tibet's "Stolen Child," the 11th Panchen Lama, who was abducted at the age of just six and whose whereabouts remain unknown to this day.

The Black Hats March puts forward three demands: "Cease forced assimilation, repeal the 'Ethnic Unity Law' and break the silence; release the Panchen Lama as well as all Tibetan political prisoners; and—Tibet is not a resource colony—put an end to ecocide in Tibet."

The TYC organised an event to launch the "Black Hat March" on March 31, 2026, at Lhagyal Ri in Dharamsala. The guest of honor was Gari Dolma, Kalon (Minister) of the Department of Security of the Central Tibetan Administration; special guests included Shri Ajit Nehria, President of the Indo-Tibetan Friendship Association; Shashwat Kapoor, State General Secretary for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); as well as Tenzin Jigme and Lhagyari Namgyal Dolkar, members of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile.

Tenzin Lobsang, General Secretary of TYC read out the Black Hat March statement, he read,"The Black Hat March is a protest against the unlawful and forced military annexation of Tibet, beginning with China's illegal invasion in 1949, the forcible imposition of the so-called "Seventeen Point Agreement" under military intimidation in 1951, and the complete occupation of Tibet by 1959 From that time onwards, the Chinese Communist government has systematically eradicated Tibet's language, script, religion, culture and natural environment, all of which stand as living testimonials of Tibet's independence and sovereignty. Over one million Tibetans have been arbitrarily arrested, imprisoned and massacred under politically fabricated charges, while forced assimilation has been aggressively pursued through China's relentless sinicisation policy. The recent passing of the so-called "Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress" represents yet another calculated attempt to accelerate the sinicisation and eradication of Tibetan identity. The Black Hat March from Dharamshala to United Nation office, Delhi stands as a powerful act of resistance against these grave injustices inflicted upon the Tibetan people."

"Historically, Tibet was a powerful empire and a deeply religious nation that wielded vast influence across Asia during its imperial dynasties. With over a several thousand years of history, Tibet possesses its own distinct language, script, religion, culture and traditional way of life, and is endowed with abundant natural resources including gold, silver, copper, iron, dense forests and rich water sources. The Tibetan people, descended from the six original ancestral clans, are a distinct race from the Chinese," the statement explained.

It added by saying, "However, since China's forced and illegal occupation of Tibet in 1959, over one million Tibetans have been massacred and countless others subjected to relentless persecution. Under successive Communist dictators, through ideologies such as the "Three Represents" and Xi Jinping's "New Era of Han-centric Nation Building," Tibet's natural environment has been destroyed, while Tibetans are denied even the most basic freedom to live, subjected to boundless suffering, torture and exploitation."

"Occupied Tibet today remains under the illegal occupation of the So-Called People's republic of China. Tibet has never been a part of China nor the so-called "Zhonghua race" and has always been a completely independent and sovereign nation. Moreover, the Tibetan Exile Government in democratic India is a continuation of independent Tibet's governing system from the time of the imperial dynasty and a legitimate upholder of Tibet's Self Governance," he declared.

Tsering Choephel, President of TYC said, "Under the false pretext of "social stability," the Chinese

Communist government systematically deprives Tibetans of their fundamental freedoms, including freedom of movement, religious belief, freedom of expression, and the basic right to learn, use and preserve their own language and cultural identity. Through deceit and malicious schemes, they have fabricated false charges against countless innocent Tibetans, including all past and present political prisoners, most notably His Holiness the 11th Panchen Lama, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima. Like placing a 'black hat on a white person,' they have arbitrarily arrested, imprisoned, tortured and killed innocent Tibetans, a grave injustice that continues to this day."

"Tibetan children as young as three years old are forcibly separated from their families and enrolled in Chinese state-run colonial boarding schools where Communist ideology is aggressively instilled. Consequently, these children are unable to speak their own language and cannot even pronounce their own names. Through countless direct and indirect means, everything Tibetan is being systematically sinicised, driving the situation to an extremely critical and alarming state," he mentioned.

The President of TYC declared, "The Tibetan Youth Congress unequivocally condemns and opposes the recent passing of the so-called "Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress" at the so-called Chinese National People's Congress on March 12, 2026 which effectively imposes a legislation forcing sinicisation upon the Tibetan people. The law, consisting of seven chapters and 65 articles, is in reality a calculated instrument of forced assimilation and cultural erasure. In short, it systematically strips Chinese occupied nations and peoples living under Chinese occupation of their fundamental freedoms."

"Especially Article 64 which states that "The people's congresses of provinces, autonomous regions, directly controlled municipalities, districts, cities and autonomous prefectures, and their standing committees, may, in light of local actual conditions, formulate local regulations to promote ethnic unity and progress." This blatantly grants local authorities the power to implement laws that are more stringent and oppressive than the already forcibly imposed law, tailored to suppress specific regions and peoples. This is an extremely malicious and brutal course of action. Therefore, to encounter the oppressor initiative of "the fourth week of September each year is designated as National Unity and Progress Publicity Week" ", the Tibetan Government in Exile recognized the fourth week of September as "Conduct various activities to protect the identity of the Tibetan people". The Tibetan Youth Congress hereby declares that the same week shall be officially observed as the 'Week of Tibetan race Genocide, : marking the week during which the Chinese Communist government has systematically sought to erase the identity and existence of the Tibetan people," he added.

"The Tibetan Youth Congress firmly reiterates that until Tibet's independence is reinstated, we will continue to expose the injustices committed by the Chinese Communist government on the international stage and will never cease to confront and oppose them with even greater strength and on a broader scale than before. As the Tibetan struggle is primarily a responsibility that must be shouldered by Tibetans themselves, we strongly urge all Tibetans in exile to unite as one, keeping in mind the hopes and aspirations of Tibetans inside Tibet, both living and deceased, and carry out the freedom struggle with even greater force and determination. We further call upon all Tibetans to preserve, promote and propagate Tibet's language, script, religion, culture and traditional customs with great pride, recognising it as their inherent right and responsibility," the President said.

"We express our sincere gratitude to the Government and people of India for their longstanding and unwavering support for Tibetans in exile. We likewise extend our deep appreciation to the United States, international governments and organisations for their genuine and continued engagement and support for the Tibetan cause. We earnestly urge all to continue their steadfast support until truth and justice for Tibet is fully achieved," TYC President concluded.

Shri Ajit Nehria and Shri Shashwat Kapoor also spoke at the event; they expressed their support for the Tibetan cause, as well as their solidarity with the Tibetans fighting for their freedom, convinced that Tibet will be free one day.

Kalon Gari Dolma stated that this event was taking place in a unique place, a venue whose walls are adorned with photographs of more than 160 Tibetans who have self-immolated, who sacrificed their lives for the Tibetan cause and freedom for Tibet and for the return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tibet. She reminded the assembly of the sacrifice of Pawo Thupten Ngodup, which occurred on April 29, 1998—an act she herself witnessed. Although this was a tragic event, the Tibetan cause must be continued from generation to generation until Tibet attains freedom; in this way, the sacrifices of Tibetan heroes and heroines will not have been in vain.

When the "Black Hat March" arrived at Gangkyi—the seat of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA)—Sikyong Penpa Tsering flag off the march. Subsequently addressing the media, Sikyong Penpa Tsering stated that the Chinese government is seeking to eradicate Tibetan language, culture, religion, and identity through new legislation: the so-called "Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress"." The objective of this peaceful march is to oppose and protest against this law. It is essential to raise international awareness regarding the repressive policies that the Chinese government is implementing in Tibet—specifically the eradication of Tibetan language, culture,

religion, and identity, as well as the destruction of the Tibetan environment.

## Dalai Lama urges peace and dialogue appeal amid conflicts in Middle East, Ukraine

31 March 2026, Phayul

The Tibetan spiritual leader His Holiness the Dalai Lama on Tuesday urged peace and dialogue amid ongoing global conflicts including in the Middle



*His Holiness the Dalai Lama during the Long Life Prayers at the Main Tibetan Temple in Dharamshala on March 25, 2026 ( Photo/OHHDL/Tenzin Choeior)*

East and the war between Russia and Ukraine. He voiced strong support for a global peace appeal made by Pope Leo during his Palm Sunday Mass, praising the pontiff's call for an end to violence and the laying down of arms.

The Pope delivered his message at the Vatican during Palm Sunday celebrations, a significant occasion in the Christian calendar marking the beginning of Holy Week. Addressing thousands of faithful, he urged warring parties around the world to renounce violence and pursue peace through reconciliation and dialogue.

Responding to the appeal, the nonagenarian leader, in a statement issued from Dharamshala, said, "I wholeheartedly endorse the powerful appeal for peace made by the Holy Father, Pope Leo. His call for the laying down of arms and the renunciation of violence resonated profoundly with me, as it speaks to the very essence of what all major religions teach."

He emphasised that the Pope's message reflects the shared moral foundation of the world's great spiritual traditions, including Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism or any other world's spiritual traditions which advocate love, compassion, tolerance, and self-discipline.

"Violence finds no true home in any of these teachings," he said, adding that history has repeatedly shown that violence only leads to further suffering and cannot serve as a sustainable path to peace.

Referring to ongoing crises such as conflicts in the Middle East and the war between Russia and Ukraine, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate stressed that lasting solutions must be grounded in dialogue, diplomacy, and mutual respect. He highlighted the importance of recognising a shared human bond that transcends political and cultural divides.

"An enduring resolution to conflict must be approached with the understanding that, at the deepest level, we are all brothers and sisters," he said. Concluding with a prayerful appeal, he wrote, "I urge for and pray that violence and conflicts may soon come to an end."

## Tendzin Choegyal Taklha obituary

31 March 2026, The Guardian



*Tendzin Choegyal with the Dalai Lama in 2006. Photograph: Tenzin Choejor/Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama*

Tendzin Choegyal Taklha, who has died aged 79, was confidant, sounding board and chief support of the Dalai Lama, his elder brother, throughout the transformation of the Tibetan leader from national political figure to global spiritual powerhouse.

Although Tendzin Choegyal himself was recognised at birth as the 16th incarnation of the Ngari Rinpoché – meaning "precious one of Ngari" – an important reincarnation lineage whose origins lay in western Tibet (modern-day Ladakh), he took the opportunity to forswear monastic life as soon as he could after going into exile in India at the age of 13. Subsequently educated, at the Dalai Lama's behest, at an English-style public school run by Jesuits in Darjeeling, Tendzin Choegyal gained a psychological insight into western ways. It was this that enabled him to counsel the Dalai Lama as his elder brother began his spiritual mission to the world.

Born in Lhasa, on an unknown date during the March new year festival of the Fire Dog, Tendzin Choegyal was the youngest child of Dekyi Tsering and her husband, Choekyong Tsering, from a family of petty-landowners who, when their fourth child was recognised as the reincarnation of the

Great 13th Dalai Lama, had since become the most important in Tibet.

Tendzin Choegyal himself was recognised not only as a reincarnate lama but also as the rebirth of an elder brother who had died shortly after childbirth. A senior monk then visiting the mourning family comforted the mother by assuring her that the child would come back. Taking some butter on his thumb, he anointed the baby's corpse by pressing it on to one of its buttocks. She should look for such a mark on her next baby which, he told her, would be healthy. In later life, Tendzin Choegyal would delight in showing off the birthmark to friends – even while expressing scepticism as to the truth of the connection.

Although he was formally inducted as a novice monk aged three, Tendzin Choegyal initially lived the life of a spoiled young aristocrat at his parents' mansion in Lhasa, until being sent away to Drepung monastery at 12, an experience that he loathed. In the meantime, his youthful escapades included taking his ponies on to the palace roof as a prank. On another occasion, having discovered his songbirds had been killed by the family cat, he herded the cat and its litter of kittens into a sack and clubbed them to death. He told both stories against himself without any attempt at justification.

When he was just three years old, China had moved to assert itself in Tibet by sending in the People's Liberation Army to take over its administration. When the Dalai Lama went to visit Beijing in 1954, he took his youngest brother with him. The little boy quickly picked up some Chinese, becoming a serious liability for the delight he took in saying out loud what the adults would not say to their hosts.

On the eve of the Dalai Lama's flight from Lhasa in 1959, the PLA having made life impossible for the Tibetan leader, Tendzin Choegyal was collected from the monastery and taken to the Norbulingka Palace, where the Dalai Lama was then quartered. From there, the two brothers and their mother escaped under the noses of the Chinese army, which Mao Zedong had belatedly ordered to detain the Tibetan leader. They arrived safely in India a month later, having trekked across the southern reaches of the Himalayas. At 13 years of age, it was the boy's special joy to be given a pistol to carry.Shortly after reaching Mussoorie, the British-Indian hill station that was the Tibetan exiles' temporary home for a year, the Dalai Lama gave instructions for Tendzin Choegyal to be enrolled at St Joseph's college in Darjeeling. Founded in the late 19th century, and run by the Jesuits, the school was modelled on the British public schools of the day but with a strongly Catholic ethos.

The former Tibetan Buddhist monk was so taken by this unfamiliar religion that he became an altar boy, helping to serve at mass. While away at school, he kept up an occasional correspondence, in English, with the Dalai Lama – who signed himself "John" in order to keep his identity hidden.

After leaving St Joseph's, now highly proficient and widely read in English, Tendzin Choegyal spent a period studying in North America. In 1972, he took up a teaching position back in India at the Tibetan children's village school in Dharamsala. There he met Rindchen Khando, whom he married that same year. They had a son, Tendzin Lodro, and a daughter, Tendzin Choensum.

Tendzin Choegyal subsequently enlisted in the Special Frontier Force, the Indian army's elite and secretive airborne mountain warfare unit set up in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian war. He rose to the rank of captain.

Returning to civilian life, Tendzin Choegyal joined the Dalai Lama's private office, serving for some years in the security department before being elected to the Tibetan government in exile, representing the people of Amdo province from 1991 to 1996.

During the mid-1980s his mental health had begun to deteriorate, and he became known for flying into rages. On one occasion, he told me, he physically ejected a nun from the Dalai Lama's helicopter as it took off in Zanskar, in 1988. Afterwards, he spoke of feeling that he was channelling a wrathful deity. He was eventually diagnosed with what is now known as bipolar disorder.

Retirement from public service gave Tendzin Choegyal the opportunity to cultivate friendships among the westerners who had begun to flock to Dharamsala in search of spiritual nourishment. The role he subsequently carved out for himself was to act as a bridge between two radically different cultures. Increasingly relied on by the Dalai Lama for his insight, from the early 90s until the Dalai Lama ceased travelling, Tendzin Choegyal was invariably at his brother's side offering support, counsel and, sometimes, contrary opinion.

He also became a highly sought-after – if always reluctant and self-effacing – speaker on Buddhism. While he never accepted his identification as a reincarnate lama, and repudiated the elaborate teachings of the tantric tradition, in the last 10 years of his life, he became an increasingly devoted Buddhist practitioner.

He is survived by his wife and their two children, as well as by a sister and the Dalai Lama.

Tendzin Choegyal Taklha, spiritual and political adviser, born March 1946; died 17 February 2026

## 17th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile concludes last session, adopts new flag rules

31 Marh 2026, Tibetan Review

That last biannual session of the 17th Tibetan Parliament in Exile (TPiE) concluded on Mar 30 with the adoption of an over Indian Rs. 3.4 billion

budget for the financial year Apr 2026-Mar 2027, and new Rules and Regulations for the Use of the Tibetan National Flag, Emblem, and Anthem, and other measures. During the session, which began on Mar 16, the TPiE earlier condemned China's ethnic unity and progress law adopted during the month's annual session of its parliament, the National People's Congress. And it failed to adopt a procedural legislation for the impeachment of top leaders of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA).

The parliament – which had a difficult start at the beginning of its term in 2021 due to a stubborn initial refusal by a quorum-busting section of the elected candidates to take their oath under the Charter of Tibetans in Exile – concluded on a relatively satisfying note as the election for the 45-member, 18th TPiE takes place on Apr 26.

While signing the new legislation this morning, Sikyong Penpa Tsering of the CTA has said the standardisation of the usage of the Tibetan National Flag, Emblem, and Anthem is pivotal in emphasising Tibet's historical status as an independent nation prior to its forceful annexation by the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The new rules will come into force on May 25, 2026.

"The Central Tibetan Administration's standardisation of Tibetan national symbols, aimed at underscoring Tibet's historical independence status, also forms part of its broader policy strategy. This includes leveraging the objectives of the Middle Way Policy to call upon the People's Republic of China to return to the negotiation table without preconditions, while also strengthening international support for the Tibetan cause," said the CTA on its *Tibet.net* website Mar 31.

The rules comprehensively detail prohibitions of any commercial exploitation, improper display, or any form of desecration of the Tibetan national flag. They lay down protocols to be followed in any official hoisting of the flag or during official mourning ceremonial events and so forth.

The national flag must not be used in any manner inconsistent with its prescribed colours, design, or form.

* * *

The Charter of Tibetans in Exile empowers the TPiE to impeach and remove from office the top executive and judicial heads of the CTA by a two-thirds majority vote. However, without having a procedure for doing so in place, the previous TPiE, the 16th, summarily removed from office the entirety of the justice commissioners of the Tibetan Supreme Justice Commission (TSJC), including the Chief Justice Commissioner, in a single, short-shrift sitting.

The move was seen as a reprisal against the TSJC for having imposed a token penalty on the TPiE's standing committee members for having failed to summon a regular meeting of the TPiE in breach of the Charter.

But the 16th TPiE obviously did not foresee that its action to summarily sack the entirety of the TSJC would leave the CTA without any person to administer oath to the candidates elected to the 17th TPiE and the Sikyong, following the elections in 2021.

At the just concluded session, a move to amend the TPiE Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business to lay down a procedure for the removal of the top executive and judicial heads of the CTA failed to pass, with some arguing that that there was no immediate need for it and others finding fault with the draft proposal, even though the proposal was stated to be in line with the practices in other major democratic countries.

* * *

During its session, the 17th TPiE also passed a seven-point resolution that strongly condemned China's "Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress," adopted on Mar 12, calling it a coercive legal instrument aimed at destroying Tibetan identity, culture, and language.

Sikyong Penpa Tsering, who introduced the draft resolution, called the law, which will come into force on Jul 1, 2026, a "legal blueprint for ethnic genocide" and a systematic effort to force the total Sinicization of the Tibetan people.

The resolution called on China to repeal the law at once and for international action to pressure Beijing to do so.

It called on Tibetans in and outside their homeland to resist China's assimilation move by preserving their language and identity, and announced that the fourth week of every September would be observed to underline this campaign.

## China's new language law sparks concerns, Tibetan community launches cultural revival initiative

31 March 2026, Open The Magazine

As cited by the CTA report, the legislation mandates the use of Mandarin as the primary language of instruction from preschool through high school for ethnic minority groups, including Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongolians

China's newly introduced "Ethnic Unity and Progress" law on March 12, 2026, has raised serious concerns over the preservation of linguistic and cultural identity among ethnic minorities, particularly Tibetans, according to a report by the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA).

As cited by the CTA report, the legislation mandates the use of Mandarin as the primary language of instruction from preschool through high school for ethnic minority groups, including Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongolians. The policy prioritises Mandarin across education, public life, and media, alongside a revised "Standard Language Law" that further strengthens state control and promotes cultural assimilation.

The report highlighted that the law enforced compulsory Mandarin education for children from ethnic minority backgrounds starting before kindergarten and continuing through the end of high school. This shift effectively replaces native language instruction in several core subjects, posing what the CTA describes as a "significant challenge" to the preservation of the Tibetan language and cultural heritage.

In response to these developments, the CTA report noted that the Parents Committee (2025-26) of the London School of Tibetan Language and Culture, under the guidance of Representative Tsering Yangkyi from the Office of Tibet in London, has initiated a weekly inter-house reward programme aimed at promoting the use of Tibetan among students.

As detailed in the report, the initiative encouraged students to actively speak Tibetan within the school environment. Those who make genuine efforts are awarded five points in the form of £5 prop money by adult members of the school. Each morning, the parents' committee distributes this prop currency to adults, who then reward students accordingly. Students submit their earnings to their respective house prefects, and weekly totals are calculated, with winners announced during the Sunday morning assembly.

The CTA report further stated that to reinforce language usage, students are assigned simple topics such as "My School," "My Family," and "My Country Tibet" to prepare at home and discuss in Tibetan at school. The initiative has reportedly received an enthusiastic response, with students actively engaging and making sincere efforts to incorporate Tibetan into their daily interactions.

Building on the programme's success, and following further guidance from Representative Tsering Yangkyi, the school is set to introduce additional measures from July 1, 2026. As cited by the CTA report, these include the introduction of a gentle corrective approach when non-Tibetan languages are used, particularly by adults, to set a strong example for students.

Additionally, short video messages of the Dalai Lama will be played in Tibetan during morning assemblies. Gyalrab (Tibetan history) lessons, which are currently conducted in English, will transition to Tibetan. Parents are also being strongly encouraged to use Tibetan at home and to ensure that children respond in the language.

The CTA report concludes that with the implementation of such policies in Tibet, the Tibetan language and cultural identity face an increased risk of systematic erosion. However, it underscores that through strengthened individual and collective efforts, at home, in schools, and within the broader Tibetan community, there remains hope that Tibetan language and heritage will continue to thrive for future generations.

## Members of 6th Local Tibetan Assembly of Tuting Settlement Sworn in

30 March 2026, CTA

On 30 March 2026, members of the 6th Local Tibetan Assembly of Tuting settlement were sworn in under the oath administered by the Tibetan Local Justice Commissioner for Norther Region, Choekyi.

The ceremony was coordinated by officiating Local Tibetan Election Commissioner-cum-Acting Settlement Officer, Mapcha Lhamo, at the settlement office. It was also attended by the Chair




*Members of 6th Local Tibetan Assembly of Tuting Settlement Sworn in*

and Vice Chair of the 5th Local Tibetan Assembly of Tuting. After a welcome and opening address, the oath of office was virtually administered by the Tibetan Local Justice Commissioner for Northern Region. She further provided information on certain sections of the Tibetan Charter and the election rules to the attendees.

Five of the seven members of the 6th Tuting Local Tibetan Assembly took their oath before the Local Tibetan Justice Commissioner. Among them, Pema Dhondup and Rinzin Dorjee were elected as the new Chair and Vice Chair, respectively.

-Reported by TSJC, CTA

## Sikyong Penpa Tsering Extends Sincere Congratulations to Nepal's New Prime Minister, Honourable Balendra Shah

28 March 2026, CTA

Sikyong Penpa Tsering, on behalf of the Central Tibetan Administration and the Tibetan people,

extended his warmest congratulations to the newly elected Prime Minister of Nepal, Honourable Balendra Shah, who was sworn in on 27 March 2026.

In his congratulatory letter, the Sikyong wrote, "Your emergence as the youngest Prime Minister, following the recent Gen-Z led movement, stands as a powerful symbol of the aspirations of the people of Nepal, particularly younger generation."

The letter further reads, "Nepal and Tibet share deeply rooted historical and spiritual bonds that have endured across generations. These ties are further strengthened by the Tibetan community in Nepal, who, having found refuge following the forced occupation of Tibet, have long contributed to the social and economic fabric of Nepal while preserving their Tibetan identity. This was made possible by the generosity of the Government and people of Nepal, for which we remain deeply grateful."

He concluded by stating, "Please accept my sincere congratulations and my best wishes for your success as you lead Nepal during this significant period in its history. Under your able leadership, we look forward to the continued strengthening of the friendship between our people and hope for Nepal to advance towards progress, prosperity, and positive change."

## CTA President flags legal uncertainty of MT Tibetan settlement amid Delhi Hight court order

30 March 2026, Phayul

The Central Tibetan Administration's President Penpa Tsering, who also serves as the Home Minister, during the budget session of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile on Saturday, delivered a detailed address highlighting the growing legal, infrastructural, and safety challenges facing the Tibetan settlement of Samyeling in Delhi's Majnu Ka Tilla (MKT).

His remarks came in the backdrop of a recent directive issued by the Delhi High Court on December 24, 2025, instructing the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) to take appropriate action against cafes, restaurants, hotels, and other commercial establishments operating in MKT without valid licenses, sanctioned building plans, and mandatory fire safety clearances. Addressing the house, the incumbent CTA President stated that the Samyeling area currently lacks official government approval and remains outside formal regularization. While there are ongoing efforts to bring the area under a legal framework, the process requires residents to individually submit applications and supporting documentation. He emphasized that while many residents have already filed applications, those who have not must do so without delay. The outcome of these applications remains uncertain, but he assured that the Department of Home is making sustained efforts to address the issue.




*The Tibetan refugee settlement in Delhi's Majnukatilla has become a hub for food and leisure in the Indian capital (Photo/Instagram)*

A major concern raised was the absence of proper registration and licensing among commercial establishments in the area. Since the land itself has not been regularized, Indian authorities are unable to legally grant trade licenses, creating a complex situation where businesses operate in a legal grey zone.

He also highlighted widespread violations of building regulations, particularly concerning height restrictions. He noted that Delhi's permissible building height is approximately 15 meters, and many structures in Samyeling exceed this limit.

He warned that such violations could invite strict enforcement action by Indian authorities, including demolition. "If the Government of India takes stringent measures, we will have no means to stop it," he cautioned, adding that it would be preferable for residents to voluntarily correct violations rather than face potentially indiscriminate demolition drives.

Fire safety emerged as a critical issue in his address. He stressed that the concerns raised by authorities are not meant to harass residents but to safeguard lives. He described the settlement as congested, with narrow pathways that hinder movement. In the event of a fire, emergency vehicles such as fire trucks would be unable to access affected areas either from the front or the rear, significantly increasing the risk of casualties.

To address this, he proposed the construction of a large water reservoir dedicated to firefighting, along with an extensive network of pipelines throughout the settlement. He emphasized the need for technical consultation with fire safety experts to determine specifications such as size, structure, and water pressure requirements, especially for multi-storey buildings.

Another pressing concern is the recurring impact of heavy monsoon rains. Water runoff from higher ground frequently floods lower levels of buildings, damaging their foundations and compromising

structural stability. The CTA President said that the issue has already been raised in court and warned that long-term exposure to such conditions could result in serious structural failures. He suggested that regular inspections by qualified engineers should be conducted, and unsafe buildings may need to be demolished and reconstructed with proper authorization.

The Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed in the Delhi High Court, while focused on Majnu Ka Tilla, carries implications for the entire city. He noted that although enforcement has so far been relatively lenient and there has not been strict enforcement across Delhi as a whole. He cautioned that delaying corrective measures would only worsen the situation and urged proactive engagement with Indian authorities.

Concluding his address, he emphasised the urgent need for a collective decision among residents. He stated that the community must decide whether to proceed under the 2014 policy framework or explore alternative arrangements. "This decision cannot be imposed from above; it must come from the people themselves," he said, urging residents to hold discussions and arrive at a unified position. He stressed that only through unity and coordinated action can meaningful progress be achieved. The Department of Home, he assured, is giving the matter serious attention and stands ready to support the community once a clear direction is established.

## His Holiness the Dalai Lama Extends Congratulations to Most Reverend Sarah Mullally on Her Appointment as Archbishop of Canterbury

28 March 2026, CTA



His Holiness the Dalai Lama Extends Congratulations to Most Reverend Sarah Mullally on Her Appointment as Archbishop of Canterbury

His Holiness the Dalai Lama has written to The Most Reverend Sarah Mullally to offer his heartfelt congratulations on her appointment as Archbishop of Canterbury.

"The world today faces many profound challenges," he wrote, "and this is a time when fundamental human values are being tested. As religious leaders, I believe we bear a special responsibility to reaffirm these values and bring them to wider attention. All the world's great religions counsel compassion, patience, self-discipline, and contentment, and offer practical guidance on how to cultivate them. These are qualities we can meaningfully share with all of humanity.

"I am delighted to know that you will be the first woman to lead the Anglican Church. There is growing scientific evidence suggesting that women tend to be more attuned to the well-being of others, particularly when it comes to compassion. It is therefore my sincere conviction that a world with more women in leadership would be a more understanding and peaceful one. Your appointment is a beacon of hope."

His Holiness ended his letter by offering his prayers and good wishes.

## Taiwan to teach Mandarin to Tibetan students in India

29 March 2026, Tibetan Review



While imposing Mandarin learning from pre-school education onwards as a coercive measure with an agenda to assimilate the Tibetan people envisaged by China's recently adopted ethnic unity and progress law is condemned, learning the language as a higher education option to improve job prospects and promote cultural exchanges is to be welcomed. This appears to be the underlying message as Taiwan and an exile educational institution signed a memorandum on Mar 25 under which the former will send Mandarin teachers to Tibetan schools in India.

The memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed by the education division of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center (TECC) in New Delhi and the Dalai Lama Institute for Higher Education in Bengaluru, reported Taiwan's *CNA* news agency Mar 25.

The report cited Chen Mu-min, TECC head and Taiwan's representative to India, as saying that under the MOU, Taiwanese teachers will be placed in Tibetan schools to teach Mandarin, thus creating more opportunities for cultural exchange and mutual understanding.

Tenzin Passang, principal of the Bengaluru institute, has said that while a Mandarin course was also being offered there since 2008, taught mostly by Tibetans, the new arrangement will bring native Chinese-language teachers, thus enhancing the quality of the course.
The report cited Jigmey Tsultrim, chief representative of the Central Tibetan Administration's (CTA) for the Tibetan settlements in southern India, as saying the MOU reflected the shared values in education, ideas, and democracy between the two sides and will strengthen bilateral ties.
Tashi Dickey, secretary at the Bureau of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, New Delhi, has said learning Mandarin expands job opportunities for Tibetan students and can open doors for the wider Tibetan society, enabling them to better express themselves to Chinese-speaking audiences as they confront China and fight for a free Tibet.
Mandarin is the dominant language for education and government in Taiwan, while Taiwanese Hokkien is used by a majority of something like 70% of the population.

## A Year On, Vietnam and China Must Account for Tulku Hungkar Dorje's Death

27 March 2027, TCHRD

A year after the death of Tulku Hungkar Dorje in Ho Chi Minh City, the circumstances surrounding his disappearance, detention, and death remain shrouded in secrecy. The failure of both Chinese and Vietnamese authorities to provide credible explanations has intensified concerns about serious human rights violations and the urgent need for an independent, impartial, and transparent investigation.
Tulku Hungkar Dorje, a prominent Tibetan Buddhist leader and philanthropist, disappeared in late September 2024 following repeated interrogations by Qinghai Public Security Bureau officers. Facing escalating pressure, he fled China and was later located in Vietnam in March 2025. On 25 March, he was reportedly arbitrarily detained in a joint operation involving Chinese and Vietnamese police. Three days later, on 28 March, he died in custody under suspicious and unexplained circumstances.
On 1 April, monastery representatives were shown a death certificate under strict conditions that prevented them from retaining or documenting it. On 5 April, monks who traveled to Vietnam to retrieve his body were excluded from a closed-door meeting at the Chinese Embassy. His body was held at Vinmec Central Park International Hospital and later transferred to a military facility.
On 20 April, Vietnamese authorities, reportedly in coordination with Chinese officials, carried out a hasty cremation of his body at 1:00 AM at the Sakya Buddhist Temple. The cremation was conducted without the knowledge or consent of his family, followers, or monastic community, denying them the ability to perform proper Buddhist rites.
The sequence of events from enforced disappearance to death in custody and secret cremation points to possible state collusion and raises credible allegations of enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killing. The continued lack of transparency risks setting a dangerous precedent for transnational repression and impunity.
Tulku Hungkar Dorje was widely respected for his spiritual leadership and humanitarian work. As abbot of the Lung Ngon Thubten Choekor Ling monastery in Qinghai province, he established vocational training programs, medical clinics, and community libraries that served thousands, including the elderly and underprivileged. His reported refusal to comply with state-imposed religious directives subjected him to heightened scrutiny by Chinese authorities.
Last year in August, UN human rights experts raised this case with both governments, emphasizing their obligations under international law to protect the right to life, prevent enforced disappearances, and ensure accountability. They warned that failure to conduct prompt, impartial, and transparent investigations violates fundamental human rights standards, including those set out in the Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death.
The experts demanded Chinese authorities to clarify their involvement in Tulku Hungkar Dorje's arrest and transfer, provide details of any investigations into his death, explain the cremation without family consent, and confirm whether reprisals have been imposed on his monastery or community.
The continued secrecy surrounding Tulku Hungkar Dorje's case not only violates international human rights law but also inflicts profound psychological harm on his family members and the Tibetan community. We call on the Vietnamese and Chinese government to immediately allow an independent investigation into the circumstances of Tulku Hungkar Dorje's death and ensure accountability.

## Long Life Prayer Offering by U-Tsang Cholkha, Dokham Zachuka Association and Kyidong Welfare Association

25 March 2026, https://www.dalailama.com/pictures/long-life-prayer-offering-by-u-tsang-cholkha-dokham-zachuka-association-and-kyidong-welfare-association



Women from Kyidong wearing traditional dress singing as His Holiness the Dalai Lama arrives at the Main Tibetan Temple courtyard to Long Life Prayers offered to him by U-Tsang Cholkha, Dokham Zachuka Association and Kyidong

## Bill on impeachment procedures of CTA leadership fails floor test

25 March 2026, Phayul

A bill seeking amendments to the 'Rules and Regulations for Parliamentary Procedures and the Conduct of Business' was dropped after failing to secure the necessary two-thirds majority from the parliament on the ninth day of the ongoing parliamentary session of the Tibetan Parliament in Exile on Wednesday.

Continuing with the legislative agenda, the house took up the second reading of the amendment bill, which had earlier been deferred during both the 9th session in March and the 10th session in September of the previous year.

The bill, tabled by MP Karma Gelek and supported by fellow MP Ratsa Sonam Norbu, sought to address procedural aspects related to parliamentary functioning, particularly provisions tied to leadership changes within the exile Tibetan government, officially known as the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA).

During the deliberations, members presented sharply differing views, reflecting a clear divide within the House over the necessity and implications of the proposed changes. Several members of Parliament strongly opposed the proposal, arguing that provisions under Chapter 17 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business, especially Clause 5 concerning the removal or change of leadership, including the President, Ministers, or the entire Cabinet, could potentially allow even a single MP to arbitrarily target and destabilize the leadership without sufficient grounds.

Opposition MPs further contended that there is no immediate need for such changes and warned that the amendment could be misused for personal or political interests, potentially serving as a tool to defame leadership rather than strengthen democratic institutions or improve governance.

In contrast, members of parliament who expressed strong support for the amendment pointed out that while the Charter of the Tibetans in Exile already provides for the removal or change of leadership, it lacks clearly defined procedures for implementation. They argued that it is the responsibility of Parliament to establish clear procedural guidelines, which are essential for maintaining the balance among the three pillars of democracy.

They also noted that the proposed amendment draws on past experiences and challenges, seeking to clarify existing provisions. They expressed the view that adopting a defined procedural framework would create a foundation for further refinement in the future.

The amendment bill, along with its first-degree and second-degree amendments, was subsequently put to a vote. However, it received support from only 23 members, falling short of the required two-thirds majority.

Notably, the proposed amendments had already undergone three stages of committee review and were based on earlier deliberations, having been deferred during the ninth session of Parliament. Despite these efforts, the house remained divided, and the bill ultimately failed to secure approval.

## International support might force China to resume dialogue: Sikyong Penpa Tsering

24 March 2026, Tribune India




Sikyong Penpa Tsering (President) of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), the Tibetan government-in-exile, said increasing international recognition of Tibet's historical status could push China to reopen dialogue, while emphasising existing back-channel contacts as largely "inconsequential".

Speaking to ANI in Dharamshala, Tsering said the CTA's current strategy is to reach out to more governments worldwide to acknowledge Tibet's historical sovereignty."By having more countries accept the reality of Tibet's sovereignty in the past, that might force the Chinese government to come and talk to us, that's one idea," he said.
The Sikyoong said prospects for " productive" talks "look very unlikely" under the leadership of Chinese President Xi Jinping, adding that the Tibetan administration will continue engaging the international community until conditions for dialogue improve.
"Right now, if you look at the policies of the Xi Jinping government, one pillar of the government looks very unlikely that there could be any productive talks, so that's why we keep saying that till such a time we will have to reach out to the international community," Tsering said.He added that the Tibetan side is not asking other countries to "lie, Tibet was an independent country", but to recognise documented historical perspectives.
"We are not asking other countries to lie; Tibet was an independent country. We have these two books I always carry, one by a Chinese professor with irrefutable evidence that if you consider Yuan and the Qing also as Chinese dynasties aside from the Mings, imperial China has never considered Tibet as a part of China. Then there is another book looking at Tibetan history from the legal perspective and also proves that Tibet was never considered as part of China," he said.
Tsering acknowledged that some communication channels with Beijing still exist but said they have not led to meaningful engagement.
"There have been back channels. I cannot lie about what is happening and what is not happening. I have said that many times, but it's inconsequential because there is nothing that can come out of it, because the whole idea is whether we can re-establish contact or not. Are they willing to talk or not? So we have not reached that level also. It's just more information sharing, those kind of things. So yes, we do keep this contact just in case we need a channel of communication otherwise... we don't expect much from the back channel," he said.
Tsering also expressed concern about the situation inside Tibet, saying increasing surveillance and restrictions have made it harder for Tibetans to leave the region.
"Last year it was less than 50, and this year it's just a few that managed to come out because there are much more restrictions. There is much more control inside Tibet," he said.
He alleged that Chinese authorities use advanced surveillance technologies to monitor Tibetans.
"China's monitoring and surveillance of Tibetan people using the Silicon Valley products, including IBM, thermal DNA testing and all that using Western technologies to control... they have perfected the art of control and surveillance... so they can track everything, including your financial track record and transactions. That's how they control you," he said.
He added that despite restrictions, Tibetans continue to show loyalty to the Dalai Lama and remain commited to preserving Tibetan culture.
He said, "But still revenge spirit has not broken. Even though they're not able to come out. Their spirit, their respect and loyalty for his Holiness the Dalai Lama and for the importance of Tibetan culture."
Tsering also thanked Tibetan voters after being re-elected as Sikyong. The Tibetan Election Commission-in-exile on February 13 declared him elected for the 17th Kashag, after he secured more than 60 per cent of the total votes in the preliminary round, eliminating the need for a final round of voting under election rules. (ANI)
(This content is sourced from a syndicated feed and is published as received. The Tribune assumes no responsibility or liability for its accuracy, completeness, or content.)

## Tibetan Parliament strongly rejects the PRC's so-called "Ethnic Unity" laws

24 March 2026, The Tibet Post

Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile unanimously passed a motion addressing the critical situation inside Tibet and a motion highlighting concerns over "the PRC's Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress", on Monday. The motion rejects the PRC's law as legally illegitimate and morally invalid under international and constitutional standards. Affirming that Tibet is an occupied nation, it calls for the immediate withdrawal of policies of forced assimilation.Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile unanimously passed a motion addressing the critical situation inside Tibet and a motion highlighting concerns over "the PRC's Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress", at ongoing the Parliament session on March 23, 2026, at TPiE hall, Gangkyi, Dharamshala.
The first motion, the five-point "official solidarity on the critical situations inside Tibet," pays tribute to the courage and sacrifice of the Tibetans who have given their lives for the Tibetan cause. It calls for the protection of the fundamental rights of the Tibetan people and demands the immediate release of political prisoners, including the 11th Panchen Lama.
The motion further calls for an end to ongoing repression and brutality, as well as the cessation of environmental degradation affecting Tibet's fragile ecosystem. The motion reaffirms Tibet's historical independence and endorses the Middle Way Policy as the most viable approach to resolving the Sino-Tibetan conflict through meaningful dialogue.
Furthermore, it appeals to peace advocates, impartial global leaders, parliamentarians, writers, media professionals, and independent research

organisations to visit Tibet and witness the ground realities first-hand.

The second motion, the seven-point resolution rejects the PRC's so-called "Ethnic Unity" laws as legally illegitimate and morally invalid under international and constitutional standards. It affirming that Tibet is an occupied nation, it calls for the immediate withdrawal of policies of forced assimilation and urges a commitment to resolving the Sino-Tibetan conflict through peaceful dialogue.

It further calls upon the United Nations to review these laws and urges the international community to hold those responsible for acts of cultural genocide accountable. The resolution also encourages Tibetans inside Tibet to uphold their cultural identity and maintain faith that freedom will return to their homeland.

Additionally, it calls on Tibetans in exile to utilize their global networks to expose and campaign against the Chinese government's strategy of "Sinicization." It announces that Tibetan organizations and individuals in the free world will observe the fourth week of September each year as a time to protect and celebrate their national identity.

It also declares that the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) is tasked with intensifying its efforts on the international stage to counter these policies, seek active global intervention, and address the perceived threats to Tibetan identity.

## Tibetan MPs Question Future of Middle Way Policy Amid China's New Ethnic Unity Law

24 March 2026, Tibet Express

The Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile on Monday unanimously passed a resolution condemning China's new law on "Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress," adopted on 12 March during the Chinese Communist Party's 14th National People's Congress.

The resolution states that the law represents a further tightening of state control over what China designates as its "ethnic minorities" and advances a vision of national unity that prioritises a singular identity over the recognition of distinct cultures. It warns that the law further restricts the already limited space for genuine autonomy nominally provided for under China's Constitution.

The Kashag's (Cabinet) resolution, tabled by the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) President Penpa Tsering and unanimously adopted by the House on the seventh day of the Parliament session, calls on China to revoke the legislation and urges it to pursue peaceful means of negotiations to address the Tibetan issue. It reaffirms that Tibet remains an occupied country and maintains that Tibetans, with their distinct identity, civilisation, and history, cannot be subsumed within a singular Chinese identity.

Placing the new law in historical context, the resolution recalls the 17-Point Agreement of 1951, signed under duress, which promised regional autonomy for Tibet under the People's Republic of China and protection for the Tibetan people's religious and cultural freedoms. It traces the subsequent breakdown of that agreement, the mass exodus of Tibetan refugees into India in 1959, and the Dalai Lama's formal repudiation of the agreement following his arrival in exile that same year.

The resolution argues that the new law, set to take effect on 1 July 2026, reverses the framework of meaningful autonomy established through China's constitutional and legal system in the early 1980s. Under that framework, communities designated as "ethnic minorities" are, in theory, granted limited rights to self-governance, including the use and preservation of their own languages, cultural and religious practices, as well as a degree of administrative and economic autonomy—rights that are not always consistently upheld in practice.

The resolution further states that, by emphasising a unified national consciousness and reinforcing standardised language and identity, China is effectively redefining national unity not as coexistence among distinct groups, but as convergence into a single, state-defined identity.

Against this backdrop, the members of the House deliberated on how Tibetans and their leadership can mobilise and advance in responding to systemic injustice and aggression. Members of Parliament strongly advocated for the preservation of the Tibetan language and identity in exile, as well as for sustained international advocacy against the unlawful and unjust actions carried out by the Chinese government inside occupied Tibet.

Several MPs noted that the new law renders the promise of genuine autonomy within the Chinese Constitution largely hollow, raising deeper questions about how the Middle Way Policy should be interpreted and on what basis meaningful autonomy can be pursued within an increasingly centralised and homogenising system. Some members contended that it is high time to review the viability of the 2008 Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan people in light of prevailing current realities on the ground.

Other MPs, however, maintained that legislative changes in China do not, in themselves, invalidate the Middle Way Policy altogether. They emphasised that, should a shift in approach be deemed necessary, it must be formally introduced through a resolution by the concerned Members, thereby enabling a structured deliberation on whether the Middle Way Policy can continue to be pursued and, if not, what alternative course of action the CTA should adopt.

## House unanimously passes resolution condemning China's new 'ethnic unity' law

23 March 2026, Phayul

The Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile on Monday unanimously passed a strongly worded resolution condemning China's newly introduced Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, describing it as a coercive legal instrument aimed at erasing the distinct identity of the Tibetan people.

The resolution was tabled by the President of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), Penpa Tsering, proposed on behalf of the Cabinet, the motion received formal support from Norzin Dolma, Minister of the Department of Information and International Relations. Following deliberations, the resolution was adopted unanimously by the house.

In its preamble, the resolution highlighted that China's National People's Congress formally adopted the law on March 12, 2026, with its implementation scheduled to begin on July 1, 2026. The Tibetan Parliament asserted that the law fundamentally contradicts both international legal standards and the constitutional guarantees provided under China's own legal framework, particularly those concerning ethnic autonomy and equality.

The seven-point resolution strongly criticized the law as a mechanism designed to institutionalize forced assimilation. It argued that the policy framework underpinning the legislation is rooted in the Chinese government's so-called "second-generation ethnic policy," which seeks to dismantle ethnic autonomy and subsume distinct identities under the broader construct of a singular "Chinese nation" or Zhonghua Minzu. The Parliament emphasized that such an approach denies the historical, cultural, linguistic, and religious uniqueness of the Tibetan people.

A central concern raised in the resolution is the law's emphasis on fostering a "shared sense of identity" aligned with the Chinese nation. Lawmakers warned that this objective is being pursued through sweeping state interventions across education, governance, cultural expression, and religious practice. The resolution pointed to provisions mandating the dominance of Mandarin as the primary medium of instruction from early education, the standardization of curricula, and the marginalization of Tibetan language and knowledge systems.

Further, the resolution noted that the law enforces cultural transformation through policies that alter traditional architectural styles, place names, and social customs, while promoting the "Sinicization" of religion. It also raised alarm over directives encouraging inter-ethnic "integration" through population movement, cross-regional employment, and administrative restructuring—measures that Tibetan lawmakers argue are aimed at diluting demographic and cultural continuity in Tibetan areas.

The Parliament also expressed concern over the law's governance mechanisms, which consolidate authority under the Chinese Communist Party and integrate ethnic affairs into an expansive surveillance and social control system. It warned that the weakening of regional autonomy, combined with enhanced monitoring and political vetting, would further restrict the already limited space for cultural and political expression within Tibet.

Another significant issue highlighted in the resolution is the extraterritorial scope of the law, which purports to hold individuals and organizations outside China accountable for actions deemed supportive of "separatism." The Parliament viewed this as an alarming expansion of legal overreach that could target Tibetan diaspora communities and advocacy efforts worldwide.

Reaffirming its political position, the Tibetan Parliament declared that Tibet remains an occupied nation and rejected any attempt to reclassify Tibetans as merely a component of the Chinese national identity. The resolution called on the Chinese government to immediately withdraw the law and cease policies that undermine the fundamental rights of the Tibetan people.

The Parliament further urged the United Nations and the international community to undertake an urgent legal review of the legislation and to take concrete measures to prevent what it described as cultural genocide. It also appealed for accountability mechanisms to ensure that those responsible for such policies are held to account under international law.

In a message directed at Tibetans inside Tibet, the resolution called for resilience and steadfast commitment to preserving Tibetan identity, culture, language, and religious traditions. It also encouraged Tibetans in exile to intensify advocacy efforts, raise global awareness, and mobilize collective action against the law.

The resolution also proposed annual activities during the fourth week of September to preserve and promote Tibetan identity. It called on Tibetan organizations worldwide to strengthen coordinated international engagement to counter the implications of China's policies.

## TNP Reports Improved Living Conditions for the Buddhist Nuns of Sherab Choeling in Northern India

20 March 2026, BDG

The Tibetan Nuns Project (TNP), a US-registered charity based in Seattle and in the Kangra District of Himachal Pradesh, India, recently reported on the success of a project to improve the living conditions for the Buddhist nuns of Sherab

Choeling Nunnery in the Spiti Valley of Himachal Pradesh, northern India.

The ground floor of the high-altitude nunnery had posed a serious health hazard to the nuns because of cold, damp, and mold, with five nuns falling ill as a consequence.

"In the spring of 2025, the nuns at Sherab Choeling Nunnery . . . requested assistance to insulate the ground floor of their nunnery," the TNP said in an announcement shared with BDG. "We are happy to report that, thanks to 44 generous donors, the insulation and wood panelling project at [the] nunnery has now been completed."

The nunnery's buildings were constructed using traditional methods, employing mud and local materials. The TNP noted that while this was culturally appropriate for the region and the nuns, the aging structures had developed significant damp issues that encouraged the growth of mold on interior walls.

"Poor insulation against the extreme cold and persistent moisture retention led to unhealthy living conditions, and several nuns developed health problems, including joint pain, knee and back problems, and increased physical discomfort during the winter months, which impacted their ability to carry out their daily tasks," the TNP remarked.

With donor funding in place, and a mild recent winter, wood panelling could be fitted to the nunnery's residential quarters, kitchen and dining area, and the temple and prayer hall.

"The nuns report that the wood panels are helping to keep the rooms warmer," the TNP related. "They also reduce dampness and prevent mold from growing because black foam [has been] placed between the walls and the wood panels. This method is commonly practiced by people in the Spiti Valley to protect their homes from dampness and mold."

"Ani Butith, who has been in the nunnery for the past 30 years and currently acts as the administrator, conveyed sincere appreciation on behalf of all the nuns," the TNP added. "She shared that although they may not be able to repay the generosity materially, they will offer Long Life and Tara prayers at the nunnery dedicated to all donors and supporters as a gesture of their gratitude."

The nuns shovel a path around the nunnery through heavy winter snow. Spiti Valley winters can be severe, with temperatures dropping as low –30ºC. Image courts of the TNP

Founded in 1995, Sherab Choeling is a non-sectarian nunnery established to educate Himalayan Buddhist nuns who would otherwise have no access to formal or spiritual education. There are currently about 60 nuns at Sherab Choeling who follow a 17-year study program that includes Buddhist philosophy, and Tibetan, Hindi, and English languages and is aimed at providing the nuns with the skills to educate future generations of nuns and the members of the communities from which they come.

"Typically, women who live in remote areas like Spiti and who are interested in studying or practicing their religion have very few options," the TNP observed. "The Tibetan Nuns Project was approached by the nunnery in 2006 to help them develop their institution and we accepted them into our sponsorship program."

"[The nuns] live and study in extremely harsh climatic conditions, especially during winter when temperatures fall well below freezing and heavy snowfall often isolates the region," the TNP observed. "The nuns have expressed great happiness and satisfaction with the completed work. This project marks a meaningful improvement in both their physical well-being and daily living environment."

The Tibetan Nuns Project provides education and humanitarian aid to refugee nuns from Tibet and Himalayan regions of India. Established under the auspices of the Tibetan Women's Association and the Department of Religion and Culture of the Central Tibetan Administration, the TNP supports hundreds of nuns from all Tibetan Buddhist lineages and seven nunneries. Many of the nuns are refugees from Tibet, but the organization also reaches out to the Himalayan border areas of India, where women and girls have little access to formal education and religious training

## China's 'first Tibetan AI' claim contested as Dharamshala's Monlam AI predates DeepZang

19 March 2026, Phayul

China's unveiling of a Tibetan-language large model, DeepZang, in Lhasa on Monday has been accompanied by bold claims in state media describing it as the "world's first" Tibetan artificial intelligence platform. Developed by a local company, CHOKNOR, DeepZang is marketed as a large language model (LLM) tailored specifically for Tibetan-language processing, designed to handle tasks such as text generation, translation, and linguistic analysis.

The company's Chairman Tenzin Norbu stated that the large language model and its applications are intended to offer a credible platform for global users to engage with Tibetan culture, history, and politics, while curbing the spread of what he described as distorted ideologies and narratives.

He further asserted that the model addresses a gap in indigenous large language technologies at both national and ethnic levels and contributes to the preservation and advancement of Tibetan cultural heritage in the age of artificial intelligence.

Highlighting its technical scope, he noted that the open-source platform is presented as China's first ethnic-language AI system with multilingual and multimodal capabilities. The DeepZang model

reportedly supports more than 80 languages, including Tibetan, Putonghua, English, Mongolian, and Uyghur, enabling integrated functions such as speech recognition, translation, comprehension, and interaction.

However, this assertion of primacy is being increasingly challenged by developments from the Tibetan exile community, where Tibetan-language artificial intelligence has already been in active development. The Dharamshala-based Monlam Tibetan IT Research Centre has demonstrated that the integration of Tibetan language into AI systems is neither new nor unprecedented.

At its third annual event held on November 3, 2025, in Dharamshala, the centre announced that its platform, Melong.ai, had surpassed several leading global models, including Gemini, Claude, and DeepSeek, in the Tibetan-language generation and comprehension. This claim highlights a significant advancement in Tibetan-focused AI that predates China's DeepZang initiative.

Further reinforcing its technological edge, the centre unveiled four major digital tools during its 2025 Monlam Manifestation event at the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts (TIPA). Among them, "Monlam Think," an upgraded version of Monlam Melong, stood out for its enhanced ability to analyze and comprehend the Tibetan language with a depth that reportedly exceeds the existing global AI systems.

Melong.ai is both multilingual and multimodal, supporting over 140 languages while accepting inputs in both text and image formats. As part of the Monlam IT team's broader pioneering efforts, the platform is designed not only to make Tibetan digitally accessible but also to preserve the language and its cultural and intellectual heritage through a distinctly Tibetan perspective.

Monlam AI further offers intelligent tools for research, language learning, and textual analysis. Its capabilities are powered by machine-learning models that support translation, optical character recognition (OCR), speech-to-text, and text-to-speech functions. Currently supporting nine languages, the platform continues to expand its accessibility and usability for a global audience.

In this context, observers argue that China's portrayal of DeepZang as the first Tibetan AI platform reflects a politically driven narrative rather than a genuine technological milestone.

"China audaciously claims that its DeepZang is the world's first LLM designed for the Tibetan language. I asked AI to verify this, and it identified MonlamAI, developed by Dharamshala-based Tibetan monk Geshe Monlam, as the first," wrote Bhuchung K Tsering, Head of the Research & Monitoring Unit at the International Campaign for Tibet, on X (formerly Twitter).

Echoing similar concerns, Sophie Richardson, Co-Executive Director of the Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders, remarked on X that such portrayals amount to "linguistic erasure presented as a technological wonder in an authoritarian regime's state-controlled media."

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## Legal mechanisms in place to counter defamation against Dalai Lama: CTA security minister

18 March 2026, Phayul



The Department of Security under the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), led by Security Minister Gyari Dolma, on Wednesday emphasised the existence of legal mechanisms to address serious defamatory statements, particularly those concerning the life and security of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

The remarks were made on the third day of the ongoing 11th session of the 17th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile, following queries raised by Members of Parliament regarding the growing spread of misinformation, fabricated documents, and misleading narratives across social media platforms.

Responding to concerns, Minister Gyari Dolma acknowledged that misleading and harmful content circulating online has increasingly impacted the community. She pointed to the spread of false claims on critical issues, including forged letters falsely attributed to institutions such as the Gaden Phodrang, the Cabinet, and various monasteries.

Emphasizing the seriousness of the issue, she stated that any content undermining His Holiness the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan cause must be treated with the highest priority. At the same time, she noted that a diversity of opinions expressed online, particularly on individual platforms such as YouTube, should be viewed within the broader framework of democratic discourse and not dismissed outright. The Security Minister stressed the need for a balanced and measured response, cautioning against both overreaction and indifference. "It is neither appropriate to treat all such content as entirely negative nor to endorse it uncritically. A balanced approach with proper leadership is essential," she said.

Highlighting the evolving nature of the challenge, she described the spread of misinformation as a form of "new warfare," noting that similar patterns are observed globally, where digital platforms are increasingly used to create social unrest and influence political processes. She further warned of the risks posed by hostile forces seeking to undermine Tibetan unity and institutions through coordinated disinformation campaigns. In this regard, she urged Tibetans to exercise vigilance and responsibility in their use of social media, cautioning against the unverified sharing of sensitive or misleading content.

To address these challenges, she stated that the CTA is working toward establishing a coordinated response mechanism, including a proposed emergency response committee comprising key officials such as the Cabinet Secretary, Home Secretary, Security Secretary, and Foreign Secretary. The committee would be tasked with monitoring developments, responding swiftly to emerging crises, and ensuring interdepartmental coordination.

Additionally, the Minister highlighted the role of the Tibetan Computer Resource Center (TCRC) mechanism in tracking the origins and spread of misinformation and strengthening response strategies. She added that efforts are also underway to enhance technological capacity, including the adoption of advanced digital tools and improved monitoring systems.

On the question of publicly disclosing individuals responsible for spreading false information, the minister expressed reservations, stating that "naming and shaming" may not always yield meaningful outcomes. Instead, she emphasized the importance of timely clarification and public rebuttal of false claims as a more effective approach. She revealed that in several instances, authorities have directly engaged with individuals who unknowingly shared misleading content, leading to its removal. At the same time, investigations are ongoing to identify the sources of more serious cases, with relevant information being shared with the Government of India and, where necessary, with authorities in other countries.

The minister reiterated that legal action has been pursued in the past in cases involving grave defamation, particularly those threatening the safety of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. "There are now established mechanisms through which legal recourse can be pursued when such incidents arise," she affirmed.

Despite current resource constraints, she noted that the CTA is making sustained efforts to strengthen its institutional capacity to respond to digital threats. She also highlighted the collective strength of the Tibetan community, noting that Tibetans often unite in response to issues concerning His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

Concluding her statement, the Security Minister welcomed further suggestions from members of the House to enhance response strategies, particularly in the legal domain, and reaffirmed that a general framework to address such challenges is already in place under the Cabinet.

## Tibetan EC Probing Nepal Voting Irregularities, Urges Higher Turnout for Final Round

18 March 2026, Tibet Express




The Election Commission (EC) of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) on Wednesday announced the shortlisted MP candidates for the final phase of the 2026 Tibetan General Election. The announcement was made at a press conference held at Lhakpa Tsering Hall in the Department of Information and International Relations.

Campaigning for the final round to elect the members of the 18th Tibetan Parliament in exile officially opened today and continues until 5:00 PM on 23 April. The EC emphasised that all campaign activities must cease two days before the election date, warning that any violation would constitute a breach of the election code of conduct. The EC also reiterated that organisations are not permitted to nominate or campaign for specific candidates, noting that such violations were observed during the first phase of the election.

Around 1,800 votes cast during the preliminary phase have been declared invalid and removed. The EC attributed this partly to the absence of a formal nomination process, which allows voters to cast ballots for individuals who may later withdraw or were not officially in contention. To address this issue, the Commission stressed the need for a standardised nomination system, which would enable candidate names to be announced in advance, helping to reduce invalid votes and minimise voter confusion.

The EC expressed concern over the low voter turnout in the preliminary election and urged greater public participation in the final round, with particular emphasis on youth engagement. Of the 91,042 registered voters, only 51,140 cast their ballots, highlighting the extend of the low turnout. Participation among university students remained particularly low, despite high expectations of younger generations.

Acknowledging seasonal challenges, the Commission noted that the election period coincides with the winter months, when many Tibetans are engaged in seasonal livelihood activities, including the sweater trade. It added that any future changes to the election schedule would require broader consensus. Chief EC Lobsang Yeshi expressed hope that the final round on 26 April will see improved participation due to more favourable weather and the return of Tibetans to their respective settlements.

The Commission also addressed concerns brought to its attention regarding some of its decisions made during the election process. It urged the public to follow its full announcements through official media channels to avoid misunderstandings or misinterpretations. The EC emphasised that it can only act within its jurisdiction and affirmed that all decisions are made in accordance with established rules and regulations.

The EC confirmed that an investigation into the voting process in Nepal is currently underway, following complaints supported by valid evidence. More information and updates will be provided once the investigation is complete.

A total of 93 candidates will contest the final election, scheduled for April 26, twenty members

each from U-Tsang and Do-med, 21from Do-tod – the three traditional provinces of Tibet ; four members each from the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism and the traditional Bon tradition ; five members each from Europe and North America ; and two candidates representing Tibetans in Asia and Australasia (excluding India, Nepal, and Bhutan).

## CTA President defends budget priorities, addresses US funding cuts and long-term sustainability

17 March 2026, Phayul



The President of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), Penpa Tsering, who also holds the portfolio of Finance Minister, delivered detailed clarifications on the second day of the ongoing budget session on Tuesday. His responses addressed a wide range of questions, concerns, and observations raised by more than 20 Members of Parliament (MPs) during Monday's deliberations on the proposed budget for the upcoming fiscal year.

During the first day of the session, MPs expressed concerns over several key issues, including the suspension and partial restoration of U.S. funding, particularly the reinstatement of approximately $7–8 million as well as the notable disparity between allocations for social welfare (66.19%) and political activities (23.38%). Some MPs argued that greater financial emphasis should be placed on political efforts to strengthen the Tibetan cause, rather than prioritising social development projects such as infrastructure in exile settlements.

Additional concerns were raised regarding the wording in the United States' 2026 budget Appropriation Act, which references recognition of the CTA and the Tibetan government-in-exile, as well as broader questions surrounding the administration's long-term financial sustainability.

Responding to these concerns, President Penpa Tsering explained that significant efforts had been made to restore U.S. funding following earlier cuts. Of the $12 million approved under U.S. assistance, $7 million has been successfully reinstated and allocated to key CTA departments, including Education, Home, and Health. However, he noted that $5.2 million remains unrestored, affecting critical initiatives such as the CTA's Capacity Building programme, allocated $3 million over five years, and the Digital Library project under the Department of Religion and Culture, which has an allocation of $2 million.

Addressing concerns over budget allocation, the CTA President clarified that while 23.38% of the proposed budget is earmarked for political purposes and 66.19% for social welfare, the administration's spending strategy reflects long-term planning. Over the past four fiscal years, the Cabinet has invested heavily in public infrastructure, including settlement development projects. Once completed, these initiatives are expected to enhance self-reliance across various sectors, including governance, education, and healthcare.

He further emphasised that the administration does not treat political and social welfare sectors as mutually exclusive. The social welfare category encompasses key departments, including Finance, Home, Education, and Health, which collectively contribute to strengthening the Tibetan cause over time. Reassuring the House, he stated that the CTA remains financially stable and is not currently facing any major fiscal challenges.

Reflecting on broader expenditure trends, the President noted that during the tenure of the 16th Cabinet, the administration recorded its highest levels of actual expenditure from the consolidated fund, covering both recurring costs and investments in political and social welfare initiatives. He stressed that such spending was necessary to meet the demands of the time, sustain the Tibetan struggle, and address the basic needs of the Tibetan people. He also remarked that achieving a just resolution for Tibet cannot rely solely on political efforts.

On the question of nomenclature, raised by some MPs in light of language in recent U.S. legislation, President Penpa Tsering stated that renaming the CTA as the Tibetan government-in-exile is neither necessary nor advisable. He explained that the current designation ensures compliance with the legal framework of the host country and helps safeguard the administration's long-term stability.

Addressing concerns about financial dependency, the CTA President revealed that approximately 29% of the administration's total expenditure is supported by U.S. assistance, while over 90% of its annual budget relies on external funding. He acknowledged the need to diversify funding sources and confirmed that efforts are underway to secure support from other donor countries and organisations.

In particular, he highlighted ongoing initiatives to engage "middle power" nations as potential sources of financial assistance. He also noted that the Cabinet has undertaken efforts to enhance transparency by presenting a comprehensive report on the CTA's financial status and expenditures over the past two decades.

However, he cautioned that due to pressure from the Chinese government and risks associated with

external interference, it is not always feasible to publicly disclose detailed information regarding funding sources. He indicated that such matters could be discussed privately with Members of Parliament if necessary.

## Speaker Khenpo Sonam Tenphel Addresses Closing of 8th All India Tibet Support Groups Conference in Dharamshala

16 March 2026, CTA




*Speaker Khenpo Sonam Tenphel Addresses Closing of 8th All India Tibet Support Groups Conference in Dharamshala*

Speaker Khenpo Sonam Tenphel of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile addressed the closing session of the 8th All India Tibet Support Groups Conference on 13 March 2026. The conference, which commenced on 12 March 2026 at the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts (TIPA), brought together key advocates and supporters from across the subcontinent. The convention was convened by the Core Group for the Tibetan Cause – India and facilitated by the India Tibet Coordination Office (ITCO).

The event was also attended by Kalon Norzin Dolma, Minister of Information and International Relations; Shri R.K. Khrimey, National Convener of the Core Group for the Tibetan Cause – India; Prof. Anand Kumar, Patron, India Tibet Friendship Society (ITFS); Shri Surendra Kumar, National Vice President, India Tibet Friendship Society (ITFS); dedicated Tibet supporters from across India; and other distinguished guests.

In his address, the Speaker expressed his profound honour at joining the closing ceremony of the 8th All-India Tibet Support Groups Conference and conveyed his deep appreciation and admiration for the Tibet supporters' selfless commitment and steadfast support for the Tibetan cause.

