# TIBET DIGEST

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An Initiative for Developing Peace Studies




**Tibet Digest is a monthly publication curated by FNVA, offering comprehensive coverage of significant developments pertaining to Tibet, Chinese politics, and Sino-Indian relations as gleaned from various open-source media outlets.**

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# SUMMARY OF NEWS

## CCP'S TIBET POLICIES

### Executive Summary: CCP Policies and Developments in Tibet (April 2026)

The developments witnessed across Tibet during April 2026 suggest that Beijing's approach toward the region is entering a more entrenched and systematic phase. What is unfolding is no longer limited to conventional political control or security management. Instead, the policies now increasingly seek to reshape Tibetan society itself — economically, culturally, administratively, and psychologically — through a combination of state-led modernisation, ideological conditioning, infrastructural expansion, and regulatory intervention.

At the official level, the language remains centered on modernisation, ecological governance, development, and stability. Yet beneath these narratives lies a broader effort to integrate Tibet more deeply into the political and institutional framework of the Chinese state while steadily weakening traditional systems of social organisation and identity.

### Key Developments

#### Pressure on Nomadic Communities Intensifies

One of the most striking developments this month has been the renewed push targeting Tibetan nomadic life. Authorities in Golog expanded campaigns encouraging herders to send increasing numbers of yaks and sheep to state-linked slaughterhouses. Large teams of officials were reportedly dispatched across townships to promote state livestock policies and encourage compliance through subsidies, insurance schemes, and compensation mechanisms.

On paper, these policies are framed as measures to improve rural incomes and modernise pastoral economies. In practice, however, they appear to be accelerating a much deeper transformation. Years of fencing policies, grazing restrictions, livestock quotas, and land-use regulations have already weakened the traditional mobility of nomadic communities. Many families are now forced to rent grazing land or depend increasingly on state systems to sustain their livelihoods.

For many Tibetans, the concern is not simply economic. The nomadic way of life has historically been tied to social structures, religious values, and patterns of cultural continuity. The increasing shift toward sedentarisation and urban relocation is therefore viewed not merely as an economic adjustment, but as part of a larger attempt to alter the foundations of Tibetan life itself.

#### Urban Governance and Technological Administration

Lhasa's newly announced urban governance regulations mark another important shift. The regulations place strong emphasis on smart governance systems, integrated management platforms, environmental monitoring, and city-wide coordination mechanisms extending from municipal to village level.

Officially, these measures are presented as part of efforts to build a modern, resilient, and environmentally sustainable high-altitude city. However, they also reflect the growing role of technology in governance and social management across Tibet. The increasing integration of monitoring systems, data platforms, and administrative oversight suggests that urban modernisation is becoming closely linked with surveillance and centralised control.

#### Expansion of Ideological Education

Another significant development was the nationwide rollout of new national security textbooks for schools. The curriculum places strong emphasis on loyalty to the Communist Party, political obedience, and the idea that national security is inseparable from Party leadership.

The significance of this move lies not only in the content itself, but in the age at which such political messaging is now being introduced. Ideological education is increasingly beginning at the primary school level and continuing throughout higher education. In regions such as Tibet, where identity,

language, and religion remain politically sensitive issues, the education system is clearly being used not only to impart knowledge but also to shape long-term political outlooks and social attitudes.

### Railway Expansion and Economic Integration

China also highlighted the growing role of the Qinghai–Tibet Railway, which has now transported over 100 million tons of freight since its opening. Freight volumes continue to rise steadily, with further integration of rail lines connecting Lhasa, Shigatse, and Nyingchi.

The expansion of railway infrastructure is often presented as evidence of economic progress and connectivity. Yet the nature of the cargo itself reveals the broader strategic logic behind these developments. Construction materials, industrial supplies, and energy resources continue flowing into Tibet, while outbound freight is increasingly associated with mineral extraction and resource transport.

The railway network therefore serves several purposes simultaneously: economic integration, resource extraction, military mobility, and long-term administrative consolidation.

### Continued Political Consolidation

Official meetings and Party study sessions throughout April repeatedly stressed the importance of Xi Jinping Thought, "Chinese-style modernisation," and strict ideological discipline within Tibet's governance system. Senior officials emphasised the need for cadres to maintain the "correct view" of political performance and align closely with central Party directives.

Such messaging reflects continuing concern within the Party about discipline, loyalty, and administrative control, particularly in regions considered politically sensitive.

### Militarised Presence in Public Space

Videos circulating online showing armed Chinese patrols moving through the streets of Lhasa once again drew attention to the highly securitised environment that continues to define everyday life in Tibet. Soldiers carrying rifles and shields patrolled openly in heavily monitored urban areas already saturated with checkpoints and surveillance infrastructure.

While such displays are officially framed as routine security measures, they also serve a political function. The visible presence of force reinforces the message that stability in Tibet remains closely tied to constant security oversight.

## Analysis

Taken together, the developments of April 2026 point toward a broader pattern that has been evolving over many years but now appears increasingly consolidated.
The Chinese state is no longer simply governing Tibet through conventional administrative means. Rather, it is gradually restructuring the relationship between Tibetan society and the state itself. Economic dependency, technological governance, ideological education, urban planning, infrastructure expansion, and social regulation are all being woven into a single framework aimed at producing deeper political integration.

What makes the current phase particularly significant is the degree to which control is being normalised through everyday systems — schools, taxation, subsidies, insurance schemes, transport networks, and digital governance platforms. This creates a model where political authority becomes embedded not only in security structures, but in the routine mechanisms of daily life.

The transformation of nomadic communities is especially revealing in this regard. Policies framed as environmental management or economic modernisation are simultaneously weakening older systems of mobility, self-sufficiency, and cultural continuity. Similarly, the expansion of ideological education reflects growing concern within Beijing about shaping identity and political consciousness over the long term.

At the same time, the continued visibility of armed patrols and surveillance structures indicates that the leadership still views Tibet through a strong security lens. Despite decades of infrastructure investment and economic development, the state continues to rely heavily on coercive visibility and deterrence.

### Future Trajectory

Several broad trends are likely to intensify in the coming years.

First, the transformation of Tibetan pastoral life will probably continue through additional sedentarisation policies, livestock regulations, and administrative integration. Younger generations are likely to become increasingly tied to urban economies and state institutions.

Second, ideological education will almost certainly deepen further, particularly through schools, digital platforms, and political training programmes. Political loyalty and national security narratives are expected to remain central components of governance in Tibet.

Third, infrastructure expansion will continue to reshape Tibet strategically and economically. Railways, logistics hubs, and urban development projects are likely to support not only trade and resource extraction, but also military mobility and long-term state consolidation.

Finally, the security dimension is unlikely to recede. Surveillance systems, visible policing, and militarised public spaces will probably remain a permanent feature of governance in Tibet, even as the state simultaneously promotes narratives of modernisation and stability.

### Conclusion

The developments of April 2026 suggest that Tibet is entering a more deeply institutionalised phase of Chinese state control — one where governance extends far beyond security measures into the restructuring of society itself. Modernisation, development, and administrative reform are increasingly intertwined with ideological management, social regulation, and long-term integration into the Chinese state system. The result is a Tibet that is becoming more connected to China economically and institutionally, while at the same time undergoing profound changes in its traditional social structures, cultural practices, and relationship with political authority

## BUDDHISM IN TIBET

### Executive Summary: Religious Policy and Cultural Control in Tibet (April 2026)

The developments emerging from Tibet and related Chinese policy activity during April 2026 point toward a steadily intensifying campaign to reshape Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan cultural identity within the framework of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ideology. The direction of policy is becoming increasingly explicit: religion is expected not merely to coexist with the state, but to actively align itself with Party objectives, political loyalty, and the broader project of national integration.

What is particularly striking is that these developments are no longer confined to domestic policy alone. Alongside tighter controls inside Tibet, Beijing is also expanding efforts to shape international Buddhist networks, influence religious discourse abroad, and promote state-approved interpretations of Tibetan Buddhism beyond China's borders.

### Key Developments

#### Religious Heritage Sites Continue to Face Demolition and Reconfiguration

Fresh reports from Drago County have once again drawn attention to the destruction and repurposing of important Tibetan religious sites. Authorities were accused of converting the site of a demolished 99-foot Buddha statue into a horse-racing track, while new structures were reportedly built over the former Geden Buddhist School after its abrupt closure and demolition.

The Buddha statue, originally constructed with local approval and community donations, held deep spiritual significance for local Tibetans. Reports also indicate that a large Guru Rinpoche statue at a nearby monastery was destroyed under official orders.

The surrounding crackdown appears equally significant. Monks and local residents accused of sharing information externally were reportedly detained and sent for political "re-education," with some allegedly pressured into accepting blame for the destruction of religious artifacts. Comparisons with

Cultural Revolution-era campaigns have once again resurfaced among observers and Tibet-related media.

What stands out is not only the destruction itself, but the symbolic repurposing of sacred spaces. Religious sites are increasingly being transformed into politically neutral or state-controlled civic spaces, reflecting a broader effort to redefine the role of religion within Tibetan society.

**Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism Moves Into a More Structured Phase**

A major focus this month was the inspection tour conducted by Li Ganjie, the senior CCP official overseeing religious and minority affairs, across Tibetan areas of Gansu and Sichuan. During the visit, Li repeatedly emphasised the need to guide Tibetan Buddhism to "adapt to socialist society" and deepen the "Sinicization" of religion.

The language used during the tour was revealing:

* stronger Party supervision over monasteries,
* tighter management of monks,
* increased patriotic education,
* promotion of Mandarin-language learning,
* and alignment of religious teaching with state ideology.

Particular emphasis was placed on training "religious talent" proficient not only in Buddhist doctrine, but also in Chinese culture, laws, and political priorities.

The message from Beijing is becoming increasingly clear: Tibetan Buddhism is expected to evolve into a politically compliant institution operating firmly within the ideological boundaries defined by the Party. Religion is no longer viewed as an autonomous moral or spiritual sphere, but as something that must reinforce national unity and state stability.

**Mandarin Language Push Expands Deeply Into Monastic Life**

Another notable development was the growing emphasis on Mandarin instruction inside monasteries. Reports from Dordong Monastery in Nyingchi highlighted monks actively studying standard Chinese language alongside political concepts such as patriotism, ethnic unity, and legal awareness.

Official reporting framed this as modernisation and social adaptation. However, the broader implications are difficult to ignore. The promotion of Mandarin inside monasteries is part of a much wider effort to gradually shift Tibetan religious education away from Tibetan-language traditions and toward Chinese linguistic and political frameworks.

The long-term concern for many Tibetans is not simply bilingualism. Rather, it is the gradual displacement of Tibetan as the primary language of scholarship, monastic debate, scripture study, and religious transmission. Language, in this context, is inseparable from cultural continuity and religious identity.

**Education and Ideological Reorientation Continue to Deepen**

The emphasis on "strengthening education" for monks and religious figures also reflects broader CCP concerns about ideological management. Senior officials repeatedly stressed that religious practitioners must:

* safeguard national unity,
* support Party leadership,
* and align doctrine with contemporary Chinese political and cultural priorities.

This approach increasingly blurs the boundary between religious education and political training.

The recently passed Ethnic Unity and Progress Law appears to be providing the legal and ideological framework for many of these initiatives, especially in areas involving language policy, religion, and identity integration.

### China Expands Its Religious Influence Abroad

One of the more important external developments was the activity of the China Buddhist Association (CBA) in South Korea. Officially framed as Buddhist friendship diplomacy between China, Japan, and Korea, the visit also reflected Beijing's growing efforts to shape international Buddhist networks and influence discussions around religion and "social stability."

Critics noted that the CBA functions closely under CCP guidance and increasingly serves as a vehicle for promoting Beijing's political narratives internationally. Concerns were raised that religious diplomacy is being used not simply for cultural exchange, but also to normalise China's state-centered approach to religion and to support campaigns against religious groups viewed as politically problematic.

This reflects an important evolution in China's religious policy: Beijing is no longer focused only on controlling religion domestically, but is also attempting to shape the broader regional conversation on religion, legitimacy, and acceptable belief systems.

## Analysis

Taken together, the developments of April 2026 suggest that Beijing's approach toward Tibetan Buddhism is entering a more assertive and comprehensive phase.

Earlier periods of policy often focused primarily on security and suppression. The current phase appears more ambitious. The objective now seems to involve reshaping the institutional, linguistic, educational, and symbolic foundations of Tibetan Buddhism itself.

**Several trends stand out.**

First, religion is increasingly being absorbed into the logic of state governance. Monasteries are expected not only to avoid dissent, but to actively promote Party-defined values such as patriotism, ethnic unity, and political stability.

Second, language policy is becoming central to religious transformation. The growing use of Mandarin in monasteries is not simply practical adaptation; it is tied to the long-term restructuring of religious education and cultural transmission.

Third, the destruction and repurposing of religious sites reveal a deeper symbolic dimension to current policies. The issue is not only physical control, but the reshaping of public memory and religious space.

Finally, China's efforts abroad indicate growing confidence in exporting elements of its religious governance model internationally. Religious diplomacy is increasingly being integrated into Beijing's broader soft-power and influence strategies.

## Future Trajectory

Several likely trends are now becoming more visible.

**1. Deeper Institutional Control Over Monasteries**
Monasteries will likely face:

* stronger political supervision,
* expanded patriotic education,
* and tighter regulation of teaching, finances, and personnel.

**2. Expansion of Mandarin-Based Religious Education**

Mandarin instruction is likely to expand further within monastic institutions, potentially reshaping how future generations of monks study and communicate religious teachings.

**3. Continued Reconfiguration of Religious Space**

The demolition, repurposing, or redesign of religious sites may continue, particularly where large institutions or symbols are viewed as politically sensitive.

4. Integration of Religion Into National Security Frameworks

Religion will increasingly be treated not simply as a cultural issue, but as a component of state security, social management, and ideological stability.

**5. Greater International Activism by State-Linked Religious Bodies**

Organizations such as the China Buddhist Association are likely to play a larger international role in promoting Beijing's narratives on religion, Tibet, and social governance.

**Conclusion**

The developments of April 2026 suggest that Beijing's Tibet policy is moving beyond the management of dissent toward a broader effort to redefine the role of religion, language, and identity within Tibetan society. Tibetan Buddhism is increasingly expected to function within a framework shaped by political loyalty, ideological conformity, and state-defined national unity. At the same time, China is becoming more active in projecting these ideas internationally through religious diplomacy and institutional influence. The result is a profound transformation not only of religious administration, but of the cultural and intellectual foundations upon which Tibetan identity has historically rested.

# CCP POLITICS

## Executive Summary: CCP Political and Strategic Developments (April 2026)

The political developments emerging from China during April 2026 suggest a system entering a period of heightened internal tension, intensified ideological consolidation, and expanding securitisation across nearly every domain of governance. While Beijing continues to project confidence through legislative activism, military modernisation, technological ambition, and centralised political messaging, a closer reading reveals growing anxieties within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership over loyalty, internal cohesion, information control, and long-term regime security.

What stands out this month is the convergence of several parallel trends: widening military purges, increasing scrutiny of senior officials, deepening ideological indoctrination, stronger legal mechanisms for extraterritorial enforcement, and renewed emphasis on political loyalty inside both the armed forces and civilian institutions. Together, these developments indicate that Beijing is preparing not only for external strategic competition, but also for perceived internal vulnerabilities within the Party-state system itself.

## Key Developments

**1. Intensification of Military Purges and Political Rectification**

Perhaps the most significant development this month was the formal confirmation of the removal of nine senior PLA generals and three military-industrial officials for "serious violations of discipline and law." The scale and seniority of those targeted are striking:

* former commanders and political commissars from the Navy, Army, Air Force, Rocket Force, and Information Support Force, along with key figures from China's military-industrial complex.

At the same time, Xi Jinping launched a fresh political rectification campaign within the military, repeatedly emphasising ideological purity, Party loyalty, and the principle that "the Party controls the gun."

Official language around "false combat readiness" and "building the army through politics" strongly suggests that the campaign is not solely about corruption. Rather, it reflects deeper concerns about political reliability and factional loyalty within the PLA leadership.

What is particularly notable is that many of those removed were once considered closely linked to Xi Jinping's own networks or to powerful military patrons associated with earlier reforms.

**2. Growing Signs of Internal Elite Tension**

A series of reports surrounding figures such as Ma Xingrui, Li Xi, and senior security officials point toward possible instability or factional strain inside the upper layers of the CCP system. Although many allegations remain unverified, the broader pattern is difficult to ignore:
* prolonged disappearances,
* internal inspections,
* overlapping corruption probes,
* and growing scrutiny of individuals tied to strategic sectors or influential political networks.
The investigations appear increasingly concentrated around:

* political "gatekeepers,"
* elite patronage systems,
* and networks linked to economic power, Xinjiang governance, military industry, and provincial administration.
The discussions surrounding Ma Xingrui are especially revealing because they point to the possibility that anti-corruption investigations are evolving into broader political struggles involving competing factions and elite relationships.

**3. Expansion of National Security and Ideological Education**

China's rollout of national security textbooks across schools nationwide marks another important step in the institutionalisation of ideological governance. The curriculum embeds:

* loyalty to the Communist Party,
* political conformity,
* and state-defined security concepts into education from primary school onward.
The language used in the textbooks reinforces an increasingly important CCP principle: the security of the Party is inseparable from the security of the nation itself.
This reflects a broader shift in governance under Xi Jinping, where ideological management is no longer confined to Party cadres but is now being deeply integrated into education, social life, and youth formation.

**4. Expansion of Legal and Extraterritorial Tools**

China also introduced several significant legal and regulatory measures this month:

* new regulations against foreign "extraterritorial jurisdiction,"
* expanded legal mechanisms targeting overseas critics,
* and growing restrictions on cross-border digital access.

The newly enacted ethnic unity law is especially significant because it explicitly extends legal liability to overseas individuals or organisations accused of undermining China's "ethnic unity."
This effectively formalises aspects of China's transnational pressure tactics against:

* Tibetan,
* Uyghur,
* Mongolian,
* Hong Kong,
* and broader dissident communities abroad.
At the same time, intensified efforts to crack down on VPNs and cross-border internet access reveal Beijing's growing concern over uncontrolled information flows and external influence.

**5. Increasing Centrality of Science and Technology in Governance**

Another important trend is the rising prominence of scientists and technocrats within the Party's upper ranks. The number of leading academicians represented within the CCP Central Committee has increased sharply over the past decade.

This reflects Beijing's prioritisation of:

* artificial intelligence,
* aerospace,

* semiconductors,
* biotechnology,
* and advanced manufacturing as core pillars of national power.
At the same time, however, several scientists and military-industrial figures have also become targets of anti-corruption investigations, indicating that strategic sectors are now under especially close political scrutiny.

**6. Legislative Expansion of State Capacity**

The National People's Congress Standing Committee reviewed several major legislative revisions this month involving:

* prisons,
* national defense mobilisation,
* agriculture,
* water governance,
* healthcare security,
* and state-owned assets.
These are not isolated technical reforms. Collectively, they point toward a broader strengthening of state coordination over:

* strategic resources,
* wartime mobilisation,
* food security,
* water security,
* and economic management.
The revision of the National Defense Mobilisation Law is particularly noteworthy in the context of rising geopolitical tensions and military modernisation.

**7. Tightening Information and Social Control**

China's efforts to further restrict VPN usage and foreign digital access indicate a renewed push to harden the Great Firewall. Internal notices suggest that authorities are seeking tighter control over:

* international internet connections,
* proxy services,
* and unauthorised data channels.
The broader objective appears clear:
to reduce access to foreign narratives, independent reporting, and uncensored information at a time of growing economic pressure and political sensitivity.

**8. Emerging Signs of Public Frustration**

Although isolated, several incidents highlighted growing expressions of dissatisfaction:

* online circulation of anti-Xi complaint letters,
* protest slogans,
* and continued references to earlier dissent movements such as the Sitong Bridge protest and White Paper Movement.
These developments do not indicate organized opposition capable of challenging the state. However, they do suggest that frustration and political discontent continue to surface despite intense censorship and repression.

## Analysis

The developments of April 2026 point toward a CCP leadership increasingly focused on regime preservation through ideological tightening, institutional control, and pre-emptive security management.

Several deeper patterns are becoming clearer.

First, the military purges suggest that Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign has evolved into something much broader: a continuing effort to secure unquestioned political loyalty inside the armed forces. The

repeated emphasis on ideological purity implies concern not merely about corruption, but about trust and internal cohesion.

Second, national security is becoming the organising principle of governance itself. Education, law, cyberspace, ethnicity policy, religion, and economic planning are increasingly being framed through the lens of political security and regime stability.

Third, the Party appears deeply aware of vulnerabilities created by:

* slowing economic growth,
* elite corruption,
* information leakage,
* and geopolitical competition.

This may explain the simultaneous push for:

* stricter ideological discipline,
* greater surveillance,
* expanded legal tools,
* and tighter information control.

At the same time, Beijing is attempting to build long-term resilience through scientific modernisation, technological advancement, and stronger centralised planning. The growing role of scientists within the political system reflects the leadership's belief that technological capability will define China's future strategic position.

Yet the coexistence of modernisation and insecurity remains one of the defining contradictions of the current system. Even as China expands technologically and militarily, the leadership continues to display persistent anxiety about internal loyalty, political stability, and ideological control.

## Future Trajectory

Several trends are likely to intensify over the coming years.

### 1. Continued Military and Political Purges

Further investigations within:

* the PLA,
* defense industries,
* and provincial leadership structures are likely as Xi continues consolidating authority ahead of the 2027 Party Congress and PLA centenary goals.

### 2. Expansion of Security-Centered Governance

National security frameworks will increasingly shape:

* education,
* internet regulation,
* ethnic policy,
* religion,
* and economic governance.

### 3. Hardening of Information Controls

Restrictions on VPNs, foreign platforms, and cross-border communications are likely to deepen as Beijing seeks tighter narrative control.

### 4. Greater Focus on Technological Self-Reliance

Scientific and technological elites will continue gaining political influence, particularly in sectors tied to strategic competition with the United States.

**5. Increased Extraterritorial Pressure**

China will likely expand legal, diplomatic, and coercive tools targeting overseas critics, activists, and diaspora networks.

**6. Persistent Elite Uncertainty**

Despite outward stability, internal factional balancing and distrust within elite networks are likely to remain an enduring feature of CCP politics.

**7. For India**

The ongoing purges and political rectification campaigns inside the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), particularly within the People's Liberation Army (PLA), security services, and strategic industries, carry important implications for India's security environment and for the future trajectory of Beijing's Tibet policy. While much of the current turbulence appears internally focused, it nevertheless affects how China may behave externally, especially along sensitive frontier regions such as Tibet and the India–China border.

One important point is that the repeated purges inside the PLA do not necessarily indicate weakness in China's military capabilities. Rather, they suggest that Xi Jinping remains deeply concerned about political loyalty, command reliability, and factional discipline within the armed forces. The strong emphasis on "political rectification," "ideological purity," and ensuring that "the Party controls the gun" indicates that Beijing still views internal cohesion within the military as a strategic priority.

For India, this creates a more complex security environment. A leadership that is internally insecure can often become externally unpredictable. Historically, periods of political consolidation inside authoritarian systems have sometimes coincided with more assertive nationalism abroad, partly because external strength reinforces domestic legitimacy. This does not automatically mean military escalation, but it does increase the importance of carefully monitoring developments in Tibet and along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The PLA's ongoing restructuring also has operational implications. The purges have affected senior figures connected to the Rocket Force, Information Support Force, and wider military-industrial system — sectors closely tied to missile operations, cyber warfare, electronic warfare, logistics, and strategic support capabilities. Although instability at the top may create temporary disruptions, the broader trajectory of PLA modernisation is unlikely to slow. In fact, Xi may use the purges to create a more centralised and politically loyal military structure ahead of the PLA's centenary goals in 2027.

This is particularly relevant for India because Tibet remains central to China's western military posture. Railways, logistics corridors, airfields, surveillance systems, and dual-use infrastructure across the Tibetan Plateau continue to expand regardless of political turbulence in Beijing. If anything, internal insecurity may strengthen Beijing's determination to maintain uncompromising control over frontier regions considered strategically sensitive.

The implications for India–China dialogue are equally significant. One of the long-standing challenges in engaging the CCP system is that decision-making is increasingly centralised around Xi Jinping and a small core leadership circle. As political distrust within the system grows, Chinese officials may become even more cautious, rigid, and security-oriented in negotiations. This could narrow the space for flexibility in border talks or confidence-building measures.

At the same time, purges create uncertainty within bureaucratic and military chains of command. Officials facing political scrutiny tend to avoid taking risks or making independent decisions. This may slow meaningful progress in negotiations because local commanders and officials become more focused on political safety than diplomatic innovation. The result is often greater rigidity at the tactical level, even if both sides continue formal dialogue.

**8. For Tibet**

There is also an important Tibet dimension to the current political climate. The intensification of ideological control, patriotic education, Mandarin-language policies, and Sinicization campaigns in Tibet should not be viewed separately from broader CCP insecurity. Frontier regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang are often treated by Beijing as barometers of national stability and political control. When the

leadership feels pressure internally, it typically tightens control over peripheral regions rather than loosening it.

In this context, the current purges may indirectly reinforce harder policies in Tibet. A politically anxious leadership is unlikely to tolerate any space for alternative identities, religious authority, or perceived external influence in Tibet. This becomes especially important as Beijing increasingly links Tibet not only to domestic stability but also to strategic competition with India and the West.

The timing is also significant given the question of the Dalai Lama succession. A leadership already focused on internal loyalty and ideological discipline is likely to approach succession politics in Tibet with even greater sensitivity and securitisation. Beijing will most certainly intensify efforts to control religious institutions, shape narratives around reincarnation, and limit external influence from Dharamshala and the broader Tibetan exile community.

For India, this means Tibet will remain both a strategic and political issue in the coming years — not necessarily through open confrontation, but through:

* intensified infrastructure competition,
* information and narrative battles,
* cyber and influence operations,
* border pressure,
* and competing claims over legitimacy and stability in the Himalayan region.

The larger takeaway is that the CCP's internal politics can no longer be separated from frontier governance and external behaviour. The same leadership anxieties driving purges in Beijing are also shaping policies in Tibet, military modernisation, information control, and Beijing's posture toward neighbouring states, including India. As a result, developments inside the CCP increasingly carry direct implications for Himalayan security, border stability, and the future character of India–China engagement.

## Conclusion

The developments of April 2026 suggest that China is entering a phase where internal political consolidation, military restructuring, ideological tightening, and frontier governance are becoming increasingly interconnected. The widening purges within the PLA, security apparatus, and Party structures point not only to Xi Jinping's continued drive for centralised authority, but also to deeper concerns within the leadership regarding loyalty, cohesion, and long-term regime security. At the same time, Tibet is being drawn even more firmly into this broader political and strategic framework.

What is unfolding in Tibet can no longer be viewed in isolation as simply an ethnic or religious policy issue. The intensification of surveillance, Sinicisation campaigns, ideological education, language policies, and administrative integration reflects Beijing's growing determination to secure Tibet as both a political frontier and a strategic buffer. In periods of internal uncertainty, the CCP has historically tightened rather than relaxed its control over frontier regions, and current trends suggest that Tibet will remain central to this approach.

For India, these developments carry important implications. Tibet continues to underpin China's western military posture, border infrastructure expansion, and long-term Himalayan strategy. A more centralised and security-driven Chinese system may also become less flexible diplomatically, even while maintaining formal channels of dialogue. As Beijing increasingly links internal stability with frontier control, developments inside the CCP are likely to shape not only Tibet's future, but also the broader trajectory of Sino-Indian relations, border management, and strategic competition across the Himalayan region.

# PROTESTS AND DETENTIONS AND OTHER NEWS FROM TIBET AND THE PRC

## TIBET

### Executive Summary: Tibet, Religious Repression, and Strategic Integration (April 2026)

The developments emerging from Tibet during April 2026 reveal an increasingly hard-edged phase of Chinese policy in the region — one where political control, economic integration, ideological management, and security enforcement are becoming ever more tightly intertwined. The month's reports point not only to intensifying restrictions on religious life and freedom of expression, but also to a deeper effort to restructure Tibetan identity, weaken independent cultural space, and fold Tibet more completely into the strategic architecture of the Chinese state.

At the same time, the developments also highlight the growing strategic importance of Tibet itself. Infrastructure expansion, especially rail connectivity, continues to transform the plateau economically and militarily, while tighter controls on monasteries, language, online expression, and religious practice indicate Beijing's continuing concern that Tibet remains politically unresolved despite decades of state investment and security management.

### Key Developments

#### Religious Repression and Secret Sentencing Continue to Intensify

Several cases this month underscored the increasingly severe nature of political and religious repression in Tibet.

A senior monk, Dhargye, reportedly disappeared for years before his family learned that he had secretly been sentenced to seven years in prison. His alleged "offence" included making religious offerings to the Dalai Lama and assisting monks leaving Tibet. Authorities provided no public information regarding his trial, sentence, or place of detention.