"We, the Tibetan people, deeply value your support and recognise your contributions as truly invaluable—something that will never be forgotten," the Speaker said.

He further remarked that Tibet and India are neighbouring nations bound by deep-rooted ties of religion, culture, and tradition spanning thousands of years. "As the source of our spiritual and cultural heritage lies in the profound wisdom of the Nalanda masters, we hold India in the highest esteem, referring to it as Aryabhumi (The Noble Land)," he added.

Recalling historical developments, the Speaker noted that in 1959, following the illegal occupation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China (PRC), His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetans were forced to seek refuge in India. He emphasised that the exceptional hospitality and generous support extended by the government and people of India have been instrumental in preserving Tibetan identity.

Today, the Tibetan issue has garnered significant international attention and support from governments, parliaments, and people around the world. The Speaker attributed this largely to India's recognition of Tibet's importance, the visionary leadership of His Holiness the Dalai Lama in pursuing a non-violent struggle grounded in truth, and the world's growing awareness of the tragic reality of human rights violations under China's repressive policies inside Tibet, where Tibetans continue to demonstrate immense courage and resilience.

"We have now lived in exile for more than sixty years. During this time, the influence and message of His Holiness the Dalai Lama have reached every corner of the globe. This stands as a testament not only to his wisdom but also to the profound values of Tibetan Buddhist culture," he said. He further noted that in today's modern era, His Holiness's guidance on global peace, compassion, altruism, and secular ethics is increasingly recognised as essential for the well-being of humanity.

The Speaker also expressed special gratitude to those who recently offered a Long-Life Prayer (Tenshug) for His Holiness, sincerely praying for his continued health and long life. He noted that His Holiness continues to promote the revival of ancient Indian knowledge while introducing India to the world as a beacon of democracy, religious harmony, and a unique model of peaceful coexistence among diverse cultures and languages.

Referring to current global developments, the Speaker observed that the world is undergoing rapid political and economic shifts, and changes are also taking place within China. In such times of uncertainty and transition, he noted that Tibet supporters remain among the most vital allies in the struggle for truth. He thanked the Tibet Support Groups across India for their tireless efforts, noting that their work has helped the Indian public better understand that Tibet was historically an independent nation and that the security of Tibet is closely connected to the security of India.

Furthermore, the Speaker highlighted the importance of informing the Indian public about the critical situation currently unfolding in Tibet,

including the Chinese government's systematic policies aimed at eradicating Tibetan identity and the destruction of Tibet's fragile ecosystem. Tibet is often referred to as the "Water Tower of Asia," as it is the source of major rivers that sustain millions of people across Asia, including in India. Protecting this environment, he emphasised, is therefore not only a concern for Tibetans but a shared responsibility.

The Speaker also commended the discussions held over the past few days regarding future action plans and strategies. He urged participants to ensure that the resolutions adopted during the conference do not remain merely on paper but are actively implemented in the days ahead. In particular, he emphasised the importance of introducing the Tibetan cause to the younger generation of Indians so that they may better understand the historical truth of Tibet and the shared interests that bind the Tibetan and Indian peoples.

In conclusion, the Speaker thanked the members of the Core Group for the Tibetan Cause – India (CGTC-I) for organising the important conference and expressed appreciation to all participants who had travelled long distances to attend the gathering in Dharamshala.

More than 200 participants, including presidents and members of various Tibet Support Groups from across India, gathered for the conference to discuss and strengthen the Indian grassroots movement in support of the Tibetan cause.

## ₹340 crore budget for CTA proposed for fiscal year 2026-27



*CTA President Penpa Tsering, also the Finance Minister during the ongoing budget session of the 17th Tibetan Parliament in Exile on March 16,*

The executive branch of the exile Tibetan government, officially known as the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), led by President Penpa Tsering proposed a budget of ₹3,407.42 million (₹340.74 crore INR) for the upcoming fiscal year during the opening day of the 11th session of the 17th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile on Monday. The 13-day parliamentary session scheduled to run from March 16 to March 30, 2026, will be the last session of the 17th Tibetan Parliament in Exile.

The budget proposal by CTA President Penpa Tsering, who currently holds the portfolio of Finance Minister, seeks an increase of ₹103.4 million compared to last year's approved budget of ₹3,304.02 million, representing an overall increase of 3.13 percent.

According to the budget proposal, ₹2,255.23 million, or 66.19 percent of the total allocation, has been earmarked for social sector expenditures. Political-related expenses account for ₹796.69 million, or 23.38 percent of the budget, while ₹355.50 million, representing 10.43 percent, has been allocated for administrative costs.

In the previous fiscal year, the administration initially proposed a budget of ₹3,675.30 million. However, the Tibetan Parliament ultimately approved a reduced allocation of ₹3,304.02 million for 2025–26. The reduction followed the termination of financial assistance from the United States government, which the CTA had anticipated when drafting its earlier proposal of approximately ₹368 crore. With nearly 90 percent of its funding dependent on external assistance, the administration was compelled to revise its fiscal planning in response to the funding shortfall.

During the opening session, Speaker Khenpo Sonam Tenphel acknowledged the continued support of the Government and people of India, as well as numerous countries and international supporters. He noted that such assistance has enabled Tibetans in exile to preserve and promote their distinct language, culture, and religious traditions for over six decades, while also strengthening international awareness of the Tibetan cause.

The Speaker also referred to recent legislative developments in the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, highlighting the passage of policies aimed at promoting "ethnic unity" and advancing the broader policy of Sinicization. He warned that such measures seek to tighten state control over minority nationalities and religious practices. Expressing concern over the implications for the Tibetan language and identity, he urged Tibetans living in the free world to remain vigilant and to continue safeguarding and strengthening Tibetan linguistic and cultural traditions.

The ongoing parliamentary session will primarily deliberate on the approval of the administration's proposed budget. Lawmakers will also review the final report of a special committee tasked with standardizing the design, colors, and specifications of the Tibetan national flag and national emblem.

## 3rd Tibetan Digital Library Consortium Conference Concludes in Dharamshala; Sikyong Highlights Heritage Preservation Amid China's 'Ethnic Unity Law'

13 March 2026, CTA



*3rd Tibetan Digital Library Consortium Conference Concludes in Dharamshala; Sikyong Highlights Heritage Preservation Amid China's 'Ethnic Unity Law'. Photo / Dawa Tsering / tibet.net*

Sikyong Penpa Tsering, the incumbent Kalon of the Department of Religion and Culture (CTA), delivered the keynote address at the concluding ceremony of the 3rd Consortium Conference of the Tibetan Digital Library. The two-day conference, held from 12 to 13 March 2026, was organised by the Department of Religion and Culture at the Administrative and Welfare Society in Dharamshala.

A total of 54 participants representing 49 Tibetan monasteries and cultural institutions affiliated with the Tibetan Digital Library project attended the consortium conference.

The closing ceremony began with introductory remarks by Dhondup Tsering, Head of the Cultural Section of the Department.

Thereafter, Sikyong Penpa Tsering addressed the gathering, stating that the Tibetan Digital Library is one of the key initiatives of the 16th Kashag, aimed at preserving the rich heritage of Tibetan scriptures from all religious schools and traditions, as well as other practices, in digital form to ensure their preservation in this age of artificial intelligence and advanced technology.

Regarding the initiative, which is undertaken with the generous support of U.S. funding that recently experienced cessation, Sikyong expressed optimism that funding for the project will be restored during the 2026 financial year of the United States. Sikyong further stressed that the successful completion of this project is of immense importance, as the teachings and principles contained in these scriptures could greatly benefit humanity.

"The unparalleled international support that we receive today is largely due to the global admiration for Tibetan Buddhism and the inspiring charisma of His Holiness the Dalai Lama," said Sikyong.



Sikyong emphasised that regardless of whether the funding is terminated or restored, it is crucial that all stakeholders collectively pool their efforts to ensure the success of this initiative for the greater benefit of humanity.

Sikyong also encouraged participants to pass on the knowledge and skills they gained from the trainings to their peers and other staff members at their respective libraries to ensure the continuity and sustainability of the project in the future.

Additionally, Sikyong spoke about the increasing challenges facing the preservation of Tibetan cultural, religious, and linguistic heritage inside Tibet. He pointed to the recent approval of new legislation on so-called "Ethnic Unity," which aims to accelerate the assimilation and Sinicisation of ethnic minorities in China at the expense of their centuries-old heritages and distinct identities.

Following this, Dhondul Dorjee, Secretary of the Department of Religion and Culture, delivered the vote of thanks.

Over the course of the two-day conference, sessions featured expert talks on the Technical Aspects of the Tibetan Digital Library and Big Data Management; Responsibilities of Librarians and Library Management in the Digital Era; the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives' efforts in the physical and digital preservation of manuscripts; the status, past challenges, and lessons learned from the Tibetan Digital Library project; presentations on the Borrowing and Lending feature in TLCM; and an overview of the Tibetan Digital Library platform.

The Tibetan Digital Library project is currently funded by the Government of the United States. During the last year's financial shortfall, Alessia Bulgari of Italy provided support by funding one year's salary for the project staff, ensuring the continuity of the project's activities.

## UK Representative Joins Greenwich Council Leaders for Tibet Flag Raising Gathering at Woolwich Town Hall

12 March 2026 CTA

On Tuesday, 10 March 2026, the Mayor of the Royal Borough of Greenwich, Councillor Linda Bird, the Deputy Mayor Councillor David



Gardner, the Deputy Leader of the Council Averil Lekau and Cllr. Mariam Lolayar, alongside the Representative Tsering Yangkey, Office of Tibet, Phuntsok Norbu, Chairman of the Tibetan Community in Britain and Tibetan people living in the Greewich Borough, raised the Tibet Flag in the Greenwich Town Hall to mark the 67th anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan National Uprising in Lhasa, Tibet's capital, and to express solidarity with the Tibetan people.

Although the formal flag-raising ceremony could not take place outside due to ongoing scaffolding at the Town Hall, the symbolic raising of the Tibetan flag inside the building remained a powerful gesture of solidarity with the Tibetan people inside Tibet, who are denied the right to raise this flag in their own homeland. The moment served as a reminder of the universal values of freedom, human rights, and human dignity.

Representative Tsering Yangkey expressed her sincere gratitude and appreciation to the Council leaders for their symbolic gesture of continued support and solidarity with the Tibetan community in its peaceful struggle for freedom, justice, and human rights.

The facilitator of the Tibet flag initiative, Tsering Passang, also conveyed his heartfelt thanks to the leaders of the Royal Borough of Greenwich for their long-standing support for the Tibetan community. He recalled that the first Tibet flag raising in the borough took place in September 2015 as a welcoming gesture during the visit of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to the UK (facilitated by the Office of Tibet London), when His Holiness delivered a public talk to more than 10,000 people at The O2, addressed the Tibetan community and met with the then Mayor of the Royal Borough of Greenwich, Councillor Norman Adams.

He further noted that the annual Tibet Flag Raising Ceremony has been held at Woolwich Town Hall since 2020 in collaboration with the Royal Borough of Greenwich. He also acknowledged the kind support and cooperation of the Mayor's Office in facilitating this meeting between the Council leaders and the Tibetan community.

Mayor Linda Bird shared her fond memories of attending the celebration of His Holiness the Dalai Lama's 90th birthday last July at the Tibetan Peace Garden, where she addressed a large gathering of Tibetans and supporters.

Later that day, the Royal Borough of Greenwich also marked the occasion on its official social media account, stating:

"Today we raised the Tibetan flag inside Woolwich Town Hall to mark Tibetan Uprising Day. Showing solidarity here in Royal Greenwich with those marking the day around the world to remember the events of 1959 and the resilience of Tibetan communities."

– Report filed by Office of Tibet, London

## Tibet supporters gather in Dharamshala to mark uprising day

10 March 2026, ANI News

Tibetans living in exile and supporters of the Tibetan cause from more than 37 countries gathered in Dharamshala on Tuesday to commemorate the 67th Tibetan National Uprising Day at the main Tibetan temple, Tsuglagkhang.

The annual observance holds deep significance for Tibetans across the world, as it marks the 1959 uprising in Lhasa against Chinese rule, which eventually led to the Dalai Lama fleeing Tibet and establishing the Tibetan government-in-exile in India. Dharamshala, which has served as the headquarters of the Tibetan spiritual leadership and the Central Tibetan Administration for decades, continues to be a focal point for such commemorations.

People attending the event included members of Tibetan exile communities, international activists, and representatives of Tibet support groups from several countries. Participants gathered to express solidarity with the Tibetan people and to draw attention to the ongoing concerns related to Tibet's political and cultural situation.

Speaking about the international engagement around the Tibetan issue, Representative of Associazione Italia-Tibet, Gunto Colonia, highlighted the discussions held among global Tibet support groups in recent days.

"We have had an international meeting of Tibet support groups for the last three days. This is the year of the 90th birthday of His Holiness, the year of compassion. They organised this meeting, and there are representatives here of Tibetan support groups from all over the world... We are here to speak about how to continue supporting the Tibetan people and how we can contribute in our

own way in our countries to the resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict," Colonia said.
According to participants, the three-day international meeting brought together activists and supporters who discussed strategies to strengthen global advocacy for the Tibetan cause. The gathering also aimed to coordinate awareness campaigns, encourage dialogue on the issue, and promote peaceful efforts toward addressing the long-standing Sino-Tibetan dispute.
The 67th Tibetan National Uprising Day is commemorated every year by Tibetans in exile and supporters worldwide. The day serves both as a remembrance of the 1959 events and as a platform to highlight the aspirations of Tibetans for the preservation of their cultural, religious, and political identity.
Events marking the day in Dharamshala typically include prayer ceremonies, public gatherings, speeches by Tibetan leaders, and participation from international supporters. This year's commemoration saw a strong turnout of global Tibet support organisations, reflecting continued international engagement with the Tibetan issue.
Earlier, the Core Group for Tibetan Cause-India concluded the Special Tibet Support Groups (TSGs) meeting in the north Indian hill town of Dharamshala.
More than 120 participants representing 32 countries expressed solidarity with the Tibetan people in their struggle for freedom and justice. The participants also met Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama.

## Tibetan National Uprising Day: CTA seeks peaceful resolution to conflict with China

10 March 2026, Hindustan Times

Shimla, The Central Tibetan Administration of the Tibetan government-in-exile on Tuesday said it focuses on themes of resilience, remembrance and the urgent need for a peaceful resolution to the Sino-Tibetan conflict on the 67th Tibetan National Uprising Day.It marked the anniversary of the 1959 uprising by paying tribute to the thousands of Tibetans who sacrificed their lives in Lhasa against Chinese rule, a release issued here said.
The Central Tibetan Administration further called for continued advocacy for human rights, with international delegations joining demonstrations to highlight the "ongoing repression" in Tibet, according to the release.
The CTA reaffirmed its commitment to the middle way approach, seeking a peaceful, negotiated settlement that provides genuine autonomy for Tibet within China. It also warned against misinformation campaigns aimed at disrupting the commemorations marking the day.
The message by the community seeking peaceful resolution highlights the "unbroken spirit" of the Tibetan people and their commitment to preserving their culture, language, and religion "despite decades of cultural erasure policies by the Chinese government", the release stated.
As 2026 marks the 90th year of the 14th Dalai Lama, it is the "Year of Compassion", the CTA said, encouraging the practice of his four main commitments."More than a historical event, represents the collective memory of a nation that refuses to forget its identity and heritage as Tibetans have continued to preserve their language, religion, and traditions both inside Tibet and in exile despite decades of political pressure and cultural assimilation policies," the release said.
For many Tibetans, the anniversary of the uprising is not only about mourning the past but also about reaffirming hope for the future, it said.
"March 10 reminds the world that the Tibetan struggle is not merely about territory, it is about the survival of a people, their culture and their right to determine their own future and each year, the Tibetans raise their flag and remember the courage of those who stood in Lhasa in 1959," it added.

## New Delhi: Tibetan Youth Congress stages peaceful protest outside Chinese Embassy on 67th Tibetan National Uprising Day



## Italian Member of the Emilia-Romagna Regional Council Alice Parma Visits Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile

09 March 2026, CTA

On 9 March 2026, Alice Parma, Member of the Emilia-Romagna Regional Council of Italy accompanied by Osanna Matteo visited the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile earlier today and met with Speaker Khenpo Sonam Tenphel and Deputy Speaker Dolma Tsering Teykhang.
During their meeting, the Speakers discussed the relationship between Italy and Tibet, which has a long history of cultural exchange dating back to the 17th and 18th centuries. During that period, Italian Jesuit and Capuchin missionaries visited Lhasa, studied the Tibetan language, and created some of the earliest Tibetan-Italian dictionaries.
They also discussed the ongoing political support for the Tibetan cause by Italian lawmakers and civil society. Italy has become one of the strongest



supporters of Tibet in Europe by passing numerous resolutions and motions on Tibet.

The Speakers also highlighted the assistance provided by many Italians in supporting the education of Tibetan children whose parents remain in Tibet through programs run by the Tibetan Children's Village (TCV).

Further discussions focused on the Central Tibetan Administration, which under the leadership of His Holiness the Dalai Lama initiated dialogue with the Chinese government. Nine rounds of dialogue were held between 2002 and 2010, but they did not produce substantive results. Instead, the People's Republic of China continues to label Tibetans as separatists and imposes arbitrary arrests and restrictions under the pretext of maintaining national stability.

The visiting guests were also briefed on China's growing control over water resources in Asia and the exploitation of the Tibetan Plateau through the construction of unprecedented dams across rivers originating in Tibet. They were also informed about the unregulated mining of Tibet's minerals and precious metals, as well as the plight of Tibetan children in Tibet, many of whom are coerced into colonial-style boarding schools and deprived of their right to Tibetan cultural heritage.

– Report filed by Tibetan Parliamentary Secretariat

## Special Tibet Support Groups Meeting Concludes with Renewed Commitment on the Eve of the 67th Tibetan National Uprising Day

09 March 2026, CTA




Following three days of intensive deliberations and discussions on a wide range of topics—including briefings on the current situation inside Tibet, strategies to counter China's increasingly distorted narratives, and reflections on why Tibet matters more than ever in the evolving geopolitical landscape—the Special International Tibet Support Groups Meeting concluded on the eve of the 67th anniversary of Tibetan National Uprising Day.

On the first day of the meeting, following the inaugural ceremony, participants issued a strong declaration affirming their united and unwavering commitment to stand in solidarity with the Tibetan people in their struggle for freedom, justice, and the preservation of Tibet's distinct national identity.

On the morning of 9 March, participants were granted an audience with His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Following the audience, the visiting Tibet supporters reconvened at the venue for the closing ceremony.

Honourable MP Michael Brand, Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Germany, and Honourable Senator Jiří Oberfalzer, Vice President of the Czech Senate—who were in Dharamshala as distinguished guests for the commemoration of Tibetan National Uprising Day—featured at the closing ceremony alongside Kalon (Minister) Norzin Dolma and Secretary Karma Choeying of the Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR), Central Tibetan Administration (CTA).

The concluding ceremony was coordinated by Master of Ceremony Tenzin Palmo, Tibet Support Groups Liaison Officer at the DIIR.

Honourable MP Michael Brand delivered the valedictory address, in which he remarked, "Coming here is like coming home for me. There are so many wonderful and inspiring people here working day in and day out for their nation and their people, along with many friends from all over the world joining that effort. One can only bow to all of you for your tireless commitment to such a noble cause."

Reflecting on the current global context, he noted, "This world is undergoing a huge shift. We do not yet know where or when this shift will end. Addressing such a distinguished audience at a time of fundamental global change requires us to reflect on these transformations. Even then, we can say that these important years are but a blink of an eye compared to the thousands of years of Tibetan history and culture—and even less when measured against the eternity that many of us believers know exists."

He continued by observing that the pace of global change has created uncertainty and anxiety in many parts of the world. "We can see, read, and even feel how fast our world is changing. Because of these shifts, many people and regions on our small planet feel insecure and even fearful. But we here, most of us, are in a somewhat better position

—people grounded in our convictions and guided by our faith. We are aware that we are not alone on this planet; there are good forces watching over us in these uncertain times."

Highlighting the global moral influence of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, he stated, "One authority of truly global reach—touching the hearts, minds, and even the souls of countless people on this planet—is at the centre of our thoughts today. Of course, I am speaking of His Holiness the Great Dalai Lama. When we talk about the fundamental shifts of our era, many people focus on the increasing dangers in the coming months, years, and decades."

While briefly speaking about the ongoing domestic and international challenges currently facing the People's Republic of China, the Honourable MP said, "That was proof to the whole world—not only in China and the region—that the regime is insecure, unsafe, rattled, and challenged."

To further support his point, he also referred to China's mishandling of its recent domestic political issues. As China views Tibet's distinct cultural, religious, and linguistic identity as a threat to its Han-centric notion of unity, he stressed, "We have to raise awareness around the globe that the precious Tibetan culture—unique and of immense importance to the whole world—is under increasing threat."

He condemned China's attempts to eradicate this uniqueness and distinction from the surface of the Tibetan Plateau and called for greater efforts from Tibet supporters to safeguard it. "We have to spread the news—the ugly and tragic news—of the hundreds of thousands of children being forced into Chinese indoctrination, separated from their parents and families, only to cut the roots of the precious Tibetan language and tear apart the Tibetan heritage."

In conclusion, the Honourable MP appealed, "Let us stand up for civilisation, for culture, for humankind, and for humanity and kindness—just as His Holiness has done throughout his extraordinary life. Let us stand up against forces of destruction, brutality, and inhumanity."

Following him, Honourable Senator Jiří Oberfalzer spoke to the gathering.

"Being member of the Czech nation, a small nation in the central Europe who went through different period of history where we struggled not having freedom and being oppressed by outsider, the Soviet regime. We understand very well what means to live under such super powers and not being free to live our own original life."

The Honourable Senator recalled that, after his country became free in 1989, President Václav Havel invited His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama who has made a great impression. "He brought a message of non-violence and peaceful relation to the world and among the people."

"It is difficult to describe any factual or realistic way of how to get out of the Chinese suppression, the power incomparable, to a people of small nation. But this is not the case of Tibet, because I would say specially thanks to His Holiness who very well know what. is the positions and situations of Tibetan people."

While commending European's commitment to support those who are in subjugation, the Honourable Senator lamented that "We are still prisoners of business. It is Europe who created strength of Chinese economy."

To demonstrate how Tibet-related initiatives are taking place in Czech Republic such as institution of NGOs that work for Tibet cause as well as Uyghurs in China. He also mentioned current Czech President, Honourable Petr Pavel's meetings with His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Sikyong Penpa Tsering last year in India, making it the first case of a sitting President's official meeting with Tibetan leadership in bold move. He also mentioned his meetings with both the former and current Sikyong of the CTA at his Senate office.

"Even Tibetan leadership are willing to negotiate, China is not open to this solution and they simply wants to delete Tibet from the world. And, I think we should, not only say, but show that we don't accept anything like this," the Honourable Senate concluded.

As the head of the organising department, Kalon Norzin Dolma delivered the concluding remarks and stated, "As we mark the conclusion of this three-day Special International Tibet Support Groups Meeting, we do so at a moment of significant consequences." The Kalon said, "We recognise that this gathering marks not an end, but the birth of a renewed collective journey toward the resolution of the Sino-Tibet conflict and the fulfilment of the aspirations of the Tibetan people."

Expressing her honour at being on the same dais with two distinguished guests, the Kalon said, "The histories of both nations, from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the triumph of the Velvet Revolution, stand as monumental testaments to the world. Your presence here reminds us that even the most formidable walls of oppression eventually crumble under the relentless power of non-violence and the unwavering weight of truth."

Further expressing her gratitude to all the participants from 32 nations, the Kalon stated, "Your presence is a profound reminder that we do not stand alone."

"Standing here before you all, I cannot overstate the critical urgency of the situation inside Tibet. It is too evident from the briefings throughout the sessions what not just the Tibetan people but the world stands to lose. As I speak, around a million Tibetan children sit in state-sponsored colonial boarding schools in Tibet. While the world has acknowledged such colonial residential schools of the past as a tragedy and a stain on the history of humanity, a million Tibetan children being forced into this very same nightmare today are being

deprived of the opportunity to learn their own language or to immerse themselves in their culture."

Given the CCP's misperception of Tibet's distinct identity as a threat to its stability and the falsehood of its claims that Tibet has been part of China since antiquity, the Kalon expounded, "To hide its own facade, the PRC seeks to forcibly sinicise and eradicate this ancient civilisation. As a result, the Tibetan language, our religion, and our culture—the very heartbeat of Tibetan identity—are under a coordinated existential threat and attacks from all sides."

The Kalon highlighted how the message of Tibetans' long-pursued belief in the "science of mind" is crucial for this tumultuous world with rising conflicts, and how the bearers of this profound treasure are still suppressed to such an extent that these traditions are now under increasing threat of extinction if not safeguarded. Further underscoring the geopolitical importance of the Tibetan Plateau, the Kalon shared her concerns over the rising challenges faced by neighbouring regions and downstream dwellers of the Tibetan rivers.

"The resolution of the Sino-Tibet conflict is not merely in the interest of the Tibetan people; it is in the wider interest of China and the world at large. Let the peaceful resolution of this Sino-Tibet conflict reignite the world's faith in non-violence."

"As the global landscape shifts, we must manoeuvre with strategic agility, adapting our methods without ever losing our core values. To meet this immense responsibility, we must ensure that the work of our support groups is institutionalised. We must move beyond discussion toward strategic alignment—one that is coordinated and action-oriented. We must ensure that support for Tibet becomes a permanent fixture in the halls of parliaments, in the strategic agendas of nations, and in the conscience of civil society," the Kalon stressed.

With a vote of thank from Secretary Karma Choeying, the three-day Special International Tibet Support Groups Meeting was successfully wrapped up.

## 8th All India Tibet Support Groups Conference Concludes with Declaration and Valedictory Session

08 March 2026, CTA

The two-day 8th All India Tibet Support Groups Conference concluded with a valedictory session held at 2:30 p.m. at the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts on 13 March 2026. The valedictory session brought together key advocates and supporters from across the subcontinent.



The two-day 8th All India Tibet Support Groups Conference concluded with a valedictory session held at 2:30 p.m. at the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts on 13 March 2026. The session brought together key advocates and supporters of the Tibetan cause from across the Indian subcontinent.

Other distinguished guests included R.K. Khrimey, National Convenor of the Core Group for the Tibetan Cause – India; Dr Anand Kumar, Patron and National President of the India-Tibet Friendship Society (ITFS), Shri Surendar Kumar, National Vice-President of ITFS and Regional Conveners of the Core Group for the Tibetan Cause – India—Lobsang Genchen, Amit Jyotikar and others, as well as presidents and general secretaries of regional Tibet support groups.

Today's valedictory session featured an address by Chief Guest, Ven Khenpo Sonam Tenphel, Speaker of Tibetan Parliament in Exile. Special Guest, Kalon Norzin Dolma, Minister of the Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR) of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), and Shri R.K. Khrimey, National Convenor of the Core Group for the Tibetan Cause – India and Shri Lobsang Genchen, Regional Convener of the Core Group for the Tibetan Cause – India.

Other distinguished guests present at the inauguration of the two-day seminar included Shri Anand Kumar, National President of the India-Tibet Friendship Society, Shri R.K. Khrimey, National Convenor of the Core Group for the Tibetan Cause – India, Jigme Jugney, Representative of the Bureau of His Holiness the Dalai Lama in New Delhi, Tashi Dickey Dekyi of Delhi-based India Tibet Coordination Office and DIIR's TSG Liason Officer Tenzin Palmo.

Distinguished dignitaries in attendance included Shri R.K. Khrimey, National Convenor of the Core Group for the Tibetan Cause – India; Shri Pankaj Goyal, National General Secretary of the Bharat Tibbat Sahyog Manch (BTSM); Jigme Jugney, Representative of the Bureau of His Holiness the Dalai Lama in New Delhi; Shri Anand Kumar, National President of the India-Tibet Friendship Society; Shri Arvind Nicose, Joint Vice-President of the Core Group for the Tibetan Cause – India; and Shri Tarh Tarak, President of the Arunachal Pradesh Tibet Support Group.

As well as regional and national convenors of the Crore-Group for the Tibet Cause in India, and presidents and general secretaries of regional




support groups. The two-day conference was convened by the Core Group for the Tibetan Cause – India and facilitated by the India Tibet Coordination Office based in Delhi.

The closing session was moderated by Regional Convener Surendra Kumar. Regional Convener Amit Jyotikar delivered the welcome address, followed by Dr Amit Jyotikar, Regional Convener of the Core Group for the Tibetan Cause – India (CGTC-I).

The 8th All India Tibet Support Groups Conference commenced with brief remarks by Shri R.K. Khrimey, National Convenor of the Core Group for the Tibetan Cause – India, who summarised the objectives and discussions of the conference.

Addressing the valedictory session as the Special Guest, Kalon (Minister) Norzin Dolma of DIIR expressed her appreciation to the organisers of the All India Tibet Support Groups Conference. On behalf of the Tibetan people, Kalon Norzin Dolma thanked the Government and people of India for their decades of kindness and hospitality. She observed that the widespread presence of Tibet Support Groups across the country is a testament to the deep solidarity Indian citizens feel toward the Tibetan cause. She expressed confidence that continued collaboration with parliamentarians, civil society, and media outlets would further strengthen the movement.

Kalon extended her gratitude to the organisers for the successful execution of the conference. She underscored India's "extraordinary generosity" in providing sanctuary to His Holiness the Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetans following the Chinese occupation. She remarked that India has evolved into the "cradle of the Tibetan way of life in exile," providing a fertile ground for Tibetans to nurture democratic values such as equality, liberty, and justice.

Reflecting on the movement's history, she paid tribute to the prominent Indian leaders who stood with Tibet as early as 1959, including Jayaprakash Narayan, Jawaharlal Nehru, Rajendra Prasad, B.R. Ambedkar, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and George Fernandes.

Speaking on Tibet's historical status, the Kalon asserted that Tibetans possess a distinct language, culture, and identity, having enjoyed peaceful relations with neighbouring nations until the invasion by government of the People's Republic of China (PRC). She described the exile community as a living testimony to a difficult history marked by military occupation, cultural destruction, and systemic policies of assimilation. Reaffirming the stance of the Central Tibetan Administration, she stated that the Tibetan leadership remains fully committed to a peaceful resolution of the Sino-Tibet conflict through dialogue and the Middle Way Approach, as envisioned by His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

"While history cannot be rewritten," the Kalon Norzin Dolma emphasised, "Tibetans will not allow their history and identity to be erased. We will continue to strive for a solution that ensures dignity, freedom, and the preservation of Tibet's unique cultural and spiritual heritage."

She further called on international supporters to continue advocating for Tibet-related legislation in their respective countries. Such laws, she said, help counter misinformation about Tibet, promote human rights, and oppose attempts by the government of the PRC to interfere in the reincarnation process of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Additionally, she drew attention to the importance of Tibet's environment, the Tibetan Plateau as the "Water Tower of Asia." She explained that Tibet is the source of ten major rivers that sustain more than a billion people across South and Southeast Asia. Warning about China's large-scale dam construction and water diversion projects, as such developments pose serious ecological and geopolitical risks for downstream countries, including India. Protecting Tibet's fragile ecosystem, she emphasised, is therefore vital for the environmental security of the entire region.

While acknowledging the close relationship, Kalon Norzin Dolma expressed the best hope that the Government and people of India will continue to stand by the Tibetan cause when the situation demands. She also reaffirmed the commitment of the Central Tibetan Administration to maintain responsible governance and serve the Tibetan people in exile until a negotiated resolution to the Sino-Tibet conflict is achieved.

Concluding her remarks, she said the Tibetan freedom movement continues to draw strength from the resilience of Tibetans inside and outside Tibet, as well as from the solidarity of Indian supporters and the international community. Expressing deep gratitude to the Government and people of India for decades of support and hospitality, she said Tibetans look forward to the day when His Holiness the Dalai Lama can return to Tibet in freedom and dignity and when they can welcome their Indian friends to a free Tibet.

The programme concluded with a vote of thanks delivered by Shri Lobsang Genchen, Regional Convener of the Core Group for the Tibetan Cause – India.

In the two-day seminar, the participants deliberated on major key topics, including India's role in the Sino-Tibet conflict, focus on

reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama, the rights and freedom of Tibetans in Tibet, the significance of Tibet's ecology for downstream countries, called for a synergised effort to strengthen the Tibetan movement, and adopted a declaration and Action Plan.

On the final day of the 8th National Convention, participants unanimously adopted a declaration outlining nine key resolutions issued during the conference, reaffirming solidarity with the Tibetan people and support for the Tibetan cause. The declaration reads as follows:



DECLARATION

8th All India Tibet Support Groups Conference on 12th and 13th March 2026 at Dharamshala.

The 8th All India Tibet Support Groups Conference brought together representatives of Tibet Support Groups across India to reaffirm their solidarity with the Tibetan people and their aspirations for freedom and ancient cultural preservation.

Conference recalled the historic support extended by the Indian people to Tibet since 1950. Late Sardar Patel, in 1954 by Dr. Baba Saheb Ambedkar and in 1959 All India Tibet Convention initiated by Loknayak Jayprakash Narayan reaffirmed the civilizational, spiritual, and cultural ties between India and Tibet.

Conference expressed serious concern over the continued occupation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China and the ongoing policies that threaten Tibet's unique cultural identity, religious traditions, language and fragile environment.

Conference condemned the reported human rights violations in Tibet, including restrictions on religious freedom, mass surveillance, the expansion of colonial-style boarding schools for Tibetan children and attempts to annihilate Tibetan identity.

Conference demand for the recognition of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) as the legitimate representative of Tibetans.

Conference called for the resumption of dialogue between representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama/CTA and the People's Republic of China (PRC) to peacefully resolve the Sino-Tibet conflict and appeal the Government of India to raise the Tibet cause on International Platform in support of resumption of dialogue.

Conference expressed appreciation for the lifelong contributions of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama in promoting world peace, compassion, non-violence, environmental awareness and the revival of Nalanda tradition of Buddhism.

Conference rejected China's claim over the reincarnation of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama and uphold the century old tradition on reincarnation by Gaden Phodrang Trust.

Conference congratulates His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama for receiving Grammy award this year which also coincides the year of compassion marking the 90th Birth Anniversary of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama.

Conference resolved to strengthen Tibet Support Groups across India, promote awareness through academic programs, social media campaigns, organize cultural and environmental initiatives and encourage greater participation of youth, women and civil societies.

## CTA Hosts Special International Tibet Support Groups Meeting Press Conference at Lhakpa Tsering Hall

07 March 2026, CTA



*CTA Hosts Special International Tibet Support Groups Meeting Press Conference at Lhakpa Tsering Hall*

The Department of Information and International Relations of the Central Tibetan Administration held a press conference on the first day of the 3-Day Special International Tibet Support Groups Meeting at Lhakpa Tsering Hall on 7 March 2026.

The declaration was presented during a media briefing addressed by Penpa Tsering, Sikyong of the Central Tibetan Administration, along with former Member of Parliament Rinchen Khandu Khrimey, National Convenor of the Core Group for Tibetan Cause (CGTC) and Kai Mueller, ICT Germany (representative of the Tibet Support Groups), announced the adoption of the Dharamshala Declaration at the Press Meet.

The press conference was coordinated by Additional Secretary Tenzin Lekshay, Spokesperson of the Central Tibetan Administration, who

outlined the purpose of the conference and introduced more than 100 participants from 32 countries at the 3-Day Special International Tibet Support Group Meeting.
During the press conference, the Declaration of the Special International Tibet Support Groups Meeting was read out, reaffirming global solidarity with the Tibetan people; endorsing 14th Dalai Lama's 2 July 2025 statement on reincarnation and affirming the exclusive authority of the Gaden Phodrang Trust; expressing strong support for the democratic leadership of the Central Tibetan Administration; and calling for the resumption of direct dialogue between the representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama or the elected Tibetan leadership and the Chinese government without preconditions.
The press conference concluded with a Q&A session.



## China urged to end rights violations in Tibet

12 March 2026, ISHR

Tibetan human rights defender Phurbu Dolma delivered a joint statement on behalf of ISHR and the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) on human rights in Tibet during Item 3 General Debate at the 61st session of the Human Rights Council,
ISHR and the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) delivered a joint statement during Item 3 General Debate to highlight ongoing repression in Tibet. It urges continued international scrutiny and calls on China to guarantee due process for detainees and grant UN human rights experts unhindered access to Tibet.
**Full statement:**
Mr. President, Excellencies,
We are deeply concerned about the continued repression of fundamental freedoms in Tibet. Tibetans face persistent persecution for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, assembly, religion, and cultural practice. Expanding surveillance practices and censorship mechanisms have contributed to an environment where lawful cultural and linguistic activities are increasingly scrutinised under State security frameworks.
In 2025 alone, the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy documented over 109 known Tibetan political prisoners who were arrested, detained, sentenced, and subjected to enforced disappearances on vague and politically motivated charges, often solely for peaceful acts such as preserving the Tibetan language or expressing cultural identity, which authorities treat as threats to State security.
These concerns are particularly relevant in light of China's sixth periodic report to the Committee Against Torture, submitted in February 2025, more than five years after its due date. The State report fails to address the situation in Tibet, where credible reports continue to document torture, ill-treatment, and incommunicado detention.
We urge Member States and Special Procedures mandate holders to continue scrutinising the human rights situation in Tibet and to press China to ensure due process guarantees for Tibetan detainees, including access to independent legal counsel, family contact, and protection from torture and enforced disappearance.
We also call on China to grant unhindered access to Tibet for relevant UN Special Procedures, as per pending country visit requests.

## Tibetans and Supporters in India Took to the Streets to Commemorate the 67th Tibetan National Uprising Day

13 March 2026, CTA




Tibetans and Supporters in India Took to the Streets to Commemorate the 67th Tibetan National Uprising Day
In early March 1959, a series of events heightened anxieties among Tibetans in Lhasa. Suspicion arose over an alleged plot by Chinese Political Commissar T'an Kuan-san to kidnap the young Dalai Lama, reportedly orchestrated through an invitation for His Holiness to attend a theatrical performance at the Chinese military headquarters. The invitation stipulated that His Holiness should come without his customary retinue of officials or the escort of the Kusung Regiment, further fuelling

Tibetan suspicions. This concern eventually mobilised the broader Tibetan populace—including residents of Lhasa, as well as Tibetans from the Kham and Amdo regions who had fled the harsh consequences of the so-called "democratic reforms" targeting spiritual leaders, religious institutions, and places of worship. Many voluntarily posted themselves as guards around the Norbulingkha Palace on 10 March and organised demonstrations in protest.

Feared by the resentment and continuous demonstrations over the following days, the Chinese PLA regiment stationed in Lhasa began bombarding Norbulingkha Palace. Concerned for His Holiness' safety, the Cabinets, along with the prophecies of Tibetan state oracles, persuaded him to leave Lhasa. March 1959 has since become one of the most painful and dramatic periods in millennia of Tibetan history—a history that had witnessed the highs and lows of empires and kingdoms, but never the abject loss of independence to an outside power. In that tragic month, His Holiness began his perilous journey into exile, and at the same time, the Tibetan people endured widespread violence following the 10 March demonstrations.

To honour the martyrs and commemorate the day, Tibetans have observed 10 March as a solemn reminder of that tragic period and as a call for renewed determination to seek justice. In the decades following the complete takeover of Tibet and the forcible expulsion or dissolution of the Tibetan government in Lhasa, Tibetans have witnessed successive efforts to dismantle traditional institutions and systems. These actions have also impacted Tibet's natural resources and wildlife. More recently, the destruction and cultural suppression have intensified, with the Chinese government implementing a Han-centric policy aimed at sinicizing ethnic minorities through state-run boarding schools that uproot younger generations from their heritage, under the pretext of safeguarding stability—threatening the survival of centuries-old Tibetan civilisation.

To condemn these suppressive and repressive policies, Tibetans in the free world continue to raise their voices and call on the international community to address this ongoing injustice.

This year, Tibetans in India held sporadic peaceful demonstrations across their settlements and regions to mark this painful day in history.

**The Tibetan community in Leh** commemorated the 67th Tibetan National Uprising Day with a peaceful procession from Men-Tsee-Khang to the Polo Ground, featuring prominent local leaders including Shri Tsering Dorjee Lakrook and Venerable Lobsang Tashi. The official ceremony commenced with prayers and a minute of silence for Tibetan martyrs, followed by the reading of the official statements from the Kashag and the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile. A key highlight was the Settlement Officer's explanation of the symbolic white horse imagery, representing His Holiness the Dalai Lama's historic escape into exile. The event, which included participation from TCV school students and the general public, concluded with solidarity speeches from Ladakhi dignitaries and the "Prayer of Truth," reaffirming the collective commitment to the Tibetan cause.

**The Tibetan Settlement Office in Herbertpur** observed the 67th Tibetan National Uprising Day on March 10, 2026, with a high-visibility peace march from Lakhanwala to the Herbertpur Bus Stand. Led by the Abbot of Gongkar Monastery and attended by approximately 350 people—including students from STS Herbertpur and TCV Selakui the event combined spiritual prayers with a disciplined public demonstration of resilience. By marching through the busy Herbertpur Chowk with banners and flags, the community successfully drew public attention to the 1959 resistance, concluding the day with collective prayers for the preservation of Tibetan culture and a peaceful resolution to the Tibetan cause.



**The Tibetan community in Kullu** marked the 67th anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising Day with a peaceful protest march followed by an official ceremony at Dhalpur Ground. Led by local Tibetan organisations and accompanied by students from Sambhota Tibetan School, the event featured the reading of official statements from the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile and the Kashag. The Chief Guest, Mr Pema Namgyal of the Indo-Tibetan Friendship Society, emphasised the importance of global solidarity with Tibetans inside Tibet and the preservation of Tibetan identity. The commemoration concluded with a formal appeal to the Government of India to confer the Bharat Ratna upon His Holiness the Dalai Lama in recognition of his lifelong contribution to peace

## Tibetan women hold a peace protest in Shimla to mark the 67th Tibetan women's national uprising day

12 March 2026, ANI

Tibetan women-in-exile in the northern Indian hill town of Shimla held a peaceful protest on



Wednesday to mark the 67th anniversary of Tibetan Women's National Uprising Day, raising their voices against Chinese rule in Tibet and remembering the sacrifices made by Tibetan women during the historic uprising of 1959.

The protest saw participation from Tibetan Buddhist women students and members of the Tibetan community living in exile, who gathered in the city to commemorate the struggle for Tibetan freedom and call for the protection of human rights in Tibet.

Participants held banners and placards while observing the anniversary, which marks the day when thousands of Tibetan women in Lhasa staged a mass protest against Chinese occupation nearly seven decades ago.

Speaking at the gathering, Tenzin Chheme, a Tibetan freedom volunteer associated with the Bharat Tibet Maitri Sangh, said the day commemorates the courage shown by Tibetan women during the uprising.

She said that on March 12, 1959, thousands of Tibetan women gathered outside the Potala Palace in Lhasa to protest against the Chinese authorities following the invasion of Tibet.

Chheme said Tibetan women across the world continue to observe the day to remember those who sacrificed their lives for Tibet's freedom and to highlight the ongoing struggle for justice and human rights.

She also expressed gratitude to India for providing safety and support to Tibetans living in exile and said Tibetan women in India remain committed to working peacefully for the freedom of their homeland.

The protest in Shimla was part of a global movement, with Tibetan women in different countries holding demonstrations to mark the anniversary and remember the women who lost their lives during the uprising.

On March 12, 1959, thousands of Tibetan women in Lhasa rose against the People's Republic of China in protest against its occupation of Tibet. The subsequent crackdown resulted in the deaths of many Tibetans and forced more than 80,000 Tibetans, including His Holiness the Dalai Lama, to flee into exile in India.

Since then, Tibetans have continued to live in exile across India and other parts of the world, while carrying forward their campaign for freedom, justice and the right to return to their homeland.

## International TSG Meeting convenes in Dharamshala with delegates from 32 countries

07 March 2026, Phayul



The Special International Tibet Support Groups Meeting commenced on Saturday at the Central Tibetan Administration's (CTA) Sikyong Hall in Dharamshala, bringing together more than 100 delegates from 32 countries to deliberate on strengthening global support for the Tibetan cause.

The gathering, convened by the Core Group for Tibet Cause–India, is a three-day event scheduled from March 7 to 9. It will focus on key issues concerning Tibet, including international advocacy, the future of Tibet support movements, and the need to cultivate a new generation of global supporters.

Speaking to media representatives, Central Tibetan Administration President Penpa Tsering reflected on the long history of Tibet Support Group conferences, noting that the first major gathering was held in Dharamshala in 1989 following the Tibetan uprising of 1987. The Tibetan political leader emphasized that the Tibet movement is currently experiencing a generational transition, as the older generation of supporters who demonstrated remarkable dedication to Tibet and deep reverence for His Holiness the Dalai Lama gradually passes on.

"As that generation fades, we must think seriously about how to cultivate a new generation of supporters," he said. "If awareness about the Tibetan issue is not spread among younger generations, sustaining global support in the future will become difficult."

He stressed the importance of engaging not only Tibetan youth but also young people in other communities around the world to ensure long-term awareness and solidarity. "Until the Tibet–China issue is resolved, we must continue strengthening support for Tibet," he said, adding that Tibetans in exile carry the responsibility of representing Tibetans inside Tibet. "If we fail to nurture a new generation of supporters, sustaining the strategic struggle for Tibet will become increasingly difficult."

Among the international participants was Australian Senator Janet Rice, also the Co-chair of Australian All-Party Parliamentary Group Tibet who described the gathering as both inspiring and deeply meaningful. Rice acknowledged that the current global situation, marked by conflicts and political tensions, can often lead to feelings of discouragement. However, she emphasized that collective action and solidarity remain vital.

"Coming here reminds us that by working together —collaboratively, cooperatively, and even joyfully —we can continue advocating for justice, no matter how long it takes," she said. "We will keep going until the Tibetan people are free from oppression, prejudice, and persecution."

Rinchin Khandu Khrimey, National Convener of the Core Group for Tibetan Cause–India, said invitations had been extended to representatives from 37 countries, with delegates from 32 countries ultimately attending the meeting despite global uncertainties. Khrimey noted that one of the central topics of discussion during the meeting would be China's interference in the recognition of the Dalai Lama's future reincarnation.

"The institution of the Dalai Lama is centuries old. It is not merely about a single religious teacher but represents a long-standing spiritual institution of the Tibetan people," he said. "Therefore, the People's Republic of China has no authority to interfere in what is purely a religious matter. We strongly condemn any such interference in the reincarnation of His Holiness the Dalai Lama."

He further said that participants would deliberate on strategies to advance the Middle Way Approach. "Over these three days we will discuss what concrete steps can be taken to move toward an amicable and mutually acceptable solution," he said, adding that the conference would adopt a declaration outlining the collective position of the participating support groups.

At the conclusion of the meeting, participants unanimously adopted the "Dharamshala Declaration," reaffirming their solidarity with the Tibetan people and their commitment to supporting Tibet's struggle for freedom, justice, and the preservation of its distinct national identity. The declaration also welcomed His Holiness the Dalai Lama's comprehensive statement of July 2, 2025, which clarified that the authority to identify his reincarnation rests exclusively with the Gaden Phodrang Trust in consultation with traditional Tibetan Buddhist authorities.

They called upon governments, international organizations, and civil society groups to formally recognise the CTA as the Tibetan Government in Exile and to engage with it as such. The declaration also renewed calls for the resumption of direct dialogue between representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama or the democratically elected Tibetan leadership and the government of the People's Republic of China, without preconditions.

## US–China Economic and Security Review Commission Meets Tibetan Parliament's Speaker and Deputy Speaker

16 March 2026, CTA



Speaker Khenpo Sonam Tenphel and Deputy Speaker Dolma Tsering Teykhang of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (TPiE) held a meeting with a delegation from the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC).

The delegation included Michael Kuiken, Vice Chair for the 2026 Report Cycle; Reva Price, Commissioner; Taylor Budowich, Commissioner; Kathleen Hawk, Director of Security and Foreign Affairs; Zoe Merewether, Policy Analyst for Economics and Trade; Kevin Kocher, Political Officer at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi; and Radharani Thakuria, Project Management Specialist (Foreign Assistance)/Political Specialist at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi.

During the meeting, the USCC commissioners engaged in an interactive discussion with the Speaker and Deputy Speaker on the functioning, structure, and composition of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile. The TPiE leadership responded to a range of questions and provided clarifications on several issues concerning the Tibetan cause in general and the role and responsibilities of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile in particular.

In the hour-long discussion, the Speakers reflected on how Tibetans, under the visionary leadership of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, have successfully nurtured and strengthened democratic institutions in exile over the past 67 years. They noted that since arriving in exile, the Tibetan community has steadily built a vibrant democratic system rooted in the principles of freedom, representation, and accountability.

The Speakers also highlighted how the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), with the continued support of countries such as the United States, India, and many other international partners, has been able to preserve and promote Tibetan culture, language, and religious heritage while simultaneously garnering global awareness and support for the just cause of Tibet.

They expressed sincere gratitude for the consistent support extended by the United States, particularly through key legislative measures such as the

Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet–China Dispute Act (Resolve Tibet Act, 2024), the Tibetan Policy and Support Act (TPSA, 2020), and the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (2018). The Speakers also welcomed the recent appointment of the U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues and acknowledged its significance in advancing international engagement on Tibet.

During the meeting, the Speakers drew attention to several pressing concerns inside Tibet. These included the coercive placement of Tibetan children in colonial-style boarding schools, the ongoing policy of Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism, the self-immolation protests by Tibetans resisting Chinese rule, and the People's Republic of China's interference in the centuries-old religious process of recognizing the reincarnations of Tibetan Buddhist leaders. They also raised serious concerns about potential interference by China in the future recognition of the reincarnation of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama.

The discussion further addressed the geopolitical and environmental significance of the Tibetan Plateau, often referred to as the "Third Pole." The Speakers emphasized its strategic location and its importance as the source of many of Asia's major rivers that sustain billions of people across South and Southeast Asia. In this context, they underscored that China's claim over Tibet lacks legitimacy from legal, historical, moral, and political perspectives.

## HP Governor Kavinder Gupta meets Dalai Lama, praises his teachings

15 March 2026, Asia News Network



Himachal Pradesh Governor Kavinder Gupta met Tibetan spiritual leader, His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, in Dharamsala on Sunday, according to the Lok Bhavan. During the meeting, the Governor expressed profound respect for the Dalai Lama's spiritual guidance and his efforts to promote peace and compassion across the world. He emphasised that the Dalai Lama's teachings, rooted in goodwill, compassion, and non-violence, remain highly relevant for humanity today.Recalling his earlier encounter, Governor Gupta noted that even before taking charge as the Lieutenant Governor of Ladakh, he had received the Dalai Lama's blessings. He described meeting him again in Dharamshala as an inspiring and spiritually enriching experience.

Governor Gupta highlighted that the Dalai Lama's message of peace, tolerance, and compassion continues to inspire people globally and serves as a guiding light for fostering a more humane and harmonious society. He also praised Dharamshala's spiritual and cultural ambience, observing that under the Dalai Lama's guidance, it has become an international hub for Buddhist philosophy and studies. He expressed hope that these teachings of peace, compassion, and mutual respect would further strengthen social harmony and understanding.

Kavinder Gupta Sworn in as Himachal Pradesh Governor

Meanwhile, former Ladakh Lieutenant Governor Kavinder Gupta was sworn in as the Governor of Himachal Pradesh in a simple yet impressive ceremony held at Lok Bhavan. Chief Justice of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, Justice Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, administered the oath of office and secrecy to him.

Governor of Haryana Ashim Kumar Ghosh, along with his wife Mitra Ghosh, Chief Minister Thakur Sukhvinder Singh Sukhu and Lady Governor Bindu Gupta were also present on the occasion.

For the first time at Lok Bhavan, the ceremony began with the singing of Vande Mataram, followed by the National Anthem. Vande Mataram was also sung again after the oath-taking ceremony concluded.

The Governor was presented with an impressive Guard of Honour on the occasion. (ANI)

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by Asianet Newsable English staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

## Tenzingang Tibetan Settlement Inaugurates New Gateways and Renovated Community Facilities

16 March 2026, CTA

Tenzingang Tibetan Settlement Inaugurates New Gateways and Renovated Community Facilities

West Kameng: The Tenzingang Tibetan Settlement Office held an inauguration ceremony on 14 March 2026 to mark the completion of three construction and renovation projects. These included the renovation of a crèche supported and financed by the Department of Home of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), as well as the construction of two new settlement gateways and the renovation of the community hall, both generously funded and supported by the Government of Arunachal Pradesh.

Additional Secretary Thupten Tsering from the Department of Home inaugurated the renovated crèche. Later that day, Shri Tseten Chombay, MLA of the Kalaktang Assembly Constituency, inaugurated the two gateways and the newly



renovated community hall, which were funded by the state government.

Following the inaugurations, a gathering was held in the newly renovated community hall. Tibetan Settlement Officer Rabten Tsering delivered the welcome address. Additional Secretary Thupten Tsering, speaking on behalf of the Central Tibetan Administration, expressed gratitude to the



Government of India and the Government of Arunachal Pradesh for their continued support toward the well-being of the Tibetan community and appealed for their sustained assistance in the future.

The Chief Guest, MLA Tseten Chombay, spoke about the unique historical relationship between Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet. He also highlighted the support extended by the state government to the Tenzingang Settlement and shared future plans for further development.

The event concluded with a vote of thanks delivered by Tashi Rabten, President of the Local Tibetan Assembly.

– Report file by Department of Home, CTA

## 67th Uprising Day: Exiled Tibetan leaders flag China's 'cultural genocide' in Tibet

11 March 2026, The Tribune India

Accusing China of pursuing what it termed a policy of "cultural genocide" in Tibet, the Kashag — the cabinet of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) — on Tuesday said Beijing's policies, including the separation of Tibetan children from their families and the expansion of state-run boarding schools, pose a serious threat to the survival of Tibetan language, religion and cultural identity.Delivering the Statement of the Kashag on the 67th anniversary of Tibetan National Uprising Day, CTA Sikyong (president) Penpa Tsering paid tribute to thousands of Tibetans who rose against Chinese rule in Lhasa in 1959 and sacrificed their lives to protect the 14th Dalai Lama and defend Tibet's freedom and cultural heritage. March 10 is observed as Tibetan Uprising Day to commemorate the revolt against Chinese rule.Tsering alleged that China has placed nearly one million Tibetan children in what he described as colonial-style boarding schools, where Mandarin is the primary medium of instruction and traditional Tibetan cultural and religious practices are marginalised."The policy of separating children from their families is among the most alarming aspects of China's assimilation strategy," he said.

Citing international concerns, Tsering said United Nations experts and several global human rights organisations have warned that such practices could amount to forced assimilation and threaten the survival of Tibetan cultural heritage.

He also raised concerns over China's labour transfer programmes affecting Tibetan farmers and nomads. According to figures cited by the Kashag, around 3.36 million Tibetans — nearly half the population of the Tibetan Plateau — have been subjected to labour transfer or relocation initiatives between 2000 and 2025, disrupting traditional livelihoods and long-standing social structures.

Criticising Beijing's policy of the "Sinicisation of Tibetan Buddhism", Tsering alleged that the Chinese government has imposed strict state control over monasteries, religious institutions and spiritual practices.

Drawing attention to environmental concerns, he warned that large-scale infrastructure expansion, mining operations and dam-building projects across the Tibetan Plateau threaten the fragile ecosystem of the region.

Rejecting Beijing's claim that Tibet has historically been part of China, Tsering asserted that Tibet remains a nation under occupation and that the issue continues to be an unresolved international matter.

On the issue of the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, the Sikyong reiterated that the process is purely a religious matter and cannot be interfered with by the Chinese government.

Meanwhile, Speaker of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile Khenpo Sonam Tenphel accused China of systematically attempting to erase Tibetan identity and suppress fundamental freedoms by imposing restrictions on religious practice, cultural expression and political rights in Tibet.

He said the Parliament-in-Exile continues to support the Middle Way Approach, which seeks a peaceful resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict through dialogue.
Tibetan leaders also expressed gratitude to India and supporters around the world, offered prayers for the long life of the Dalai Lama and reiterated the Tibetan people's aspiration to see him return one day to the Potala Palace in a free Tibet.
Italian parliamentarian Alice Parma, German legislator Wiebke Winter, Latvian parliamentarian Juris Vilums, Czech Senator Jiri Dusek, former president of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering, vice-president of the Czech Senate Jiri Oberfalzer and German parliamentarian Michael Brand were among the international dignitaries who addressed the gathering. Senior RSS functionary Indresh Kumar and former MP RK Khirmey, national convener of the Core Group for Tibetan Cause, also spoke on the occasion.
They called on China to end repression in Tibet and resume dialogue with the 14th Dalai Lama, expressing hope that Tibet would one day be free. Later, exiled Tibetans took out a march from McLeodganj to Dharamsala. A large number of lay Tibetans, activists, monks, nuns and schoolchildren participated in the march.

## China's unrelenting repression highlighted on 67th Tibet uprising anniversary

11 March 2026, Tibetan Review



Tibetans and supporters across the free world marked the 67th anniversary of the Lhasa uprising against China's armed invasion and illegal occupation of Tibet on Mar 10. A group of 10 US lawmakers set the tone for the anniversary, urging Washington the day before to make Tibet a priority in its China policy. The official commemoration was held by the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) on the Tsuglakhang compound in Dharamshala, with Prof Dr Hans-Gert Pöttering, former President of the European Parliament, as the chief guest, and with the attendance also of a number of other international and national guests.
The bipartisan US lawmakers' action was led by Congressmen Jim McGovern (D-MA) and Young Kim (R-CA). Their letter, addressed to the administration's top Tibet policy official, Riley M. Barnes, who also serves as the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, urged the Trump administration to make Tibet a priority in its dealings with China.
Referring to the series of US laws adopted on the issue of Tibet, the lawmakers wrote: "We know what is possible when the Administration and Congress work together to promote America's interests regarding Tibet," They wrote about looking forward to "working with you as Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues to implement these laws and appropriations provided by Congress, to advance a renewed and reinvigorated push to peacefully resolve the dispute over Tibet's future, and to continue the U.S. government's unwavering support for our Tibetan allies."
The lawmakers specified eight areas in which the Trump administration and Congress could collaborate to advance US policy on Tibet consistent with those laws. These included promote dialogue between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and representatives of the Dalai Lama or Central Tibetan Administration (CTA); defending the right of religious freedom in the Dalai Lama's succession; countering the PRC's disinformation about Tibet; promoting access to Tibet for foreign diplomats, journalists and tourists; continuing programmatic support for Tibetans; prioritizing a solution for Tibetans in Nepal; engaging with the CTA; and supporting Tibetan broadcasting services.
* * *
Apart from the chief guest, those who attended the Dharamshala event included Senator Jiří Oberfalzer, Vice-President of the Czech Senate; Michael Brand, German Parliamentary State Secretary, as well as others European lawmakers that included Alice Parma from Italy, Dr Wiebke Winter from Germany, Juris Vilums from Latvia, and Senator Jiri Dusek from the Czech Republic. Several of the guests addressed the gathering.
The event was preceded by a three-day Special International Tibet Support Groups Meeting with the participation of the above guests and a number of others totalling some 100 from 32 countries. Following intensive deliberations and discussions on a wide range of topics—including briefings on the current situation inside Tibet, strategies to counter China's increasingly distorted narratives, and reflections on why Tibet matters more than ever in the evolving geopolitical landscape—the meeting renewed the participants' commitment to strive towards achieving a resolution to the issue of Tibet.
In New Delhi, many Tibetan activists gathered outside the Chinese embassy to mark the uprising day and to call for a free Tibet. Several were detained by police, according to the *IANS* news service Mar 10.
* * *

In the UK, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Tibet (APPG Tibet) organised a wreath-laying ceremony at the Innocent Victims' Memorial in Westminster Abbey, London, to commemorate the 67th anniversary of Tibetan National Uprising.
Also, the Office of Tibet in London hosted a group of ten undergraduate and postgraduate students from the University of Westminster for a 90-minute interactive session focusing on the political and diplomatic outreach of the CTA aimed at resolving the Sino-Tibetan conflict, the resilience of Tibetans living inside occupied Tibet, and the strategic importance of the Tibetan Plateau as a major source of minerals driving China's renewable energy transition.
* * *
In North America, the 36 Tibetan community associations across the continent organized protests and peaceful marches in their different localities, including at the United Nations Plaza in New York City, which was addressed by the CTA's Representative at the Office of Tibet, Dr Namgyal Choedup. Local officials and governments in several regions showed support for Tibet through various proclamations and public announcements.
* * *
In Australia's capital Canberra, the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) Co-Chair Senator Deborah O'Neill (Labour) introduced a cross-party motion on Tibet in the country's Senate, highlighting growing and international concern over human rights in Tibet and the protection of Tibetan cultural and religious identity. An identical motion was also passed in the House of Representatives.
The motion was co-sponsored by senators from several political parties, reflecting a strong cross-party consensus in the Australian Senate on the importance of protecting Tibetan human rights and safeguarding religious freedom.
Canberra also saw hundreds of Tibetans and supporters gathering outside Parliament House to mark the uprising anniversary in an event jointly organized by the Australian Tibetan National Association and the Australia Tibet Council. MPs David Smith, Dr Sophie Scamps, and Kate Chaney, as well as Senators Barbara Pocock, Lidia Thorpe, David Shoebridge, and Steph Hodgins-May addressed gatshering.
* * *
In Japan's capital Tokyo, a peaceful demonstration was held in front of the Chinese Embassy with the participation of Tibetans and supporters. Carrying Tibetan national flags and placards that highlighted the gravity of the ongoing situation in Tibet, the participants raised slogans, calling for freedom in Tibet and urging an end to repression and cultural genocide there. They also called for the closure of Chinese colonial-style boarding schools in Tibet and advocated for non-violence, human rights, and the preservation of Tibetan culture and identity.
Tibetans, Japanese supporters, and members of the Mongolian community, also staged a peace walk through the busy streets of Shibuya, carrying Tibetan flags and banners while chanting messages calling for peace and justice in Tibet.
* * *
Earlier on Mar 7, nearly 30 Czech supporters of Tibet, including Senators Přemysl Rabas and Jiří Růžička, climbed Sněžka, the highest mountain in the Czech Republic, to raise the Tibetan national flag and express solidarity with the Tibetan people ahead of the Tibetan uprising anniversary. The climb was joined by Former Deputy Prime Minister and Former Minister for Environment Martin Bursik, Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama Thinley Chukki from the Tibet Bureau in Geneva, Mayor of the municipality of Blatno Iveta Rabasová Houfová, President of the Czechs Support Tibet and Secretary of the Czech Parliamentarians' Group for Tibet Kateřina Bursik.
The event marked the eighth time Czech supporters organized the solidarity climb on Sněžka to commemorate the 1959 Tibetan National Uprising and demonstrate continued support for the Tibetan people's struggle for freedom and human rights. Many participants carried Tibetan flags as they ascended the mountain, which rises 1,603 meters above sea level.
* * *
International human rights organization Human Rights Watch issued a statement for the occasion on Mar 9, saying "repression of Tibet remains unrelenting" and referring to issues of crackdowns and arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, religious repression, and other issues.
The statement called on world leaders to "use this moment to challenge China's enforced silence surrounding Tibet, by pressing for information about the 45 known detention cases, accountability for deaths in custody, and genuine international access to the region."
(Sources: *Tibet.net*, Mar 9-11, 2026, *hrw.org* Mar 9, 2026, and others,)

## Over 20 India Tibet Support Groups offer long life prayer to His Holiness the Dalai Lama

11 March 2026, The Tibet Post

More than 20 India Tibet support groups in India offered long life prayers for His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibet, in Dharamshala on Wednesday. More than 500 Indians from different religious and cultural backgrounds participated in the ceremony to pray for the long life of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama attended a Long Life Offering (Tenshug) Ceremony organised by 24 Tibet Support Groups in India under the aegis of the Core Group for Tibetan Cause–India at the

courtyard of the Tibetan Main Temple (Thekchen Choeling Tsuglakhang) in Dharamshala on March 11, 2026. More 500 Indians and representatives presented in the ceremony and they also presented cultural performances to the His Holiness and audience gathering there.
Namgyal Monastery chanted the respective verses the convenor of the Core Group and two senior members of the Tibet Support Groups offered a mandala and representations of the body, speech and mind of the Buddha to His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
'The Song of Immortality - The Extensive Prayer for the Long Life of His Holiness the Dalai Lama' by his two tutors was recited first in Hindi, led by Kailash Chandra Baudh, and then in Tibetan. Then Indians and representatives of different religious and cultural backgrounds people in India presented Tenshug offerings, Tibetan and Indian flags were presented to His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
RK Khrimey, the Ex-MP and Ex-Cabinet Minister, Arunachal Pradesh National Convener, Core Group for Tibetan Cause- India and senior members of the All-India Tibet Support Groups released a Tenshug Souvenir. After that they presented His Holiness with a 'Karuna Ratna', a Jewel of Compassion, which consisted of a golden bodhi-leaf with a Dharma wheel on one side and a hand in the teaching mudra on the other.
RK Khrimey, the National Convener of Core Group for Tibetan Cause- India addressed the gathering and said,"With folded hands and hearts filled with devotion, we stand before Your Holiness as representatives of the Core Group for Tibetan Cause — India- a national family of twenty-four Tibet Support Groups across this country, united in spirit with countless friends and well-wishers."
"On this sacred occasion of Tenshug (long-life prayer), we offer our deepest prayers for Your Holiness' long life, radiant health and the continued flow of your compassion for the benefit of all sentient beings. May your presence remain a guiding light for humanity," he added.
He said, "Today, with renewed resolve and deep emotion, we solemnly reaffirm:
1. To strive earnestly for the resumption of the suspended dialogue between the emissaries of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama and the representatives of the People's Republic of China.
2. To uphold, honour, and safeguard the Statement Affirming the Continuation of the centuries-old Institution of the Dalai Lama, declared on 2 July 2025, free from any external interference.
3. To keep alive, with unwavering dedication, the flame of Tibet and the just aspirations of the Tibetan people in every national and international forum.
"We make this pledge in faith, in gratitude, and in hope —offering it as our humble Tenshuk for the His Holiness the Dala Lama, and for a future where truth, compassion, and justice may prevail for Tibet and Tibetan people," Rinchin Khandu Khrimey concluded his speech.

## Meeting opens in Dharamshala of Tibet supporters from 32 countries

07 March 2026, Tibetan Review



More than 100 people from 32 countries are taking part in a three-day Special International Tibet Support Group meeting in Dharamshala, India, which opened on March 7, with a presentation of what was called the Dharmashala-declaration.
The declaration reaffirms global solidarity with the Tibetan people; endorses the 14th Dalai Lama's Jul 2, 2025 statement on reincarnation and affirms the exclusive authority of the Gaden Phodrang Trust on this matter; expresses strong support for the democratic leadership of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA); and calls for the resumption of direct dialogue between representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama or the elected Tibetan leadership and the Chinese government without preconditions.
The declaration was presented at a media briefing addressed by Sikyong Penpa Tsering of the CTA, as well Mr Rinchen Khandu Khrimey, National Convenor of the Core Group for Tibetan Cause (CGTC), and Kai Mueller, ICT Germany (representative of the participating Tibet Support Groups).
At the press conference, Additional Secretary Tenzin Lekshay, Spokesperson of the CTA, outlined the purpose of the conference and introduced the participants in the meeting.
The meeting is being convened by the CGTC and facilitated by the CTA's Department of Information and International Relations.

## Intl. Tibet Support Groups condemn current crisis in Tibet and renew support for Tibet

07 March 2026, The Tibet Post

Special International Tibet Support Groups meeting convened in Dharamsala to discuss Tibet-related issues. On the first day of the meeting, they issued a joint declaration, in which they

condemned China's current repressive policies in Tibet, called for the resumption of dialogue between representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and China.The Special International Tibet Support Groups Meeting was organised by the Core Group for Tibetan Cause–India and the Department of International Relations of the Central Tibetan Administration. It brought together 106 Tibet supporters from 32 countries. The meeting began at 9 a.m. in the Sikyong Hall, Building T, Gangchen Kyishong, Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), Dharamshala, H.P., India, and will run from March 7 to 9, 2026.

After the inauguration, they issued a statement titled "Dharamsala Declaration." Penpa Tsering, Sikyong of the Central Tibetan Administration, accompanied by Rinchen Khandu Khrimey, National Coordinator of the Core Group for Tibetan Cause (CGTC), and Kai Mueller, ICT Germany (representing participating Tibet support groups), held a press conference at Lhakpa Tsering Hall on March 7, 2026, to announce the declaration.

Kai Mueller read out the declaration and said, "We, representatives of Tibet Support Groups, convened at the Special International Tibet Support Groups Meeting from 7 to 9 March 2026 in Dharamshala, India, with over 100 participants representing 32 countries, united in our unwavering commitment to stand in solidarity with the Tibetan people in their struggle for freedom, justice, and the preservation of their distinct national identity, do hereby declare:

"In this auspicious Year of Compassion, officially designated by the Central Tibetan Administration in celebration of the 90th birthday of His Holiness the Great 14th Dalai Lama, we extend our heartfelt greetings and sincere wishes for his long life and continued good health. We reaffirm the profound significance of the Institution of the Dalai Lama, which for centuries has served as a central pillar of Tibetan Buddhism and a cornerstone of Tibetan cultural and national identity.

"That since the Chinese communist invasion and occupation of Tibet the Tibetan people have had to undergo much suffering, not only losing their country's independence but being faced with the very extinction of their identity, culture, religion and way of life. Despite this, the Tibetan people under the leadership of His Holiness the Great 14th Dalai Lama and that of the elected Tibetan leadership have continued to stick to their nonviolent approach to regain Tibetan freedom and dignity. We the supporters of Tibet gathered in Dharamsala applaud the courage and determination of the Tibetan people, express our commendation to their peaceful approach to their struggle, and call on the international community to effectively support such non-volent initiatives to avoid international crisis.

"We have taken cognizance of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama's definitive guidance, most notably in his comprehensive statement of 2 July 2025, on the issue of Tibetan religious freedom, including on the issue of recognition of reincarnations in Tibetan Buddhism. We express our gratitude to His Holiness for reaffirming the continuation of the centuries-old Institution of the Dalai Lama, for vesting the exclusive authority to identify his reincarnation in the Gaden Phodrang Trust, acting in consultation with traditional Tibetan Buddhist spiritual authorities. We unanimously endorse His Holiness's statements, recognizing them as the exclusive and final authority regarding his reincarnation. Furthermore, we assert that any attempt by the government of the People's Republic of China PRC) to intervene in this sacred Tibetan religious tradition constitutes a grave violation of international norms and the fundamental right to freedom of religion. We remain committed to opposing and countering any such interference.

"We applaud the Tibetans in exile for their democratic governance system, as exemplified by the elected Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) leadership. We reaffirm our recognition of and support to the CTA as the sole legitimate government of the Tibetan people, representing the authentic voice of Tibetans both inside and outside Tibet. We call upon governments, international organizations, and civil societies to extend formal recognition to CTA as the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and engage with it as such.

"Finally, we deliberated on the ongoing repressive Chinese policies in Tibet and renew our unwavering commitment to the just cause of Tibet and to the pursuit of a peaceful resolution to the Sino-Tibetan conflict. We call for the resumption of direct dialogue between the representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama or the democratically elected Tibetan leadership, and the government of the People's Republic of China, without preconditions. We recommit to intensifying global advocacy, documenting human rights violations, and sustaining international attention on the situation in Tibet until a just and lasting resolution is achieved," he concluded.

The Dharamshala Declaration adopted unanimously on March 7, 2026 by the Special International Tibet Support Groups Meeting, Dharamshala, India.

## Latvian MP Juris Vilums Visits Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile

07 March 2026, CTA

Parliamentarian Juris Vilums of Latvia visited the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile earlier today, 7 March 2026, where he met with Speaker Khenpo Sonam Tenphel and Deputy Speaker Dolma Tsering Teykhang. During the meeting, they discussed a wide range of topics of shared interest, including the current situation inside Tibet under the occupation of the People's Republic of China.





Welcoming the Latvian lawmaker, the Speaker expressed appreciation for his significant presence at the 9th World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet, held in Tokyo last year. He also highlighted Tibet's special connection with the Baltic states, recalling that the 7th World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet was held in Riga, Latvia, in 2019 with the support of the Latvian Tibet Support Group, chaired by Janis, and the Latvian Parliamentary Support Group for Tibet.

Speaking about the first parliamentary support group for Tibet established in India in the 1970s, the Speaker also referred to similar parliamentary support groups around the world. He highlighted the Latvian Parliamentary Support Group for Tibet as one of the significant groups, noting that parliamentarian Vilums has shouldered significant responsibility within it.

The Speaker further reflected on the similar historical experiences of Tibet and Latvia, noting that both had endured foreign occupation. While Latvia successfully regained its independence in 1990, he expressed hope that Tibet may one day achieve a similar fate. Emphasising that the Tibetan cause is not only for Tibetans but a global one, he explained that Tibet's environment, religion, and language are of importance to the entire world.

The Deputy Speaker noted that Latvia's history of struggle and its subsequent independence serve as an inspiration for Tibetans to work even harder. Acknowledging the shared experience of colonial occupation, she welcomed the lawmaker and remarked that his visit to Dharamshala signifies solidarity and support for democracy and truth, encouraging Tibetans inside Tibet.

Speaking on the critical situation prevailing in Tibet under the occupation of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Deputy Speaker highlighted the politically driven policy of coercing Tibetan children into colonial-style boarding schools. She explained that this policy deprives them of their right to study their language, religion, and culture, while attempting to indoctrinate them into pledging allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its leadership.

Finally, the Deputy Speaker provided an overview of the evolution of Tibetan democracy, a gift bestowed upon the Tibetan people by His Holiness the Dalai Lama in 1960. She outlined the subsequent progress in democratic governance, from the establishment of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile on 2 September 1960, to the election of the first Kalon Tripa (Prime Minister) in 2001, the election of the first Sikyong in 2011, and the present leadership of the Central Tibetan Administration, with both the Sikyong and Parliamentarians elected by the Tibetan diaspora. She also explained the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile's biannual sessions, its composition, periodical visitation programs, and other initiatives.

## NED Vice President Brian Joseph Meets Speaker Khenpo Sonam Tenphel

06 March 2026, CTA



Speaker Khenpo Sonam Tenphel of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (TPiE) met with Brian Joseph, Vice President of Programs at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and Pema Tulotsang, Senior Director and Program Officer at NED, earlier today on 6 March 2026.

Welcoming them, the Speaker spoke about the longstanding partnership between the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile and the National Endowment for Democracy, particularly noting the significant participation of NED's current president Damon Wilson and former president Carl Gershman at the 8th World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet (WPCT), organized by the TPiE in Washington, DC, in 2022.

Highlighting Carl Gershman's role in chairing a panel discussion during the 8th WPCT and Damon Wilson's visit to Dharamshala, the Speaker also referred to the NED's Democracy Service Medal, which was awarded to Panchen Lama, Sikyong Penpa Tsering, and the NED's Democracy Award to the Tibet Action Institute. He noted that the recognition boosted the morale of Tibetans, particularly as the medal was awarded to Panchen Lama, whose whereabouts remain unknown to the world.

The visiting delegation was also briefed on the composition and functions of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile, as well as its future projects and programs. Discussions also covered several critical issues, including the coercion of Tibetan children into colonial-style boarding schools, the People's Republic of China's interference in the reincarnation process of Tibetan Buddhist leaders, and potential interference in the recognition of the future reincarnation of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

The visiting guests were also given a guided tour of the Parliament Hall.

– Report filed by Tibetan Parliamentary Secretariat

## The Chinese Communist Party commemorates "Tibetan Serfs Emancipation Day," while the Central Tibetan Administration asserts that invasion is the true reality.

01 March 2026, VOT

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recently commemorated the so-called "67th anniversary of the liberation of one million serfs in Tibet" in Lhasa, claiming that "democratic reforms have completely changed" Tibet's fate and enabled the people to "be masters of their own destiny." The Central Tibetan Administration stated that the so-called "commemoration of the liberation of one million serfs" is actually the CCP's attempt to justify its invasion and occupation of Tibet; the invasion and occupation are the facts, and the million serfs are just a pretext. If the CCP truly cares about the Tibetan people, it should return to the negotiating table as soon as possible and consult with His Holiness the Dalai Lama to resolve the Tibetan issue.The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recently held so-called commemorative events across Tibet to mark the 67th anniversary of the liberation of one million serfs in Tibet. The Central Tibetan Administration stated that these so-called "emancipation of serfs" commemorations are actually the anniversary of the CCP's invasion of Tibet.

According to Chinese state media reports, the CCP held a flag-raising ceremony in front of the Potala Palace in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, on March 28, claiming that "cadres and people from all ethnic groups and sectors in the Tibet Autonomous Region participated in the flag-raising ceremony in Potala Palace Square in Lhasa to celebrate the anniversary of the liberation of one million serfs in Tibet."

In a speech that day, Garma Tseten, chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region, stated that the "democratic reforms" had "completely changed" Tibet's destiny, enabling the people to "be masters of their own country." He also stated, "We will uphold the leadership of the Party and safeguard national unity and ethnic solidarity."

Xinhua News Agency, the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, stated, "In 1959, the democratic reforms completely abolished the feudal serf system, and millions of serfs were liberated and became masters of the country and society. From then on, a new chapter was opened on the snowy plateau."

In an interview with Voice of Tibet, Tenzin Lheshe, spokesperson for the Central Tibetan Administration, pointed out that in the past 67 years, the Chinese Communist Party has never realized the vision of the Tibetan people, and the so-called liberation is actually an invasion.

Tenzin Leshe also pointed out that the so-called "Tibetan Serfs Emancipation Day" was actually held by the CCP for its own political needs. Its purpose was to justify its invasion and occupation of Tibet. The invasion and occupation were the facts, and the million serfs were just a pretext.

Tenzin Leshe emphasized that no matter how much the CCP boasts about Tibet's development, the situation in Tibet is actually deteriorating, and its level of freedom is among the lowest in the world. If the CCP truly cares about the Tibetan people, it should return to the negotiating table as soon as possible and consult with His Holiness the Dalai Lama or the elected leaders of Tibet to resolve the Tibetan issue.

# SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

## New 136-Kms Railway Route From Bihar To Nepal Approved

31 March 2026, Track in

Recently, the Ministry of Railways has completed the Final Location Survey (FLS) and prepared the Detailed Project Report (DPR) of the 136-km-long new rail line project which is a India-Nepal rail line which will further help in improving the connectivity between the two nations and promote economic growth and development.Connecting Tibet and India By Railway Network Through Nepal

Just ahead of a new government taking office in Kathmandu following the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), India has come out with a Detailed Project Report (DPR) for a new rail link between the two countries.

In the meantime, a feasibility study for a China-Nepal railway through Tibet is set to be completed in June.

It appears that both of these railway lines from Tibet and India are to reach Kathmandu, effectively linking Tibet and India by railway network through Nepal's capital.

The story started when the governments of India and Nepal issued a joint statement to expand rail connectivity on April 7, 2018.

Moving ahead, they have agreed to construct a new electrified railway line, funded by India, linking the border city of Raxaul in India with Kathmandu in Nepal, the Raxaul-Kathmandu new line project.

Commencement Of the Work On Indo-Nepal Rail Service

"Pashupatinath Dham is located outside India in Kathmandu, Nepal. The nearest Railway station is Raxaul, which is well connected with the railway network. Final Location Survey of Raxaul (India)-Kathmandu (Pashupatinath) new line (136 Km) has been completed and Detailed Project Report (DPR) prepared," said Ashwini Vaishnaw, the Railway Minister, in a written statement in Rajya Sabha on March 20, 2026.

Once the DPR is prepared, the project's sanction requires consultations with various stakeholders, including state governments, along with necessary approvals such as appraisal by NITI Aayog and the Ministry of Finance, added the Union Minister.

On the subject of the timeline, Vaishnaw said, "As sanctioning of projects is a continuous and dynamic process, exact timelines depend upon appraisals and approvals by various stakeholders."

Notably, the Railway Minister was responding to questions raised by Rajya Sabha MP Prof. Manoj Kumar Jha.

In this regard, India and Nepal exchanged Letters of Exchange (LoE) to amend the Protocol to the Treaty of Transit last year.

With this agreement, they made an agreement to facilitate the movement of rail-based freight, including bulk cargo, between Jogbani in India and Biratnagar in Nepal.

## Chinese CCTVs to be banned from selling in India, new rules come into effect next month

30 March 2026, WION

Several Chinese surveillance equipment manufacturers will soon be barred from selling internet-connected CCTV cameras in India starting April 1, 2026. This comes after the implementation of new certification and security compliance rules coming into effect from the said date. The move, according to experts is aimed at tightening digital security and reducing reliance on foreign surveillance technology in sensitive infrastructure.Chinese video surveillance companies that are likely to be affected by the move are Hikvision, Dahua and TP-Link. According to Economic Times, the government is explicitly refusing to certify products made by these companies and those using Chinese chipsets.About one-third of all CCTV sales in India till last year were Chinese, but with this move, home grown brands like CP Plus, Qubo, Prama, Matrix, and Sparsh- that have shifted to Taiwanese chipsets - and now cater to 80 per cent of the Indian market, according to market tracker counterpoint will do even better business.
Notably the high end market is captured by US-based brands such as Bosch and Honeywell.

The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) introduced the essential requirements (ER) norms for CCTV cameras in April 2024, by which the industry was given two-year time to certify each product under the STQC (Standardisation Testing and Quality Certification) regime at certified labs.
This requires CCTV camera manufacturers to declare the country of origin of vital components like the System-on-Chip (SoC) and the devices tested against vulnerabilities that could give unlawful access at accredited labs. Currently, 507 models of CCTV cameras are certified to sell in the indian market.

## India authorises some state firms to procure critical equipment from China

30 March 2026, The Print

India authorised some state firms including Bharat Heavy Electricals and Steel Authority of India on Friday to procure critical equipment from China, according to a government source and document, after easing restrictions.

Reuters reported last month that India would relax restrictions on buying Chinese equipment imposed after a deadly 2020 border clash, allowing state-run power and coal companies to start limited imports as shortages aand project delays mounted. India has since then also eased investment curbs on China.Under the relaxation of the rules, India's largest state-run power equipment maker Bharat Heavy Electricals can procure 21 types of critical equipment from China, the government order said. A similar authorisation has been given to Steel Authority of India for certain critical components, and for sourcing of coal-gasification equipment by other state-run firms, a government source said.
The deadly clashes in 2020 between Indian and Chinese troops along the Himalayan frontier prompted New Delhi to tighten rules on Chinese procurement and investments, but a global realignment of trade sparked by U.S. tariffs has prompted India to consider a calibrated reset with China to keep supply chains steady and attract investments.
Last August, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China for the first time in seven years, meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping to discuss improving ties, after which the two countries resumed direct flights and New Delhi eased visa procedures for Chinese business professionals.
The government order issued this month, seen by Reuters, exempts Chinese bidders participating in state contracts from registration with a government committee to obtain political and security clearances.
Earlier this month, New Delhi also eased restrictions on Chinese investments in select sectors to help ease a capital squeeze, marking a significant reset of economic ties.
(Reporting by Sarita Changanti Singh and Nikunj Ohri; writing by Shivangi Acharya; Editing by Jan Harvey and Susan Fenton)
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## Willing to work with India for 'common interests' in Global South, BRICS: China

26 March 2026, The Hindu

Following a meeting between Foreign Minister Wang Yi and outgoing Indian ambassador Pradeep Kumar Rawat in Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian says the two sides view each other as "development opportunities"
China is willing to work with India for upholding "common interests" in Global South and the BRICS grouping, said the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) of China on Thursday (March 26, 2026). Following a meeting between Foreign Minister Wang Yi and outgoing Indian ambassador Pradeep Kumar Rawat in Beijing, Chinese MoFA spokesperson Lin Jian said the two sides view each

other as "development opportunities".China is willing to work with India for upholding "common interests" in Global South and the BRICS grouping, said the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) of China on Thursday (March 26, 2026). Following a meeting between Foreign Minister Wang Yi and outgoing Indian ambassador Pradeep Kumar Rawat in Beijing, Chinese MoFA spokesperson Lin Jian said the two sides view each other as "development opportunities".

The remarks from Beijing coincided with remarks by Chinese ambassador Xu Feihong who on the same day called for greater cooperation between the two sides and said there are "some" stakeholders who do not favour positive relation between India and China.

Following the meeting between Mr. Wang and Mr. Rawat, Mr. Lin said, "China is willing to work with India to implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, continue to regard each other than threats, treat each other as partners instead of rivals, expand mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields, safeguard the common interests of the Global South, strengthen multilateral collaboration in mechanisms such as BRICS…." India is the current chair of BRICS and the next BRICS summit is scheduled to be held in India.Cultural cooperation

In Delhi, the Chinese ambassador reflected similar positive sentiments and said Indian yoga, aromatherapy and cuisine were gathering popularity in China and called for greater cultural cooperation. "China and India are neighbours that cannot be moved apart. It should be the right choice for both sides to be good neighbourly friends and partners that help each other succeed, and realise the 'Dragon-Elephant Tango'. However, some people are unwilling to see China and India live in harmony," said ambassador Xu Feihong, arguing that some antithetical forces "hope to profit from discord between our two countries". The remarks from the Chinese envoy coincided with multiple initiatives that the two sides are taking to normalise ties, including restarting civil aviation links that were disrupted in the aftermath of the Galwan clashes of June 2020.

Delivering a speech titled "Bridging Hearts Through Youth: China and India Toward a Shared Future", the envoy said India and China should "foster objective and rational views of each other."

'We welcome more young people from India to visit China, see it with your own eyes, experience the vitality of Chinese modernisation, share stories of China-India friendship, and help build a more objective and rational understanding between our peoples," said Mr. Xu. He said India and China should deepen exchanges and support each other in platforms like BRICS and the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) as the world deals with "turbulence, unilateralism and protectionism".

Coinciding with positive sentiment being expressed by Chinese diplomats, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is making changes at the level of transfers and postings that will be relevant for India-China ties in the coming years. India's current High Commissioner to the U.K. Vikram Doraiswami will be the next ambassador to China and Rudrendra Tandon, former Indian ambassador to Afghanistan, has been appointed Secretary (East) of the MEA.

## China is excluding India from its South Asia outreach. New Delhi's being framed as volatile

26 March 2026, The Print

The Asian Department at China's Ministry of Commerce announced on 10 March that trade between China and South Asian countries had surpassed $ 200 billion for the first time, marking a 10.7 per cent year-on-year increase. The department's director, Wang Liping, presented this milestone as evidence of the resilience and growing dynamism of regional economic cooperation. The announcement coincided with the 10th China–South Asia Expo and the 30th China Kunming Import and Export Fair, two flagship platforms advancing China's economic outreach in the region.

It is noteworthy that India was conspicuously absent from the meetings and official references. Excluding a country that accounts for over 60 per cent of total China–South Asia trade can't be incidental. Rather, it reflects a deeper and more consistent pattern in China's regional framing, one that separates India's economic and strategic weight from its narrative presence.

A South Asia without India?

Chinese academic discourse offers further insight into this positioning. Lin Minwang, vice dean at Fudan University's Institute of International Studies, described India as a "complex and volatile" South Asian power. Even though the volatility is attributed to the region rather than India itself, such characterisations help justify China's push for alternative regional frameworks that proceed without India.

This pattern is visible in China-led institutional platforms. Last year, the Shanghai Institute of International Studies convened a China-South Asia Development Cooperation High-level Dialogue. The forum brought together participants from China, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, while excluding India. The dialogue's policy recommendations centred on three priorities: deepening cooperation in trade, infrastructure, and security; promoting flexible, trilateralism and minilateralism, alongside enhanced connectivity and people-to-people exchanges; and strengthening strategic alignment through Belt and Road projects and tailored economic corridors.

These initiatives illustrate the gradual consolidation of China-centric frameworks that operate parallel to India. While presented as inclusive and development-oriented, they risk reshaping regional cooperation in ways that constrain India's institutional role and strategic influence.

Seen in this light, the emerging narrative appears deliberate. One interpretation traces China's framing of a South Asia without India to historical legacies. British colonial strategy cast Tibet as a buffer between India and China, embedding a top-down territorial logic that continues to influence regional geopolitics. Within sections of India's strategic community, the commentator noted, South Asia is viewed as a natural sphere of influence, while Tibet and the broader Qinghai–Tibet Plateau are framed in terms of strategic depth.

This critique is amplified in popular Chinese discourse. A *Baijiahao* commentator, for instance, questioned why, among the seven countries surrounding India, five appear closer to China, leaving India relatively isolated in South Asia. The explanation offered points to structural factors: unresolved colonial-era borders, a rigid territorial outlook, pressures from smaller neighbours, and persistent security anxieties. These dynamics can position India as a dominant regional actor, at times underestimating the agency of its neighbours.

By contrast, the commentator argues, China is portrayed as a partner unburdened by colonial legacies, emphasising economic cooperation, infrastructure development, and non-interference. For resource-constrained states, such an approach can be particularly attractive, prompting some to align more closely with China on key issues.

In this framing, India's perceived marginalisation is a structural outcome shaped by history and policy orientation. In regional diplomacy, influence tends to follow those who combine respect with the consistent delivery of tangible benefits.

At the same time, Chinese discourse increasingly casts India as a regional hegemon and, at times, a disruptive actor—narratives that help justify its exclusion from emerging regional initiatives. It also subtly reinforces anti-India sentiment among neighbouring states. Discussions on Chinese online platforms have even entertained the idea of South Asian cooperation frameworks functioning without India.

One commentator argued that South Asia's future will depend on who can deliver tangible development outcomes, suggesting that China's initiatives offer a more "open" alternative. They warn that India risks alienating its neighbours and pushing them further toward "looking east" if it clings to notions of regional primacy.

Sidelined in discourse, central in reality

Chinese discourse portrays India's influence in South Asia as under scrutiny and in decline. A *Baijiahao* commentator, for instance, points to perceived infrastructure constraints, industrial dependencies, and domestic pressures to argue that India's regional ambitions are faltering. Such assessments, however, are overstated. India remains the pivotal power in South Asia, with enduring economic, strategic, and geopolitical weight that cannot be easily marginalised.

China's regional engagement is presented as inclusive, yet its discourse selectively sidelines India to bolster Beijing's strategic positioning. This framing appears less an objective reflection of regional realities than an attempt to shape them, projecting benevolence while reconfiguring regional alignments. In practice, India's structural centrality ensures that it remains an indispensable power, complicating and ultimately challenging the reductive narrative of an "India in decline in South Asia" advanced in sections of Chinese media.

## Dragon in the water: Chinese survey ships step up operations near India as world focuses on Hormuz

26 March 2026, The Telegraph Online

China is taking advantage of the fact that much of the world's attention is fixed on tensions around the Strait of Hormuz and has quietly stepped up its presence in waters much closer to India. A third Chinese "research" vessel has now entered the Indian Ocean region, adding to a small but growing flotilla operating across the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.

The latest ship, the Shi Yan 6, sailed into the Indian Ocean via the Sunda Strait, a narrow tough to navigate seaway between Java and Sumatra. It has declared its destination as Malé, the capital of the Maldives, which in recent years has become a regular port of call for Chinese vessels operating in the region.

It is not alone. Two other Chinese "research" vessels are already active across these waters. The Da Yang Hao arrived in late February and has since moved westwards, sailing closer to Africa. Another similarly named ship, the Da Yang Yi Hao, which first arrived in December, has been crisscrossing the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea between India, Pakistan and the African coast.

On paper, these ships are engaged in scientific work. In practice, their capabilities have drawn sustained scrutiny from Indian security planners. The Shi Yan class of vessels focuses on mapping the seabed, while the Da Yang class studies sub-surface conditions and scouts for minerals. Crucially, many of the areas being surveyed lie close to India's submarine operating routes.

The distinction matters. By studying the shape of the seabed, the Shi Yan ships can help build highly detailed underwater maps. The Da Yang vessels go a step further, drilling and analysing what lies beneath. Such data have clear dual-use value: in

submarine warfare, understanding underwater terrain makes it far easier to identify potential hiding spots, navigation corridors and surveillance blind zones.

China's deployment of these vessels around India is not new, but it has intensified in recent years. The current pattern can be traced back to 2022, when the Chinese tracking ship Yuan Wang 5 docked at Hambantota port in southern Sri Lanka. The port itself is a sensitive issue – leased to a Chinese company for 99 years after Sri Lanka was unable to service its debt – giving Beijing a strategic foothold along key Indian Ocean shipping lanes.

The arrival of the Yuan Wang 5 caused alarm in New Delhi, not least because one of its roles is to track missile and satellite launches – capabilities directly relevant to India's defence programme. Under pressure from India, and reportedly also from the United States, Sri Lanka subsequently restricted Chinese research vessels from docking at its ports.

Since then, many of these ships have shifted their logistics hub to Malé. The Shi Yan 6 itself first visited the region in 2023. By 2024, several Chinese vessels – possibly eight to 10 – were operating in these waters. In the following year, their focus appeared to shift slightly farther from India's immediate coastline, with increased activity closer to Diego Garcia, another strategically sensitive location.

Unsurprisingly, the Indian Navy keeps a close and continuous watch on these movements. Maritime experts note that Chinese survey vessels often return to the same locations repeatedly, gradually building up a highly detailed and layered picture of the seabed and sub-surface environment.

Under international maritime law, countries can apply to the International Seabed Authority for permission to explore the ocean floor. China has made extensive use of this framework and now operates roughly 50 research vessels across the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The United States maintains a fleet of a similar size.

India, by contrast, operates a far smaller fleet of around 10 to 12 research vessels. There is also a structural difference: Indian ships are largely run by civilian scientific bodies such as the National Institute of Oceanography and the Ministry of Earth Sciences, whereas Chinese vessels are widely seen as having closer links to the country's navy, reinforcing concerns about their strategic role.

New Delhi is now trying to narrow that gap. Among its most ambitious projects is the Matsya 6000, a deep-sea submersible capable of diving to 6,000 metres with a crew of three on board, part of a broader push to strengthen India's scientific and strategic presence in the depths of the Indian Ocean.

## India-China push to resume Lipulekh trade reignites Nepal's concerns

22 March 2026, The Kathmandu Post

On Friday, India's premier news agency, the Press Trust of India, reported that, after a six-year gap, border trade between China and India via the Lipulekh Pass in the Pithoragarh region of Uttarakhand is expected to resume this year.

Quoting the District Magistrate Ashish Bhatgai, the report claims that preparations for the trade session, which normally spans from June to September, have started in accordance with orders from the Union government.

The Lipulekh Pass, known as Pulang-Gunji in the local Tibetan dialect, is one of three villages located in the Kalapani area. Though currently under Indian control, Nepal has consistently asserted its claim over the area.

Nepal has previously protested India and China making bilateral arrangements over Lipulekh, in 2015 and 2020. The new announcement has reignited concerns about Nepal's sovereignty and put pressure on the outgoing prime minister, Sushila Karki, as well as the incoming Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) government to raise this issue with both India and China.

Nepal has been claiming that the Lipulekh pass belongs to it and has written several diplomatic notes to India and China, in addition to raising the issue with leaders of both countries multiple times. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also repeatedly issued statements asserting that the Lipulekh pass is an inseparable part of Nepal. It was also incorporated into Nepal's official map in 2020 through an amendment to the constitution.

Now, the onus will lie on the new and powerful RSP government to resolve the territorial dispute with the two neighbours.

Experts and observers said that the Nepal government should take up the matter with India and China immediately to avoid further complications, as a new government is set to be installed soon in Kathmandu.

The RSP is going to form the next government, and its senior leader, Balendra (Balen) Shah, who is projected as the prime minister, is set to be sworn in on March 27.

On August 19 of last year, during Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi's visit to India, the two neighbours agreed to reopen the Lipulekh pass for border trade. The agreement triggered widespread opposition in Nepal, and the RSP condemned the move in the strongest terms, stating that the Lipulekh pass belongs to Nepal and that neither India nor China can conduct trade through it without Nepal's consent.

Issuing a statement on August 26, 2025, the party firmly maintained that Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh, and Kalapani are integral parts of Nepal's sovereign territory, based on the country's statute, the Sugauli Treaty of 1816, and subsequent

historical agreements and evidence. The party had said Nepal's claim over these areas is clearly established on historical, geographical, political, and legal grounds.

"The party has taken serious note of recent developments concerning the reopening of traditional trade routes through Lipulekh, involving agreements between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China. Such developments, made without Nepal's participation, have raised concerns. The party emphasises that it is the responsibility of the government of Nepal to address this sensitive issue as a top priority. While discussions have been held in Parliament, lack of clarity and transparency from the government has created doubts and concerns among the public," the statement, signed by Sishir Khanal, head of the international department of the party, had mentioned.

"When India and China renewed their agreement to trade through the Lipulekh pass, then prime minister, Sushil Koirala, telephoned Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and expressed reservations," Dinesh Bhattarai, who was Koirala's adviser at the time, told the Post. The Koirala government also sent a diplomatic note to China stating that Lipulekh belongs to Nepal.

"Without Nepal's facilitation,India and China cannot conduct trade via Lipulekh because the territory belongs to us. But, without taking our prior consent, both India and China have been entering into new agreements despite our strong reservations and protests. The new government should take up the matter with both India and China in the strongest terms. Their actions set a bad precedent," said Bhattarai, who is also Nepal's former representative to ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Switzerland.

Bhattarai calls this a diplomatic test for the new RSP government. During his visit to China at the end of August last year, former Prime Minister KP Oli had also raised the matter with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin. On August 20, 2025 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement stating that Lipulekh is an inseparable part of Nepal.

"The Nepal government is clear that Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh and Kalapani, situated East of the Mahakali river, are inseparable parts of Nepal. These are also officially incorporated in the Nepalese map, included in the Constitution as well," the foreign ministry had said.

India, in response, rejected Nepal's claim, asserting that trade through Lipulekh has been happening for decades. "We have noted the comments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nepal related to the resumption of border trade between India and China through the Lipulekh Pass," Randhir Jaiswal, spokesperson for India's Ministry of External Affairs, had said.

"Our position in this regard has been consistent and clear. Border trade between India and China through Lipulekh pass commenced in 1954 and has been going on for decades."

The spokesperson had further claimed that the trade had been disrupted in recent years due to Covid and other developments, and both sides had now agreed to resume it. On Nepal's territorial claims, Jaiswal said such claims were "neither justified nor based on historical facts and evidence," while describing them as "untenable."

India has also said it remains open to "constructive interaction" with Nepal on outstanding boundary issues.

Bhattarai urged the government to strongly raise the matter with both neighbours.

The RSP, which last year called on the government to present a clear and confident position on the issue, now shoulders the responsibility of addressing it.

According to PTI, the Ministry of External Affairs of India issued a No Objection Certificate (NOC), prompting action to reopen trade between India and China.

The District Magistrate Bhatgai states that Uttarakhand Chief Secretary Anand Bardhan received a letter from Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri requesting the reopening of trade along the Himalayan route.

"The Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry have also issued permissions," according to the letter.

According to Bhatgai, the state administration has been requested to instruct the relevant departments to ensure that trade resumes for the 2026 session. To improve coordination between the two sides, Chinese counterparts would receive the contact information of local officials," said the PTI report.

Preparations cover trade passes, banking services, currency exchange, customs, transit camps, communication, security, and medical facilities for traders, according to the PTI.

Former ambassador Tapas Adhikari said that the government should revive the position taken by the Koirala government in 2015 and assert Nepal's claim publicly before the new government takes office.

"This issue should not be left to the incoming government. Once the present government establishes a clear position, it will be easier for the next government to take up the matter with both the neighbours," said Adhikari.

## China welcomes appointment of new Indian ambassador: spokesperson

22 March 2026, Xinhua

China welcomes the appointment of Vikram Doraiswami as the new Indian ambassador to China, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said on Friday in response to a related query.

Spokesperson Lin Jian said at a daily press briefing that diplomatic envoys are important bridges for

friendly cooperation and the development of relations between countries, adding that he noticed the new ambassador has given himself a Chinese name.
China stands ready to provide Doraiswami with the necessary assistance as he carries out his duty and looks forward to his positive role in promoting the continuous improvement of China-India ties after assuming his post, Lin said.

## China Expands Chengdu J 20 Presence In Tibet Raising Alarms Along India Border

21 March 2026, Tibet Rights Collective



China Expands Military Footprint in Tibet

China has reportedly intensified its military footprint in Tibet with the deployment of advanced stealth fighter jets near the Indian border underscoring once again the strategic militarization of the Tibetan plateau
According to recent reports at least 14 Chengdu J 20 Mighty Dragon stealth fighters have been stationed at Shigatse Air Base in Tibet located less than 100 miles from Indias Sikkim border This marks the largest known concentration of these fifth generation aircraft in close proximity to Indian territory
Tibet From Buffer Zone to Military Launchpad
The deployment highlights an ongoing transformation of Tibet into a forward military zone under the Peoples Liberation Army Air Force PLAAF Once a historical buffer between India and China Tibet is increasingly being repurposed as a strategic military platform
Positioned at high altitude Shigatse Air Base is among the worlds most elevated military airfields giving China a vantage point across the Himalayas Several aircraft are reportedly under protective cover while others remain in the open suggesting both operational readiness and long term deployment
Long Range Strike Capabilities Near the LAC
The J 20 fighters are believed to be equipped with PL 15 long range air to air missiles one of Chinas most advanced systems With a range capable of extending across the Line of Actual Control these systems introduce new tactical challenges for Indias air defense posture
From this location the aircraft could potentially target strategic zones on the Indian side including areas near the Siliguri Corridor often referred to as Indias chicken neck
Escalation Risks in a Fragile Region
This buildup is widely viewed as destabilizing The forward deployment of stealth fighters in such proximity to a contested border increases the risk of rapid escalation and miscalculation between two nuclear armed powers
India for its part has been investing heavily in aircraft optimized for high altitude and high temperature conditions typical of the Himalayan region The Indian Air Force maintains that its platforms hold an operational edge in such conditions often citing the Ladakh factor
However the increasing presence of advanced Chinese platforms like the J 20 signals a shift toward more technologically sophisticated aerial competition over the Himalayas
The Strategic Cost of Occupation
For Tibetans this development is part of a broader and troubling pattern The expansion of military infrastructure from airbases to missile deployments continues to reshape the Tibetan landscape without the consent of its people
Tibets geography is being leveraged not for the benefit of its inhabitants but as a strategic asset in great power rivalry The militarization of the plateau not only heightens regional tensions but also deepens the marginalization of Tibetans within their own homeland
TRC Call for Attention
Tibet Rights Collective TRC urges the international community to recognize the dual reality unfolding in Tibet a region rich in cultural and ecological significance is simultaneously being transformed into a high altitude military stronghold
As geopolitical competition intensifies Tibet risks becoming both a frontline and a flashpoint
Greater transparency de escalation and international scrutiny are essential to ensure that Tibet does not become the silent ground on which larger conflicts are prepared

## India also has a 'Strait of Hormuz' to counter China's border aggression

21 March 2026, LiveMint



India enhances its defence against China, leveraging the Malacca Strait to potentially disrupt Chinese oil imports, making full-scale military

conflict less likely due to economic interdependencies.

**India-China news:** The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz turned out to be a rescue tool for the Iranian government against the US-Israel attack. However, the US-Iran war has also fueled the upcoming possible border aggressions, like China attacking Taiwan or India, as the Dragon has beyond-border ambitions in these two countries. As Iran was ready for any kind of border aggression by Israel or the US, the Indian military staff have been successfully safeguarding the Indian territory from China. The Galwan Valley clash in 2020 is a glaring example of it.

According to experts, except in 1962, China never dared to indulge in a direct military fight with India. In fact, they chose a proxy war to keep India busy with its neighbouring countries. However, India not only foiled these proxy wars but also modernised its defence through new defence ties and technology transfers. The recent defence deals with Germany, the EU, France and Israel are glaring examples of it. However, experts also pointed out that in the event of any border aggression by China, India also has the 'Strait of Hormuz', which can be used to cut off around 80% of China's total oil and energy imports.

On lessons that India and China can learn from the US-Iran war, Ponmudi R, CEO, Enrich Money, said that China understands that any full-scale military confrontation with India carries risks far beyond the land border, particularly in the maritime domain.

"The Strait of Malacca remains a critical energy lifeline for Beijing, with a significant share of its crude imports passing through this narrow chokepoint—often described as China's long-standing Malacca dilemma. This is where India's geography becomes strategically relevant. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands provide India with a natural vantage point near the western entrance of Malacca, strengthening its ability to monitor and potentially influence maritime traffic in a conflict scenario," said Ponmudi of Enrich Money.

However, China has, over the years, built strategic petroleum reserves, diversified supply routes through Russia and Myanmar, and invested in reducing its dependence on a single corridor. India, therefore, cannot assume that disruption alone would decisively alter the balance.

India's maritime edge over China

Highlighting New Delhi's maritime edge over Beijing, Akshat Garg, Head of Research & Product at Choice International, said that India effectively holds its own "Strait of Hormuz" against China in the form of the Malacca Strait, through which roughly 80% of China's oil imports transit via the Indian Ocean. Any major conflict or deliberate blockade by India of this maritime chokepoint would severely disrupt Beijing's energy supply chain, crimping the dragon's industrial and commercial activity at a time when it is already sensitive to global oil-price volatility. This creates a powerful asymmetric deterrent: China simply cannot afford a full-scale conventional war with India, given that its dependence on seaborne crude via the Malacca far exceeds its current land-based or pipeline alternatives.

Expecting the Chinese administration to indulge more in the proxy wars instead of an intensified US-Iran like India-US war, the Choice International expert said, "Strategically, Beijing is far more likely to lean into limited-warfare tactics—border skirmishes, information operations, and proxy pressure—rather than direct large-scale military aggression. China will continue to exploit its influence in Islamabad, Dhaka, Kathmandu and other regional capitals to keep India off-balance, while jointly relying on energy-market dynamics and shipping-channel dependencies to shape the security conversation."

Akshat Garg said that from a crude-oil-market standpoint, any credible threat to Malacca-linked flows would hurt China's own manufacturers and force India to recalibrate its Malacca Strait-linked import basket, making both sides mindful of the fine line between coercion and mutual economic pain.

So, the Malacca Strait remains a powerful deterrence factor for India against China. It raises the cost of fuel and energy for China, which is why Beijing is more likely to continue with calibrated pressure through border tensions and regional influence rather than risk a full-scale confrontation.**Disclaimer:** This story is for educational purposes only. The views and recommendations above are those of individual analysts or broking companies, not Mint. We advise investors to check with certified experts before making any investment decisions.

## A diplomat for difficult times: Doraiswami heads to Beijing to improve India-China ties

21 March 2026, First Post

Mandarin-speaking envoy returns to Beijing at a moment when careful diplomacy, strategic patience and quiet confidence will be essential. His record suggests that he is well equipped for the task.The appointment of Vikram Doraiswami as India's next ambassador to China marks a significant moment in the trajectory of a seasoned and highly regarded diplomat. For a professional envoy, a transition from one P5 capital to another is widely seen as a marker of distinction and trust. Moving from London to Beijing places Doraiswami firmly in that category, underscoring both his proven capabilities and the confidence the Government of India reposes in him at a



*Vikram Doraiswami's tenure as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom was marked by effectiveness amid global turbulence and bilateral sensitivities. He now takes on his China posting with considerable trust and confidence reposed in him. Image: ANI*

particularly sensitive juncture in India–China relations. Doraiswami's tenure as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom has been notable for its effectiveness during a period marked by turbulence in global politics as well as bilateral sensitivities. In London, he combined an approachable personality with intellectual clarity, emerging as one of India's most visible and articulate diplomatic voices. His willingness to engage openly with the media, his ease with public diplomacy, and his ability to connect with both the Indian diaspora and the British public enhanced India's profile in the UK. These attributes, coupled with a calm and composed demeanour under pressure, have made his stint in London widely appreciated.His posting to Beijing comes at a time when India and China are attempting to rebuild a relationship that deteriorated sharply following the border clashes of 2020. The bilateral relationship has since remained strained, defined by a lack of trust and limited engagement at the highest levels. Yet, shifting global dynamics are compelling both countries to reassess their positions. The evolving international order, alongside pressures emanating from the United States and broader geopolitical contestations, has created space—if not urgency—for India and China to explore avenues of coexistence and selective cooperation.India's worldview continues to emphasise multipolarity, where major powers, including both India and China, have legitimate roles to play. China, on the other hand, often appears to approach the emerging order with a stronger sense of centrality and primacy. Reconciling these perspectives, even partially, will be a central challenge for Doraiswami as he takes up his assignment in Beijing. His appointment suggests a deliberate choice: a diplomat known for his balance, depth of understanding, and professional restraint at a time when nuance and steadiness are essential.

Doraiswami brings to the role a strong grounding in China itself. A Mandarin speaker, he began his career with a posting in Hong Kong, where he developed his language skills, and later served in Beijing. This early exposure has given him both linguistic competence and cultural familiarity—assets that are invaluable in a country where nuance, context, and long-term relationship-building carry particular weight. His ability to engage with Chinese counterparts in their own language is likely to enhance both access and credibility. His appointment returns Chinese-speaking diplomats as envoys to Beijing. Notable non-Chinese-speaking ambassadors included Nirupama Rao, S Jaishankar and Gautam Bambawale, all of whom later became foreign secretaries.

Over the course of his career, Doraiswami has accumulated wide-ranging diplomatic experience across continents. He has served as Consul General in Johannesburg and later as Ambassador to Uzbekistan and South Korea—posts that required navigating complex regional dynamics and advancing India's strategic and economic interests. Each assignment added to his reputation as a thoughtful and effective negotiator, capable of balancing firmness with tact.

In New Delhi, he has held several important positions within the Ministry of External Affairs, including heading divisions dealing with the Americas. Notably, he also served as Private Secretary to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. This role provided him with an insider's understanding of the functioning of the Prime Minister's Office and the broader machinery of government, equipping him with insights into policy formulation at the highest level. Such experience is particularly valuable in a posting like Beijing, where diplomatic engagement is closely intertwined with strategic decision-making back home.

Colleagues and observers alike often remark on Doraiswami's composure. Even in demanding or contentious situations, he has demonstrated an ability to remain measured, coherent, and effective. This quality was especially evident during his tenure in London, where he had to contend with politically charged protests by various groups, as well as security challenges involving the High Commission. Throughout, he maintained a steady course—firm in articulating India's position while avoiding unnecessary escalation.

His media engagement during sensitive moments further illustrated his strengths. Appearing on major British platforms, he did not shy away from difficult questions, presenting India's perspective with clarity and confidence, while also challenging narratives that he believed misrepresented Indian interests. This blend of accessibility and assertiveness enhanced India's diplomatic messaging in a complex media environment.

Beijing, however, will present a different context. Public diplomacy in China is more constrained, and engagement tends to occur through more formal and structured channels. While Doraiswami may have fewer opportunities for the kind of open media interaction that marked his

London tenure, his clarity of thought and disciplined approach to diplomacy are likely to serve him well in navigating the Chinese system.

The challenges before him are formidable. Restoring a degree of trust in the bilateral relationship, managing ongoing border tensions, and finding pathways for limited cooperation in areas such as trade, climate change, and multilateral forums will require patience and persistence. At the same time, he will need to ensure that India's core interests and sensitivities are conveyed clearly and consistently.

In this context, Doraiswami's combination of experience, linguistic skill, and temperament makes him a fitting choice. His career reflects a steady rise built on competence rather than flamboyance, and his approach—calm, professional, and grounded—aligns with the demands of the assignment he is about to undertake.

As India and China cautiously explore the possibility of stabilising and perhaps gradually revitalising their relationship, the role of the ambassador in Beijing assumes particular importance. Vikram Doraiswami steps into this position at a moment when careful diplomacy, strategic patience, and quiet confidence will be essential. His record suggests that he is well equipped for the task.

## Bollywood's previously 'battle of Galwan' movie being toned down on anti-China rhetoric

20 March 2026, Tibetan Review




Not only has the movie's title been changed from "Battle of Galwan" to "Maatrubhumi" (Motherland), but also its content is being modified to tone down on its alleged anti-China elements, according to more Indian media reports Mar 16-17. The move is seen as being in keeping with the recent uptick in ties between the two countries, which had hit its nadir in decades after deadly clashes between their troops in the Galwan valley of Ladakh in mid-2020.

A source confirmed that the title change is linked to the current diplomatic sensitivity surrounding India and China, reported *bollywoodhungama.com* Mar 16.

"Salman Khan was advised in certain official and strategic quarters to not only rethink the title of the film, but also tone down the anti-China portions.

Taking that feedback seriously, Salman chose to align the film with the larger national mood and preserve the broader sensitivity of the subject. As a result, the title was changed and a substantial portion was reworked, with the conflict being fictionalized," the report quoted the "source" as saying.

The film, initially based on the Galwan conflict between Indian and Chinese forces in 2020, had sparked criticism from China's state media in China, particularly the *Global Times*, which claimed that it "distorts facts" and "fuels anti-China sentiment".

The criticisms came after a teaser of the film – which is still being made – was released in Dec 2025, showing Salman leading Indian troops in a close combat battle against Chinese forces in Eastern Ladakh.

The report also stated that the changes were achieved through reshoots and rewrites, turning the film into a more emotionally charged work. "A significant part of the script has been rewritten to reshape the film into a more emotionally charged patriotic saga. The changes also came after inputs from relevant quarters, and the new version is said to explore a more intimate dynamic between Salman Khan and Chitrangda's characters," the source has added.

But director Apoorva Lakhia has maintained that from the very start, the filmmakers had registered two titles – Battle of Galwan and Maatrubhumi. "As we went through the journey of making our film, we realised it was never just about a battle. At its heart, the film is about humanity, empathy, and the silent battles our soldiers fight," *timesofindia.com* Mar 16 quoted Lakhia as saying.

Produced by Salman Khan under the banner of Salman Khan Films and directed by Apoorva Lakhia, Maatrubhumi – with the subtext "May War Rest in Peace" – stars Salman as an Indian Army Colonel. The makers say that the film aims to present an unflinching portrayal of courage, sacrifice, and resilience, while balancing the intensity of conflict with the intimacy of love and family, reported *hindustantimes.com* Mar 17.

Though previously scheduled to be released on Apr 10, reports now state that it may be pushed to later in the year, apparently due to changes being made to its storyline."

## 14 J-20 Stealth Fighters: China Just Deployed Its Best Jets 100 Miles From India's Most Vulnerable Border

18 March 2026, 1945

Reuben F. Johnson breaks down why China has deployed at least 14 Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon stealth fighters to Shigatse Air Base in Tibet — less than 100 miles from India's Sikkim border and the Siliguri Corridor.

-Six are sheltered under protective tarpaulins. Eight sit in the open. At 12,000 feet elevation, Shigatse is one of the highest military airbases on earth, and the J-20s might be armed with PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles capable of reaching targets on the Indian side of the border.India has also been expending considerable resources on fighters capable of operating at "high-hot"—meaning high altitude, high temperature—locations. Fighter jets capable of operating in these conditions are regarded as essential for



*J-20 Stealth Fighter Landing. Image Credit: Creative Commons*

maintaining control of the skies over the Himalayas.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) rates its aircraft as having superior performance in these conditions—commanders sometimes refer to this as the " Ladakh" factor. One Indian commentator wrote in December 2025 that "Chinese jets like the J-20 struggle with engine performance in the thin air of the Himalayas."

"The [French-made] Rafale was customized with 'India Specific Enhancements' including cold-start capabilities for high-altitude bases," that writer continued. "Its [Safran] M88 engines and delta-canard design allow it to take off with a full weapons load from high-altitude runways where other jets would be grounded or forced to fly light."

-India's Rafale fighters have a high-altitude performance edge. But 14 fifth-generation stealth fighters on your doorstep changes the calculation regardless.

The PLAAF Is Forward-Deploying its Chengdu J-20 On the Indian Border

According to reports in Indian media, recent satellite imagery confirms that the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has deployed new Chengdu J-20 "Mighty Dragon" stealth fighters to Shigatse Air Base in Tibet.

This would place the advanced aircraft less than 100 miles from the Sikkim border, near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) dividing Indian and Chinese claims.

Past imagery indicated that six of these aircraft were based at the location. But more recent passes by remote sensing platforms show that six J-20s are deployed at the base and covered with protective tarpaulins, with another eight parked out in the open, confirming a total presence of at least 14 aircraft.

This PLAAF deployment is regarded as potentially destabilizing because it places fifth-generation jets within striking distance of India's Siliguri corridor. This could spark escalation between the two air forces and an increase in regional aerial competition.

**High-Hot Performance**

The facility where the J-20s were seen, the Shigatse Peace Airport, is officially designated as a "dual-use military/civilian facility." The airport was originally a purely military base and today serves as a crucial high-altitude strategic airbase.

Shigatse rests at an altitude of more than 12,000 feet. It sports a 5,000-meter runway and has regularly hosted advanced military aircraft—not just J-20 stealth jets, but also Hongdu GJ-11 stealth drones.

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**Significance**

Although in the past the J-20 has been seen based at locations close to the Indian border, the current sightings are the largest, most significant deployment of the aircraft in this region.

Their presence signals an increase in the PLAAF's aerial capabilities at a time when the Chinese Communist Party leadership in Beijing is anxious

to show how much China's armed forces have advanced since President Xi Jinping first took power in 2012.
Experienced observers of the PLAAF point out that from this location, J-20s possibly armed with the PL-15—the longest of the PLAAF's long-range air-to-air missiles—could present a new problem to the Indian Air Force. Armed with the PL-15, the J-20s could reach targets on the Indian side of the border.
Just how effective such a pairing would be remains to be seen.
India is reported to have recovered export versions of the PL-15 that were fired at the IAF by Pakistani aircraft but failed to hit their targets and landed nearly intact in India.
They have since been examined, meaning the missiles could be more vulnerable to Indian electronic warfare systems.

## China calls India a partner, not threat, says foreign minister Wang Yi

08 March 2026, The Telegraph India

China on Sunday called for a more cooperative approach in its ties with India, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi urging the two Asian powers to view each other as partners and opportunities rather than strategic rivals.
Speaking at his annual press conference on the sidelines of the National People's Congress (NPC), Wang said both countries should follow the direction set by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping to stabilise and improve bilateral relations.
Referring to the recent diplomatic engagements between the two leaders, Wang said Modi and Xi had a successful meeting in Tianjin last August. "Building on the fresh start enabled by their Kazan meeting in 2024, the Tianjin summit brought about further improvement in China-India relations," he added.
Highlighting signs of renewed engagement between the two neighbours, Wang said, "We are heartened to see re-energised interactions at all levels, a new record in bilateral trade, and closer people-to-people exchanges. All this has brought tangible benefits to the two peoples."
On the future trajectory of ties, Wang said both countries "must maintain the correct strategic perception of each other as partner rather than rival, and opportunity instead of threat".
"Both sides also must uphold good-neighbourliness and friendship, and jointly safeguard peace and stability in the border areas and focus on development," he said.
"As each other's important neighbours and members of the Global South, China and India enjoy profound civilisational ties and share extensive common interests," Wang said.
"Mutual trust and cooperation is beneficial to the development of the two countries, while division and confrontation is detrimental to the rejuvenation of Asia," the Chinese foreign minister said.
He also emphasised that the two sides should adhere to the direction set by their leaders and remove external disruptions. "The two sides should follow the direction set by leaders and remove interference," he said without elaborating.
Wang further said India and China should support each other in hosting BRICS summits. India is scheduled to host the summit this year, while China will host it in 2027.
BRICS, which originally comprised Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, has since expanded to include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Iran.
India-China relations, which remained frozen for five years following the military standoff in eastern Ladakh, began showing signs of normalisation after two meetings between Modi and Xi — first in Kazan, Russia in 2024, and later on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Tianjin last year.
Since then, both sides have resumed visa and flight services and initiated a series of measures aimed at restoring normal diplomatic engagement.

# CHINA IN THE REGION

# CHINA-BHUTAN

# CHINA-EAST TURKESTAN

## Women's History Month Must Not Forget Uyghur Women

31 March 2026, Bitter Winter

Detention in mass camps, forced sterilization, coerced birth control, and sexual abuse are rarely mentioned. Perhaps economic ties with China make criticism inconvenient.

Every year, when March arrives, the world celebrates Women's History Month. We hear powerful stories of courage, resistance, and progress: women who broke barriers, women who changed laws, women who reshaped societies.

Yet there are also women whose stories remain buried beneath silence.

As a Uyghur woman, I cannot observe this month without thinking of the women whose voices have been erased—women whose suffering rarely enters the global feminist conversation.

I grew up in the Uyghur homeland during a period of enormous upheaval in China. My childhood unfolded in the years following the Cultural Revolution, when the country was cautiously emerging from chaos. At school, we were taught that women "hold up half the sky." The slogan echoed everywhere—a proud declaration that the Communist revolution had liberated Chinese women from feudal oppression.

On paper, women were equal.

But daily life told a far more complicated story.

Like many young women growing up in China at the time, we learned early about the invisible boundaries that shaped our lives. Sexual harassment was common but rarely acknowledged. Speaking about it could bring shame rather than protection. The language of equality filled official speeches, yet the lived reality for many women remained constrained by deeply rooted discrimination.

The state also exercised extraordinary control over women's bodies. During much of my youth, China's onechild policy governed family life with an iron hand. Pregnancies were monitored and births tightly regulated. For many Chinese women, the pressure was immense. In a society where sons were often preferred, stories of female babies abandoned or quietly disappearing circulated in whispers through villages and towns. These tragedies were rarely spoken of openly, yet they formed a silent undercurrent beneath everyday life.

Even then, the idea that the state could decide the fate of women's bodies had become normalized.

Decades later, that same logic of control would take a far more devastating form in my own homeland.

Today, the world knows that the Uyghur region has become the site of one of the gravest human rights crises of our time. Mass detention camps, pervasive surveillance, and the destruction of families have transformed the lives of millions. Uyghur women have borne some of the most painful consequences. Many have been transferred into vast forcedlabor programs that remove them from their homes and communities, sending them to factories under conditions of coercion and constant monitoring. Uprooted from the social networks that once protected them, they become more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.

These policies do not merely serve economic interests. By targeting women—the cultural carriers of language, family, and tradition—they strike at the heart of Uyghur society itself.

Testimonies from survivors describe forced sterilization, coerced birth control, and sexual abuse within detention facilities. In its final judgment, the Uyghur Tribunal, chaired by Sir Geoffrey Nice KC, concluded that "the deliberate imposition of measures intended to prevent births within the Uyghur population" constituted a central element of the genocide being committed against the Uyghurs.

But beyond these horrifying statistics lies another, quieter tragedy: the disappearance of Uyghur women whose voices once enriched our cultural and intellectual life.

Brilliant female poets, scholars, and artists have vanished. Women who wrote about love, language, and homeland have been silenced. Teachers who nurtured generations of students are gone. Intellectuals who carried the memory and wisdom of our culture have disappeared into the machinery of repression.

Their absence leaves a wound that is difficult to describe.

For more than a decade, my own life has been shaped by the struggle to ensure that these stories are not forgotten. As a human rights activist, I have traveled across the world speaking about the Uyghur genocide. I have interpreted survivors' testimonies so that their words can reach international audiences. I have translated stories that might otherwise remain unheard. Through music and cultural work, I try to preserve fragments of a civilization now under threat.

There are moments when the weight of this work feels overwhelming. I have not been able to speak with my own family for over nine years. Like so many Uyghurs in exile, I live with the constant uncertainty of not knowing whether those we love are safe.

Yet silence would be a far greater betrayal.

What pains me deeply during Women's History Month is how rarely Uyghur women appear in global conversations about women's rights. Many prominent voices who rightly advocate for women elsewhere have remained strikingly quiet about the systematic abuses faced by Uyghur women.

Perhaps the political reality feels uncomfortable. Perhaps economic ties with China make criticism inconvenient.

But the suffering of women should never be subject to geopolitical calculation.

If feminism is truly universal, it must include the women who cannot speak for themselves—the imprisoned poet, the grieving mother, the young girl growing up in a surveillance state where even her language is treated as a threat.

And yet the story of Uyghur women is not only one of suffering. It is also a story of resilience.

Across exile communities around the world, Uyghur women continue to organize, write, sing, and advocate. They carry our language, our memories, and our traditions forward, refusing to allow an entire culture to disappear.

History has always been shaped by the courage of women, often in ways the world fails to notice.

In Islam, the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) said, "Paradise lies at the feet of mothers." It reminds us that the strength and dignity of women form the moral foundation of any society.

Knowing this, the fate of Uyghur women must weigh heavily on the conscience of the world. When mothers are silenced, daughters vanish, and poets are erased, a vital thread of our shared humanity is torn away.

Women's History Month should not only celebrate the victories of the past. It must also confront the injustices unfolding in the present.

And among those injustices, the suffering—and the courage—of Uyghur women must never be forgotten.

## China's repression shadows global Uyghur resilience

29 March 2026, ANI News

The World Uyghur Congress (WUC) has released its weekly brief, highlighting a series of international engagements aimed at exposing what it describes as China's ongoing repression of Uyghurs, intensifying global attention on China's policies in East Turkistan.

Uyghur communities across continents marked Eid and Nowruz last week with vibrant cultural events, even as concerns over China's intensifying repression in East Turkistan persist. Celebrations held across Europe, North America, and Central Asia featured traditional dance, music, poetry, and cuisine, reflecting a determined effort to preserve Uyghur identity in exile.

A major highlight was a large cultural concert organised by the World Uyghur Congress Cultural Committee and the Uyghur European Culture Centre, bringing together over 200 participants and artists from across Europe. Youth played a prominent role, showcasing heritage through

performances that highlighted community resilience amid ongoing human rights concerns.

Parallel to these celebrations, the World Uyghur Congress and the Uyghur Centre for Democracy and Human Rights conducted an advocacy mission across Paris, The Hague, and Amsterdam. Delegations engaged policymakers and officials to highlight allegations of forced labour, surveillance, and transnational repression affecting Uyghur communities abroad. European stakeholders reiterated the need for sustained international scrutiny of China's policies in the region.

The week also marked a sombre milestone as activists highlighted the enforced disappearance of Hushtar Isa and Yalkun Isa, relatives of prominent Uyghur leader Dolkun Isa. A decade after their detention, their whereabouts remain unclear, with rights groups alleging politically motivated sentencing and calling for transparency and release.

At a separate event, activist Rushan Abbas raised alarm over allegations of state-backed forced organ harvesting, citing testimonies and reports suggesting systematic abuse targeting detained Uyghurs. These claims continue to fuel international concern over human rights violations in Chinese-controlled territories.

In the United Kingdom Parliament, lawmakers, including Chris Evans and Marie Rimmer, called for stronger diplomatic pressure on China, emphasising restrictions on religious freedom and the normalisation of systemic abuses.

Meanwhile, on Parliament Hill, Canadian officials and activists marked 20 years since the detention of Uyghur-Canadian imam Huseyin Celil, who remains imprisoned without consular access. Advocates renewed calls for proof of life and direct communication with his family. (ANI)

## China denies forced labour allegations after Liberal MP Michael Ma's comments

28 March 2026, The Global Times



*Prime Minister Mark Carney embraces Michael Ma, member of Parliament for Markham-Unionville, who crossed the floor from the Conservatives to the Liberals on Dec. 11, 2025. JUSTIN TANG/THE CANADIAN PRESS*

China is again denying claims of forced labour in the country as calls grow for Prime Minister Mark Carney to clarify Canada's stance on the issue amid fallout from comments made by Liberal MP Michael Ma that appeared to cast doubt on reported human rights abuses.

The Chinese Embassy in Canada pushed back on the allegation that forced labour is used in the production of Chinese electric vehicle components in a social media post Friday night, calling it a "blatant lie" that some are using to undermine the Canada-China EV deal.

The comments from the embassy came a day after Ma apologized for a tense exchange during a committee hearing where he asked an expert if she'd seen forced labour in China with her own eyes or if she had relied on "hearsay."

Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, a senior fellow at the University of Ottawa, had told committee members that Chinese vehicles are made with products of slave labour performed by members of the Uyghur minority, referring to research by Human Rights Watch.

Ma later clarified he had been asking McCuaig-Johnston about forced labour in Shenzen, an EV manufacturing hub, not Xinjiang, where the Chinese government has been accused of widespread abuses against Uyghurs.

Still, calls are growing among Conservatives for Carney to address Ma's comments and clarify where the federal government stands on the issue of forced labour as Canada builds a stronger trade relationship with China.

Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre called on Carney to do just that in a social media post Saturday morning, echoing a previous call from Conservative foreign affairs critic Michael Chong for Carney to "urgently" clarify his position.

"Mark Carney must tell us where he stands," Poilievre wrote, asking the Prime Minister to provide a yes or no response on whether he believes there is forced labour in China.

Energy Minister Tim Hodgson said Friday the federal government is opposed to forced labour. In a statement Saturday, a spokesperson for International Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu said the same.

"Canada unequivocally condemns forced labour, in all of its forms, everywhere," said spokesperson Huzaif Qaisar. "Mr. Ma's comments as reported are not reflective of the Government of Canada's position on the incredibly serious issue of forced labour."

"Canada has robust legal and regulatory measures in place to ensure that no item imported to Canada is produced through forced labour," Qaisar added in a statement that lacked explicit reference to China.

Lynette Ong, director of the China Governance Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, said the government should take this opportunity to acknowledge concerns of forced labour in China in the face of "overwhelming

evidence" of the practice or else risk reputational harm.
"Refusing to admit that evidence exists, that would make us appear weak," Ong said.
Conservatives put pressure on Carney to clarify his position on forced labour in China
The United Nations reported in 2022 that China had committed serious human rights violations in Xinjiang against Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities that "may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity."
A report issued that same year by Global Affairs Canada found China "is using otherwise legitimate programs for retraining and relocation of unemployed workers as instruments of a broader campaign of oppression, exploitation and indoctrination of the Uyghur Muslim population into Han [majority] Chinese culture."
Ong says acknowledging human rights abuses in China won't necessarily harm trade relations with the Asian superpower as Canada looks beyond the U.S. for trade partners in the midst of tariff-related uncertainty.
Ong says China is also in a position where it needs to strengthen trade.
"China's domestic economy is actually not doing so well. It's relying on export growth to drive its economy, particularly exports of EVs and other high-tech products," she said.
"Canada is part of [The Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement], so for its EVs to be able to come into Canada has got implications for the North American market."
The EV deal saw Canada lower its previous 100-per-cent tariff on Chinese EVs to 6.1 per cent and allow for 49,000 Chinese EVs to be imported, with a ramp-up to 70,000 within five years. China, meanwhile, agreed to reduce tariffs on Canadian goods, including canola.
Ong took a pragmatic approach to Canada's relationship with China, saying Beijing may be an incompatible political ally, but Canada has a lot to gain economically by maintaining good trade relations.
"In this age of global uncertainty and competition and geopolitical tension, we cannot afford to lump political and economic interests together," she said. "We have a lot of incompatible values with China. But economic-wise, there are a lot of things that we can work on that will serve the interests of both countries."
On Friday, Hodgson said Canada was in the process of recalibrating its relationship with China. While he acknowledged the two countries have had differences, he said those disagreements – and the bilateral conversations about them – don't need to be made public.
"We will not allow for products done with forced labour into this country. They understand that. They understand what our lines are. and so we're focused on where we do agree," Hodgson said.
"Those lines are clear. We don't need to have public discussions about where we disagree. We make that clear, to our friends in China."

## WUC Slams Canadian MP Michael Ma Over China Human Rights Remarks

28 March 2026, Asia Net

The World Uyghur Congress condemned Canadian MP Michael Ma for downplaying Uyghur forced labour claims during a committee meeting about a Canada-China EV deal. The WUC called his remarks troubling and urged him to take a principled stance.
The World Uyghur Congress has strongly criticised comments made by Canadian Liberal Member of Parliament Michael Ma, alleging that his remarks downplayed well-documented human rights violations in China, as cited in a WUC press release.
Details of the Parliamentary Controversy
The controversy arose during a meeting of Canada's House of Commons Industry Committee on March 26, 2026, where discussions were underway regarding Prime Minister Mark Carney's recent agreement with China. The deal allows the import of 49,000 Chinese-manufactured electric vehicles into Canada at reduced tariff rates following Carney's visit to Beijing earlier this year. Michael Ma was part of the official deThe World Uyghur Congress has strongly criticised comments made by Canadian Liberal Member of Parliament Michael Ma, alleging that his remarks downplayed well-documented human rights violations in China, as cited in a WUC press release.
Details of the Parliamentary Controversy
legation.
According to the WUC press release, concerns were raised during the session by Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, who pointed out that electric vehicles may rely on Chinese aluminium potentially linked to Uyghur forced labour. In response, Ma questioned her claims, asking whether she had personally witnessed such conditions or visited the region. His remarks reportedly triggered strong reactions from opposition Conservative MPs, who sought clarity on the government's stance regarding the Uyghur genocide.WUC's Strong Rebuke
Reacting to the development, WUC President Turgunjan Alawdun expressed concern, stating that it was troubling to see an elected official appear to dismiss credible evidence of human rights abuses, particularly in a country like Canada, where such issues have been widely acknowledged at multiple levels.
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Canada, where such issues have been widely acknowledged at multiple levels.
Broader Context of Uyghur Forced Labour
Highlighting broader concerns, the WUC pointed to growing evidence documenting the expansion of state-imposed Uyghur forced labour across at least 17 industries, including the automotive sector. It cited findings by Human Rights Watch, which reported that a significant share of the world's aluminium production--used in vehicle manufacturing--originates from East Turkistan.
Broader Context of Uyghur Forced Labour
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Broader Context of Uyghur Forced Labour
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Further, the International Labour Organisation has highlighted the scale of forced labour affecting Uyghurs and Tibetans in China, according to the WUC statement. The issue also intersects with ongoing calls from Canadian lawmakers and rights groups urging the government to press Beijing for the release of Huseyin Celil, who has reportedly been imprisoned in China for nearly two decadesConcluding its statement, the World Uyghur Congress urged Michael Ma to reaffirm his commitment to human rights and take a more informed and principled stance in addressing Uyghur forced labour within Canadian supply chains. (ANI)
(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by Asianet Newsable English staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

## New county established in Xinjiang

26 March 2026, China Daily

URUMQI -- The people's government of Northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region on Thursday announced the establishment of Cenling county.
The establishment of the county, which is administered by Kashgar prefecture, has been approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council.
The county seat of Cenling is Xinhua township.

## Suspected Surveillance Incident at Tokyo Uyghur Symposium Raises Concerns Over Transnational Repression

19 March Uyghur Times

A case of suspected surveillance targeting Uyghur activists was reported during a Uyghur human rights symposium held on February 25 at Japan's House of Representatives Members' Office Building in Tokyo.
The event was organized by the Japan Uyghur Association and co-sponsored by the World Uyghur Congress.
According to reports, a suspicious man was observed repeatedly photographing participants inside the venue, drawing the attention of organizers and Japanese security authorities. Upon questioning by police, the individual admitted he had been paid to take photos and had no personal interest in the symposium itself.
Japanese media, including *Sankei Shimbun*, reported that the man was a Chinese student studying at a university in Tokyo. He stated that he had been asked by an acquaintance to attend the event and photograph participants in exchange for a payment of 6,000 yen. He also admitted to attending a similar Uyghur-related event at the same venue in September of the previous year, where he had engaged in comparable activities.
Organizers expressed concern that images of attendees could be shared with Chinese authorities, potentially placing the families of Uyghur participants in danger back in their homeland. Some Uyghurs involved in organizing such events reportedly avoid revealing their identities for this reason.
This incident is not considered isolated. According to the World Uyghur Congress, many Uyghurs living abroad fear ongoing surveillance and intimidation. Reports indicate that individuals posing as students or attendees have repeatedly monitored Uyghur, Tibetan, Mongolian, and Chinese dissident communities, photographing participants at public gatherings.
Observers say such actions reflect broader patterns of "transnational repression," where individuals and communities are monitored or pressured beyond national borders. The case has also raised concerns in Japan about the lack of a strong legal framework to address such activities, particularly as the incident occurred within a parliamentary facility.
Analysts and community members warn that these developments highlight how security gaps may allow foreign-linked surveillance activities to take place even within democratic institutions.
**Hebibulla Izchi, Reporter, Writer**; He published many articles articles in the German journal *Tibetische Perspektive* on Uyghurs and China's repression. His book *Kök Tashliq Archive – July 5 Massacre* has been released and is being

translated into English, German, and Turkish, with a second volume in preparation. He previously worked as a reporter for Uyghur News Agency and Radio Free Asia.

## China's Repression Still Haunts Uyghur Exiles

18 March 2026, Human Rights Watch

This Ramadan, as I sit down with a hot bowl of lentil soup and freshly made Uyghur noodles to break my day-long fast, I try very hard not to think about my father, thousands of miles away, in a prison, and what he does not get to eat, and if he even knows it is his favorite time of the year.

This Ramadan marks a decade since I last broke my fast with my father. Also, my last visit to my homeland, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in northwest China, where the authorities have committed atrocity crimes. I chose to speak out for my father and others and that choice cost me a disconnection, maybe forever, from those I love back home.

Growing up in a conservative Uyghur family, I began fasting at an early age. I remember my school years vividly—how I had to develop strategies to hide from teachers and peers that I fasted, prayed, and came from a religious household. During breaks, I would buy snacks from a shop, pretending I would eat them, only to secretly throw them away.

Living under the Chinese government's repression forced me to develop survival skills early on. I learned to live two parallel lives: one of performative obedience, and one of quiet resistance.

The Chinese government has carried out egregious human rights violations in the region since late 2016—including mass arbitrary detention, unjust imprisonments, mass surveillance, and forced labor—amounting to crimes against humanity. In June 2018, what I dreaded most happened: I lost contact with my father, Memet Yaqup. Later, I learned he had received a prison sentence of 16 years —one among hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs incarcerated simply for being who they are – in addition to my uncles, cousins, and other relatives who are also serving sentences from 15 years to life.

That part of the story is typical, widely known.

What the world does not see is what happened to the hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs living in the diaspora, like me, my mother, sister, and wife, whose lives were turned upside down during these years. During the height of the Chinese government's "Strike Hard Campaign," people back home were detained for contacting relatives abroad; authorities confiscated Uyghurs' passports, and made it impossible to escape from the region.

When those of us living abroad demanded information about our disappeared family members, Chinese police threatened and intimidated us—acts now recognized as "transnational repression." Some were even coerced to produce propaganda for the government or to gather information on the diaspora community, threatened with the safety of their families or with the hope of being reconnected with them after years of separation.

Like other Uyghurs in the diaspora, I waited in the anxious dark as my father's silence stretched from days to months to years. It took two years after his arrest for me to learn he was still alive, and another two years to learn he had been imprisoned. The person who conveyed news of his sentence told me I should be grateful he survived at all. "We have lost many people," the person said. To this day, I have no idea why he was imprisoned or anything about my 58-year-old father's health

In 2020, I married the love of my life—also a Uyghur—without being able to have my father's and her parents' blessings. Our daughter, Nurbanu, was born in 2021. I posted a photo of her on the Chinese social media app Douyin, hoping someone back home, maybe my wife's parents, might see it and share our joy, celebrating this important milestone in our life, even though they would not dare contact us because of strict surveillance. Instead, police interrogated several people simply because of that one image of me holding my baby. They asked if anyone had been in contact with me.

They also banned my Douyin account.

Now, as a researcher documenting the Chinese government's human rights violations, I am at heightened risk of surveillance and intimidation. Beijing's transnational repression may prevent me from ever safely speaking to anyone I grew up with—even if my father is freed one day.

My daughter passed away at the age of 2 from an incurable health condition in November 2023. When I held her lifeless body in the back seat of my car on a rainy day in Istanbul, sitting between my wife and mother on the way to her funeral, I felt the absence of not one, but two people. My father likely never knew he had a granddaughter and will never get to know her. The government punished him for being a Uyghur; it punished me because I refused performative obedience and dared to criticize Beijing.

Yet I remain stubbornly hopeful. One day, in my hometown, I will stand beside my father again and pray at the site of the mosque where I last attended Eid Al-fitr prayer in 2016—before the authorities destroyed it in 2019. I will tell him all about Nurbanu, and how she looked just like him.

Because I believe we will survive. We will rebuild our lives— and even our mosques— and thrive once again, because no tyranny lasts forever.

## Police Investigates the Aggressors of Amsterdam's Lonely Uyghur

18 March 2026, Bitter Winter

What happened in February in The Hague is evidence of China's transnational repression and should not be condoned.



*In front of the Amersfoort Police Station. The author just received the formal report confirming that a criminal investigation was officially launched on March 11, 2026.*

"Truth may bend, but it will never break"—Uyghur proverb

"Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere"—Martin Luther King

On February 14, 2026, I was brutally assaulted in The Hague, a city that symbolizes global peace and democracy. Inside the City Hall, during a Chinese New Year event, my peaceful protest was met with sudden and violent aggression. A group of Chinese individuals twisted my arms and neck, pinned me to the floor, slammed my head against the ground, and whispered death threats into my ear: "You belong in a concentration camp! You deserve to die! I am going to kill you!" This was a blatant act of transnational repression.

On March 11, 2026, the Dutch National Police officially accepted my criminal complaint and issued a signed report. This means that the crimes committed by these Chinese actors will no longer remain hidden; the Dutch judicial system has now opened a formal investigation.

March 11, 2026, is a historic day for me and for the entire Uyghur diaspora. The Dutch National Police formally registered my case (Aangifte) concerning the violence I endured. In the official document I signed and received, the actions of the Chinese perpetrators were classified under Article 300 of the Dutch Penal Code, covering assault, physical injury, and threats. This confirms that the violence carried out in the heart of The Hague is no longer regarded as a mere "confrontation," but is being investigated as a criminal act. On the same day, the police accepted my complaint, the City Executive of The Hague responded to questions from City Council members, stating that the "violent behavior of the Chinese party during the event is absolutely unacceptable."




*The banner held at the demonstration was seized and never returned.*

That same day, one of the Netherlands' largest newspapers, "Algemeen Dagblad (AD)," published a report titled: "Violence against Uyghur demonstrator is unacceptable; Chinese security guards have no right to act this way." The article also exposed the deception of the Chinese organizers, who had falsely listed the City of The Hague as a "supporter" on their website to spread propaganda. The city clarified that it had provided no financial support for the event. This revelation is an international embarrassment and a significant blow to the credibility of the Chinese Embassy. The incident was also discussed in another AD article and one published by Dagblad070.

The event itself was organized by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the People's Republic of China and the Embassy of the PRC in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Although the organizers claimed support from the City of The Hague and various Chinese associations, the city has now publicly distanced itself. The Zhejiang Wu Opera Research Center carried out the performance. The names of the organizers appear on the poster reproduced here. The poster indicated: the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the People's Republic of China, the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, De gemeente Den Haag, Vereniging van Wenzhou Chinezen in Nederland, Stichting Landelijke Federatie van Chinese Organisaties in Nederland, Vereniging Nederland China, CCEN Stichting Chinese Culturele Evenementen Nederland, Zhe Jiang Wu Opera Research Center (ZheJiang Wu Opera Troupe, Wu Opera Aat Heritage Center Of Jindong District, Jinhua City, Lanxi Li Yu Drama Research Institute).




*The organizations involved in the event.*

This event was directly supervised by the Chinese Embassy and organized through its proxy organizations. The individuals who choked me, slammed my head to the ground, and threatened my life were not random bystanders but leaders of the very organizations supporting the event. The organization Anti-CCP, founded by Jiang Peikun, has exposed their identities on its website.
One of them is Qing Xudong, Honorary Chairman of the Dutch Chinese Business Federation, identified as the man who choked me. Qian Xudong, originally from Wenzhou, China, immigrated to the Netherlands in 1989 and rose from a grassroots entrepreneur in the culinary and textile sectors to a high-level strategic liaison for Chinese interests in Europe. Beyond his commercial success in catering and trade, he is regarded as a key operative in United Front–style community affairs.
In 2018, he was appointed President of the 5th Board of the Netherlands-China Chamber of Commerce (NCCC), a position he has used to systematically advance trade and strategic cooperation between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Netherlands. As a dedicated member of the CPC, his role extends into the diplomatic sphere. On September 17, 2019, he presided over the grand celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China in the Netherlands. He serves as a primary point of contact for visiting Chinese government delegations, facilitating high-level official missions and ensuring that overseas Chinese business activities remain aligned with the Party's economic and political objectives.
Another individual involved in the assault is Zhang Aimin, Chairwoman of the Dutch Chinese Cultural and Sports Exchange Association, identified as the woman who forcibly seized my banner. A Wenzhou native who immigrated to the Netherlands in the 1980s, she is a prominent figure in the Dutch-Chinese community and the daughter of a Chinese military officer. Although she presents herself as a community activist frequently featured in the press, her long career has involved managing and operating multiple organizations that serve the interests of the Communist Party of China. A long-time operative in the administrative work of the diaspora, she was an early participant in the General Association of Chinese Professionals in the Netherlands. Her influence has grown through several key appointments: in 2018, she served as Executive President and Secretary-General of the Singapore-Malaysia-Chinese Association in the Netherlands; in 2023, she became President of the Board of the Chinese Cultural and Sports Exchange Association in the Netherlands, a position she still holds in 2026. She also serves as a Senior Advisor to the European Dutch Overseas Chinese Women's Union. In the context of international political analysis, she is identified as a key manager of organizations linked to Beijing's United Front strategy. By directing these various cultural, athletic, and women's associations, she plays a central role in maintaining the CCP's influence over the overseas diaspora, ensuring that community activities and organizational narratives remain aligned with the political objectives of the Chinese state.
These individuals acted as proxies for a state organ to suppress political expression. In addition, a man wearing an orange "Security" vest who physically restrained me and caused psychological terror remains unidentified pending the police investigation.
The violent rush to seize my 130 cm banner was no coincidence. The banner read: "Restoring East Turkestan's Independence is the Only Way for the Survival of the Uyghurs." It featured images of the Chinese occupation on October 12, 1949, and a depiction of a Uyghur person being gagged by the Chinese government. These visuals clearly expressed our political aspirations. The organizers feared that my peaceful protest inside City Hall would disrupt their New Year propaganda and that images of our struggle for independence would reach the global media.
My years of solitary, peaceful resistance against colonialism and genocide have finally brought the crimes of the Chinese regime to the attention of the Dutch justice system. This is the result of a Uyghur's refusal to kneel before tyranny in a free democratic country. I am deeply grateful for the justice provided by the Dutch government. This outcome has inspired me and renewed my spiritual motivation. The Chinese government must understand that it cannot silence my voice through transnational repression, violence, or death threats. Although I suffered physical assault and trauma, I have shown the Dutch government, politicians, and the public that a Uyghur person can feel as if they are being dragged to a concentration camp even in a free country. This is the power of peaceful protest.
The Dutch police are currently investigating the transnational crimes committed against me. I will share the results with my readers as soon as they become available. Justice will

## Trump Administration Quietly Eases Uyghur Forced Labor Enforcement

17 March 2026, Turkestan Press

While trade tensions with China dominate headlines, the Trump administration has largely shelved one of the most powerful tools Congress created to hold Beijing accountable — the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA).
Passed in 2021 with near-unanimous bipartisan support, the law requires US importers to prove that goods made in Xinjiang do not involve forced labor. Under Biden, enforcement steadily grew, with $1.4 billion worth of goods detained in 2024.

Under Trump, that figure collapsed to just $178 million — an 87% drop. No new companies have been added to the forced labor blacklist since Trump took office, despite the Biden administration leaving what officials described as a strong pipeline of candidates ready for listing.
Monthly inspection rates also fell sharply, dropping from over 900 shipments per month to around 224. In January, Customs and Border Protection quietly changed its reporting methodology, making direct comparisons harder to track.
Critics argue the administration is deprioritizing Uyghur rights as leverage in broader trade negotiations, particularly ahead of Trump's expected summit with Xi Jinping in Beijing. "Important trade restrictions that protect human rights worldwide are up for negotiation," warned Laura Murphy, a former DHS senior policy advisor.
Advocates point out the contradiction: "You cannot have reciprocity with a country using slave labor," said Nury Turkel, a Uyghur-American lawyer whose Congressional testimony helped create the law.
Meanwhile, a UN-appointed panel warned in January that China's forced labor practices across multiple provinces could amount to crimes against humanity, and China's legislature this week passed a new law enshrining ethnic assimilation policy into national law.

## China steps up repression of Uyghurs, other religious minorities

17 March 2026, Muslimnetwork

US religious freedom watchdog says Beijing's "sinicization of religion" campaign includes use of AI tools to trace and target Muslims
China continues to expand its policies aimed at reshaping religion to align it with ruling party ideology while repressing ethnic and religious minorities, according to the 2026 annual report of the United States Commission on International **Religious Freedom.**
The report says Chinese authorities remain committed to the state's policy of "sinicization of religion," which seeks to integrate the ideology of the ruling Chinese Communist Party into religious practice while promoting the assimilation of ethnic minorities.
Despite growing international criticism over the treatment of Muslim communities such as Uyghurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, the commission said Beijing continues the policies that restrict religious expression and tighten control over religious leaders and communities.
The commission, therefore, urged Washington to redesignate China as a "Country of Particular Concern," the U.S. government's most severe category for nations that commit systematic and egregious violations of religious freedom.

**Mass detentions in Xinjiang**
The report says at least half a million members of Turkic Muslim minorities, including Uyghurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, remain imprisoned or held in internment facilities in the far-western region of Xinjiang.
Authorities have also expanded forced labor programs and state-run residential boarding schools, which critics say are designed to assimilate minority populations and weaken their cultural and religious identity.
China has repeatedly denied accusations of abuse in Xinjiang, describing its policies as counterterrorism and poverty-reduction measures.
The commission says repression extends beyond Muslim minorities.
Among Tibetan Buddhists, authorities have demolished religious monuments such as stupas and statues, imprisoned monks and reiterated their intention to control the succession of the exiled spiritual leader Dalai Lama.
Independent Protestant Christian groups have also faced intensified pressure. The report notes that more than 20 members of the house church Zion Church were detained in October, including its pastor, Ezra Jin.
The commission cited pressure on underground Catholic clergy to join state-controlled religious institutions, noting that authorities appointed two Catholic bishops without approval from the Catholic Church.
Practitioners of the spiritual movement Falun Gong also remained targets of prosecution. The report says some elderly adherents died in custody after alleged mistreatment.
**Surveillance and technology**
According to the commission, China has intensified the use of artificial intelligence and digital surveillance technologies to monitor religious activity, particularly among ethnic minorities.
Authorities have developed AI tools capable of tracking and analyzing Uyghur and Tibetan languages online, which researchers say further restricts religious expression and communication.
The report also accuses China of engaging in transnational repression, targeting religious minorities living abroad through surveillance, disinformation campaigns and pressure on foreign governments.
In February, Thailand deported 40 Uyghurs to China, a move that drew criticism from rights groups who warned they could face imprisonment, torture or other punishment upon return.
International human rights bodies have repeatedly raised concerns about China's treatment of religious communities.
Experts from the United Nations have highlighted allegations of arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances of religious leaders and restrictions on the religious freedoms of Uyghurs, Tibetans and Christians.

**Policy debate in Washington**

The commission's findings come as U.S. policymakers debate how to respond to Beijing's policies.

USCIRF urged Washington to redesignate China as a "Country of Particular Concern," the U.S. government's most severe category for nations that commit systematic and egregious violations of religious freedom.

It also recommended sanctions against Chinese government entities responsible for the policies, including the United Front Work Department and elements of China's public security apparatus.

The commission further called on the United States to appoint a special coordinator for Tibetan issues to address concerns over religious freedom and Beijing's efforts to influence the future succession of the Dalai Lama.

**Legislative efforts**

Several proposals addressing China's human rights record have been introduced in the United States Congress, including the Uyghur Policy Act of 2025, the Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act of 2025, and the Combatting the Persecution of Religious Groups in China Act.

The report noted that reductions in U.S. funding for human rights programs and international media during the administration of Donald Trump affected organizations documenting religious freedom violations in China, including the Uyghur and Tibetan language services of Radio Free Asia.

USCIRF said continued monitoring, diplomatic engagement and targeted sanctions remain key tools for addressing what it described as systematic and ongoing restrictions on religious freedom in China.

## PRESS RELEASE: WUC RAISES CONCERNS ON NEW ETHNIC UNITY LAW

The World Uyghur Congress (WUC) expresses serious concern on the newly approved ***Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress***, adopted on Thursday during the Chinese Communist Party's annual parliamentary session. The law effectively codifies long-standing policies of assimilation and repression into national legislation, providing a formal legal basis for practices that have already severely restricted the rights of **Uyghurs, Tibetans and Southern Mongolians.** By linking "ethnic unity" to state security and anti-separatism policies, the law grants authorities sweeping powers to punish individuals accused of undermining unity.

The *Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress*, first introduced in 2023 and submitted to the 14th National People's Congress, forms part of the National People's Congress' five-year legislative plan and is intended to guide the Chinese government's ethnic policy framework. The legislation provides officials with a more detailed legal structure through which restrictions can be imposed, further institutionalizing fear and repression in East Turkistan, Tibet, and Southern Mongolia. Any limited legal protections that previously existed for ethnic groups are effectively subordinated to the new law.

"Paired with the Counter-Terrorism Law, which has served as the legal justification for the mass internment camp system launched in 2016, this new legislation will further deepen repression against Uyghurs in East Turkistan, particularly in relation to linguistic, cultural, and religious freedoms," said WUC President **Turgunjan Alawdun**. "Over the past decade, policies of forced assimilation and Sinicization have already inflicted severe damage on Uyghur cultural and religious identity."

While the law does not fundamentally change existing policies, it serves to formalize and legitimize an ideological framework centered on assimilation and political control. The legislation broadly prohibits any acts deemed harmful to "ethnic unity," a vague and expansive concept that allows authorities significant discretion in determining what constitutes a violation. In practice, this creates legal grounds for punishing expressions of ethnic identity, cultural practices, religious observance, or criticism of government policies.

Such provisions risk further forcing Uyghurs and other non-Han communities to conform to state-defined cultural and political norms promoted by the Chinese Communist Party. Activities associated with religion, non-Han cultural identity, or dissent against government policies could increasingly be framed as threats to "ethnic unity," reinforcing existing patterns of repression.

The law also promotes policies aimed at accelerating assimilation through increased social and spatial integration. It encourages cross-regional population transfers and the deliberate "intermingling" of ethnic groups in the name of strengthening a shared national identity.

The law further promotes and incentivizes inter-ethnic marriages, particularly between Han Chinese and members of minority communities such as Uyghurs. This campaign of inter-ethnic marriages already started in 2014. These measures contribute to broader efforts to dilute minority identities and accelerate the assimilation of non-Han peoples.

The law also raises concerns regarding **transnational repression.** Certain provisions may allow Chinese authorities to pursue individuals or organizations outside China accused of undermining "ethnic unity," reflecting an expanding pattern of legal intimidation targeting diaspora communities and international advocacy efforts.

The new law comes amid intensified efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to disrupt the intergenerational transmission of language, culture, and religious knowledge in East Turkistan.

Uyghur children have been separated from their families and placed in state-run boarding schools where they are pressured to abandon their Uyghur identity and adopt a state-defined national identity.
The legislation further reinforces the prioritization of Mandarin as the dominant language in education and public life, marginalizing ethnic languages such as Uyghur and Tibetan. In many areas, including East Turkistan, mother-tongue education has already been replaced by Mandarin-only instruction. Reports indicate that Uyghur children are increasingly discouraged from speaking their mother tongue even in informal or private settings.
The adoption of this law stands in contradiction to China's own constitutional provisions and regional autonomy laws, which formally guarantee ethnic minorities the right to preserve and develop their languages, cultures, and religious traditions. It also raises serious concerns regarding China's obligations under international human rights law, including the **International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights**.
The World Uyghur Congress urges the international community, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and national governments, to raise these concerns with Chinese authorities in bilateral engagements, particularly as many heads of state prepare for upcoming official visits to China.

## The normalization of Uyghur repression in the name of 'social governance' in China

11 March 2026, Global Voices




*Chinese President Xi Jinping has been urging grassroots officials to strengthen and innovate social governance since 2021. Screenshot for Chinese National Radio's video on "Xi's thought on social governance." Fair use.*

In recent years, Chinese official discourse has increasingly used the term "social governance" (社會管治) to describe policies in the Uyghur region (Xinjiang) of China. This seemingly neutral administrative language is quietly reshaping people's perception of repression, genocide, forced assimilation, and social control.
The Uyghurs are a native people of the Uyghur region (in northwestern China), known in modern history as East Turkestan. They have a distinct language, ethnicity, and culture that differ from those of the Han people, who make up approximately 92 percent of the population of the People's Republic of China. In the eighteenth century, the region became a colony of the Manchu Qing Empire. It was later ruled by the Republic of China and is now governed by the People's Republic of China. In the twentieth century, Uyghurs fought wars against the rule of the Republic of China and established the independent East Turkestan Republics in 1933 and again in 1944. For decades, the Uyghurs have faced persecution from the People's Republic of China.
Since 2016, the plight of the Uyghurs has drawn widespread international attention due to reports of mass detention, forced disappearances, extensive surveillance systems, and restrictions on religious and cultural life. Leaked government documents, testimonies from camp survivors, and multiple international investigations have made the region a central issue in global human rights discussions.
Chinese authorities have consistently described these policies as necessary measures to combat terrorism and maintain stability. However, United Nations human rights experts and international human rights organizations have repeatedly expressed serious concern about the scale of repression and its impact on Uyghur society.
In recent years, the official narrative surrounding the region has begun to shift. Detention facilities have become less visible in state media coverage, tourism campaigns highlighting the region's landscapes and cultural heritage have re-emerged, and official reports increasingly portray the region as peaceful, prosperous, and harmonious.
Within this evolving narrative, one concept has become particularly prominent: "social governance."
On March 1st, the state-run newspaper Xinjiang Daily published an article titled "Uniting Hearts and Minds, Advancing Through Governance" (凝心聚力向治而行). The report described discussions among grassroots officials reviewing governance practices and planning future administrative priorities. It portrayed the Uyghur region as a model of effective governance, social stability, and public satisfaction.
Phrases such as "Party leadership," "closed-loop petition systems," "volunteer service networks," and "grassroots governance" appear repeatedly throughout the article, constructing an image of orderly and efficient administration.
Yet within this seemingly neutral language of governance, the uppermost political concerns regarding the cultural, religious, and social autonomy of Uyghur disappears.
"Social governance" replaces ethnic and political concerns

When decoding Chinese official documents, a major key is to look for what officials avoid saying. This particular piece makes little reference to ethnic rights, religious freedom, language use, or cultural continuity. Nor does it acknowledge the concerns repeatedly raised by international observers.

The conflicts in the Uyghur region are not merely a matter of governance but also stem from history, demographic change, and political power structures.

According to data from China's National Bureau of Statistics, the population of the Uyghur region in 1953 was approximately 4.87 million, of whom about 3.64 million — roughly 75 percent — were Uyghurs, while Han Chinese accounted for only about 6 percent. By 2010, however, Han Chinese made up roughly 40 percent of the population, while the Uyghur share had declined to around 46 percent.

Many researchers link this demographic transformation to decades of large-scale migration policies that encouraged settlement from China's interior.

Although China formally operates a system of "regional ethnic autonomy (民族區域自治制)," the political structure tells a different story. The most powerful position in the region — the Communist Party secretary — is appointed by the central government, while the regional chairman, who is typically Uyghur, holds far less real authority.

Under such a structure, autonomy often exists more as a symbolic arrangement than as meaningful self-governance.

As a result, Uyghurs have increasingly been marginalized in their own homeland, not only politically but also in areas such as education, employment, and language use.

Party leadership and the shrinking of independent social space

The article published in the state-run outlet further consolidates the asymmetrical power structure and repeatedly emphasises the efficiency of "Party-led social governance."

Under such rhetoric, the ruling party is positioned as the central organizer of social life, leaving little space for independent social organizations. Religious institutions, community-based mutual aid networks, traditional authority structures, and informal social organizations are replaced by a state-directed governance system engineered through a decade-long set of security policies.

After 2016, large numbers of Uyghurs were sent to facilities officially described as "vocational education and training centers." International researchers estimate that at the peak of the campaign, hundreds of thousands to over one million Uyghurs may have been detained.

At the same time, authorities constructed an extensive surveillance infrastructure that includes biometric data collection, digital monitoring systems, and neighborhood-level grid management.

Large-scale social control programs were also introduced. One example is the so-called "pairing to become family program" (結對認親), in which government officials were assigned to stay in Uyghur households to monitor daily life and strengthen political oversight.

These policies have not only reshaped the region's administrative structures but also deeply affected everyday life for Uyghur communities.

The governing logic of the party-led control system is expressed in the article by another key concept, "stability," which is used alongside the phrase "long-term peace."

Stability is framed as the highest public good, and governance policies are presented as preventive measures designed to eliminate potential risks, which may cover acts including: speaking the Uyghur language, participating in religious activities, communicating with relatives overseas, studying or travelling abroad.

United Nations human rights experts have described aspects of governance in the region as a form of preventive oppression, in which individuals may face restrictions not because of specific actions but because of their identity, beliefs, or social networks.

The article's official narratives also praise the expansion of volunteer service networks as an achievement of social cohesion and civic participation.

Yet, in reality, the party-organized networks, which have increasingly become the only acceptable form of collective activity, have replaced traditional forms of social support within Uyghur communities, including religious charity and community-based mutual aid networks.

Through this process, everyday social life becomes increasingly integrated into governance structures.

The soft language of assimilation

The official article concludes by emphasizing the importance of cultivating a "a shared sense of Chinese national identity" (中華民族共同體意識). This implies that while cultural differences may exist, the Chinese national identity should be prioritized above all other identities.

Such a principle is translated into a set of assimilationist political practices, which often mean that ethnic cultures may be displayed, but not independently organized; ethnic languages may exist, but not dominate public life; religion may be practiced, but only within strict political boundaries.

Some policies have been geared to Ugyhur's family structures, including campaigns encouraging interethnic marriage and the centralized management of children whose parents have been detained.

Critics argue that such policies represent a profound attempt to reshape Uyghur cultural and social life.

The tone of the article “Uniting Hearts and Minds, Advancing Through Governance” is moderate, rational, and optimistic, and thus, powerful.
It has renamed control into governance, repression into service, and assimilation into integration. Structural coercion is presented as responsible public administration.
Governance in the post-violence era
The governance model emerging in the Uyghur region also reflects a broader transformation in contemporary authoritarian politics.
Repression does not always rely on visible coercion, as administrative systems, data technologies, social engineering, and policy language can gradually reshape social reality.
For many Uyghur families, the defining experience of recent years has not been open conflict but disappearance: across the Uyghur diaspora, countless people have lost contact with relatives back home. Many have been detained, sentenced, or simply vanished from public life.
The social governance system, presented as rational, benevolent, and successful in Chinese official discourse, is precisely engineered to deprive people of the ability to organize themselves, express their identity, and sustain their cultural life, thereby quietly normalizing repression in society.



*Xinjiang, China, where most Uyghurs live. Image from Wikimedia Commons. CC BY-SA 3.0.*

## USCIRF 2026 Report: China's Genocide Against Uyghurs Escalates Into New Phase

07 March 2026, Turkestan Press

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has released its 2026 Annual Report, placing China among the world's most severe violators of religious freedom and documenting an intensifying campaign of genocide and cultural erasure against Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples in East Turkistan.

The report identifies China's "Sinicization of religion" policy — personally praised by Xi Jinping during his 2025 visits to East Turkistan and Tibet — as the regime's most dangerous tool, aiming to strip religion of its spiritual essence and reshape it into a Party loyalty instrument. This includes demolishing mosques, forcibly altering their architecture into Chinese styles, and a September 2025 regulation banning all unauthorized online religious activity.
At least half a million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Turkic peoples remain detained in camps and prisons. Children are systematically separated from families and placed in state boarding schools to sever them from their language, faith, and identity — acts the report recognizes as among the most severe forms of genocide under international law.
Daily religious life has been fully criminalized. In one harrowing case, a Uyghur mother named Seylihan Rozi was sentenced to 17 years in prison simply for teaching her children a few Quranic verses. During Ramadan 2025, authorities demanded Uyghurs submit video proof they were not fasting.
China's repression has also gone global. Thailand deported 40 Uyghurs to China under Beijing's pressure. Switzerland reported Chinese agents coercing Uyghurs to spy on their own communities. Turkey dismantled a Chinese espionage network targeting exiled Uyghurs.
On the response side, the U.S. has enacted visa restrictions on officials complicit in forced repatriations, tightened enforcement of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, and passed the Uyghur Policy Act of 2025 with bipartisan support.
The report concludes with an urgent call: the international community must move beyond statements and take unified political, economic, and legal action — before an ancient people's language, faith, and existence are permanently erased.

## Global Alarm Rises Over Uyghur Arrests in China's Holy Month Siege

06 March 2026, Impact Policies

Global Alarm Rises Over Uyghur Arrests in China's Holy Month Siege. Intensified crackdowns on Uyghur Muslims in China's Xinjiang region during Ramadan have triggered widespread international concern, highlighting a pattern of religious suppression and mass arrests.
These measures, enforced as part of broader state policy, transform the holy month into a period of heightened surveillance and coercion, raising urgent questions about human rights violations on a massive scale. Reports from advocacy groups detail thousands detained for basic religious observances, underscoring the systematic nature of Beijing's approach to Uyghur communities.

Historical Context of Xinjiang Policies

Since 2017, China's state policy in Xinjiang has involved the construction of vast internment camps, with estimates indicating over 1 million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities detained in facilities officially termed

These camps emerged in response to sporadic violence in the region, but critics argue they serve as instruments of cultural assimilation rather than security. The state policy expanded to include pervasive surveillance systems, covering up to 80% of the Uyghur population through facial recognition, AI-driven monitoring, and police checkpoints.

During religious periods like Ramadan, these controls intensify, with authorities banning fasting, seizing prayer materials, and deploying drones over mosques. This escalation aligns with a long-term state policy aimed at curbing what Beijing describes as extremism, though independent analyses reveal a deeper intent to erode Islamic practices.

By 2026, the infrastructure of control includes repurposed or demolished religious sites, with approximately 16,000 mosques affected since the policy's inception, representing a profound assault on Uyghur architectural and spiritual heritage.

The state policy extends to family separations, forced labor programs, and mandatory

sessions that prioritize loyalty to the Communist Party. Birth rates in Uyghur-majority areas have plummeted by around 60% since 2017, attributed to coerced sterilizations and intra-family detentions.

These elements collectively paint a picture of demographic engineering, where human rights to family, faith, and autonomy are systematically curtailed under the guise of national stability.

Ramadan 2026: The Holy Month Siege Unfolds

Ramadan in 2026 has witnessed a familiar yet alarming surge in enforcement, with reports of over 500 arrests in Hotan alone for "illegal religious activities" such as private fasting or gatherings. Checkpoints proliferate around mosques, and residents face random inspections for halal food or religious texts, creating an atmosphere of constant dread. This "Holy Month Siege" weaponizes the spiritual significance of Ramadan, turning reflection and abstinence into punishable offenses.

Surveillance spikes during this period, with detention rates increasing by 20-30% in targeted zones, according to leaked police data. Uyghurs report being coerced into public meals to demonstrate non-observance, while children are separated for state-run indoctrination.

The state policy here reveals its precision: by targeting the holiest month, authorities amplify psychological pressure, fostering compliance through fear. Satellite imagery confirms expanded camp capacities ahead of Ramadan, suggesting premeditated escalation.

These actions do not occur in isolation but build on years of infrastructure development, including AI systems that flag religious attire or behaviors. The result is a community under siege, where even silent prayer risks arrest, embodying a state policy that views religious expression as a threat to unity. Human rights advocates have long documented these patterns, emphasizing how they erode communal bonds during times meant for unity.

Scale and Statistics of Suppression

Quantitative evidence underscores the enormity of the crackdown. UN assessments peg the total detained since 2017 at over 1 million, with Ramadan periods marking consistent upticks in processing through camps.

In Xinjiang, surveillance apparatuses monitor 80% of Uyghurs daily, generating petabytes of data for predictive policing. Mosque demolitions stand at 16,000, a 65% reduction that has gutted religious life, per cross-verified satellite analyses.

Forced labor implicates hundreds of thousands, with Uyghurs transferred to factories across China, feeding global supply chains in cotton, electronics, and solar panels. Economic indicators show stunted growth in Uyghur areas, contrasted by Han Chinese influx, signaling assimilationist goals. Health data reveals elevated suicide rates and trauma-linked disorders, with human rights reports citing torture in detention facilities.

Detention spikes during Ramadan—such as Hotan's 500+ cases in 2025—illustrate localized intensity, often for trivial violations. These figures, drawn from survivor testimonies and defected official documents, confirm a state policy of preemptive control, where religious observance equates to subversion. The cumulative toll includes cultural losses: traditional dances, languages, and cuisine fade as generations are reprogrammed.

Mechanisms of Control and Surveillance

China's state policy relies on cutting-edge technology for enforcement. Integrated Joint Operations Platforms aggregate data from cameras, apps, and informants, assigning "extremism" scores to individuals. During Ramadan, algorithms prioritize mosque vicinities, triggering drone patrols and rapid arrests. This tech-driven approach ensures minimal resistance, with compliance rates nearing 100% in monitored zones.

Physical infrastructure complements digital oversight: ringed checkpoints, razor-wire perimeters around villages, and re-education compounds dot the landscape. Forced attendance at propaganda classes during fasting hours reinforces secular ideology, portraying Islam as incompatible with modernity. Human rights concerns peak here, as detainees endure sleep deprivation, beatings, and ideological bombardment tailored to religious holidays.

The policy's efficiency stems from centralized command, with regional leaders incentivized by

promotion quotas for "stability maintenance." Leaked directives reveal quotas for detentions, tying career advancement to suppression metrics. This bureaucratic machinery sustains the siege, making Ramadan a litmus test for loyalty.

Impacts on Uyghur Identity and Society

The Holy Month Siege strikes at the core of Uyghur identity, severing ties to Islam that define communal life. Fasting bans and prayer prohibitions fragment families, with children reciting party oaths instead of Quranic verses. Cultural erasure accelerates: historical texts are burned, attire policed, and holidays commandeered for state events.

Societal ripple effects include eroded trust, underground faith practices, and mass emigration attempts. Women face heightened scrutiny, with sterilizations linked to human rights abuses under family planning edicts. Economic disempowerment follows, as Uyghurs are sidelined from local commerce in favor of state enterprises.

Long-term, this state policy risks radicalizing youth through despair, contradicting Beijing's security rationale. Exile communities preserve heritage digitally, but domestic isolation threatens extinction. The holy month's desecration symbolizes broader existential peril, where survival demands cultural suicide.

Global Response and Geopolitical Ramifications

International alarm has prompted sanctions, trade bans, and diplomatic isolation efforts. Western parliaments debate genocide recognition, tying aid to transparency demands. Economic decoupling targets Xinjiang products, with audits costing firms billions yet exposing complicity.

China counters with deflection, framing critiques as interference while leveraging Belt and Road ties for silence from Muslim states. This divide pits human rights universality against sovereignty claims, fueling US-China tensions. Forums like the UN Human Rights Council see stalled resolutions, hampered by vetoes.

Corporate responses vary: some divest, others comply with audits. Advocacy amplifies via leaks like the Xinjiang Police Files, sustaining pressure. Yet enforcement gaps persist, as global interdependence tempers resolve.

Challenges to Accountability and Reform

Beijing's opacity blocks verification, denying access to independent observers. Domestic propaganda portrays camps as successes, citing terrorism declines—though analysts attribute this to suppression, not deradicalization. State policy evolves subtly, shifting from overt camps to "community correction" centers.

Human rights pathways remain fraught: tribunals gather evidence, but prosecutions elude. Exile testimonies fuel campaigns, yet fatigue sets in amid competing crises. Sustainable change demands unified economic leverage, transcending rhetoric.

The Uyghur plight endures, with Ramadan arrests epitomizing resilient defiance against erasure. Global vigilance must evolve into concrete mechanisms, challenging the state policy at its roots.

## China's Plan to Demolish the Baytullah Mosque in Ghulja Revealed

05 March 2026, Turkestan Press




China is planning to demolish and convert one of the most iconic historic mosques in Ghulja (Yining), East Turkistan — the Baytullah Mosque — into a Chinese-style structure. The mosque has already been fenced off and is being prepared for demolition.

According to information recently conveyed to Istiqlal Television, the Baytullah Mosque, which carries over two and a half centuries of history in the Ghulja region, now faces demolition under the pretext of "reforming Arab-style architecture." China has planned to convert the mosque into a Chinese-style building and has forced residents to sign documents consenting to its demolition and conversion.

The Baytullah Mosque was built in 1773, expanded once in 1865, and renovated in 1981. Like the Id Kah Mosque in Kashgar, it had temporarily escaped China's destruction — preserved as a tourist attraction to deceive visitors. For years, it has served as one of the region's tourist sites. However, as a result of China's systematic campaign of forcibly changing religious and historical names, the mosque's name was already changed to "South Liberation Road Mosque" decades ago.

Relevant reports have revealed that China has demolished or destroyed nearly 16,000 mosques across East Turkistan, and it is not difficult to imagine that the true and most current figure may be even higher. While famous mosques such as Id Kah and Baytullah have been kept standing as window dressing for China's deception, they now face the threat of destruction under China's so-called "Sinicization of Islam" terror policy.

## UN Warns of Enforced Disappearance of 40 Uyghurs Deported to China by Thailan

05 March 2026, Turkestan Press

One year after Thai authorities forcibly returned 40 Uyghur Muslim men to China, the United Nations has expressed grave concern over their fate, warning that their disappearance reflects a dangerous pattern of transnational repression against ethnic and religious minorities.

The men were deported on 27 February 2025 under intense Chinese government pressure, in violation of the international principle of non-refoulement. Before their deportation, they had been held for over a decade in Bangkok's Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Centre under substandard conditions, completely cut off from family, lawyers, and the outside world.

A year on, their families have received no communication, no confirmation of their whereabouts, and no indication of whether they are even alive. China has denied independent monitors access and continues to refuse detainees timely legal counsel, citing vague "national security" grounds. Relatives who attempt to seek information face systematic surveillance and intimidation, silencing them into fearful isolation.

The UN experts were unequivocal: "Justice cannot be pursued in silence." They condemned the deportations as a blatant breach of international human rights law, noting they were carried out despite repeated urgent appeals from UN bodies, Thailand's own National Human Rights Commission, and civil society organizations worldwide.

The OHCHR issued three clear calls to action — China must grant independent monitors full private access and end the intimidation of families; Thailand must be held accountable; and all states must immediately stop forcibly returning Uyghurs to China and strengthen international safeguards against such acts of transnational repression.

## Japan Urged to Adopt Law to Counter Uyghur Forced Labor

05 March 2026, Ughyur Times

Lawmakers and Uyghur activists gathered in Tokyo on February 25 at an event hosted by the Japan Uyghur Association to discuss the Chinese government's ongoing human rights abuses in the Uyghur region and the need for stronger international measures against forced labor.

Keiji Furuya, a senior member of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and chair of the Japan Uyghur Parliamentary Association, said Japan should send "a big message to the world" regarding China's treatment of Uyghurs. He noted that the parliamentary group plans to draft




legislation modeled after the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act adopted by the United States.

In a February 18 letter, Human Rights Watch urged Japan to introduce import restrictions targeting goods linked to state-imposed forced labor. The organization said such measures would increase pressure on the Chinese government to end abusive labor practices in Xinjiang and elsewhere.

Human Rights Watch also recommended that Japanese companies importing goods from high-risk regions should be required to prove that their products are not produced through forced labor.

World Uyghur Congress reported that On 25 February, a major international symposium under the theme "China's Ethnic Regional Autonomy System and the Reality of Uyghur Genocide" was held in Tokyo, organized by the Japan Uyghur Association and co-sponsored by the World Uyghur Congress and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.

Zumretay Erkin, the vice president of World Uyghur Congress said:"what is happening in East Turkistan is not distant — it is embedded in global supply chains, present in everyday products, linked to exported surveillance technologies, and felt by Uyghur families living in Japan. This is not only a humanitarian crisis, but also a matter of national security and regional stability."

According to rights groups, since 2016 Chinese authorities have detained up to millions of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in political "reeducation" camps and imprisoned hundreds of thousands more without due process. Many have been subjected to torture, mass surveillance, family separation, and forced labor.

Forced labor programs in Uyghur region affect global supply chains in sectors such as automotive manufacturing, solar panels, apparel, seafood, agriculture, and critical minerals.

Japan has previously raised concerns about China's human rights record, including during the 2024 review of China at the United Nations Human Rights Council and in a 2025 meeting with Xi Jinping.

Human rights advocates say stronger import controls and corporate accountability laws are necessary to ensure that global markets do not benefit from forced labor.

## Imprisoned Uyghur Writer Yalqun Rozi Awarded 2026 Graciela Fernández Meijide Award

01 March 2026, UyghurTimes

Imprisoned Uyghur literary critic Yalqun Rozi named among political prisoners from Equatorial Guinea, China, and North Korea honored in the award's first global edition, with the ceremony set for August on the Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Totalitarianism.

The fourth "Graciela Fernández Meijide Award for the Defence of Human Rights" has recognized imprisoned Uyghur writer and literary critic Yalqun Rozi as a 2026 recipient. The award ceremony will be held in August on the Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Totalitarianism.

The award aims to honor efforts to defend human rights, whether by individuals, groups, or organizations, in countries with authoritarian regimes, in democracies facing setbacks in civil and political freedoms, or in situations where activists' safety is threatened, based on reports from respected international organizations.

The jury, composed of Inés Pousadela, Eduardo Ulibarri, Vicente Palermo and Rubén Chababo, reviewed nominations highlighting the lives and arbitrary detention of citizens from Azerbaijan, North Korea, Cuba, China, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco and Venezuela. These cases were submitted by human rights organisations and relatives.

In the official minutes of this fourth edition, the jury stated:

"Each and every nomination received, from Africa, Asia and Latin America, concerns citizens living in countries where civic space is severely restricted. In these contexts, authoritarian or totalitarian regimes have violated the most basic civic freedoms, forcing their societies to live under fear and repression. For this reason, each of these activists deserves recognition and admiration from the members of this jury."

Other award recipients include Anacleto Micha Ndong of Equatorial Guinea and Kim Jung-Wook, Choi Chun-Gil and Kim Kook-Kie of North Korea.

The YALQUN ROZI, a respected Uyghur literary critic, writer and former editor at the state-run Xinjiang Education Press, focused his work on protecting and promoting the Uyghur language, culture and identity within the official education system before his detention by the Chinese authorities.

According to the jury, "His case exemplifies the repression of non-violent cultural advocacy and the systematic persecution of Uyghur intellectuals for defending the cultural and human rights of their people. As various human rights organisations have reported, systematic persecution and the Chinese government's plan to eradicate Uyghur identity have intensified since 2017. Since then, nearly three million Uyghurs have been arbitrarily detained and sent to camps where they have faced political indoctrination, torture, rape, forced sterilisation, forced labour and other forms of inhumane treatment. Thousands of children have been placed in state-run boarding schools, while the Uyghur birth rate has been reduced by half due to forced sterilisation and compulsory intrauterine device insertions."

The World Uyghur Congress (WUC) welcomed the recognition of Yalqun Rozi.

"Yalqun Rozi's case starkly illustrates the systematic and arbitrary targeting of Uyghur intellectuals under the ongoing crackdown. Renewed global attention would contribute to sustained pressure for his release. Greater international awareness may also help clarify his current whereabouts and health conditions, which remain largely unknown to his family members." – said WUC President Turgunjan Alawdun.

"CFU is proud to see Yalkun Rozi honored as a recipient of the 2026 Graciela Fernandez Meijide Award," said CFU Executive Director Rushan Abbas. "Yalkun Rozi's recognition is a victory for the Uyghur spirit. While the CCP attempts to rewrite our history by imprisoning our greatest scholars, this honor proves that our culture is resilient against the CCP's war against Uyghur identity and our cause is global. We will continue to amplify his voice until he and every intellectual held in the shadow of this genocide are free. We are grateful to CADAL for shedding light on his case and Uyghur culture as a whole."

Uyghur intellectual Zulhayat Ötkür describes Mr. Yalqun Rozi as a literary figure who achieved remarkable results within the Uyghur community, characterizing him as a critic rich in critical spirit, a public intellectual with a strong sense of responsibility, a researcher driven by a spirit of inquiry, and a persuasive speaker with the ability to inspire and convince others.

# CHINA & HONG KONG

## 'They can reach me wherever': China using financial tactics to coerce people who flee, says report

25 March 2026, The Guardian

UK urged to tackle transnational repression, as dissidents say Beijing has targeted them with tax bills and other threats.

I didn't feel safe, even though I'm not based in Hong Kong any more," said Christopher Mung Siu-tat after getting tax bills from Hong Kong authorities. "The regime can reach me by their long arms wherever I am."

Siu-tat, the executive director at the Hong Kong Labour Rights Monitor, a UK-based NGO, fled Beijing's sweeping national security laws years ago. The letters are the latest example of a series of transnational repression (TNR) tactics the 54-year-old has faced in recent years.

"I was not surprised that the Hong Kong police and Chinese agents have been chasing me because of my political advocacy, but I was shocked that the authorities have been weaponising the revenue department as a political tool," he said.Two letters claimed that the UK-based trade unionist owed additional income tax and profit tax for the year 2018, as well as tax for a business he had never registered. Siu-tat then received another letter claiming retroactive taxes for the following year.

In 2023 he was one of several exiled dissidents with a bounty placed for his arrest. The same year, his relatives in Hong Kong were questioned. In 2024, Siu-tat's Hong Kong passport was cancelled, and as recently as October 2025, he was visited by counter-terrorism police to discuss measures to improve his safety in the UK.

The case is one of many highlighted in a new report by the China Strategic Risks Institute on economic transnational repression, analysing how China uses financial levers to coerce dissidents overseas.

Tensions between Beijing and the UK have thawed somewhat since Keir Starmer's visit to Beijing in January. Further calls to deepen cooperation between the two nations came on Monday, from China's foreign minister during a meeting with the UK national security adviser, Jonathan Powell, according to reports.

The report by the global thinktank calls on the UK government to define economic TNR, to prevent politically motivated measures such as freezing bank accounts and funds, the revoking of professional qualifications and retrospective tax bills that leave individuals materially worse off.

"The reluctance of financial institutions to deal with economic TNR out of alleged fear that doing so might harm their profits in jurisdictions like China is exactly why the practice needs to be properly defined in legislation," the report says.

It highlights financial institutions in the UK and Germany facing obligations to uphold Chinese domestic security laws applied extraterritorially. The two nations have signed an agreement to develop working groups with China to tackle money laundering, which the report says is at risk of being used to further economicIt also points to coercion through Hong Kong's mandatory provident fund (MPF), in which the average Hongkonger has £26,376 worth of pension savings, according to official figures. Authorities in Hong Kong refuse to acknowledge British national (overseas) passports and BNO visas as valid for withdrawing retirement funds early. In 2023, those who relocated to the UK under BNO visas raised concerns over HMRC sharing personal details with Chinese authorities as part of bilateral trade agreements.

A spokesperson for the Chinese embassy said: "These allegations are purely unfounded and not worth refuting.

"Combating money laundering crimes is a shared responsibility of all countries including China and the UK."

Xiangui Fang, a former human rights lawyer, says he was forced to give up his licence because he was outspoken of the decline of rule of law in China.

Having worked on politically sensitive cases for a Beijing firm, Fang left China in 2024 upon learning he was under investigation after lobbying human rights concerns at international conferences.

In a 2025 radio interview, he spoke critically of how the rule of law in China had declined under Xi Jinping. After this, he was told that a judicial official in Beijing wanted Fang to apply to cancel his law licence, otherwise those of his entire law firm would be suspended.

In July 2025, he followed through. Now he is without work in the UK, and unable to transfer his qualifications.

"I had no choice," said Fang. "If the judicial bureau wants to punish lawyers, they should base [it] on a formal complaint," he said, rather than "just based on political reasons".

## Tiananmen vigils 'always promoted love, responsibility,' Hong Kong activist tells subversion trial

21 MARCH 2026, HKFP

Hong Kong's Tiananmen vigils had "always promoted love and responsibility" rather than "hatred and despair," a democracy activist has told her national security trial.




*Chow Hang-tung, former leader of the group that organised Hong Kong's annual Tiananmen vigils, was escorted to Court of Final Appeal on June 8, 2023. File photo: Lea Mok/HKFP.*

Chow Hang-tung, a former leader of the now-defunct Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, testified on Friday that the vigils had the power to unite participants, rejecting the accusation that the gatherings stoked hatred against the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP).Chow, co-defendant Lee Cheuk-yan, and the Alliance are standing trial for "inciting subversion," an offence under the Beijing-imposed security law that carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison.

For decades, the Alliance organised vigils at Victoria Park to commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown in Beijing, when hundreds, perhaps thousands, were killed as troops dispersed pro-democracy demonstrators in and around Tiananmen Square.

**'Love, not hate'**

Chow, a barrister representing herself in the trial, recounted attending the vigils at Victoria Park as a child, describing them as "mesmerising" and "capable of bringing people together as one."

"The June 4th [Tiananmen crackdown] vigils had never become a place of hatred and despair even though they revolved around such a dark matter," Chow said in Cantonese. "Instead, the gatherings had always promoted love and responsibility."

"They told people that when facing injustice, we must not stand by and watch, we must step forward and make the world a better place."

The vigils provided a space to remember and articulate human suffering, she said, which she argued was an essential part of the Alliance's advocacy for democracy.




*The Tiananmen vigil in Victoria Park on June 4, 2019. File photo: Holmes Chan/HKFP.*

"The magic that allows Victoria Park to unite people throughout the years is love, not hate, as the prosecution claims," she said. "The reason we insist on telling and recording the injustice was never to spread hatred, but to gather love."

Prosecutors allege that the Alliance sought to incite others to overthrow CCP rule through its calls to "end one-party rule," a core tenet of the group since its founding in 1989.

Chow denied that the Alliance had encouraged others to resort to "illegal means" to topple the CCP, arguing that the slogan was a demand for democratisation.

She told the court that she organised a Tiananmen commemoration while she was studying at a university in the UK and joined the Alliance as a volunteer after graduating in 2010.

At that time, she was working for a Chinese labour rights NGO. At the end of 2014, she decided to run for the Alliance's executive committee, she said.

**UN submission**

She described her role as "researching and writing reports behind the scenes" due to her connections with Chinese activists and what she called a "repressive environment" for civil society after President Xi Jinping took power in 2012.

Her work at the Alliance included submitting recommendations to the UN's Universal Periodic Review of China – a top-level review of human rights records of UN member states – in 2018. The wide-ranging list highlighted China's alleged "residential surveillance" and "arbitrary detention" against human rights activists and made suggestions on legal reforms.

In court, Chow said the list was proof that the Alliance sought concrete reforms in China rather than using negative incidents to stoke hatred against China.

"The negative incidents are real problems that need to be addressed. They are not means we use to incite others," she said.




*From left: Lee Cheuk-yan, Albert Ho, Chow Hang-tung. Photos: HKFP.*

She also drew the court's attention to a 2018 joint protest by the Alliance and civil society groups in Hong Kong, in which Richard Tsoi, an ex-vice chair of the Alliance, read out a statement opposing China's constitutional amendment that year.

The amendment removed China's two-term limit on the presidency and added CCP leadership as the "defining feature" of the country's socialist system.

Chow said that, during the protest, Tsoi was calling on China's lawmakers to defend the constitution and implement human rights protections. "I can hardly see how we were advocating illegal means," she said.

The Alliance disbanded in 2021 after authorities banned the vigil for two years, citing Covid-19 restrictions, and arrested its leadership on national security allegations. Chow and Lee have been behind bars since September 2021.

A third defendant, former lawmaker Albert Ho, pleaded guilty when the trial opened in January.

Chow is set to resume her testimony on Monday.

## Call to end Chinese Communist Party rule does not mean 'overthrowing' gov't, Hong Kong lawyer tells subversion trial

11 March 2026, HKFP

Calling for an end to the rule of China's ruling party does not mean "overthrowing" its government and state organs, a Hong Kong court has heard during the national security trial of Tiananmen vigil activists.

The court on Wednesday continued to hear submissions from Lee Cheuk-yan and Chow Hang-tung, both former leaders of the now-disbanded Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, to determine whether the prosecution has produced sufficient evidence to support its case.Lee and Chow are standing trial for "inciting subversion" under the Beijing-imposed national security law. The offence carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in jail.

The case revolves around the Alliance's slogan calling for "an end to one-party rule" in China,



*Front row, from left: Albert Ho, Lee Cheuk-yan and Chow Hang-tung, leaders of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, lead a candlelit remembrance in Victoria Park in Hong Kong on June 4, 2020. File photo: Anthony Wallace/ AFP.*

which prosecutors allege amounts to breaching the country's constitution and inciting subversion.

'Quantum leap'

Defence counsel Erik Shum, representing Lee, told the court on Wednesday that the prosecution must establish that calling for an end to one-party rule is tantamount to toppling or undermining the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) leadership.

For 30 years, the Alliance's call for ending one-party rule was intertwined with its advocacy for democratisation in China, Shum said, adding that China could become a democracy in the future through further constitutional amendment.

"Even if the prosecution can prove that ending one-party rule means ending the CCP's leadership, it does not automatically become overthrowing or undermining its leadership," he said. "This is a quantum leap."

He also argued that China's top state organs, including the National People's Congress, could still operate without the CCP's leadership.

"If the CCP leadership has ended, it does not mean all central state power bodies will break down," he said.

Prosecutors allege that following China's 2018 constitutional amendment – which stipulates the CCP's "leadership" is the "defining feature" of the country's socialist system – the Alliance's advocacy has amounted to "overthrowing or undermining the basic system" of China and the country's "body of central power."

**Legitimate demand**

Chow, a barrister representing herself in the trial, argued that the court must consider human rights protections when reviewing whether the Alliance had incited others to commit subversion.

The Alliance's slogans fell within a Chinese citizen's legitimate demand for choosing the country's leadership, she told the court.

"This is a goal which every Chinese national has the right to pursue," she said. "The prosecution is trying to make this goal an unspeakable,

unthinkable, and forbidden one, but they cannot provide any legal basis."
In response, prosecutor Ned Lai argued that even a future constitutional amendment cannot change China's fundamental socialist system under the CCP's leadership.
Ending the CCP's leadership must be undermining the country's political system, he said.
But Judge Alex Lee appeared frustrated with Lai's submission, saying the prosecution should not interchange "ending" with "undermining."



*Judge Alex Lee. Photo: Judiciary.*

You have to understand our difficulty here," the judge said on Wednesday. "If we are not allowed to make interpretations, then undermining is undermining, ending is ending."
The prosecution previously submitted that the court could understand the constitution by relying on its literal meaning.
The three-judge panel said it would rule on Friday whether the case could go on.
"This decision will be very significant and carry a lot of implications. The issues are also very complicated," Judge Lee said in Cantonese as he adjourned the trial.
If the judges rule in favour of the defence on Friday, it will result in the immediate dismissal of charges and the defendants' acquittals.
Lee Cheuk-yan and Chow Hang-tung, who have been behind bars for over 1,600 days since their arrests in September 2021, are seeking early acquittals from national security charges.
A third defendant, solicitor Albert Ho, pleaded guilty when the trial opened in January.
During the 1989 crackdown in Beijing, hundreds, perhaps thousands, were killed as troops dispersed pro-democracy demonstrators in and around Tiananmen Square.
For over three decades, the Alliance held annual vigils in Victoria Park to commemorate the 1989 crackdown, calling for democracy and an end to one-party rule. Authorities banned the gathering for the first time in 2020, citing Covid-19 restrictions. The following year, the Alliance disbanded after authorities banned the vigil again and arrested its leadership.