Similarly, Tibetan writer and political prisoner Gangkye Drukpa Kyab, imprisoned for writings connected to the 2008 Tibetan protests, was reported to be in critical condition after years of alleged torture and mistreatment in prison. Tibetan activist Tsering Dolma was also reported to be suffering from severe physical deterioration following repeated detention and abuse.

The pattern visible across these cases is increasingly clear:

* enforced disappearances,
* secret sentencing,
* denial of due process,
* torture allegations,
* and criminalisation of ordinary religious or cultural activity.

The fact that religious offerings, language education, possession of photographs of the Dalai Lama, or online communication can now trigger severe punishment reflects the degree to which expressions of Tibetan identity are increasingly treated through the lens of state security.

#### Monasteries and Monks Remain Central Targets of State Control

The detention of monks Samten Gyatso and Jamyang Samten — reportedly held incommunicado for over a year — further illustrates the vulnerability of monasteries under current policies. Their alleged offences included sharing information online, possessing politically sensitive material on their phones, and maintaining digital communication networks.

At the same time, Chinese authorities intensified scrutiny of Tibetan livestreamers and online religious expression. Individuals discussing traditional Tibetan practices such as Sang Sol on social media reportedly faced interrogation and detention under internet and religious regulations.

This signals an important evolution in policy:

the state is no longer focused solely on controlling monasteries physically, but increasingly seeks to regulate digital religious space and online Tibetan social interaction.

**Language and Cultural Identity Continue to Face Pressure**

The release of Tibetan language activist Yeshe Sangpo after serving 18 years in prison again highlighted the long-standing tension surrounding Tibetan language rights. He had originally been imprisoned after leading protests demanding protection for Tibetan language education. Reports indicate he emerged from prison in fragile health.

Meanwhile, cases such as the sentencing of Tibetan teacher Palden Yeshe for organizing Tibetan language classes reinforce concerns that educational and linguistic preservation efforts are increasingly viewed as politically sensitive.

These developments suggest that language remains one of the core battlegrounds in Tibet. The issue is no longer merely cultural preservation; for Beijing, language, education, and identity are increasingly linked to political loyalty and national integration.

**Expansion of Infrastructure and Strategic Connectivity**

China continued highlighting the success of the Qinghai–Tibet Railway, emphasizing the enormous growth in freight transportation into and out of Tibet. Official data showed that cargo throughput has risen dramatically since the railway opened in 2006, with outbound freight growing especially rapidly.

**The railway's strategic significance extends far beyond transport:**

* it supports large-scale resource extraction,
* strengthens military logistics,
* facilitates demographic and economic integration,
* and deepens administrative control over Tibet.

Reports this month also focused on the extraordinary engineering challenges of the railway itself, including its oxygen-supplied train systems, permafrost engineering, and high-altitude infrastructure. While presented internationally as a triumph of Chinese engineering, the railway simultaneously represents one of Beijing's most important strategic instruments in Tibet.

The continued expansion of rail networks linking Lhasa, Shigatse, and Nyingchi further reinforces Tibet's growing integration into China's broader economic and military system.

**Expansion of Political Narratives and International Messaging**

China also launched new international documentary and media projects centered on the Long March and revolutionary history. While not directly Tibet-focused, such initiatives reflect Beijing's broader effort to shape international narratives about China's political legitimacy, historical trajectory, and governance model.

This increasingly forms part of a larger ideological competition in which Tibet remains highly sensitive internationally.

## Analysis

The developments of April 2026 point toward a Tibetan policy framework that is becoming simultaneously more technologically sophisticated, more ideological, and more securitized.

**Several important patterns stand out.**

First, Tibet continues to be governed fundamentally as a political-security issue rather than simply an ethnic or developmental region. The repeated use of secret trials, enforced disappearances, prolonged detention, and restrictions on ordinary religious practices suggests that Beijing still sees independent Tibetan identity as a potential challenge to long-term political stability.

Second, the Party's approach increasingly targets the mechanisms through which Tibetan identity reproduces itself:

* monasteries,
* language,
* education,
* digital communication,
* and the relationship between religious teachers and followers.
This marks a shift from reactive repression toward long-term social and cultural restructuring.

Third, infrastructure expansion must be understood not only economically, but strategically. Railways, logistics hubs, and high-altitude engineering projects are central to China's long-term military and administrative consolidation of Tibet. The Qinghai–Tibet Railway in particular has transformed Beijing's ability to move personnel, equipment, resources, and goods across the plateau at scale.

The combination of hard security measures with infrastructure-led integration reflects a broader dual-track strategy:
coercive control alongside deep state penetration through development and connectivity.

## Implications for India and Regional Security

**For India, these developments carry direct strategic significance.**

Tibet remains the geographic foundation of China's western military posture and its broader Himalayan strategy. Expanding rail connectivity, logistics infrastructure, and dual-use transport networks increase the PLA's long-term operational flexibility along the India–China frontier. The continued strengthening of rail and freight systems into Tibet improves China's ability to sustain rapid troop movement, equipment deployment, and logistical support across high-altitude regions.

At the political level, the tightening repression inside Tibet also reflects Beijing's continuing sensitivity regarding frontier stability. A leadership preoccupied with internal control often becomes more rigid externally, especially in regions tied to sovereignty and territorial legitimacy. This has implications for:

* border negotiations,
* military confidence-building,
* and broader India–China engagement.

The ideological tightening surrounding Tibetan Buddhism and the Dalai Lama issue is also likely to become increasingly important as succession questions approach. Beijing's determination to control religious institutions, language, and monastic systems suggests that the future contest over legitimacy in Tibetan Buddhism may become even more politically charged in the coming years.

For India — home to the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamshala — this issue will remain deeply intertwined with both bilateral relations and Himalayan security dynamics.

## Future Trajectory

Several broad trends are likely to intensify.

### 1. Continued Criminalisation of Religious and Cultural Expression

Religious devotion, language preservation, and independent education initiatives will likely face increasing legal and political pressure.

### 2. Expansion of Digital Surveillance

Monitoring of phones, online activity, livestreaming, and social communication inside Tibet is likely to become more systematic and technologically advanced.

### 3. Further Strategic Integration Through Infrastructure

Railways, highways, logistics corridors, and dual-use infrastructure will continue expanding, reinforcing both economic extraction and military mobility.

### 4. Deepening Ideological Management

Political education and Sinicization campaigns inside monasteries and schools are likely to intensify further, especially around language and religious training.

**5. Increased International Sensitivity Around Tibet**

As questions surrounding the Dalai Lama succession draw closer, Tibet is likely to become an increasingly sensitive issue not only domestically for China, but also internationally and in Sino-Indian relations.

### Conclusion

The developments of April 2026 suggest that Tibet is entering an even more deeply securitised and strategically integrated phase under Chinese rule. Political repression, ideological restructuring, infrastructure expansion, and surveillance are no longer separate policy strands; they are increasingly operating together as part of a broader state project aimed at reshaping Tibet politically, culturally, and strategically. At the same time, the growing importance of Tibet to China's military logistics, frontier security, and national integration strategy means that developments inside Tibet will continue to carry implications far beyond the plateau itself — particularly for India, Himalayan stability, and the wider regional balance in Asia.

## PRC

### Executive Summary: Political Control, Ideological Expansion, and Systemic Pressures in China (April 2026)

The developments emerging from China during April 2026 point toward a political system becoming simultaneously more technologically sophisticated, more ideologically intrusive, and more security-driven. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues expanding its mechanisms of social control beyond traditional political dissent into increasingly personal, cultural, educational, and even spiritual domains. At the same time, signs of structural strain are becoming more visible beneath the surface of state confidence — including economic slowdown, demographic pressure, public health controversies, debt burdens, and growing anxieties over ideological loyalty.

A notable feature of this month's developments is the widening definition of what constitutes a political or ideological threat. The state's focus is no longer confined to organised political opposition. Increasingly, independent religious life, informal social networks, self-improvement communities, underground churches, online behaviour, artistic expression, and even children's education are being brought within the scope of political management and ideological supervision.

Together, these developments reveal a CCP leadership that sees long-term stability as dependent not only on economic growth or security capacity, but on shaping thought, identity, belief systems, and social behaviour at every level of society.

### Key Developments

**Expansion of Ideological Governance and Religious Control**

One of the clearest trends this month was the continuing expansion of ideological supervision into religious and cultural life.

Multiple reports highlighted growing pressure on underground Catholic communities following the 2018 Vatican-China agreement. Human Rights Watch and other observers noted intensifying surveillance, forced registration into state-controlled religious bodies, restrictions on children attending churches, and ideological monitoring of clergy.

The reports suggest that Beijing increasingly views religion not merely as a faith issue, but as a question of political loyalty and state authority. The concept of "Sinicization" continues to evolve beyond cultural adaptation into a system requiring religious institutions to align politically and ideologically with CCP priorities.

What is especially striking is the widening scope of ideological campaigns:

* children are being targeted through anti-religious education in schools,
* independent spiritual groups are being criminalised,
* and informal social organisations are being framed as threats to state security.

The campaign against the "Create Abundance" movement is particularly revealing. Although not conventionally religious, the group was treated as ideologically dangerous because it created independent networks of meaning, emotional support, and community outside Party control.

This suggests that the CCP's concern is no longer simply religion itself, but any autonomous space capable of generating loyalty, identity, or influence outside state supervision.

**Expansion of Surveillance into Everyday Life**

Reports this month also highlighted the normalisation of mass surveillance technologies in ordinary daily life.

Facial recognition systems are now reportedly being used to automatically fine ordinary citizens for minor infractions such as bicycle violations, often without direct police interaction.

The significance of this development lies not in the fines themselves, but in what they represent:
a transition from targeted surveillance of political threats toward continuous monitoring of the general population.

Combined with:

* digital identity systems,
* mobile payment tracking,
* internet censorship,
* and AI-assisted monitoring,
China appears to be moving steadily toward a deeply integrated model of predictive social governance.

The growing invisibility of enforcement is also important. Surveillance is increasingly becoming automated, decentralised, and embedded into ordinary urban life rather than visibly coercive

**Suppression of Alternative Thought and Expression**

Several cases this month reflected the CCP's expanding intolerance toward independent intellectual, artistic, or spiritual expression.

The trial of dissident artist Gao Zhen over satirical sculptures of Mao Zedong drew concern from the United Nations human rights office, particularly because the law under which he was prosecuted reportedly did not exist when the artworks were created.

Similarly, the continued repression of Falun Gong practitioners and independent spiritual communities points toward the Party's enduring sensitivity regarding belief systems outside state supervision.

What emerges is a system where:

* ideology,
* political loyalty,
* and state-defined historical narratives are becoming increasingly inseparable.

**Economic Pressures and Structural Slowdown**

Although political control remains the dominant theme, several reports highlighted mounting structural pressures inside China's economy.

China's long-running urban metro expansion boom appears to be slowing sharply as local governments struggle with:

* debt burdens,
* collapsing land-sale revenues,
* and weakening demographic growth.

Even major cities such as Shenzhen and Guangzhou reportedly face difficulties securing approval for large-scale subway expansions.

This matters because infrastructure construction has long served as:

* an economic stimulus tool,
* a source of political legitimacy,
* and a mechanism for local government financing.

The slowdown reflects broader challenges linked to:

* the property sector crisis,
* aging demographics,
* and rising fiscal strain.

**Reassessment of the Zero-COVID Legacy**

A particularly important development was the publication of research suggesting that the abrupt end of China's Zero-COVID policy may have resulted in between 1.4 and 2.5 million excess deaths among elderly citizens.

The study's methodology — using elite mortality data due to the absence of reliable official statistics — highlights continuing concerns over transparency inside the Chinese system.

Politically, the issue remains highly sensitive because it directly touches on:

* Xi Jinping's personal leadership,
* the legitimacy of state crisis management,
* and public trust in official narratives.

The report also reinforces a broader theme visible across multiple sectors:
the tendency of highly centralised systems to implement abrupt policy reversals once political priorities shift.

**Science, Technology, and Strategic Ambition Continue to Advance**

At the same time, China continued demonstrating major technological and scientific ambitions.

Notable developments included:

* record-breaking Antarctic drilling capabilities,
* advances in yak cloning technologies in Tibet,
* and continued investments in frontier scientific research.

These projects reflect Beijing's long-term emphasis on:

* biotechnology,
* climate science,
* polar capabilities,
* and strategic technological self-reliance.

China's Antarctic drilling achievement is particularly significant because polar research increasingly intersects with:

* climate influence,
* strategic resource access,
* and geopolitical positioning in emerging global commons.

## Analysis

The developments of April 2026 suggest that China is moving deeper into a governance model where political security overrides nearly all other considerations.
Several interconnected patterns stand out.

First, ideological management is expanding far beyond traditional politics. The CCP increasingly seeks to regulate:

* values,
* belief systems,
* historical memory,
* emotional communities,
* and even children's moral education.

This reflects a leadership deeply concerned not only with overt opposition, but with the emergence of independent social space itself.

Second, surveillance is becoming normalised and internalised. China's evolving model increasingly relies less on visible coercion and more on automated systems that quietly shape behaviour through continuous monitoring and digital enforcement.

Third, despite the state's technological confidence, underlying economic and demographic pressures are becoming harder to conceal. Slowing infrastructure expansion, local debt burdens, demographic decline, and lingering distrust surrounding public health transparency all point toward structural challenges that could shape governance in the coming decade.

At the same time, Beijing continues investing heavily in science, biotechnology, polar research, and frontier technologies — sectors viewed as essential to long-term national power and strategic competition with the United States.

The coexistence of technological ambition and political insecurity remains one of the defining characteristics of the current Chinese system.

## Implications for Tibet, India, and the Region

Many of the trends visible across China are directly relevant to Tibet and India.

The expansion of surveillance, ideological education, religious Sinicization, and social management across China mirrors policies already deeply entrenched in Tibet and Xinjiang. In many respects, frontier regions continue to function as testing grounds for governance methods later expanded nationwide.

For India, the growing fusion of technology, nationalism, and centralised security governance in China carries long-term strategic implications:

* cyber and digital influence capabilities,
* tighter frontier management,
* more integrated state surveillance systems,
* and stronger infrastructure coordination.

China's advances in polar research, biotechnology, and high-altitude scientific capabilities may also carry indirect strategic relevance for the Himalayan region over time.

At the political level, a leadership increasingly focused on ideological discipline and internal security may also become less flexible in dealing with sensitive external disputes, including the India–China border issue and Tibet-related concerns.

## Future Trajectory

Several trends are likely to deepen over the coming years.

### 1. Further Expansion of Ideological Governance

Political supervision will increasingly extend into:

* education,
* religion,
* online culture,
* mental health spaces,

* and civil society.

**2. Growth of Automated Surveillance**

AI-driven facial recognition, digital identity systems, and predictive monitoring are likely to become even more deeply integrated into everyday governance.

**3. Continued Pressure on Independent Religious and Social Networks**

The definition of ideological threat is likely to keep widening beyond formal political dissent.

**4. Slower Infrastructure Expansion but Greater Strategic Investment**

China may reduce broad infrastructure expansion while concentrating investment in strategically important sectors and regions.

**5. Increasing Sensitivity Around Historical Narratives**

The Party is likely to tighten further control over history, memory, and artistic expression as legitimacy concerns grow.

## Conclusion

The developments of April 2026 reveal a Chinese political system that is becoming more intrusive, more technologically embedded, and more ideologically expansive. The CCP is no longer focused solely on suppressing organised political opposition; it is increasingly attempting to shape the social, moral, religious, and intellectual environment in which Chinese citizens live. At the same time, beneath this expanding system of control lie visible structural pressures — economic slowdown, demographic strain, public distrust, and concerns over long-term stability. The result is a China that appears outwardly powerful and technologically advanced, yet increasingly governed through a lens of insecurity, ideological management, and permanent political vigilance.

# CPC'S TIBET POLICIES

## New State Mandates Drive Record Numbers of Nomadic Livestock Toward Industrial Slaughter

24 April 2026, Tibet Times



*Tsadha County Nomad in haixi mongolian and Tibetan autonomous prefecture, Qinghai province*

In 2026, the Chinese authorities launched campaigns to push local population to sell nomadic livestocks to slaughterhouses in the Tibetan region of Gade County, Golog Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and intensified efforts to publicize the distribution of government incentives and subsidies.

According to official news published online by the Chinese authorities on 6th April, in order to intensify the promotion of policies mandating Tibetan nomads and farmers to send their livestocks such as yaks and sheep to slaughterhouses, the so-called Gade County Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Water Conservancy, and Science and Technology Bureau of Golog Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture dispatched 100 officials to six townships and one town. These officials held meetings aimed at *"boosting public awareness and participation in the 2026 county-wide livestock off-take policies, intended to drive high-quality pastoral growth and stabilize rural incomes."* Emphasizing government incentives and subsidies, the campaign encourages residents to scale up the sale of cattle and sheep to slaughterhouses throughout the county.

Years of Chinese government policies—specifically the partitioning and fencing of grasslands based on household size—have triggered acute pasture shortages. As a result, Tibetan nomads are now routinely forced to rent summer and winter grazing lands just to sustain their herds. Beyond these land constraints, the mandate to send vast numbers of livestock to slaughter annually has decimated the livelihood of nomadic families, forcing them to abandon their way of life and move to urban areas. This trajectory highlights the underlying objective of state policy: the systematic displacement and forced urbanization of Tibetan nomadic communities.

Regarding the recent situation in Golog, Tibet, a local Tibetan source informed Tibet Times, "For

several years now, the Chinese government has been forcing farmers and nomads in many parts of Tibet to send livestock to slaughterhouses. This is done, on one hand, to eliminate the native Tibetan way of life and, on the other, to trample upon the religious beliefs of the rural population." The source went on to state, "While a policy mandating livestock slaughter has been in effect for years, few locals comply; instead, Tibetans continue the practice of 'life release,' choosing to liberate animals destined for the slaughterhouse."

For local herders and farmers, obtaining government subsidies and compensation money is a complex and difficult process that demands meticulous record-keeping. In cases where livestock are killed by wolves or die of other causes, claimants must provide clear proof of identity, including ear tags and registration certificates. Additionally, the animal's head or the microchip embedded beneath its skin must be presented. Only after these requirements are met —and the remaining meat and hide are surrendered to the government—can the so-called subsidy finally be collected.

Currently, in the nomadic counties of Ngaba, Tibet, a mandatory tax of 26 yuan is charged per head of yak, regardless of age or size. In the event of a loss and death of livestock, the government provides 2,000 yuan for a mature yak and 1,000 yuan for a younger one. However, if a yak is killed by wolves or other predators, a reduced subsidy of 500 yuan is issued, provided the owner can produce the animal's head as proof.

Similarly, in the Golog region of Tibet, the tax burden on nomadic households includes the annual surrender of two to three yaks as a livestock tax, on top of an annual fee of 18 yuan per head. All yaks covered by these payments are fitted with official ear tags. If a tagged animal dies, the government provides a payout of 2,000 yuan per head, categorized as a "state subsidy."

In 2023, a branch of China's Ping An Insurance Company conducted a month-long visit through Driru County in Nagchu, Tibet, ear-tagging over 160,000 yaks. They implemented a system requiring herders to pay a 150-yuan premium per head in exchange for 5,000 yuan in coverage per deceased animal. Reports indicate that although 236 yaks were identified as ill during registration, timely medical intervention limited the losses to 100 head. Additionally, the region enforces a tiered housing tax: households in stable financial standing pay 35 yuan annually, while those categorized as impoverished under government assistance pay a reduced rate of 16 yuan.

Furthermore, in Central and Western Tibet, taxes are levied on farmland, residential plots, and livestock. An annual fee of 15 yuan is charged per head of cattle; should an animal die, a 5,000-yuan payout is issued provided the identity can be verified. Regarding housing and land taxes, payments are mandatory only when the property size exceeds specific government-mandated thresholds.

Since approximately 2000, the Chinese government has mandated that nomadic households pay annual taxes on milk, meat, and grazing land based on family size, though these regulations have undergone significant shifts.

Today, tax structures for farmers and herders vary across Upper, Lower, and Central Tibet, covering livestock, farmland, and housing. In exchange for these payments, the state issues what is termed a "subsidy." Ultimately, this system has positioned the government as the de facto owner of the natural environment and the livestock within it, reducing farmers and nomads to mere caretakers of state-owned animals and grasslands.

According to the independent UN expert on January 2026 "Between 2000 and 2025 some 3.36 million Tibetans have been affected by government programmes requiring them to rebuild their house for nomads to become sedentary, whilst official statistics say that around 930,000 rural Tibetans have been relocated through either whole village relocation or individual household relocations"

As per 2024 Human Rights Watch report on Tibetan relocation policies (2000–2025), at least 930,000 Tibetans were slated for resettlement. From 2016 to the present, over 709,000 Tibetans (76%) have already been forced to move. This includes more than 140,000 people forcefully relocated as entire village units and over 567,000 individual households subjected to forced displacement. The report underscored that by 2025, these relocation and construction policies would have placed the livelihoods of approximately 2.1 million Tibetan nomads at critical risk.

Beginning around 1950, the Chinese Communist government launched its invasion from eastern Tibet, marked by the widespread seizure and looting of livestock and private property. By 1958, the state enforced collectivization across the Amdo region, establishing village cooperatives to manage state-owned animal husbandry. This shifted again around 1983, when livestock and assets were privatized and redistributed to households based on village populations. Allotments varied by locality: in some areas, individuals received six yaks and a horse; in others, ten yaks each; and elsewhere, twenty yaks per person with one horse shared between two people. Farmland was similarly redistributed on a per-capita basis.

## Lhasa to modernize urban governance with landmark regulations

23 April 20206, Kangba TV Lhasa, the capital of Southwest China's Xizang autonomous region, announced on Monday that its first comprehensive

regulations on urban management will take effect on May 1.

Marking this as a major legislative milestone for the plateau city, the regulations are designed to modernize urban management by addressing city appearance, environmental protection, water and gas supply, green space planning, and parking facilities.

The document defines responsibilities across government levels and departments to foster synergy and establish an effective framework for localized urban management.

A cornerstone of the regulations is the integration of smart technology to improve governance. The city plans to establish a dedicated operations and management service platform that will incorporate advanced monitoring, early-warning systems, and command and dispatch functions.

Reflecting Lhasa's unique cultural identity, the regulations prioritize preserving regional heritage and biodiversity. Municipal facilities and green spaces will be designed to emphasize local ethnic characteristics, with native plant species used to safeguard the area's natural environment.

Sonam Gyatso, deputy director of Lhasa's justice bureau, highlighted the regulations' comprehensive approach of combining political leadership with systematic governance. "Under the new framework, urban management responsibilities will span city, county, township, and village levels, emphasizing community participation alongside government oversight," he said.

"Additionally, the document introduces forward-looking initiatives such as urban health evaluations, sponge city construction, and enhanced waste management practices," he said, adding that these measures aim to strengthen the city's resilience against environmental challenges while improving the quality of life for residents.

The adoption of these regulations signals a significant step forward for Lhasa's urban governance as it aligns with broader national efforts to promote innovation, sustainability, and modernization. It provides a legal foundation to drive the city's vision of becoming a livable, resilient, and intelligent high-altitude metropolis.

## Yan Jinhai: Making Due Contributions to the Construction of a New Socialist Modern Tibet by the People's Congress

18 April 2026 xzxx

Yan Jinhai emphasized at the third (expanded) study session of the Party Group Theoretical Learning Center of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of the Autonomous Region in 2026

Performing its duties in accordance with the law and actively taking responsibility, the People's Congress shall make its due contribution to the construction of a socialist modern new Tibet.

Lhasa, April 17 (Reporter Tsering Pianduo) – On April 16, Yan Jinhai, Deputy Secretary of the CPC Lhasa Municipal Committee and Secretary of the Party Group and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Lhasa Municipal People's Congress, presided over the 3rd (expanded) study session of the 2026 Theoretical Learning Center Group of the Party Group of the Standing Committee of the Lhasa Municipal People's Congress. The session focused on studying and discussing Xi Jinping's economic thought and General Secretary Xi Jinping's important expositions on Chinese-style modernization. Members of the Party Group of the Standing Committee of the Lhasa Municipal People's Congress delivered speeches.

Yan Jinhai pointed out that General Secretary Xi Jinping attaches great importance to economic work, putting forward a series of new concepts, new ideas, and new strategies, leading my country's economic development to achieve historic achievements and undergo historic changes, forming Xi Jinping's economic thought, which provides solid theoretical support and a guide for action for Chinese-style modernization. We must stand at the height of firmly upholding the "two establishments" and resolutely achieving the "two safeguards," and study, implement, and put into practice Xi Jinping's economic thought, especially the General Secretary's important expositions on Chinese-style modernization, so as to effectively enhance our political, ideological, and practical consciousness in safeguarding the construction of a socialist modernized new Tibet.

Yan Jinhai emphasized the need to appreciate the power of thought and to deeply study and implement the new ideology. He stressed the importance of profoundly understanding the immense power of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, especially Xi Jinping's economic thought, grasping its comprehensiveness, understanding its innovative theoretical breakthroughs, and comprehending its precise practical orientation. He urged everyone to accumulate momentum through learning and transform that momentum into action, truly arming their minds, guiding practice, and driving work forward. He also emphasized leveraging Tibet's advantages to build on past achievements and create a new future. Following the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and the work requirements of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee, he called for fully utilizing Tibet's political, policy, resource, and late-mover advantages, demonstrating unwavering determination and pioneering spirit, and striving to write a new chapter in the modernization of Tibet with Chinese characteristics. Finally, he stressed the need to shoulder the responsibilities of the People's Congress and perform its duties

according to law to safeguard the new journey. We must ensure that legislation is fully adapted to modernization, give full play to the leading role of the People's Congress in legislative work, accelerate the formulation and improvement of local regulations with Tibetan characteristics, and provide a stable and transparent legal environment for the reform and development of the entire region; we must promote close integration of supervision with modernization, conduct supervision in accordance with the overall requirements and goals of the region's economic work, comprehensively utilize methods such as listening to reports and conducting research to understand the actual situation and effectiveness, and carefully examine the government's "economic accounts" and safeguard the people's "purses"; we must support deputies in offering suggestions for modernization, organize deputies to go deep into industrial parks and enterprises to listen to their demands, and guide deputies to actively offer suggestions on industrial development, rural revitalization, and project planning, so as to make due contributions to the construction of a socialist modern new Tibet.

Xu Chengcang, Jiang Bai, Tang Mingying, and Liu Guangxu, members of the Party Leadership Group of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of the Autonomous Region, attended the meeting.

## Lai Jiao: Make every effort to ensure the centralized rectification work is effective.

18 April 2026, xzxx

Lai Jiao emphasized at the meeting on the deployment of the centralized rectification work of learning and education on establishing and practicing the correct view of performance in the autonomous region

Focusing on key issues and adhering to rigorous standards, we are making every effort to ensure that the centralized rectification work is implemented effectively.

Lhasa, April 17 (Reporter Tsering Pianduo) – On April 17, the Tibet Autonomous Region held a meeting to deploy a concentrated campaign to promote the study and implementation of a correct view of performance evaluation. The meeting focused on studying and implementing the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping's important speeches and instructions, and made arrangements for the concentrated campaign across the region. Lai Jiao, member of the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee and Minister of the Organization Department, attended and delivered a speech.

Lai Jiao pointed out that the centralized rectification is an important measure for carrying out the study and education campaign. Party organizations and leading cadres at all levels throughout the region should take the centralized rectification as a practical action to firmly uphold the "two establishments" and resolutely achieve the "two safeguards," and, in accordance with the deployment of the Autonomous Region Party Committee, raise their political stance, strengthen their ideological and behavioral awareness, and earnestly and resolutely rectify outstanding problems.

Lai Jiao emphasized the need for a problem-oriented approach, firmly grasping the key objectives of the centralized rectification campaign, clarifying the responsible parties, completion deadlines, and acceptance standards, and ensuring targeted efforts and a closed-loop process. He stressed the importance of ensuring all parties fulfill their responsibilities, with principal leaders personally deploying, coordinating, and supervising the campaign, and all relevant departments working together efficiently. He also emphasized the need for open rectification, actively accepting public supervision, and using public approval and satisfaction as the fundamental standard for evaluating effectiveness. Furthermore, he stressed the importance of addressing both the symptoms and root causes, rigorously rectifying current problems while establishing long-term mechanisms to consolidate the results. He called for strengthened supervision and accountability, seriously urging rectification of those who fail to address issues or are perfunctory, ensuring the effectiveness of the centralized rectification campaign through a rigorous and pragmatic approach. Finally, he emphasized the need for integrated learning, investigation, and rectification, transforming the results of the learning and education into a powerful force for achieving a good start to the "15th Five-Year Plan" and building a new socialist modern Tibet.

## New textbooks introduced to inculcate Chinese students with party-state ideology

18 April Tibetan Review

In China, the party is the state and the state the party. In order to drive this message home, the party-state has introduced new school textbooks even as existing teaching materials are already heavily saturated with political indoctrination materials that scuttle independent thinking and discussion.