## Jimmy Lai will not appeal conviction, paving way for political negotiations over release

06 March 2026, The Guardian

Jimmy Lai, the prominent pro-democracy activist who was recently sentenced to 20 years in prison in Hong Kong, has said he will not appeal his conviction.
The decision marks the end of a years-long legal saga for the 78-year-old critic of the Chinese Communist party (CCP), and opens the door for political negotiations to his release.
A member of Lai's Hong Kong legal team said: "We can confirm we have clear and definitive instructions not to lodge an appeal against conviction or sentence."
Lai, a British citizen, was sentenced in February after being convicted in December on charges of sedition and conspiracy to collude with foreign forces. He had pleaded not guilty to all charges.
Although Lai was spared the maximum penalty of a life sentence, his 20-year jail term is the harshest penalty given for national security offences in Hong Kong. His family has said that it could mean "he will die a martyr behind bars".
Western governments including the UK have described Lai's prosecution as politically motivated and have called for his immediate release.
The UN rights chief, Volker Türk, has said that the verdict was incompatible with international law and must be quashed.
The UK prime minister, Keir Starmer, is understood to have raised Lai's case in his recent meeting with China's leader, Xi Jinping, in Beijing. Lai's son, Sebastien, subsequently said the UK did not do enough to secure his father's release on the highly anticipated China trip.
The decision not to appeal against the conviction concludes Lai's legal process, and could mark the start of the political process to secure his release.
Western governments have previously secured the release of citizens held by China, including the Australian journalist Cheng Lei and the Canadian citizens Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, who were imprisoned after a row between Beijing and Ottawa over the detention of a Huawei executive.
But those cases were all linked to deteriorating bilateral relations, while Lai has been an outspoken critic of the CCP, a regime that treats dissidents harshly.
Lai's lawyers would not elaborate on why he was not appealing.
A Hong Kong appellate court recently overturned separate fraud convictions against Lai, the sentences for which have already been served. The numerous legal cases brought against the once powerful media mogul were described by his supporters as "lawfare" – the use of the legal system to silence critics.

The US president, Donald Trump, is expected to visit China between 31 March and 2 April. Trump has previously said that he asked Xi to "consider" releasing Lai, who previously said that Trump was "the only one who can save" Hong Kong from the tightening grip of the CCP.
The Chinese and Hong Kong authorities have defended Lai's conviction and said that it is not related to press freedom.
The UK Foreign Office and the Hong Kong government were approached for comment.

# CHINA-NEPAL

## China expresses readiness to work with new Nepal gov't as pro-Beijing former PM Oli arrested

29 March 2026, Tibetan Review



China has welcomed Nepal's new Prime Minister Balendra Shah as it seeks to recast two decades of Nepal policy anchored in the country's Communist stalwarts KP Sharma Oli and Pushpa Kamal Dahal "Prachanda", who sought to move Kathmandu closer to Beijing, including by cracking down on Tibetans, weakening its traditional ties with India, noted *dailypioneer.com* Mar 28.
Oli, the immediate former Prime Minister, was arrested on Mar 28, just a day after Shah, 35, took office in connection with the violent crackdown on the Gen-Z anti-corruption protests in Sep 2025. At least 76 people were reported killed in the protests and its aftermath, including 22 protesters, three police officers, and 10 prisoners shot while trying to escape.
Congratulating Shah, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian told the media in Beijing that China always supported Nepal in safeguarding independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and in realising solidarity, stability, development and prosperity.
Lin has expressed China's readiness to work with the new Nepalese government to carry forward the traditional friendship, deepen practical cooperation, and advance the strategic partnership of cooperation featuring ever-lasting friendship for development and prosperity.
The report noted that the massive victory of the four-year-old Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), riding high on last year's Gen-Z protests, which led to the resignation of the Oli Government, ushered a new normal in Nepal's recent history, marking an end to the dominance of communist parties, which gained political prominence after the abolition of the monarchy in the Himalayan nation in 2008.
China stepped up engagement with the country's communist parties, especially the CPN-UML headed by Oli and the CPN (Maoist Centre) led by Prachanda, who advocated for closer political and economic ties with China.
Both became Prime Ministers three times each since 2008, played important roles in helping China to advance its influence in Nepal including with the embrace of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The report continued that, importantly, China and Nepal signed up to the One China policy under which Nepal effectively closed the Tibet border, which halted hundreds of Tibetans from crossing over India to meet the Dalai Lama in Dharamshala, India.
The report cited observers as saying the sudden decline of the two communist leaders marked a titanic shift in Nepal's politics, and China will try to engage with the Balen Shah government to retain the border controls in Tibet and halt Tibetans from crossing over.
Critics have been cited as saying the BRI projects failed to make headway due to political bickering between Oli and Prachanda. The two countries signed up to the initiative in 2017, but none of the 10 projects has moved beyond planning.

## Impact of Nepal's election on China

29 March 2026, Taipei Times

This year's parliamentary election in Nepal — the first after the Gen Z-led violent protest that toppled the previous government in September last year — were marked by a foundational shift in Nepal's domestic politics. The results resoundingly rejected the traditional political parties, with the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), led by Balen Shah, securing a majority in the 275-member Nepalese House of Representatives. The complete

turnaround in Nepal's political environment could undermine China's game plan in South Asia.

Over the years, China has sought to turn Nepal into a strategic asset in South Asia. A major shift in China's Nepal policy was observed in 2017, when Beijing played a role in bringing two Nepalese communist parties together — the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), led by the K. P. Sharma Oli, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), led by Pushpa Dahal. This paved the way for the installation of Oli as Nepalese prime minister.

In the years that followed, China's involvement in Nepal's domestic politics intensified, with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) striving to bolster a communist government in Nepal — one that could align its policy and interests with China's objectives in South Asia. While Xi's 2019 visit to Nepal resulted in the two sides signing a comprehensive cooperation agreement, it also resulted in the Nepalese House unanimously passing a constitutional amendment recognizing three Indian areas as part of Nepal.

The Oli administration was instrumental in bringing Nepal into Xi's pet project, the Belt and Road Initiative, in 2017. The presence of Chinese companies in Nepal's strategic sectors — infrastructure, energy and others — has expanded. More to the point, major infrastructure projects were awarded to Chinese companies during the tenure of Oli. Defense cooperation has also witnessed some significant progress.

However, the new government's coming to power in Kathmandu is seen as an unprecedented blow to China's Nepal policy. First, the loss of political grip by the communist parties in Nepal would put a complete stop to China's clandestine efforts to consolidate the tenets of a communist regime in South Asia and beyond.

Thus, the defeat of Oli and other top communist leaders is not merely a reflection of the people's dissatisfaction with these leaders, but also underscores their discomfort with China's inroads into Nepal. This can be gauged from the fact that sections of Nepal's political parties, civil society and media had expressed their objection to China's interference in internal affairs.

Second, Shah, the new prime minister, has a critical view of China. He canceled his visit to Beijing in 2023 on the grounds that China's Ministry of Natural Resources' standard map did not incorporate Nepal's new map showing the Lipulekh, Kalapani and Limpiyadhura areas as Nepalese territory, instead of Indian territory.

Third, Beijing is also concerned that the Shah administration could review the feasibility of Chinese projects and recognize the economic and strategic costs Nepal would incur. That situation would not only adversely impact China's interests in South Asia, but also give countries in other parts of the world a cue to resist China's attempt to make them its colonies under the Belt and Road Initiative.

Fourth, China's aim to foster a close bond between its military-industrial complex and Nepal's defense needs, and thereby make Nepal dependent on it for military supplies and services, would also face a dead end. Coupled with this, the US' engagement with Nepal has not gone unnoticed by Chinese strategists. With a US$500 million Millennium Challenge Corporation agreement and more than US$200 million in annual aid, US-Nepal ties have seen significant progress in the past few years.

Fifth, with the absence of a friendly government in Nepal, China would not be in a position to clamp down on Tibetan refugees in Nepal. At the same time, Beijing is apprehensive that the engagement between Tibetan refugees staying in Nepal and India would feel emboldened to challenge China's Tibet policy.

Finally, Shah belongs to the Madhesi region of Nepal, which has the "bread and blood" relations with India's state of Bihar, and he studied and lived in India for a long time, meaning that the prospect for a strong bilateral relationship with India during his tenure is high, further adversely impacting China's interests.

With a new political generation emerging in Kathmandu and China facing strategic limitations in sustaining its engagement with Nepal, it is hoped that the consolidation of democratic institutions would enable the people of Nepal to comprehend China's expansionist gaze on Nepal and South Asia.

## Nepal to get new railway line with India as RSP gov't takes office, its Tibet railway lagging

25 March 2026, Tibetan Review

Ahead of a new government taking office in Kathmandu following the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), with its 35-year-old Prime Ministerial leader Balendra Shah's, massive recent electoral victory, India has come out with a Detailed Project Report (DPR) for a new rail link between the two countries. Meanwhile, a feasibility study for a China-Nepal railway through Tibet is set to be completed in June. Both the railway lines from Tibet and India are to reach Kathmandu, effectively linking Tibet and India by railway network through Nepal's capital.

India's Ministry of Railways has completed the Final Location Survey (FLS) and prepared the Detailed Project Report (DPR) of Raxaul-Kathmandu new line project. The 136-km-long new rail line project will further improve the connectivity between the two nations and promote economic growth and development, reported *indianexpress.com* Mar 23.

The project followed a joint statement issued by the governments of India and Nepal on April 7,

2018 for the construction of a new electrified railway line to expand rail connectivity between the two countries. This project is to be funded by the government of India and will link the border city of Raxaul in India with Kathmandu.

The report noted that in a written statement in Rajya Sabha (the upper house of Indian parliament) on Mar 20, 2026, Railway Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw said: "Pashupatinath Dham is located outside India in Kathmandu, Nepal. Nearest Railway station is Raxaul, which is well connected with railway network. Final Location Survey of Raxaul (India)-Kathmandu (Pashupatinath) new line (136 Km) has been completed and Detailed Project Report (DPR) prepared."

* * *

Meanwhile, regarding the Kerung-Kathmandu Railway, China completed the field study in April "and are now drafting the feasibility study," the *kathmandupost.com* Feb 26 quoted Bodh Bhandari, information officer at Nepal's Department of Railway, as saying.

The Kerung-Kathmandu railway will be part of the 550-km railroad connecting the Tibetan city of Shigatse with Kerung near the Nepal-Tibet border, the report said.

Bhandari has expressed confidence that the feasibility study would be structured to allow the both technically and financially highly challenging project to proceed.

While the total investment needed for the project will be known once the feasibility study is completed, the pre-feasibility study put the cost of the 72.25 km Nepali section at $2.75 billion. China wants to charge the Belt-and road Initiative (BRI) interest rate on a loan for this project while Nepal, fearing being debt-trapped, is insisting on a much lower grant-in-aid interest rate.

The proposed Tibet-Nepal railway project is not only geographically highly challenging but also very costly for both China and Nepal.

According to the pre-feasibility study report, around 98.5% of the railway would either be bridges or tunnels, and the construction cost would be Nepali Rs3.55 billion per kilometre. It envisages that engineers would build ramps along the northern and southern slopes leading to Lake Paiku, near Kerung, to connect the tracks to the Kathmandu section. The goal of the ramps would be to overcome the significant elevation difference between the southern and northern toes of the Himalayas, the report said.

## China got Nepal to ban a Tibetan Rinpoche last month, complains about burning of Xi's books

18 March 2026, Tibetan Review

China has been complaining about Tibetan lamas (religious masters) visiting Nepal and got one banned last month. It has now complained about the burning of copies of a book by President Xi Jinping at a communist-party-run college on Mar 14 night, reported the *kathmandupost.com* Mar 17.

The report cited officials at Nepal's Foreign Ministry and Home Ministry as saying China had been expressing concerns over several recent developments in the country, including visits by Rinpoches [Tibetan spiritual leaders] to Kathmandu. At China's request, the government did not allow one Rinpoche to visit Nepal last month.

The report did not name the Rinpoche.

Nepal is home to citizens in a sizeable section of the country northern belt following Tibetan Buddhism and devotees often invite top Tibetan masters to perform rituals and give empowerments and teachings.

With regard to the reported burning of copies of President Xi Jinping's *The Governance of China* at the Manamohan Technical College in Budhiganga, the chief district officer of Morang, Yuvaraj Kattel, has said junior staffers had burned the books and other items due to lack of storage space and the need to clear the room.

The report said that a video footage of the burning show some books, including copies of President Xi's, being set on fire along with other books, with some people seen holding up Xi's book to the camera.

Reacting to the incident, the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu on Mar 15 sent a note verbale to Nepal's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, urging prompt action against those involved, the report cited foreign ministry officials as saying.

The report said it was not clear why so many copies of the book were kept at the technical college.

This book by Xi has been translated into a number of foreign languages and sent abroad as an exertion of China's soft power. It was not clear what language the books burnt in the college in Nepal was in.

The report said the Morang district administration and Koshi provincial police were investigating the case.

* * *

The incident was first reported by the Biratnagar-based news website *Live News Raftar* on Mar 14 night. After the video went viral, the chief district officer of Morang district, Yuvaraj Kattel, telephoned website to ask them to delete it, saying it could harm Nepal-China relations.

"We have instructed local officials in Morang to investigate the matter and take action against those involved," Home Minister Om Prakash Aryal has said.

The college, which aspires to be a university, was set up by pro-China CPN-UML leaders. According to the college website, the late UML leader Bharat Mohan Adhikari served as president of the college from Aug 6 to Mar 2, 2019. The current president

is UML leader and former deputy prime minister Ishwar Pokhrel, who has held the position since Nov 14, 2019, the report said.
The report cited Sonu Kumar Das, the editor of *Live News Raftar*, as saying he saw a large number of copies of the Chinese president's book being burned, while many others were still stored in the college. He has spoken of having earlier received a tip-off that some sensitive or corruption-related documents were set to be destroyed at the college.

## China demands investigation after Nepal college burns hundreds of copies of Xi Jinping's book

18 March 2026, The Independent

China lodged a protest with Nepal after a college in the Himalayan nation burned hundreds of copies of Xi Jinping's book over the weekend.
*The Governance of China* was apparently burned along with several other texts at the Manmohan Memorial Polytechnic in Morang.
A video circulating on Nepali social media shows copies of Mr Xi's book, with the Chinese leader's picture on the cover, being tossed into a bonfire.
*The Governance of China,* published in 2014, compiles Mr Xi's speeches setting out his blueprint for the country's governance, economic direction and global ambitions. It wasn't known why the college housed hundreds of copies of the book.
Dean Rekha Shrestha reportedly claimed the "termite-infested" books had been lying unused for years whereas the administration said that junior staff burned the books and other documents to clear space in the lab room.
In the wake of the incident, the Chinese embassy in Kathmandu sent a note to Nepal's foreign ministry urging an investigation and prompt action against those involved. This prompted home minister Oman Prakash Aryal to instruct Morang district officials and police to investigate the incident and take action.
Chief district officer Yuvaraj Kattel sought a written explanation from the college and deployed police after crowds gathered.
Nepal "cannot tolerate such incidents" given its close relations with China, he said, adding that authorities were working to establish the facts".
"Since this is a sensitive issue, we are trying to find out the truth," he told *The Kathmandu Post*.
The incident was first reported by Sonu Kumar Das of *Live News Raftar* who allegedly saw people holding copies of Mr Xi's book up to the camera before throwing them into the flames.
"On Saturday evening, I got a message from someone that the college is going to burn down some documents. Initially the college administration didn't allow us to enter the college premises. Later, some students took me inside the college building where those books and other items were set on fire," the reporter said.
"I was astonished that such a large number of copies of the book by Xi Jinping were burnt down."
After the video went viral, Mr Kattel allegedly telephoned the *Live News Rafter* office and asked them to delete it, saying it could harm Nepal-China relations.
The incident triggered calls on social media by Nepali users to hold people who burned the books accountable to avoid souring relations with China.
The episode is an early diplomatic test for newly elected prime minister Balender Shah who faces the delicate task of balancing the country's ties with India and China.
"Enough is enough, we cannot promote such nonsense. We should not create unnecessary tension with our neighbouring country. These actions only fuel aggression and division," one user, Aashika Poudel, said on Facebook.

## Nepal accepts $4 million grant from China to support its upcoming election

04 March 2026, Phayul

In a development that has captured domestic and regional attention, the Government of Nepal has formally accepted a US $4 million grant from the Government of the People's Republic of China to support the nation's House of Representatives election scheduled for 5th March 2026. The announcement followed a Cabinet meeting, where senior ministers reviewed and endorsed the proposal.
According to an official diplomatic note from the Chinese Embassy to Nepal's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the $4 million will be disbursed under the framework of the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement of 2017 between the two governments.
The note specifies that the funds must be used exclusively for election-related support, including mobilizing temporary election police personnel, providing uniforms for the temporary election police, logistical support for these election security forces, and monitoring and oversight activities by the Armed Police Force.
In line with Chinese protocols, a dedicated account at Nepal's central bank will hold the funds, and each withdrawal will require diplomatic approval via the Ministry of Finance and the Chinese Embassy.
Nepal is on the cusp of one of its most consequential electoral exercises, with nearly 19 million registered voters set to cast their ballots in a snap election to form a new House of Representatives. The vote comes in the aftermath of widespread public unrest and the resignation of the former prime minister.

China's growing political and economic influence in Nepal has already affected how Tibetan refugees are treated. Beijing has long regarded Tibet and its diaspora as a sensitive political issue, and its ties with Kathmandu have influenced Nepal's policies toward Tibetans. As China's footprint in Nepal expands, there's concern that the environment for Tibetan refugees could become more restrictive and surveilled.

A Tibetan resident in Kathmandu, who requested anonymity, told Phayul that the Tibetan community in Nepal shares a deepening sense of anxiety over Beijing's expanding influence in the country, fearing that it could lead to even more restrictive policies targeting Tibetans. "Although Tibetan refugees in Nepal have no voice or participation in the forthcoming elections, since the youth-led revolution, many remain cautiously hopeful for a more positive and inclusive environment,"

A netizen on X (formerly Twitter) described the development as far more than routine election assistance and wrote, "This is bigger than an election. It is about sovereignty and repression. Nepal taking a $4M election grant from China comes with strings that threaten democracy and deepen foreign control over security forces. This is how influence becomes obedience under the shadow of the Chinese Communist Party."

"For Tibetan refugees in Nepal, this is especially dangerous. Beijing has long pressured Kathmandu to harass, silence, and persecute Tibetans, restrict protests, block religious freedom, and deny refugees their basic rights. More Chinese leverage means more fear for Tibetans who fled repression in Tibet seeking safety. The people of Nepal must stand up before democracy is sold piece by piece. And India should treat this as a clear warning sign. What begins in Kathmandu will echo across the region," the same user added.

## Feasibility study for a Tibet-Nepal railway expected to be completed in Jun'26

02 March 2026, Tibetan Review

Although the multi-billion dollar funding for the project is far from certain, even as the technical challenges also remain enormous, the long-awaited feasibility study of a Tibet-Nepal railway is set to be completed by the end of Jun 2026, reported *kathmandupost.com* Feb 26.

The mega trans-Himalayan railway project is seen as giving China access to larger South Asian markets and cut through "complicated and arduous" Himalayan terrain.

China is completing the feasibility report for the Kerung-Kathmandu Railway, while Nepal's southern neighbour, India, has already completed a similar study for a Raxaul-Kathmandu railway line, the report said, citing officials at Nepal's Ministry of Physical Infrastructure and Transportation.

"They [Chinese] had completed the field study in April and are now drafting the feasibility study," Bodh Bhandari, information officer at the Department of Railway, has said.

The feasibility study has been taking a long time indeed. The Xi'an-based China Railway First Survey and Design Institute Group Co. Ltd was entrusted to carry out the feasibility study, which was started in Dec 2022, the report noted.

The same firm had conducted a pre-feasibility study of the project in 2018 and concluded that the complex geological terrain and the laborious engineering workload will be the most significant obstacles to the project.

The pre-feasibility study was stated to have already raised questions about the project's viability, including the payback period, economic rate of return, among other things. It covers three districts in Nepal: Kathmandu, Nuwakot, and Rasuwa.

After the pre-feasibility study, the current phase will finalise crucial details such as the total length; the numbers of tunnels, bridges, and stations; costs, and other key factors. Based on this, the government will work towards financial closure and, if feasible, to project financing, Bhandari has said.

The total cost of the feasibility study for the 72-km Nepal section of the railway is estimated at around Rs3.4 billion (180.47 million RMB), the report said.

While the total investment needed for the project will be known once the feasibility study is completed, the pre-feasibility study put the cost of the 72.25 km Nepali section at $2.75 billion.

According to the pre-feasibility study report, around 98.5% of the railway would either be bridges or tunnels, and the construction cost would be Rs3.55 billion per kilometre. It envisages that engineers would build ramps along the northern and southern slopes leading to Lake Paiku, near Kerung, to connect the tracks to the Kathmandu section. The goal of the ramps would be to overcome the significant elevation difference between the southern and northern toes of the Himalayas, the report said.

Bhandari has said the pre-feasibility had accounted for the fact that the Himalayan region is geologically fragile and is situated in a seismic zone.

China's plan is stated to be to extend the railway from Shigatse to Kerung, and then to Nepal's capital Kathmandu.

The Kerung-Kathmandu railway will be part of the 550-km railroad connecting the Tibetan city of Shigatse with Kerung near the Nepal-Tibet border, the report said.

Bhandari has expressed confidence that the feasibility study would be structured to allow the both technically and financially highly challenging project to proceed.

# CHINA & PAKISTAN

## Pakistani FM leaves for China on regional issues

31 March 2026, Xinhua

As Pakistan is beefing up efforts to mediate tensions in the Middle East, Mohammad Ishaq Dar, the country's deputy prime minister and foreign minister, left for China on Tuesday.
At the invitation of Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, Dar will visit China on Tuesday to hold talks with Wang on current international and regional conflicts and bilateral relations, according to a spokesman of the Chinese foreign ministry on Tuesday.
The visit will provide an opportunity for both sides to hold in-depth discussions on regional developments, as well as bilateral and global issues of mutual interest, according to a press release from the Pakistani foreign ministry on Monday.
The two foreign ministers had a phone conversation on the developments regarding the situation in Iran on Friday. Wang, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, said during the talks that China is willing to enhance strategic communication and coordination with Pakistan and make joint efforts to promote peace and end the conflict.

## China, Pakistan to 'strengthen' cooperation on Iran, Beijing says

31 March 2026, MEE

China and Pakistan will "strengthen" their cooperation on Iran, Beijing's foreign ministry said Tuesday, as top Islamabad officials visited the Chinese capital.
"The two foreign ministers will strengthen strategic communication and coordination on the Iran situation and... make new efforts toward advocating for peace," foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning told a press conference, calling China and Pakistan "all-weather" strategic partners.

## How China Is Banking on Pakistan's Clout in the Middle East to Solidify Global Ambitions

29 March 2026, Modern Diplomacy

Following the recent events related to the conflict in Iran in March 2016, Pakistan emerged as a vital strategic partner for China, playing multiple roles that serve Chinese interests in the region.



*Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif meet in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, September 17, 2025. Saudi Press Agency/ Handout via REUTERS*

Following the recent events related to the conflict in Iran in March 2016, Pakistan emerged as a vital strategic partner for China, playing multiple roles that serve Chinese interests in the region. For China, in the post-Iran War era, Pakistan represents a geopolitical safety valve and a crucial diplomatic bridge for maintaining energy flows and balancing international power in South and Southeast Asia. China also declared its explicit support for Pakistan's role as a mediator to de-escalate tensions between Iran and the United States. The Pakistani capital, Islamabad, hosted ministerial meetings that included Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to discuss the repercussions of the war, a step Beijing considers essential for safeguarding regional stability.
Furthermore, China has strengthened its close relationship with Pakistan to maintain its influence in the Islamic world, particularly in the post-Iran war era, and to counter the growing Western-Indian alliances in the region. The China-Pakistan axis is seen as a potential avenue for alleviating the isolation or pressures imposed on Iran, thus serving China's vision of a multipolar world order. To that end, China has continued to provide military and technical support to Pakistan to ensure its regional deterrence capabilities, especially given the escalating tensions on its borders with India and Iran. China closely monitors internal stability in Pakistan, fearing that the security chaos emanating from Iran could spill over into Pakistani territory, potentially jeopardizing its substantial investments. Pakistan plays a vital role for China in securing energy routes and logistical alternatives following the Iran-Iraq War. With energy supplies from Iran and the Gulf disrupted by the war, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has become increasingly important as a strategic alternative for China. China relies on Pakistan to secure a land and sea route, reducing its dependence on the

Strait of Malacca, which could be closed in the event of conflict.

Furthermore, the escalating US military and political pressure against Iran has deepened the trilateral axis of China, Pakistan, and Iran, as Beijing and Islamabad seek to consolidate regional stability and protect their geostrategic interests. To this end, China is adopting an iron brother strategy with Pakistan, not just as a bilateral ally but as a geopolitical launching pad (conduit) to deepen its influence in the Islamic world and the Middle East. This relationship is of paramount importance given the current tensions between the United States and Iran, as Washington seeks to target Beijing's network of allies. Here, China is working to utilize Pakistan as a bridge to the Middle East, leveraging Pakistan's historical and religious weight in the region through several channels, most importantly diplomacy and mediation. Beijing supports Pakistan's role as an acceptable mediator in regional conflicts, such as the current mediation between the United States and Iran to de-escalate tensions. This role grants China indirect influence and portrays it as a power that supports stability through local partners like Pakistan. In addition to Pakistan's role through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as a gateway for energy for China, the CPEC (with investments exceeding $65 billion) is considered the cornerstone for connecting western China to the Pakistani port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea. This corridor provides Beijing with a land route that bypasses traditional maritime chokepoints controlled by the United States, such as the Strait of Malacca, thus facilitating its access to energy resources in the Arabian Gulf. Pakistan's role also plays a crucial part in China's military and security penetration. Here, China uses Pakistan as a platform for military integration in the region, with the Pakistani military establishment acting as a silent architect of strengthening Chinese defense ties with the Gulf states.

The contours of the rapprochement and the roles of Pakistani regional powers with respect to China can be understood through the lens of China's use of Pakistan as a diplomatic bridge. Here, Pakistan emerges as a middle power seeking to act as a back channel to bridge the gap between the major powers (China and the United States) and prevent the region from sliding into a full-blown war. This involves offering proposals to end the ongoing conflict, coinciding with China's cautious stance. Despite condemning the American strikes and deeming them a violation of international law, China adopts a policy of balance in its relations. It supports Iran strategically through 25-year agreements but hesitates to engage militarily in order to protect its broader economic interests in the Middle East. With a high level of Chinese-Pakistani security and military coordination, there are indications of increasing technological and military cooperation. Washington fears the development of joint missile programs or the transfer of advanced Chinese-Pakistani technology to Iran to counter threats.

In this context, China, Pakistan, and Iran face the same regional challenges and pressures, particularly through the dynamics within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO, which includes these three countries, serves as a framework for confronting American challenges, but it struggles to formulate a unified response due to divergent national agendas. Amidst the risk of escalation, the US military tensions with Iran led China and Pakistan to urge their citizens to leave Iran in February 2026, reflecting the seriousness of the on-the-ground threat despite their political alliance. This has also had an economic impact. The continued US-Iranian military escalation has shifted regional and international trade routes. While the Pakistani route has been occasionally disrupted, trade through Afghanistan has increased as a strategic alternative.

These Chinese moves intersect with a US strategy aimed at isolating and besieging China internationally by targeting its strategic partners and striking Iran as a gateway to China in order to strangle its energy supplies. Here, we analyze that a US war or military escalation against Iran is essentially aimed at creating a China chokehold on Chinese oil supplies, as Beijing relies heavily on Iranian oil (approximately 20% of its maritime imports). Furthermore, these US attempts to dismantle China's chain of allies are part of a broader strategy. Washington views Iran, Venezuela, and Russia as links in a chain supporting Chinese influence. By targeting the leadership in Tehran or crippling its capabilities, the US seeks to break this geopolitical link and strategically isolate China. These US moves in the Gulf and on Iran's Kharg Island also aim to challenge Chinese control over waterways and secure control of the Strait of Hormuz, which Beijing considers a direct threat to its national security and global trade.

*Thus, we conclude that while the United States attempts to geopolitically encircle China by targeting its strong proxies in the Middle East, such as Iran*, China responds by strengthening its strategic depth through Pakistan. Pakistan is not merely a strategic ally of China, but a safety valve, ensuring continued communication with the Islamic world and providing logistical alternatives in the event of a confrontation in the Gulf or the South China Sea.

## China backs Pakistan's mediation in US-Iran talks

26 March 2026, China Daily

China supports all efforts conducive to de-escalation, cooling the situation and the resumption of dialogue in ending the Middle East

conflict, and calls on all parties to start the peace talk process as soon as possible, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said on Monday.
Mao's remarks came after Pakistani Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar said that both Washington and Tehran have expressed confidence in Pakistan to facilitate talks aimed at ending the ongoing conflict. Dar raised the possibility after a meeting in Islamabad over the weekend with the foreign ministers of Turkiye, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to discuss the regional situation.
"We appreciate Pakistan's efforts to promote the easing of the situation and support Pakistan in continuing to play its mediation role," the spokeswoman said.
China stands ready to strengthen communication and coordination with Pakistan and all other relevant parties to jointly promote peace, end hostilities and safeguard regional peace and stability, Mao added.

## Pakistan, China reaffirm commitment to CPEC phase-II

26 March 2026, Mettis Global

Pakistan and China have reaffirmed their commitment to pushing forward the second phase of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), with a renewed focus on agriculture, industrial cooperation, and priority infrastructure projects, as both sides pledged deeper collaboration and continued economic partnership.
Pak China ties were highlighted during a meeting between Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Chinese Ambassador Jiang Zaidong in Islamabad, according to a press release issued.
The prime minister appreciated China's consistent economic support and reiterated Pakistan's dedication to strengthening the all-weather strategic cooperative partnership.
Shehbaz Sharif also emphasized Pakistan's constructive role in promoting regional stability and de-escalation, stressing the importance of close coordination on matters of mutual interest.
He congratulated Chinese leadership on the successful conclusion of the "Two Sessions" and thanked Xi Jinping, Li Qiang, and Wang Yi for their Pakistan Day greetings.
Ambassador Jiang Zaidong, in his remarks, praised Pakistan's economic resilience and reform efforts, reaffirming China's continued support, particularly in trade and investment.
Both sides expressed satisfaction over ongoing exchanges and looked forward to high-level engagements to mark the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations.

## Pakistan, China launch bilateral naval exercise amid wider strategic cooperation

26 March 2026, Arab News

Pakistan and China launched a joint naval exercise in Karachi, the Pakistan Navy said on Wednesday, as a Chinese warship arrived at port to take part in drills that have been held periodically to enhance maritime coordination between the two countries.
The exercise is part of a broader strategic cooperation between them that spans defense, economic and diplomatic spheres.
The two countries have worked closely together on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), featuring major infrastructure projects such as the development of Gwadar port, alongside deep defense collaboration ranging from joint fighter jet development to military procurements from Beijing.
"The SEA GUARDIAN exercise aims to further strengthen bilateral relations through the mutual exchange of maritime expertise and enhanced interoperability between the two friendly navies, reflecting their shared commitment to regional peace," the statement said.
"The exercise will feature a range of harbor and sea-phase activities, including subject matter expert engagements, a young officers' seminar on contemporary topics, gunnery firings, coordinated patrols, and other maritime security operations," it added.
The exercise started on Wednesday after the Chinese naval vessel arrived in Karachi and was being escorted into port by Pakistan Navy ships in a ceremonial reception.
It will continue till Apr. 2, according to the statement.
Pakistan and China have steadily expanded maritime cooperation in recent years, with such exercises forming the security component of their broader partnership, while Islamabad also conducts similar naval drills periodically with other regional and international partners.
The Pakistan Navy said the exercise reflects the two countries' shared commitment to regional stability and is expected to further deepen their strategic partnership while contributing to maritime security in the region.

## Pakistan, China agree to deepen cooperation amid evolving regional and global challenges

24 March 2026, Dunya News

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar on Tuesday held a key meeting with Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Jiang Zaidong in Islamabad, where both sides engaged in an extensive exchange of views on bilateral relations and pressing regional and global developments.

The meeting underscored the enduring strength of the Pakistan-China relationship, widely described as an "all-weather strategic cooperative partnership", as both sides revisited areas of mutual interest and reaffirmed their commitment to deepening collaboration.

During the discussions, both officials examined the broader regional landscape, including rapidly evolving geopolitical dynamics and shifting global conditions. Particular attention was given to rising tensions in the Middle East, with Dar stressing the urgent need for dialogue and diplomacy to prevent further escalation.

He emphasised that peaceful negotiations remain the most viable path forward, reiterating Pakistan's consistent position in favour of de-escalation and conflict resolution through diplomatic channels. The exchange reflected shared concerns over instability in key regions and its potential impact on global peace and economic security.

**Pakistan offers to host peace talks to end US-Israeli war on Iran**

Dar reaffirmed Pakistan's firm resolve to promote peace and stability not only within the region but beyond, highlighting Islamabad's commitment to constructive engagement on international platforms. The talks also covered a range of bilateral priorities, including security cooperation, economic connectivity, and efforts to further strengthen trade and investment ties.

Both sides explored avenues to enhance cooperation under existing frameworks, reflecting the depth and diversity of the partnership. The dialogue also touched upon practical steps to bolster economic linkages and reinforce coordination in areas of shared strategic interest.

The meeting concluded with a mutual understanding to maintain close communication and regular consultations on issues of common concern. Both sides agreed that sustained engagement would be essential in navigating complex regional challenges and advancing shared objectives.

The interaction took place against the backdrop of long-standing strategic ties between Pakistan and China, with a continued focus on regional stability, mutual cooperation, and coordinated responses to emerging global developments.

## BIG shock to Shehbaz, Munir as China to directly deal with Afghan Taliban, bypasses Pakistan to…; Beijing will now…

22 March 2026, NEWS24ONLINE

**China-Taliban relations**: In a major setback to Pakistan, its "all-weather ally" China, is reportedly considering to directly deal with Afghanistan's ruling Taliban regime to advance its interests in the country, bypassing Islamabad, amid the ongoing conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Is China building direct relations with Taliban?

According to reports, China, which was the first major country to recognise the Taliban government after the June 2021 takeover and the first to deploy its ambassador to Afghanistan, has begun strengthening ties with the Taliban, without Pakistan playing the middleman.

Beijing suspects that Pakistan is incapable of protecting Chinese interests in Afghanistan, and has started to reconfigure its relationship with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan is not expected to play any role under the new arrangement.China has used Pakistan for over two decades to expand Beijing's influence in Afghanistan, and Islamabad has exploited China's dependence to further its own interests. Since 2021, this dependence has grown significantly for China, with Beijing maintaining direct contact with various Afghan Taliban factions with the help of the Pakistani military and its ISI spy agency.However, the deteriorating ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan which are threatening to boil over into a full-scale war between the two countries, has essentially ended this arrangement, prompting Beijing to establish direct ties with the Taliban regime without Islamabad playing messenger.

Additional, China finds it prudent to distance itself from Pakistan in its Afghan policy due to the current tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, experts say.

Why China wants ties with Afghan Taliban?

The deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, primarily triggered by Pakistani strikes, has prompted China to virtually halt all its projects in the country, and forced Beijing to withdrawing Chinese citizens engaged in these projects.

Chinese intelligence agencies, including the Ministry of State Security, have ordered the withdrawal or exchange of personnel involved in ongoing projects and outreach work in Afghanistan, and Beijing suspects that Pakistan is deliberately worsening the situation to sabotage Chinese projects in the country.

This has prompted Beijing to establish a direct relationship with Kabul, bypassing Pakistan, to protect its interests in the region.

China-Taliban relations

While China's relations with Afghanistan date back several decades, Beijing has maintained a cautious engagement with Kabul since the Taliban returned to power in June 2021 after US withdrawal from the country.

China's primary interest in Afghanistan lies in the country's mineral resources and the security of its western borders in Xinjiang. Beijing fears its absence in Afghanistan could result in Afghan territory being used by Uighur militant groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which is why it also refrains from antagonising the Afghan Taliban.

Over the past few years, China, with the help of Pakistan's ISI, has cultivated friendships and strengthened ties with the Afghan Taliban. However, the current situation has prompted

China to essentially sideline Pakistan and build direct ties with Kabul.

## Chinese FM calls for resolving issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan through dialogue, consultation

14 March 2026, China Daily

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said on Friday that the issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan can only be resolved through dialogue and consultation.
The use of force would only complicate the situation and intensify the contradictions, which would be of no benefit to either side and threatens regional peace and stability, he said.
Wang, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, made the remarks in a phone conversation with Afghan Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi at the latter's request.
Muttaqi thanked China for its active efforts in mediating the conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan, noting that the Afghan people, who have suffered greatly from war, cherish the opportunities for peace and development.
The Afghan foreign minister said his country wants to be a source of regional peace rather than unrest, reaffirming that its territory will not be used to attack neighboring countries.
Afghanistan does not wish to engage in military conflict with other countries, and looks forward to mutual trust and friendly coexistence with neighboring countries, he said.
The Afghan side believes that dialogue and consultation are the only way to resolve issues and looks forward to China, as a major country and a friendly neighbor, playing a greater role, he said.
For his part, Wang said that the more volatile the external environment becomes, the more regional countries should strengthen unity and cooperation, overcome difficulties together, and forge a path of cooperative security and common security.
Afghanistan and Pakistan are inseparable brothers and neighbors that cannot be moved away from each other, he said.
China has always maintained an objective and impartial stance on the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Wang said.
The special envoy on Afghan affairs of the Chinese Foreign Ministry is shuttling between the two countries to mediate, he said, adding that it is hoped that both sides will keep calm and exercise restraint, have face-to-face exchanges at an early date, achieve a ceasefire as soon as possible, and resolve differences and contradictions through dialogue.
China is willing to continue to make active efforts to help achieve reconciliation and detente between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Wang said.
The two sides also exchanged views on the situation in Iran.
Wang reaffirmed China's principled position, stating that China is willing to work with the international community, including Afghanistan, to further play a constructive role in striving for peace.

## China Launches 'Shuttle Diplomacy' To Defuse Pakistan-Afghanistan Crisis | Exclusive Details

March 11, 2026, News18 Online

In a significant diplomatic intervention aimed at stabilising a volatile South Asian frontier, CNN-News18 has learnt that China has stepped forward as a primary mediator in the escalating conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Beijing's top diplomat, Wang Yi, has formally communicated China's "keen interest" in a de-escalation role, marking a shift towards more active regional crisis management as border tensions threaten to spiral into a broader confrontation.
The centrepiece of Beijing's intervention is the deployment of China's Special Envoy on Afghan Affairs, who is currently engaged in "shuttle diplomacy" between Islamabad and Kabul. During a high-level phone call with Pakistan's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Mohammad Ishaq Dar, Wang Yi confirmed that the envoy is working on the ground to foster communication and reconciliation.
This shuttle diplomacy aims to create a neutral channel for dialogue at a time when direct diplomatic engagement between the Taliban-led administration in Kabul and the Pakistani government has hit a historic low.
The conversation between Wang and Dar focused heavily on the recent skirmishes along the Durand Line. Wang Yi expressed deep concern over the clashes, stressing that the "immediate priority" is to prevent further military escalation. For China, stability in this region is not merely a diplomatic preference but a strategic necessity, given its massive investments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its interests in Afghan mineral resources.
Wang reaffirmed China's firm support for Pakistan's fight against terrorism, a statement that carries significant weight as Islamabad continues to blame Afghan-based elements for a surge in domestic militant attacks.
Beijing's message to both neighbours is clear: regional peace is contingent upon a stable Afghanistan–Pakistan border. Wang Yi called for both nations to:
**Prioritise Dialogue:** Use diplomatic engagement over military posturing.
**Negotiate Differences:** Address the root causes of border friction through formal bilateral frameworks.

**Uphold Stability:** Recognise that a conflict-ridden border benefits neither state and undermines the broader security of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

This move follows China's successful mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023, suggesting that Beijing is increasingly comfortable acting as a "peace broker" in complex geopolitical disputes. By positioning itself as a mediator in the Pak-Afghan conflict, China seeks to prevent a security vacuum that could be exploited by transnational terror groups, which Beijing views as a direct threat to its western Xinjiang province.

As the Special Envoy continues to move between the two capitals, the international community is watching closely to see if China's "revolutionary pragmatism" can bridge the deep-seated trust deficit between Islamabad and the Taliban.

### Pakistan Losing Credibility, Says Top Journalist, Claims China May Deploy PLA To Guard Its Projects

07 March 2026, News 18

Senior Pakistani journalist and political commentator Najam Sethi has claimed that Pakistan has lost significant credibility internationally and is increasingly relying on China for security cooperation, including the possible involvement of Chinese security and intelligence personnel inside the country.

Speaking during a discussion on the recent Middle East crisis and shifting geopolitical alignments, Sethi said Pakistan's long-standing policy of independently securing Chinese investments has changed. According to him, Islamabad had earlier assured Beijing that it would handle security for projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a flagship initiative of China's Belt and Road Initiative.

However, Sethi claimed that China had increasingly demanded a greater role in protecting its assets and personnel in Pakistan. "China wanted joint intelligence and joint security operations inside Pakistan," he said, adding that Beijing also sought involvement in the protection of workers and infrastructure connected to CPEC.

Pakistan had traditionally resisted such proposals, insisting that its own security forces would provide protection. But Sethi alleged that a new understanding has recently been reached that allows China to strengthen its own security presence in the country.

"This means Chinese PLA personnel and Chinese intelligence will come inside Pakistan to protect their assets," he said, referring to the People's Liberation Army.

According to Sethi, the arrangement may also include intelligence sharing, with Chinese agencies providing Pakistan information about militant activities, including those linked to the Taliban, as well as alleged foreign intelligence operations in the region.

He described Pakistan's acceptance of these terms as a major shift in policy, suggesting that Islamabad has been compelled to accommodate Beijing's demands.

Sethi also commented on evolving regional dynamics, arguing that current geopolitical tensions have created new diplomatic opportunities for Pakistan. He claimed that both Russia and Iran are increasingly dissatisfied with India and view New Delhi as being aligned with the United States.

According to him, this situation could open space for Islamabad to improve relations with Moscow and Tehran as part of a broader strategy to counter India's influence in the region.

# CHINA-SOUTHERN MONGOLIA

### Construction begins on new energy power line linking Inner Mongolia with Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region

17 March 2026, Chinadaily

Construction of the Inner Mongolia section of the West Inner Mongolia-Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei ±800 kilovolt ultra-high-voltage direct current transmission project commenced on March 17 in Togtoh county, Hohhot, capital of North China's Inner Mongolia autonomous region.

The project represents the region's first transmission channel designed to deliver electricity from large-scale renewable energy bases in desert areas to external markets.

Upon completion, it will transmit power generated from a 12-million-kilowatt renewable energy base in the Kubuqi Desert to major demand centers across North China.

Jia Tikang, deputy director of the construction department at State Grid Inner Mongolia Eastern Power Co, said the project will adopt full-process

mechanized construction, strengthen on-site safety management, and enhance risk prevention measures to improve efficiency and accelerate progress.
The project is expected to significantly advance the large-scale development and efficient transmission of renewable energy in Inner Mongolia. It will also help the region build an ultra-high-voltage transmission network with outbound capacity exceeding 50 million kW, enabling more efficient allocation of power resources across a wider area.
With substantial investment and strong industrial spillover effects, the project is expected to drive more than 39 billion yuan ($5.65 billion) in related investment and create over 12,000 jobs.
It will involve hundreds of enterprises across equipment manufacturing, survey and design, and construction sectors, fostering technological innovation and supporting the development of a modern industrial system.

## Inner Mongolia to remain focused on people's livelihoods in 15th Five-Year Plan

07 March 2026, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202603/07/WS69abf260a310d6866eb3c625.html
By Ma Si, Xu Dan in Beijing and Yuan Hui in Hohhot | chinadaily.com.cn | Updated: 2026-03-07 17:39

The Inner Mongolia autonomous region is committed to prioritizing people's livelihoods when drafting its 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30), with a sharp focus on improving living standards and enhancing public services.
Bao Gang, chairman of the Inner Mongolia autonomous region, said during a news conference on Friday at the ongoing two sessions that "Until every household and every individual has their basic needs met, we cannot rest content."
Bao made the comments when answering a question posed by China Daily. He emphasized the government's commitment to people-centered development.
"As long as the people's vision for a happy life remains unrealized, we must tirelessly lead them in working toward that goal."
The government outlines specific targets for 2026, including generating over 500,000 job postings, providing vocational training for 400,000 people.
Education and healthcare feature prominently in the initiatives. The region will expand student accident insurance to cover high school students and kindergartens, and provide free daily milk to primary school students and kindergarten children in counties.
Healthcare measures include 2,000 free cataract surgeries for low-income families and 10,000 yuan in assistance for women with breast or cervical cancer.
During the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-25), Inner Mongolia has made significant progress, with urban employment increasing by 1.06 million and per capital disposable income exceeding 40,000 yuan ($5,799), ranking ninth nationwide.
The region has established four national regional medical centers and 39 specialized centers, while basic living security standards have reached or exceeded national averages.

## 30 million tonnes of uranium found — the discovery that could reshape global energy

06 March 2026, Future Sciences

A staggering uranium discovery in China's Ordos Desert could reshape the global energy landscape. With an estimated 30 million tons of uranium, this unprecedented find raises major questions about the future of nuclear energy and China's strategic ambitions. How might this resource influence global energy balances and China's long term power in the nuclear sector?
**China** has recently revealed an extraordinary discovery that could redraw the geopolitical map of global energy. Beneath the arid expanses of the Ordos Desert in Inner Mongolia, Chinese researchers have identified a uranium deposit of unprecedented scale, estimated at more than **30 million tons of uranium**.
The timing is significant. Beijing has been accelerating efforts to diversify its energy mix while reducing reliance on fossil fuels. Developing this strategic resource could secure China's energy independence for decades and potentially transform the country into a key player in the global uranium market.
**A strategic resource hidden beneath the dunes**
The Ordos Desert, a harsh landscape of sand and rock, concealed beneath its surface an energy treasure few could have imagined. This remote region of Inner Mongolia, known for its extreme climate conditions, is now believed to contain one of the largest uranium reserves ever discovered.
Strategic resource consulting
The technologies used by Chinese exploration teams reflect remarkable scientific progress. Identifying such a deposit in an environment as inhospitable as the **Ordos Desert** highlights the significant advances made in modern mining exploration methods.
Uranium now occupies a central place in China's current energy strategy. Once enriched, this heavy metal fuels nuclear reactors capable of producing electricity with a much lower carbon footprint than fossil fuels.
The discovery also comes at a particularly convenient moment. China is currently building eleven new nuclear reactors to meet its growing energy demands. Access to such vast reserves could help ensure long term supply security for the country's expanding nuclear fleet.

**Uranium investment guide**

Experts suggest that these newly identified resources could meet national energy needs for several generations. In an increasingly uncertain global energy environment, that level of security represents a considerable strategic advantage.

A major shift in the global uranium market

A discovery of this scale has the potential to reshape the balance of supply in the **global uranium market**. Until now, production has largely been dominated by a handful of major countries:

- Kazakhstan, the world's leading producer
- Canada, known for its high grade deposits
- Australia, home to vast uranium reserves
- Namibia, which operates several large scale mines

**Uranium supply chain**

If China emerges as a major uranium producer, the consequences could be significant. Global price dynamics and international trade relationships may shift depending on the extraction strategy Beijing ultimately adopts.

Beyond economics, the discovery strengthens China's diplomatic position. Becoming largely self sufficient in uranium would reduce vulnerability to international pressure while giving Beijing greater strategic autonomy in energy policy.

Control over such a critical resource for **nuclear power** could also become a powerful diplomatic tool in international negotiations surrounding climate policy and energy transitions. As a potential supplier of uranium, China would gain an additional lever of influence on the global stage.

**Environmental challenges and China's long term energy vision**

Despite its enormous potential, exploiting this massive deposit raises serious environmental questions. Uranium extraction carries risks for fragile desert ecosystems and nearby communities.

Renewable energy tech

Managing radioactive waste, ensuring worker safety, and dealing with significant water consumption in such an arid region will be major challenges. Public acceptance of large scale mining operations will depend heavily on the environmental protections put in place.

At the same time, this discovery fits into a broader national strategy where nuclear power coexists with massive investments in renewable energy. China remains the world leader in solar and wind energy development, suggesting a diversified approach to its future energy mix.

The uranium reserves of Ordos represent only one piece of a much larger energy puzzle. Step by step, Beijing appears to be assembling a strategy designed to support economic growth while gradually moving toward a less carbon intensive economy.

The implications of this **discovery** extend far beyond China's borders. In the coming decades, it could play a decisive role in shaping the future of global energy.

# CHINA-TAIWAN

## MAC warns KMT chair not to fall into CCP's united front trap during China visit




31 March 2026, Taiwan News

*Presidential Office Spokesperson Karen Kuo. (Presidential Office screenshot)*

The Mainland Affairs Council on Monday warned KMT Chair Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) against falling for Beijing's united front tactics after Chinese leader Xi Jinping invited her to lead a delegation to visit China in April.

The council said, "The CCP's ambition to eliminate the Republic of China and annex Taiwan will not change through exchanges with any political party or individual in Taiwan," per Liberty Times. It urged Cheng to take the CCP's coercion seriously, not yield to its political agenda, and "avoid falling into united front traps aimed at dividing Taiwan."

It also reminded her that no entity may enter into political agreements with China or engage in matters involving public authority without official authorization.

Asked whether she would meet President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) before departing, Cheng said she is willing to meet Lai either before or after the trip. She added that Taiwan has too many "knots" to untangle and cannot continue internal conflict, and she is open to dialogue on cross-strait relations, domestic disputes, and the constitutional impasse.

Presidential Office Spokesperson Karen Kuo (郭雅慧) said the public expects Cheng to explain why she is actively pursuing a visit to China while the Legislative Yuan's review of the special defense budget has been delayed.

An official familiar with cross-strait affairs told Liberty Times that Beijing's timing of the visit ahead of a potential meeting between US President Donald Trump and Xi suggests China

believes it has secured KMT cooperation and may use the visit to influence the Trump-Xi summit. The official added that, following CCP practice, a meeting with top leaders, such as a potential Cheng-Xi meeting, is typically arranged at the end of a visit if the visitor has performed well in the earlier stages.

Chinese democracy activist Wang Dan (王丹) said on Facebook that the CCP is using the KMT as a pawn ahead of Trump's visit to China. He said this indicates Taiwan will be a central issue in any Trump-Xi meeting, requiring coordination from the KMT.

Tunghai University scholar Hung Pu-chao (洪浦釗) told Liberty Times that China's initiative to arrange the visit is intended to create the impression that cross-strait tensions can be eased through exchanges. In reality, he said, it aims to undermine the legitimacy of Taiwan's arms procurement efforts.

## CCP infiltration of TPP widespread

30 March 2026, Taipei Times

Former Taipei mayor and Taiwan People's Party (TPP) founding chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) was sentenced to 17 years in prison on Thursday, making headlines across major media. However, another case linked to the TPP — the indictment of Chinese immigrant Xu Chunying (徐春鶯) for alleged violations of the Anti-Infiltration Act (反滲透法) on Tuesday — has also stirred up heated discussions.

Born in Shanghai, Xu became a resident of Taiwan through marriage in 1993. Currently the director of the Taiwan New Immigrant Development Association, she was elected to serve as legislator-at-large for the TPP in 2023, but was later charged with involvement in Beijing-directed election interference, fraud and forgery, as well as other financial crimes.

The evidence presented by prosecutors included chat logs from June 2019 to October last year between Xu and Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs Service Center for Cross-Strait Marriages and Families Director Yang Wentao (楊文濤), as well as Chinese Kuomintang Shanghai Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification Revolutionary Committee deputy head Sun Xian (孫憲).

Prosecutors said Xu explicitly declared her loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and provided long-term reports about the Taiwanese political landscape to Yang and Sun while participating in election activities under their instruction, as well as coordinating a plan to promote the participation of Chinese spouses in Taiwanese politics. She also allegedly reported on the daily activities of Chinese spouses in Taiwan, aiding the CCP in exerting control over them.

According to the indictment, Xu became disillusioned with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) because it did not nominate Chinese spouses for legislator-at-large positions. She even voiced her complaints to Yang, saying that the KMT "never really wanted unification, it's only fooling Beijing."

With instructions to turn a party towards the goals of the CCP, Xu looked to the TPP and began organizing Chinese spouses to campaign for former Taipei deputy mayor and incumbent TPP Legislator Vivian Huang (黃珊珊) to run for Taipei mayor in 2022, as well as rallying support for Ko in his presidential campaign in an attempt to secure a legislator-at-large seat.

Prosecutors also alleged that Xu facilitated Sun's 10-day visit to Taiwan in October last year, concealing his government connections through a shell company and falsifying a daily itinerary which allowed him to secretly meet with KMT and TPP officials.

Although Xu eventually gave up her legislator nomination in 2023 due to concerns over her suspected CPP-linked background, the indictment said that Xu had sent Sun the personal profile of Li Zhenxiu (李貞秀), another Chinese spouse and naturalized Taiwanese citizen. Li became a TPP legislator-at-large last month, but was embroiled in a scandal over her alleged failure to renounce her Chinese nationality. Xu and Sun's chat log indicated that Li was handpicked by Xu and approved by Sun, who even provided a backup plan for if Li failed to secure the seat.

The indictment was sobering for many, as it detailed how the CCP's espionage operations in Taiwan are not limited to the military, and can be coordinated by "local collaborators" in civic groups and political parties which then meddle in Taiwanese elections and legislation.

Mainland Affairs Council MAC Deputy Minister Liang Wen-chieh (梁文傑) on Thursday said the indictment revealed that the CCP's intervention in Chinese spouse groups operates through a "highly organized chain of command," which aims mainly to infiltrate the KMT and TPP.

While many people also blame the TPP for allegedly harboring CCP spies, Liang said any party can be a victim of Chinese infiltration, and the focus should be on how the TPP responds to the indictment.

When questioned by reporters in 2023, Ko claimed to have "never seen Xu," but photos of the two together as early as 2019 were later revealed by the media, and the indictment listed in-person meetings between Ko and Xu before 2023.

TPP Chairman Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌) on Wednesday criticized the indictment, saying that it resembled the authorship of the "Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) troll army." On Thursday, Huang said that Xu was nominated by the party

through an open audition, and Ko called the DPP the “real [Chinese] communist bandits.”
Although a verdict has not yet been reached on the case, the indictment serves as a warning for Taiwanese on potential methods of CCP infiltration — potentially the tip of the iceberg of a wider, more systematic “united front” network. The TPP should explain why it continued to work with Xu and why it now insists on backing Li’s legislative seat despite the unsettled controversy over her qualifications.

## Official highlights new Chinese warfare undermining Taiwan's democracy

28 March 2026, Focus Taiwan



*Deputy Interior Minister Ma Shih-yuan speaks at the 2026 Taiwan Civil Defense Convention hosted by Kuma Academy in Taipei, Saturday. CNA photo*

March 28, 2026Deputy Interior Minister Ma Shih-yuan (馬士元) said Saturday that China is using what he described as "dislocation warfare" and "erosion warfare" to undermine the foundations of Taiwan's democracy and freedom.
Speaking at the opening of the 2026 Taiwan Civil Defense Convention hosted by Kuma Academy, Ma said that, in addition to public opinion, psychological and legal warfare, Beijing is deploying two new methods to disrupt Taiwan's democratic system.
The first is "dislocation warfare," he said, referring to efforts to distort the proper functioning of democratic institutions.
As for "erosion warfare," Ma said China uses various proxies to gradually undermine Taiwan's democratic and free system, a challenge that requires vigilance.
He noted that such efforts can be difficult to counter, as authorities risk being accused of "McCarthyism" or of creating internal enemies.
To better respond to China's hybrid coercion, Ma said the Ministry of the Interior has in recent years emphasized "interoperability," marking a shift from traditional defense approaches to integrating government and civilian capabilities.
In the past, the military, police, firefighting and civil defense systems operated independently with little coordination, he said, but global developments since 2022 have made interoperability a core concept in promoting civil defense.
Ma stressed that the government's current efforts are aimed at safeguarding Taiwan's democratic system, ensuring that its economy, political system and religious freedoms can continue to exist and develop freely under the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, which he described as a regime with "fascist" characteristics.
Meanwhile, Kuma Civil Defense Education Association Chairperson Liu Wen (劉文) said the academy is shifting its focus from individual-based, decentralized training to engaging groups and institutions, with the aim of integrating expertise from the public sector, civil society and various professional fields into a resilient, nationwide civil defense network.
The two-day event opened Saturday morning and was attended by Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴), Deputy Foreign Minister François Wu (吳志中) and National Security Council Deputy Secretary-General Lii Wen (李問).

## US Intelligence Finds No CCP Plan to Invade Taiwan by 2027

21 March 2026, Vision Times

The U.S. intelligence community’s annual threat assessment, released on Wednesday, March 18, stated that Communist China has no specific plan to invade Taiwan by 2027 and has set no definitive timeline for such an operation. The report emphasized, however, that Beijing has never abandoned its goal of absorbing Taiwan, treating it as a core element of what the Party calls the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
Rather than 2027, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has designated 2049, marking one hundred years since it seized power on the Chinese mainland, as the key target date.
According to Newsweek’s coverage of the report, the CCP has long threatened to use military force to resolve the Taiwan question, while claiming it would prefer to achieve so-called “unification” without an invasion “if possible.” This dual posture has remained consistent for decades: the regime holds out the prospect of peaceful absorption while keeping invasion planning active.
The report reviewed the historical background of the conflict. In 1949, the CCP defeated the Kuomintang party running China at the time and established a new government, while the Republic of China government relocated to Taiwan, and the two sides have been governed separately ever since.
Taiwan went on to develop a multiparty democratic system, while the CCP continues to govern mainland China as a repressive dictatorship. Beijing claims sovereignty over Taiwan despite having never governed the island,

a claim the Taiwanese government has consistently rejected.
In recent years, the CCP has dramatically escalated military pressure on Taiwan, staging frequent large-scale exercises near the island and raising the risk of an accidental or deliberate confrontation. U.S. President Trump has said he does not believe CCP general secretary Xi Jinping would easily resort to military action against Taiwan. After China's military conducted a two-day exercise in the Taiwan Strait last December, Trump noted that Beijing's military activity in the region had been going on for years.
The intelligence community warned that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would inflict severe damage on the global economy.
A Taiwan Strait conflict would disrupt US transportation systems and global technology supply chains
The report found that if the United States intervened in a Taiwan conflict, American transportation infrastructure could suffer what it described as significant but recoverable disruptions from Chinese cyberattacks. Even without direct U.S. military involvement, American and global economic and security interests would pay a heavy price, including breakdowns in technology supply chains and widespread financial market panic.
The assessment focused primarily on the most immediate and serious threats facing the United States over the coming year. Within that framework, intelligence agencies concluded that China's military continues to build its capacity for operations against Taiwan.
The report assessed that China's armed forces have been making steady but uneven progress toward the goal of being able to seize Taiwan if ordered, while simultaneously developing capabilities designed to deter or counter potential U.S. military intervention. The scale, frequency, and intensity of Chinese military operations around Taiwan have all increased markedly.
Whether Beijing ultimately resorts to force will depend on multiple factors: the readiness of China's military, internal political conditions in Taiwan, and whether the United States would intervene. Beijing views the Taiwan question as one front in its broader strategic rivalry with Washington and is working to prevent the U.S. from using Taiwan to constrain China's expansion.
Record $11 billion US arms sale to Taiwan and growing tensions between China and Japan
Last December, the Trump administration announced arms sales to Taiwan totaling more than $11 billion, a new record. Trump said he maintains a good relationship with Xi Jinping.
Tensions over the Taiwan Strait have also spilled into Japan. Last November, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi described a potential CCP attack on Taiwan as an existential threat to Japan. Relations between Beijing and Tokyo deteriorated noticeably after her remarks.
The CCP has responded by pressuring Japan through multiple channels. The report predicted this pressure would continue and likely intensify through 2026, with the aim of punishing Japan and sending a warning to other countries against taking a position or involving themselves in the Taiwan question.
The intelligence community stressed that countering these threats requires strong intelligence collection and response measures, with particular urgency in the near term to prevent the situation from deteriorating into a larger conflict.
In a separate section reported by Politico, the assessment warned that the missile threat to the U.S. homeland is growing rapidly. Intelligence agencies identified China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan as countries developing a range of missile systems, including weapons capable of carrying nuclear and conventional warheads, with the ability to strike the continental United States.
By 2035, the number of foreign missiles aimed at the United States is projected to increase from roughly 3,000 today to more than 16,000. The expanding missile arsenals of these countries also pose a growing threat to American space-based assets. Russia, the report noted, is developing an anti-satellite weapons system capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

## CNA: Xinhua News Agency Released a New List of Prohibited Terms, Emphasizing Taiwan Is a Province of China

01 March 2026, China Scope

Xinhua News Agency recently released a new batch of prohibited terms, covering five major categories: social life, legal matters, ethnic and religious issues, matters involving territorial sovereignty and Hong Kong–Macau–Taiwan, and international relations.
In the category concerning territory, sovereignty, and Hong Kong–Macau–Taiwan, there are 13 prohibited expressions. Xinhua states that "Hong Kong and Macau are Special Administrative Regions of China, and Taiwan is a province of China. In all written texts, maps, and charts, special care must be taken not to refer to them as 'countries.'" This is especially important when listing multiple countries and regions together, where the phrase "countries and regions" must not be omitted.
For the names of Taiwan's governmental institutions, quotation marks should be used when they cannot be avoided, such as Taiwan's "Legislative Yuan," "Executive Yuan," "Control Yuan," and "Election Commission." Terms such as "central," "national," or "Chinese Taipei" must not appear; if they must be used, they should be

placed in quotation marks, such as Taiwan "Central Bank," Taiwan "Premier," or "Legislator." Institutions like Taiwan "Tsinghua University" and the Taiwan "National Palace Museum" should also be placed in quotation marks.

"It is strictly forbidden to refer to the leader of the Taiwan region as the 'President (Vice President) of the Republic of China,' even with quotation marks."

Other prohibited expressions include: Taiwan's socalled "laws" should be described as "relevant regulations of the Taiwan region." In matters involving crossStrait legal affairs, terms from international law such as "document authentication," "judicial assistance," or "extradition" must not be used.

The two sides of the Taiwan Strait and Hong Kong must not be collectively referred to as "the two sides of the Strait and the three regions." The phrase "Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan tourists traveling to China" should be expressed as "Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan tourists traveling to the mainland." "Taiwan" corresponds to "the mainland (or the motherland's mainland)," and "Hong Kong and Macau" correspond to "the mainland," and these concepts must not be confused.

Additional prohibited expressions include placing Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Macau alongside China as parallel entities, such as "China–Hong Kong" or "China–Taiwan." Instead, one should use expressions like "the mainland and Taiwan" or "Fujian and Taiwan."

## CCP-Tied Activists Desperately Trying To Keep Chinese Land Grabs Alive Near US Military Bases

26 March 2026, AOL

A network tied to the Chinese government is mobilizing activists to protest two Republican-sponsored U.S. national security bills, a Daily Caller News Foundation investigation discovered.

Midwest affiliates of United Chinese Americans (UCA), a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit, first packed a March 17 Ohio House hearing with dozens of opponents to H.B. 1, an Ohio bill which would prohibit citizens of "foreign adversary" nations from acquiring property near military installations, before allegedly chasing down proponents in the capitol hallway to pepper them with questions.

Several days later, UCA and its Iowa chapter staged a protest on March 21 at the Hawkeye State's capitol against H.F. 2513, which would ban Iowa's universities from hiring H-1B visa holders from foreign adversary nations.

While the UCA network frames recent activism as opposition to "discriminatory" and "anti-immigrant" bills, a significant number of UCA's leaders have served as members of the Chinese government and/or in arms of a Chinese influence and intelligence service called the United Front Work Department (UFWD), raising concerns about foreign interference in American politics.

The U.S. China Economic and Security Commission, which is a U.S. legislative branch commission, has detailed the nefarious workings of the UFWD.

"Chinese leader Xi Jinping describes the 'united front' political war machine as his number one weapon to erode American power and ultimately displace the U.S.," Michael Lucci, founder and CEO of State Armor, told the DCNF.

"One way they do this is by interfering in statehouses across the country, packing committee rooms with CCP loyalists, like we saw in the Ohio statehouse," said Lucci, who testified in favor of H.B. 1. and engaged directly with the activists on March 17.

UCA president Haipei Shue told the DCNF that his organization has never had a relationship with the Chinese government, but acknowledged that he previously worked for the Chinese government before moving to the U.S. and that another board member has a "casual official tie with a Chinese city."

"Tell me who has not worked in Chinese government?" Shue said. "Are you going to weaponize that employment fact to suggest that all these people are suspicious? They should not be trusted?"

However, Shue did not address Chinese government and state media reports flagged by the

DCNF indicating that several other current UCA board members have also held Chinese government positions or that UCA has promoted UFWD youth programs. (RELATED: EXCLUSIVE: US Intel Funded Projects Riddled With Chinese Gov't-Linked Researchers)




*[OCCA home page screenshot]*

**'CCP Propaganda'**

A UCA community partner that promotes UFWD initiatives called the Ohio Chinese American Association (OCAA) and its sister organizations coached activists to testify against H.B. 1, according to DCNF translations of social media posts and the network's documents.

"CCP-linked individuals shouldn't own property near sensitive infrastructure in Ohio or any other state," Jacqueline Deal, a State Armor advisory board member who testified in favor of H.B. 1, told the DCNF. "They also shouldn't be surprised to find themselves exposed when they try to interfere in our democracy by testifying without disclosing their CCP ties."

Republican Ohio State representatives Angela King and Roy Klopfenstein introduced H.B. 1 in January 2025, which would prohibit citizens of China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia and Venezuela from owning land within 10 miles of military bases and critical infrastructure in Ohio, such as water treatment facilities. The bill has now had four hearings in the state's Republican-majority House and is nearing a potential vote, according to House Speaker Matt Huffman, the Toledo Blade reported.

The Buckeye State is home to several sensitive U.S. military installations including Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, where the National Air and Space Intelligence Center is garrisoned, as well as the Defense Supply Center Columbus, which "provides weapons system and platform support to U.S. forces and federal agencies worldwide."

Several states, including Alabama, Florida and Missouri have also moved to limit or outright ban Chinese nationals from owning land following news reports highlighting CCP-tied entities purchasing plots near U.S. military sites.

However, UCA and its national affiliate network maintain such bans are "anti-Chinese" and "xenophobic."

OCAA — which lost its nonprofit status in November 2025 for failing to file with Ohio's Secretary of State — claims that H.B. 1 "discriminates based on national origin" and would "threaten fundamental civil liberties," according to a March 13 OCAA-sponsored statement. It is unclear if OCAA has appealed the loss of its nonprofit status.

Two days before H.B. 1's March 17 hearing, OCAA and related nonprofits circulated a template promoting their talking points as well as instructions on how to testify. OCAA and its affiliates also provided "Stop H.B. 1" t-shirts to the bill's opponents, according to social media posts.

Footage from the hearing shows H.B. 1 opponents wearing matching purple "Stop H.B. 1" shirts, all testifying with very similar language against the bill.

UCA "community partnership representative" and OCAA chairman, Vincent Wang, urged lawmakers in his opposing testimony to "reject fear-based policymaking and instead craft evidence-driven solutions to the real challenges Ohioans face — rising cost of living, workforce availability, healthcare access, and long-term economic competitiveness."

Lucci told the DCNF that after he and Deal testified, they exited the still on-going hearing and were allegedly followed out by approximately five H.B. 1 opponents, including Wang, who purportedly "began ceaselessly pestering" Deal.

"Wang followed me into the hallway to pepper me with questions about how I found out what I knew about him," said Deal, whose testimony noted UCA's Chinese government ties and OCAA's relationship with UCA. "He seemed to be upset by transparency."

Lucci claims he then posed "one simple question" to Wang: "Should the CCP be kicked out of Ohio?"

"Wang refused to answer over and over, but even




*[Image created by DCNF with ACFROC + Erie Chinese Journal pics]*

when he finally conceded that the CCP is the enemy of the U.S., he still couldn't bring himself to admit the obvious truth that the CCP should be kicked out of Ohio," said Lucci, who called the confrontation "highly unusual behavior in a state legislature."

Ohio business filings also identify Wang, whose Chinese name is Wang Wenkui, as the registered agent for Ohio-based Global Media

Collaborations LLC (GMC), which Wang has used to develop close ties with Chinese state media outlets like CCTV, according to DCNF translations of reports from Erie Chinese Journal, an Ohio-based Chinese language news outlet. OCCA and Wang did not respond to the DCNF's requests for comment.

Yet, GMC is not Wang's only organization with Chinese government ties.

OCAA's website also spotlights several CCP ties, including posts promoting a UFWD-run summer camp in China for ethnically-Chinese children as well as announcements detailing OCAA's participation in UCA's "Food of Love" program. That program, which ostensibly exists to donate food to local communities, is actually an initiative that was launched by the UFWD's All-China Federation Of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC) during the COVID-19 pandemic, according to DCNF translations of ACFROC announcements.

The Chinese government has been accused of orchestrating a global campaign during the pandemic to hoard medical supplies and later donate such goods to countries with "political conditions, such as public statements of gratitude," according to federal reports. The Food of Love program is a related pandemic-era initiative that aims to highlight the contributions of the Chinese community to pandemic relief worldwide while also contributing to a shared sense of identity with China and Chinese culture, according to the ACFROC announcements.

UCA's president Shue denied knowledge that ACFROC had launched the Food of Love program, but did not address the ACFROC announcements or a UCA webpage about the food drive that directly links to the UFWD's website, both of which the DCNF flagged in an email.

"Ohio lawmakers should power forward through this wave of CCP propaganda and advance H.B. 1," Lucci said.

"The CCP is pre-positioning across the country near our military installations and critical infrastructure to cause mass disruptions," Lucci added. "The CCP and all their spies and beholden businesses should be kicked out of Ohio."

## House Democrat says Trump 'begging' China to help with Iran: 'We are losing'

26 March 2026, The Hill

Rep. Seth Moulton (D-Mass.) said Wednesday that President Trump has heavily pushed China to help with the Strait of Hormuz reopening amid the U.S. conflict against Iran.

"Apparently, now, their primary goal is reopening the Strait of Hormuz, which, let's be clear, was open before Trump started this war of choice. So, the reality is, at this moment, we are losing this war," Moulton told CNN's Anderson Cooper on "Anderson Cooper 360."

"If Trump were to stop the war tonight, he would have to negotiate with the Iranians to reopen the strait that they have closed, that's why he's begging, he's begging our greatest adversary, the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, he's asking to come and bail him out, to reopen this strait," he added, in comments highlighted by Mediaite.

On Thursday, Trump said that a "present" from Iran to the U.S. that he talked about two days earlier was the passage of 10 oil-carrying ships through the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran has restricted traffic amid the conflict in the region.

The president told reporters he was going through "very substantial" talks with Iran. Trump said that while talking with Iran, "they said 'to show you the fact that we're real and solid and we're there, we're going to let you have eight boats of oil.'"

"I didn't think much about it, and then I watched the news, and they said … 'There are eight boats that are going right up the middle of the Hormuz Strait,'" Trump added.

The current average cost of a gallon of regular gas in the U.S. is sitting at about $3.98 per gallon, up about $1 from a month ago, according to AAA.

Washington's conflict against Iran is reaching the one-month mark, with polling finding that Americans are not happy with the fighting. In a recent CBS News/YouGov poll, 60 percent were against the American conflict with Iran, while 40 percent were for it.

When reached for comment, the White House directed The Hill to a clip posted on the social platform X of a Cabinet meeting in which the president says the U.S. doesn't "need the Hormuz Strait."

## US bans foreign-made internet routers over security concerns

24 March 2026, The Independent

The U.S. has banned new foreign-made internet routers after the White House claimed they pose "unacceptable risks" to national security.

The Federal Communications Commission added all consumer routers – used in homes to connect computers, phones and other devices to the internet – to its 'Covered List', blocking the import and sale of all new devices.

A White House-convened Executive Branch determined that routers produced outside the U.S. introduce "a supply chain vulnerability that could disrupt the US economy, critical infrastructure, and national defense".

Any new router made outside the U.S. will now need FCC approval before being sold in the country, though anyone using a foreign-made router that they already own will still be able to use it.

The ruling comes amid concerns that some routers could serve as an easy point of access for hackers.
China-made devices from the popular U.S. brand TP-Link were recently investigated over a spate of Chinese cyber attacks, though the company has denied any links to the Chinese government.
“Malicious actors have exploited security gaps in foreign-made routers to attack American households, disrupt networks, enable espionage, and facilitate intellectual property theft,” the FCC stated on Monday.
“Today’s action does not impact a consumer’s continued use of routers they previously acquired. Nor does it prevent retailers from continuing to sell, import, or market router models approved previously through the FCC’s equipment authorization process.”
The move follows similar bans of foreign technology after President Donald Trump called on the U.S. to “never be dependent on any outside power for core components – from raw materials to parts to finished products – necessary to the nation’s defence or economy.”
In December, the FCC added the world’s biggest drone maker, DJI, to its Covered List, blocking any new products from being released.
Following the latest ban on foreign routers, FCC Chairman Brendan Carr said: “Following President Trump’s leadership, the FCC will continue to do our part in making sure that U.S. cyberspace, critical infrastructure, and supply chains are safe and secure.”

## The U.S. House Select Committee on China expressed concern over the expansion of the CCP's influence at the United Nations.

23 March 2026, VOT

The U.S. House Select Committee on Strategic Competition with China recently held a hearing in New York, focusing on the issue of the CCP's expanding influence within the United Nations system. Meanwhile, in response to a recent joint statement by Australia and New Zealand expressing concern about human rights in Tibet and Hong Kong, the Chinese Embassy in New Zealand strongly objected, stating that matters concerning Tibet and Taiwan are "purely China's internal affairs."




Recently, John Moolenaar, chairman of the U.S. House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the CCP, and Michael Waltz, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, attended a hearing in New York hosted by the U.S. House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on National Security, State Department and Related Programs on the threat posed by the CCP.
According to a press release on the committee's website, Mulenar presented details of the committee's latest investigation at the meeting, highlighting how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) manipulates UN mechanisms to advance its strategic objectives. A new report from the U.S. House Select Committee on Strategic Competition with the United States states that the CCP continues to expand its influence throughout the UN system through financial donations and the placement of Chinese officials in key UN positions. Participants also engaged in in-depth discussions on other malicious influences by the CCP within the UN system.
Furthermore, Australia and New Zealand recently held their third Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultation in Canberra, where both sides expressed serious concerns about the human rights situation in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong under Chinese rule. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has lodged a protest against this.
In response at a press conference, the Chinese ambassador to New Zealand stated, "China expresses strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to these unfounded accusations and smears!" He also reiterated that "the affairs of Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are purely China's internal affairs and brook no interference from any external forces in any way."
The ministers of Australia and New Zealand issued a joint statement at the third Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultation held recently, reiterating their deep concern over the systematic persecution in Xinjiang and expressing their profound worry about the Chinese Communist Party authorities' continued erosion of religious freedom, cultural heritage, educational rights, and the space for the use of the Tibetan language in Tibet.

## Texas orders cybersecurity review of state agencies for Chinese-made medical devices after federal warnings

11 March 2026, Industrial Cyber

Texas state agencies and publicly owned medical facilities have been directed to review potential cybersecurity risks linked to certain Chinese-manufactured patient monitoring devices after federal warnings highlighted vulnerabilities that could expose sensitive health data. They have also been directed to conduct an inventory of network-connected medical devices and review existing

cybersecurity protections, emphasizing that safeguarding Texans' personal medical information is a top priority.

The directive specifically highlighted devices such as the Contec CMS8000 patient monitor and the Epsimed MN-120 patient monitor, which are already included on Texas' list of restricted technologies due to potential security risks.

In his Monday letter, Greg Abbott, Texas governor, said that these measures follow cybersecurity alerts issued by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), warning that the affected patient monitors contain serious vulnerabilities, including a hidden backdoor that could allow unauthorized actors to remotely access the devices or the networks to which they are connected. Regulators said the monitors may also collect patient data such as personally identifiable information and protected health information and transmit it outside the healthcare environment when connected to the internet, raising concerns about privacy, device manipulation, and broader hospital network compromise.

He added, "These FDA and CISA notices underscore the need for state agencies and state-owned medical facilities to ensure they are continually operating safe and secure environments, as even FDA-regulated devices can introduce operational and cybersecurity risks if they are not carefully assessed and monitored."

Describing security vulnerabilities found in Chinese-manufactured patient monitoring devices, Abbott said that "these risks include the ability of unauthorized actors to access protected health information remotely. These notices confirm the warnings of experts who have elevated the proliferation of Chinese-manufactured smart medical devices across our healthcare system as a serious data privacy concern. I will not let Communist China spy on Texans. State-owned medical facilities must ensure there are safeguards in place to protect Texans' private medical data."

Given the cybersecurity concerns raised by the FDA, CISA, and other experts regarding certain foreign-manufactured and internet-enabled medical devices, Texas state agencies and all state-owned medical facilities have been directed to take several actions. The Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC), the Department of State Health Services (DSHS), and public systems of higher education must review all state-owned medical facilities under their jurisdiction and confirm that all newly purchased medical devices were procured in compliance with Executive Order GA-48.

These agencies are also required to catalog and share their inventory of all state-owned medical devices capable of transmitting data via a network, or that can be accessed remotely with the Texas Cyber Command (TXCC). In addition, HHSC, DSHS, and public higher education systems, with support from TXCC, must review the cybersecurity policies used to protect personal health information in state-owned medical facilities. The reviews must specifically address how these policies respond to alerts and notices issued by the FDA or CISA regarding internet-connected medical devices.

HHSC has also been tasked with promoting awareness of FDA resources for reporting cybersecurity concerns related to medical devices through outreach to Texas hospitals and healthcare providers regulated by the agency. Meanwhile, TXCC will evaluate whether devices such as the Contec CMS8000 and Epsimed MN-120 patient monitors, along with any other technologies flagged in FDA safety notices, should be added to Texas' prohibited technology list and will provide recommendations to the governor's office.

TXCC will also convene executives from HHSC, DSHS, and public higher education systems to recommend improvements to state agency policies governing medical devices, focusing on emerging cybersecurity risks, monitoring practices, and mitigation strategies.

"Addressed agencies shall submit their reports and recommendations on the above directives to the Office of the Governor by April 17, 2026," Abbott added. "In addition to the executive actions above, I will propose legislation next session to protect Texans' medical data from foreign hostile actors like Communist China."

The governor's directive comes as healthcare cybersecurity risks continue to intensify globally. A recent report from the Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Health-ISAC) found that ransomware, nation-state espionage, and vulnerabilities in connected medical technologies remain among the most significant threats facing the health sector. The report highlighted how the growing use of IoMT (Internet of Medical Things) devices has expanded the attack surface for hospitals and health systems, increasing the risk that compromised devices could expose sensitive patient data or disrupt clinical operations.

The agency also noted that cyber incidents across the healthcare sector have continued to rise, with attackers increasingly targeting critical infrastructure and sensitive medical information. In response, health organizations are expanding threat-intelligence sharing and conducting tabletop exercises to test incident response and identify operational gaps before adversaries exploit them, underscoring the growing focus on resilience as healthcare systems face a rapidly evolving cyber threat landscape.

## U.S. Defense Contractor Built iPhone Hacks Used by Russia

10 March 2026, TechBuzz

A U.S. military defense contractor has admitted to building sophisticated iPhone hacking tools that were later deployed by Russian espionage

operations in Ukraine and Chinese cybercriminals, according to an exclusive TechCrunch investigation. The revelation, which follows Google's discovery of the malware in active operations, raises urgent questions about how American-made cyber weapons ended up in adversarial hands - and whether they leaked, were stolen, or sold through shadowy intermediaries.

Google just dropped a bombshell that's sending shockwaves through the cybersecurity world. The tech giant's threat intelligence team uncovered a series of sophisticated iPhone hacking tools actively deployed by Russian intelligence operatives in Ukraine and a separate Chinese cybercriminal group. But here's the kicker - sources inside a U.S. government defense contractor have now confirmed those tools originated from their own development labs.

The admission, obtained exclusively by TechCrunch, marks a stunning breach in operational security for America's military-industrial complex. It's one thing for nation-state adversaries to develop their own exploits. It's quite another when they're wielding weapons built by U.S. taxpayers for American intelligence operations.

Apple has spent years fortifying the iPhone against exactly these kinds of attacks, touting its hardware security features and encrypted architecture. Yet these tools managed to penetrate those defenses with precision that only comes from deep technical knowledge and substantial resources - the kind typically available to well-funded government contractors.

The discovery ties back to Operation Triangulation, a multi-year espionage campaign that Kaspersky researchers first exposed in 2023. That operation used a chain of zero-day vulnerabilities to compromise iPhones through invisible iMessage exploits, requiring no user interaction whatsoever. Victims simply received a message, and their devices were pwned.

What no one knew until now was where those tools came from. While Kaspersky documented the technical mechanics brilliantly, the origin story remained murky. Google's investigation changed that, identifying code signatures and operational patterns that pointed directly to Western development.

The U.S. defense contractor sources wouldn't speak on the record, and TechCrunch has withheld the company's identity pending further investigation. But the implications are clear: somewhere between the lab and the battlefield, these tools went sideways. Whether through theft, a compromised supply chain, sale to a third party, or something more deliberate remains the central mystery.

This isn't the first time American cyber weapons have boomeranged. The NSA's EternalBlue exploit famously leaked via the Shadow Brokers dump in 2017, later powering the devastating WannaCry and NotPetya ransomware attacks. That incident cost billions globally and prompted serious questions about the risks of stockpiling vulnerabilities.

But this case feels different. EternalBlue was stolen goods, a smash-and-grab on NSA servers. These iPhone tools appear to have transitioned more deliberately into adversarial hands, raising darker questions about the cyber weapons supply chain and who's really controlling these capabilities once they're built.

The timing is particularly sensitive given ongoing tensions over Ukraine and heightened scrutiny of Chinese cyber operations. U.S. officials have spent years warning about Beijing's espionage apparatus and Moscow's hybrid warfare tactics. Discovering that American-made tools are enabling both is politically explosive.

L3Harris, Peter Williams' Trenchant, and other defense contractors have built lucrative businesses developing offensive cyber capabilities for U.S. intelligence agencies. The work happens in classified facilities under strict operational security. Yet this incident proves that even the most carefully guarded tools can escape containment.

Google's Threat Analysis Group deserves credit for connecting the dots. Their researchers reverse-engineered the malware samples, identified the attack vectors, and traced the infrastructure back to known Russian and Chinese threat actors. The technical forensics were impeccable - good enough to trigger alarm bells inside the contractor community.

For Apple, this represents another chapter in the endless cat-and-mouse game of mobile security. The company has patched the specific vulnerabilities exploited in these attacks, but the broader threat remains. As long as nation-states and well-funded contractors are developing iPhone exploits, new zero-days will emerge.

The cybersecurity community is now watching closely for official responses. Will the Pentagon launch an investigation into how contractor-built tools reached adversaries? Will Congress hold hearings on offensive cyber weapon controls? Will Apple demand greater transparency about who's targeting its products?

One thing's certain: the era of plausible deniability around cyber operations just got a lot more complicated. When your own tools show up in enemy hands, the questions get uncomfortable fast.

This revelation forces an overdue reckoning about offensive cyber weapon development and control. When U.S. defense contractors build iPhone exploits powerful enough to penetrate Apple's security in the hands of Russian intelligence and Chinese cybercriminals, the entire premise of controlled cyber capabilities collapses. The national security establishment must now explain how tools developed for American operations ended up targeting American allies in Ukraine. And the tech industry needs to confront the reality that no matter how sophisticated their defenses

become, well-resourced adversaries with insider tools will keep finding ways through. The next phase of this story will determine whether the U.S. cyber weapons program can maintain credibility - or whether this leak becomes the catalyst for fundamental reform.

## What China's latest economic plans say about its tech ambitions and rivalry with the US

09 March 2026, AP News

Two major economic plans unveiled at the annual meeting of China's legislature outline top priorities that have different ramifications for the global economy.

In the government plan for 2026, the No. 1 task is "building a robust domestic market." Then comes accelerating technological progress. But longer-term, a plan for the next five years gives more prominence to achieving advances in tech. The subtle difference highlights the government's balancing act. Its overarching goal is to transform from a low-cost manufacturing to a tech-driven economy.

But a more immediate concern is dealing with a prolonged period of sluggishness that has depressed consumer and business confidence. China is such a large exporter that the choices it makes affect countries and jobs around the world.

The plans, presented at the recent opening of the National People's Congress, offer a window into the government's thinking. They are set to be formally endorsed by the rubber-stamp legislature at the end of the eight-day session on Thursday.

**Tech crucial to China's future**

Analysts believe technological prowess remains the far more important goal for Chinese leader Xi Jinping and his vision to build the nation into a major power that can contend with the United States on issues ranging from trade to Taiwan tensions.

Speaking to a provincial delegation at the National People's Congress, Xi called for new breakthroughs, original innovation and "seizing the strategic high ground of science and technology," according to a state media report.

China's rapid growth into the world's second-largest economy has lifted it to the level of a middle-income nation. To keep advancing, Xi has promoted polices that move the economy into higher-value industries.

A government-backed push into electric vehicles, for example, has transformed China into an emerging player in the global auto industry, while dovetailing with national climate goals.

The five-year plan vows to "target the frontiers of science and technology," speeding up development in areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum technology, biotechnology and new energy.

**Moves toward self-sufficiency**

The push has expanded and morphed as technology has evolved into an area of competition with the U.S. with national security implications.

The U.S. has restricted the access of Chinese companies to the most advanced technologies, including semiconductors that drive AI. The justification is that these parts can wind up in weapons at a time when the two countries are military rivals as well.

China's government has responded by pouring resources into trying to develop these components itself as well as engineer ways to remain competitive with less advanced parts.China must "fight the battle for key core technologies," the five-year plan said. Specific goals, apart from AI, electric vehicles and robotics, include making advancements in semiconductors, batteries, biomedicine and 6G mobile networks.

The plan also pledged to expand production of China's homegrown passenger jet, the C919, and make breakthroughs in developing its own commercial jet engine. The U.S. temporarily cut off the supply of Western-supplied engines for the C919 last year during an escalation in the trade war with China.

Rare earths — where China is the global leader — was highlighted as an area where it should maintain its competitive edge as the U.S. and other countries seek to develop their own supplies of the critical elements for many advanced tech and military products.

**Trump's tariffs**

Even as China's economy has cooled at home, rising exports have kept it growing overall. But tariffs imposed by U.S. President Donald Trump have exposed the risk of relying too heavily on overseas markets.

China was able to shift exports to other markets, but that is facing challenges as its record trade surplus of almost $1.2 trillion raises alarm about the threat to factory jobs and the broader economies in other countries.

That has added impetus to China's push to pump up consumer spending, so the economy is less dependent on outside forces.

"Facing a complex and challenging international environment, we must remain committed to the strategy of expanding domestic demand," the annual economic plan said.

But for all the strong words, analysts say the effort appears aimed at keeping the economy afloat rather than boosting it. The annual plan sets a growth target of 4.5% to 5% for 2026, leaving room for a drop from last year's 5% rise.

Meanwhile, the government is primed to offer huge subsidies for high-tech advances in manufacturing, analysts said.

"Technological development and self-sufficiency remain central priorities, and industrial policy will continue to be deployed as an essential tool to

achieve them," economists at Capital Economics wrote in a research note.
Similar subsidies to the wind and solar industries led to manufacturing oversupply that was exported at rock-bottom prices, undercutting overseas competitors. The end result could be an even larger imbalance between China's immense manufacturing capacity and its weaker domestic demand, further driving up its exports.

## China ignores Trump's Hormuz request as the Iran war deepens and his Beijing trip slips

04 March 2026, AP News

China won't help the United States reopen the Strait of Hormuz as requested by President Donald Trump, but it is probably welcoming the delay in Trump's highly anticipated trip to Beijing as the U.S. risks getting bogged down in the Middle East, analysts say.
The latest developments are unfolding as Trump's Iran war, in its third week, is faced with mounting pressure as oil has stopped moving through the strait and U.S. allies have refused to step up to secure the strait. That has produced concerns that China, the United States' biggest geopolitical rival, could stand to benefit from a war that some say was ill-considered.
"President Trump's request to delay his long-awaited summit with President Xi Jinping underscores how significantly he underestimated the fallout from Operation Epic Fury," said Ali Wyne, senior research and advocacy adviser for U.S.-China relations at the International Crisis Group. "A show of U.S. force that was meant to intimidate Beijing has instead served to puncture the illusion of U.S. omnipotence: Unable to reopen the Strait of Hormuz alone, Washington now needs its principal strategic competitor to help it manage a crisis of its own making."
The Chinese Foreign Ministry gave a nonanswer when asked if it would help reopen the strait but repeated its call for "parties to immediately stop military operations, avoid further escalation of the tense situation and prevent regional turmoil from further impacting the global economy."Beijing, which had never officially confirmed Trump's state visit, originally scheduled for March 31, has signaled willingness to work with the U.S. to reschedule the visit by stating that the two sides "remain in communication." It even helped clarify that the postponement had nothing to do with Trump's request for China to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
On Tuesday, Trump said the Chinese "were fine" with the delay and claimed "a very good working relationship with China."
Sun Yun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center, said, "I think the Iran request is now going to be less pressing for China to fulfill."
At the same time, Chinese diplomats have been engaging with countries in the Middle East, pledging a constructive role in easing tensions and restoring peace.
On Sunday, through the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, Beijing delivered to Iran an emergency humanitarian aid package of $200,000, earmarked for families of children and teachers killed in the bombing of the Shajarah Tayyebeh elementary school building in Minab, Iran, with the Chinese ambassador to Iran condemning the school attack.
**State visit delayed**
A delay in the state visit is welcome by both the Trump administration and China, said Brett Fetterly, a managing principal in the China practice at The Asia Group, a Washington-based consultancy.
"I think the political environment is difficult for the United States to have the commander in chief travel abroad while managing military operations," Fetterly said. "On the Chinese side, it doesn't hurt to play for more time, to better understand what exactly President Trump might want." A recent trade talk in Paris between the two governments appears to have yielded little agreement and suggested difficulties remain in addressing structural differences in trade, technology and economic security, Fetterly said. "At the end of the day, both sides really needed some time to define what the range of deliverables are," he said.
The U.S. business community has also expressed concern that preparations for the summit might not have been sufficient to produce substantive agreements.
**Pivot away from Asia**
Transfers of military assets from the Indo-Pacific region to the Middle East,, including a sizable portion of Marines deployed there as part of a rapid-response unit and an anti-missile defense system, have raised concerns that the U.S. could get distracted from its own stated priority to refocus on Asia.
"The longer this war continues, and the more forces that are shifted out of Asia, the more it will feed Asian allies' concerns about U.S. distraction and resource constraints," said Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies U.S. strategy in Asia.
A delay in the state visit could also mean a delay in any arms sales to the self-governing island of Taiwan to deter attacks from Beijing, he said. China has vowed to take Taiwan by force if necessary, but the United States is obligated by its own law to give the island sufficient hardware to defend itself. The issue remains the thorniest in U.S.-China relations."I believe that China is happy to delay the visit and reap the benefits as the United States once again gets bogged down in the Middle East," Cooper said.
And Beijing probably doesn't need to do much, he added: "I think most Chinese experts and officials believe that the United States is undermining itself, so they just need to get out of the way."

# COMMENTARIES

## Beijing Codifies Repression of Overseas Activists

31 March 2026, Domino Theory

Earlier this month, China's legislature approved a new law aimed at promoting what it refers to as "ethnic unity." The law's primary focus is domestic: It mandates the use of Mandarin as the primary medium of education in schools across China, and calls for intermarriage and geographical integration between the Han majority and China's other 55 recognized ethnicities.

But to the Chinese government, ethnic unity is also a global matter. For decades, the Chinese Communist Party has sought to silence and intimidate members of its global diaspora who are critical of the regime, a practice referred to as transnational repression. Analysts say this new law will codify and extend that effort.

"Organizations and individuals outside the [mainland] territory of the PRC that commit acts aimed at the PRC that undermine ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division are to be pursued for legal responsibility in accordance with law," the law reads, referring to the People's Republic of China by its acronym.

Cases of formal extradition against overseas activists are rare, and usually limited to countries that maintain close ties with China. But the explicit codification can still have a chilling effect, said Emile Dirks, a research associate at the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto who studies transnational repression.

"It serves as a kind of sword of Damocles hanging over people's heads," Dirks said. "It's explicitly written down, a law that is clearly intended to prohibit certain kinds of public activism."

For members of the Chinese diaspora who are sympathetic to causes that the Chinese government deems as a threat to its interests, he added, the new law makes clear the costs of engaging in such behavior.

Article 21 of the new ethnic unity law strikes a more positive tone. "The state is to strengthen contact and communication with the overseas diaspora and support them in carrying forward Chinese culture and promoting cultural exchanges and cooperation between China and the world," it reads.

The juxtaposition of positive messaging alongside a more threatening tone maps onto what Dirks described as China's two-pronged approach to transnational repression. The Chinese Communist Party works to support members of the diaspora who view the regime positively while working to silence those who do not.

Silencing tactics include denying visas for people who would like to travel back to China, as well as using family members who still live there as a cudgel of intimidation, according to Bhuchung

Tsering, vice president of the International Campaign for Tibet.

Tsering said that these tactics are part of a larger strategy to constrain the space for discussion around issues facing Tibetan people, including the status of the Dalai Lama. "People outside Tibet, in exile, who talk about China's abuses of Tibetans, who talk about China's imposition of Mandarin on Tibetans, can be in theory prosecuted under this law," he said.

For Chinese citizens who plan to return to China, engaging in activist causes abroad can be even more dangerous.

Last summer, Zhang Yadi (張雅笛), a Chinese student who began writing for a pro-Tibet newsletter while studying abroad, disappeared after returning to China on vacation. She is now believed to be held at a detention center in her hometown of Changsha, facing charges of "inciting separatism."

Teng Biao (滕彪), a prominent Chinese human rights lawyer, said that even though the Chinese authorities have had the authority to target activists for years, the new law is ultimately aimed at controlling them more efficiently. "It's true that without written laws, the party can also achieve their goals. But that's more inconvenient," he said. "That's more expensive."

With a broadly worded law on the books, he said, the courts can feel more confident convicting people who question the regime.

## The New Law on Ethnic Unity: A Threat to Tibetan Buddhism

30 March 2026, Bitter Winter



*The legal assault against Tibetan Buddhism's soul. AI-generated.*

On March 12, 2026, the People's Republic of China introduced a new ethnic policy officially framed as promoting "ethnic unity" and a consolidated national identity. Despite this framing, the policy carries profound implications for Tibetan Buddhism. In Tibetan society, religion, language, and culture are not separate domains but form a deeply integrated whole. Any state intervention targeting a single element, particularly language or cultural expression, inevitably extends to the religious sphere as well. The policy, therefore, functions not merely as a political framework but as a direct mechanism shaping the transmission, practice, and long-term continuity of Tibetan Buddhist traditions.

The relationship between language and religion is particularly profound in the Tibetan context, though not entirely inseparable. The Tibetan language is deeply intertwined with Tibetan Buddhism, serving as the primary medium through which its teachings, rituals, and philosophical traditions are transmitted. Foundational texts such as the volumes of Buddha's teachings, the "Kangyur" (bka' 'gyur), the collected words of the Buddha, and the "Tengyur" (bstan 'gyur), comprising centuries of Indian and Tibetan philosophical commentary, are preserved in classical Tibetan, a linguistic system uniquely constructed to carry precise doctrinal meaning, layered philosophical interpretation, and symbolic depth that no translation has ever fully replicated and no simplification can preserve. These are often difficult to capture in translation fully. Consequently, any weakening of the language risks limiting access to the original teachings and diminishing understanding of their depth. For this reason, Tibetans both within Tibet and in exile regard the preservation of their language as a matter of utmost importance.

Policies implemented by the Chinese government are widely perceived as systematic efforts to erode Tibet's cultural and religious foundations, targeting above all its language and spiritual institutions. The 2007 Order No. 5, formally titled "Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddha in Tibetan Buddhism," made this intervention explicit, requiring state approval for the recognition of reincarnated spiritual masters. What had long been a sacred, community-rooted process was thereby brought under political authority. The question this raises is not technical but fundamental: can a spiritual institution preserve its authenticity when its most sacred determinations require government sanction?

The displacement of Tibetan by Mandarin as the primary medium of instruction compounds this erosion. Language is not a neutral tool of communication. It is the root of cultural identity and the living medium through which spiritual knowledge is transmitted across generations.

The Dalai Lama addressed this directly during a media interaction at the Tibetan Canadian Cultural Centre in Toronto on October 24, 2010. He argued that China, with its own deep Buddhist heritage, stands to benefit from preserving Tibetan

Buddhist culture rather than suppressing it. He pointed to India as a working example, a country that sustains profound linguistic diversity without treating it as a threat to national unity. The contrast with current Chinese policy could not be sharper.

Recent developments lay bare the true cost of resistance. According to the International Campaign for Tibet, Tibetan monk Palden Yeshi, aged 52, from a monastery in Kardze (Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan, was detained by Chinese authorities on May 17, 2021, and subjected to nearly five years of enforced disappearance. His family received no information about his whereabouts until late February 2026, when a relative was finally permitted to visit him at Chushul Prison, southwest of Lhasa. There, he disclosed that he is serving a six-year sentence believed to be directly linked to his efforts to preserve the Tibetan language.

His case is not an isolated incident. It is emblematic of a broader pattern in which cultural and linguistic preservation is treated as a criminal act. When a monk disappeared for nearly five years and was imprisoned for protecting his own language, the claim that these policies merely promote "ethnic unity" becomes impossible to sustain.

Tibetan Buddhist systems like Madhyamaka and Dzogchen rely on highly precise language to express subtle distinctions. Translation often reduces multiple terms to a single word, such as "mind" or "emptiness," thereby losing both clarity and depth. Thus, language is not just descriptive but essential for guiding realization.

Furthermore, in Tibetan tradition, especially in Vajrayana practices, teachings are not regarded as complete through textual study alone. They require three essential modes of transmission: oral transmission (rlung), instruction (khrid), and empowerment (dwang). These are passed down from teacher to student in Tibetan, preserving lineage continuity and serving as the initial doorway for beginners to enter Vajrayana practices.

Therefore, if the language weakens, oral transmission declines, and the essential essence may be lost. If the language declines, these subtle instructions may disappear. This challenge is particularly significant in traditions associated with Padmasambhava, where teachings known as "terma" (hidden treasures) are revealed by "treasure revealers" (gterstons). These teachings often rely on the dakini script (mkha'drodgyig), requiring deep linguistic and cultural familiarity to interpret. A decline in Tibetan literacy could therefore prevent future generations from decoding the spiritual heritage.

This concern reflects core Buddhist principles like dependent origination, highlighting interdependence. The loss of language, therefore, risks the loss of an entire philosophical training system. Beyond doctrine, the Tibetan language preserves stories of saints and yogis, cultural metaphors, and elements of devotional poetry whose depth often fades in translation. It is thus not only religion that is at stake, but how it is experienced and lived.

In this light, the erosion of the Tibetan language does not eliminate Buddhism itself. Still, it poses a risk of losing the depth and continuity of Tibetan Buddhism as a living tradition.

In 2010 at Bodhgaya, the Dalai Lama urged Himalayan communities to learn Tibetan, emphasizing that Buddhist teachings cannot fully survive in translation and must be preserved through the language itself.

This position has since been corroborated at the highest levels of international scrutiny. In a report presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva, Nicolas Levrat warned that Chinese state policies are contributing to the systematic erosion of Tibetan civilization, describing them not merely as discriminatory but as a form of "eradication in more subtle ways." At the center of this concern is the large-scale boarding school system imposed on Tibetan children, through which Mandarin, state ideology, and assimilative practices dominate daily life. In contrast, the Tibetan language is structurally marginalized. Separated from their families and communities, these children are denied the natural conditions through which language, culture, and religious identity are transmitted across generations.

The relationship between the Tibetan language and Tibetan Buddhism is not one of convenience or historical accident. It is one of the constitutive interdependences. Language is not the medium through which Tibetan Buddhism is communicated; it is the condition under which it exists, is understood, and is transmitted. Every policy that erodes the Tibetan linguistic environment, therefore, strikes not at the periphery of the tradition but at its core.

The ethnic policy introduced by the People's Republic of China on March 12, 2026, clearly reveals this reality. Framed as cultural consolidation, it effectively dismantles the conditions needed for Tibetan Buddhist knowledge to survive. The tradition may persist in name, but without its language, texts, and living transmission, it is not preserved; it is being erased.

The preservation of the Tibetan language is therefore not a cultural preference or a political position. It is essential. Without it, the full depth, authenticity, and continuity of Tibetan Buddhism cannot survive, not because the religion lacks resilience, but because no tradition can endure the systematic destruction of the conditions that make it possible. It is the survival of one of humanity's most profound and irreplaceable intellectual and spiritual inheritances.

## Jiang Xueqin, the viral 'prophet' predicting the world's fate from a Beijing classroom

29 March 2026, SCMP




'Professor Jiang' has been dubbed 'China's Nostradamus' after forecasting Trump's election win and the war with Iran. But some of his ideas veer into conspiracy theory

Beijing-based high-school teacher Jiang Xueqin may not seem like an obvious candidate for a geopolitical "prophet".

Dressed casually in a polo shirt, the greying Chinese-Canadian looks unassuming.

But through his hugely popular *Predictive History* YouTube channel, Jiang has become known as "China's Nostradamus", gaining a following for his outlook on world affairs.

While most of his fans are outside China, his lectures and interviews have been translated and uploaded on Chinese social media sites, prompting a range of discussion about his programmes and perspectives.

Jiang is best known for three "big predictions" he made in May 2024, when US president Joe Biden was still in office.

First, he said Donald Trump would win the presidential election later that year. Second, he said the United States would then launch a war on Iran.

Now Jiang's fans are waiting to see if the third forecast will also come to pass – one that predicts a turning point in the global order.

However, "Professor Jiang's" ideas on the existing order can be controversial, veering into well-trodden conspiracy theories on shadowy secret societies.

*Jiang Xueqin, a Chinese-Canadian educator once known narrowly for his work on education, has become known for his predictions on geopolitics. Photo: Handout*

Jiang was born in China in 1976 and moved to Toronto when he was six. He has described his parents as "very poor" and "not well educated".

Despite his humble background, he graduated from Yale University in 1999 with a degree in English literature.

Jiang then went on to work as a freelance journalist. According to Reporters Without Borders, he was detained by police in the northeastern Chinese city of Daqing in 2002 after recording a workers' demonstration. He was later expelled from the country.

However, Jiang was allowed to return and began working as a teacher, beginning a long history of involvement in educational reform.

From 2008 to 2012, he worked to move the curriculum of high-profile schools in Shenzhen and Beijing away from their laser focus on gruelling test prep – ultimately unsuccessfully. His efforts gained him coverage both in Chinese and foreign media.

As recently as this February, he was listed as a researcher by Harvard University's Global Education Innovation Initiative, though this page is no longer public.

He now teaches philosophy and English at Moonshot Academy, a Beijing school known for its innovative approach to education.

In his classes, some of which he posts to his YouTube channel, he analyses history, explains current affairs and forecasts global developments, with lectures such as *The Hellenistic World* and *Church and Empire*.

Others are more eccentric, such as his video on St Paul's role in shaping Christianity titled *The Organisation of Evil*.

Jiang's lecture in which he made his "big predictions" first went viral in June 2025, when Israel and the US attacked Iranian nuclear and military sites in a 12-day war.

But interest has soared again since the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran on February 28.

Now, his channel has more than 2 million subscribers and there is a cottage industry of channels that repackage his content. One, which dubs his lectures into Portuguese, has more than 200,000 subscribers.

Beyond his own channel, Jiang has been making appearances on podcasts and online video news shows, including an interview on British broadcaster Piers Morgan's channel and an hour-long chat with US conservative commentator Tucker Carlson. During the Carlson show, which refers to him as a "political prophet", Jiang said the US would become mired in a drawn-out war of attrition in Iran that could last years.

That forecast doubled down on the third of his 2024 "big predictions": that the US will lose the war in Iran, leading to a reshaping of the world order.

So, what could this new order look like?

In *Pax Judaica*, the concluding lecture of his *Secret History* series, Jiang describes one theory of what might happen after the United States is forced from the Middle East. Namely, a secret society called the Illuminati – supposedly an alliance of Freemasons, Jesuits and a now-defunct Jewish cult – would control the world from Jerusalem. While conceding that this is just a theory, Jiang says it

does help "connect the dots" and explain "why things are happening the way they are".
In his interview with Piers Morgan, he described such secret societies as the "real power base" of the US.
Jiang's fans often praise him as a fearless truth-teller. Many of the comments on his videos say his lectures feel like university-level courses. "The fact that we are all tuning in to Prof Jiang's class really shows our tiredness of BS and extreme hunger for truths … simplified and digestible," one comment under a recent video read.
Others are more sceptical.
"He's the 'monkey with a typewriter' version of Nostradamus – make [thousands of] predictions, get praised when a few turns [sic] out right. What's really weird is how many people are amazed by this", one detractor wrote on X, formerly Twitter.
In a conspiratorial twist, some have claimed his sudden rise may have been orchestrated by hidden forces.
While Jiang has not achieved widespread fame in China, some in the country have tried to explain why a teacher making predictions from a Beijing high school appeals to Western audiences.

"Jiang seems to carry a certain 'Orientalist' aura of mystery, appealing simultaneously to conservative values, liberal expectations of minority voices and left-leaning perceptions of China's rising influence," one commenter on question-and-answer site Zhihu said.
Some critics said that despite Jiang being known as "China's Nostradamus", there's little Chinese about his world view.
"Judging from his remarks, he appears to believe in the superiority of the Western-led order and does not seem particularly sympathetic towards China, but as an intellectual, he cannot simply dismiss China's objective rise and growing strength," one commented.

## Tibet recognition blocked by China's diplomatic and economic leverage: Report

28 March 2026, Social News

The non-recognition of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) stems not from a lack of claim by Tibet but from China's coercive and economic capacity, which renders such a claim "diplomatically untenable".
"In the annals of international diplomacy, recognition is the currency of sovereignty. Yet no state has ever formally recognised the Central Tibetan Administration as a legal government. The reason is not a lack of internal legitimacy. The CTA is a functioning exile administration with democratic elections and institutions. The reason is the iron grip of realpolitik. To recognise the CTA would be to challenge the People's Republic of China's territorial claims, a step no government has been willing to take given Beijing's economic leverage and geopolitical weight," a European Times report detailed.
"This silence is not accidental. Under international practice, recognition of governments in exile has precedent, from the Polish government during World War II to Kuwait's exile government in 1990. Such recognition has generally depended on the prospect of restoration. In Tibet's case, China's consolidation of control and its permanent seat on the UN Security Council severely limit that possibility. States therefore avoid recognition not because the CTA lacks internal legitimacy but because the costs of defying Beijing are prohibitive," it added.
According to the report, China's consolidated control and its permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) severely constrain the possibility of recognition. The nations withheld recognition not because "the CTA lacks internal legitimacy but because the costs of defying Beijing are prohibitive".
Yet, the Dalai Lama occupies a distinct space beyond this diplomatic impasse, welcomed globally not as a head of state but as a Nobel laureate, spiritual teacher, and voice of Tibetans in exile.
"This distinction allows governments to acknowledge Tibet's cultural and moral cause without triggering China's retaliatory machinery. Beijing can pressure states to avoid official dealings with the CTA, but it cannot erase the Dalai Lama's stature as a religious leader whose teachings on compassion and nonviolence resonate across cultures," the European Times report mentioned.
Highlighting the paradox, the report added, "The CTA embodies Tibet's political aspirations but remains constrained by non-recognition. The Dalai Lama, by contrast, wields soft power that no decree from Beijing can extinguish. His moral authority ensures that Tibet remains present in global consciousness, even as its political institutions are denied formal standing."

Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama's enduring voice underscores that moral legitimacy can persist amid political silence. Tibet may never find recognition in the halls of the United Nations, yet it continues to resonate in the conscience of humanity, a report mentioned.

## The China lessons India can ill-afford to ignore

26 March 2026, Asia Times

Two months ago, China's Communist Party leadership held a key gathering in Zhongnanhai. On January 30, the Politburo's first study session signaled its strategic priorities.

Yet in India, the event passed with barely a whisper. No major paper or academic institution has analyzed the discussion. This silence signals a deeper failure to grasp the scale of the challenge across the Himalayas.

The session launched China's 15th Five-Year Plan. It did not address macroeconomic stabilization or geopolitical posturing, typical topics at such events. Instead, it focused entirely on planning and developing future industries. If the idea of "new quality productive forces" introduced two years ago was the strategy, this meeting laid out the plan.

China's leaders were clear: seize the top positions in science and technology, and drive national development. Mastering future industries is not optional in great power competition; it is a compulsion. Those who lead these technologies will shape the global economy.

Policy circles called this meeting the "final hammer." China will channel all fiscal, financial, and human resources into six key technological areas over five years: quantum technology, bio-manufacturing, hydrogen fusion, brain-computer interfaces, embodied intelligence and 6G. Each field is worth trillions.

China is betting that the next decade belongs to "hard technology plus," not just model innovation.

The six frontiers

**1**. Embodied intelligence is "AI with a body." Companies like Tesla, UBTech, and Logic Robotics are deploying robots beyond factory walls. The breakthrough combines language model intelligence with precise motor control. Old robots repeated tasks; new ones learn and adapt. China will use a "new national system" to target real-world uses—underground work, bomb disposal, elderly care—to generate valuable data.

**2**. Brain-computer interfaces are leaving the lab and heading to the clinic. The market will reach $3 billion this year. China's large clinical population is a unique advantage. Breakthroughs in 2025 from Neuralink and Chinese teams speed progress. First, Beijing targets medical uses for Parkinson's, epilepsy and paralysis. Next come consumer uses for sleep, focus, and VR interaction. Companies that master electrodes and neural decoding will profit most.

**.** China sees 6G as an integrated network across space, air, and ground, beyond just fast broadband. It will support the low-altitude economy, self-driving vehicles, and embodied intelligence. 5G improved speed; 6G will solve coverage and latency. China started the second phase of testing in early 2026. Satellite internet and ground stations will make direct satellite connectivity for smartphones routine.

**4.** Nuclear fusion and hydrogen energy are the top prizes. China's "artificial sun" keeps breaking records, with commercial reactors now the goal. Hydrogen is the bridge, starting with heavy trucks and ships. China needs energy independence because it imports most of its oil.

**5.** China describes quantum technology dramatically. Traditional computers are like oxen pulling carts; quantum computing attacks the very foundations of physics. New computers could cut drug development to moments. Quantum communication could make unhackable networks. Including quantum in the 15th Five-Year Plan means it is moving from the lab to practical use.

**6.** Bio-manufacturing may be the quietest revolution of all. The old method of extracting nylon and plastics from oil was polluting and energy-intensive. Synthetic biology now makes it possible to produce the same materials from fermented corn. One Chinese company is already doing so at a competitive cost.

If 20% of fossil fuel use could be displaced by bio-fermentation, China's import dependence would shrink dramatically. This is a national-level "lower-dimensional attack" on a structural vulnerability.

Indian absence

This Chinese strategic planning matters to India because India lacks any comparable system for long-term technology planning to compete with China.

When Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014, he eliminated the Planning Commission, which provided some developmental foresight. NITI Aayog replaced it, but as a think-tank with no power to implement. This ended central planning in name but, in practice, crippled India's ability to develop a long-term strategy and guide the Indian government.

Consider the comparison with "Made in China 2025", which was launched the same year as Modi's "Make in India". One succeeded spectacularly. China now leads the world in electric vehicles, solar panels, high-speed rail, semiconductors and robotics.

Its manufacturing sector accounts for more than 28% of GDP; high-tech products constitute over 60% of exports. The other campaign produced rhetoric and photo opportunities. India's manufacturing share of GDP remains stuck between 15% and 17%. R&D spending languishes at below 0.7% of GDP, compared with China's 2.4%.

India trails China across the six technology fields China has prioritized. China invests billions in quantum computing, while Indian scientists struggle for basic research funding. China uses bio-manufacturing to cut oil imports; India relies on imported crude.

China builds robots and satellite constellations with a national system; India's NITI Aayog produces reports that go unread.

A failure of foresight

China's official press release warns against overcrowding and calls for targeted fiscal and tax policies to support technology finance.

These are lessons from past industrial policies that created overcapacity. China will now target subsidies precisely, ending widespread handouts. "Patient capital" from pension funds, insurance,

and national funds will support risky, long-term industries.

This is strategic planning of a kind that India has consciously and deliberately dismantled. The 15th Five-Year Plan's "first lesson" signals that China's policymakers understand: capital was accumulated from real estate and exports 20 years ago; the mobile internet changed lifestyles ten years ago; the baton has now passed to core technology. The new normal, in Beijing's formulation, is "industry poses questions, technology provides answers."

New Delhi's strategic thinking is fixated on populism, cronyism, and short-term electoral gain by making false promises. India has no equivalent of the Politburo's study session—no leadership forum to assess global trends and allocate national resources.

The Planning Commission's abolition, hailed as reform, removed India's ability to compete in technology-driven industrial transformation.

Challenge unacknowledged

China does not consider India a competitor in this race. From Beijing's perspective, India remains a country trying to find gold on a new continent using an old map.

This is not mere condescension; it is a cold-eyed assessment of institutional realities. The Chinese system can direct patient capital into six simultaneous technological bets. The Indian system cannot reliably fund one.

The irony is that India possesses many of the raw materials for success: a young population, a vibrant entrepreneurial culture, and world-class scientific talent. The stakes are high: without the right institutional architecture to marshal these assets, India risks squandering its opportunities for global influence and economic leadership.

The Planning Commission was imperfect, often inefficient and sometimes misguided. But its abolition was not followed by the creation of anything better. India now has no institution capable of producing a 15th Five-Year Plan, let alone enforcing its priorities.

The January 30 session in Zhongnanhai was, by any measure, a significant event. It revealed the technological roadmap of the world's second-largest economy for the next half-decade. That India's media and academia paid it no attention is not a sign of healthy self-reliance but of strategic myopia. You cannot compete in a race you refuse to acknowledge exists.

The question for India is not whether it can match China's resources. It is whether it can rebuild the institutional capacity for long-term thinking that it so casually dismantled a decade ago.

The first lesson of China's 15th Five-Year Plan is not about quantum computing or bio-manufacturing. It is about the virtues of strategic foresight itself. That is a lesson India can ill afford to ignore.

## China's New Ethnic Unity Law: From Autonomy to Assimilation

March 26, 2026, CFR

On March 12, China's legislature adopted the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress (Chinese; English translation), a sweeping new statute that codifies Beijing's approach toward China's 56 officially recognized ethnic groups. Substantively, the law enshrines a decades-long shift towards aggressive assimilationist policies. Structurally, it reflects a deepening merger of Party ideology and state law that is becoming increasingly prevalent under Xi Jinping.

This new law is the culmination of a policy trajectory that has been building for over a decade, dating back to the 2014 Central Ethnic Work Conference. Under Xi, Beijing is steering away from the post-1949 legal framework of nominal ethnic autonomy (albeit under tight Party control) imported from the Soviet Union. In its place, officials have steadily been pivoting towards what scholars have termed "second-generation ethnic policies"—an aggressive assimilationist approach that emphasizes a common Chinese national identity over accommodation of ethnic differences. Provincial and municipal authorities across China have enacted a wave of local "ethnic unity and progress" regulations in recent years, such as those in Xinjiang (2015) or Inner Mongolia (2021). The new national legislation elevates this approach to the level of a national statute governing all of China.

The new law's core concept is captured in the term zhulao (铸牢) – to "forge" or "cast" metal – and its instruction that "forging the communal consciousness of the Chinese nation" is core to the Party's ethnic policies. As James Leibold has pointed out, this phrasing reflects a hardening of Beijing's political line under Xi Jinping – explicitly written into the Party's Charter at the 19th Party Congress in 2017 – aimed at "melting" subnational and ethnic identities into a shared collective one.

This is a sharp departure from the framework of the 1984 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, which explicitly provided for education in minority languages and warned against majoritarian (i.e., Han) chauvinism in an effort to reset ethnic relations in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. In contrast, the new 2026 law has no such warning, mandates pre-school education in Mandarin, directs government authorities and private firms to "give prominence" to the display of Chinese characters over minority languages in public settings, and instructs them to promote the "forging of national identity" as a component of all official work on families and family education.

Naturally, Beijing's assimilationist pivot risks worsening ethnic tensions in China. Efforts to roll out similar policies in Inner Mongolia back in 2020 (including ramping up Chinese-medium instruction in elementary schools) generated widespread citizen protests and boycotts, followed by a purge of ethnic Mongolian Party and government officials viewed as insufficiently committed to Beijing's new line.

Apart from its substance, the new ethnic unity law is also notable for its structure. As the legal scholar Changhao Wei has observed, two features of the text are highly unusual. It opens with a narrative preamble—a device used in only three other PRC statutes in over four decades. And core chapters are organized around political slogans directly lifted from Xi Jinping's ethnic work doctrine, rather than the functional legal categories that are standard in Chinese legislation.

This parallels a broader trend: the steady blurring of the boundary between Party regulations and state law. As political scientist Holly Snape has documented, Beijing is steadily constructing a comprehensive network of Party regulations that increasingly reaches beyond the Party itself to regulate state and society. On the one hand, this process has involved the importation of quasi-legal mechanisms within the Party's own regulatory system, such as the introduction of filing and review mechanisms to verify whether regulations issued by lower-level Party organs are compliant with Xi's personal political doctrine. But on the other, it is leading Party ideological practices to steadily "seep into state law." And the newly issued ethnic unity law is a clear example of that latter trend, with the top leader's specific ideological formulations being used as the statute's organizing skeleton. Taken together, both the substance and structure of the new ethnic unity law point in the same direction. China's reform-era legal institutions and practices – the framework of nominal ethnic autonomy, and the conventions that maintained some degree of separation between Party and state – are steadily eroding as the country moves yet deeper into the counter-reform era Information

## How China's structural flaws make it more aggressive on borders

26 March 2026, First Post

With its over-ambitious plans and despite inherent flaws, China is bound to become more aggressive on the borders; Delhi should take note of these developments

A few days ago, *The Times of India* (*ToI*) commented on something that many analysts have recently been observing: "Chinese-manufactured weaponry – long touted as a cheaper but equally powerful alternative to Western arsenals – has imploded spectacularly in recent conflicts."

The article explained, "From India dismantling Pakistan's defences during Operation Sindoor, America's surgical raid snatching Venezuela's Maduro, to US-Israeli strikes pulverising Iran's shields, Beijing's gear has proven inept. What was hyped as 'battle-tested innovation' now reeks of shoddy engineering, weak software, and zero real-war grit."

The *ToI* conclusion was, "The repeated failures suggest that these aren't mere glitches, but a sign of systemic rot."

Several other signs show the Middle Kingdom in a poor light: the shortage of water and other natural resources; the ageing of the population; the pushbacks from neighbouring countries, including Japan & the Philippines; the reported internal unrest on the 'frontiers' of the Kingdom (read, Tibet and Xinjiang); and also a serious economic meltdown, particularly after the property sector crisis which sparked a financial crisis following the 2021 default of Evergrande Group, which resulted in large-scale unemployment.

This points to the difficulties faced by the leadership in Beijing today.

However, there is no doubt that China continues to dream of becoming the power number one in the world, especially in the wake of the confused foreign and economic policies of the United States; the outlandish attitude of the US president is certainly helping Beijing to dream of 'Making China Great Again'.

**Another Side of the Coin**

There is another side to the flaws of the Middle Kingdom, often viewed far in advance of India in terms of infrastructure development, advanced research and other innovative domains; though the Indian system is far from being perfect, it, however, remains decades ahead in terms of individual freedom and true democracy.

The Communist Party of China (CPC) constantly uses the word 'People', ie, People's Republic, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Great Hall of the People, but in fact it is the Party which is supreme in every domain, particularly in selecting and removing 'people' from their posts or functions, thereby limiting the true creativity of the nation.

This was seen in early March when the PLA delegation shrunk to about half its normal strength of 275 delegates to the National People's (one more) Congress (NPC).

**The 15th Five-year Plan**

It is in this context that the introduction of China's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) should be analysed.

The First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) was drafted on the Soviet model; it was a survival plan to feed the Chinese people and start an industrial base.

Over the years, the plans continued to evolve, with the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-1962) geared towards central command and extensive planning. However, following Mao Zedong's wrong economic policies, it ended in the Great

Leap Forward, which caused the death of 40 or 50 million Chinese. The plan entailed pouring all local available resources into large projects; it was a shift from the rapid industrialisation of the First Plan.

In an excellent paper in *ChinaTalk*, Kyle Chan defined each decade from the Sixth Plan (1981-85) onwards; he argues that the 1980s witnessed the advent of 'Old and New Technology': "a dual focus on advancing high-tech sectors such as computers and semiconductors while also improving agricultural technology, such as new seed varieties and fertiliser production."

The 1990s were characterised by 'High-Tech Industrialisation and Leapfrog Development': "The full range of target sectors [were] computers, software, semiconductors, microelectronics, energy, transportation (including high-speed rail), chemicals, biotech, IT, new materials, aerospace, and manufacturing equipment." The Ninth Plan (1996-2000) particularly included long-term goals. Since then, China has planned for a blend of stabilisation, development and visionary objectives.

The 2000s were centred on the 'Information Revolution', heavily focused on 'informatisation' to drive industrialisation. For example, in 2008, China created a new super-ministry called the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology: "It is a powerful cross-cutting technology for boosting everything from manufacturing and infrastructure to services and defence—analogous to how China treats AI today," wrote Kyle Chan.

It was an opportunity for Beijing to leverage its 'latecomer advantage' on the West.

The 2010s saw the emergence of 'strategic industries'; during this period, China focused on cutting-edge technologies, including cloud computing, carbon fibre, superconducting materials, rare earths, high-end CNC machines, next-generation nuclear power, genetics, and biomanufacturing.

The 2020s saw the advent of 'key core' technologies and artificial intelligence (AI), partly triggered by the US administration's actions against China's technology industry, in particular Huawei and ZTE. China jumped into "increasingly ambitious cutting-edge technologies, such as quantum, fusion, brain-computer interface, drones and flying cars, and AI."

Beijing also tried to tackle the 'technological chokepoints' such as semiconductors, foundational software, and aviation, with the focus on technological self-reliance. AI and especially 'embodied AI' became the core focus. These policies seem to have paid rich dividends.

**Riding Ahead**

The new plan will be different in the sense that China will not try to 'catch up' with the US but has decided to ride ahead.

For this, the next generation of IT, embodied AI, quantum technology, biomanufacturing, nuclear fusion, 6G communications, advances in the aviation and space domain or brain-computer interfaces will be experimented with and developed, as well as many new technologies that one can't think of today.

**Stabilising the Restive Frontiers**

In parallel, and perhaps more importantly for India, a new push will take place in key infrastructure developments on China's frontier's regions (namely Xinjiang and Tibet).

The plan includes highway expansion: upgrading the three major highways running into Tibet to strengthen the 'strategic backbone corridors'.

But also, the expansion of the railway network: it will be expanded to over 5,000 km by 2035, aiming to link Tibet with neighbouring provinces (Xinjiang, Sichuan, and Yunnan) with all the strategic implications that one can imagine for India.

Further, the plan involves developing 20 general border airports, including the upgrade of the Nyingchi airport on the Indian border in the north-east.

And worse for India, the 'hydropower development', in other words, large-scale projects, including hydropower development on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo river (later Siang and Brahmaputra), are now prioritised.

The announced objectives are for the 'stability of the frontiers', a 'unified domestic network', 'energy security' and ultimately 'regional integration'; the latter must be seen with the sinicisation of Buddhism in Tibet and Islam in Xinjiang, which will complete the circle of assimilation.

**Beijing's Views**

In a presentation of the plan, Xinhua noted: "Running through this plan is another important thread. China's vast frontier regions have assumed a more prominent role in the national masterplan to build a unified domestic market, strengthen energy security and expand opening up. This emphasises that the Chinese modernisation endeavour is aimed at securing prosperity for all."

In core sections of the draft plan about transport, energy, digital infrastructure and regional integration, the frontier regions (Tibet and Xinjiang in particular) "are being closely woven into China's modernisation tapestry".

According to Zhang Bin, deputy director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the plan highlights, among other things, "the strategic importance of Xinjiang. With its location, resources and industrial base, it can serve as a key hub in China's broader opening up."

Xinhua explains that the 15th Plan emphasises "continued expansion of westbound freight train services and accelerated development of port infrastructure … thus further boosting westward trade flows."

For Beijing, Xinjiang had a nearly 20 per cent year-on-year increase in the total value of its foreign trade in 2025, ranking first in terms of

growth rate among all Chinese provincial-level regions, hitting more than 75 billion U.S. dollars. However, Uyghur culture is lost in the process.

This 'expansion' practically means a complete assimilation of the local populations, whether it is in Xinjiang, Tibet or Inner Mongolia.

Ethnic Unity?

Further, at the time the Five-Year Plan was presented to the NPC, a law about 'Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress' was passed.

For the Washington-based *International Campaign for Tibet* (ITC): "The legislation advances a PRC strategy of demographic homogenisation for Tibetans and other non-Chinese peoples behind anodyne language."

For example, the law says that "it helps better support people of all ethnic groups across the country in advancing national development and rejuvenation through Chinese-style modernisation."

ITC observes: "Several provisions in the law serve to legitimise CCP policies forcing Tibetans and others to assimilate into the CCP-defined 'Chinese' nation. … The law provides a legal tool for the CCP to establish and enforce a unified national identity and singular idea of China, shaped by CCP and authoritarian ideology."

With its over-ambitious plans and despite its inherent flaws, China is bound to become more aggressive on the borders; Delhi should take note of these developments.

## Cold Peace: India–China Reset Meets Hard Power Reality

21 March 2026, BW

India and China witnessed a cautious thaw in relations through 2025, marked by renewed diplomatic engagement and the limited restoration of people-to-people ties. However, beneath this surface-level rapprochement, structural rivalry and emerging security challenges—particularly Beijing's deepening alignment with Islamabad and its expanding maritime footprint—continue to shape New Delhi's threat perception.The improvement in ties followed political signalling from the October 2024 Kazan Summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, which translated into incremental confidence-building measures. By the end of 2025, direct flights between the two countries had resumed, visa procedures had been eased, and religious tourism had seen an uptick. Track-two engagements, including exchanges among think tanks, academics, and political representatives, also gathered pace alongside discussions on economic cooperation.

**China–Pakistan Collusion Raises Two-Front Threat**

A major takeaway from Operation Sindoor was the growing operational and diplomatic convergence between China and Pakistan. Following the Pahalgam terrorist attack, Beijing reportedly played a role in softening international responses, including influencing the language of a US statement that omitted references to The Resistance Front (TRF) and alleged Pakistani involvement.

At multilateral forums as well, China's positioning drew scrutiny. During the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Defence Ministers' meeting, the joint declaration excluded mention of the Pahalgam attack while including an incident in Pakistan, signalling a diplomatic tilt.

More significantly, during the May 2025 conflict, China is assessed to have provided Pakistan with real-time intelligence support, including satellite imagery, missile and drone targeting data, and tracking inputs. While Beijing refrained from overt military posturing, the scale of this functional assistance reinforced concerns of a coordinated two-front scenario for India.

Pakistan's heavy reliance on Chinese military hardware—estimated to account for over 80 per cent of its arsenal—was also tested during the conflict. Indian strikes reportedly exposed vulnerabilities in Pakistan's air defence systems, many of which failed under operational stress, allowing Indian missiles and drones to penetrate and damage critical infrastructure.

**China Expands Naval Footprint in Indian Ocean**

Parallel to developments on land, China has steadily increased its maritime presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). What began as anti-piracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden has evolved into a sustained naval footprint, supported by Beijing's overseas base in Djibouti and access to multiple regional ports.

In 2025, several Chinese vessels, including oceanographic and surveillance ships, were deployed across the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea, and waters near key locations such as Sri Lanka, Mauritius, and Diego Garcia. These platforms are believed to collect sensitive data, including missile telemetry and seabed mapping.

Indian authorities observed a pattern wherein Chinese surveillance ships appeared in proximity whenever India issued Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) for missile tests. In response, the Indian Navy reportedly adopted countermeasures, including randomising test notifications to assess Chinese deployment patterns, thereby confirming systematic monitoring.

China's naval capabilities have also expanded with the induction of its third aircraft carrier, CNS Fujian. The 80,000-tonne vessel, equipped with advanced electromagnetic launch systems, enhances Beijing's power projection capabilities, even as its conventional propulsion limits prolonged deployments.

**PLA Turmoil May Temper Immediate Risks**

Amid these external developments, internal churn within China's military has introduced an element of uncertainty. President Xi Jinping's ongoing purge within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) intensified in early 2026, with the removal of

senior generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli on charges linked to undermining command authority and combat effectiveness.