Students in China are now required to learn to be loyal to the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) right from elementary school, and all the way till high school, with the introduction of national security text books rolled out recently, according to *theepochtimes.com* Apr 17.

The four-volume series, titled “National Security Education Readers for Primary and Secondary Students,” has been rolled out nationwide and is intended for use from elementary through high school, the report said, citing Chin’s state media *Xinhua* New Agency Apr 15. The books

were compiled under the direction of the country's National Textbook Department under the Ministry of Education.

The report said the rollout marked the latest step in the CCP's broader push to integrate political and ideological education more deeply into China's school system, extending it to younger age groups.

The textbooks' contents are stated to emphasize the Party's role in maintaining national stability, framing national security in explicitly political terms.

In the elementary school textbook, students are stated to be taught that the country's safety and stability are the result of collective efforts "under the leadership of the Party."

At the middle school level, the lessons are stated to stress that "national interests come first," with national interests being obviously synonymous with party interests.

And the high school teaching materials are sated to focus on a framework of guiding principles—including adherence to Party leadership over national security and the concept of a "comprehensive national security outlook"—as core components of instruction.

The report cited a bookseller in Beijing surnamed Wu as saying the new series is being positioned as an "authoritative" resource for national security education and will be used alongside existing political education materials, including textbooks on Xi Jinping Thought, the state ideology and guiding doctrine for the CCP and China.

The report cited some critics as saying the curriculum reflects an effort to reshape how young people understand the relationship between the state, the Party, and individual rights.

"The core of what the CCP calls 'national security' is ultimately political security, meaning the security of the regime itself," a current affairs analyst from China's Shenyang city has said.

The unnamed analyst has said the goal of the curriculum is less about educating students and more about encouraging acceptance of existing power structures.

"It is about instilling obedience [to the authorities]," he has said, adding he had chosen to send his own child abroad for education.

The introduction of the national security textbooks is seen to have come amid a wider tightening of ideological oversight in the CCP's education system.

In recent years, Chinese universities have been instructed to avoid discussion of topics deemed politically sensitive, especially concepts often described as Western. In regions such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia, the CCP has replaced minority language instruction with Mandarin, the report noted.

The report cited a Chinese scholar surnamed Du as saying the expansion of political education reflects growing concern within the CCP about shaping the attitudes of younger generations.

"Indoctrination is starting earlier and becoming more systematic," he has said, citing anecdotal examples of young children adopting political language at home. "When a system relies on continuous indoctrination to maintain [public] approval, it can also suggest underlying insecurity."

Du has said that as social and economic pressures mount in China, the CCP's focus on youth education has intensified, with curriculum design increasingly tied to political priorities.

The latest move is seen as underscoring the CCP's need to use schools not only to impart knowledge but also to shape political outlooks from an early age.

## China reports huge railway-haul of goods in and out of Tibet

16 April 2026, Tibetan Review

China said Apr 15 that its Qinghai–Tibet Railway had transported more than a hundred million metric tons of goods in and out of Tibet autonomous region since its opening in 2006, with the growth in outbound goods rising much faster, and reflecting the colonial nature of this mode of opening up the region.

The Qinghai–Xizang Railway has transported more than 100 million metric tons of goods in and out of the Xizang autonomous region since opening in 2006, according to China Railway Qinghai–Xizang Group, reported the official *chinadaily.com.cn* Apr 14, using the sinicized term "Xizang" for "Tibet".

The report cited data from the railway group as showing that from just 361,000 tons in 2006, annual throughput reached 8.31 million tons by 2025, with an average annual growth rate of 18%.

The report said Inbound cargo, mainly coal, cement, construction materials, and grain, had risen from 340,000 to 6.9 million tons, while outbound freight had expanded faster, from 21,000 to over 1.4 million tons.

Significantly, the report did not say what the outbound goods have mainly consisted of. Given the fact that China is mining globally significant amounts of various type of minerals, including especially lithium, rare earths, copper and its byproducts such as gold, iron, and so forth, these are bound to make up the bulk of the railway's haul out of Tibet.

The import into Tibet of coal, cement, construction materials, and grain show the other side of the colonial nature of the Chinese railway infrastructure in Tibet. These are needed to open up and develop the region to meet the requirements of the rising population of Chinese immigrants and the armed forces, as well as to build dams to harness the region's massive hydropower potential to generate what is called clean energy for China.

The only Tibetan products going out of Tibet by this railway mentioned by the report are “specialty products such as highland barley and Tibetan beverages” which are enabled “to reach national markets”.
As China’s mining activities in Tibet keeps increasing, so also is its railway infrastructure facilities. The report said that capacity and network coverage had improved significantly, with the Golmud–Lhasa section now having 58 stations, maximum traction loads of 2,880 tons, and 17 daily train pairs. With the integration of the Lhasa–Shigatse and Lhasa–Nyingchi railways, a Y-shaped backbone network has taken shape, the report added. In the western half of Tibet proper, which China calls Xizang, the rail network now exceeds 1,000 kilometres, with five freight stations and strengthened hubs in Lhasa, Shigatse, and Nyingchi. A system of seven regional freight centres and 47 service outlets covers Qinghai, Gansu, and Xizang, the railway group has said.

## Focusing on "Four Major Tasks" and Concentrating Efforts on "Four Creations," We Will Write a New Chapter for a Beautiful Changdu During the 15th Five-Year Plan Period

08 April 2026, xzxw

Recently, Lai Jiao, member of the Standing Committee of the Regional Party Committee and Minister of the Organization Department, visited Changdu City, Gongjue County, and Jiangda County to promote the spirit of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, guide and supervise the study and education on establishing and practicing a correct view of performance, investigate the work of leadership reshuffling at the city, county, and township levels, the "one focus, two promotions" initiative, and the work of cadres stationed in villages, visit and extend greetings to veteran Party members who have been "glorious in the Party for 50 years" and village-based work team members, and carry out reception and visits to the grassroots.
Lai Jiao pointed out that 2026 marks the 105th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China and the first year of the 15th Five-Year Plan. Party organizations at all levels and the vast number of Party members and cadres in Changdu City must thoroughly study and implement the spirit of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and its subsequent plenary sessions, earnestly implement the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping's important speech during his inspection of Tibet, and, under the strong leadership of the Party Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region, guide long-term stability and high-quality development with a correct view of performance, writing a new chapter for a beautiful Changdu.
In Gongjue County and Jiangda County, Lai Jiao emphasized the need to steadily and orderly advance the reshuffling of township leadership teams, optimize team structure, enhance overall function, strengthen a strict tone, measures, and atmosphere, and strictly enforce discipline and conduct during the reshuffling process, making it a vivid practice for consolidating the achievements of comprehensively and strictly governing the Party. He also stressed the importance of consolidating the achievements of the village (community) "two committees" reshuffling, continuously promoting grassroots governance and rural revitalization through Party building, developing and strengthening the collective economy, promoting the "Golden Harvest Rural Benefit Pass" inclusive financial service, and enhancing the sense of gain, happiness, and security among people of all ethnic groups.
At the Zangdong Biotechnology Co., Ltd. in Gongjue County, Lai Jiao fully affirmed the achievements of Awang sheep breeding technology innovation and transformation, emphasizing the need to promote the integration of grass and livestock, and the combination of planting and breeding, to forge a path of market-oriented, branded, large-scale, and standardized plateau-characteristic agricultural and pastoral development. In Gangtuo Village, Gangtuo Town, Jiangda County, Lai Jiao learned in detail about the construction and use of the red-themed beautiful village and red education base. He pointed out the need to make good use of the "first village peacefully liberated in Tibet" as a calling card, strengthen the protection and revitalization of red heritage, and adhere to the path of rural revitalization based on "red leadership + green development.”

## Chinese soldiers patrolling Lhasa with guns to intimidate Tibetans has been described as a routine tactic for maintaining Chinese rule.

04 April 2026, VOT

A recent video circulating online shows heavily armed Chinese soldiers patrolling the streets of Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, further confirming the CCP's long-standing military control over Tibetans. The Mainland Post, an international media outlet that focuses on human rights in China, reported on this, pointing out that behind the CCP's official narrative of "development" and "stability," force remains the CCP's most genuine trump card for maintaining its rule in Tibet.
A video from Tibet has recently gone viral online, clearly showing a group of Chinese soldiers carrying shields and rifles, wearing bulletproof vests, patrolling the streets of Lhasa, surrounded




by Tibetans holding prayer beads and turning prayer wheels, a scene full of deterrence.

The Mainland Post, an international media outlet that has long focused on human rights in China, reported that the video once again reveals the Chinese Communist Party's long-standing practice of using force to suppress the basic human rights of Tibetans. These images are completely consistent with the militarized rule that has continued in Tibet since it was occupied by the Chinese Communist Party.

The Mainland Post points out that Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, has increasingly become a city under heavy control. Surveillance cameras are ubiquitous, checkpoints are numerous, and armed patrols are commonplace; coercive control has long been a part of daily life for local residents. The frequent appearances of soldiers in public places are not isolated incidents, but rather a routine means for the authorities to maintain their rule.

In March of this year, Freedom House's latest annual World Freedom Report ranked China as an "unfree country" with only 9 out of 100 points for political rights and civil liberties. Tibet, under Chinese rule, had a freedom score of zero, even lower than North Korea.

The Mainland Post points out that this video, which originated in Tibet, strongly confirms that Tibet remains one of the most severely controlled regions under Chinese Communist Party rule.

In its 2018 Freedom of the World report on Tibet, Freedom House points out that under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule, decision-making power in Tibet is highly concentrated in the hands of CCP officials, and the basic rights of both Tibetan and Han residents are generally restricted. However, Tibetans often face more severe repression than Han Chinese when expressing any dissent, such as regarding Tibetan Buddhism and cultural identity. The report also mentions that the CCP's policies of encouraging Han Chinese to immigrate to Tibet while forcibly relocating Tibetans from their ancestral homes have weakened the Tibetan population.

# BUDDHISM IN TIBET

## China accused of erasing Tibetan religious heritage amid fresh constructions in Drago county

29 April 2026, Tribune India

Authorities in Tibet's Drago County have come under criticism after reports revealed that a site once home to a towering Buddha statue has been converted into a horse racing track by the Chinese Communist government, while new structures have been erected over the demolished Geden Buddhist School, as reported by Tibet Times.According to Tibet Times, the developments stem from a wider campaign that began in late 2021, when Chinese authorities allegedly demolished a 99-foot Buddha statue, a Maitreya



Buddha figure, and dozens of Mani prayer wheels near Gaden Rabten Namgyal Ling Monastery.Due to strict surveillance and restrictions in the region at the time, details remained scarce.The statue was relocated inside a monastery assembly hall, while its original site has been repurposed into a large racing circuit. The Buddha statue, originally constructed in 2015 with local government approval and funded by community donations, was considered spiritually significant by residents.

In a parallel development, authorities reportedly ordered the abrupt closure of the Geden Buddhist School in October, giving administrators just three days to comply. Following its demolition, two sizeable buildings have appeared on the site, though their purpose remains unclear. Reports also indicate that a 46-foot statue of Guru Rinpoche at a nearby monastery was destroyed under official directives.

Meanwhile, more than a dozen individuals, including monks, were detained on accusations of sharing information externally. Many were reportedly sent to a political re-education facility, with no confirmed updates on their condition. Further allegations suggest that detained monks were pressured into signing statements accepting blame for the destruction of religious artefacts.

Observers have drawn parallels between these actions and earlier campaigns reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, as highlighted by Tibet Times.

The controversy has also revived scrutiny of local leadership, particularly after former county party secretary Wang Dongsheng died under unclear

circumstances in 2024. He had previously overseen large-scale demolitions at Larung Gar Buddhist Academy, where thousands of monastic dwellings were dismantled and residents expelled, as reported by Tibet Times. (ANI)

## China's top party leader on religious, minority affairs inspects Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism in Gansu, Sichuan

23 April 2026 Tibetan Review

China's top Party leader responsible for minority and religious affairs has toured the historically Tibetan regions of Gansu and Sichuan provinces from Apr 18 to 22 to supervise the enforcement of the recently adopted, much-criticised law on so-called ethnic unity, calling for the governance of religious affairs and guiding Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to a socialist society.

Li Ganjie, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee, made the remarks during a research tour in the western provinces of Gansu and Sichuan, reported China's state news agency *Xinhua* Apr 23.

The historically Tibetan regions of Gansu include Kanlho (Chinese: Gannan) Prefecture and Pari (Tianzhu) County in Wuwei prefecture while those in Sichuan include Kardze (Ganzi) and Ngaba (Aba) Prefectures.

Strengthening political supervision of the management of religious centres and education in patriotism, giving primary importance to learning Mandarin, and eventually teaching Tibetan Buddhism in this official Chinese language are some of the underlying meaning of Li's call.

The report said the trip took Li to Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, where he learned about their law-based standardized management. He also visited a Buddhist college in Gansu and the Center for Tibetan Studies of Sichuan University to investigate religious education systems, the training of Buddhist monks, and Tibetology research.

While talking to people of different ethnic groups, Li has emphasized the need to uphold the Party's leadership over religious work, develop religions in the Chinese context, and strengthen and improve the management of monasteries.

Li was also stated to have highlighted the importance of enhancing the education, training, and management of representative figures in Tibetan Buddhism, and guiding religious figures to resolutely safeguard national reunification and ethnic unity.

He has also called for efforts to run religious institutions well, establish and effectively utilize Tibetology research institutions, advance research on Tibetan Buddhism, and continuously improve the capabilities of officials engaged in religious work.

The emphasis on the use of Tibetology research institutions is meant to encourage the fabrication of false or distorted historical narratives "showing" Tibetan Buddhism to be part of Chinese Buddhism.

## China must 'strengthen education' of Tibetan Buddhists, Beijing official says after tour

24 April 2026, SCMP

A senior Chinese official who oversees religious



and ethnic minority affairs has called for China to "strengthen" the education, training and management of Tibetan Buddhist personnel.

Li Ganjie, head of the Communist Party's United Front Work Department and a member of the now 22-man Politburo, made the call during a trip to Tibetan areas in western China, state news agency Xinhua reported on Wednesday.

He visited several religious organisations and study institutions in the Tibetan autonomous prefectures of Gansu and Sichuan provinces this week, the report said.

"[We must] guide Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to socialist society in accordance with the requirements of systematically advancing the Sinicisation of religion and strengthening the rule of law in religious affairs," he said.Similar calls have been made by senior officials, including President Xi Jinping.

During the inspection tour from April 18 to 22, Li inspected the training and education of Tibetan Buddhist monks, a facet Beijing considers crucial to the "Sinicisation" of religion. He urged Tibetan Buddhist groups to implement the party's religious policies, and bolster the management of monasteries.

"[We] must strengthen the education, training and management of representatives of Tibetan Buddhism, guiding religious figures to safeguard national unity and ethnic solidarity," Li said.

He said Tibetan Buddhist organisations and management institutions should improve religious schools to cultivate "high-level religious talent"

proficient in both Tibetan Buddhist doctrines and Chinese culture.

Li also urged local authorities to promote the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress – which was passed at the National People's Congress during China's annual "two sessions" last month – to ethnic minority groups. The law aims to provide a statutory mandate to assimilate the country's ethnic minority groups, thereby countering Western influence and criticism.

The final version of the law emphasised that "religious groups and institutions should guide religion to adapt to socialist society".

"[The law] clarifies that religious practice is expected to align not only culturally but also politically with the current system," said Peter T.C. Chang, a visiting senior fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore and a former deputy director of the Institute of China Studies at the University of Malaya.

"This wording reinforces the idea that religious organisations should contribute to ethnic unity and social stability, rather than operate as separate identity structures."

During the two sessions in March, the Panchen Lama, the second-highest spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism after the Dalai Lama, expressed support for the law and called for "strengthening the education of religious figures".

He said the education of monks should be strengthened in four areas: "statutory common national language" [standard Chinese], history and national conditions, laws and regulations, and modern scientific knowledge.

"[We should] seek content from the doctrines that is conducive to social harmony and interpret the doctrines in a way that conforms to the requirements of China's development and to the Chinese culture," the Panchen Lama said.

Tibet remains among Beijing's biggest challenges in religious and ethnic minority affairs.

The 90-year-old Dalai Lama, the highest religious leader of Tibet, has been in exile in India since a failed armed uprising against Beijing in 1959. Beijing accuses him of being responsible for unrest in Tibet during the 1980s and in 2008. He has denied the allegations.

Beijing and the Dalai Lama have long disagreed over how to choose a successor to the religious leadership of Tibetan Buddhism. Beijing says all reincarnations of senior Tibetan Buddhist monks require its approval and must be sought within China.

**The Dalai Lama has become a point of tension in the China-US relationship.**

The United States has historically supported greater autonomy for Tibet and legislated against Beijing's role in the process of Tibetan succession and its interpretation of Tibetan history.

And in February, Washington appointed a new special coordinator for Tibetan issues, an appointment made despite cuts to foreign aid and global advocacy spending under US President Donald Trump.

## China Uses "Buddhist Friendship" in Seoul to Advance Its Religious Policy Agenda

21 April 2026, Bitter Winter

A CCP-controlled delegation promotes Beijing's line while regional partners intensify pressure on the Unification Church, Shincheonji, and other groups labeled as "cults."



*Pro-CCP Chinese Buddhist leader Zong Xing visits the Jogye Order of Korean Buddhism. From Weibo.*

A delegation from the China Buddhist Association (CBA), led by vice president Zong Xing, traveled to Seoul from March 30 to April 2. They attended the preparatory meeting for the 26th China-Korea-Japan Buddhist Friendship Exchange Conference. Chinese media portrayed this visit as a continuation of the "golden bond" of trilateral Buddhist cooperation, an idea established in 1995 by senior monks from the three countries. Official reports described the gathering as a way to contribute to regional stability and world peace, using the familiar language that defines Chinese religious affairs propaganda.

However, these reports did not point out that the China Buddhist Association is not an independent religious group. A December 2022 report by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) found that the CBA serves as a tool of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to control Buddhism inside China and promote state narratives outside. USCIRF called the association "a conduit and endorser of state propaganda" and criticized its role in the government's ongoing violations of religious freedom. According to the same report, the CBA is responsible for spreading CCP propaganda against religious movements the Party labels as "cults," including

groups that are not connected to Buddhism. The USCIRF denounced the China Buddhist Association's "complicity in the government's systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom."




*Buddhist representatives from the Chinese CBA, Japan, and Korea sign a cooperation memorandum in Seoul. From Weibo.*

Zong Xing has openly supported using Buddhism to promote CCP political messages. In 2025, he faced backlash in Taiwan for turning his attendance at the funeral of respected monk Jing Yao into an opportunity to advocate for Taiwan's "reunification" with the People's Republic of China. His recent meetings in Seoul included discussions with Ven. Jinwoo of the Jogye Order, Ven. Deoksu of the Cheontae Order, and Ven. Sangjin of the Taego Order.

These are the same Buddhist leaders who met with South Korean President Lee Jae-myung on January 12, 2026 at the Blue House. During that meeting, President Lee called for action against "pseudo-religious" groups like the Unification Church and Shincheonji, which were labeled as "heretics." While it is unclear if all participants endorsed Lee's stance, Ven. Jinwoo openly supported the initiative.



*President Lee meeting religious leaders at the Blue House, January 12, 2026. Source: Korea Presidential Office.*

"Bitter Winter" has previously reported on how Chinese experts have worked alongside South Korean and Japanese anti-cult activists to promote policies aimed at groups seen as hostile to Beijing, including the Unification Church. President Lee's administration has joined this movement, adopting a pro-China stance and increasing pressure on religious communities that criticize his government or are viewed as unfriendly to China.

Zong Xing's visit to Korea should be seen in this context. Under the guise of "peace" and "friendship," the CBA delegation likely pushed Beijing's agenda to support Lee's campaign against religious movements that both governments consider hostile. Japanese Buddhists are also involved in the trilateral dialogue, but in Japan, the PRC has faced more challenges in gaining Buddhist support against groups like the Unification Church and Jehovah's Witnesses than it has in Korea.

Additionally, China continues to collaborate with South Korean Christian anti-cult activists and lawyers who criticize the Unification Church and Shincheonji. This partnership now faces a challenge: President Lee and his party are advocating for a bill that would allow the government to dissolve religious organizations quickly. Many Korean Christian groups oppose this proposal, fearing it could eventually target them, particularly those with conservative views not aligned with the administration.

To maintain their long-standing cooperation with Chinese and local anti-cult organizations, some Christian leaders have suggested a more focused approach. As reported by "The Korea Times," the Korean Society of Church Law has proposed a law specifically targeting the Unification Church and Shincheonji rather than a general law. Some Christian pastors and lawyers have indicated they would accept such an ad hoc law as long as it does not extend to their own churches.

This special-purpose law would raise significant constitutional and international law issues. However, both anti-cult activists and the Chinese international propaganda have shown little reluctance to support measures that target religious minorities they deem undesirable. In this atmosphere, the China Buddhist Association's "friendship" diplomacy seems not like a simple spiritual exchange but rather another means for Beijing to push its regional agenda against groups it views as threats.

## Mandarin learning law already being actively implemented in Tibet's monasteries

17 April Tibetan Review

Following China's adoption last month of its law on so-called promoting ethnic unity and progress, mandating the predominance of Mandarin learning and use across the PRC, monks in Tibet are now required to take time off their traditional

Tibetan grammar and scripture learning to study the language of their rulers.

As in many cases under Chinese rule in Tibet, where measures have already been under implementation for years before the laws on them are actually adopted, monks in Tibet have already been learning Mandarin (or Putonghua) for years. As a result, many have already gained efficiency in the language.

For example, monks at Dordong Monastery, located in Bome County of Nyingtri City, Tibet autonomous Region, have actively studied the standard spoken and written Chinese language and acquired knowledge relevant to modern society, reported China's online Tibet new service *m.tibet.cn/eng* Apr 17.

Thirty-seven-year-old monk Tsewang Palden is a representative example, the report said. In an interview, he spoke fluent Putonghua, noting that the standard spoken and written Chinese language serves as a bridge connecting them with the broader society. He has reportedly recalled that in the past, when travelling to places such as Lhasa and Chengdu for medical treatment or other personal matters, language barriers often posed difficulties.

While learning a language out of personal interest for career advancement and to adapt to modern life is fully understandable, China's plan is stated to be to eventually get all the Tibetan Buddhist texts translated into Chinese and to make the monasteries teach their students only in this language, the planned language also of monastic interactions.

Referring to the monk Tsewang Palden mentioned above, the report said that after a year of study, he is now able to communicate proficiently in the national common language in daily life. "In addition to attending classes diligently, he also uses the Internet for self-study, learning vocabulary for everyday situations such as seeking medical care and shopping. He has also been studying laws and regulations, ethnic unity, and the principles of patriotism and devotion to religion."

The use of Mandarin language as an attempt to weaken the Tibetan people's interest to focus on studying their language, culture, and religion and thereby widen, even divert, their interests in other fields could not, perhaps, be put more succinctly.

"With society developing so rapidly, we must keep pace with its progress," Tsewang Palden was quoted as saying.

## Monks at Dordong Monastery Actively Learn the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese language

17 April 2026 m. Tibet

Dordong Monastery, located in Bome County, Nyingchi, Xizang, has a history of more than 380 years and is regarded as a pearl along the ancient




Tea-Horse Road.In recent years, while preserving traditional culture, monks at the monastery have actively studied the standard spoken and written Chinese language and acquired knowledge relevant to modern society.Thirty-seven-year-old monk Tsewang Palden is a representative example. In an interview, he spoke fluent Putonghua, noting that the standard spoken and written Chinese language serves as a bridge connecting them with the broader society. He recalled that in the past, when traveling to places such as Lhasa and Chengdu for medical treatment or other personal matters, language barriers often posed difficulties. After a year of study, however, he is now able to communicate proficiently in the national common language in daily life. In addition to attending classes diligently, he also uses the Internet for self-study, learning vocabulary for everyday situations such as seeking medical care and shopping. He has also been studying laws and regulations, ethnic unity, and the principles of patriotism and devotion to religion. "As long as one does not master the standard spoken and written Chinese language, even basic communication becomes inconvenient," Tsewang Palden said. "With society developing so rapidly, we must keep pace with its progress."

# CCP POLITICS

## NPCSC Session Watch: Prison Administration, Social Welfare, Defense Mobilization, State-Owned Enterprise Assets, Water Resources & Agriculture

30 April 2026, NPC

China's top legislature, the 14th NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC), will convene for its 22nd session from April 27 to 30, the Council of Chairpersons decided on Monday, April 20. According to the Council's proposed agenda, the session will consider eight legislative bills, which we preview below. The Council also approved the NPCSC's 2026 work priorities as well as 2026 plans for legislative, oversight, delegates-related, and foreign-affairs work. We expect all but the foreign-affairs work plan to be released after the upcoming session, likely in early May.

**Returning Bills**

Four bills are scheduled for further review.

The draft revision to the *Prisons Law* [监狱法] and the draft *Social Assistance Law* [社会救助法] will return for their third—and most likely final—review.

The draft *Healthcare Security Law* [医疗保障法] and the draft *Cultivated Land Protection and Quality Improvement Law* [耕地保护和质量提升法] return for their second review. Both are likely to pass within the year.

**New Bills**

Four new bills have been submitted for review.

*First*, the NPC Financial and Economic Affairs Committee submitted a draft revision to the *Law on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises* [企业国有资产法]. Enacted in 2008, this Law governs one of the three main categories[1] of state-owned assets in China: "state-owned assets of enterprises" [企业国有资产]. This term is defined as "the rights and interests formed by the State's various forms of investment in enterprises," including wholly state-owned companies and state equity stakes in other enterprises, whether controlling or not. The Law regulates the State's role as investor, the governance of state-invested enterprises, and major transactions involving state-owned assets. In 2024, the NPCSC issued a report calling for clarifying the State's role as investor and reducing administrative interference; strengthening the corporate governance and internal controls of state-owned enterprises; improving the basic rules governing the valuation, transfer, and disposition of state-owned assets; and reforming the management of revenue from state-owned capital. We expect the revision to undergo three reviews.

*Second*, the NPC Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee submitted a draft revision to the *Agriculture Law* [农业法], China's "basic law" on agricultural and rural affairs.[2] Originally adopted in 1993, the Law was last substantially

updated in 2002. Since then, the NPCSC has inspected its enforcement four times, underscoring its importance. The NPCSC's most recent inspection report from 2024 recommended amendments to strengthen food security, farmland protection, support for agricultural sci-tech innovation, and green agricultural development. We expect the revision to pass after two or three reviews.

*Third*, the State Council and the Central Military Commission jointly submitted a draft revision to the *National Defense Mobilization Law* [国防动员法], enacted in 2010. In October 2021, the NPCSC authorized an open-ended program to reform the national defense mobilization system, suspending certain (unspecified) provisions in four statutes—including this Law—that concern "the leadership and management structure, the allocation of functions among military and civil authorities, and the establishment of working institutions for national defense mobilization . . . as well as the direction and use of resources for national defense mobilization." While the specific reform measures have not been released, the 2020 revision to the *National Defense Law* [国防法] indicates that the State Council will no longer play a leading role in defense mobilization. We expect the revision to pass after two or three reviews.

*Lastly*, the State Council submitted a draft revision to the *Water Law* [水法], first enacted in 1988 and revised once in 2002. In an article published last year, a researcher at a think tank affiliated with the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) argued that, after the 2002 revision, the Law no longer functions as a comprehensive statute governing water conservancy, but instead as a specialized statute focused on water resources—their development, use, conservation, protection, and management. The researcher calls for expanding the Law's scope to cover three additional areas: aquatic environments, aquatic ecosystems, and water security. Although, unusually, neither the MWR nor the Ministry of Justice released a draft for public comment, an MWR research report on the bill discloses it took an approach broadly consistent with scholarly proposals, seeking to restore the Law as a "basic law" on water. We expect the bill to pass after two or three reviews.

With contribution from Taige Hu

1. The other two are state-owned assets of administrative organs and public-service institutions, and state-owned natural resources. ↩
2. Indeed, it was initially titled the *Basic Agriculture Law* [农业基本法] before the NPCSC deleted the first word to expedite its passage. Otherwise, officials argued, the Law would have qualified as a "basic law" and therefore constitutionally required approval by the full NPC (which would not convene until nine months later)—as if changing the bill's title alone could also alter its substance. ↩

## China's Power Brokers Under Siege as Security Chief and Key 'Gatekeepers' Face Scrutiny

27 April 2026, Vision Times



*Chinese Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong (C) attends a meeting with US National Drug Control Policy director Rahul Gupta at a hotel in Beijing on June 20, 2024. (Image: NG HAN GUAN/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)*

A wave of personnel reshuffles and disciplinary investigations across China's political and security system has drawn attention to potential internal shifts within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with analysts pointing to signs of tightening control and possible factional realignment on the highest levels.

At the center of recent developments is Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong, whose position has come under scrutiny following a series of unusual personnel changes within China's Ministry of Public Security.

**A slew of purges**

On April 21, Chinese authorities announced the appointment of Lu Wuqin as assistant minister of public security, filling a vacancy left by a recent retirement. While such appointments are routine, observers noted that Lu has no known prior working relationship with Wang.

Over the past year, several officials previously associated with Wang have been reassigned or removed, including former vice ministers and senior aides. In comparison, newly appointed figures appear to lack direct ties to him.According to publicly-available information, Lu, a career official born in 1967, has held roles in auditing, criminal investigation, and public communications within the ministry. His background, analysts say, suggests a technocratic profile rather than affiliation with a specific political faction.

**Absent from key meetings**

Additional attention has focused on Wang's absence from a recent high-level diplomatic-security meeting. While he participated in a March trilateral dialogue with Vietnam alongside Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Defense Minister Dong Jun, he did not attend a subsequent "2+2" strategic dialogue involving Cambodia and trade issues.



*Wu Hao and Jiang Youwei pictured in a composite image. (Image: Online Screenshot)*

Analysts have pointed to this absence, combined with ongoing internal inspections, as part of a broader pattern. In mid-April, China's top anti-corruption body announced that a central inspection team would be stationed within the Ministry of Public Security for approximately two and a half months. Such inspections typically target both disciplinary compliance and political alignment.

Developments within the security system coincide with high-profile cases involving other senior officials often described as political "gatekeepers," figures responsible for managing administrative operations and resource flows, analysts say.

In Liaoning Province, reports have circulated regarding the case of Jiang Youwei, a senior provincial official who had recently appeared at multiple public events before abruptly disappearing from view. While no official announcement has confirmed details of his situation, the case has drawn attention due to its timing and unusual circumstances.

Separately, authorities announced that Wu Hao, a senior official formerly associated with China's powerful economic planning system, is under investigation for "serious violations of discipline and law." Wu previously served in key roles within the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), where he was involved in overseeing major investment and industrial policy initiatives.

**Corruption in high-stakes sectors**

The investigation into Wu has renewed focus on corruption risks in sectors tied to large-scale state investment, including technology, infrastructure, and energy. Observers note that agencies responsible for allocating funding to strategic industries, such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology, control vast financial resources, making them particularly vulnerable to influence and misconduct.

One netizen described the environment as one in which "whoever controls project approvals controls the flow of billions," highlighting the potential for abuse within complex bureaucratic systems.




*The CCP reportedly allows a 'threshold for embezzlement and bribery' of under 3 million yuan. (Image: Online Screenshot)*

The convergence of personnel reshuffles, anti-corruption inspections, and high-profile investigations has fueled speculation about broader dynamics within China's political system. Some analysts interpret these developments as part of ongoing efforts by CCP leadership to consolidate control and enforce discipline across key institutions. Others view them as evidence of internal tensions, particularly in areas where political authority intersects with economic power. While official statements emphasize routine governance and anti-corruption enforcement, the timing and concentration of recent events have drawn heightened scrutiny.

Despite growing attention, many details surrounding these cases remain unclear. Chinese authorities have not publicly confirmed several of the more widely circulated claims, and independent verification remains limited. As developments continue, observers say the situation reflects both the scale of China's internal governance challenges and the opacity of its political system.

**Editorial note:** This article is based on publicly circulating reports and commentary from independent analysts. The claims described have not been independently verified by Vision Times, and relevant authorities have not publicly confirmed the allegations.

## Ma Xingrui Allegedly Breaks Down, Confesses And Implicates Top Standing Committee Members

27 April 2026, Vision Times

Recently, there have been revelations claiming that during the investigation, Ma Xingrui suffered a mental breakdown and disclosed many individuals he was not supposed to name, On March 5, 2023, the First Session of the 14th *National People's Congress of the Communist Party of*



*China convened at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Li Xi (left), Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and Ma Xingrui, then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, were seen attending the opening ceremony. (Image: via Getty Images)*

involving multiple top-level national Standing Committee members.

Some analysts believe that from now until the end of next year's "Two Sessions," a number of officials will be brought down, and the scale of the purge will not be smaller than before.

Ma Xingrui 'implicates' many top national Standing Committee members

On April 23, 2026, U.S.-based independent commentator Cai Shenkun posted on the X platform, revealing: "According to a single source, under intense pressure, Ma Xingrui's mental state completely collapsed, even nearing a loss of control and a state of delirium. He implicated many people he should not have implicated, including several current and former top national-level Standing Committee members. If this information is true, then the issues involving Ma Xingrui clearly go beyond simple corruption and point to intense and brutal power struggles within the top ranks of the Chinese Communist Party.

Ma Xingrui, whose career had progressed relatively smoothly and who originally had a scholarly demeanor, suddenly encountered the crushing pressure of a political 'meat grinder.' Whether physically or psychologically, it would be difficult to withstand such a sudden blow. On the surface, the CCP leadership still appears calm, and Xi Jinping continues to frequently meet with various dignitaries, but beneath this calm, there may already be undercurrents surging and an atmosphere of unusual tension."

At present, the authenticity of this claim cannot be independently verified.

On April 3, 2026, Ma Xingrui, a member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and deputy head of the Central Rural Work Leading Group, was officially announced by the Chinese Communist Party to be under investigation.

Since November last year, Ma Xingrui had been absent from important CCP meetings for an extended period, and there were widespread reports that he and his family had already been placed under control.

From the time rumors of Ma Xingrui's troubles first emerged to the CCP's official confirmation of his downfall, at least half a year had passed. This reflects intense internal struggles at the top levels of the CCP and behind-the-scenes maneuvering among various factions.

A commonly held view is that Ma Xingrui and Xi Jinping's wife, Peng Liyuan, are both from Shandong, which contributed to his steady rise through the ranks.

On April 3, 2026, Cai Shenkun revealed on the X platform that Ma Xingrui's wife, Rong Li, had given insurance policies in Hong Kong and other locations to the wives and children of many officials. The amounts ranged from several million to tens of millions (RMB), and the scale and number of recipients were astonishing. Most absurdly, those giving the insurance may not have seen it as bribery, and those receiving it may not have considered it corruption. Everything was wrapped in the guise of "personal relationships," but in reality, it formed a hidden and complex political network.

On April 4, 2026, Cai Shenkun further disclosed that one month after Ma Xingrui was removed from his post as "Party Secretary of Xinjiang," in August 2025, the CCP Central Committee began convening twice-monthly meetings of the wives of Politburo members—including Peng Liyuan—to study reports on so-called "Party conduct and clean governance," and imposed strict rules on these elite spouses. They were required to submit a monthly report, in what was described as a "rectification campaign among officials' wives."

Analysis: A number of officials may be brought down

U.S.-based commentator Zhang Tianliang stated in his self-media program that this effectively means Ma Xingrui, through his wife Rong Li's "wives' network," formed a kind of political faction. He not only had corruption issues, but also built his own "team" through factional alliances.

The CCP authorities are currently conducting a very severe investigation into Ma Xingrui. If his wife Rong Li had financial dealings with the wives of many Politburo members—or even Standing Committee members—including Li Xi, the Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection who is very close to Ma Xingrui, then on one hand Xi Jinping would be highly wary of this, and on the other hand, it would be unlikely for Xi to allow Li Xi to investigate the case.

From January 23, 2017 to December 2021, Ma Xingrui served as Governor of Guangdong Province. From October 28, 2017 to October 2022, Li Xi served as Party Secretary of Guangdong Province. The two overlapped in their positions for four years.

Cai Shenkun disclosed that there had previously been overseas reports claiming that Li Xi's wife and Ma Xingrui's wife Rong Li had worked together to extract huge financial gains. He believes these rumors are not baseless. According

to CCP internal rules, the “top leader” bears responsibility for failing to properly supervise or for tolerating misconduct among team members.
Therefore, Li Xi may bear “supervisory responsibility” for corruption that occurred under Ma Xingrui in Guangdong, and could face accountability or internal disciplinary action. As for the timing, it may come after Li Xi steps down as Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.
Cai Shenkun also revealed that the person currently handling Ma Xingrui’s case is not Li Xi, but Liu Jinguo..
Zhang Tianliang believes that Ma Xingrui, as a technocrat, rose relatively smoothly through what is described as Peng Liyuan’s “wives’ network,” and had experienced little major turbulence in his career. During an isolated investigation, he was unable to withstand the immense pressure and reportedly implicated many officials.
Therefore, if Xi Jinping seeks reappointment at the CCP’s 21st National Congress but does not deal with the many officials named by Ma Xingrui, it would be difficult to justify. It can thus be inferred that many government officials may fall in the future. Specifically, from now until after the CCP’s “Two Sessions” in 2027, there may be ongoing purges of officials, and the intensity of these actions is unlikely to be less than before.

## China's national political advisory body holds leadership meeting

25 April 2026, People’s Daily online



*Wang Huning, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National Committee, presides over and addresses the 50th Chairperson's Council meeting of the 14th CPPCC National Committee, in Beijing, capital of China, on April 24, 2026. (Xinhua/Rao Aimin)*

The 14th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the country's national political advisory body, held its 50th Chairperson's Council meeting on Friday.
Wang Huning, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the CPPCC National Committee, presided over and addressed the meeting.
Wang urged stepped-up consultations, deliberations, research and thematic studies centered on the goals and tasks for developing the service sector during the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-2030), and formulating pragmatic and constructive suggestions.
He called for investigations and research into key issues in ecological conservation and efforts to organize educational activities aimed at protecting ecosystems and the environment.
Wang also stressed the need to fully implement the Party's overall policy for the new era on resolving the Taiwan question, leverage the CPPCC's role as the most inclusive organization in the patriotic united front, and rally people's support and strength to advance the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and national reunification.
The meeting decided that the 17th session of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC National Committee will be convened in late June.

## Xi Turns to Jiang Zemin’s Legacy as Internal Purges Undermine His Power Base

22 April 2026, Vision Times

Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) top leader, has spent much of the past decade positioning himself as a central figure in the Party’s anti-corruption campaign. Yet alongside this effort, another dynamic has unfolded: While officials tied to Xi’s own faction have faced repeated purges within the military and security apparatus, family members of earlier Party leaders have continued to expand their influence across key sectors of the economy.
Recent developments suggest a renewed alignment between Xi and the family of his predecessor, former CCP leader Jiang Zemin—an evolution that may carry significant implications for both political stability and elite economic interests.
Following the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022, Xi’s allies consolidated control over many of the Party’s top positions across political, military, and administrative systems. However, subsequent developments have included a series of internal investigations and removals involving senior officials.
Zhang Youxia and He Weidong, both vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, have been linked in overseas reporting to internal disciplinary actions. Meanwhile, Li Xi, head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), has reportedly moved against officials connected to his earlier tenure in Guangdong, including Ma Xingrui.
While these shifts unfolded within the political sphere, parallel developments have emerged in the commercial sector. In November 2024,

Starbucks announced a joint venture with Boyu Capital, a private equity firm founded by Jiang Zhicheng, the grandson of Jiang Zemin, to operate its China business. Under the agreement, Boyu Capital would hold up to a 60 percent stake, with Starbucks retaining 40 percent. The transaction was finalized in April 2025, with plans to expand store operations across China.

Around the same time, Liu Lefei, the son of former Politburo Standing Committee member Liu Yunshan, extended his presence in the investment sector. Liu controls CPE Yuan Feng, a firm that evolved from the state-linked CITIC Industrial Investment Fund. In November 2025, the firm entered into a joint venture with Restaurant Brands International, parent company of Burger King, committing $350 million in initial funding and securing a controlling stake. The deal closed in early 2026.

Since 2025, Boyu Capital has expanded into high-profile investments across China's consumer and technology sectors, including stakes in Beijing SKP and involvement in companies such as Mixue Ice Cream and Tea, CATL, and Hengrui Pharmaceuticals. Liu Lefei has similarly participated in international acquisitions, including a controlling stake in SML Group, a firm specializing in RFID and brand identification technology.

Observers have noted the concentration of such investments among individuals linked to families of former senior officials, drawing comparisons to systems in which economic influence is closely tied to political lineage.

**Allegations of economic coordination**

The recent activity involving individuals connected to the Jiang family has also revived earlier claims that circulated in overseas Chinese political discussions more than a decade ago.

In 2014, reports surrounding the CCP's Beidaihe meetings described a possible alignment between Alibaba founder Jack Ma and figures associated with elite political families, including Jiang Zhicheng and Liu Lefei. These claims, sometimes referred to as the "Anti-Heaven Plan," alleged efforts to consolidate influence across China's financial and internet sectors. While these claims were never independently verified, subsequent developments are well documented.

In October 2020, Jack Ma publicly criticized China's financial regulatory system. Shortly thereafter, Ant Group's highly anticipated IPO was suspended, and Ma largely disappeared from public view for an extended period.

According to reporting by The Wall Street Journal, the decision followed internal reviews of Ant Group's shareholder structure, which included individuals connected to politically influential families. Ant Group was later forced to restructure, and Alibaba faced regulatory penalties. By 2023, Ma's voting control in Ant Group had been significantly reduced.

Boyu Capital's earlier investment in Ant Group, completed in 2016, was structured through intermediary entities, including Beijing Jingguan Investment Center. The firm had also participated in a consortium that repurchased Alibaba shares from Yahoo in 2012, ahead of the company's U.S. listing.

Some analysts describe these relationships as part of a broader system in which private entrepreneurs operate alongside politically connected families. In Chinese political discourse, the term "white glove" is sometimes used to describe business figures who manage assets on behalf of individuals unable to hold them directly.

**Longstanding political arrangements**

Analysts of Chinese elite politics have long pointed to informal arrangements between leadership factions as a mechanism for maintaining stability.

One such arrangement, often described as "skip-generation succession," involved senior leaders designating successors beyond their immediate replacements, creating expectations of long-term continuity and protection for affiliated networks.

Deng Xiaoping designated Hu Jintao as a future leader. Jiang Zemin later supported Xi Jinping's rise. Hu Jintao, in turn, was widely reported to have promoted Hu Chunhua as a potential successor. Xi's consolidation of power and departure from this pattern has disrupted these expectations, particularly among political families that once relied on such arrangements for long-term security.

Earlier accounts suggest that Jiang's support played a role in Xi's elevation to the Politburo Standing Committee in 2007. During Xi's first term, anti-corruption campaigns targeted senior figures such as Zhou Yongkang and military leaders Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong.

At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi secured a third term while some officials linked to earlier political networks remained in senior roles, reflecting continued accommodation between factions.

**Jiang's legacy**

Recent developments indicate a shift in how Jiang Zemin's historical role is being presented. Chinese authorities have announced renovations at the Mao Zedong Mausoleum in Beijing, with work scheduled between March and August. Reporting by Hong Kong-based Ming Pao suggests that a centennial commemoration for Jiang may be held during this period, potentially signaling a level of recognition reserved for a select group of Party leaders.

At the same time, individuals associated with Jiang's network, including his son Jiang Mianheng, have not been publicly implicated in recent investigations, despite broader disciplinary actions affecting related sectors.

Jiang Mianheng has held positions within the Chinese Academy of Sciences and played a role in major national science and technology initiatives,

including the Shenzhou space program and the Chang'e lunar missions. Some officials within these systems, including Ma Xingrui and Zhu Zhisong, have more recently been linked to disciplinary probes.

Observers suggest that the selective nature of these investigations reflects the complexity of factional dynamics within the CCP.

**A delicate balance of power**

Xi's current position appears to reflect a balancing act, maintaining authority while managing relationships across competing political networks. In this context, renewed references to Jiang Zemin's legacy may serve to reinforce continuity within the Party's leadership structure, even as internal tensions persist.

While Xi has long sought to distinguish his leadership from earlier eras associated with corruption and patronage, recent developments point to a more intricate reality, one in which political authority, historical legacy, and elite networks remain deeply intertwined within China's governing system.

## CCDI Secretary Li Xi Faces Pressure Amid Reported Political Ties in Beijing

23 April 2026, Vision Times



*On March 5, 2023, the First Session of the 14th National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China convened at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Li Xi (left), Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and Ma Xingrui, then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, were seen attending the opening ceremony. (Image: via Getty Images)*

Since the beginning of this year, former Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui has fallen from power, while Evergrande boss Xu Jiayin and former Minister of Justice Tang Yijun have appeared in public trials. Now, reports note that CCDI (Central Commission of Discipline Inspection) Secretary Li Xi, who is deeply tied to them through overlapping interests, also finds himself in an increasingly precarious position.

Analysts believe that just as Chinese President Xi Jinping was unable to protect Ma Xingrui after a long delay, it will also be difficult for him to protect Li Xi, who may end up spending the rest of his life in Qincheng Prison if placed under investigation and convicted of corruption charges.

Li Xi allegedly implicated by 3 key figures

Recently, political commentator Chen Pokong, based in the United States, analyzed in his self-media program that Politburo member and CCDI Secretary Li Xi is currently in a difficult situation because he is linked to three important individuals. The Politburo serves as China's top ruling body.

The first is former Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui, who has already fallen from power. The two had worked together for four years in Guangdong as partners. From Jan. 23, 2017 to December 2021, Ma Xingrui served as Governor of Guangdong Province. From Oct. 28, 2017 to October 2022, Li Xi served as Party Secretary of Guangdong Province.

Chen Pokong pointed out that during Ma Xingrui's tenure in Guangdong, he amassed enormous wealth, and his corruption allegedly involved the family of Peng Liyuan. It is said that he transferred US$4.2 billion in benefits to Xu Xingjian, the brother-in-law of Xi Jinping's wife, Peng Liyuan. Li Xi is considered a trusted aide of Xi Jinping, while Ma Xingrui is described as a favored figure of Peng Liyuan. Since Ma Xingrui has already fallen from power, Li Xi's situation may also have become extremely precarious due to his association with him.

**A tangled web**

Chen Pokong stated that Ma Xingrui has deep and complex ties with Peng Liyuan. Even if Xi Jinping could still protect Peng Liyuan, he is no longer able to protect Ma Xingrui. Therefore, whether Xi can protect Li Xi is also uncertain, because Ma Xingrui is likely to testify against Li Xi, and there are two other individuals who may also expose him.

One of them is Tang Yijun. He is a member of Xi's trusted political network who rose through Zhejiang and is considered a close confidant of Xi Jinping. From May 2015 to October 2017, Li Xi served as Party Secretary of Liaoning Province. In October 2017, Tang Yijun was appointed Deputy Party Secretary of Liaoning Province. From January 2018 to April 2020, he served as Governor of Liaoning Province.

After that, from Oct. 28, 2017 to October 2022, Li Xi served as Party Secretary of Guangdong Province and was "elected" to the Politburo, preparing for advancement into the Politburo Standing Committee. Later, Xi Jinping removed former Minister of Justice Fu Zhenghua and former Minister of Public Security Sun Lijun, and promoted Tang Yijun, despite his troubled background, to become Minister of Justice in Beijing.

**Tang's demise**

On Feb. 2, Tang Yijun was sentenced to life imprisonment. His charges were mainly based on testimony from Evergrande chairman Xu Jiayin. Xu Jiayin had extensive dealings with officials in

many provinces and cities; for example, Evergrande Group's cooperation agreements with Guangdong Province and Liaoning Province were nominally formal partnerships but were actually channels for illicit benefit transfers. Tang Yijun ultimately became implicated through Xu Jiayin.

On April 13–14, 2026, Xu Jiayin's case was publicly heard at the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court. He had previously implicated Ma Xingrui and Tang Yijun, leading to both being taken down under pressure from anti-Xi factions within the CCP. Xi Jinping delayed for a long time but ultimately could not protect Ma Xingrui, resulting in his official downfall.

Chen Pokong stated that Li Xi has therefore been implicated by three individuals: Xu Jiayin, Tang Yijun, and Ma Xingrui. The materials provided by these three are sufficient to bring down Li Xi. Unless Xi Jinping decides to fully protect Li Xi, as a Politburo Standing Committee member under the CCP's unwritten rule that "Standing Committee members are above legal prosecution," Li Xi's alleged crimes are no less serious than those of Ma Xingrui, Tang Yijun, and Xu Jiayin.

**Analysis: Xi may not be able to protect Li Xi**

Chen Pokong said that Xu Jiayin is a private entrepreneur and the main briber, playing a more passive role in transferring benefits. Ma Xingrui, who served in the military industry and later governed Guangzhou and Xinjiang, allegedly transferred benefits to the Peng Liyuan family and is a key figure. Li Xi, however, as Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), holds major disciplinary power. During Ma Xingrui's tenure as Party Secretary of Shenzhen and Governor of Guangdong, he was under Li Xi's authority, and therefore would have had to "show respect" to him.

Chen Pokong believes that when Tang Yijun was transferred to Liaoning, he was originally meant to take over Li Xi's position. At that time, Li Xi had already arranged cooperation projects with Xu Jiayin. When Tang Yijun inherited this system, it would have been impossible for him not to "show respect" to Li Xi.

Among these wealth-generating projects, Li Xi was likely the "main figure," standing above Tang Yijun, Ma Xingrui, and Xu Jiayin in the hierarchy. The materials provided by these individuals could therefore place Li Xi in an extremely precarious position within the CCP.

**More purges on the horizon?**

One early sign, according to the analysis, was that in November 2025, Ma Xingrui was absent from a Politburo meeting for the first time, and Li Xi was also absent. It was said that Zhang Youxia, who attended the meeting at the time, became angry and stated: "How can someone like Ma Xingrui still attend Politburo meetings? He should no longer be present." It was reported that Ma Xingrui was subsequently taken away, and Li Xi was also strongly reprimanded by anti-Xi factions and Zhang Youxia, which explained his absence from the meeting.

Li Xi later reappeared in public as usual. But shortly after that, Xi allegedly launched a "political purge," leading to the downfall of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, which caused subtle shifts in the political situation. At one point, it was believed outside the system that Xi could protect Ma Xingrui, but in the end Ma Xingrui was officially announced to have fallen from power.

Chen Pokong pointed out that since Xi Jinping ultimately could not protect Ma Xingrui, the question remains whether he can protect Li Xi. He believes this is difficult, because corruption cases are mainly concentrated among Xi's own faction. Li Xi, as head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, is supposed to be an anti-corruption official, yet he is also allegedly deeply involved in corruption—something that is difficult to justify.

Moreover, after Ma Xingrui, Tang Yijun, and Xu Jiayin were investigated, the materials they provided reportedly included extensive references to Li Xi's alleged corruption. During internal CCP discussions, this would further implicate him. Taken together, these factors could increase the likelihood of Li Xi's downfall.

Even if he does not fall from power while still holding a Politburo Standing Committee position, due to the CCP's unwritten rule that "Standing Committee members are above legal punishment," once he steps down after the 21st Party Congress, his fate may resemble that of former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang: Prosecuted, sentenced, and sent to Qincheng Prison.

**Editorial note:** This article is based on publicly circulating reports and commentary from independent analysts. The claims described have not been independently verified by Vision Times, and relevant authorities have not publicly confirmed the allegations.

## Why leading Chinese scientists are rising to the top in the Communist Party

21 April 2026, SCMP

The number of members from China's leading scientific and engineering institutes in the top ranks of the Communist Party has doubled over the course of a decade, according to a new report.

It said the number of academicians in the party's 18th Central Committee, selected in 2012, stood at 15, accounting for around 3.5 per cent of the total membership.

But when the 20th Central Committee started its five-year term in 2022, this total had risen to 30, around 8 per cent of the total, including seven full members.

The Central Committee has more than 350 members – including full and alternate – and is a

key decision-making body for directing policy and endorsing changes to the party leadership.
This increase is particularly noteworthy, as scientists historically had limited direct representation in the party's top leadership and instead acted as consultants.
Meanwhile, provincial leaders, military officers and senior political figures typically dominated the upper ranks.
Academician is a lifetime title awarded by the country's leading official research institutions, such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE).
The new members of these bodies are chosen every two years and no more than 200 can join at a time.
At present CAS has 893 members and CAE has 984.
The increased role played by academicians reflects the increasing importance of scientific and technological backgrounds in the selection of China's political elites, according to the report's authors, Li Cheng, the founding director of the Centre on Contemporary China and the World, a think tank based at the University of Hong Kong, and Zhao Xiuye, a researcher at the centre.
Leading scientists are now also being given an increased role in government, either by shaping policy in related fields or through being given provincial leadership roles – a trend the report described as a "revolving door with Chinese characteristics".
A typical example is Education Minister Huai Jinpeng, a computer scientist who became a member of the CAS in 2009.
He was appointed vice-minister of industry and information technology in 2015 and became a member of the Central Committee two years later.
The report said Huai's background meant that the former president of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics could play a role in shaping industrial policy and educational reform.
Although there are no academicians in the Politburo, the party's core decision-making body, its members include several with scientific or technological backgrounds who entered politics through this "revolving door".
These include Chen Jining, the Shanghai party chief and a former environmental scientist; Li Ganjie, a physicist and former head of the National Nuclear Safety Administration; Yuan Jiajun, a former aerospace engineer and chief designer of the Shenzhou spacecraft project; and Vice-Premier Zhang Guoqing, a former defence contractor.
Li and Zhao said the increasing prominence of scientists in such roles reflected the leadership's increasing focus on "new-quality productivity" – a phrase coined by President Xi Jinping to describe the increasing importance of hi-tech fields such as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics and aerospace to economic development.
The report – published in Think China, an online commentary magazine published by the Singaporean newspaper Lianhe Zaobao – added that Beijing had been actively recruiting academicians in these emerging fields to sit on the Central Committee.
It cited the example of Chen Jie, an AI specialist and member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, who is now an alternate member of the Central Committee and vice-minister for education.
However, in recent years the country's top scientists have also faced increased scrutiny as part of China's long-running anti-corruption campaign.
At least six former members or alternate members of the Central Committee have been removed from the list of academicians since 2012.
No official reason has been given for their removal, but it is a strong indication that the scientists are under investigation for suspected corruption.

## CCP Confirms Purge Of Nine Senior Generals And Three Military-Industrial Leaders Over Discipline Violations

20 April 2026, Vision Times



*March 9, 2026, representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) military entered the Great Hall of the People to attend the second plenary meeting of the National People's Congress. (Image: Getty Images)*

Recently, the CCP's latest bulletin from the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the first time disclosed the reasons behind the downfall of nine senior military generals. All of them are "suspected of serious violations of discipline and law." Meanwhile, three senior officials from the military-industrial system were also brought down for "suspected violations of discipline and law."

**First disclosure of reasons behind the downfall of nine senior generals**

On April 17, 2026, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the CCP released Bulletin No. 2 of 2026. In the "Report on the Qualifications of Certain Deputies," it was revealed for the first time that the following individuals were all removed from their positions

as deputies to the National People's Congress due to "suspected serious violations of discipline and law":

- Li Wei, former Political Commissar of the Information Support Force (General)
- Li Qiaoming, former Commander of the Army (General)
- Shen Jinlong, former Commander of the Navy (General)
- Qin Shengxiang, former Political Commissar of the Navy (General)
- Yu Zhongfu, former Political Commissar of the Air Force (General)
- Wang Donghai, former Political Commissar of the Central Military Commission's National Defense Mobilization Department (Lieutenant General)
- Bian Ruifeng, former Assistant Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission (Major General)
- Ding Laifu, Commander of the 73rd Group Army (Major General)
- Yang Guang, former Commander of Base 64 of the Rocket Force (Major General)

Among them, on Jan. 26, 2026, the CCP Central Military Commission's National Defense Mobilization Department held a military representatives' meeting and removed Wang Donghai from his position as a deputy to the National People's Congress.

On Jan.23, 2026, the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission of the CCP convened a military representatives' meeting and removed Bian Ruifeng from his position as a deputy to the National People's Congress.

On Jan. 19, 2026, the CCP Army held a military representatives' meeting and removed Li Qiaoming and Ding Laifu from their positions as deputies to the National People's Congress.

On Jan. 19, 2026, the CCP Rocket Force held a military representatives' meeting and removed Yang Guang from his position as a deputy to the National People's Congress.

On Jan. 13, 2026, the CCP Navy held a military representatives' meeting and removed Shen Jinlong and Qin Shengxiang from their positions as deputies to the National People's Congress.

On Jan. 9, 2026, the CCP Information Support Force held a military representatives' meeting and removed Li Wei from his position as a deputy to the National People's Congress.

On Dec. 22, 2025, the CCP Air Force held a military representatives' meeting and removed Yu Zhongfu from his position as a deputy to the National People's Congress.

Meanwhile, the "Report on the Qualifications of Certain Deputies" also disclosed for the first time that in 2021, after General Shen Jinlong stepped down as Commander of the Navy, he was reassigned as a full-time member of the Strategic Planning Committee of the Central Military Commission. After Major General Yang Guang stepped down as Commander of Base 64 of the CCP Rocket Force, he was reassigned as a full-time deputy commander of the Hubei Provincial Military District.