The shake-up has reduced the size of China's Central Military Commission and further consolidated power under Xi. However, it has also triggered unease within the officer corps, disrupted cohesion, and raised questions about the reliability of military procurement systems.

Experts suggest that this internal instability may temporarily reduce Beijing's appetite for military adventurism, offering India a limited strategic window.

**No De-escalation Along LAC Despite Engagement**

Despite the diplomatic thaw, the military stand-off along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) remains unresolved. Nearly 60,000 troops from each side continue to be deployed, with no visible signs of disengagement or de-induction.

While 2025 saw modest improvements in bilateral ties, India's security calculus continues to be shaped by persistent risks—from a potential two-front contingency involving China and Pakistan to Beijing's growing maritime reach.

Analysts argue that India must utilise the current phase of relative restraint within the PLA to accelerate infrastructure development, modernise military capabilities, and prepare for future contingencies, as the long-term trajectory of Sino-Indian relations remains defined by competition rather than cooperation.

## A Heartfelt Appeal to the Tibetan Diaspora Communities

19 March 2026, Tibetan Review

The need to adopt a pro-active approach towards preserving the Tibetan national identity especially through the inculcation of linguistic skill has become ever more pressing today not only because of China's ongoing coercive Sinicization drive in Tibet, which has seen the country's Communist Party rulers adopt a new Law on 'Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress' recently, but also in view of the fact that the once closely-knit Tibetan communities in India, Nepal and Bhutan have been hollowing out with their youngsters dispersing across the free world in quest for better opportunities and life, writes Tsering Yangkey. *

I believe that, as Tibetans, we all share a deep and unwavering faith in His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, and an innate patriotism toward Tibet. To me, these two qualities are indispensable conditions for calling oneself Tibetan. Fulfilling the aspirations of His Holiness and serving the cause of Tibet are inseparable, for His Holiness and Tibet are like the two faces of the same coin. As Tibetans, the purpose of our lives is to serve these two sacred causes. The preservation and protection of the Tibetan language is not only our moral responsibility but also one of the four principal commitments of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

We all know that our forefathers fled their homeland, following His Holiness the Dalai Lama, with a single mission and purpose: to struggle for our freedom in exile and eventually return home. They did not leave Tibet in search of better jobs, improved educational opportunities, or a more comfortable livelihood, as many of us do today.

With his profound vision and determination, His Holiness requested the Government of India to allow the establishment of separate Tibetan communities. He did this with a single aim—to preserve our identity as Tibetans. As a result, despite living outside our homeland and being few in number, we have been able to preserve, promote, and nurture our religion, culture, and language. This achievement is largely due to His Holiness's far-sighted leadership and tireless efforts, which won recognition for him with the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989.

Today, however, the situation is changing—both inside Tibet and in exile. First, His Holiness is advancing in age, even though he has reassured us that he hopes to live for several more decades. At the same time, Tibetans living in India, Nepal, and Bhutan—especially young people—are increasingly migrating to Western countries. As a result, Tibetan settlements, schools, and monasteries are gradually emptying. Since many people of reproductive age are leaving for work abroad, population growth within our communities in South Asia has slowed significantly.

Back in Tibet, the government of the Chinese Communist Party is determined to eradicate our identity. The establishment of so-called boarding schools in Tibet has led to Tibetan children being forcibly enrolled in them, depriving them of their right to study their own language and cultural heritage. Recently, authorities have implemented policies requiring preschool children to begin learning Mandarin and threatening criminal law action against individuals overseas seen as "undermining ethnic unity." Private Tibetan language schools have been systematically shut down, and teachers associated with them have been detained or disappeared. The message is clear: erase the language, erase the people.

The survival and identity of any people depends fundamentally on the preservation of their language. Religion, culture, history, and collective memory are all preserved and transmitted through language. If a language disappears, the identity of that people gradually fades with it. With Tibetan children in Tibet being denied the right to learn their own language, we are approaching a critical threshold that threatens our existence as a distinct people in the world.

Tibetans in Tibet are not in a position to preserve our language due to such restrictions. Meanwhile, many Tibetans in the diaspora—particularly those living in the West and in major Indian cities—are

gradually losing their language, often citing a lack of environment or opportunities to learn and practice it. For many years, Tibetan communities in India, Nepal, and Bhutan have served as the guardians of our identity. But now, as more people move abroad, our once close-knit communities risk becoming increasingly dispersed. This raises a serious question: who will preserve and carry forward our identity in the future?

Until recently, the preservation of our identity was not considered an urgent issue. Today, however, it has become as serious as our political struggle. We must recognize the reality faced by Tibetans inside Tibet under Chinese control. Our brothers and sisters there are helpless. In contrast, those of us living in the free world have the freedom, opportunity, and resources to speak and learn our language. No one prevents us from speaking Tibetan at home or with fellow Tibetans.

I would like to emphasize that parents play the most crucial role in this effort. In addition to speaking Tibetan at home, parents can send their children to Tibetan weekend schools, encourage them to attend online Tibetan language classes, and take them to summer camps in India—such as programs organized by institutions like the Sarah College, Tibetan Children's Villages, Sera Jey Monastic University, Gyumed Tantric Monastery, and the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts. If we do not encourage and support our children in learning Tibetan, how will they pass it on to the next generation when they become parents themselves?

Our religion and culture teach us morality, love, compassion, peace, harmony, universal responsibility, mindfulness, meditation, environmental protection, and many other values that benefit humanity as a whole. People around the world admire Tibetan culture, including scientists who are deeply interested in Buddhist philosophy—especially Buddhist psychology and the study of the mind. Therefore, learning and preserving our language and culture is not selfish—it is a service to the world.

Although we cannot directly change the situation inside Tibet, we can do our part to preserve our identity—an identity for which our brothers and sisters in Tibet continue to struggle. When Tibetan children in Tibet are prevented from learning their own language, we should speak and learn Tibetan even more actively in exile. When birth rates in Tibet are controlled, we should strengthen our communities abroad. When mixed marriages are encouraged to dilute our identity, we must marry within our community. In this way, we can respond peacefully, without hatred or violence.

To the Lhakar Gorshe groups, I also have a small request: please take some time—perhaps half an hour—to learn the lyrics of the songs you perform and understand their meanings. Through them, you will discover the richness of our culture: the lives of nomads and farmers, offerings and praises to our spiritual masters, the beauty of our snow-capped mountains, the purity of our rivers, the vast green grasslands, and the majesty of our animals—yaks, sheep, and the loyal Tibetan Mastiffs.

My dear fellow Tibetans, I urge you: speak Tibetan, learn Tibetan, think Tibetan, and act Tibetan. Make this your next birthday resolution. Remember that where there is a will, there is always a way. We have already seen many Tibetan children born in the West who can speak Tibetan fluently and read and write the language beautifully. This shows that it is indeed possible, if we truly care and make the effort.

The survival of our identity is in our hands now. Let us not be the generation that breaks the chain. Let us be the generation that strengthens it.

I may sound like a hypocrite for writing this appeal in English rather than in the Tibetan language. However, I chose to write it in English so that our younger generation can fully understand it and reflect upon it. Otherwise, I normally write in Tibetan when communicating with fellow Tibetans.

## China's new 'cookie-cutter' law to shape citizens in the Party's image', Benedict Rogers

17 March 2026, HongKong Watch

It uses nice terms like 'ethnic unity,' but in reality, it is about bringing everyone into line

China's new "ethnic unity" law, passed by the National People's Congress last week, is the latest step in Xi Jinping's campaign of forced Sinicization. It codifies in law what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been implementing for some years — a program of forced assimilation for China's ethnic minorities aimed at wiping out ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity.

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk expressed concern, arguing the new law "risks entrenching assimilationist policies in statute, restricting minority-language education, and limiting free practice of religion and culture."

He further said that "its provisions could overly restrict freedoms of expression, belief and assembly and penalise peaceful exercise of minority rights generally," while reminding that "international human rights law requires states to protect identities of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities."

Concepts such as "ethnic unity," a common national identity, and a shared national language are not in themselves bad ideas. Indeed, in my country — the United Kingdom — and in most Western democracies, they are concepts that are increasingly debated as part of the public discourse.

On one level, it makes sense that citizens of China should be able to speak Mandarin Chinese, the language of the majority, as this will enhance their

education, employment, and social mobility prospects.

Sharing a common loyalty to one's country, regardless of ethnicity, is a desirable objective.

However, there are three points about China's plans that should be kept in mind.

First, this is less about social cohesion and more about political control and repression.

The "identity" the CCP wants its citizens, of all ethnicities, to adopt is loyalty to the Communist Party. Indeed, the CCP conflates Party and State, so that to be patriotic means to be devoted to the Party.

In any democracy, you can be loyal to your country without being aligned with the governing party. You can be a patriotic American and a critic of the incumbent president. You can be a British patriot and an opponent of the sitting prime minister.

The same is true in Asia's democracies, such as Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. Even in India under the Hindu nationalist government of Narendra Modi, or in Indonesia under former dictator Suharto's son-in-law Prabowo Subianto, you can be a political opponent without your patriotism being in doubt.

But not in China. The Party, the State, and the nation are one in the mind of the CCP.

That is why the new law insists that citizens must have "correct views" on history, culture, and religion, and abandon "outdated customs." It requires parents to "educate and guide children to love the Chinese Communist Party."

Secondly, this will apply to people who were never part of historic China.

The history is disputed, but certainly for significant periods of history, Tibet and East Turkistan were their own nations, which were invaded by China.

Now the CCP wants us to call East Turkistan — the homeland of the Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim peoples — by the name it has chosen, "Xinjiang," which literally means "New Frontier."

It is also mounting a campaign to persuade the world to call Tibet "Xizang," a Chinese term meaning "Western Zang."

China invaded Tibet in October 1950.

Last week, Tibetans and friends of Tibet around the world marked the 67th anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising Day on March 10, 1959. That day, tens of thousands of Tibetans protested against Chinese military occupation and were massacred. The Dalai Lama escaped into exile, where he has been ever since.

A campaign of forced assimilation has already been underway for decades in both occupied Tibet and occupied East Turkistan.

Under Xi Jinping, it has intensified. More than one million Tibetan children have been forcibly separated from their parents and coerced into colonial boarding schools, where they are prohibited from learning their own Tibetan language, practising their own Tibetan Buddhist religion, or celebrating their Tibetan culture.

United Nations experts have spoken of their concern. Thousands of Buddhist monasteries have been destroyed or desecrated in Tibet over the past seven decades. Tibetan Buddhist monks have been jailed. Millions have been killed.

In East Turkistan — or Xinjiang — Uyghurs are facing what is increasingly recognised as a genocide. The United States government and several parliaments around the world have called it a genocide, as has an independent tribunal chaired by British barrister Sir Geoffrey Nice, who prosecuted Slobodan Milosevic.

The United Nations has suggested it may amount to international crimes, particularly crimes against humanity. This has included the destruction or desecration or closure of mosques, and the persecution of Muslims for normal religious activities such as fasting during Ramadan, praying, reading the Holy Koran, wearing a beard of a certain length or a headscarf, or abstaining from pork or alcohol.

Thirdly, Xi Jinping has also been mounting a campaign of Sinicization against Christians across China, which again proves that this is not about culture or language, but politics.

The Sinicization of religion is not about making religion culturally sensitive or integrated — it is about making religion politically co-opted. It is about forcing state-controlled churches to display portraits of Xi and CCP propaganda banners alongside, or sometimes instead of, religious imagery.

A crackdown against Christians who refuse to comply — or who run churches outside the state-approved institutions — is intensifying, resulting in the detention last October of Pastor Ezra Jin, founder of the Zion Church network, and 17 of his pastors and elders.

This new legislation builds on and enshrines into law this persecution. It uses nice terms like "ethnic unity," but in reality, it is about bringing everyone into line, requiring everyone to conform to the CCP's teachings and propaganda.

"Ethnic unity" is very different from "inter-ethnic harmony."

A 22-year-old Chinese student, Zhang Yadi, has been detained since last summer because, while studying in Paris, she had become involved with a group working to promote understanding and awareness among Chinese students about Tibetan culture.

This was promoting inter-ethnic harmony, an idea it turns out the CCP dislikes, and so she was arrested when she returned home to visit her family.

Back in 2018, a tiny, inconsequential political party in Hong Kong — the Hong Kong Independence Party, set up by a young man called Andy Chan — was banned.

Diversity, of ethnicity, religion, culture, or thought, and inter-ethnic harmony or pluralism of religious, philosophical, spiritual, political, or cultural ideas, are concepts that terrify the CCP.

That is why it has introduced this new law — because it wants to make every Chinese citizen, regardless of their ethnicity, a cookie-cutter mold in the Party's image. It is a campaign of forced assimilation that is genocidal in its intentions.
This article was published in UCA News on 17 March 2026.

## China's New Year Gift to Mount Kailash Pilgrims: More Checkpoints, Less Pilgrimage

27 March 2026, Bitter Winter

Fearful of the event's increasing success, Beijing attempts to diminish the holy journey to the point of insignificance.
Each year, as the Tibetan New Year arrives and spring draws near, thousands of Tibetans traditionally embark on a journey to Mount Kailash, a sacred peak respected in Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism, and Bon. It stands out as one of the few places on earth where these four religions find common ground. Unfortunately, the Chinese authorities share a different viewpoint: they believe Tibetans should not be allowed to visit freely.
This year, according to information from Tibetan sources, the authorities have added another layer of restrictions for Tibetans wanting to walk around the mountain. The system is straightforward: if a pilgrimage holds deep meaning, spiritual value, and cultural importance, Beijing will find a way to control it to the point of insignificance.
Tibetans now have to register with local security offices before they can step onto the pilgrimage route. This process includes new travel permits, background checks, and a review of "relevant documents," a phrase that in China can cover anything from an ID card to a political loyalty test. Pilgrims report that even after getting the required papers, they are often stopped at checkpoints and questioned again. Nothing says "religious harmony" like a new military outpost on a sacred trail.
Those who do not have the correct permit risk being detained immediately. Several Tibetans have already been turned back or temporarily held, highlighting that today in Tibet, simply walking around a holy mountain can be seen as a public security threat.
Mount Kailash, located in the Ngari region, is not merely a mountain. For Buddhists, it is associated with Demchok, the deity of bliss. For Bon practitioners, it connects to the legendary Shenrab Miwo. For Hindus, it is the home of Shiva.
For Jains, it represents the path to spiritual liberation. In short, it is one of the most significant pilgrimage sites in Asia.
Traditionally, Tibetans circumambulate the mountain to gain merit, cleanse negative karma, and follow in the footsteps of saints like Milarepa, who is believed to have meditated there. Completing one circuit is said to cleanse a lifetime of obscurations; twelve circuits, an entire cosmic cycle; and 108 circuits, well, enlightenment is nearly guaranteed.
But enlightenment is not an acceptable outcome in the current political climate.
The new restrictions fit into a larger trend: Beijing's effort to convert Tibetan religious life into a tightly controlled administrative process. Pilgrimage routes are monitored, monasteries are watched, and even prayer gatherings need official permission. Spirituality is only acceptable when it aligns with the state's security framework.
Ironically, these measures affect Tibetans more than foreign tourists. International visitors often have easier access to the area than the people who have lived there for generations. A Tibetan pilgrim may need several permits to walk around a mountain revered by his ancestors for a thousand years, while a foreign traveler with a tour guide can sometimes pass through with fewer hurdles.
Despite the restrictions, Tibetans still try to undertake the pilgrimage. The cultural and spiritual significance of Mount Kailash runs too deep to be erased by paperwork. Each year, many continue the journey, even though it now requires navigating checkpoints, facing interrogations, and dealing with the constant risk of being turned back.
The Chinese authorities may manage to slow the flow of pilgrims, but they have not succeeded in extinguishing the devotion that drives them. In Tibet, faith has endured far worse than a new set of forms to fill out.

## CCP's Show Biz Policy in Tibet: A Sinister Agenda Hidden in Plain Sight

21 March 2026, Tibetan Review



Professor Phuntsog* makes a striking observation, suggesting that the CCP employs a calculated strategy to manipulate public perception. While permitting the production and showcasing of Tibetan music and dance—the visible and surface-level aspects of culture, likened to the tip of an iceberg—the CCP systematically undermines the deeper, unseen elements of Tibetan identity, such as language, traditions, and religion. This tactic serves as a propaganda tool to reinforce the CCP's

narrative of Tibet as a socialist paradise while simultaneously diverting young Tibetans from academic pursuits.

The stunning, colorful landscape of Tibet is home to a vibrant array of established and emerging musician luminaries, who traverse the land or ride horses for their performances. The enchanting sounds of their music resonate captivatingly with the breathtaking geography and magically complement each other. Since my retirement, I have had the opportunity to enjoy the beauty of Tibetan music, particularly songs originating in Tibet. The enchanting melodies, poetic lyrics, and vibrant, colorful costumes reflect the richness of Tibetan culture. Yet, this enjoyment is short-lived by an unsettling incongruity: the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) relentless suppression of Tibetan culture, religion, and language is at odds with the apparent freedom and abundance of Tibetan music production in the region.

This contradiction has puzzled me for quite some time. On one hand, we see the CCP systematically dismantling the pillars of Tibetan identity—its language, religion, and traditions. On the other hand, Tibetan music and dance continue to be produced and showcased under the CCP's watchful eye. While I do not claim to have definitive answers, I have a strong suspicion about the motives behind this paradox. By sharing my observations, I hope to raise awareness and foster a deeper understanding of what I believe is a calculated strategy to undermine the very essence of Tibetan culture.

**A Calculated Contradiction**

The CCP has long demonstrated its intention in policy and in actions to erase the unique identity of Tibet, particularly by targeting its language, which serves as the vessel for sacred Buddhist scriptures and traditions. President Xi Jinping's aggressive Sinicization of Tibetans has further escalated the process of erasure to a dangerous level not seen in the past. Tibetan songs often refer to their language as the "soul of the nation," reflecting its central role in preserving cultural and spiritual heritage. Yet the CCP paradoxically permits, and even oversees, the production of Tibetan music, granting its seal of approval to select works. This selective tolerance raises an important question: why does the CCP allow the performance of Tibetan music and dance while simultaneously suppressing the Tibetan language in schools and religious institutions?

The answer lies in the CCP's strategic use of Tibetan music as a propaganda tool. By allowing the visible elements of Tibetan culture—its songs, dances, and colorful costumes—to flourish under controlled circumstances, the CCP seeks to project an image of harmony and cultural preservation to the outside world. This carefully curated façade is designed to deceive foreign dignitaries, tourists, and even Tibetans themselves into believing that Tibetan culture is alive and thriving under CCP rule. It is undeniably a part of the CCP's propaganda to support its narrative of Tibet as a socialist paradise.

**A Staged Spectacle**

Take, for example, the grand celebrations of the Tibetan New Year in Lhasa. These events are marked by elaborate performances of traditional songs and dances in halls adorned with glittering lights and flashing displays reminiscent of Western music concerts. Musicians, singers, and commentators, dressed in vibrant costumes and hats of all shapes and sizes, sit in neat rows, exchanging smiles and formal bows. Traditional tables are laden with Tibetan cookies, sweets, and various beverages, creating a festive atmosphere of abundance.

Yet, for an observer like myself, the artificiality of these events is glaringly obvious. From the overly staged settings to the performers' rehearsed expressions, the lack of genuine warmth and authenticity is palpable. These performances, while outwardly celebratory, feel hollow—a stark contrast to the heartfelt and spontaneous expressions of Tibetan culture I have known.

**The Hidden Agenda**

The CCP's promotion of Tibetan music and dance is not an act of cultural preservation but a calculated effort to manipulate perceptions. By showcasing these visible aspects of Tibetan culture, the CCP seeks to mask its systematic suppression of the deeper, more integral components of Tibetan identity.

Language, for instance, is the cornerstone of Tibetan culture. It is the medium through which sacred Buddhist scriptures are transmitted, and it embodies the collective wisdom and spirituality of the Tibetan people. Despite this, the CCP imposes severe linguistic restrictions in schools and monasteries, undermining the very foundation of Tibetan identity.

This tactic of promoting the "surface" elements of culture while eroding its "core" is both deceptive and insidious. Anthropologists often describe culture as an iceberg: the visible aspects, such as music and dance, represent only a small fraction, while the deeper, unseen elements—language, values, and beliefs—constitute the majority. By allowing the former to flourish while systematically dismantling the latter, the CCP is effectively hollowing out Tibetan culture from within.

**The Cost of Deception**

One of the most damaging outcomes of this strategy is its impact on Tibetan youth. The CCP's promotion of show business lures talented young Tibetans away from academic and spiritual pursuits, offering them fleeting fame and monetary rewards. The CCP likely recognizes that a highly educated Tibetan youth could pose a threat to its unfounded claims that Tibet is an integral part of China. For example, the courageous and illustrious writer Tsering Woeser has used the power of the pen to expose the oppressive nature of the occupying regime.

In many parts of Tibet, it is not uncommon to see school-age girls, dressed in elaborate costumes, performing in restaurants to entertain guests. While these performances may appear harmless, they represent a disturbing trend: the commodification of Tibetan culture at the expense of education and long-term opportunities for these children.

The CCP not only exploits Tibetan youth by diverting their energy and potential into superficial pursuits but also undermines their individual futures and weakens the collective resilience of Tibetan society. The subversiveness of this approach is so subtle that the deception escapes the attention and awareness of participants and native onlookers alike.

Conclusion

The CCP's show business policy in Tibet is not a celebration of Tibetan culture but a sinister strategy to control and manipulate it. By promoting the visible aspects of culture while suppressing its core, the CCP seeks to create an illusion of harmony and preservation, deceiving both the international community and the Tibetan people themselves.

We must remain vigilant and discerning, recognizing this façade for what it truly is: a calculated effort to erode the essence of Tibetan identity. Only by exposing these tactics and advocating for the authentic preservation of the Tibetan language, religion, and traditions can we hope to protect Tibet's rich cultural heritage for future generations.

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## China adopts an ethnic unity law that critics say will cement assimilation

21 March 2026, AP News

China adopted a sweeping law Thursday to promote what it calls "ethnic unity," a measure that critics say would further erode the rights of some minority groups as authorities cement a push toward assimilation.

The law, approved by the country's ceremonial legislature, is designed to foster "a stronger sense of community among all ethnic groups in the Chinese nation," said Lou Qinjian, a delegate to the National People's Congress who introduced the proposal to the whole body.

The proposed law lays out the need to promote ethnic unity by all government bodies and private enterprises, including local governments and state-affiliated groups like the All-China Women's Federation.

"The people of each ethnic group, all organizations and groups of the country, armed forces, every Party and social organization, every company, must forge a common consciousness of the Chinese nation according to law and the constitution, and take the responsibility of building this consciousness," it reads.

Academics and observers say the new provision represents a setback for the identity of ethnic minorities because it mandates the use of Mandarin Chinese in compulsory education, among other things.The majority of China's population is Han Chinese and the official language is Mandarin. The country has 55 ethnic groups, making up 8.9% of the 1.4 billion population.

The constitution states that "each ethnicity has the right to use and develop their own language" and "have the right to self-rule," while the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy promises limited autonomy to those groups, including allowing them to create flexible measures to develop their economy.

Experts say the new law is likely to take priority in practice.

"It puts a death nail in the party's original promise of meaningful autonomy," said James Leibold, a professor at Australia's LaTrobe University who has studied China's changing policies toward its ethnic minorities. Leibold called the measure a capstone of Chinese President Xi Jinping's "major rethink" of ethnic policies.

Meaningful autonomy once existed in teaching native tongues

According to Article 15 in the new law, Mandarin Chinese is mandated to be taught to all children before kindergarten and throughout the rest of compulsory education up to the end of high school.

Mandarin is already the primary language of instruction in Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang — Chinese regions with large ethnic minority populations — but the new law essentially states that minority languages cannot be the primary language of instruction nationwide.

Until recent years, ethnic minorities had some autonomy in what language could be used for teaching in schools.

In the past, students in Inner Mongolia, a Chinese autonomous region bordering Mongolia, could study large parts of the entire curriculum in Mongolian.

That changed in 2020, when new students found out their Mongolian language textbooks could no longer be used and they could only use Chinese textbooks. The policy change led to massive protests and an immediate crackdown, as well as later re-education campaigns, according to an

essay co-written by Leibold and a former Mongolian journalist.
Students in the region can currently only study Mongolian as a foreign language class inside schools, one hour a day.
Push for assimilation



Scholars also note the mention of pushing for "mutually embedded community environments" in the law, which they say may result in the breakup of minority-heavy neighborhoods.
"The intention is to encourage Han and other minorities to migrate into each other's communities," said Minglang Zhou, a professor at the University of Maryland who studied China's bilingual policies.

*Delegates talk to Gyaltsen Norbu, the Chinese government-appointed 11th Panchen Lama during the closing ceremony of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), in Beijing, Wednesday, March 11, 2026. (AP Photo/Ng Han Guan)*
Many countries, including the U.S., pursue similar assimilation policies. China has said its approach is to bring development to ethnic minorities areas.
"Xinjiang is a place where many ethnic minorities live," said Hanengbi Ayisa, deputy of the National People's Congress from Xinjiang, ahead of the vote. "We attach great importance to the sense of community and national unity of the Chinese nation, and the unity of all ethnic groups is very well maintained."
But Maya Wang, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch, said the law is not about ensuring equality.
"The question was never so much about ensuring their participation in the economy in an equitable manner, more inclusive manner," because the policies are being forced on Tibetans, Wang said. "And a truly inclusive model does not preclude the ability of children to speak two languages."
Law lays out legal penalties related to ethnic policy
The law also creates a legal base for the Chinese government to prosecute people or organizations outside China if their actions harm the progress of "ethnic unity."
The legal penalties for people abroad echo the clause in the National Security Law which China imposed on Hong Kong in 2020, which states that authorities can prosecute people based outside China over actions that Beijing perceives as secession or subversion. Hong Kong's government has issued bounties for 34 overseas activists on suspicion of violating the security law.
Rayhan Asat, a legal scholar at Harvard University, said "the law serves as a strategic tool and gives the pretext to government to commit all sorts of human rights violations."
Asat said her younger brother, Ekpar Asat, is serving a 15-year prison sentence in Xinjiang on charges of inciting ethnic discrimination and ethnic hatred. Asat said her family never got any formal notice from the government about his arrest or a trial.
Asat's brother was an entrepreneur who built a social media platform for Uyghurs. She said he was taken shortly after he visited the U.S. as part of the State Department's International Visitor Leadership Program in 2016.
Ethnic Uyghurs, a Muslim minority group, have been the target of a long-term campaign of detention, and later incarceration by China. While the short-term interment camps were said to be closed in 2019, thousands ended up in prison, where experts have said they were targeted for their identity and not for actual crimes.
Asat said she hopes that U.S. President Donald Trump will raise his case in his upcoming summit with Xi.
She said she worries about how the new generation will define being Uyghur.
"I think preserving any sort of Uyghur identity would be impossible," she said.

## From Land Reform to Tiananmen: One Man's Account of CCP Political Campaigns in China

17 March 2026, Vision Times

In modern China, the legacy of political campaigns launched under Chinese Communist Party rule continues to shape lives long after the events themselves have faded from official memory. For those who lived through them, the consequences were not abstract historical episodes but deeply personal tragedies that fractured families and left enduring scars.
An elderly man from Jining, identified as "a man of conscience," recounts a lifetime marked by violence, loss, and survival. His story spans the land reform campaigns of the 1950s, the Great Leap Forward famine, the Cultural Revolution, and the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, offering a rare, first-hand account of how these movements unfolded at the grassroots level.
**A childhood shattered by land reform**
He was ten years old in the early 1950s, living with his family in a small village south of Jining along the Grand Canal. His father, labeled a "rich peasant," farmed a modest plot of land. The family

lived simply but steadily, sustained by agriculture and his mother's weaving.

That stability ended abruptly during the Communist Party's land reform campaign.

According to his account, local militia members stormed into their home one night, accusing his father of being a "landlord" and "class enemy." He was dragged from his bed and taken to a tree at the village entrance, where he was publicly humiliated and beaten. Villagers were forced to participate, throwing stones and shouting accusations.

His father's legs were broken in the beating, leaving him permanently disabled. The family's land was confiscated, and they were classified among the "five black categories," a political designation that brought long-term discrimination and social exclusion.

From that point on, survival became a daily struggle. His mother scavenged along the riverbank for shellfish to sell, often going hungry so her children could eat.



*Zhou Enlai bore undeniable responsibility for the mass deaths of the Great Famine. (Image: Internet source)*

Famine and loss during the Great Leap Forward

The situation worsened during the Great Leap Forward between 1958 and 1961.

As the state pushed mass steel production and collectivization, agricultural work was neglected. Crops were left to rot in the fields, and food shortages spread rapidly. In his recollection, villagers resorted to eating tree bark, soil, and rodents to survive.

His younger brother died of starvation during this period. Soon after, his mother, overwhelmed by grief, took her own life by jumping into the canal.

Across the countryside, he recalls seeing corpses along the riverbanks and hearing constant cries of hunger and despair. Officially, the famine was attributed to natural disasters, but in his telling, it was the result of policy decisions that left ordinary people with no means to survive.

**Violence during the Cultural Revolution**

After becoming an orphan, he was sent to work in a collective farm on the outskirts of Jining. Conditions were harsh, with long hours of labor and minimal food.

During the Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966, violence intensified.

He describes witnessing the death of a retired teacher, identified as Professor Zhang, who had been labeled a "rightist" after questioning farm management practices. During a struggle session, Professor Zhang was forced to drink ink and was later beaten to death by Red Guards.

Other tragedies followed. His uncle, a Buddhist believer, was persecuted and killed after being reported for keeping a small statue at home. A neighbor died in a labor camp after being accused of criticizing government policies. Another woman in the village froze to death after her family was purged.

The destruction extended beyond individuals. Temples were demolished, books burned, and cultural relics destroyed. In his account, the city's historical landscape was reduced to ruins.



*Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Zhao Ziyang (C) addresses the student hunger strikers through a megaphone at dawn 19 May 1989 in one of the buses at Tiananmen Square in Beijing where pro-democracy hunger strikers had been sheltered. Zhao Ziyang pleaded in vain against using force to crack down on demonstrators in Tiananmen Square; the massacre eventually occurred in the night of June 3-4, 1989. (Image: XINHUA/AFP via Getty Images)*

**The shadow of 1989**

By the late 1970s and 1980s, China had entered a period of economic reform. He married and started a family, hoping to rebuild a sense of normalcy.

That hope was again disrupted in 1989.

His son, a university student, joined demonstrations calling for democratic reforms. He was arrested and detained for six months. Upon release, he showed signs of severe psychological trauma and physical abuse.

Unable to recover, his son later died by suicide.

For the father, the loss echoed earlier tragedies. He describes a sense of recurring cycles, in which each generation faced new forms of repression under changing political conditions.

**A memory that does not fade**

Today, Jining has transformed into a modern city, with new buildings and parks along the canal. Yet for him, the past remains ever-present.

He describes walking through familiar streets and feeling as though the voices of the dead still linger, carrying unresolved grievances and suppressed truths.

He also expresses concern about ongoing human rights issues in China, including reports of organ harvesting, the disappearance of rights activists, and the suppression of protests in Hong Kong. In

his view, the political system has evolved in form but not in nature.
At the end of his account, he states that he has formally quit the Chinese Communist Party, and joined the Tuidang (Quit the CCP) Movement.
"The nightmare has lasted a lifetime," he says. "It cannot be forgotten, and it cannot be escaped."
The views expressed are solely those of the author.

## Claude Arpi | The Next Battlefield In Tibet: Over Buddhism!

17 March 2026, Deccan Herald

Strategic analysts have a hard time for the past few years; most of their views and predictions have gone wrong due to the turmoil which has been occurring all around the world. It is particularly true since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, which was supposed to last only for a few days.
New war tactics and weaponry, for example the use of drones, have appeared in a big way. If it does not want to lose coming battles, India does not have much choice, it needs to take a relook at the battlefields. In these circumstances, information warfare takes an increasingly predominant place.
China has always been far ahead of the rest of the world in the field of propaganda and information warfare, which has sustained the totalitarian regime for decades.
Today, however, one of China's favourite themes is Buddhism.
Beijing would like the world to believe that Buddhism has for centuries been an important component of Chinese civilisation and that China should take the lead in the propagation of the teachings of the Great Monk, who more than 2,500 years ago wandered in the plains of North India, preaching compassion, mindfulness and interdependent arising. Paradoxically, Beijing wants to teach Buddhism to Tibet. In September 2025, a meeting was convened in Lhasa by Wang Junzheng, the secretary of the party committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), to address Communist officials dealing with "religion".
Is it not surprising that a State which follows Karl Marx's atheist precepts should deal with religion?
Wang insisted on the necessity "to earnestly study and implement General Secretary Xi Jinping's important instructions on religious work and… systematically promote the Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism". The objective was to "lay a solid foundation for long-term peace and stability". This means that to be stable, Tibet needs to be Buddhist, but with Chinese characteristics.
Wang mentioned Xi Jinping's visit to Tibet in July 2025, during which the President gave "important instructions… to emphasise Buddhism with the requirements to systematically promote the Sinicization of China's religion, strengthen the governance of religious affairs and the rule of law and guide Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to the socialist society".
In other words, first Marx and then the Buddha.
On November 11, Wang Junzheng, again presiding over a symposium on religious legislation in Tibet, asked the participants to "solidly promote the construction of the Chinese national community, actively guide Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to the socialist society".
On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of his enthronement, Gyaltsen Norbu, called the "fake" Panchen Lama by Tibetans, mentioned the succession of the 14th Dalai Lama. Norbu said: "The reincarnation of the living Buddha is an internal affair of our country. Historically, the reincarnation of living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism in China has always adhered to the principles and traditions of domestic search, and there has never been a precedent for visiting abroad".
He added: "China's living Buddha reincarnation system belongs to Chinese monasteries, and its reincarnation management is an integral part of China's religious affairs management."
China is batting for a Chinese Dalai Lama, something that the latter has ruled out.
In December 2025, India took the initiative of organising a four-day international conference on the "Cultural and Historical Significance of His Holiness the Sixth Dalai Lama, Gyalwa Tsangyang Gyatso" in Tawang.
The sixth Dalai Lama was born in the 17th century in Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh.
In a post on X about the event on the Sixth Dalai Lama, Arunachal Pradesh chief minister Pema Khandu wrote: "Tawang [has] today become the centre of a global academic dialogue on his cultural, historical and spiritual legacy. He continues to inspire humanity through his timeless teachings, poetry and compassion."
In another post, he remarked: "The world remembers his poetry, but not the fullness of his teachings and wisdom. It is time that changes."

Beijing was not amused. It believes that Buddhism belongs to China (and that Tawang too is Chinese!).
Pasang Norbu, honorary president of the Tsangyang Gyatso Cultural Research Association in Tibet, issued a statement about what he called the so-called "international conference"; he said that "it represents a blatant provocation to China's territorial sovereignty and the established norms of international relations… Such actions seriously undermine the
efforts of both China and India to resolve territorial disputes and enhance bilateral relations. Ultimately, this is a political farce with ulterior motives."
Today, China seems to believe that it is the only "owner" of Buddhism.
In this connection, it was a positive move that the second Global Buddhist Summit was convened by

the International Buddhist Confederation (IBC), in collaboration with the Union ministry of culture. It took place on January 24 and 25 at the Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi. It was a new occasion to reaffirm that Buddha is a Son of India.
The two-day conference brought together more than 200 delegates and around 800 participants from India and abroad, mostly Buddhist leaders, scholars, practitioners and policymakers, to discuss contemporary global challenges viewed through the message of the Buddha. The theme of the summit was “Collective Wisdom, United Voice, and Mutual Coexistence”.
The main objective was to convey that India stands for world peace in the troubled times that the planet is going through and planetary issues must be faced in the spirit of collaboration, respect for others and mindfulness.
It would be good for China to remember history.
During the 7th century AD, after marrying Princesses Bikruti of Nepal and Wencheng of China, King Songtsen Gampo had converted to Buddhism. A hundred years later, King Trisong Detsen requested Shantarakshita, the abbot of Nalanda University, to teach the Buddha Dharma and ordain the first monks. Shantarakshita immediately faced serious difficulties due to the strong opposition from the indigenous faithd. He convinced the King to invite the tantric guru Padmasambhava, who alone could subdue the forces adverse to Buddhism. The Indian Master succeeded in his endeavour and built the first monastery in Samye, south of Lhasa.
Later, Shantarakshita predicted that a dispute would arise between the Indian and Chinese schools of Buddhism. The dispute was sorted out through the famous Samye Debate. After two years of intense discussions (792-794 CE), the Indian path prevailed and a proclamation was issued stating that the Indian path was thereafter the state religion. Since then, the Nalanda Tradition of Indian Buddhism has been the state religion of Tibet.
India must be prepared to tackle the propaganda onslaught from China; it will be tomorrow’s battlefield.

## China: 'Ethnic unity' law sparks fears of forced integration

16 march 2026, DW

**China**'s National People's Congress (NPC) last week approved by an overwhelming majority a law that had been submitted to the legislature three years ago: the **Law Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress**.
There were 2,756 votes in favor of this "ethnic unity" law, three abstentions and three votes against.
Some 442 delegates from **ethnic minority groups** took part in the vote, accounting for around 14% of all members of parliament.
Beijing claims the law will promote national unity, and eliminate the disadvantages faced by ethnic groups in social life.
China, a multi-ethnic state of 1.4 billion people, officially recognizes 56 ethnic groups. Fifty-five of them are classified as "minorities" because the largest group — the Han Chinese — makes up 92 % of the population, with just under 1.2 billion people.
Other ethnic groups include the Mongols (6.3 million), the Muslim Hui (11.4 million), the Tibetans (7.1 million), and the **Muslim Uyghurs** (11.7 million).
Several smaller ethnic groups are not officially recognized — including the Jewish community, which is estimated to number a few thousand people.
**Minority groups fear repression**
The law, which contains 65 articles, will enter into force on July 1.
Article 1 states the purpose of the ethnic unity law is to "forge a strong sense of the community of the Chinese people, advance the establishment of the community of the Chinese people, and promote the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people."
The law does not specify concrete penalties for violation, instead referring to the criminal code.
"Where the organization, planning, or carrying out of violent terrorist activities, ethnic division activities, or religious extremist activities constitutes a crime, criminal responsibility is to be pursued in accordance with law," according to Article 62.
Critics see the law as allowing authorities in Beijing more room to frame ethnic groups' demands for cultural autonomy as a push towards "separatism."
"Paired with the counter-terrorism law, which has served as the legal justification for the mass internment camp system launched in 2016, this new legislation will further deepen repression against Uyghurs in East Turkestan, particularly in relation to linguistic, cultural and religious freedoms," said Turgunjan Alawdun, president of the Munich-based World Uyghur Congress.
**The congress serves as a political advocacy organization for exiled Uyghurs.**
Alawdun refers to China's **northwestern Xinjiang province** as "East Turkestan," a term that's popular among Uyghur separatists.
Mass camps for Uyghurs, a Turkic-speaking predominantly Muslim minority, have been built in Xinjiang under the guise of "vocational education and training centers" used to combat "extremism and terrorism."
"Over the past decade, policies of forced assimilation and Sinicization have already inflicted severe damage on Uyghur cultural and religious identity," Alawdun added.
The law has accelerated Beijing's efforts to suppress ethnic minorities, particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang, said Jack Burnham, a senior research

analyst at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
The law provides a de facto legal justification for this repression.
"Specific measures by the state include banning Uyghurs from participating in prayers and destroying historic mosques," Burnham told DW.
Incentives have also been created to encourage Han Chinese to resettle in large numbers in Uyghur areas. At present, Uyghurs make up only about 45% of the population in their own autonomous region of Xinjiang.
Change in language hierarchy
Several large ethnic groups in China still have their own languages and scripts.
These are depicted, for example, on Chinese banknotes. However, the new law places the official language of the Han Chinese above other dialects.
"Schools and other educational institutions are to use the nation's common language and script as the basic language and script for education and teaching," the law states.
"The state is to promote preschool students' learning of Mandarin, so that youth who have completed compulsory education have a basic understanding of the nation's common language and script."
Ideologically and politically, all ethnic groups are to be more closely bound to the Han-dominated majority society and to the Communist Party.
The law requires the state to "lead each ethnic group to carry forward an ethnic spirit with patriotism at its core… and persist in identifying with the great motherland, the Chinese people, Chinese culture, the Chinese Communist Party, and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics."
This, Burnham argues, promotes "Han nationalism."
"In addition to the emphasis on Mandarin rather than regional languages in education and public services, the law forces minorities to live in 'mixed communities' with a substantial Han population," he said.
In regions inhabited by ethnic minorities, resistance has so far been strong when it comes to their languages and scripts, which are seen as the last remaining markers of their identity.
In 2020, large-scale protests erupted in the Inner Mongolia autonomous region after local education authorities banned the use of Mongolian-language textbooks in primary and middle schools.

## With Balen in-charge, Nepal Can Play a New "India" Card

16 March 2026, Openthemagazine

The new government in Nepal expected to be led by Balendra Shah will find a willing partner in Prime Minister Narendra Modi and has the opportunity to turn a new page as an old guard of senior politicians who revelled in whipping sectarian passions and indulged in cross-border political jockeying for short term gains stands discredited
After becoming Prime Minister in May, 2014, Narendra Modi's first travel out of India was to Nepal where he addressed the Constituent Assembly and Parliament, official discussions focussed on sub-regional cooperation in trade, transit, connectivity and hydro-power and also paid obeisance at the ancient Pashupatinath temple where he offered 2,500 kg of sandalwood.
The first bilateral visit by an Indian PM in 17 years, Modi's agenda reflected a desire to strengthen cultural relations, often described as "*roti-boti ka Rishta* (shared ties of bread and marriage)" that symbolise the intermixing of Indian and Nepalese societies.
The Prime Minister's choice of Nepal as his first port of call was not just a sentimental call. It was part of a series of initiatives to secure Indian interests in the neighbourhood and build a solid base for bilateral cooperation through projects to develop and share waters and electricity from the rivers that flow from Nepal to India. Trading links would further bind the two nations in ways that would limit disruptions caused by temporary shifts in the political climate. Modi and then Nepal PM Sushil Koirala in a joint statement agreed to resolve pending border issues "once and for all."
**Survival Games in Nepal**
As things turned out, Nepal did not enjoy a stable government and policies even after adopting a new Constitution which dismantled the role of the monarchy. Leader of Opposition Pushpa Kamal Dahal "Prachanda" and Communist Party of Nepal (UML) chairman K P Sharma Oli who Modi met in 2014 were to form a government, squabble and fallout. Meanwhile in 2015-16 a blockade by Madhesi groups unhappy over the new Constitution soured ties. Then Oli's desperate moves to remain PM and sideline Prachanda saw him recklessly inflame dormant boundary issues and it was only fitting that this myopic and power hungry politician was humiliated by rapper-turned-politician Balendra Shah in the Nepal elections held this month.
Shah's fate was shared by Nepal's "mainline" parties including Nepali Congress, the country's oldest political party that had led the protests that ended Rana rule in early 1950s. Nepali Congress joined hands with Oli for a transparently opportunistic power sharing deal in 2024 that proved a kiss of death. Communist leaders like Oli and Prachanda who fought bitterly among themselves and failed to deliver any meaningful governance prepared the ground for Shah and the newly formed Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP) to win 162 of 275 seats in the House of Representatives after "Gen Z" protests swept Oli out of office in September, 2025.
**A New Force Emerges**

Modi congratulated 35-year-old Shah and RSP chairman Rabi Lamichhane after their success. Shah is expected to be sworn in Prime Minister this week and he responded to Modi in a message promising to "strengthen, deepen, and make more outcome-oriented the historic, close, and multi-dimensional relations existing between Nepal and India in the coming days." As Mayor of Kathmandu Shah had lashed out at India, China and other nations for Nepal's problems and is has played the "India" card on occasion. Yet, his remarks about an outcome-oriented is promising if it can translate into concrete progress in things that really matter to the citizens of Nepal and



India.

The rise of RSP is a story about just how low the stock of the Nepali Congress and communist factions has sunk. The view of these parties as cynical power brokering corrupt outfits has led to their humiliation. The weight of expectation on the shoulders of RSP leaders is not inconsiderable. The one thing they could avoid is the temptation to indulge in the dangerous – and ultimately unproductive political gamesmanship with India. Oli's fate is evidence that this does not end well. Nepal is well within it rights to consider the advantages of India and China as partners and investors, even drive the best bargains from both, but there is a need to recognise what is in Nepal's best interests.

**Forging a Connection**

India is looking for a new chapter in ties with Nepal and there is hope in official circles that New Delhi can work with Shah who did his MTech in Bengaluru. There is relief that RSP has won a strong majority and will be less vulnerable to political jockeying by rivals or even within. In the past, the infighting between communist factions had seen the Chinese ambassador dabble in their internal matters in a bid to forge unity. Her energetic efforts did not succeed but did muddy the waters in Kathmandu and create hurdles for India-Nepal relations. India can now look to re-build ties and bring about greater convergence on people-to-people contacts, travel, tourism, trade and development of the large cross-border hydro resources.

The election of a Bangladesh Nationalist Party government in Dhaka instead of an incompetent and self-serving interim regime led by Nobel prize winner Mohammad Yunus has immediately led to a quiet upswing in relations. Pro-Pakistani and Islamist generals in the Bangladesh Army have been purged and Gen Kaiser Chowdhury, head of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence, had a quiet meeting with Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval on the sidelines of this year's Raisina Dialogue. It can be hoped that relations with Nepal too will even out and the new government that is break from the discredited old guard will see the virtues of a genuine hand of friendship.

Both China and India share long borders with Nepal but the one with India allows economic and cultural osmosis. Nepal's border with Tibet is daunting, marking by geographical barriers and is vulnerable to natural disasters and seasonal limitations. The forces of nature have a way of conveying a message that is neither incidental or random.

## Anthropologist Gerald Roche on China's New Ethnic Unity Law (Q&A)

13 March 2026, Domino Theory

*Women from the Miao ethnic minority take part in celebrations of the 2023 Miao New Year and Guzang Festival, a traditional Miao festival celebrated every 13 years, in Leishan County in China's southwestern Guizhou Province. (Photo: CN-STR/AFP)*

"The state is just a snowplow, pushing ahead. There might be pebbles that get in its way, but they're not going to slow it down."

On Thursday, China's ceremonial legislature approved a sweeping new law to promote what it refers to as "ethnic unity." The law calls on all sectors of Chinese society to promote solidarity between the country's officially recognized ethnic groups and the Han majority, and to resist any foreign attempts to "divide" China.

"The people of each ethnic group, all organizations and groups of the country, armed forces, every Party and social organization, every company, must forge a common consciousness of the Chinese nation according to law and the constitution, and take the responsibility of building this consciousness," the law reads.

China's ethnic minorities make up roughly 9% of the country's 1.4 billion population. The Chinese government first officially recognized 39 of them in 1954. By 1979, it had expanded the list to encompass the 55 minority groups, often referred to as "*minzu*" (民族), that it still recognizes today.

The new measure, which the Chinese government calls the law for "Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress," mandates that Mandarin be used as the primary medium of education from before kindergarten until the end of high school. The law also encourages intermarriage between Han and other ethnicities; calls for the integration of villages and neighborhoods traditionally home to

a single ethnic group; and urges parents to "educate and guide minors to love the Chinese Communist Party."

"My strong sense about this new law is that it's really just a codification of practices that were already in place," said Gerald Roche, an anthropologist at La Trobe University in Australia.

Roche has studied the politics of language oppression in China for decades, including years of fieldwork in Qinghai Province, which is home to large numbers of ethnic Tibetan groups. On Thursday, I called him to ask about the impact of this new law, and to better understand how it fits into the broader sweep of China's state-building project.

(The following conversation has been edited for length and clarity.)

**Harry Saunders:** Are there any places where the new rule about ethnic languages being taught as the primary language will change anything? Is there anywhere where that isn't already the practice?

**Gerald Roche:** I'm mostly familiar with Tibetan areas outside the Tibetan autonomous region. For example, in the Tibetan-dominated areas of Qinghai, when I was living and doing my research from 2005 until I was blacklisted in 2018 or 2019, Mandarin was the medium of instruction already. In a few prefectures, they still used Tibetan. I haven't seen what's happening on the ground there recently, but if they were still teaching Tibetan, they would have to switch to Mandarin under this new law.

In practice, the situation on the ground was actually more complicated. There were studies showing that in the classroom, even if a school was formally designated as a Tibetan medium school or a Mandarin medium school, they would use both languages in almost equal measure, because it's quite challenging to teach children in a language they don't understand at all. Even in the Tibetan language schools, they know that Mandarin is the national language, the language of economic success. So they would bring in as much Mandarin as they could.

**HS:** Under this new law, do you think that kind of flexibility, that kind of pragmatic approach to things, can continue on the local level?

**GR:** This is the $1 million dollar question: How enforceable is the new law going to be? What goes on in the classroom between teachers and students is so far outside the purview of Beijing. There are all these mechanisms they can put in place: punitive measures to make sure that the schools, the principals and the teachers are meeting their targets. But the everyday realities are beyond their control. So even if this law is saying that Mandarin has to be the formal language of education, the enforcement of that law is a very different issue.

I'm not trying to say that the law isn't significant or that it's not going to have impacts. Those impacts will be felt over time. If you look at the linguistic practices of people across China, you will start seeing the impact from this law 10 years from now. But those impacts will be permanent.

China is a country with about as much linguistic diversity as Europe. There are about 300 languages in China. The official *minzu* recognition system only recognizes 55 nationalities, each of them with a single language. So when they were building the education system from the middle of the 20th century onwards, they were only building it to support those 55 languages. The constitution says that minorities have the freedom to use and develop their own languages. It only means those 55 languages. No one has the freedom to use or develop the other 245 languages spoken in China, including in education. So they started to build their education only to service those 55 languages and mostly Mandarin Chinese. 40 years later, the education system really started to be implemented in minority areas.

In Qinghai, where I lived, education was compulsory, but people didn't go to school because they were too poor and they had other stuff to do. The government didn't try to enforce it. But then in the '90s and early 2000s, they started to enforce it. When that education system was imposed on people, if their language wasn't recognized by the government, within about 10 to 20 years people would stop teaching that language to their kids, and they would start teaching whatever the dominant language is.

You always see these policies taking effect, but because of the way language works, it takes time. So, yeah, we're going to see the impacts of this ethnic unity law in about 10 to 20 years. It will be seen at the level of the family and the home. Parents will stop teaching these languages to their kids. And that's how you kill a language.

For a long time the primary mechanism that the party has used to assimilate minority languages was just to pretend that they don't exist. They would call them dialects instead of languages, provide some limited support for the main 55 ethnic languages and everything else gets nothing. The reason we have this ethnic unity law now is that those previous policies have done their job. They've worked. All of those smaller languages have collapsed. They'll be gone soon, and now the government is focusing on those remaining larger languages, like Tibetan and Uyghur and Mongolian.

**HS:** Some people have highlighted the idea that Xi Jinping (習近平) is taking a harder line, that it's something special about his time in power that would cause the CCP to do this. But it sounds like what you're saying is that they've been doing this for a long time.

**GR:** I would say both positions are correct. Xi Jinping's policies since the very beginning have been a lot harsher. But it's just a different phase of the old program. One of the ways that people describe this is with a phrase called "double

assimilation." First, you take the small groups. And then you assimilate them into the *minzu*. Then you take the *minzu* and you assimilate them into the Chinese nation. Those two processes are connected, because the aim is to have this homogenous nation of everyone speaking Mandarin Chinese.

Phase one is finished now. This is phase two. It looks like a break with the past. It looks like something more intense and severe, but it's just applying the same methods from phase one to different groups in phase two. People talk about the good old days when there was genuine ethnic autonomy, and now they say that's being taken away. But most minorities in China never had ethnic autonomy on any level, even on the superficial level. Hundreds of languages never had any support, were never used in education, never appeared in science, never had any media, were never recognized by the government. Just nothing.

There really never was a good old days of ethnic autonomy in China. Ethnic autonomy was designed from the beginning to assimilate smaller groups into bigger groups.

**HS:** What is the difference between having ethnic policies that are implemented in different ways in different places versus having one big ethnic unity law?

**GR:** The policies are there to set the broad direction of the agenda, and there's acknowledgment that things will be messy and complicated on the ground. 100% of the time for policymakers, there will be resistance from individual people in particular contexts. But so long as momentum keeps on moving in the same direction, then the change is inevitably going to be achieved.

You saw this with the National Language Law, which started promoting Mandarin Chinese really aggressively in 2000/2001. They were setting targets for driving up the percentage of people in China who could be classified as knowing Mandarin, but they didn't define what that meant. Around 2007, they breached above the 50% threshold for the first time. From there, the number just keeps on going up because they keep setting targets and investing resources.

Even though there's pushback, even though there's resistance, even though things don't always go as planned, the sheer constant force means that all of those little variations will all just get swept up in the end. In Qinghai, when the government started pushing for Chinese-language textbooks, there were big protests about it. And then the government was like: "Okay, you don't have to have Chinese textbooks anymore because you protested too much." Then they just try again in a few years. They keep on pushing until people are too exhausted to fight back.

**HS:** Let me ask you about the age component here. Because over time, the amount of compulsory education has changed, right? And now we're seeing this push into the kindergarten level. What's the importance of that component?

**GR:** The importance of the kindergarten component is that it gets children into the system earlier, when their capacity to acquire language is more flexible than later on. It makes those kids more vulnerable to having the dominant language imposed on them.

There's also the social aspect, where you have lots of kids coming together, doing what kids do, teasing each other, forming cliques, bullying, and things like that. That also contributes to the process. There's quite well-known research from Papua New Guinea that shows that the language shift from a minority to a majority language happens faster when kids are off on their own more often.

The Chinese state is creating those conditions deliberately. They've got the kindergartens where the kids are all together being exposed to dominant languages. They've got the boarding school system where kids are away from their families. So they're really putting a wedge between children and their families and the language that connects them.

Similar things were done in the U.S., in Canada, in Australia. They're being done today in India where they have massive boarding schools for Adivasi people, where the kids are separated from their families. We know what happens in these contexts. You separate the child from the family, you separate them from the community, you put them together in a place where they are vulnerable and alone, and you expose them constantly to the dominant language, and you punish them for using the minority language. It is an extremely effective form of coercion. It works very well, and it works very fast.

**HS:** Which of the minority groups in China do you think will be most resilient in the face of this?

**GR:** The groups that we hear most about in the news are the ones that probably have the most resilience, and that's in part because they have a transnational diaspora. Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongolians. They are larger and more visible. They have prior literary traditions that put cultural importance on the language. They're going to be the longest holdouts. But they're coming under strong assault now.

A comparison between the Tibetans and the Yi (彝) is always instructive. The Yi are another minority ethnic group about the same size as the Tibetans, so around 6 million people, very linguistically diverse, never had a centralized political system. They have no transnational diaspora to help draw attention to their plight in international spheres. So no one knows about the Yi. No one knows what's happening to them. The government has nominated one official language for the Yi. All the languages that aren't being recognized are just being eroded, totally washed away. But there's no one standing up in UN forums to put pressure on

China to protect the Yi. There's no protest movement. They don't have an exile government.

**HS:** Do you expect to see pushback from international groups having any impact on the implementation of this ethnic unity law?

**GR:** I would say two things. First, yes, there has been a lot of pushback against previous policies of the Chinese state, in the United Nations and other international forums, but it's only been on a very limited handful of issues and has never taken into consideration the larger scale of the project.

I think the most powerful antidote to what is proposed in this law would be the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. It has the strongest protections for indigenous languages, anywhere in the world. If you analyzed what is happening in China in terms of those language rights, it would really highlight how extensive the problem is. However, you will not find a state willing to stand up and use that declaration to attack China because most states are unable or unwilling to adhere to the declaration in their own country.

Recognition and protection of self-determination is a fundamental principle of the declaration. If China had democracy and people were allowed to vote for what languages they wanted, that problem wouldn't exist. China is a conquest empire that turned into a country. The Han, the Qing dynasty, conquered Xinjiang, conquered Mongolia, conquered Tibet, conquered Southwest China, and then it just turned into a country. They have indigenous people. There are indigenous people in China. China legally refuses to acknowledge that. If they can refuse, if they can deny that that history is colonial, if they can deny that they have indigenous people, then they don't have to address the problem of self-determination.

**HS:** The last thing I want to ask you relates to the internet, because, as I'm sure you're aware, young people today live their lives as much online as they do in physical classrooms and on the playground. How does that impact the resilience of these languages and the government's efforts to essentially eradicate them?

**GR:** I'm gonna start out by slightly taking a left turn to your question, which is to say that the internet and the way it manifests in the West is also relevant to this dynamic. If international support and transnational activism is important, it would all be helped by people in the West having a better understanding of these issues in China. Instead, what you see now is Chinamaxxing. "I'm at a very Chinese point in my life." You see these influencers posting content where it's like, "look at these drones, look at the Shanghai skyline, look at this high-speed train." China's winning the social media war for how we think about China in the West, and that's undercutting the effectiveness of those transnational forms of advocacy in really, I think, significant ways.

The rise of social media has been important, particularly the video streaming platforms and voice messaging because a lot of these languages are unwritten. They're just spoken languages and in many cases, they've tried to get state support to develop a writing system to use in schools, and the state has refused to give that. So these video platforms are useful, but they're also controlled, and there are two parallel systems of control. One is the formal system of control, where algorithms and potentially human censors will cut the stream if you are not using Mandarin. Sometimes you have to chuck in a word of Mandarin every now and then to stop the censors from kicking you off. Sometimes you might have to only speak in Mandarin and you can't use any other language.

The second one is social control. These policies get reinforced by social stigma, where a language that the state is trying to assimilate will be a language that people consider less prestigious, funny sounding, backwards, silly or whatever. You get people reproducing these prejudices through streaming platforms as well. That contributes to the state's goals. If you're constantly being insulted and told that your language is no good, that's a powerful psychological driving force to push you towards dominant languages.

I do hear, when I'm in touch with people from there, that the video streaming platforms in particular have broadened awareness of linguistic diversity and broadened appreciation for linguistic diversity in Tibetan areas. That's important. It's great that Tibetans now know more about the languages that other Tibetans speak.

But there's only so much that awareness and positive attitudes can do when you have a powerful centralized state, willing to deploy its military, send you to prison, and torture you to death for language activism. Those platforms do have a role. They are changing things. I don't think it's enough to offset what the state is aiming to do. The state is just a snowplow, pushing ahead. There might be pebbles that get in its way, but they're not going to slow it down.

## Five Ways Xi Jinping Destroyed the CCP's Own Foundations

12 Mach 2026, Vision Times

Over his thirteen years in power, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping dismantled the Chinese Communist Party's governing infrastructure across five domains: the bureaucracy, ideology, the State Council, the military, and the Party's own elite coalition. The result is a system that appears centralized but has been stripped of the internal mechanisms it once relied on to function.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has spent decades marketing its governance model as a form of institutional stability, a system that could outlast the personality of any single leader. Xi Jinping's first decade proved that claim hollow. Chinese dissidents have given Xi the sardonic nickname "Chief Accelerator," a reference to their belief that

his policies are speeding up the CCP's own demise.

What the regime describes as "comprehensive, strict Party governance for the new era" has, in practice, operated as a five-stage demolition of the CCP's own operating system. Power is more concentrated than at any point since Mao Zedong. The regime, paradoxically, is more fragile than at any point in the reform era.

Xi's 'anti-corruption' purge replaced institutional trust with fear

The so-called "anti-corruption campaign" was Xi Jinping's opening act. In its early days, the campaign played well with the Chinese public. High-ranking officials fell in rapid succession, and ordinary citizens believed a leader had finally arrived who would take on the entrenched interests of the Party elite.

The reality that emerged over the following years was far less inspiring. The campaign functioned as a loyalty-sorting mechanism. The Party slogan "swatting flies and hunting tigers" translated, in practice, into a system for determining who stayed in Xi's inner circle and who was expelled. Officials with rival factional ties were purged; loyalists were promoted regardless of competence.

Under the old CCP system, corruption was corrosive, but it also served as a kind of institutional adhesive. The understanding that everyone in the bureaucracy participated in graft, and that everyone was therefore mutually compromised, held the system together. Officials tolerated corruption above them because they benefited from corruption below them.

Xi slashed through that web. The implicit bargain between local and central officials disappeared, replaced by a climate of raw fear. Bureaucrats across the country adopted a survival posture: approve nothing, sign nothing, take responsibility for nothing. The administrative system still operates on the surface. Underneath, it has seized up. The only criteria that matter are "loyalty" and "obedience," and a system built solely on those inputs is one that quietly eats itself from within.

Xi's ideological campaigns pushed China back toward the Mao era

As power concentrated, Xi Jinping rolled out a series of ideological slogans: "common prosperity," "cultural confidence," "ideological purification." These phrases carried the unmistakable odor of the Mao era. The underlying logic was the same: institutional stability depends on loyalty, economics must yield to politics, and market principles must submit to the Party line.

More than a decade of market-oriented reform had generated real dynamism and social resilience in Chinese society. Xi's ideological campaigns smothered all of it. Private capital began to flee or go silent. Internet giants were brought to heel. Entrepreneurs were sidelined one by one. Intellectuals re-learned the art of silence. Nationalist trolls replaced public discourse as the Party's preferred megaphone.

On the diplomatic front, China's "wolf warrior" posture alienated partners worldwide. Economically, foreign capital voted with its feet. Innovation supply chains fractured. The CCP has always claimed its legitimacy rests on economic development. Xi's leftward turn severed the very root of that claim. The "new era," stripped of its polished vocabulary, amounts to a political restoration project dressed in the language of the Cultural Revolution.

The State Council lost its policy role and became a transmission belt

Once ideology displaced market logic, the political structure followed. Under the system inherited from Deng Xiaoping, the CCP and the State Council operated on parallel tracks. The Party set direction; the government managed implementation. This dual-track arrangement gave China's bureaucracy a measure of operational autonomy and technical competence.

Xi Jinping dismantled that division entirely. The State Council, once the hub of policymaking and administrative coordination, was reduced to a relay station. Every decision, from macroeconomic management to micro-level regulation, had to be "aligned with General Secretary Xi's thought." The first task of every government organ was no longer problem-solving; it was studying Party documents. Technocrats gave way to political commissars.

The consequences are visible across the Chinese economy. The real estate collapse, runaway local government debt, and record youth unemployment all trace back to the same structural problem: local officials are afraid to make decisions, ministry-level leaders refuse to accept responsibility, and the entire system is frozen in a posture of waiting for instructions from the top.

Xi Jinping's military purges turned discipline into a fear ritual

After neutering the State Council, Xi turned his purge machinery on the military. From the Rocket Force to the logistics support system, China's armed forces have been convulsed by rolling investigations. Major holidays are now routinely preceded by rumors of generals "losing contact," the CCP's euphemism for detention.

Inside the system, these campaigns are widely understood as political score-settling dressed in the language of military discipline. Basic trust within the officer corps has collapsed. Senior generals live in perpetual anxiety. Mid-level commanders have learned to follow orders mechanically without exercising independent judgment. Rank-and-file soldiers obey out of fear, not confidence.

Under Mao Zedong's principle that "the Party commands the gun," the military retained a degree of institutional stability even under tight political control. Xi's version of military discipline has eliminated even that residual cohesion. His "zero tolerance" campaigns converted loyalty into pure submission: heads bowed on the surface, minds

drifting away underneath. What the regime calls "rectification" has hardened into a permanent fear ritual with no mechanism for restoring genuine trust.

Xi's purge of the red aristocracy shattered the Party's last internal covenant

After the military purges, even China's "red aristocracy," the families of revolutionary-era CCP founders, could no longer consider themselves safe. The downfall of Zhang Youxia, the former vice chairman of China's top military command body and a second-generation revolutionary scion, marked the final rupture of the trust compact between Xi and the Party's old-guard elite.

For the red second generation, this was a psychological collapse. They had always assumed their revolutionary bloodlines functioned as a political insurance policy: the right to proximity, the right to speak candidly to the leader. Xi rewrote those rules. The only standard that now applies is unconditional obedience to the "core." Former comrades are being investigated. Former colleagues are being sidelined. Rank and seniority offer no protection.