This inevitably brings to mind that when former Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui was officially announced to have been removed from office, his new position was disclosed for the first time as "Deputy Head of the Central Rural Work Leading Group."

On Feb. 26, 2026, an announcement issued after the closing of a meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress showed that the qualifications of 19 NPC deputies were terminated, including the nine generals mentioned above.

**Mapping the network of relationships among the fallen generals**

Zhang Tianliang, U.S.-based political commentator, analyzed in his self-media program that General Li Wei, former Political Commissar of the Information Support Force, had long been engaged in political work rather than serving as a military commander. He mainly held positions such as Director of the Political Department and Deputy Political Commissar of the CCP Army's 47th Group Army, Political Commissar of the South Xinjiang Military District, Political Commissar of the 21st Group Army, and Political Commissar and Party Committee member of the Xinjiang Military District, before later becoming the first Political Commissar of the Information Support Force.

Zhang Tianliang pointed out that Li Wei is similar to Miao Hua, former Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, and He Weidong, former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CCP—both of whom were primarily engaged in political work. Li Wei likely had close ties with Miao Hua and may have been implicated and brought down as a result.

Li Qiaoming served as Commander of the CCP Northern Theater Command in 2016, and later became Commander of the CCP Army, being promoted to the rank of General. Zhang Tianliang noted that the Army is where Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, built his career. Both Li Qiaoming and Zhang Youxia participated in the Battle of Laoshan, and therefore had a very close relationship—Li is considered a trusted confidant of Zhang. However, he has not been seen for quite some time.

According to a report by CCTV News, the CCP's official media outlet, the Central Military Commission held a ceremony at the Bayi Building in Beijing on December 23, 2024, to promote officers to the rank of General. According to pro-Beijing Hong Kong media *Sing Tao Daily*, four generals were absent from the ceremony, including Army Commander Li Qiaoming, former Army Political Commissar Qin Shutong, Armed Police Commander Wang Chunning, and Navy Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi.

On Dec. 23, 2024, there were posts on the X platform claiming that Li Qiaoming had been dismissed, and that internal power struggles between Xi Jinping and Zhang Youxia had intensified to a critical stage.

Zhang Tianliang pointed out that Admiral Shen Jinlong, former Commander of the Navy, came up through the CCP Navy system and naturally had close ties with Miao Hua, who also worked within the naval system.

Meanwhile, Admiral Qin Shengxiang, former Political Commissar of the Navy, served as Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission when Xi Jinping first came to power. Entrusted by Xi, Qin also concurrently served, starting in 2016, as Director of the Office for Military Reform and Organization of the Central Military Commission. Zhang Tianliang said that Qin Shengxiang played a key role in military reforms, helping Xi transform the previous seven military regions into five theater commands, and could be considered someone Xi trusted deeply.

Zhang Tianliang believes that if this had happened a year ago, Qin Shengxiang's downfall would have been interpreted as a sign that Xi Jinping was "finished." However, with the official announcement of Qin's removal now, it suggests that Xi is carrying out a "Zhu Yuanzhang-style" large-scale purge. He further noted that in 2017 Qin Shengxiang became Political Commissar of the Navy and was promoted to General in 2019. This shows that his transfer from the Central Military Commission General Office to a substantive role as Navy Political Commissar was effectively a promotion and preparation for his eventual elevation to General. However, Qin may have fallen because, as Navy Political Commissar, he had relatively close ties with Miao Hua.

Zhang Tianliang also stated that General Yu Zhongfu, former Political Commissar of the Air Force, came from the Air Force and likely did not have particularly close ties with Miao Hua, He Weidong, or even Zhang Youxia. He may have been brought down due to involvement in corruption related to the Equipment Development Department.

Zhang further predicted that in the future, it may become difficult to see official announcements about the downfall of military officials. This is because most generals have already been removed, and currently many lieutenant generals are filling positions nominally held by generals. These lieutenant generals may not be members of the National People's Congress or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, so even if they are removed, it is unlikely that such official announcements will be made.

**Reasons for the downfall of three senior military-industrial officials revealed**

On Feb. 4, 2026, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the CCP issued an announcement stating that three representatives from the military-industrial system—Zhou Xinmin, former chairman of AVIC; Liu Cangli, president of the China Academy of Engineering Physics; and Luo Qi, chief engineer of China National Nuclear Corporation—were removed from their positions as deputies to the National People's Congress. However, at that time, no reasons were given for their dismissal.

In Bulletin No. 2 of 2026 issued by the NPC Standing Committee, the "Report on the Qualifications of Certain Deputies" disclosed for the first time that Zhou Xinmin, Luo Qi, and Liu Cangli were removed due to "suspected violations of discipline and law."

Subsequently, the official website of the Chinese Academy of Engineering removed information related to academician Luo Qi, and the official website of the Chinese Academy of Sciences removed information related to academician Liu Cangli. Both Luo Qi and Liu Cangli were also removed from the list of academicians.

## China: Fears of a Further Crackdown on Netizens Illegally Accessing Foreign Sites

17 April 2026, Bitter Winter

Xi Jinping himself is promoting a campaign to prevent the Chinese from reaching uncensored news, entertainment, and academic resources from abroad.

Virtual Private Networks, commonly known as VPNs, and the so-called "airports" that many Chinese internet users depend on are not sophisticated hacking tools. They are straightforward services that let regular users connect to the broader internet instead of the limited area controlled by China's censors. A VPN sets up an encrypted tunnel to a server outside the country, while an "airport" is a black-market service that offers access to these tunnels in an easy-to-use format.

Many Chinese users use them to watch international entertainment services, but their true importance goes beyond that. Without these tools, it becomes impossible to read uncensored news, access foreign academic resources, or visit websites blocked by the Great Firewall, including "Bitter Winter." VPNs and airports are the only ladders people can use to see beyond the "official" Internet.

Recently, a series of internal notices shared online and collected by "China Digital Times" has raised concerns that these ladders might soon be forcibly removed. One document from a regional content-delivery provider shares instructions from its upstream telecom partner requiring that all international connections be terminated for business clients. The wording is broad: every IP address under their control must block traffic to any location outside mainland China. The same notice directs customers to remove any signs of VPNs, proxies, or other tools used to bypass restrictions. Those who do not comply will face

immediate disconnection, data loss, and no refunds.

The memo seems to be part of a broader trend, not just an isolated overreaction by one company. Other providers have reported issuing similar warnings. Additionally, a separate document—allegedly from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology—invites major state telecom companies to a meeting focused on tightening control over unauthorized cross-border data connections. The emphasis on "dedicated lines" might sound technical, but it refers to any method that allows information to flow beyond the Great Firewall without official approval. When the ministry calls for a special meeting on such matters, it typically indicates that an organized effort to enforce compliance is underway.

Another document, an invitation to a seminar at the Cyberspace Administration of China, does not mention VPNs at all. However, it encourages officials to explore Xi Jinping's "key thoughts on national cyber power," a phrase that has come to signify the ideological basis for China's increasingly interventionist policy in the digital realm. Attendees are asked to leave their phones in lockers and stay in the meeting room for the entire session—a small but significant hint of the environment in which these policies are formed.

The renewed focus on "airports" is no accident. These services have thrived due to widespread demand for uncensored access. Researchers have found that airport providers operate in a competitive, low-profit market, offering affordable monthly plans and a variety of foreign servers. Some serve thousands of customers, many of whom have little understanding of the technology involved. They buy a small device online, connect it to their home router, and access foreign websites almost instantly. For many, this is not a political statement but a basic necessity: they want to watch a foreign show, read an international newspaper, or access a blocked academic article. Yet the normality of this behavior is what troubles the authorities. A tool that makes it easy to bypass censorship is inherently a threat to a system that relies on that censorship.

Legal experts have long pointed out that China's rules on VPNs exist in a gray area. Creating or selling tools to bypass restrictions has always carried risks, and there have been occasional crackdowns on service providers. However, ordinary users have usually faced little more than occasional fines. The new draft Cybercrime Law, currently under discussion, raises concerns that this gray area may tighten further. Some analysts believe that the draft includes provisions regarding unauthorized international connections, which could be interpreted in ways that increase pressure on both providers and users. Whether this suggests a shift toward full criminalization remains unclear, but the timing of recent corporate and governmental notices suggests enforcement could become stricter even without new laws.

For Chinese internet users relying on VPNs and airports to access the outside world, the consequences are significant. Losing access to foreign entertainment would be a nuisance. Losing access to uncensored information would be much worse. Bypass tools enable citizens to compare sources, verify information, and understand how the world views their country. They allow scholars, journalists, and everyday readers to access materials that would otherwise remain blocked. They help those interested in religious freedom, human rights, or social issues read reports that domestic platforms would never publish.

If fully enforced, the new wave of restrictions would further expand the Great Firewall, which makes the Chinese Internet an enclosed garden. As always, the initial victims of such measures are not criminals or extremists, but ordinary people who want more than government-approved information allows. Whether the current notices signal the start of a sustained effort or a temporary display of strength remains to be seen. At any rate, in the battle between control and connectivity, the authorities are again signaling that control must come first.

In China, simply reading a foreign website becomes a subtle declaration of intellectual independence. The tools that facilitate this—VPNs, airports, and other circumvention methods—are crucial because they support the freedom to access information. This is precisely why they are under threat, and why the world needs to pay attention.

## 'Complaint Against Xi Jinping' Allegedly Filed in Shenzhen, Screenshots Circulate Online

18 April 2026, Vision Times




*Someone has filed a complaint with the Shenzhen municipal government against Xi Jinping, calling on people within the system to overthrow the Communist Party. (Image: online screenshot)*

On April 17, a message claiming that "someone filed a complaint with the Shenzhen municipal government against Xi Jinping, demanding that the Communist Party step down!" spread widely on social media platforms. The complaint letter also

called on conscientious public officials within Shenzhen government agencies to immediately oppose the Communist Party, "save the nation," and overthrow the CCP, drawing widespread attention.

According to two screenshots posted on April 17 by X (Twitter) user "Furinana (Return of the King version)," the case request number is: 042603241116973619901. The subject of the complaint reads: "Shenzhen Public Security Bureau, please stop making threats; I maintain my stance that Xi Jinping is a dictator and that the CCP should be overthrown." The complaint states:

"If the Shenzhen public security authorities are truly capable, they should follow formal legal procedures, contact China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then request extradition from the Swiss government through diplomatic channels, rather than merely harassing my family members in China."

I reiterate: the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China are not subordinate to each other, and the PRC has no right to represent Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party is nothing but a group of bastards. Overthrowing the CCP and ending the socialist authoritarian system is the political responsibility of every Chinese person. The dictatorial traitor Xi Jinping, who practices totalitarian rule, will meet a bad end and will sooner or later face the judgment of history. I hereby call on conscientious public officials within Shenzhen government agencies to immediately oppose the CCP, save the nation, and overthrow the Chinese Communist Party.

I will not change the above stance, nor will I give up expressing it due to any form of threats, pressure, or indirect influence (including actions targeting my family). If the Shenzhen Public Security Bureau continues to threaten my family, I will expose within the CCP system—through petition mailboxes at the national, provincial, municipal, and county levels, as well as government information disclosure channels—allegations that Xi Jinping used his brother-in-law Deng Jiagui to set up offshore companies for corruption, and that his sister Xi Qiaoqiao and niece Zhang Yannian illegally hold overseas assets, thereby fully exposing the alleged crimes of the dictatorial traitor Xi Jinping.

Address involved: Nanshan Subdistrict, Nanshan District.

According to the screenshots, the above complaint has already been accepted. The acceptance date was March 24, 2026. The Shenzhen Public Security Bureau responded on April 3.

In response, some netizens commented: "It doesn't matter who comes to power—there are countless 'Xi Jinpings' in China. The only solution is to change the system, replacing one-man authoritarian rule with democratic elections similar to those in the United States… If Chinese




people are to truly live like those in a normal country and enjoy various rights, the system must be changed."

As early as 2016, during the Chinese Communist Party's "Two Sessions," a group calling themselves "loyal Communist Party members" published an open letter calling for Xi Jinping to resign.

Late at night on March 4, 2016, *Wujie News*, a Party propaganda outlet under the Cyberspace Administration of China, suddenly published an open letter signed "loyal Communist Party members," titled "Request for Comrade Xi Jinping to Resign from His Party and State Leadership Positions." The letter listed multiple reasons for demanding his resignation and accused Xi of governance failures and authoritarian tendencies, stating that he "lacks the ability to lead the Party and the country into the future and is not suitable to continue serving as General Secretary."

However, shortly after the open letter was published, it was deleted, and the Wujie News website was also shut down. According to reports, Wujie initially explained to authorities that it had

been hacked, and later claimed the incident was caused by an "automatic content aggregation" feature. As this occurred during the politically sensitive period of the CCP's "Two Sessions," the incident drew outside attention. Not long afterward, the Wujie News site stopped producing its own reporting and only republished state media content. Later, multiple Wujie News employees—including senior executives—were detained over the incident.

In recent years, public calls to "overthrow the CCP" and for "Xi Jinping to step down" have never truly ceased; instead, they have intensified.

In February 2020, rights lawyer Xu Zhiyong published a "Letter of Persuasion to Resign," criticizing Xi Jinping's pandemic and Hong Kong policies and calling for him to step down. In 2023, Xu Zhiyong was sentenced to 14 years in prison.

In May 2020, Shandong poet Lu Yang (Zhang Guiqi) posted a video on WeChat reciting lines such as "Xi Jinping step down; the CCP's authoritarian regime must end," after which he was arrested.

In October 2022, Peng Lifa broadcast recordings and hung banners on Sitong Bridge in Beijing reading "Xi Jinping step down; the Communist Party step down." After his arrest, his whereabouts have remained unknown. The Sitong Bridge incident helped spark the "White Paper Movement"; in November of the same year, protests spread across multiple locations, with people in cities such as Shanghai and Beijing taking to the streets chanting "Communist Party step down!" and prompting solidarity demonstrations overseas.

On Aug. 29, 2025, Chongqing resident Qi Hong displayed large anti-CCP slogans via projection on a high-rise building in Xijie, University Town, Chongqing. The messages included: "Only without the Communist Party can there be a new China; freedom is not a gift—it must be reclaimed," "Rise up, those unwilling to be slaves; rise up and fight to reclaim your rights," "Down with red fascism; overthrow Communist tyranny," and "No more lies—want truth; no more enslavement—want freedom; the tyrannical Communist Party must step down."

In October 2025, just after the conclusion of the CCP's 20th Central Committee Fourth Plenum, someone hung two anti-CCP banners on the streets of Sanlitun in Beijing. The messages directly stated: "The essence of the Communist Party is an anti-human cult that will bring endless disaster to China," and "Lift the ban on political parties; allow free party formation, free competition, and free choice; establish a new China based on freedom, humanity, and the rule of law."

Since the beginning of 2026, several widely circulated online videos have drawn attention. In one video, a young man angrily curses the CCP: "I love my country, but I don't love the ruling party of my country—I'm talking about the Communist Party! Don't you have any damn awareness?!"

Another young man stands on the street shouting: "Down with the Communist Party! Down with dictatorship! Down with evil!" In a busy district of Guangzhou, a shirtless young man yells angrily at police and a large crowd of onlookers: "Communist Party, I *** you!" …

On the overseas platform X, a post saying, "I think the Communist Party stepping down is only a matter of two or three years! At the latest, not beyond 2028! What do you all think?" went viral, receiving 810,000 views in just three days. The comment section was highly active:

"It's possible the Communist Party will step down in 2027!"

"It's half-dead—probably can last another five years."

"The fall of authoritarian rule is already in a countdown! Good news could come at any time!"

"I believe the disintegration of the CCP is getting closer and closer, so if you haven't withdrawn from the Party, Youth League, or Young Pioneers yet, declare your withdrawal quickly. If the CCP collapses one day, all opportunities will be gone."

## China codifies repression of overseas activists under new law

17 April 2026, Muslim Network

Beijing's law targets critics abroad while promising support for diaspora members who promote government ideology

China has introduced a sweeping new law ostensibly aimed at promoting "ethnic unity," but experts warn it will also deepen the state's reach in monitoring and deterring critics living outside its borders.

The law, approved earlier this month by China's legislature, primarily targets domestic affairs — mandating the use of Mandarin as the primary medium of education in schools and calling for intermarriage and geographic integration between the Han majority and China's 55 other recognized ethnicities.

But it also explicitly addresses overseas communities. "Organizations and individuals outside the territory of the PRC that commit acts aimed at the PRC that undermine ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division are to be pursued for legal responsibility in accordance with law," the legislation states.

Analysts say the law codifies and extends the Chinese Communist Party's long-standing practice of transnational repression. Emile Dirks, a research associate at the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto who studies transnational repression, described it as "a sword of Damocles hanging over people's heads." Even if formal extradition against overseas activists remains rare, the explicit codification creates a chilling effect on those engaged in causes the Chinese government deems threatening.

The law's Article 21 strikes a more positive tone, pledging state support for diaspora members who carry forward Chinese culture — reflecting what Dirks describes as Beijing's two-pronged approach: rewarding sympathetic diaspora voices while silencing critical ones.

Silencing tactics include visa denials and using family members remaining in China as leverage, according to Bhuchung Tsering, vice president of the International Campaign for Tibet. "People outside Tibet, in exile, who talk about China's abuses of Tibetans, who talk about China's imposition of Mandarin on Tibetans, can in theory be prosecuted under this law," he said.

For Chinese citizens planning to return home, activism abroad carries even greater risk. Last summer, Zhang Yadi, a Chinese student who began writing for a pro-Tibet newsletter while studying abroad, disappeared after returning to China and is believed to be held at a detention center in Changsha on charges of "inciting separatism."

Prominent human rights lawyer Teng Biao said the new law is ultimately about efficiency. "It's true that without written laws, the party can also achieve their goals. But that's more inconvenient. That's more expensive," he said.

## China Introduces 'National Security' Textbooks in Schools Nationwide

17 April 2026, NTD

New curriculum embeds Communist Party loyalty and political themes starting from elementary school, drawing criticism over ideological influence on students.



*Students salute as a national flag is raised during a ceremony on the first day of the new school year at an elementary school in Beijing on Sept. 1, 2021. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)*

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has introduced a new set of so-called national security textbooks for students across the country, embedding political themes such as loyalty to the Party into classrooms.

The four-volume series, titled "National Security Education Readers for Primary and Secondary Students," has been rolled out nationwide and is intended for use from elementary through high school, according to Chinese state media Xinhua New Agency on April 15. The books were compiled under the direction of the country's National Textbook Department under the Ministry of Education.

The rollout marks the latest step in the CCP's broader push to integrate political and ideological education more deeply into China's school system, extending it to younger age groups.

Several China-based educators and analysts who are critical of the regime's move spoke to The Epoch Times on condition of anonymity or only revealing their surnames out of fear of reprisal.

Political Ideology Introduced Early

Content from the textbooks emphasizes the CCP's role in maintaining national stability and frames national security in explicitly political terms.

In the elementary school edition, students are taught that the country's safety and stability are the result of collective efforts "under the leadership of the Party."

At the middle school level, lessons stress that "national interests come first."

High school materials focus on a framework of guiding principles—including adherence to Party leadership over national security and the concept of a "comprehensive national security outlook"—as core components of instruction.

A bookseller in Beijing surnamed Wu told The Epoch Times that the series is being positioned as an "authoritative" resource for national security education and will be used alongside existing political education materials, including textbooks on Xi Jinping Thought, the state ideology and guiding doctrine for the CCP and China.

Some critics say the curriculum reflects an effort to reshape how young people understand the relationship between the state, the Party, and individual rights.

"The core of what the CCP calls 'national security' is ultimately political security, meaning the security of the regime itself," a current affairs analyst from China's Shenyang city told The Epoch Times.

"Teaching elementary school students about Party leadership in this context effectively merges the Party with the state and redefines what 'security' means."

The analyst said the goal of the curriculum is less about educating students and more about encouraging acceptance of existing power structures.

"It is about instilling obedience [to the authorities]," he said, adding that he had chosen to send his own child abroad for education.

Others warn that the approach could have long-term effects on students' critical thinking.

A retired Chinese middle school teacher surnamed Xue told The Epoch Times that Chinese state media actively promoted the new textbooks in recent weeks. She said that these materials could weaken critical thinking among young people and make them more inclined to accept authority without question.

"The CCP's textbook plants seeds of fear and absolute obedience," she said. "It risks turning students into instruments of the regime, rather than citizens with a sense of civic awareness."

Part of a Broader Trend

The introduction of the national security textbooks comes amid a wider tightening of ideological oversight in the CCP's education system.

In recent years, Chinese universities have been instructed to avoid discussion of topics deemed politically sensitive, especially concepts often described as Western. In regions such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia, the CCP has replaced minority language instruction with Mandarin.

A Chinese scholar surnamed Du told The Epoch Times that the expansion of political education reflects growing concern within the CCP about shaping the attitudes of younger generations.

"Indoctrination is starting earlier and becoming more systematic," he said, citing anecdotal examples of young children adopting political language at home. "When a system relies on continuous indoctrination to maintain [public] approval, it can also suggest underlying insecurity."

As social and economic pressures mount in China, Du said the CCP's focus on youth education has intensified, with curriculum design increasingly tied to political priorities.

He noted that efforts to align education closely with state ideology are not without historical precedent—particularly in highly centralized systems—underscoring that schools are being used not only to impart knowledge but also to shape political outlooks from an early age.

## China Enacts Law to Counter Foreign Extraterritorial Jurisdiction

13 April 2026, China Scope

China officially implemented the "Regulations Against Foreign Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction" today, establishing a legal framework to counter what Beijing considers overreaching foreign sanctions. The move comes just ahead of an anticipated summit between President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Trump, scheduled for May 14–15 in Beijing, and is widely seen as a pointed warning signal.

Signed by Premier Li Qiang and published by Xinhua on April 13, the regulations take effect immediately upon publication. The stated aim is to safeguard China's national sovereignty, security, and development interests, protect the lawful rights of Chinese citizens and organizations, and uphold an international order grounded in international law.

The regulations, comprising 20 articles, establish three main pillars. First, they define the scope of application: when a foreign government violates international law and basic norms of international relations through improper extraterritorial measures that harm China's interests, Beijing reserves the right to respond — including by asserting its own extraterritorial jurisdiction over conduct with an appropriate connection to China.

Second, the regulations create a system to identify, block, and counter such foreign measures. No organization or individual may execute or assist in enforcing foreign extraterritorial measures against China. A "malicious entity list" will be established targeting foreign organizations and individuals who promote or participate in such measures, along with a prohibition order system and corresponding legal liabilities.

Third, the regulations strengthen support mechanisms, allowing Chinese citizens and organizations to sue parties whose enforcement of foreign measures infringes on their lawful rights. Industry associations are also called upon to provide guidance to members.

Countermeasures available to the Chinese government include visa denials, entry bans, deportation, asset freezes, restrictions on transactions and investment, import and export prohibitions, and fines, among other steps.

## Xinhua Drops Xi Jinping From a Line That Used to Place Him Alongside Mao Zedong

11 April 2026, Vision Times

A flagship state media piece backing Xi's April 2026 purge of the Chinese military high command dropped his name from a line that had long been used to place him alongside Mao Zedong

On April 8, 2026, China's official Xinhua News Agency released a set-piece article titled "Forging a Stronger Army of Heroes: Chairman Xi Jinping Leads the Entire Military in Deepening Political Rectification Through the Spirit of Self-Revolution." The piece was timed to open a new political rectification campaign inside the People's Liberation Army, and it follows the pattern the CCP has always used before a crackdown, flooding the propaganda channels in the days before the targets start falling. Resentment inside the PLA officer corps is already running high, and the Xinhua piece, read closely, suggests Xi Jinping is turning the heat up from a position of weakness.

The second sentence of the Xinhua article reads: "On the foundation of Mao Zedong's original answer, 'let the people supervise the government,' the Chinese Communists of the new era have given a second answer: the Party's self-revolution."

The slot now filled by "the Chinese Communists of the new era" had routinely been occupied, in earlier versions of this formula, by Xi Jinping's own name. Placing Xi's name there was one of the Party's favorite rhetorical devices for putting him on the same historical plane as Mao, the CCP's founding chairman. Replacing it with an anonymous collective noun is a meaningful demotion. It also runs directly counter to what Xi is trying to accomplish with his new campaign,

since a “political rectification” modeled on Mao’s 1942 Yan’an Rectification Movement is supposed to amplify a leader’s personality cult, not quietly deflate it.

The timing of the Xinhua piece leaves no doubt about its purpose. It ran the same day the first session of a new “training class for senior officers of the entire military” opened, and the same day the commander of the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command, General Yang Zhibin, published a signed article in Study Times, the newspaper of the Central Party School. The three pieces together form the opening salvo of a political purge aimed at the top of the Chinese military command.

Party elders appear to be pushing back on Xi’s campaign

Xi Jinping has most likely run into serious criticism from the Party’s old guard, the retired elders who still wield informal influence over the top leadership, and the editors who produced the Xinhua piece quietly made room for that pressure. Large numbers of senior officers have been taken down in recent months, but Xi’s confidence appears to have been visibly weakened by the same campaign he launched.

A second sign of that weakening appears later in the article, in a line about the “profound and complex changes in the world, the country, the Party, and the military.” The phrasing is a deliberate fog. What the author will not say out loud is that the trends in the world, the country, and the PLA are all moving in directions unfavorable to the Party. Otherwise the piece would not be reaching, in the very next breath, for one of the Party’s oldest survival slogans, “escaping the historical cycle of order and chaos,” an internal euphemism for the existential fear that the CCP itself may one day collapse.

The rest of the article is straightforward cover fire for the purge that is about to begin.

**What ‘building the army through politics’ really means in CCP jargon**

The Xinhua piece returns repeatedly to the phrase “building the army through politics,” and Yang Zhibin’s Study Times article, published the same day, echoes the theme by calling for a crackdown on what it labels “false combat readiness” that has strayed from the demands of “actual combat.”

The language the Party uses here is jargon whose meaning has nothing to do with the English words on the page. When CCP official media talks about “false combat readiness” or “false combat effectiveness,” it is not saying that the troops cannot fight. It is saying that the troops are not sufficiently indoctrinated. The criterion is whether “politics is in command,” a phrase that Cultural Revolution-era defense minister Lin Biao used repeatedly in the 1960s to mean the same thing. In this framework, a unit with excellent weapons, excellent tactics, and excellent morale still suffers from “false combat effectiveness” if its political loyalty to the Party leader is in doubt. Xi’s talk of “building the army through politics” and Yang’s attack on “false combat readiness” are two versions of the same message.

That is also why the Party keeps returning to the 1929 Gutian Conference as a reference point, since the Gutian resolution explicitly attacked what it called the “purely military viewpoint,” the dangerous idea that “if the military is good, politics will naturally be good; if the military is bad, politics will not be good either.”

**Xi Jinping fears his own officer corps more than he fears Washington**

Xi Jinping is less frightened of losing a shooting war with the United States, Japan, or Taiwan than he is of the people inside his own officer corps harboring second thoughts about him. He worries that the supporters and sympathizers of the purged Central Military Commission vice chairman Zhang Youxia, or of the purged army chief Liu Zhenli, may one day stage a repeat of the 1976 Huairen Hall coup, the Politburo-backed move that ended the Cultural Revolution by arresting Mao’s widow and her closest allies within weeks of his death. From its founding, the CCP has always feared its own cadres more than its external enemies.

That fear is why the Xinhua article uses the word “political” more than seventy times across its headline and body. Xi is trying to build ideological insurance against the possibility that someone inside the military will do to him what recent events have done to Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro or to Iran’s supreme leader Ali KhameneiXi Jinping does not trust the people holding the guns

Stripped of Party-speak, one sentence in the Xinhua article amounts to an admission that Xi Jinping does not trust the people currently holding the guns inside the Chinese military: “Ensure that the gun barrel is always held in the hands of those who are loyal and reliable to the Party.”

That same sentence has been appearing in CCP propaganda over and over again in recent years, and its repetition is itself a leak. The more often the regime insists that the Party firmly holds the gun, the clearer it becomes that Xi does not, in fact, hold the gun firmly at all. His mass arrests of senior officers have taken on a compulsive quality, functioning less as a rational purge than as a psychological release valve that he reaches for whenever the pressure builds.

The trap Xi has built for himself is that the pressure he keeps applying is itself the fuel. Resentment inside the PLA accumulates a little more each day, and the longer it builds, the more likely it becomes that it will one day detonate all at once.

. He is hunting for the internal enemies he believes must be embedded somewhere in the ranks, the so-called “American collaborators.”

## Xi: senior officers must 'stay pure' to meet Chinese military's centenary goal

09 April 2026, SCMP

With the countdown on in earnest to the PLA's centenary next year, President Xi Jinping has urged the corruption-battered top ranks of the military to refine their ideological purity to give the armed forces a "brand new look".

Xi told senior People's Liberation Army officers on Wednesday to maintain resolute political loyalty to the Communist Party and said that any thought or action driven by self-interest or corruption was "fundamentally against the party's nature and purpose", state media reported.

"Senior military officers must take the lead in restoring and promoting the fine traditions of our party and military … It is essential to understand discipline, be clear about rules and norms, and maintain a sense of reverence," he said.

"We must ensure that everyone is equal before laws and regulations, with no special treatment in compliance and no exceptions in enforcement."

Xi added that the PLA must "always stay pure" to meet its centenary goal, set for August 2027. Beijing has kept the details of its expectations vague. However, in his 2022 work report to the 20th party congress, Xi linked the goal to the PLA's ability to "win local wars".

He was speaking at the opening ceremony of a training course for senior military cadres from across the armed forces at the National Defence University in Beijing. The event was live-streamed across the PLA's high-level units.

The course was established after the massive anti-corruption campaign of recent years which has seen the downfall of dozens of the PLA's top brass, including five of seven members of the Central Military Commission, the top military decision-making body.

"Political rectification" – a catchphrase that means both rooting out corruption and ideological issues in the military – was included in the five-year plan covering 2026 to 2030, a document endorsed by the national legislature in March.

In his speech on Wednesday, Xi ordered military cadres at all levels to "consciously maintain the proper perspective, firmly stand on the side of the people and overcome all self-serving thoughts and distractions that alienate them from the masses".

Senior leaders should "take the lead" in political life, such as set an example of speaking truth, cultivate the magnanimity to tolerate differing views and "foster a robust atmosphere that encourages candid reporting, forthright advice and courageous struggle".

"Our party and our military have continuously grown stronger through struggles against various erroneous ideologies and conduct," Xi added.

On the same day, General Yang Zhibin, head of the PLA's Eastern Theatre Command, which oversees the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea, pledged to build up the troops' combat capabilities through improved political work such as ideological purification.

"By drawing profound lessons from the serious disciplinary and legal violations of fallen high-ranking military officers, we must accurately target and root out the ideological contagion left by their "pernicious influence'," he wrote in Study Times.

"We must truly eliminate ideological impurities, uproot erroneous concepts and correct deviations in 'world view, outlook on life and values' from the depths of the soul," Yang wrote.

Commanders from all of the PLA's five theatre commands have been either sacked for corruption or replaced after disappearing from the public eye over the past year. The investigation into Yang's predecessor, Lin Xiangyang, was announced in October.

## Earnestly study, publicize, and implement the spirit of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (NPC and CPPCC) to unite people's hearts, build consensus, and continuously enhance the "five recognitions."

08 April 2026, xzxw

Recently, Silang Nima, member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Lhasa Municipal Committee and Minister of the United Front Work Department, conducted research at Drepung Monastery and Naiqiong Monastery in Lhasa, delivering a speech on the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping's important speech during the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (NPC and CPPCC) sessions, and supervising key tasks related to the governance of religious affairs.

Yu Yungui, vice chairman of the CPPCC of the Autonomous Region, participated in the research.

Slang Nima pointed out that it is necessary to earnestly study, publicize and implement the spirit of the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, tell the story of the major achievements of my country's development and Tibet's development during the "14th Five-Year Plan" period, let the monks and nuns of the temples personally feel the development and changes in Tibet and the special care of the Party, and continuously enhance the "five recognitions".

Slang Nima visited temples to learn about their management, cultural relic protection, and fire safety work, and engaged in in-depth exchanges with temple management committee cadres, monks and nuns, and fire and rescue personnel. He emphasized the need to fully implement the Party's theories and policies on religious work in the new era, to effectively implement the "Regulations on Religious Affairs of the Tibet

Autonomous Region," and to continuously improve the rule of law in religious affairs governance. He stressed the importance of leveraging the role of religious representatives, deepening and expanding education on the "three consciousnesses" within religious communities, and earnestly carrying out the "Study Regulations, Abide by Precepts, Emphasize Cultivation, and Build a Positive Image" education campaign to promote the better and healthier inheritance and development of Tibetan Buddhism. He also emphasized the need to strengthen the investigation of fire and electricity safety hazards, ensure adequate and adequate fire-fighting equipment, establish and improve a joint management mechanism, and increase publicity on safety knowledge, carrying out fire safety work with a "constant sense of responsibility." Finally, he urged the temple management committee to earnestly conduct education on establishing and practicing a correct view of performance, to effectively publicize and implement various policies benefiting temples and monks, and to do more to build consensus and build consensus, using a correct view of performance to guide the improvement of temple management efficiency.

## The CCP strictly controls overseas social interactions, preventing those within the system from meeting with relatives and friends abroad.

07 April 2026, Epoch Times

As the CCP comprehensively upgrades its prevention of "overseas relations," personnel within the system are facing unprecedented social control. Interviews revealed that judicial system personnel generally avoid meeting with old friends returning from overseas. According to informed civil servants, such contacts have been incorporated into the reporting and political vetting system, and China's social control is transforming into a "semi-closed" state.An implicit rule, previously confined to sensitive positions, is spreading throughout the entire Chinese Communist Party (CCP) system. According to Mr. Liu, an insider within the CCP's judicial system, who spoke to The Epoch Times, since early January this year, the public security, procuratorate, and judicial systems have issued internal notices stating that any contact with individuals with overseas backgrounds is considered a potential source of risk, requiring avoidance and reporting; in severe cases, severing ties may be necessary. Even relationships with classmates and friends, which were originally considered private, are now subject to scrutiny and require explanation and reporting.

Mr. Liu said, "Right now, the authorities are strictly guarding against contact with people overseas. These people are usually your old classmates, old friends, online friends, and relatives. The main concern is leaks of secrets. Some people inadvertently reveal internal information when chatting with relatives and friends overseas, including sensitive matters that are happening, such as the arrest of corrupt officials or the Zhang Youxia incident. I think this kind of regulation is not only in the public security, procuratorate, and judicial system, but also in the municipal and district governments."

Mr. Huang Kunming (pseudonym), who lives in San Francisco, USA, returned to China in early March this year. After returning to the United States, he told reporters that his feelings about returning to China this time were completely different from those three years ago. He said, "I contacted a high school classmate in Shijiazhuang who works in the public security, procuratorate and judicial system. I sent him three messages to arrange a meeting time, but he never replied. Another time, we arranged a classmate dinner. The classmate agreed at first, but then showed up at the last minute, and he didn't answer my calls."

Huang Kunming said that he later learned from another classmate that this classmate, who worked in the Public Security Bureau, had internal discipline that required him to ask for permission from his superiors before contacting people from overseas: "It means that you have to explain the background of the classmate you are meeting, especially classmates from the United States. They have to conduct internal screening, so the other party does not dare to meet me privately."

He added that he had heard in the past that there was a so-called "walking 500,000" in China, which offered a reward of up to 500,000 yuan for reporting spies. "This time, I really felt this atmosphere from my classmate."

Another engineer, Song Xuan (pseudonym), who immigrated to the UK years ago, had a similar experience. She told The Epoch Times reporter, "An official working in a ministry of the State Council, after receiving my invitation to meet, did not respond to me via WeChat as usual. Instead, he used a family member's phone to call the intermediary, clearly stating that he could not meet with me and asking the other party to convey his greetings. He said that due to work reasons, it was 'inconvenient to meet, but there will be another time.'"

Song Xuan said that she had not returned to China for several years and did not expect that the authorities' vigilance against overseas Chinese had reached this level, and their wariness of foreign personnel had obviously increased: "It's terrifying. How can this regime be so fearful? Is there going to be a war? It's too bizarre."

Since the implementation of the newly revised Anti-Espionage Law by the Chinese Communist Party in 2023, many places have seen the emergence of mobilization and reporting mechanisms themed on "counter-espionage by the whole people." Localities have become

significantly more vigilant about foreign-related contacts, and related restrictions have been continuously tightened in practice.

Internal documents leaked from various locations in the past show that public officials are required to fill out a "Registration Form for Overseas Relatives," and any contact without prior notification could trigger a political review and disciplinary action. Netizen "Soul of Freedom" commented: "This is about cutting people off from the outside world, forcing them to live only within the information it sets for them."

Zhou Liang (pseudonym), who used to work at Tianjin Customs, told reporters that not long ago, after returning to China from Australia, he invited a former colleague who worked at customs to meet him. The colleague declined the invitation, citing his busy work schedule: "My classmate told me that he was very busy lately and that we should skip the meal. He said, 'I'm picking up my child tomorrow, so let's meet at the school gate.' In the end, we chatted briefly at the school gate. He also said that it wouldn't matter if his colleagues saw us, because there were security cameras there, it was a public place, and we could say it was a chance encounter."

Zhou Liang said that his customs colleague revealed that the company's regulations require reporting any contact with people returning from overseas. Therefore, choosing to have brief contact in a public space can be explained as accidental, thus reducing the risk.

In response to these changes, Mr. Deng, a senior media professional in Tianjin, told reporters that this shows the CCP's management logic has expanded from "behavioral control" to "relationship control." He pointed out that the authorities are no longer only focusing on the behavior of public officials in their positions, but are incorporating interpersonal networks and social interactions into the risk assessment system. This control method is severing contact between those inside and outside the system, and has also made many public officials more cautious in their daily interactions.

## Ma Xingrui Officially Removed By The CCP, First Details of New Position Revealed

06 April 2026, Vision Times

A member of China's top leadership body, the CCP Politburo, has officially been announced as removed, and the CCP also disclosed his new position in the announcement. Ma Xingrui had been missing for a long time, absent from multiple CCP meetings, and even failed to send a wreath when several senior CCP figures passed away.

On April 3, 2026, according to a report by CCP state media *Xinhua News Agency*, Politburo member and Deputy Leader of the Central Rural



*The image shows CCP Politburo member Ma Xingrui, then Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission Wang Yi, and then Vice Premier Liu He attending the opening ceremony of the CPPCC* meeting on *March 4, 2023. (Image: NOEL CELIS/AFP via Getty Images)*

Work Leading Group, Ma Xingrui is under investigation for "serious disciplinary and legal violations" and is currently subject to disciplinary review and supervisory investigation by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission (CCDI-NSC).

Independent media commentator Sato Peng posted on X (formerly Twitter) that Ma Xingrui's official removal by the CCP conveys two key messages:

1. Ma Xingrui is indeed in serious trouble.
2. After being removed from his previous post last year, Ma was assigned to the same position as his predecessor, Chen Quanguo —Deputy Leader of the CCP Central Rural Work Leading Group. However, Ma did not make it to the Central Rural Work Conference in December 2025 before being detained.

It is noteworthy that this is also the first time the CCP has officially disclosed Ma Xingrui's new position after he was removed as Party Secretary of Xinjiang.

In July 2025, Ma was removed from his post as Xinjiang Party Secretary, summoned back to Beijing, and the CCP stated he would be assigned another position, but his new role was never announced. From November 2025 onward, Ma repeatedly missed major CCP high-level meetings:

- Nov. 28, 2025: CCP Politburo collective study session
- Dec. 10, 2025: Central Economic Work Conference
- Dec. 25, 2025: CCP Politburo "main life" meeting
- Jan. 12, 2026: Fifth plenary session of the CCDI

He also missed the CCP's Two Sessions in March 2026. In addition, Ma was "removed" by the CCP National People's Congress Presidium.

Chinese netizens reacted widely, saying things like:

- "This is a really big tiger."

- "After waiting so long, the boot has finally dropped. Few words, big deal!"
- "It was clear something happened as soon as he was removed last year; it was just a matter of time."
- "Quite a few people from the aerospace system have fallen."

Overseas netizens commented:

- "The boot has dropped, the aerospace faction is in total collapse."
- "Cast an I Ching hexagram—Ma Xingrui case, someone is going to lose their head."
- "The boot has finally dropped, Ma Xingrui officially announced. Xi Jinping's loyal confidant, Peng Liyuan's subordinate, is going to Qincheng to enjoy life. And you, when are you going?"

After Ma Xingrui's prolonged "disappearance," it was observed that many of his former subordinates from his posts in Xinjiang and Guangdong were also being removed.

On March 27, 2026, Guo Yonghang, Vice Chairman of the Guangdong Provincial Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), was also officially announced as removed. Guo had previously served as Ma Xingrui's top secretary during Ma's tenure as Shenzhen Party Secretary in 2015. In May 2015, Guo was promoted to Shenzhen Municipal Standing Committee member and Secretary-General, becoming Ma's chief aide.

After Ma became Guangdong Governor on Jan. 23, 2017, Guo was promoted to Party Secretary of Zhuhai in February 2018. In December 2025, Guo stepped down as Guangdong Provincial Standing Committee member and Guangzhou Party Secretary and became Vice Chairman of the Guangdong CPPCC. Multiple sources told Chinese media *Caixin* that Guo had been questioned by relevant authorities. Guo's removal also reflects Ma Xingrui's precarious situation.

In February 2026, Gao Shiwen, Mayor of Nanchang, consecutively missed important municipal meetings. The Nanchang municipal government's social media account had previously updated a weekly "Gao Shiwen Comrade's Governance Week" every Sunday, but updates suddenly stopped on Feb. 8. Social media reports suggested that Gao was summoned for questioning by relevant CCP authorities. Gao had served as Ma Xingrui's secretary for many years during Ma's tenure at the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation.

Independent commentator Du Zheng wrote in Taiwan media *Up Media* that Guo Yonghang and Gao Shiwen share two clear common traits: they were both Ma Xingrui's secretaries, and they are both Ma's fellow Shandong natives. When a secretary gets into trouble, it usually reflects a crisis for their superior. The shared "Shandong native" connection supports the notion of CCP factions being organized around hometown ties. The most powerful backer of the so-called "Shandong faction" in the CCP is Xi Jinping's wife, Peng Liyuan. Ma Xingrui's close relationship with Peng Liyuan had previously helped him rise rapidly in the party ranks.

Du Zheng stated that Ma Xingrui is a protégé of Xi Jinping and his wife, Peng Liyuan. The reason for targeting Ma now is due to widespread corruption in the CCP's military-industrial sector, combined with reports of corruption within Ma Xingrui's own family. This situation put Xi and Peng in a difficult position, forcing Xi to "shed tears while cutting down Ma Xingrui" in the Year of the Horse.

As Peng Liyuan's top protégé, the fact that Xi could not even protect Ma Xingrui indirectly reflects Xi's political position within the CCP.

# PROTESTS, DETENTIONS AND OTHER NEWS FROM TIBET AND THE PRC

# Tibet

**The highest railway in the world climbs to 5,072 meters in Tibet — the carriages have a pressurized oxygen system because there isn't enough air up there for passengers to breathe.**

27 April 2026, Petroleoegas

**The highest railway in the world crosses 960 kilometers above 4,000 meters in altitude and reaches a maximum point of 5,072 meters — where the air has 40% less oxygen and passengers rely on pressurized systems to breathe**

Inaugurated in July 2006, the Qinghai-Tibet railway is the highest railway in the world. According to Wikipedia, the section between Golmud and Lhasa stretches for 1,142 kilometers, of which more than 960 kilometers run above 4,000 meters in altitude — a region where the air contains 40% less oxygen than at sea level.

Moreover, the highest point of the line is at the Tanggula Pass, at 5,072 meters above sea level. To put it into perspective, this altitude is higher than the summit of Mont Blanc, the highest mountain in Western Europe.

Therefore, each train journey between Xining and Lhasa is literally a mountain climb — but sitting in a seat with oxygen coming from the walls.

Why the carriages need oxygen — and how the system works



Each carriage has a dual oxygen system — altitude steals 40% of the air at sea level

As detailed by China Tibet Train, each train that travels the highest railway in the world has two independent oxygen supply systems.

The first system automatically increases the oxygen level inside the carriages when the train enters the plateau zone above 3,000 meters. In practice, the carriages function like pressurized airplane cabins — maintaining an artificially breathable atmosphere.Secondly, each seat has an individual oxygen outlet that passengers can use if they feel symptoms of altitude sickness, such as headache, dizziness, or nausea.

Furthermore, the temperature control system keeps the carriages warm even when the outside temperature plummets to -45°C on winter nights in the Tibetan plateau.

Thus, the engineering of the train transformed what would be a lethal journey for most people into a relatively comfortable experience.



*The highest railway in the world runs 550 km over permafrost — how to build tracks on melting frozen ground*

Indeed, the biggest technical challenge of the highest railway in the world was not the altitude itself, but the ground on which the tracks needed to be built. According to Chinese engineers, 550 kilometers of the line run over permafrost — permanently frozen ground that becomes unstable when heated.

Consequently, if the tracks were supported directly on the ground, the heat from the train itself and the stations could melt the permafrost and cause the railway to sink.

In this regard, engineers developed creative solutions. In some sections, they elevated the line over viaducts so that cold air could circulate freely beneath the tracks. In others, they installed cooling tubes in the ground to maintain a stable temperature.

The most ingenious method uses natural convection: vertical tubes filled with liquid ammonia capture the winter cold and store it underground during the summer, keeping the ground temperature below zero even in the hottest months.

In comparison, the **construction of a high-speed railway in the United States** faces bureaucratic obstacles. The Tibetan railway faced obstacles from physics itself.



*The ghost station: Tanggula is at 5,068 meters and has no staff*

In sections over permafrost, the line runs over viaducts so that cold air circulates beneath the tracks

Still, perhaps the most surprising fact about the highest railway is the Tanggula station. Located at 5,068 meters in altitude, it is the highest railway station in the world.

The station operates automatically, with sensors and cameras remotely controlled from operation centers at lower altitudes.

However, the station has no permanent staff. Especially because the extreme conditions — intense cold, strong winds, and lack of oxygen — make continuous human presence unfeasible.

Similarly, very few trains stop at Tanggula. Most just pass through the station at reduced speed while passengers observe the lunar landscape of the plateau through the window.

To understand the isolation, the nearest town to the station is more than 100 kilometers away by dirt roads.

Despite this, local Tibetan residents live in the area around the station, genetically adapted to altitudes that would incapacitate most people.

**Tunnels at record altitude: drilling through mountains at 4,648 meters**

In addition to the open-air tracks, the line includes impressive tunnels. The Fenghuoshan Tunnel is the highest railway tunnel in permafrost in the world. Meanwhile, the Kunlun Mountain Tunnel is 1,686 meters long and is at 4,648 meters altitude — the longest tunnel in permafrost on the planet.

Equally challenging is the **engineering of bridges and viaducts** along the route. More than 675 bridges distribute the weight of the trains without disturbing the fragile ecosystem of the plateau.

On the other hand, engineers had to deal with frequent earthquakes in the region, winds of up to 150 km/h, and sandstorms that reduce visibility to almost zero.

**46 years of construction — from the first failed attempt to the world record**

Tanggula is the highest station in the world at 5,068 meters — it has no permanent staff

According to historical data, the construction of the railway began in 1958 with the section between Xining and Golmud, completed only in 1984 — 26 years later. However, the most difficult section, between Golmud and Lhasa, only began construction in 2001.

More than 100,000 workers participated in the construction during the five years of work on the Golmud-Lhasa section. Many carried portable oxygen cylinders while working.

In practice, China took 46 years from the first excavation to the full inauguration of the line in 2006. The total cost reached $4.2 billion — a modest amount for a project of this scale.

The project involved the construction of 675 bridges and 7 tunnels, as well as 45 stations distributed along the route.

In summary, the highest railway in the world cost less than a single subway station in cities like New York or London.

Today, more than 1 million passengers and 8 million tons of cargo travel the line annually, connecting isolated Tibet to the rest of China.

Could the same engineering that tamed the Tibetan permafrost be applied to similar challenges in the Arctic, where melting permafrost threatens entire infrastructures?
Finally, the Qinghai-Tibet railway proves that human engineering can conquer even the most extreme conditions on the planet. However, it also reminds us that, at 5,072 meters in altitude, it is not the train that needs help to breathe — it is the people inside it.

## International Communication Documentary Project "The Long March: A Road Without End" launched in Beijing

20 April 2026, Kangba TV

The launch ceremony for the international communication documentary project "The Long March: A Road Without End", produced by China International Communications Group (CICG) and jointly produced by the CICG Center for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (People's Pictorial) and other organizations, was held in Beijing on April 18th.
The documentary invites foreign friends to serve as travelers and observers, retracing the Long March route to explore a common path that embodies spiritual depth, developmental warmth, and broad human resonance. It deconstructs grand history into shared human experiences, presenting perseverance, trust, collaboration, and hope through journeys and dialogues. For audiences at home and abroad, especially the younger generation, can not only understand the gist of the Long March but also grasp why China has forged such a great path.

## Tibetan political prisoners in critical condition after torture; calls to address their plight

20 April 2026, The Tibet Post
Tibetan political prisoners Gangkye Drukpa Kyab and Tsering Dolma are in critical condition and their health has deteriorated in the Chinese prisons. They were sentenced to 14 and 8 years in prison respectively for writing on the 2008 Tibet uprising and staging peaceful protests against the Chinese communist Party(CCP). According to a reliable source to TPI, on March 29, 2026, the Tibetan political prisoners Gangkye Drukpa Kyab and Tsering Dolma are in a critical condition and their health has deteriorated in Chinese prisons. Their family members are calling on the UN, Human Rights Watch and other international organisations and governments to intervene with the Chinese government to ensure their transfer to a hospital or the implementation of measures to address their critical condition.
In 2024, Gangkye Drukpa Kyab's family was permitted to visit him at Mianyang Prison in Sichuan. However, all subsequent visits have been denied, and it is unclear whether he is still being held at that prison. With family visits continuing to be blocked and medical care being denied, his family is deeply concerned for his health and well-being.
The source described the torture suffered in Chinese prisons as "cruel and inhuman"; as a result, Gangkye Drukpa Kyab now suffers from cardiac and renal conditions, as well as vision problems, amnesia, and digestive complications.
Gangkye Drukpa Kyab is writer, his pen name is called Gang-metak. He was arrested by Serta County police at around 5:30 pm local time on March 23, 2021, at his home in Serta County, eastern Tibet. Karze (Garze) Intermediate People's Court sentenced him to 14 years in prison for allegedly "inciting separatism" and "endangering state security" in September 2022.
He also arrested by Serta county police on February 15, 2012. After more than one year in detention, Nyachu People's Court sentenced the Tibetan writer to five and a half years in jail for his writings, which were accused of "inciting secession" and "sending illicit material outside of China." He was later imprisoned in the People's Republic of China's Sichuan Province Prison.
His best-known works, such as "*Calling from afar-Jangpo,*" "*Pain in Time-Du-kyi-na-su*," "*Today's Tear-Dari-gi-Michu*," "*White-scarf magazine*," and "*Worded with Red Blood in 2008*," are mostly about the 2008 Tibet uprising. The 2008 Tibet uprising was a series of demonstrations and protests in Tibet against China's repressive policies.
On September 16, 2016, he was released from Sichuan Province Prison. However, on the day of his release, he was accused of wearing a portrait of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on his head and was detained for 17 days by the county police. And after his release, he suffered from serious health conditions as a result of the brutal torture and beatings he endured in prison, including kidney failure, cardiac problems, vision loss, and intestinal issues.
Gangkye Drukpa Kyab was born on August 6, 1981, in Serthar county, Karze, eastern Tibet, from Rag-Tam-Ge-Phen village. His father's name is Thupten Nyima, and his mother's name is Wangthang Dolma. With his wife Wangshu Lhamo, he has a daughter and son.
The same source also reported that the Tibetan prisoner Tsering Dolma was in a critical condition in the Chinese prison. She was arrested on April 2, 2021, in Serthar County and she was sentenced to eight years in prison by the Karze (Garze) Intermediate People's Court. According to the same source, she fractured her hip as a result of beatings inflicted by the Serthar County Chinese police and continues to suffer from severe pain. She is also suffering from memory loss and a heart condition, the consequences of the torture and ill-treatment she endured during her detention.

She was arrested multiple times after staging a peaceful protest in Seta County against Chinese policies in Tibet, from 2008 and 2012. On June 1, 2008, a large number of Chinese police with 13 vehicles arrived in Kangtsa village and detained Dolma and her father without giving a clear reason.
As a result of the horrific torture and beatings she endured in prison, she developed severe health issues after her release, including cardiac problems, vision loss, and an epileptic fit.
Tsering Dolma, is a Tibetan mother of two sons from Kangtsa village in eastern Tibet (Ch: Gang Zha Cun, Serta County, east of Sichuan Province). Her father is called Solo and mother is called Tsokyi. Her whereabout remain unknown, as China is known to transfer prisoners from one prison to another.

## Two Tibetan monks held incommunicado for over a year amid crackdown

17 April 2026, Phayul



*(L-R) Jamyang Samten and Samten Gyatso in an undated photo (Photo/Tibet Times)*

Two Tibetan monks from Chu Khama Monastery in Machu County, identified as Samten Gyatso and Jamyang Samten, have remained in detention for more than a year following their arrest by Chinese authorities, with no information available regarding their current condition or whereabouts, according to a report by the Dharamshala-based Tibetan media outlet *Tibet Times*.
Samten Gyatso had previously come under scrutiny for sharing images of the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, His Holiness the Dalai Lama, on social media platforms including WeChat. Police are reported to have conducted multiple searches of his monastic quarters, confiscating religious and literary materials, including a book titled *The Buddha's Appearance in the Land of Snow*. He was also reportedly questioned after composing a short tribute marking the anniversary of the Dalai Lama's Nobel Peace Prize. Though he was released following earlier interrogations, these incidents appear to have contributed to heightened surveillance.
Similarly, Jamyang Samten had engaged in online community activities, including the creation of a digital group used to disseminate information among the public. He had also authored a book, which reportedly led to accusations of unauthorized publication without obtaining the required state approvals. Although he had previously been detained and later released on these grounds, such activities may have contributed to his subsequent arrest.
The two monks were reportedly detained under separate circumstances. Sources indicate that one was taken directly from the monastery, while the other was summoned by local police after his mobile phone had been confiscated. He was instructed to collect the device, but upon arrival, he was detained and has not been released since.
More than a year after their detention, Chinese authorities have yet to disclose any official details about the monks' status. The exact dates of their arrests also remain unclear, and communication with individuals connected to the case has reportedly become increasingly difficult, raising concerns over enforced incommunicado detention.
Although no formal charges have been publicly confirmed, sources suggest that the detentions may be linked to material discovered on their mobile phones. Authorities are believed to have found images of the Tibetan national flag during routine phone inspections. Both monks had reportedly undergone repeated interrogations prior to their detention, despite the absence of any formal accusations at the time.
The prolonged detention of the two monks, in the absence of formal charges or access to legal representation, highlights persistent concerns over restrictions on religious freedom and freedom of expression in Tibet under Chinese colonial rule.

## China reports huge railway-haul of goods in and out of Tibet

16 April 2026, Tibetan Review

China said Apr 15 that its Qinghai–Tibet Railway had transported more than a hundred million metric tons of goods in and out of Tibet autonomous region since its opening in 2006, with the growth in outbound goods rising much faster, and reflecting the colonial nature of this mode of opening up the region.
The Qinghai–Xizang Railway has transported more than 100 million metric tons of goods in and out of the Xizang autonomous region since opening in 2006, according to China Railway Qinghai–Xizang Group, reported the official *chinadaily.com.cn* Apr 14, using the sinicized term "Xizang" for "Tibet".
The report cited data from the railway group as showing that from just 361,000 tons in 2006, annual throughput reached 8.31 million tons by 2025, with an average annual growth rate of 18%.
The report said Inbound cargo, mainly coal, cement, construction materials, and grain, had

risen from 340,000 to 6.9 million tons, while outbound freight had expanded faster, from 21,000 to over 1.4 million tons.
Significantly, the report did not say what the outbound goods have mainly consisted of. Given the fact that China is mining globally significant amounts of various type of minerals, including especially lithium, rare earths, copper and its byproducts such as gold, iron, and so forth, these are bound to make up the bulk of the railway's haul out of Tibet.
The import into Tibet of coal, cement, construction materials, and grain show the other side of the colonial nature of the Chinese railway infrastructure in Tibet. These are needed to open up and develop the region to meet the requirements of the rising population of Chinese immigrants and the armed forces, as well as to build dams to harness the region's massive hydropower potential to generate what is called clean energy for China.
The only Tibetan products going out of Tibet by this railway mentioned by the report are "specialty products such as highland barley and Tibetan beverages" which are enabled "to reach national markets".
As China's mining activities in Tibet keeps increasing, so also is its railway infrastructure facilities. The report said that capacity and network coverage had improved significantly, with the Golmud–Lhasa section now having 58 stations, maximum traction loads of 2,880 tons, and 17 daily train pairs.
With the integration of the Lhasa–Shigatse and Lhasa–Nyingchi railways, a Y-shaped backbone network has taken shape, the report added.
In the western half of Tibet proper, which China calls Xizang, the rail network now exceeds 1,000 kilometres, with five freight stations and strengthened hubs in Lhasa, Shigatse, and Nyingchi. A system of seven regional freight centres and 47 service outlets covers Qinghai, Gansu, and Xizang, the railway group has said.