The aftershocks run through three separate systems. In the Party apparatus, retired cadres have gone completely silent, with no remaining space for political opinions. In the economic system, enterprises linked to red families are being forced to "return to public ownership" through quiet takeovers. In the military, veteran officers have been scattered, and young generals now treat performative loyalty as their primary career skill. Everything must be "politically correct," even at the expense of professional competence.

The resulting political landscape is paradoxical. The center of power appears stable but has never been more isolated.

A system that consumed itself

From the "anti-corruption" purges to the ideological restoration, from the gutting of the State Council to the military shakedowns and the demolition of the red aristocracy, Xi Jinping's decade-long imperial reconstruction project has revolved around a single principle: replace rules with loyalty.

On the surface, Xi cleared out factional obstacles and rebuilt personal authority. Over the long run, this process amounted to severing the "institutional elasticity" that the CCP depended on for survival. Internal cohesion has been replaced by fear. Professional governance has been sacrificed to political orthodoxy. Where there was once a layered hierarchy capable of self-correction, there is now only a chorus of performative allegiance. Where there were once feedback mechanisms, there is only the inertia of blind compliance.

The campaign Xi branded as "self-revolution" has, in practice, become an act of self-consumption. The CCP's outward structure remains standing. Its interior has already been hollowed out.

## An Alternative Perspective on the Iran War

12 March 2026, Tibetan Review

While international crises such as the ongoing war in Iran do not automatically change Tibet's position, they reshape the system in which our future will be negotiated, and in periods of systemic adjustment, preparedness matters, writes Wangpo Tethong.*

In moments of acute international crisis, it is tempting to view events as geographically contained. The ongoing military conflict mainly between the US and Israel on the one side and Iran on the other side is, at first glance, far removed from Tibet. There is no direct political, military, or economic linkage to the Tibetan issue. And yet, as a member of an international Tibet organization, I cannot view such events as disconnected.

What concerns me is not only the battlefield dynamic, but the systemic and normative one.

When major powers act in ways that appear to stretch or violate international law, the consequences extend far beyond the immediate theatre of conflict. For Tibetans—whose struggle has consistently relied on non-violence, international law, and universal human rights norms—the credibility of those frameworks is not abstract. It is strategic capital. If the rules-based order is applied selectively, it weakens the authority of the powerful, but it also complicates the tools available to peoples without a state of their own.

At the same time, crises reshape geopolitical calculations. The strategic posture of the United States toward China, shifting European alignments, and India's positioning in a volatile security environment all interact in subtle ways. The Indo-Pacific and Middle Eastern theatres may be distinct security complexes, but they are connected through great-power rivalry, energy flows, and normative competition. Perceptions of distraction, or inconsistency alter risk calculations elsewhere —including across the Taiwan Strait and along the Himalayan frontier.

For Tibet, this is not theoretical. Beijing's policies in Tibet are inseparable from its broader conception of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and regime security. Any erosion, or reinterpretation of international norms around sovereignty and the use of force inevitably affects the political environment in which Tibet advocacy operates.

There is also a social dimension often overlooked. Tibetan Muslims—predominantly Sunni—exist within a broader regional context that includes significant Shia populations in India and Ladakh. Religious polarization elsewhere does not automatically translate into internal tensions. But global narratives of religious confrontation can reverberate even in communities such as the Tibetan.

An additional layer deserves attention: How are such global crises are perceived in Beijing?

The leadership in China has, over the past decade, projected an image of strategic confidence—anchored in economic scale, centralized authority, and a long-term dystopian vision of national rejuvenation. However, the current international environment is far less predictable than the one in which that confidence was cultivated. And on the other hand, judging from how China has reacted to the attack so far, Beijing's potential allies in the region, and above all the Iranian leadership, may finally understand how irrelevant China is compared to the US for the region. Chinese dependency from gas and oil from Iran and from the Gulf region is much greater than its capacity to be a factor in the power balance of the Middle East.

Major-power confrontation, fragmented alliances, economic pressures, and sudden military escalations elsewhere introduce volatility into Beijing's strategic planning. In moments like these, there is often a first phase of confusion: reassessing risks and chances, recalibrating messaging, evaluating economic vulnerabilities, and testing the reliability of partnerships. Beijing reacts to this confusion with almost complete silence at the moment.

What typically follows such a phase of confusion is a search for a new balance. For Tibetans, the key question is if such periods of transition reshape opportunity structures. Maybe we are hoping for too much.

Historically, moments of global flux have sometimes created diplomatic openings, that smaller actors can strategically engage. At other times, insecurity has led states to harden repression and ideological rigidity.

As a Tibetan, I try to avoid both naïve optimism and fatalism. Instead, we, including all other oppressed people in China such as the Uyghurs, Southern Mongolians and Hongkonger must analyse carefully:

Does China's search for a global role incentivise flexibility—or reinforce securitisation?

Does contestation of international norms create new spaces to insist on consistent application of international law?

Do shifts in great-power alignment open alternative geopolitical opportunities for people like us?

At this stage, uncertainty dominates. But uncertainty is not inherently negative. It is a transitional condition.

As Tibetans committed to non-violence, and principled engagement, our responsibility is to remain patient, analytically rigorous, and politically prepared. We cannot predict how the emerging balance will look. But we can ensure that when opportunities arise—whether diplomatic or otherwise—we are ready to engage them with clarity.

International crises do not automatically change Tibet's position. But they reshape the system in which our future will be negotiated. And in periods of systemic adjustment, preparedness matters.

## Op-Ed: India's Calibrated Opening to China-Linked Capital Signals a Pragmatic Shift

16 March 2026, India Briefing

India appears to be quietly recalibrating one of the most restrictive investment policies introduced during the pandemic. **Amendments to Press Note 3 (PN3)**—the 2020 rule requiring government approval for foreign direct investment (FDI) from countries sharing a land border with India—suggest a strategic shift; New Delhi is attempting to unlock capital and technology flows without compromising national security safeguards.

At the center of the policy adjustment is a simple but consequential question: How can India expand its manufacturing ecosystem and integrate into global supply chains while maintaining strategic caution toward Chinese capital?

The answer, it seems, lies in controlled liberalization rather than wholesale deregulation.

Easing of Press Note 3: Unlocking investment flows

The 2026 relaxation of Press Note 3 norms is expected to revive a backlog of pending investment proposals, potentially leading to a short-term **increase in capital inflows from China**, including Hong Kong. A March 23, 2026, CRISIL market intelligence report suggests that the share of Chinese investments in India's total FDI could gradually return to pre-restriction levels of around 2 percent.

While the immediate impact may be visible through faster approvals and increased inflows, the more significant effects are likely to unfold over the medium to long term.

Prior to the implementation of PN 3, China (including Hong Kong) contributed approximately 2 percent of India's total FDI inflows between 2014 and 2019. Notably, China accounted for almost the entire share (99.9 percent) of investments originating from countries sharing land borders with India.

Under the stricter norms, this share declined sharply to 0.27 percent, indicating a significant contraction in investment flows from China.

From blanket restrictions to targeted screening

India introduced Press Note 3 in April 2020 during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic. It mandated prior government approval for investments from neighboring countries, primarily to prevent opportunistic acquisitions of distressed Indian companies. However, in practice, the rule had broader implications for global capital flows.

Even minimal Chinese shareholding in global funds or multinational companies triggered approval requirements. This slowed investments not only from China but also from venture capital funds and corporations based in the United States, Europe, Taiwan, and South Korea that had Chinese limited partners.

Over time, the approval process developed substantial bottlenecks, with hundreds of proposals reportedly pending clearance. Venture capital funding for Indian startups also faced increased uncertainty, particularly where funds had Chinese participation.

According to estimates by CRISIL, investment proposals worth INR 756.91 billion (US$8.1 billion) were submitted under Press Note 3 during FY 2020–21 and FY 2021–22. However, authorities approved only INR 136.25 billion (US$1.45 billion), underscoring the restrictive nature of the framework. Rejected proposals accounted for nearly five percent of India's average annual FDI inflows over the past five years.

The central government's recent amendments signal a recognition that the earlier framework was overly broad and may have constrained legitimate investment flows.

The 10 percent threshold: A key structural change

A major shift introduced under the 2026 amended PN3 framework is the definition of "beneficial ownership."

Under the new approach, investments with less than 10 percent non-controlling ownership from investors in land-border countries may proceed through the automatic route, subject to applicable sectoral regulations.

This threshold addresses a major challenge faced by global investors: many venture funds and institutional investors have diversified investor bases. This sometimes includes small Chinese limited partner stakes. Previously, even these minority exposures could trigger regulatory scrutiny.By introducing a clear ownership threshold, India is effectively distinguishing between strategic control and passive capital participation.

For global venture funds and private equity firms, this clarification could restore confidence that compliance risk will not unexpectedly derail investment transactions.

## Why The Dalai Lama's Daring Escape In 1959 Still Haunts The World – OpEd

16 March 2026, Eurasia Review

On the night of March 17, 1959, a quiet but historic escape unfolded in the Himalayan shadows. Using a disguise as a young soldier, the 14th Dalai Lama escaped Chinese-occupied Lhasa, exploiting the cover of darkness.What followed that escape was a fortnight-long torturous




*The 14th Dalai Lama being interviewed by Voice of America journalist Lillard Hill in 1959. Photo Credit: VOA, Wikimedia Commons*

trek through the punishing mountainous terrain under freezing weather to reach India.

That escape has reshaped Himalayan geopolitics like never before, defining the political fate of Tibet, and creating one of the most enduring symbols of non-violent resistance in modern history.

The background to the 1959 flight of the young Tenzin Gyatso was the Tibetan Uprising and the Chinese oppression and human rights violations.

Just ahead of that, tensions between the Tibetans and the Communist state in Beijing had worsened into an open confrontation that was both political and military.

The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Buddhist leadership were under tremendous pressure from the People's Republic of China since the occupation of Tibet in the early 1950s.

By March 1959, there were rumours in Lhasa that the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) was conspiring to arrest the Dalai Lama and imprison them, threatening the survival of Tibetan Buddhism itself.

That triggered the gathering of thousands of Tibetans around Norbulingka Palace, the Dalai Lama's summer residence, fearing that the Chinese military would imprison him.

That fear was further intensified by the Chinese PLA tightening its artillery positions around Lhasa, resulting in intelligence inputs that the military was planning to bombard the palace.

These inputs led the Tibetan leadership to believe that there was no other option for the young Dalai Lama but to leave the palace and Tibet itself.

The young Tenzin Gyatso dressed as a soldier, swung a rifle over his shoulder, and quietly slipped out of Lhasa.

He and his small entourage crossed the icy waters of the Kyichu River and began an unforgiving journey across the Himalayan mountain passes under uninhabitable cold weather.

For nearly two weeks, the Dalai Lama's small convoy traversed through the rugged mountain passes, battling the inclement weather amidst the constant threat of detection by Chinese PLA patrols.

On March 31 that year, the Dalai Lama crossed over to India, where the then Prime Minister of

India, Jawaharlal Nehru, provided him with political asylum.
Eventually, the young Dalai Lama chose Dharamsala in present-day Himachal Pradesh to settle down.
Dharamsala, a hill station, soon became the hub of Tibetan settlements in India, where the government-in-exile, called the Central Tibetan Administration, was set up.
However, this moment also led to a historic breakdown of the traditional political order, and the Dalai Lama became a spiritual and political leader of his people without a homeland.
Yet, the escape also transformed the Dalai Lama into a greater role on the global stage. He became the symbol of peaceful resistance to Communist China's political repression.
Since his flight to India and the years that followed, the Dalai Lama was singularly responsible for taking the Tibetan cause and Tibet's illegal occupation by Communist China as an international political issue.
The Tibetan cause gained international attention, as the United Nations passed three resolutions in 1959, 1961, and 1965, condemning the human rights violations inside Tibet and calling for respect for the Tibetans' fundamental freedoms.
The Communist government in Beijing, though, dismissed these UN resolutions, maintaining that Tibet was historically part of China and rejecting the reports of political repression.
Yet, the Dalai Lama's message of non-violence and global peace caught the attention of the world and resonated far and wide, even as the diplomatic deadlock continued.
The Dalai Lama took inspiration from Buddhist teachings and principles, and moral persuasion against violence and armed resistance. He reframed the Tibetan struggle as a universal fight for dignity and cultural survival.
After three decades of his asylum in India, the Dalai Lama's strong commitment to peaceful dialogue was recognised with the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989.
The Nobel cemented his position and reputation as the world's most respected and honoured advocate of non-violence and global peace, often compared to India's Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who won the moniker 'Mahatma' for adhering to non-violent principles.
Yet, the central issue concerning Tibet and Tibetans remains unresolved: their freedom from Chinese occupation and liberty to live their lives peacefully inside the occupied Tibet.
Over six decades after the Dalai Lama's flight from Lhasa, Tibet continued to be a matter of international discussions, while Tibetans either suffer under Chinese oppression or are in exile outside their homeland.
Each year, the anniversary of his flight from Lhasa on March 17 is observed by Tibetans in exile and human rights activists worldwide as the day of silent, non-violent resistance to oppression and repression.
The day is not just remembered as an escape, but as the moment when a spiritual and political leader of a peaceful people became a refugee and when the Tibetan struggle entered the global consciousness.
Remember March 17, and the Dalai Lama's escape from Lhasa, matters more today than ever.
The flight was not merely a dramatic episode in the Cold War era.
It was the most defining moment in the modern history of human rights and the fight against violations, the fight for preserving cultural identity, language, and religion, apart from non-violent resistance to oppression and repression from Communist China.
The daring escape and the Dalai Lama's story continue to echo beyond the Himalayan mountains on all continents.

## Beijing Is Legalizing the Assimilation of Tibetans and Other Ethnic Minorities

12 March 2026, The Diplomat

China is amending its laws to weaken ethnic identities, including Tibetan language and culture.
Jianli Yang
Source:
In recent years, the Chinese government has intensified policies in Tibetan areas that aim to reshape Tibetan identity through language, education, and cultural control. These measures are not isolated administrative actions but part of a broader national strategy centered on what Beijing calls **"forging a strong sense of the Chinese nation community"** (铸牢中华民族共同体意识). Under this framework, the Chinese Communist Party seeks to strengthen a unified national identity by weakening ethnic identities that might compete with the political narrative of the "Chinese nation." Increasingly, these assimilationist policies are not merely administrative practices; they are being codified into law.
For decades, the Chinese state maintained tight political control over Tibet, particularly over Tibetan Buddhism and religious institutions. Yet in the realm of language and education, earlier policies were comparatively more accommodating than those of today. In 1994, the **"Measures for Implementing the Compulsory Education Law of the People's Republic of China in the Tibet Autonomous Region"** stipulated that schools should **"use Tibetan as the principal medium of instruction while gradually improving a bilingual Tibetan-Chinese education system."** Within this framework, Tibetan language education held a central place in the school system, while Mandarin Chinese functioned largely as a supplementary language.

At that time, Tibetan students also had institutional options in China's university entrance examination system. Two separate examination tracks existed. One, known as **"min kao Han,"** required students to take exams in Chinese. The other, called **"min kao min,"** allowed ethnic minority students to take their exams in their own languages. While imperfect, this system acknowledged linguistic diversity and allowed Tibetan language education to retain meaningful institutional space.

This situation began to change dramatically after Xi Jinping came to power. Under the banner of achieving the **"great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,"** Beijing increasingly began to view minority languages—including Tibetan—as potential threats to national unity. The policy shift reflects a deeper transformation in China's ethnic governance doctrine.

Chinese policymakers and scholars now frequently refer to a transition from the **"first-generation ethnic policy"** to the **"second-generation ethnic policy."** The earlier framework, developed during the Mao and Deng eras, formally emphasized ethnic regional autonomy and the protection of minority languages and cultures. Although implementation was uneven, the official policy at least recognized the legitimacy of cultural pluralism within the Chinese state.

The second-generation ethnic policy represents a significant departure from this approach. Rather than preserving ethnic diversity, it seeks to minimize the political and social significance of ethnic distinctions. Its central objective is the creation of a unified national identity centered on the concept of the **"Chinese nation" (中华民族)**. In practice, this shift encourages linguistic assimilation, cultural homogenization, and tighter political integration of minority regions.

Language policy in Tibet provides one of the clearest examples of this transformation. Officially, the Chinese government continues to describe its education policy as "bilingual education." In reality, Mandarin Chinese has increasingly become the dominant language of instruction, while Tibetan has been relegated to a secondary or optional subject. Core academic subjects such as mathematics, science, and history are now overwhelmingly taught in Mandarin.

This trend was reinforced by legislative developments discussed during the most recent **Beijing "**Two Sessions**."**Lawmakers revised the **National Common Language Law**, removing earlier provisions that allowed minority languages to serve as primary mediums of instruction in schools. The revised law explicitly requires that Mandarin be used as the fundamental teaching language and mandates the use of standardized national textbooks throughout the education system.

These changes have had profound consequences for ethic minority students. The **"min kao min"** examination track has largely disappeared, leaving only the Chinese-language examination system. Tibetan language proficiency, for example, is no longer central to university admissions except for students applying specifically to Tibetan-language academic programs.

Perhaps the most controversial element of the new policy has been the rapid expansion of the boarding school system in Tibetan areas. Research by human rights organizations suggests that roughly **one million Tibetan children** have been placed in state-run boarding schools. These institutions operate primarily in Mandarin and reportedly restrict the use of Tibetan language in daily life. Because students live on campus for extended periods, they are separated from their families and communities during crucial stages of cultural and linguistic development.

At the same time, private Tibetan language schools have been systematically closed. In several cases, teachers associated with independent Tibetan-language education initiatives have been detained or disappeared. Today, Tibetan language instruction within public schools has been drastically reduced, and private efforts to establish Tibetan language schools are rarely permitted.

The contrast is striking. Chinese immigrants in the any parts of the world are free to establish Chinese-language schools. Tibetan immigrants abroad can organize Tibetan-language education in diaspora communities. Yet Tibetans living in Tibet itself increasingly lack the freedom to establish Tibetan-language schools in their own homeland.

The situations in other ethnic minority areas in the PRC such as Xinjiang and the Inner Mongolia are similar.

The proposed **Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law** further strengthens this assimilationist framework. The draft legislation requires that preschool children begin learning Mandarin and mandates that students **"basically master the national common language by the end of compulsory education."** At the same time, it weakens provisions in the **Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law** that previously protected minority language rights.

The law also introduces provisions that allow authorities to pursue legal responsibility for individuals overseas accused of **"undermining ethnic unity."** Such clauses extend the reach of China's ethnic policy beyond its borders and further integrate identity issues into the country's national security framework.

International concern about these developments has grown. In a **2026 report**, the **United Nations Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues** warned that systematic restrictions on minority language education could lead to **"linguistic erasure"** and create a serious risk of cultural destruction. The report noted that policies designed to eliminate a language from public life

may approach what international law describes as **cultural genocide**.
Viewed in this broader context, China's current policies in Tibet represent more than a shift in language education. They reflect a structural transformation in the Chinese state's approach to ethnic governance. The combination of administrative campaigns and legislative codification suggests that Beijing is moving to institutionalize the second-generation ethnic policy.
Through both political campaigns and legal reforms, China is steadily narrowing the space for minority autonomy in education, language, and religion. The legal codification of assimilation policies marks a new phase in Beijing's frontier governance strategy—one that seeks not merely to manage ethnic diversity but to fundamentally reshape it.
Dr. Jianli Yang is a research fellow at Harvard Kennedy School of Government, a distinguished visiting fellow at Center for the National Interest and a columnist for National Review.

## Ethnic unity law contradicts China's constitution, puts premium on assimilation

10 March 2026, Cornell

This week, China's National People's Congress is expected to pass a new "Ethnic Unity" law that moves away from regional ethnic autonomy toward a nationwide framework that prioritizes Mandarin and Han cultural norms.
**Magnus Fiskesjö** is an associate professor of anthropology at Cornell University who studies ethnic relations and political anthropology in China and Southeast Asia.
Fiskesjö says: "The Chinese constitution says clearly (General Principles, Article 4): 'All ethnic groups shall have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages.' The new law now to be enacted, 'Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress,' openly contradicts the constitution.
"The law is consistent with a dramatic recent policy shift, to suppress the ethnic diversity formally recognized since 1949. The next step may be the formal abolishment of 'ethnic minorities' as such — as long advocated by radical elements inside the Chinese regime.
"This is already being put in practice through measures such as the mass family separations in the Uyghur and Tibetan regions and beyond. The children of the next generation are now isolated and brutally forced to forget their own language and culture — an openly genocidal policy directly parallel to the atrocious Indian boarding schools of North America's past."
**Allen Carlson** is an associate professor of government at Cornell and an expert on Chinese foreign policy.




Carlson says: "The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a multi-ethnic state, in which the super majority ethnicity, the Han Chinese, comprise over 90% of the total population, but the other ethnic groups, most notably Tibetans and Uyghurs, constitute the majority in crucially important frontier regions.
"Beijing's approach to governing these non-Han ethnicities has been unwavering since 1949. They must support the PRC's national unity and bolster its territorial integrity. The way Beijing has ensured such a commitment has varied. There have been periods when emphasis was placed on respecting the autonomy of non-Han peoples. But more often, a premium has been placed on assimilation. This has been especially so over the last decade.
"If approved, the 'Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress' law will further entrench this trend by placing an even greater emphasis on assimilation. The law makes it clearer than ever that in President Xi Jinping's PRC non-Han peoples must do more to integrate themselves with the Han majority, and above all else

## How China plans to project more power in Xinjiang and Tibet over the next 5 years

10 March 2026, SCMP

China plans to further strengthen its strategic transport network in sensitive border regions over the next five years to fortify and better project power along its remote frontiers amid rising geopolitical uncertainty.
One project involves building a 394km (245-mile) highway linking the northern and southern sides of the rugged Tianshan Mountains in far-western Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, according to the draft 15th five-year plan released last week.
The route will run parallel to a strategic road built in the 1970s to improve military mobility following the 1962 Sino-India border war.
*SCMP Graphics*

Construction of the Dushanzi-Kuqa Highway in central Xinjiang began in September and is expected to finish in 2032. Once completed, it

will allow year-round travel and cut journeys across the Tianshan Mountains to half or a third of the time.Under the plan, which outlines China's policy priorities for the rest of the decade, China aims to complete two highways spanning all nine of its land-border provinces and "advance" construction of the National Coastal Highway along its east coast that links the port city of Dandong, near North Korea, with Dongxing on the border with Vietnam.
It also proposes upgrading the three existing highways running into Tibet.
China has built the world's largest highway network as it attempts to boost economic growth and stimulate consumer spending through infrastructure investment.
But rising geopolitical risks along its borders – fuelled by territorial disputes, conflicts between neighbouring states and Beijing's concern that terrorism could spill over – have heightened the strategic importance of logistics in frontier regions.
In August, Beijing established the Xinjiang-Tibet Railway Company to oversee the construction of a strategic 1,980km (1,230-mile) artery between Lhasa in Tibet and Hotan in Xinjiang.
Sitting on the Karakoram plateau, Hotan administers the Galwan Valley, the hotly contested area at the centre of the bloody war in 1962 and a deadly clash in 2020 that resulted in a months-long military stand-off with India and a diplomatic chill between the two Asian powers that only began to thaw last year.
Liu Zongyi, director of the Centre for South Asian Studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, said both economic development and strategic stability were driving China to expand infrastructure in border areas.
Chinese leaders have long embraced the idea that "building roads is the first step to prosperity" and see improved transport links as key to boosting economies in border regions that lag behind the more developed coastal provinces.
"Infrastructure holds significant strategic and economic value," Liu said. "In the event of an emergency, personnel and resources could be deployed more quickly to frontier regions, which is crucial for border stability and national defence."
Since the Galwan clashes, both Beijing and Delhi have ramped up infrastructure construction near border regions.
In 2022, China unveiled plans for a new highway between Lhunze in Tibet and Mazha in Xinjiang that will run near disputed areas, such as the Depsang Plains, the Galwan Valley and Hot Springs on the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
In 2024, the Indian government approved a plan to build the 1,637km Arunachal Frontier Highway, which is expected to connect 12 districts and 1,683 villages along the LAC, according to The Times of India.
The construction pushes have sparked diplomatic tension. In January, India's Ministry of External Affairs lodged a protest over China's road construction in the Shaksgam Valley, which is administered by China as part of the Kashgar prefecture in Xinjiang.

India, which sees the region as part of its territory, called the Chinese construction an "illegal occupation". The Chinese foreign ministry responded that the area "belongs to China", adding that it was "fully justified" in conducting infrastructure construction "on its own territory".

## China's good-neighbourly friendship claim with India lacks ground reality

08 March 2026, Tibetan Review

Although the ground reality at the still tense but so far multi-year incident-free border situation may not justify the painting of an upbeat picture, China has on Mar 8 called for a more cooperative approach in its ties with India, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi urging the two Asian powers to view each other as partners and opportunities rather than strategic rivals.
Mutual trust and cooperation is beneficial to the development of China and India, while division and confrontation is detrimental to the rejuvenation of Asia, China's official *Xinhua* news agency Mar 8 cited Foreign Minister Wang Yi as saying. He was speaking at a press conference on the sidelines of the ongoing annual, fourth session of the 14th National People's Congress, China's parliament, in Beijing.
China and India must maintain the correct strategic perception, uphold good-neighbourliness and friendship, focus on development, which is the biggest common denominator of the two countries, and make BRICS cooperation more substantive to bring new hope to the Global South, Wang was cited as saying.
Also, China's official *globaltimes.cn* Mar 8 cited Wang as saying, sourced from *Xinhua,* in a single-



sentence news report, that China always places neighbouring countries in priority position of diplomatic agenda.
Referring to the recent diplomatic engagements between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi

and Chinese President Xi Jinping, especially their successful meeting in Tianjin last August, Wang has said, as reported by India's *PTI* news agency May 8, "Building on the fresh start enabled by their Kazan meeting in 2024, the Tianjin summit brought about further improvement in China-India relations."

The report said Wang highlighted signs of renewed engagement between the two neighbours, saying, "We are heartened to see re-energised interactions at all levels, a new record in bilateral trade, and closer people-to-people exchanges. All this has brought tangible benefits to the two peoples."

To reinforce the feel-good factor supposedly arising from the above developments, Wang was further quoted as saying, "As each other's important neighbours and members of the Global South, China and India enjoy profound civilisational ties and share extensive common interests."

The *PTI* report noted that India-China relations, which remained frozen for five years following the military standoff in eastern Ladakh, began showing signs of normalisation after two meetings between Modi and Xi — first in Kazan, Russia in 2024, and later on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Tianjin last year. Since then, both sides have resumed visa and flight services and initiated a series of measures aimed at restoring normal diplomatic engagement.

However, the ground reality remains that India's core concern before full normalisation of Sino-India ties – the restoration of mutual trust – still remains to be fulfilled. China's propensity to renege on painfully crafted agreements signed after protracted negotiations between the two sides still remains largely unaddressed, as repeatedly pointed out by India's foreign minister S Jaishankar. As a matter of fact, China still insists that the military standoff in eastern Ladakh in 2020 was undoubtedly and absolutely India's fault, the very opposite of what the latter alleges.

In addition, China refuses to take any step towards a final resolution of the border dispute, a legacy of its illegal occupation of Tibet, calling it complex.

The most damning refutation of Wang's feel-good remarks about the current state of affairs can be seen in the fact that both sides still have tens of thousands of troops amassed against each other close to their Tibet-border, even as they keep deploying more military assets and building more strategic infrastructure there, after the 2020 Ladakh border clashes.

## Inside China's 15th 5-year plan: AI, fusion and defence drive next frontier

08 March 2026, SCMP

China on Thursday unveiled a draft blueprint of key projects for the 2026-2030 period, aimed at overcoming chokepoints to gain a steadier footing in the global tech race and its rivalry with the United States.

The 15th five-year plan was released as China's top legislature and political advisory body convened in Beijing for the annual "two sessions" meetings, a time when major economic priorities and policy directions are formally set.

Here are the major takeaways from Beijing's sweeping plan to navigate a complex and turbulent international environment.

**All-front fortress**

The plan outline indicates that Beijing is preparing for extreme contingencies, including potential external shocks or disruptions to coastal regions.

The push to set up strategic hinterlands and backups for key industries in interior regions is expected to continue, while food self-sufficiency and stable energy production have been framed as pivotal for extreme-scenario preparedness.

On the defence front, China is prioritising increased strategic deterrence, accelerated readiness for unmanned and intelligent warfare, and the rapid adoption of emerging technologies.

Border security will also be fortified through new "strategic backbone corridors" linking Xinjiang and Tibet with the rest of the country and repairs to old ones.

**'China model' in new sectors**

China aims to play a bigger role in setting global standards for AI governance, the digital economy and outer space activities.

This includes establishing a global organisation for artificial intelligence (AI) cooperation, along with AI collaboration platforms and technology application centres under Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative global infrastructure strategy and within the Global South.

Beijing also aims to foster an open-source ecosystem for technological development and innovation.

**Engine of the future**

High hopes have been placed on controllable nuclear fusion as a cornerstone of China's future energy supply and security. Plans include speeding up the development of its "artificial sun" programme, with fusion positioned as pivotal to achieving long-term energy independence.

The plan also seeks to strengthen research and application of quantum technology and computing power. It envisions building an integrated space-to-ground quantum communication network and expanding a nationwide computing grid to support cutting-edge scientific research.

On energy security, in addition to building oil and gas pipelines and expanding wind and solar power bases, China aims to deepen global cooperation to safeguard the security of "strategic corridors".

**Institutional attraction and soft power**

The plan includes a road map to becoming a global magnet for the world's best minds,

including an incentive framework to attract hi-tech talent from abroad.
To advance its goal of becoming a global science hub, China will encourage leading overseas science and engineering universities to set up joint educational programmes in the country. It also plans to allow cross-border transfers of research funds, making it easier for international teams to work on Chinese soil.
It also pledges to better protect private companies, curb "profit-driven" law enforcement and improve legal mechanisms to safeguard China's expanding overseas assets and investments.
**Last frontiers: deep sea, space, and atoms**
China will also intensify efforts in deep-sea exploration, polar research, outer space and next-generation nuclear energy – areas it identifies as future sources of scientific innovation and long-term strategic advantage.
The plans to advance deep-sea exploration include the development of a new generation of submersibles and setting up a deep-sea research station.
It also seeks to expand its presence in the Arctic and Antarctic, positioning them as global frontiers for scientific advancement.

## "The Broken China Dream": Xi Jinping, the West, and the Prosperity Trap

04 March 2026, Bitter Winter

If you thought that capitalism and the rise of Chinese billionaires would soften the Communist Party's totalitarian rule, now you need to think again.
04 March 2026, Bitter Winter



*Professor Pei Minxin (credits) and his new book.*

Chinese-American political scientist Pei Minxin's "The Broken China Dream: How Reform Revived Totalitarianism" (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2026) is an autopsy report on a failing idea that few were willing to address: the belief that markets would weaken authoritarianism, that billionaires would push the Chinese Communist Party toward democracy, and that a rising middle class would seek elections rather than larger apartments. Pei dissects the myth with scholarly precision and the dry humor of someone who has watched Western policymakers cling to the same fantasies for 40 years.
The book starts in the 1980s, a brief moment when China seemed to be moving toward more freedom. Pei reminds us that even then, the reform era was not a smooth journey toward openness but rather a struggle behind the Zhongnanhai walls. Deng Xiaoping's coalition, united only by the desire to marginalize Hua Guofeng, quickly split into reformists who wanted to ease the system and conservatives who wanted to revive the command economy with better lighting. The decade concludes, inevitably, with tanks on Chang'an Avenue and a message that would define the next thirty years: economic experimentation is acceptable, but political experimentation is not.
Pei then shows how the CCP learned to grow wealthy without loosening its control. The rural reforms of the 1980s sparked entrepreneurial energy, but always at the fringes and under the watchful eye of a party intent on keeping power. China's mixed economy—part market, part state, all political—became the engine of the "miracle" but also the source of contradictions that would later suffocate it. Growth was allowed, even promoted, as long as it posed no threat to the monopoly on power.
The Jiang Zemin years, often seen as technocratic and dull, emerge in Pei's account as the period when neo-authoritarianism became a solid system. Stability was created through rules, norms, and a vast security apparatus that made dissent dangerous and futile. The party co-opted elites, bought off the middle class, and wrapped itself in nationalism. It looked modern but was fragile, like a skyscraper on unstable ground.
Hu Jintao's administration, with its focus on "harmonious society," comes across as perhaps well-meaning but overwhelmed. Inequality soared, corruption spread, and environmental damage reached alarming levels. The 2008 global financial crisis, initially seen by Beijing as evidence of Western failure, instead revealed the limits of a Chinese growth model that was overly reliant on debt, exports, and construction booms. By the time Hu left office, the system was already straining under its own contradictions.
Then comes Xi Jinping, and Pei's narrative shifts from gradual decline to sudden reversal. Xi's China is not just authoritarian; it seeks to revive totalitarian practices many thought had faded with Mao. Anti-corruption campaigns double as purges of political rivals. Surveillance becomes widespread. Ideology makes a robust return, as evidenced by the infamo



*Jiang Zemin (1926–2022) and Hu Jintao. Source: Chinese Communist Party.*

us Document No. 9's list of forbidden Western ideas. Ethnic minorities, civil society, private entrepreneurs, and even senior party officials find themselves under attack from a state that now demands not just obedience but also ideological loyalty. Pei argues that the "China Dream" is a plan for centralized, personal, and unchecked power.

The later chapters depict a slow-motion disaster. Debt rises sharply. The population ages. Innovation stalls due to political fear. The economy, once the regime's most significant source of credibility, turns into a liability. At the same time, China's external circumstances shift from engagement to confrontation. What was once described as a "peaceful rise" now appears to be a path toward geopolitical conflict, driven by Xi's assertiveness abroad and repression at home. Pei does not resort to drama, yet he clearly shows that a system that cannot reform itself will eventually clash with the outside world.

The conclusion connects all the threads with a clarity that feels sobering. China's journey since 1979 has not failed to democratize because of missed opportunities. It failed because the very practices that drove economic growth also reinforced political control. The CCP's strategy for survival—repress, co-opt, centralize—succeeded too effectively. The institutions that supported Maoism were never dismantled; they were repurposed. Under Xi, they have been reactivated with new ideological zeal. The result is a nation moving not toward liberalization but toward an even more sophisticated, technology-driven form of totalitarianism.

Pei's central message is both powerful and uncomfortable: economic reform does not automatically lead to political reform. In China's situation, it led to quite the opposite. Prosperity has strengthened the party, enhanced its security forces, and given it the means to tighten its control. The "broken dream" is not only China's dream of revival: it is the West's misguided belief that capitalism would soften Leninism.

In the end, Pei offers no easy optimism. China's path under Xi points toward stagnation at home and conflict abroad. The system's internal logic pulls it further away from democracy, not closer. The world must finally confront a truth it has long avoided: totalitarianism does not fade in the marketplace; at times, it thrives.

## The 15th Five-Year Plan

03 March 2026, Observing China

The Investigator | No. 04/2026

The 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP) will be approved at the end of the National People's Congress (NPC), which begins on 5th March. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reports on last year's adoption of a draft at the Fourth Central Committee plenum have set out its general measures.

It is a commonplace saying that foreign policy is domestic policy carried out abroad – but for the CCP, the inverse is true. Chinese foreign policy, whose mainspring is an abiding anti-Americanism, is steering domestic policy.

Certainly, this claim is exaggerated: it is easy to point to purely domestic concerns – such as local government debt, the real estate market, unemployment and a mismatch of skills, and a long term water shortage (most the result of an economic model described by Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP, in 2013 as 'unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable' – all adjectives which remain relevant). Nevertheless, the FYP and future domestic policies will be heavily influenced by foreign policy considerations.

**The 'struggle' against America and the 'West'**

As the 'Recommendations' for formulating the 15th FYP stressed:

Unilateralism and protectionism are on the rise, and hegemonism and power politics pose greater threats. The international economic and trade order is facing grave challenges, and global economic growth lacks steam. Major-country rivalry is becoming more intricate and intense than ever.

The perception that the United States (US) is out to repress and contain the People's Republic of China's (PRC) rise has been a leitmotif of past decades. On coming to power, Xi wasted no time in emphasising the struggle with America and the free and open nation successors to the Western bloc. It was the backdrop to his first Politburo speech, where he set out how to avoid falling into the trap which led to the fall of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Three months later, the CCP promulgated 'Document No. 9', an ideological screed excoriating the political, economic and social values of the free and open nations. Since then, there has been plenty of talk of an economic systems war, a governance systems war and, above all, a science and technology war.

Xi has also made clear that the battlefield for that war is the so-called 'Global South'. It is towards

those countries in particular that the CCP has constructed its foreign policy architecture of a 'community of shared future for mankind' supported by the four 'Global Initiative' pillars (Development, Security, Civilisation and Governance).

Seven areas in the 15th FYP where 'struggle' with the US affects policies

**The political purity of the CCP**

This is always top priority. Internally, its essence is strict obedience to the demands of 'Xi Jinping Thought'. The reverse of that coin is a full rejection by CCP members of free and open nations' 'universal values' in favour of 12 'core socialist values', whose detailed definitions are the party's prerogative.

'Promoting and practicing the core socialist values' are sufficiently important to earn their own heading in the 'Recommendations' for the 15th FYP. Externally, the four Global Initiatives emphasise 'common values' (peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy and freedom), first enunciated by Xi in his speech to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 2015. 'He [Xi] has since made profound expositions on the common values of all mankind many times.' Unsurprisingly, such expositions condemn the values behind 'Western' actions.

**The importance of security**

The concept that 'development is the foundation of security, and security is the condition for development' – as described in an article in the *People's Daily*, the official newspaper of the CCP, and of course attributed to Xi – was born in April 2014, when he 'creatively proposed the overall national security outlook at the first meeting of the Central National Security Commission'.

It has since climbed higher in the firmament of CCP policy: it became 'a major principle of the party's governance' at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017. In October 2020, the fifth plenum included it in the guiding ideology for the 14th FYP. Two years later, the 20th Party Congress wrote it into the CCP's constitution. It has figured in top level meetings and documents ever since.

While 'build[ing] a solid security baseline in development' means solving pressing economic and social threats to stability emanating from within the PRC, the 15th FYP Recommendations give very considerable emphasis to threats coming from outside the country. The order of topics in CCP documents matters, and it is important to note that the backdrop to the two priorities given pride of place is the need to avoid dependencies on the US and its allies and partners.

**Modernisation and reinforcement of the industrial base**

The PRC will continue to strengthen its manufacturing base by upgrading traditional industries, 'ensur[ing] that China's industrial chains become more self-supporting and risk-resilient'. Fostering emerging industries and industries of the future means developing 'pillar industries' and 'extensively apply[ing] new technologies'.

A high-quality service sector is envisaged, while new types of infrastructure are to be integrated with modernised traditional infrastructure. The Recommendations call for enhancing 'the diversity and resilience of international transportation routes. It is not hard to see these measures as aimed at avoiding dependencies on 'hostile foreign forces'.

**Domination of the new sciences and technologies, and emerging industries**

The priority awarded second place is 'Achieving greater self-reliance and strength in science and technology and steering the development of new quality productive forces'. This covers 'original innovation and breakthroughs in core technologies in key fields', with an emphasis on long-term support for 'basic research'.

The call is for 'strengthening self-sufficiency in scientific and technological infrastructure', and ensuring that advances and innovations quickly enter practical application by supporting leading companies. The education system and immigration of global talent are also to underpin this aim. Data and Artificial Intelligence (AI) must be fully integrated into economic development. The CCP sees self-reliance and self-sufficiency in the technologies and industries of the future as essential for avoiding dependence on the US.

**Modernising the PRC's national security system and capacity**

The national security system merits its own chapter heading in the Recommendations. The emphasis is more on the international aspects of security than CCP control of domestic threats to its continued rule. The first section talks of refining mechanisms for ensuring national security in foreign affairs and stepping up the fight against 'foreign sanctions, interference and long-arm jurisdiction'.

When it comes to key sectors for building national security capacity, the priority areas include food; energy and resources; key industrial and supply chains and major infrastructure; strategic mineral resources; the security of strategic corridors; and developing a strategic hinterland and ensuring backup plans for key industries. Emerging domains include cyberspace, data, AI, biology, ecology, nuclear energy, outer space, deep sea, the polar regions and low-altitude airspace.

Most of these areas are foreign-facing. For example, food security and avoiding reliance on foreign supplies of seed has long been a top priority for the CCP. Grain can be bought on the international market at prices lower than in the PRC, but doing so would mean a greater reliance on free and open nations – something to be minimised, even if it cannot be entirely avoided.

The contrast with the 'Proposal' for the FYP from the 2020 plenum is stark. There, international concerns hardly figured, with the focus being on

domestic challenges to security. Five years later, the CCP is clear that major challenges are exogenous, and that domestic policies must be aligned with that reality.

**A more open call for military-civilian fusion**

A striking feature of the 2025 Recommendations is the emphasis on military-civilian fusion, something which, in recent years, the CCP had gone quiet after it aroused 'Western' disquiet. No longer, it would seem. The CCP is increasingly conscious of, and confident in, its 'struggle' with other powers:

We should deepen military-civilian reforms and establish a well-regulated, orderly framework where both sides fulfil their respective functions and work in close concert with each other. We should move faster to develop strategic capabilities in emerging fields and work toward effective integration between new quality productive forces and new combat capabilities so that the development of one helps drive that of the other.

This section also talks of promoting interoperability between military and civilian standards, enhancing military-civilian alignment and ensuring that all major infrastructure facilities meet national defence requirements so strategic needs are better fulfilled in advance.

**Internationalisation of the renminbi**

Internationalisation of the renminbi (RMB) has been talked of for many years. In a speech to high-level officials in January 2024, Xi said that for the PRC to realise the ambition of becoming a financial powerhouse, it must 'have a strong currency, widely used in international trade, investment, and foreign exchange markets, and holding the status of a global reserve currency'. The Recommendations call is more modest:

…advance the internationalisation of the RMB, pursue greater openness of RMB capital accounts, and build a homegrown, risk-controllable cross-border RMB payment system. We should promote reform in global economic and financial governance…

The CCP has seen the damage which the US can inflict through 'foreign sanctions, interference and long-arm jurisdiction', hence its desire to move away from a US dollar-dominated international financial system. However, progress is likely to remain limited. Fully opening the capital account and other measures run contrary to the party's devotion to control.

**The other side of the coin: Creating dependencies**

Most of the measures discussed above are motivated by a desire to avoid dependencies on 'hostile foreign forces'. However, they also make foreign countries dependent upon the PRC. The processing of rare earths is the most egregious example, but increasingly areas such as solar and wind energy, electric vehicles and batteries, and telecommunications equipment and cellular modules are dominated by Chinese companies. This gives the CCP considerable geopolitical leverage. In many cases, it would bestow the ability to disrupt or destroy critical national infrastructure in the event of hostilities, as well as allow the harvesting of vast amounts of data.

**Conclusion**

The reports to the National People's Congress in March and the new FYP will cover all aspects of governing the PRC. Even if the space devoted to foreign affairs is usually short, behind the emphasis on self-reliance and 'development and security' lies an eye fixed firmly on an unstable external environment and the blurring of internal and external security.

The CCP sees the global future as one of 'struggle'; of self-reliance and decoupling; of a fading distinction between military and civilian technologies and industries; of creating dependencies; of an identity between national and economic security. Free and open countries need to see this clearly and react accordingly.

That does not mean ceasing to pursue trade and investment, no longer working with the PRC on climate change and other global problems, or discouraging academic and cultural exchanges. It means engagement with eyes wide open.

In the cases of the United Kingdom (UK) and some European countries, it means considering whether it is wise to allow Chinese companies to be involved in critical national infrastructure, such as wind energy and power grids – particularly when, in Britain's case, security concerns ruled out Chinese participation in the nuclear industry – or whether it is wise to welcome Chinese investment in the vehicle sector, if the connectivity involved in modern cars and trucks would render a country's logistics system dependent upon the CCP's goodwill and even make it inoperable during a time of hostilities.

The 15th FYP is a massively important document. It requires study by foreigners. Behind its many targets and aspirations lies great geopolitical significance. Xi has been clear since he came to power that there is a clash of systems and values, and that the PRC must attain the 'dominant position'.

The FYP gives pointers as to how that is to be achieved. Ignore them, and free and open countries may find that, under CCP suzerainty, they become less free and less open.

## Xi Jinping's Expanding Military Purge Now Reaches His Own Inner Circle

03 March 2026, Vision Times

On Feb. 26, 2026, the standing committee of China's rubber-stamp legislature quietly tore open the curtain on the latest round of Xi Jinping's military bloodletting. In a single session, 19 delegates lost their seats, including nine military officers. Five of the nine held the rank of full general, the highest active-duty rank in China's

armed forces. The announcement confirmed previously rumored purges of the former navy commander Shen Jinlong, former navy political commissar Qin Shengxiang, and former air force political commissar Yu Zhongfu. It also delivered a bombshell: Li Qiaoming, the former army commander once considered a powerful and capable military figure, had been removed without any prior public announcement.

The timing was deliberate. China's annual "Two Sessions," the rubber-stamp legislative meetings and the Party's political advisory conference, begin on March 4 and 5. These are the CCP's most prominent political theater events of the year, and this purge was designed to set the tone.

The delegate purge was widely interpreted as a "political flogging of fallen generals," a final administrative step confirming that internal Party investigations are complete and judicial proceedings will follow. There is no return from this.

Yet the names that generated the most speculation were those that did not appear on the removal list. Zhang Youxia, the vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission and the second most powerful military figure in the country, and Liu Zhenli, the joint staff chief, both remain listed as delegates in the military and armed police delegation. Their conspicuous survival on the delegate rolls is not necessarily a sign of safety. It may signal something more ominous: that a larger reckoning is still being prepared behind closed doors.



*Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of both the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission and the state Central Military Commission, arrives in Qingdao, Shandong province, on April 22, 2024, ahead of the opening of the 19th Western Pacific Naval Symposium. (Image: Wang Zhao/AFP via Getty Images)*

**Xi Jinping's personal military secretary reportedly raided**

If Zhang Youxia's continued presence on the delegate list was expected, the reported downfall of Zhong Shaojun shattered any remaining illusion of stability within Xi's innermost circle.

According to the prominent political commentator Chen Pokong, who broke the story on Feb. 27, Zhong Shaojun, the former director of the Central Military Commission's General Office, was subjected to a surprise raid on a Friday. Zhong was not a peripheral figure. He was a core member of Xi's "Zhejiang New Army," the group of loyalists Xi brought with him from Zhejiang province when he ascended to national power. For over a decade, Zhong served as Xi's personal military secretary, a "sentinel within the military" whose job was to monitor rival generals on Xi's behalf.

Zhong's fall completes a devastating pattern. Xi relied on three military secretaries across his tenure. Qin Shengxiang, inherited from the Hu Jintao era, has been confirmed as purged. Fang Yongxiang, associated with Xi's Fujian province network, went down alongside the Eastern Theater Command faction when He Weidong and Miao Hua were purged. Now Zhong, Xi's most trusted personal appointee, has reportedly been raided as well. All three are gone.

Zhong's trajectory told the story before the raid confirmed it. His transfer from the powerful CMC General Office directorship to a political commissar post at the National Defense University, without the expected promotion to full general, was already a signal of lost favor. Rumors had circulated that Zhong might recover his standing after Zhang Youxia's influence waned, perhaps even rising to vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. The raid destroyed that possibility.

**Xi Jinping is besieging himself**

The line from Li Qiaoming's removal to Zhong Shaojun's raid traces a clear arc of self-destruction. Xi has declared open war on the "red second generation," the children of revolutionary-era CCP founders who form a distinct power bloc within the Party and military. Zhang Youxia is more than a military commander; he is the spiritual figurehead of the red second generation's presence in the armed forces. By systematically purging Zhang's allies and even targeting his own former confidants (if those confidants shifted their loyalties or cut deals with the red second generation faction), Xi has made clear that his trust in this entire cohort has collapsed. He is forcing every general to declare allegiance, pushing the red second generation off the political stage, and, in doing so, cornering himself, because he, too, is a member of that same generation.

The dictator's isolation deepens. When even a secretary who served at your side for decades can be sacrificed, every remaining official understands the message: no one is protected. The inevitable result is a court of terrified subordinates. Stalin's pre-war officer purges offer the closest parallel: by the time he finished destroying his own military leadership, the Red Army was so hollowed out that it nearly collapsed when Germany invaded. Xi is reproducing the same dynamic, eliminating anyone with independent competence or loyalty to any institution other than himself, until no capable or willing servants remain.

Military morale is collapsing. Li Qiaoming was widely regarded as having played a critical role in securing Xi's position during a 2022 crisis. His reward was to be discarded without ceremony. This "use and discard" pattern will chill whatever

residual loyalty remains in the officer corps. When generals discover that absolute obedience to Xi Jinping does not guarantee survival, passive resistance and quiet mutiny become the rational response.

**Who wins after the purge?**

The 2026 "Two Sessions" will be a grim affair. Every empty seat in the delegate hall represents a career destroyed and a factional score settled. Xi Jinping believes that purging his way to security will consolidate his power. Every cut he makes, however, severs another pillar holding up the regime.

When the "barrel of the gun," China's military, no longer answers reliably; when the "barrel of the pen," the loyal secretaries and propagandists, become prisoners; when the red second generation and Xi Jinping reach a final break, this internal war, which may well continue through 2027, could mark the beginning of the CCP regime's terminal unraveling. The question is no longer whom Xi will purge next. It is whether the machine can keep running at all. The winners, ultimately, will be those with the courage and foresight to abandon the sinking ship.

## Xi Jinping's Fear of His Own Military Drives a High-Tech Surveillance Crackdown on China's Armed Forces

03 March 2026, Vision Times

The CIA's latest outreach to China's military ranks arrived in the form of a polished 95-second video, and it struck a nerve. Meanwhile, China's official military newspaper revealed plans to use artificial intelligence and big data to monitor soldiers at the grassroots level, confirming what many already suspected: the Chinese Communist Party fears its own army more than any foreign adversary. The dynamic echoes the Cold War, when a Soviet general's disgust with communist corruption led him to hand the United States 25 years of intelligence that helped end the standoff.

On Feb. 12, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a short recruitment video titled "Why Stand Up: To Save the Future." The video was aimed squarely at Chinese military personnel, and it demonstrated an intimate understanding of CCP internal politics.

The footage zeroed in on the anxieties of officers serving under Xi Jinping, China's top leader. "The leaders are really only protecting their own private interests," one line declared. "Anyone with real leadership ability will eventually be feared and ruthlessly destroyed." If Zhang Youxia, the vice chairman of China's top military command body, or Liu Zhenli, the military's joint staff chief, were to watch those lines, they would recognize the message instantly. Both were considered among the few genuinely competent military professionals remaining in the senior ranks.

The video avoided slogans. Instead, it appealed to something more personal: parenthood. "I can't let these madmen shape the world my daughter will grow up in," one voice said. "Choosing this path is how I fight for my family and my country." The screen then showed a computer displaying a "Contact the CIA" interface. A figure sat in a parked car in heavy rain, typing: "For the peaceful future of both our countries, I want to give you some important information." A license plate bearing the character for Anhui province flickered on screen, an apparent allusion to the late prime minister Li Keqiang, whose sudden death in 2023 remains surrounded by suspicion.

The details showed more than production quality. They showed that the CIA understands CCP factional politics at a granular level. A similar video released roughly a year earlier drew over 15 million views and, according to U.S. officials, generated new intelligence sources.

The more precise and emotionally resonant these videos become, the more anxiety they create inside the Party apparatus. CCP leaders know how many people within their own system feel trapped and persecuted by the very regime they serve. Many are looking for a way out.

Beijing's response: AI-powered surveillance of its own soldiers

The Party's answer came through the pages of the People's Liberation Army Daily, the CCP military's official mouthpiece. On Feb. 25, the paper published an article in its "ideological front" column under the headline "Using Technology to Advance the Modernization of Grassroots Military Governance." The article argued that "modernizing grassroots military governance" was essential to "solidifying the foundations of strengthening the military."

To most readers, "strengthening the military" suggests improving combat readiness. Inside the CCP's coded vocabulary, it means something different. A recent PLA Daily editorial stated openly that "political strength is the most fundamental kind of strength." In Party-speak, a "strong military" is one that obeys the Party unconditionally, defends CCP rule above all else, and, when the moment demands it, is willing to turn its weapons on the Chinese people, as it did during the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 4, 1989.

Strip away the bureaucratic language and the article's message is blunt: use high-tech surveillance to detect any sign of disloyalty within the ranks. Other passages confirmed this reading: "Building the military must start from the political perspective" and "all technology applications must serve the Party's absolute leadership over the military."

The CCP's obsession with controlling its own forces has deep roots. When the Soviet Communist Party collapsed, the Soviet military's refusal to intervene on behalf of the regime played

a decisive role. Beijing is determined to prevent the same scenario in China.
There is a Chinese proverb: "Chase the fish and they flee to the abyss; chase the birds and they fly to the deep forest." The harder you squeeze, the faster your quarry escapes.
No surveillance system, however "intelligent," can extinguish the desire for freedom. The Party's drive to turn every barracks into a digital panopticon will accelerate exactly the behavior it seeks to prevent. Officers and officials with a conscience, people who do not want their children to grow up inside a high-tech prison state, will face a clarifying choice. History shows that some of them will choose to act.
The Cold War precedent: General Polyakov and the power of conscience
During the Cold War, a Soviet military intelligence general named Dmitri Polyakov made exactly that choice. A two-star general in the GRU, Soviet military intelligence, Polyakov worked as a CIA source for 25 years. He provided the names of nearly 150 Soviet spies, 1,500 KGB and GRU operatives and staff, 25 crates of classified documents, Soviet cipher systems, spy recruitment methods, and intelligence transmission routes. The damage to Soviet intelligence was without parallel.
Former CIA Director James Woolsey called Polyakov the most valuable spy of the entire Cold War. "General Polyakov didn't just help us win the Cold War," Woolsey said. "He also prevented the Cold War from turning hot. His role was immeasurable."
A CIA officer who worked on Polyakov's case for 15 years recalled: "He made it clear he had to help us. Otherwise, the Soviet Union would win the Cold War, and that was something he could not bear."
Former CIA official Sandy Grimes described Polyakov as "a man of enormous courage… In the end, we won. The Cold War ended. The Soviet Union dissolved."
Polyakov was not motivated by money. He described himself as a Russian patriot, driven by revulsion at the corruption of the Communist Party elite. The CCP's current trajectory, a regime that surveils its own soldiers, purges its own generals, and builds digital cages around its own people, is producing the same conditions that turned Polyakov against the Soviet system. The question is not whether a Chinese Polyakov exists. It is how many there are, and when they will act.

## As US names official for Tibet policy, is it eyeing China, its minority groups or trade?

01 March 2026, SCMP

The United States has appointed a new official to oversee its policy on Tibet, a move analysts say signals Washington's interest in playing up the issue while dealing with Beijing.
The appointment is set against US President Donald Trump's cuts to foreign aid and global advocacy, as well as a strategic detente with Beijing.
On February 17, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that Riley Barnes, the assistant secretary for democracy, human rights and labour, would assume the role of US special coordinator for Tibetan issues, a role mandated by Washington's Tibetan Policy Act.
The announcement coincided with Losar, the Tibetan New Year.
Coming one year into Trump's second term, the appointment contrasts sharply with his first tenure – when Robert Destro was named to the role only in October 2020, with just three months to go before Trump left office.
Barnes' appointment comes at a sensitive time, just weeks before Trump's planned trip to China to meet President Xi Jinping in April.
Observers tend to view Trump as relatively indifferent to China's ethnic minority issues, showing little appetite for ideological confrontation with Beijing. This is particularly so during his second term, which has been marked by escalating trade and technology conflicts.

Barry Sautman, a specialist on China's ethnic minority groups and professor emeritus at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, argued that the appointment was likely to be "not in spite of, but because of" the coming visit.
"It is a reminder that the US can still deploy the Tibet issue, along with a host of other China-related issues, despite the marked weakening of the Tibetan emigre nationalist cause, and the weakening of Trump's position, due to his setback on the tariff issue, his alienation of US allies, etc," Sautman said.
Sautman said he viewed the move as part of a pattern in which Trump was engaging in ideological confrontation through proxies such as Rubio or trade hawk Peter Navarro, while he himself focused on transactional outcomes.
On February 18, the day after the appointment of Barnes, the Chinese foreign ministry declared that "the US' establishment of the so-called 'special coordinator for Tibetan issues' interferes with China's internal affairs, and China has never recognised it".
It said Tibet was an inseparable part of China and that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama must follow historical protocols and central government approval.
The current Dalai Lama has lived in exile in India since the People's Liberation Army crushed an armed uprising in Tibet in 1959. Beijing accuses him of being responsible for unrest in Tibet during the 1980s and in 2008 – allegations he denies.
Days before turning 90 last July, the Dalai Lama said his office alone would have the power to decide on his reincarnation, after previously

suggesting that his successor would be found outside China.
In a swift rejection of the plan, Beijing said the succession of the Dalai Lama must be in accordance with both tradition and Chinese law. Beijing insists that all reincarnations of senior Tibetan Buddhist monks require its approval and must be sought within China.
Barnes has held several senior positions at the State Department. He visited Dharamsala – the seat of the Tibetan government-in-exile – in 2019 and also last July for the Dalai Lama's 90th birthday.
In his inaugural remarks, delivered during the State Department's annual Losar reception in Washington, Barnes said one of his "top priorities" was to "advance US government efforts to preserve Tibetans' precious heritage".
However, observers raised doubts about the substance behind the rhetoric, citing the US' limited power and resources in this regard.
A Congressional staffer with expertise on the issue told the South China Morning Post on condition of anonymity that the appointment did not change the fact that Trump had "no interest in human rights or ethnic minority issues in China, or anywhere else".
During Trump's visit to Beijing in April, the issue was most likely to be "traded away" for a deal that "serves his personal interests", the staffer argued.
He said the special coordinator's rank had been downgraded since the previous Democratic administration, and that Barnes had less power to advocate for Tibetan rights against the East Asia bureau of the State Department, which prioritised maintaining the relationship with Beijing.
Barnes was also coming into the Tibet coordinator job "with fewer tools at his disposal", the staffer added, citing the Trump administration's elimination of USAID – Washington's main agency for foreign aid – and cuts to human rights and advocacy programmes.
During his second term, Trump has shrunk US foreign aid and programmes promoting democracy, sparking widespread debate about the US ceding ground to its adversaries.
Early last year, the administration moved to merge USAID into the State Department and cancel 83 per cent of its programmes. Funding for the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which operates Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America, was terminated.
The announcement of Barnes' appointment came shortly after the US Congress partially reversed some of the funding cuts.
On February 3, Congress approved the Fiscal Year 2026 National Security, Department of State and Related Programmes Appropriations Act, which restored US$653 million for USAGM and allowed Radio Free Asia to resume Mandarin, Tibetan and Uygur broadcasts via short wave.
The act also allocates at least US$10 million to NGO bodies supporting Tibetan culture, development and environmental efforts inside Tibet.
A further US$8 million is designated for programmes supporting Tibetan refugees and diaspora communities in India and Nepal. At least US$5 million is allocated to strengthen the Central Tibetan Administration – the official name of the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamsala. Up to US$1.5 million supports economic and capacity-building efforts for displaced Tibetans.
But the Congressional staffer raised concerns over implementation.
"While Congress did pass traditional funding levels for Tibetan programmes in fiscal year 2026, it is unclear whether these funds will reach Tibetan communities because of President Trump's position that he does not have to spend money that Congress approves," the staffer said.
The funding levels are also below those of previous years, and doubts persist over whether the administration will disburse the funds as intended.
Sautman said he remained sceptical of any tangible impact, as "no new approach to US engagement with the Tibet issue is apparent".
He argued that Barnes' rhetoric was a "cost-free substitute for diminished US government human rights funding".
Beijing would not be deterred by the US from insisting on its selection of the Dalai Lama, Sautman said.
Last Thursday, the official website China Tibet Online argued in a commentary that Barnes' appointment was a "political manoeuvre" following "failed" trade wars and tariff tactics.

The position, it said, functioned as a "hidden thorn" in Sino-US relations, revealing a long-term strategy to contain China by manipulating Tibet-related issues.
The editorial argued that the US adjusted its Tibet policy based on self-interest under the "America first" doctrine, offering token support to separatists when needing to pressure China while cutting them off when convenient.
"These so-called 'coordinators' are all stubborn anti-China hawks, whose primary goal is to prioritise American interests. The so-called claim of defending Tibetan interests is just a pretext," it said.

## China's problem is that Tibetans endure

01 March 2026, Sunday Guardian

China's problems with Tibet endure because Beijing is trying to solve a political and civilizational question with instruments of coercion, assimilation, and demographic engineering—tools that cannot manufacture legitimacy where none exists. The core reality is simple and immovable: Tibetans are not Chinese, and no amount of pressure, propaganda, or

“ethnic fusion” campaigns can turn a distinct people with their own history, language, faith, and memory into something they are not. Beijing’s policies can suppress, but they cannot transform.The Chinese state has spent seven decades insisting that Tibet is an inseparable part of China. Yet the intensity of its efforts betrays its insecurity. A territory that is truly secure does not require mass surveillance and grid-style policing, boarding schools designed to separate children from their families, restrictions on language, religion, and movement, criminalization of loyalty to one’s own culture, and a permanent military presence to enforce “stability”. These are not the hallmarks of confidence. They are the architecture of a government that knows it has not won the consent of the governed. Tibetans have never internalized Beijing’s narrative of belonging to the Chinese nation. Their sense of identity predates the People’s Republic by centuries and is rooted in Buddhism, the land, and the institution of the Dalai Lama. This identity is not a political slogan; it is a lived inheritance. It cannot be erased by decree.

Beijing’s strategy rests on the belief that identity is malleable if pressure is applied long enough. But the state misunderstands the nature of Tibetan resilience. Language is not just communication—it is worldview. Mandarin-language schooling, especially the boarding school system that now houses nearly a million Tibetan children, aims to produce a generation that thinks and dreams in Chinese. Yet Tibetan families continue to teach their children prayers, stories, and songs at home. Even when language is suppressed, cultural memory persists.

Religion cannot be nationalized. The Communist Party’s attempt to control monasteries, appoint reincarnate lamas, and dictate the future of the Dalai Lama misunderstands the spiritual authority of Tibetan Buddhism. Faith is not granted by the state, and legitimacy cannot be manufactured by political committees. The more Beijing interferes, the more Tibetans cling to their traditions.Demographic engineering cannot dissolve belonging. Large-scale migration of Han settlers into Tibetan areas has changed the urban landscape, but it has not changed Tibetan consciousness. Instead, it has deepened the sense of being colonized in one’s own homeland. Surveillance breeds defiance, not loyalty. The omnipresent security apparatus—cameras, checkpoints, informant networks—creates compliance, not conviction. Tibetans know the difference between silence and acceptance.

The Chinese government often frames Tibetans as backward minorities who must be “modernized.” But Tibetans have shown a remarkable ability to adapt without surrendering their identity. They use technology to preserve language, share teachings, and maintain community across borders. They keep alive the memory of a free Tibet through oral history, religious practice, and cultural continuity. Even inside Tibet, where expression is dangerous, the persistence of Tibetan identity is unmistakable. The state’s own internal documents—leaked over the years—acknowledge that Tibetans remain “ideologically resistant” and “politically unreliable.” Beijing’s campaigns are not failing because they are insufficiently forceful; they are failing because they target the wrong thing. You cannot coerce a people into forgetting who they are.

China’s Tibet problem is not a temporary challenge. It is structural, rooted in contradictions that cannot be reconciled through authoritarian means. A state that demands loyalty cannot tolerate a people whose spiritual leader lives in exile. A government that fears cultural difference cannot accept a civilization built on nonviolence, compassion, and monastic authority. A political system that equates unity with uniformity cannot coexist with a nation that insists on being itself.

As long as Beijing insists that Tibetans must become Chinese in order to be loyal, the conflict will remain unsolvable. Identity is not a policy variable. It is a truth people carry within them. China’s leaders often speak as if time is on their side—that with enough years, enough schools, enough surveillance, Tibetans will eventually assimilate. But history suggests the opposite. Cultures under pressure do not dissolve; they harden. Nations denied self-expression do not fade; they deepen their sense of purpose.

Tibetans have survived exile, occupation, and cultural assault. They have preserved their language, their faith, and their dignity. They have raised new generations who know exactly who they are.

China’s problem with Tibet is not that Tibetans resist. It is that Tibetans endure.