## China accused of silencing Tibetan voices as activist handed 18-year secret sentence

13 April 2026, Big News Network

A profile released by the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) has reignited concerns over China's treatment of Tibetan political prisoners, highlighting the case of Lodoe Gyatso, who is currently serving an 18-year prison sentence under opaque legal proceedings.
According to the CTA, Lodoe Gyatso, also known as Sogkhar Lodoe Gyatso, hails from Sog County in Nagchu, within the traditional Tibetan province of Kham.
Now in his mid-50s, he is described as having endured decades of systematic persecution by Chinese authorities for exercising his right to peaceful expression.
Gyatso was arrested on January 28, 2018, only months after completing a prior two-year imprisonment.
His detention followed a solitary, non-violent protest in Lhasa, where he reportedly marched around the Potala Palace dressed in traditional Tibetan attire, calling for peace in Tibet and globally.
The charges against him have been labelled as involving 'state secrets,' a classification frequently criticised by rights groups for enabling closed-door trials and denying due process.
The proceedings leading to his current 18-year sentence were conducted entirely outside public scrutiny, with no independent legal oversight and without informing his family, as highlighted by the CTA.
A Tibetan Buddhist monk, Palden Yeshi, who vanished in May 2021 after being taken into custody by Chinese authorities, has resurfaced years later as a convicted prisoner serving a six-year sentence in Lhasa's Chushul Prison, raising fresh concerns over China's treatment of Tibetan cultural figures, as reported by the Central Tibetan Administration.
In a post shared on X, the CTA stated that Yeshi was reportedly detained on May 17, 2021, and remained missing for nearly five years, with no official information provided about his condition or whereabouts during that period.
Even now, Chinese authorities have not publicly disclosed the exact charges against him.
However, sources suggest he may have been targeted for organising voluntary Tibetan language classes for more than 300 local children, an initiative authorities could have construed as a threat to state security under broadly defined laws against 'separatism.'

## Tibetan monk secretly sentenced to seven years in prison following years of enforced disappearance

1 April 2026, TCHRD

According to the latest information received by the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), Dhargye, a 64-year-old Tibetan monk, has been secretly sentenced to seven years in prison following his arbitrary arrest in August 2021 in Lhasa, Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR).
Dhargye's family members learned of his sentencing only in late January this year. They have not been informed of the date of sentencing, the court that delivered the verdict, or his current place of detention. Information about his enforced disappearance only emerged last year. It is also unclear whether any formal trial was conducted. Throughout this period, his family has received no official notification regarding his detention, charges, or sentencing.

Information received by TCHRD indicates that Dhargye was sentenced for making religious monetary offerings Kyab-ten and Ngo-ten to His Holiness the Dalai Lama. He is also believed to have been accused of assisting Tibetan monks to leave Tibet.

A source told TCHRD: "Dhargye's family members are very concerned about his wellbeing as he is already in his sixties, and the lack of any information about him is deeply troubling."

TCHRD previously reported the arbitrary arrest of Dhargye in Lhasa along with his relative Tsering and a nun named Choekyi. While the two were released after several months, Dhargye remained in detention and was subsequently subjected to enforced disappearance.

Dhargye was widely known for his honesty, spiritual discipline, and service to the Tibetan community. A monk of Serta Sera Monastery, he spent years in Lhasa undertaking pilgrimages, engaging in long retreats, and receiving teachings from eminent lamas. He was frequently sought by local Tibetans to perform consecration rituals for sacred objects, scriptures, and stupas, and operated a small shop providing such religious services.

Recent developments indicate an intensifying pattern of repression targeting Tibetan Buddhist practices. Increasing numbers of Tibetans have been subjected to detention and imprisonment for engaging in acts of religious devotion, including making financial offerings to spiritual teachers living outside Tibet.

TCHRD has documented several such cases. In 2022, two Tibetan monks Rachung Gendun and Sonam Gyatso from Kirti Monastery in Ngaba (Ch: Aba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan Province, were sentenced to three and two years in prison respectively. Their sentencing followed the discovery, through mobile phone communications, that they had sent monetary offerings to the Dalai Lama and Kirti Rinpoche, the exiled head of Kirti Monastery in India.

Similarly, a Tibetan monk named Lobsang Thapkhey was detained and interrogated at Ngaba County police station for sending a monetary offering of 2000 Chinese yuan as a prayer offering to the Dalai Lama, Kirti Rinpoche, and other Tibetan Buddhist teachers in India following the passing of a senior lama.

The criminalisation of such practices strikes at the core of Tibetan Buddhist belief, where offering (Tib: *choepa*) constitutes an essential expression of devotion and a means of maintaining the spiritual relationship between teacher and disciple. Restrictions on these practices undermine the ability of Tibetan Buddhists to freely manifest their religion and maintain spiritual connections.

Religion remains a primary target under the Chinese government's "stability maintenance" policy. Authorities continue to equate expressions of loyalty to the Dalai Lama with crimes such as "inciting separatism" or "subverting state power." This approach has resulted in the systematic restriction of the right to freedom of religion and belief, making it increasingly difficult for Tibetans to practice their faith without fear of reprisal in Tibet.

## Chinese authorities crack down on Tibetan livestreamers under various pretexts

15 April 2026, The Tibet Post

Chinese authorities in Tibet intensified restrictions on religious activities and Tibetan internet users, particularly livestreamers, by detaining and




summoning them to police stations, and issuing warnings based on various accusations.According to the source, Lhakpa and Karma went live on their social media app, on April 7, 2026, and talked about religious activities such as help making Sang Sol (purification offering). They were subsequently interrogated by the Chinese authorities at the police station in Ngari Prefecture, western Tibet. They were warned that their actions violated so-called "Chinese internet law" and "legislation on religious activities". In November 2020, the Chinese authorities banned the traditional Tibetan 'Sang Sol' practice outside the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa, Tibet.

Sang Sol' (Tibetan: བསང་གསོལ, "purification offering") is a traditional Tibetan practice involving burning fragrant substances, primarily juniper, to cleanse, purify, and offer to enlightened beings and local spirits. It serves as a ritual to remove negative energy, clear obstacles, repay karmic debts, and accumulate merit by generating generosity. However, the Chinese authorities imposed restrictions on the Sang Sol and other religious activities in the midst of the sinicisation of Buddhism.

Chinese police in Tengchen County, Chamdo, eastern Tibet arrested a Tibetan man named Uygen. He was accused of discussing "illegal topics and deceiving ordinary people," which allegedly had a "negative impact" on society. Such accusations are often used to illegally arrest and imprison Tibetans in the absence of concrete evidence. He was later sentenced to six years in prison by the Tengchen County People's Court. Due to the strict restrictions imposed by the Chinese authorities on information relating to

Tibet, the date of arrest and sentencing, and the location of his place of imprisonment remain unknown.

Most often, Tibetans have been secretly sentenced on political grounds, even though they had committed no illegal acts. Although they engage in no illegal activities, by preserving Tibetan language, culture and religion, the Tibetan scholars, teachers, and writers have been arrested in recent years, with the aim of eradicating the Tibetan language and religion.

Chinese authorities sentenced a Tibetan teacher named Palden Yeshe to six years in prison for teaching the Tibetan language to 300 students during their vacation. His whereabouts was only revealed recently, nearly five years disappeared after his arrest by Chinese police.

The National People's Congress (NPC) passed a law on March 12, 2026, titled "Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress in the People's Republic of China (PRC)." This law reinforces policies of "Sinicization" and "assimilation," particularly with regard to Tibetans and other oppressed peoples of Mongolia and East Turkestan. It mandates the Sinicization and assimilation of the Tibetan people, using parents, monasteries, various social organizations, and state institutions as instruments of implementation; the law is scheduled to officially take effect on July 1, 2026.

Chinese government is doing everything in its power to eliminate Tibetan identity, religion and culture through repressive policies. It has banned Tibetan children from learning their language, visiting monasteries or becoming monks, and prohibited the construction of new monasteries. It is enforcing new policies and prohibiting the display of Tibetan thangkas and the wearing of Tibetan hats.

China-Tibet: The one-thing you need to know:

Over the past 70 decades, there has been ongoing political repression, social discrimination, economic marginalization, environmental destruction, and cultural assimilation, particularly due to Chinese migration to Tibet which is fueling intense resentment among the people of occupied Tibet.

The communist-totalitarian state of China began its invasion of Tibet in 1949, reaching complete occupation of the country in 1959. Since that time, more than 1.2 million people, 20% of the nation's population of six million, have died as a direct result of China's invasion and occupation. In addition, over 99% of Tibet's six thousand religious monasteries, temples, and shrines, have been looted or decimated resulting in the destruction of hundreds of thousands of sacred Buddhist scriptures.

Until 1949, Tibet was an independent Buddhist nation in the Himalayas which had little contact with the rest of the world. It existed as a rich cultural storehouse of the Mahayana and Vajrayana teachings of Buddhism. Religion was a unifying theme among the Tibetans -- as was their own language, literature, art, and world view developed by living at high altitudes, under harsh conditions, in a balance with their environment.

## Tibetan jailed by China for 18 years during language rights protest emerges in fragile heath

10 April 2026, Tibetan Review



A Tibetan man, now in his late 50s, imprisoned for 18 years after leading a language rights protest in a historically Tibetan area of Sichuan province, China, in 2007 has emerged from jail last month in fragile health, reported the Tibetan language.

Yeshe Sangpo and his brother Lobsang, residents of Bumnying Village in Sershul (Chinese: Shiqu) County, Kardze (Ganzi) Prefecture, led a group of local Tibetans in a protest in the county seat to demand respect for Tibetan people's right to preserve, study, use, and promote their own language in the face of tightening government restrictions.

The Chinese police assaulted the protesters with severe blows, resulting in angered victims responding in kind. In the ensuing melee, a Chinese policeman reportedly died. Yeshe Sangpo, being a main organiser of the protest, was blamed for it and later tried and sentenced in Mar 2008 to serve an 18-year jail term.

Trials in such cases typically take place without the trappings of a fair judicial process, with the accused invariably held guilty and given lengthy jail sentences.

Yeshe Sangpo was released on Mar 25 after completing his jail sentence, aged 57. The report did not mention the nature of his poor health condition.

## Senior Tibetan monk secretly sentenced to 7 years in Lhasa after years of enforced disappearance

01 April 2026, Phayul

Dhargye, a 64-year-old Tibetan monk, has reportedly been sentenced in secret to seven years in prison following his arbitrary detention in August 2021 in Lhasa, the capital city of Tibet, according to the research group, Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD).

Dhargye's family only became aware of the sentence in late January this year. Authorities have not disclosed key details, including the date of sentencing, the court responsible for the verdict, or his current place of detention. His case remains shrouded in secrecy, with no confirmation as to whether a formal trial was ever conducted.

For over three years, Dhargye's whereabouts were unknown, amounting to an enforced disappearance. Throughout this period, his family received no official notification regarding his detention, the charges against him, or the legal proceedings leading to his sentencing.

According to information obtained by TCHRD, Dhargye was reportedly punished for making religious monetary offerings—*Kyab-ten* and *Ngo-ten*—to the exile Tibetan spiritual leader His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama. He is also believed to have been accused of assisting Tibetan monks in leaving Tibet.

A source cited by the group stated that Dhargye's family remains deeply concerned about his wellbeing, particularly given his age and the complete lack of information regarding his condition and whereabouts.

TCHRD had previously reported Dhargye's arrest alongside his relative Tsering and a nun, Choekyi, in Lhasa. While the two were released after several months in detention, Dhargye remained in custody and was subsequently subjected to enforced disappearance.

Dhargye, a monk of Serta Sera Monastery, was widely respected for his integrity, spiritual discipline, and service to the Tibetan community. He spent many years in Lhasa undertaking pilgrimages, engaging in prolonged retreats, and receiving teachings from prominent lamas. Known for his religious devotion, he was often sought by local Tibetans to perform consecration rituals for sacred objects, scriptures, and stupas, and also ran a small shop offering religious services.

# PRC

## China clones 10 healthy yaks in high-altitude livestock breeding breakthrough

29 April 2026, Down To Earth



*Yaks are endemic to the Tibetan Plateau and the Himalayas and serve as livelihood assets for local herding communities.Photo: iStock*

Chinese researchers have been successful in cloning 10 healthy yaks, in what state-controlled media described as a 'breakthrough' in high-altitude livestock breeding.

The yaks were cloned in Damshung county of Lhasa, Xizang autonomous region, as the Chinese government calls Tibet. All 10 cloned yaks were carried to term and born naturally between March 25 and April 5, according to an announcement from the county, *China Daily*, the website of the English-language daily newspaper of the same name owned by the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party, noted.

According to the portal, "the calves were produced using a self-developed technology that creates 1:1 replications. The development could cut yak breeding cycles from around 20 years to under five and reverse long-standing genetic decline, according to Fang Shengguo, who led the research team from Zhejiang University".

China first cloned a yak last year when "Nam Co No 1" was born in July 2025. The current development builds on that and marks a shift from a "0-to-1" laboratory breakthrough to "1-to-10" replicable production, laying the groundwork for industrial-scale expansion, the portal quoted Fang as saying.

The scientists genome sequenced nearly 9,000 yaks to identify top-tier "seed yaks" with desirable traits, such as those that grow quickly, are fertile, have strong immune systems, and can adapt to high altitudes.

They then used somatic cell cloning to replicate these elite genotypes. The approach, according to the *China Daily* article, directly addresses long-standing bottlenecks in Tibet's yak industry, where

genetic resources have been degrading for decades and traditional breeding methods are slow and inefficient.
According to Fang, the research team plans to raise a population of over 100 elite cloned yaks by 2028 and develop the first high-altitude-adapted improved yak strain, alongside standardised breeding protocols.
Yaks are endemic to the Tibetan Plateau and the Himalayas and serve as livelihood assets for local herding communities and are an integral component of the plateau's ecosystem.

## No Real Freedom for the Catholic Church in China

28 April 2026, Bitter Winter

After the 2018 agreement, pressure on Chinese Catholics is escalating amid apparent indifference from the Vatican, a Human Rights Watch Report says.



*Inside the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception in Beijing. Photo by Peter Potrowl. Credits.*

The noose is tightening around China's Catholics who refuse to bow to Beijing.
Despite a rapprochement with the Holy See in 2018, which conceded the appointment of Bishops to the Chinese state with formal Vatican approval, their situation is grimmer than ever, with no improvement for China's 12 million or so Catholics.
According to Yalkun Uluyol of Human Rights Watch (HRW), in his latest report, China's clandestine Catholic faithful are under more pressure than ever to sign up to Beijing's "Sinicized" version of their faith.
"A decade into Xi Jinping's Sinicization campaign and nearly eight years since the 2018 Holy See-China agreement, Catholics in China face escalating repression that violates their religious freedoms," he said. He has urged Pope Leo XIV to "urgently review the agreement and press Beijing to end the persecution and intimidation of underground churches, clergy, and worshipers."
Beijing has been trying to cut ties with the Vatican since the 1950s, when the papal envoy was expelled under Mao Zedong, and Shanghai's Cardinal Ignatius Kung was jailed for 30 years for refusing to renounce papal authority. The clampdowns have always been particularly severe against those who refuse to pledge allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party.
Since President Xi Jinping's premiership in 2012, he has redoubled his efforts to bend all faiths into the Chinese Communist mold, with the Sinicization of religion and the imposition of "Chinese Characteristics" into religious architecture, teachings, and traditions becoming a core strategy in 2016. Foreign influence, Xi Jinping's bête noire, became the target. Legal oversight over religion has increased, "patriotic worship" has been imposed, and online religious activities have been targeted.
Beijing wasted no time in clamping down once the agreement was signed in 2018. Bishops were pressured to join the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA). The Holy See appeared to dovetail into Beijing's plans when it issued guidelines in 2019 allowing conscientious objection to the CPCA while accepting membership as the new normal.
A tranche of new laws restricting religious observance has come into force since then, cracking down on religious materials, children's ministry, and Catholic-based charitable work. A Catholic priest's plea to the Vatican to stop the closure of a long-standing orphanage in the Diocese of Zhaoxian, plus others that had come under the axe since 2018, has been brushed aside.
All religiously oriented charitable activities are now effectively banned following the new "Regulations on Religious Affairs" in 2018, which, whilst claiming to enshrine freedom of religious belief, have in effect restricted the ability of individuals or organizations to engage in such activities and denied them legal status.
Catholics are not alone in the rollout of oppression, which has incorporated all major religions in China. Tibetan Buddhists and Muslims have also seen their places of worship demolished and their adherents forcibly indoctrinated, imprisoned, tortured in clampdowns described as crimes against humanity and even genocide.
Vatican officials, causing consternation among Catholics in 2018, described "Sinicization" as potentially compatible with the inculturation of Christianity. They interpreted "Sinicization" as the process of embodying the religion in local Chinese culture, citing Catholic missionary "greats" such as Alessandro Valignano, Matteo Ricci, and Giuseppe Castiglione, who wished to open the way to a Catholicism with "'Chinese forms,'…to proclaim the Gospel of Jesus Christ from a fully Chinese perspective." However, the inculturation promoted by the great Catholic missionaries bore little resemblance to Xi Jinping's "Sinicization," which requires religion to embrace the Chinese Communist Party's "core Socialist values."



*Matteo Ricci (1552–1610). His "Sinicization" was not the one proposed by Xi Jinping.*

Neither Pope Francis nor the current Pope Leo XIV has spoken up against the accelerated ideological control, surveillance, and travel restrictions of China, 12 million Catholics, with Pope Leo XIV having rubber-stamped Beijing's five latest bishop appointments.

None has flagged up the illegal detention, even torture, of 10 Vatican-approved bishops whose persecution over many decades has been met with a wall of silence, nor raised the deaths of six other bishops who have died over the past six years, nor that of those who have simply vanished.

The Vatican's muted reaction has emboldened Beijing to increase its stranglehold on all Catholics.

According to the HRW report, some underground Catholics said they felt betrayed by the Vatican, and dozens of Catholics interviewed by one expert reported feelings that the Vatican is also "coming after them."

A priest living abroad fears that because new bishops are now not being appointed for the underground church, "in the long run, underground Catholics [in China] will be gone."

Mandated ideological training for clergy has been described in the report by an academic who had interviewed dozens of church members in China as a concerted effort to "decrease the energy of religious figures."

Increased surveillance and requirements in some areas to pre-register their intention to attend a church service have discouraged the faithful in the newly appointed "patriotic" churches from attending, prompting some to arrange fake weddings to "gather and pray" outside the watchful eye of cameras at official buildings.

A Catholic with firsthand knowledge of conditions in Shaanxi shared his fears with HRW that restricting access to children was "aimed at cutting generational ties within the Catholic community."

Internal documents have been circulated discouraging parents from "instilling religious ideas in their children" and telling schools to "guide students to report" any such instances to the relevant authorities proactively.

According to the HRW report, repression of Catholics contravenes or violates a swathe of international human rights standards and law, not least of which is Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed but not ratified, enshrines the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right includes for everybody "freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching."

Uluyol urges the Holy See and concerned governments to press Beijing to respect the religious freedom of all Catholics and other religions in China. "The Chinese government should stop persecuting and intimidating worshipers for upholding their faith and spirituality independent of Communist Party control," he said.

## China's New Front Line Against "Illegal Religion": Primary School Classrooms

24 April 2026, Bitter Winter

A campaign in Lishui, Zhejiang, shows how the fight against "heterodox teachings" now targets even young pupils.

by He Yuyan



*Anti-xie-jiao propaganda in Changgangbei Primary School. From Weibo.*

China has finally tackled a problem that has troubled empires for ages: how to protect the country from the threat of primary school children learning the wrong kind of religion. The answer,

revealed in Lishui, Zhejiang, on April 8, is surprisingly simple. If you cannot convince adults to reject "xie jiao," start earlier—much earlier. Why wait until adolescence, when dangerous ideas like independent thought may have already taken hold? You can begin shaping future defenders of ideological purity at age seven.

A coalition of local science associations, anti-xie jiao activists, special equipment inspectors, and environmental enthusiasts marched into Changgangbei Primary School to deliver what was called a "lively and engaging" anti-xie-jiao science class. In effect, it was a reminder that in today's China, "science" is often a polite term for "atheism," and "xie jiao" (sometimes incorrectly translated as "cults" or "evil cults") has a flexible definition that now includes not only "groups promoting heterodox teachings" (its literal meaning) but also nearly any form of unregistered religious life.

According to the official report by the China Anti-Xie-Jiao Association, the event "thoroughly broke the dullness of traditional preaching." It certainly did. Staff members, now called "science teachers," explained to children what a xie jiao is, how it disguises itself, and why it is "anti-science, anti-society, and anti-humanity." They used cartoons, animations, and "real cases," all carefully chosen to ensure pupils learned to fear the wrong religion before encountering it. If the Party does not approve a belief system, it is not just incorrect—it is dangerous, manipulative, and morally corrupt. If a child ever meets someone who prays too enthusiastically, quotes scripture without permission, or hands out pamphlets not approved by the United Front Work Department, the appropriate response is vigilance, not curiosity.

To emphasize this point, the schoolyard was turned into a small ideological theme park with anti-xie jiao posters, comic strips, and slogans urging students to "revere science" and "resist xie jiao." Teachers and officials handed out over 1,100 brochures for children to take home, transforming every living room into a potential front line in the battle against unorthodox beliefs. The report proudly stated that students were encouraged to become "little anti-xie-jiao guardians," a phrase that sounds absurd but is chilling in reality. Primary school pupils are enlisted to monitor their families' spiritual hygiene.

The official story claims this campaign "organically integrates anti-xie-jiao education with science promotion and environmental concepts," as if the fight against unregistered religion were a natural extension of recycling and air quality awareness. The real integration is different: it merges political loyalty, atheistic education, and the systematic discrediting of any belief system that the state does not control. Here, "science" serves as a rhetorical shield, a way to present ideological conformity as rationality and to depict religious diversity as a threat to social stability. The children of Lishui are not being taught to think scientifically; they are being taught to associate faith with danger and obedience with enlightenment.

What comes through in this cheerful school visit is a picture of a society where the boundaries of "xie jiao" expand as needed. This term encompasses not only groups labeled as heterodox but also house churches, unregistered Buddhist and Daoist communities, and any spiritual movement that resists state oversight. The definition of "xie jiao" becomes infinitely flexible, and the list of enemies grows long. With primary school students as the guardians of ideological purity, no one is too young to join the struggle, and no area of life—not even childhood—is free from the state's campaign to shape belief.

These events are about shielding the Party from religious diversity. The children think they are defending "science," but what they are truly defending is a view where the only acceptable faith is faith in the state. And if they learn to report suspicious religious actions along the way, that is even better. After all, the future of ideological security has to start somewhere, and why not in the first grade?

## Ordinary Chinese Citizens Now Caught in Facial Recognition Dragnet

22 April 2026, China Scope

France's *Le Monde* reported this week that ordinary Chinese citizens with no criminal or political history are receiving fines through automated facial recognition cameras, marking a notable expansion of the country's vast surveillance apparatus into everyday life.

For years, many Chinese assumed large-scale monitoring was reserved for political dissidents, NGO workers, or activists. That assumption is now being challenged. Shanghai resident Li Yan (a pseudonym) describes himself as an entirely unremarkable citizen — no political involvement, no suspicious associations. Yet in late March, he received a police text message fining him 50 yuan (approximately $6.90 USD) for briefly riding his bicycle on a sidewalk. No officer stopped him. His bicycle had no license plate. The message cited "electronic technology" as the method of identification. After confirming with police that his face had been automatically matched through a public security camera, Li came to a quiet but unsettling realization: the anonymous space that once allowed people to get away with life's small imperfections may be disappearing.

*Le Monde* notes that surveillance cameras now blanket China's streets, though official numbers are never disclosed. Most citizens had grown accustomed to them, assuming the systems targeted others. But applying facial recognition to petty violations has drawn fresh attention. Notably, apps like WeChat and Alipay already enable near-total movement tracking, and online speech is

routinely filtered. When a prominent law professor raised concerns about Beijing's 2025 unified digital identity system, her social media account was suspended and her posts deleted.

Facial recognition in China already extends far beyond law enforcement — airports like Shanghai Hongqiao allow boarding without tickets, and gyms identify members from several meters away. Shanghai's police began piloting facial recognition fines for unlicensed vehicles as early as 2017, but the system has since expanded dramatically. In the Xuhui district alone, 120 dedicated cameras now target cycling and scooter violations.

"This is just the beginning," Li said. "If someone as insignificant as me can be automatically identified on any street, imagine where this is heading."

## China's Definition of an 'Evil Cult' Is Expanding Beyond Religious Groups

20 April 2026, The Diplomat

"Create Abundance" is not, in any conventional sense, a religion. For that reason, its persecution signals a dangerous expansion of China's ideological control.

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"Create Abundance" is not, in any conventional sense, a religion. For that reason, its persecution signals a dangerous expansion of China's ideological control.

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) recently added the Chinese group "Create Abundance" to its Victims List, identifying it as a persecuted religious organization. The designation is significant and welcome. It reflects growing awareness in Washington that Beijing continues to repress belief communities.

Yet the label actually risks missing a deeper and more troubling reality: "Create Abundance" is not, in any conventional sense, a religion. For that reason, its persecution signals a dangerous expansion of China's ideological control.

"Create Abundance" (创造丰盛) emerged nearly three decades ago as a loose network centered on personal development, moral reflection and mutual support. Its founder, Zhang Xinyue, promoted a set of ideas that emphasized self-improvement, gratitude, emotional awareness, and the pursuit of happiness through inner growth. Its teachings encouraged participants to draw from diverse traditions – religious or otherwise – on the premise that belief systems can help individuals live better, more ethical lives. But the group itself did not prescribe doctrine, clergy, rituals or exclusive truth claims. In fact, its membership has included Christians, Buddhists, Muslims, and others, coexisting within a shared framework of personal cultivation.

In practice, "Create Abundance" functioned less like a church than like a hybrid of a book club, wellness network, and civic association. Its affiliated "Luxury Living Art Galleries" offered reading sessions, lectures, tea gatherings, travel programs, and discussions on philosophy and life improvement. The group's guiding materials – such as "The Wisdom of Growth" and "The Growth of Heart and Spirit" – are, by any ordinary standard, closer to motivational literature than theological texts.

Yet it is precisely these features that made the group intolerable to the Chinese Communist Party.

While "Create Abundance" has been accused of defrauding members and operating like a pyramid scheme, that's not what the Chinese authorities are concerned about. The legal cases against the group make that clear.

In 2025, a court in Liaoning Province convicted eight individuals associated with the network of "using superstition to undermine the implementation of the law," sentencing them to prison terms and imposing heavy fines. Authorities shut down more than 1,000 affiliated venues across over 500 cities, confiscated massive assets and placed dozens of individuals on wanted lists.

The evidence presented in court reveals the true nature of the prosecution – and its profound arbitrariness. The central "proof" against the defendants was an expert report commissioned from a state-affiliated think tank, which concluded that the group's books promoted "idealism," "superstition," and "distorted worldviews" inconsistent with Marxist materialism. In other words, the crime was not fraud, violence, or coercion. It was the expression of ideas.

Even more striking, the judgment offers no concrete details – no victims, no specific criminal acts, no demonstrable harm. It provides vague assertions that the defendants "promoted positive energy," traveled abroad, or obtained funds improperly. The confiscation of property – reportedly amounting to hundreds of millions of yuan and affecting even non-defendants – appears wildly disproportionate and detached from any proven wrongdoing.

The campaign against "Create Abundance" is not simply religious persecution. It is the criminalization of non-state-sanctioned ways of thinking.

The Communist Party has long been wary of any organized group that operates independently of its control, particularly one that attracts a large and educated following. "Create Abundance," with hundreds of thousands of participants and a nationwide presence, fit that profile.

The group's social composition appears to have heightened official anxiety. A significant portion of its participants were women – many from elite or politically connected families – who turned to the network as a space to process personal trauma, including experiences tied to corruption, abuse, or inequality within China's power structures. Such

networks of shared experience carry an inherent political risk.

In modern China, revelations by women – whether in corruption scandals or high-profile cases like that of tennis star Peng Shuai and former senior official Zhang Gaoli – have demonstrated how private grievances can destabilize public authority. A community that fosters awareness, solidarity and voice among such individuals is, from Beijing's perspective, potentially subversive.

In addition, the group reportedly provided emotional and communal support to "*shidu*" families – parents who lost their only child under China's one-child policy and cannot have another. These families represent a quiet but deeply aggrieved population, and their collective organization, even around themes of healing and meaning, can translate into latent political discontent.

Taken together, these factors explain why the state reached for familiar but elastic charges to bury "Create Abundance": "feudal superstition," "evil cult," "violating Marxist materialism," and ultimately "endangering national security." The language is generally associated with the CCP's tight control over religious, but in practice authorities suppress any form of independent association – religious or not – that might generate alternative sources of identity, loyalty, or truth.

This is the broader significance that risks being obscured by labeling "Create Abundance" as a religious group. Beijing is not only targeting religion. It is extending its coercive framework into philosophical, cultural, and even therapeutic spaces – any domain where individuals seek meaning outside the CCP's narrative.

That trend should concern not only human rights organizations but also international actors operating in China. Foreign individuals and groups engaged in counseling, spiritual guidance, or community-building may find themselves crossing invisible red lines, as the definition of "superstition" or "ideological threat" continues to expand.

The USCIRF's attention is both justified and necessary, but it should be the beginning, not the end, of policy engagement. The U.S. Congress and the State Department should explicitly recognize this case as part of a new pattern in China: the politicization of thought itself. They should press for transparency in legal proceedings, call for the release of those detained, and support asylum claims for individuals facing persecution. Targeted sanctions against officials involved in such cases could also raise the cost of ideological repression.

More broadly, Washington should integrate these developments into its understanding of China's governance model. What is at stake is not only religious freedom but the boundary between state authority and the inner life of citizens.

## Human Rights Watch: church ban for minors in China violates human rights

17 April 2026, Zenit

Human Rights Watch: church ban for minors in China violates human rights A new release by the human rights NGO highlights the increased pressure by Chinese authorities on Catholics in the shadow of «sinicisation» and the agreement with the Holy See on episcopal appointments. A member of an underground community merged into an official diocese laments that, "We started praying like we were thieves." A United Front document has emerged calling for telling on parents who "instill religious ideas to their children".

Human Rights Watch (HRW) released new blunt account today of China's crackdown on Catholic communities, saying that it intensified after the 2018 agreement with the Holy See on episcopal appointments. Titled China: Pressure on Catholics Escalates, the study says that the repression «contravenes or violates international human rights standards and law.» It summarises developments in China's religious policy over the past decade, drawing on many reports previously cited by AsiaNews regarding the increasingly tight control imposed by Xi Jinping through a series of new regulations under the watchword of «sinicisation".It includes personal accounts by people with first-hand knowledge of Catholic life in China, as well as experts on religious freedom and Catholicism in China interviewed by HRW. The account's underlying thesis concerns the authorities' use of the agreement with the Holy See (renewed until October 2028) to pressure «underground» communities that had never sought to officially register by joining the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association or other Chinese Communist Party-controlled organisations. A person who attended a church that was demolished, its cross removed, said that members were threatened and arrested. Speaking to HRW, they explained that they were left with "no other choice but to join the official church.» Another person said the agreement proved to be «a intelligent weapon to legally destroy underground churches,» as senior underground bishops, persecuted for years, died or were replaced by officially appointed bishops. On this issue, a particularly interesting story comes from a Chinese Catholic who fled the People's Republic in 2023 offering insight into what it means in practice today to accept this type of formal transition, which in theory should be done in the name of the unity of the Church in China. "After forcibly joining the official church, our church was in a state of panic, and some priests were forced to leave the county," he said. "We felt the Chinese government became more heavy-handed after the agreement. We started praying like we were thieves, gatherings for major holidays disappeared.

We used to have mass in hours that everyone could join, which changed to unreasonable hours, so people cannot join.

"The authorities," he added, "also cancelled our choir singing and shuttered windows of the church so that prayers are not visible from outside. Children growing up now have no memory of church prayers or ceremonies. "The church premises are strictly regulated, and we cannot bring children since bishops and priests are very much afraid of the government. At one point, before escaping China in 2023, I stopped going to the church to avoid government surveillance. The reference to the ban on minors' participation in liturgies and youth-centred activities in parishes is a crucial aspect of the suffering of Catholics in China today. "The authorities," reads the HRW article, "have increasingly restricted children's access to Catholic churches throughout the country, especially since the promulgation of revised Regulations on Religious Affairs in 2018, which prohibit religious activities in ordinary schools and restrict the establishment of religious schools to national or provincial-level religious organizations, subject to state approval."

A Chinese academic who has interviewed dozens of Catholics said that, in the past, local governments 'did not check a lot' whether children were attending church services. "However, the authorities now have started to strictly implement such bans, which a Catholic with firsthand knowledge of conditions in Shaanxi said in January 2026 'is aimed at cutting generational ties within the Catholic community.'"

The HRW account cites a case reported by ChinaAid in December on a church in the city of Xuchang, Henan province, which was closed because it "violated relevant regulations by allowing minors to enter the church to play music instruments".

## China raises pressure on underground Catholics to join official church, Human Rights Watch finds



Human Rights Watch, in a detailed new report, says Chinese authorities are increasing pressure on underground Catholic communities to join the state-controlled official church while tightening surveillance and travel restrictions on all of China's estimated 12 million Catholics

Chinese authorities are increasing pressure on underground Catholic communities to join the state-controlled official church while tightening surveillance and travel restrictions on all of China's estimated 12 million Catholics, a rights group said Wednesday.

The detailed report from Human Rights Watch said the heightened pressure was part of a decade-old campaign to ensure that religious denominations and independent churches are loyal to the officially atheist Communist Party.

China's Catholics have been divided between an official, state-controlled church that didn't recognize papal authority and an underground church that remained loyal to Rome through decades of persecution.

Pope Francis, in 2018, sought to ease Vatican-China tensions with a deal giving the state-controlled church a say in naming bishops — a task traditionally exclusive to the pope.

Despite that deal, "Catholics in China face escalating repression that violates their religious freedoms," said Yalkun Uluyol, a China researcher at Human Rights Watch. "Pope Leo XIV should urgently review the agreement and press Beijing to end the persecution and intimidation of underground churches, clergy, and worshippers."

The Vatican spokesman, Matteo Bruni, didn't immediately respond Wednesday when asked to comment on the report.

China's Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to a query by The Associated Press.

Human Rights Watch said its researchers are not allowed into China. It said its report is based on input from people outside China "who had firsthand knowledge of Catholic life in China," as well as experts on religious freedom and Catholicism in China.

Under the 2018 agreement, Beijing proposes candidates for bishop that the pope can then veto, though the agreement's full text has never been made public.

Last June, a month after becoming pope, Leo made his first appointment of a Chinese bishop under the agreement. And in a subsequent interview, Leo specified that he would continue with the agreement "in the short term."

"I'm also in ongoing dialogue with a number of people, Chinese, on both sides of some of the issues that are there," Leo said. " It's a very difficult situation. In the long term, I don't pretend to say this is what I will and will not do, but after two months, I've already begun having discussions at several levels on that topic."

Since 2018, according to Human Rights Watch, Chinese authorities have pressured underground Catholic communities to join the state-controlled Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association "by arbitrarily detaining, forcibly disappearing ... and subjecting underground Catholic bishops and priests to house arrest."

The report described some of those actions, attributed to people who had left China and who were not named in the report.
The government has also intensified ideological control, surveillance, restrictions on religious activities, and foreign ties in official churches, according to Human Rights Watch. It said that regulations adopted in December subject foreign travel by Catholic clergy to state approval.
The Chinese government officially recognizes five religions — Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam — and tightly supervises them.
In 2016, President Xi Jinping said he would "Sinicize" the country's religions — increasing oversight and ideological control in a bid to align religious practice with the Communist Party's ideology and leadership.
Since then, Human Rights Watch asserted, the authorities have demolished hundreds of church buildings or the crosses atop them, prevented adherents from gathering in unofficial churches, restricted access to the Bible, and confiscated religious materials not authorized by the government.
The Sinicization campaign has also meant severe repression of Tibetan Buddhism and Islam , Human Rights Watch said.
In October, a pastor of a prominent underground Christian church was detained, according to his daughter, a church pastor and a group that monitors religion in China.
They said Pastor Ezra Jin Mingri of the Zion Church was detained at his home in Guangxi province, along with dozens of other church leaders across China.
Zion Church is among the largest so-called underground or house churches that are unregistered with the Chinese authorities. They defy government restrictions requiring believers to worship only in registered congregations.
Last month, ChinaAid — a U.S.-based group advocating for religious freedom in China — urged U.S. President Donald Trump to demand Mingri's release ahead of his planned meeting with Xi in May.
"The Chinese Communist Party has escalated its systematic campaign to eradicate independent religious life," said Bob Fu, ChinaAid's president. "The United States must respond with consequences — not just concern."

## Yunnan: Blind Falun Gong Practitioner Sentenced and "Disappeared"

16 April 2026, Bitter Winter

The case of Yang Xiaoming, a blind Falun Gong practitioner from Kunming, shows how far state repression can go when it views faith as a crime.
Her story covers three decades of persecution, including forced abortion, job loss, and torture that led to blindness. Yet even her blindness did not protect her from being seen as an enemy of the state. In late March 2026, she vanished from her home in circumstances that friends describe as clearly coercive; an open door, a fallen chair, and scattered objects on the table painted a grim picture. For a woman who could not see, the message was chilling: even the most vulnerable are not safe from those who want to silence them.
Born in 1969, Yang began practicing Falun Gong in 1995. After the crackdown in 1999, she became one of many ordinary believers targeted for not renouncing their faith. Over the years, she faced forced labor, torture, and the loss of her marriage and job. By the end of 2012, repeated beatings had left her completely blind.
Her disability did not stop authorities from pursuing her. In May 2022, she was detained again, but the detention center refused to take her because of her medical issues. She was released on bail but still faced prosecution. On March 14, 2023, a court sentenced her to seven years in prison and imposed a heavy fine. Due to her health, she stayed at home and did not go into custody.
That fragile reprieve ended in March 2026. Friends who visited her home found signs of a sudden struggle and no trace of Yang. Given her sentence and the pressure she faced, they believe she was forcibly taken away to complete her term. If that is the case, she would likely remain imprisoned until 2033.
Her disappearance reveals a disturbing mindset: that a blind woman, already physically broken by years of abuse, is still seen as dangerous simply because she refuses to give up her beliefs. This mindset reduces faith to a form of rebellion, disability to irrelevance, and human dignity to a hassle.
Yang Xiaoming's case is yet another a stark example of how repression continues even against those who pose no real threat—except the threat of remembering who they are and what they believe.

## UN human rights office raises concern around trial of Chinese dissident artist

15 April 2026, Reuters

The United Nations human rights office on Wednesday said it was concerned by the trial of Chinese dissident artist Gao Zhen, famous for making provocative satirical sculptures of former leader Mao Zedong.
Gao was tried at the end of March over accusations of "slandering national heroes and martyrs", the U.N. human rights office said — a law which it said came into force more than a decade after the satirical sculptures were created.
"The case against him raises concerns with regard to retroactive application of criminal law and use



of criminal sanctions to punish artistic expression, undermining the principle of legality," the office said in a statement.
The Chinese mission in Geneva did not immediately respond to a Reuters request for comment.
Gao, who was detained in 2024 during a visit from the U.S., faces a maximum three-year prison sentence, said his wife Zhao Yaliang and Shane Yi, a researcher at the Chinese Human Rights Defenders group which operates outside the country.
The U.N. rights office called for Gao's immediate release from detention, where he is being held pending judgment after his closed-door trial concluded on March 30, citing concerns that his health is deteriorating.
The one-day trial took place at Sanhe City People's Court in Hebei province, neighbouring the capital Beijing, and ended without a verdict, Zhao and Yi told Reuters, citing information from his lawyers.
Verdicts are often announced months later in such trials.

## The World Is Facing Horrors in China—and Looking Away

14 April 2026, National Interest

"I cannot believe what you have told me," Felix Frankfurter, a US Supreme Court justice and a strong supporter of the American Jewish Congress, said in 1943 to Jan Karski after reading his report on Nazi Germany's ongoing extermination of the Jews in occupied Poland.
Karski, a courier in the Polish resistance, had arrived in America earlier that year—sent by the Polish government-in-exile in London to the United States to deliver a secret report to the American government and press. That report was based on information gathered by Polish underground informants inside Auschwitz and other German extermination camps; it included detailed descriptions of the treatment of Jews and other minorities, the abysmal conditions in the Warsaw Ghetto, and the Nazi program of genocide.
While in the United States, Karski met with senior officials, including President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and Frankfurter. Despite the urgency of his mission, however, many American decision-makers did not fully grasp or believe the scale of his revelations. Karski's warnings were often met with disbelief or dismissed as exaggerated war propaganda, and the report's coverage by the American press was limited. It was only at the end of the war, when Allied troops liberated the Nazi death camps and saw the horrors within with their own eyes, that the true scope of the Holocaust became known to all.
Why did it take so long, when the information was available in 1943? In trying to determine why leading thinkers in the West did not believe the initial reports about what was going on in Auschwitz, the clearest reason was put into words by Frankfurter: the truth was simply too horrible for most to accept.
Nearly a century later, the Holocaust is an established fact, and Holocaust education is compulsory in schools around the globe. That education is accompanied by the adage "Never again": the civilized world cannot afford to ignore another genocide. Nevertheless, if history were to repeat itself—if someone presented a report like Karski's to the public, documenting mass murder being conducted in broad daylight—how would we react? Would we dismiss it as propaganda, or would we have the moral courage to believe it?
"Killed to Order" Links Chinese Communism and Mass Murder
*Killed to Order*, by Jan Jekielek, presents an unflinching, comprehensive report on the ongoing persecution of Falun Dafa adherents in China—including the well-documented practice of harvesting the organs of its practitioners. Yet it also attempts to provide an answer to this question, as Jekielek himself struggled with it for years.
Jekielek starts the book in Frankfurter's position. He describes feeling the same feeling Frankfurter felt when he first heard about forced organ harvesting in China from an eyewitness. "Rumors and whispers of forcible organ harvesting from prisoners in China had been circulating among different dissident groups for a while," Jekielek wrote. "But I'd never taken these stories entirely seriously, hoping they were simply exaggerations… I simply couldn't accept that [the] story could possibly be real. It sounded too fantastical, too implausible, too evil."
*Killed to Order* describes China's organ harvesting business in gory detail. Though the author's fiercely anti-communist outlook is clear, the book is not a political screed; it is meticulous in its research and convincing in its sourcing. Jekielek tracks the organ chain from the bottom to the highest circles of the Chinese communist apparatus. Within the book, one can read testimonies from Chinese surgeons, survivors, former communist officials, and foreign transplant specialists who were exposed to the practice while in China.
What really draws attention to Jekielik's work is not only the explanation of how organ harvesting works in China and what atrocities are committed

along the way, but also how, through this example, one can see how Chinese communism functions. He shows that it is a living, breathing system, rather than a relic of old times that has given way to technocratic capitalism in practice, as many in the West assert.

What Is Falun Dafa?

China's relationship with Falun Dafa began in the early 1990s, right after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Despite the Tiananmen Square massacre, freedom was on the march around the world, and many believed that China was loosening its grip on society. At the same time, the country experienced a boom in the practice of *qigong*, or traditional Chinese meditation and exercises. Beijing tolerated the *qigong* craze, reasoning that it would improve public health and lessen the strain on its healthcare system.

As the 1990s went on, one strain of *qigong* came to exceed the others in popularity: Falun Dafa, also known as Falun Gong. For a time, the practice had the official endorsement of the Party, and reached tens of millions of followers at its peak—typically estimated between 70 and 100 million.

What distinguished Falun Dafa from other forms of Chinese physical activity allowed by the communists was its spiritual dimension. Its founder, Li Hongzhi, urged followers to adopt a handful of ethical principles: truthfulness, compassion, and forbearance. Another rule of the movement was not to take money or any other profit from teaching. Though Chinese officials would later describe the movement as a dangerous cult controlled by Li, Jekielek stressed the apolitical and individual nature of its practice; there was never any "membership list" or formal organization, only a growing group of practitioners.

Falun Dafa spread like wildfire, and it grew to alarm the Chinese Communist Party. It is not difficult to see why. Falun Dafa's focus on spirituality amounted to a direct contradiction to Marxism's fundamentally materialist ideology. Even the principle of not taking money befuddled Beijing; without capital, there is no leverage for redistribution and state control over the "producer" of the good. Most damningly, because Falun Dafa was so strongly anchored in traditional, pre-revolution Chinese culture, it could be interpreted as a rejection of the doctrines of communism. For a Party long accustomed to total control over society, any movement that could challenge its rule, no matter how benign, could not be permitted to exist. As Jekielek explains:

"In a totalitarian society like communist China, which, historically speaking, is a relatively new and still poorly understood political innovation, the state controls everything. Anything that even suggests independence from state authority is either crushed or co-opted. Such a society can't function any other way. There is no space for a civil society because its very existence would threaten the Party's absolute control." Mass Murder and Organ Harvesting

In 1999, the persecutions began. The Communist Party established a bureau dedicated to fighting and disintegrating Falun Dafa. This bureau—known as the 610 Office, or "Liu Yao Ling," named after its June 10 creation date—was created outside of Chinese legislative channels and explicitly empowered to conduct extrajudicial activity. Party officials justified the bureau's sweeping powers by citing the nature of the threat; by this time, Falun Dafa practitioners numbered in the tens of millions, and included members of the administration and the military.

During the early days of the anti-Falun Dafa campaign, the government tried to "re-educate" its practitioners, encouraging them to abandon the faith. When that failed, it escalated its crackdown—rounding up thousands of adherents and pressing them into labor camps without trial or legal recourse. According to numerous credible sources, the 610 Office was responsible for a wide range of violent actions that were nominally illegal even under the Chinese legal system: extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual assault, and the illegal confiscation of property.

According to Chinese law and official practice, it is permitted to use the organs of executed prisoners for transplants. This practice had never been used at scale before, but the crackdown on Falun Dafa adherents created the ideal conditions. Jekielik describes the beginnings of large-scale organ harvesting as the precise moment when the needs of the system, state corruption, and market demand converged in the early 2000s. Every "need" of the moment could be met through organ harvesting: enemies of the system would disappear, supply of organs would grow, China's overburdened healthcare system would improve, and foreign medical tourists would bring an influx of cash. Most disturbingly, a donor's organs must be harvested shortly after death and cannot be stored for long periods of time: this means that in order for a recipient to benefit from them, the donor must be executed within hours of the transplant. This state of affairs means that Chinese political prisoners are kept alive until a recipient for their organs is ready to receive the transplant, then immediately executed and harvested—"killed to order," as Jekielek puts it.

The true number of Falun Dafa practitioners murdered for their organs will likely never be known. Estimates vary in the hundreds of thousands; Jekielek speculates a higher-end figure of one million. Nor, in spite of the Party's loud protestations, has the practice come to an end. As Falun Dafa practitioners have gone further underground and become more difficult for the authorities to find, Beijing has shifted gears, using the practice against other troublesome ethnic minorities such as Tibetans and, in more recent years, Uyghurs. The West Benefits from China's Human Rights Abuses—by Design

One might assume that the Western world would react to these horrors with vicious condemnation, international sanctions, and extreme diplomatic pressure. Indeed, many in the West have called for precisely these steps. Yet despite the compelling evidence, much of the Western world reacted with studied ignorance—and, in some cases, compliance.

The historical record is clear that Beijing's practice of organ harvesting benefited immensely from an influx of "organ tourists" from abroad, taking advantage of the abundant supply and low cost of spare organs in China and not questioning where they came from. As of 2026, only two countries in the world have taken steps to limit organ tourism: Israel has banned insurance reimbursement for transplants performed abroad in suspicious circumstances, and the United States has introduced legislation and sanctions targeting forced organ harvesting.

What is particularly interesting is how Jekielek links forced organ harvesting to the Chinese doctrine of "unrestricted warfare." According to this doctrine, the Party should achieve absolute dominance by all means military and non-military, including economic, legal, and psychological. In this schema, organ harvesting amounts to a non-military tactic: it both ingratiates China to the West as a healthcare supplier and erodes the West's confidence in its own principles.

"The CCP's strategy of 'wooing the barbarians,' of drawing Western elites into cooperation and complicity, was no accident," Jekielek writes. "Nor was it some kind of diplomatic improvisation. It was deliberate, methodical, and central to a broader campaign designed to weaken the West from within: to erode its moral confidence, corrupt its institutions, and make its leaders unwilling or unable to confront the truth of what China has become." Most Americans would recoil at the thought of accepting organs from murdered Chinese political prisoners. Yet there are subtler, more insidious ways that they benefit from China's disdain for human rights. They browse TikTok, shop on Temu, watch movies from Hollywood studios catering to Chinese censors, and buy clothes from Nike and Gap—both of which were implicated in forced labor use in Xinjiang, along with dozens of others of major Western companies. If they were given a simple, binary choice between the continued flow of cheap goods and better human rights halfway around the world, which would they choose?

When everyone is complicit—when Westerners themselves benefit from China's practices—no one is to blame.

*Killed to Order* is an important study of how today's China is built on some of the worst crimes of our time. It explains how communism works, and explains that the West cannot change the world simply by attempting to export its lifestyle and assuming the best. It also shows how deeply the Chinese Communist Party has penetrated the United States, waging a constant war—even if we do not fully recognize it.

The question is no longer what we know. Like Felix Frankfurter and Jan Karski, are we willing to believe, and act in time?

## China's Metro Boom Era Is Coming to an End

13 April 2026, China Scope

China's rapid subway expansion era is drawing to a close, as local governments face mounting financial pressures and demographic headwinds — even in prosperous coastal cities.

A widely circulated article from the WeChat account "Urban Finance" highlights how several major cities have recently seen subway plans rejected or scaled back. Ningbo's development authority stated the city lacks the ridership levels needed to qualify for a fourth phase of rail construction. Shenzhen's proposed Metro Line 18 failed to receive national approval. And Guangzhou's fourth phase of subway planning may be approved for only about 100 kilometers fewer than originally submitted — a reduction of over 60 percent.

The article notes that approval difficulties are no longer limited to smaller cities; even high-tier urban centers are finding it harder to get new lines greenlit. Behind the tightening standards lie two key forces: the collapse of the real estate sector has severely squeezed local government revenues and worsened debt problems, while slowing population growth has undermined the ridership case for new lines in many cities.

The financial toll is already visible. Shenzhen Metro, which intervened to bail out property developer Vanke Group, reported a loss of 33.46 billion yuan (approximately $4.6 billion USD) by the end of 2024 — more than it earned over the previous five years combined.

The broader fiscal picture reinforces the challenge. National land sale revenues fell to 4.15 trillion yuan (approximately $571 billion USD) in 2024, less than half the peak of 8.7 trillion yuan (approximately $1.2 trillion USD) reached in 2021.

China currently has over 40 cities with metro systems, including Shanghai and Beijing, both of which have surpassed 900 kilometers of operating lines. But the article argues the era of cities racing to build sprawling networks is effectively over. While new lines will continue opening in the coming decade, the spectacle of cities competing to submit hundred-kilometer expansion plans is unlikely to return.

## Death Toll of the Abrupt End of Zero COVID in China: Likely, Two Million

09 April 2026, Bitter Winter

In December 2022, Xi Jinping declared victory over the virus and ended the restrictive policy overnight, fearful of unprecedented protests. It caused a disaster.



*Doctors and paramedics celebrating "victory" over COVID. From Weibo.*

For three years, China functioned within a vast health crisis of its own creation. The Zero COVID policy involved mass testing, digital surveillance, quarantines that affected entire apartment blocks, and extensive lockdowns that made the rest of the world's restrictions seem mild. This approach was presented as a success of discipline and the state's strength. For a time, it worked. While other countries faced multiple waves of infection, China managed to keep the virus away through strict measures: a cough meant sealing off an entire neighborhood.

But by late 2022, the plan began to fail. Omicron, a variant that viewed lockdowns as a small hurdle, slipped through the system. After months of increasingly bizarre restrictions, the Chinese public erupted in protests unseen since 1989. People called for an end to the lockdowns, with some even daring to demand Xi Jinping step down. Within days, the government made one of the quickest policy changes in recent public health history. On December 7, 2022, Zero COVID ended. Xi claimed his personal victory over the virus.

What followed was not a victory. It was a surge of infections so vast that pharmacies ran out of fever reducers within hours, hospitals overflowed, and antiviral drugs became rare. The government, which had spent three years tracking every asymptomatic case with meticulous care, suddenly stopped counting deaths. By early May 2023, it reported just 121,000 COVID deaths—a figure so implausibly low that even its staunchest statisticians must have hesitated.

Into this gap came a team of researchers—He Guojun, Li Shuo, and Quan Yucheng—who published a study in the "Journal of Population Economics," which was further commented on by Stanford University's Center for China's Economy and Institutions and is attracting considerable attention among Chinese netizens. Their approach was cleverly simple: if the state would not disclose how many ordinary citizens died, maybe it could not hide the deaths of its elites. China's academics, senior Party officials, and members of its top political bodies do not pass away quietly. Their obituaries are public, ceremonial, and hard to keep under wraps. The researchers created a dataset of 10,705 elites aged 65 and older, tracking their deaths from 2017 to March 2023. This group, typically shielded by the best available healthcare, became a grim indicator of what happened when Zero COVID ended abruptly. For two weeks after the policy shift, elite mortality remained normal—exactly the time needed for infections to spread, symptoms to show, and severe cases to worsen. Then the numbers skyrocketed. In the last week of 2022, deaths among elites were more than ten times the pre-pandemic baseline. Weekly mortality peaked at 1,030% above normal, then dropped to 680% the next week, and only returned to baseline by February. The entire disaster lasted less than five weeks, but its effect on annual mortality was clear: a 19% increase for 2022 and 24% for 2023.

Age, as always with COVID, was crucial. Men over 85 experienced a 61% increase in mortality, with a sixteen-fold spike at the peak. Even among the elite, status mattered. The highest-ranking figures—senior national leaders and top academics—had the highest mortality not because they lacked access to care, but because they were older and had lived long enough to develop chronic conditions that COVID exploits. Men had worse outcomes than women, consistent with global trends.

If the elite faced such severe consequences, what happened to everyone else? The authors extrapolated their age- and sex-specific mortality rates to the general population, reasonably assuming that ordinary citizens were at least as vulnerable as those with better access to healthcare. This resulted in a lower estimate of 1.44 million excess deaths among those over 65, with an upper estimate of 2.56 million. These numbers align with independent estimates from other researchers, all of which far exceed the official count.

China's total pandemic death toll from 2020 to 2023 still compares favorably with countries of similar size and income. At immense human and social cost, Zero COVID did prevent mass casualties during the more lethal pre-Omicron waves. However, the sudden change—prompted not by health data but by political fear—cost lives that could have been saved. Antivirals were scarce, ICU beds were not enough, booster campaigns were incomplete, and households were caught off guard. The virus was always going to spread once restrictions lifted, but the clash between Omicron and an unprepared health system amplified the damage.



*He Guojun, one of the authors of the study on elite deaths and COVID. From X.*

The tragedy is not that China reopened. It did so abruptly, as if flipping a switch, expecting a virus that had been held at bay for three years to wait while the system caught up. Xi Jinping declared victory, but the obituary pages told a different story—not in slogans, but in names, dates, and the quiet realities of loss.

In the end, the elites became the observers the researchers describe: a group too visible to ignore, too significant to be buried without ceremony, and too numerous to overlook. Their deaths revealed what the government tried to hide. When Zero COVID ended, the virus did not simply return. It surged in all at once, and it took its toll.

## China attempts to reform RSDL

08 April 2026, Safeguard Defenders

In the summer of 2025, posts began to appear on local prosecutor websites in China talking about new rules for carrying out RSDL, a secretive system of incommunicado detention.

In recent years, RSDL had been making headlines with a string of people dying in RSDL. In 2025, there was even a prominent court case where 11 police officers were sentenced in connection with the death of man after being brutally tortured in RSDL.

This new regulation appears to be China's answer to the growing criticism of the system. However, like RSDL itself, there has been a lot of secrecy surrounding these new provisions, which has become known not because they have been formally announced, but piecemeal.

A full analysis has been made of these new provisions, how it compares with their predecessor, and with China's other key criminal justice system-related laws. The analysis shows much left to be desired, and there is good reason for significant doubt whether the new provisions will actually be enforced, or remain on paper only.

## China sets record in Antarctic drilling

07 April 2026, China Daily



*Scientists carry out the country's first ever hot-water drilling test in Antarctica in February. ZHANG NAN / FOR CHINA DAILY*

China's 42nd Antarctic expedition team has successfully completed the country's first ever hot-water drilling test in Antarctica, reaching a depth of 3,413 meters, the Ministry of Natural Resources said on Tuesday.

The achievement breaks the previous international record of 2,540 meters for polar hot-water drilling and marks a major technological leap.

Conducted at the Qilin Subglacial Lake on Feb 5, the test demonstrates China's ability to carry out drilling research across more than 90 percent of the Antarctic ice sheet and the entire Arctic ice sheet.

The Qilin Subglacial Lake, named by China in 2022, is the second-largest buried lake in Antarctica. It is located in Princess Elizabeth Land in the East Antarctic ice sheet, about 120 kilometers from China's Taishan Station.

Polar ice sheet hot-water drilling is a frontier field in international research that studies paleoenvironmental changes, helps predict global climate change and explores the boundaries of life in extreme environments.

The drilling technique is used primarily in glaciology and polar research to create boreholes through thick ice sheets or glaciers. Instead of using a traditional rotating metal drill, this method uses a high-pressure stream of near-boiling water to melt a path through the ice.

Compared with mechanical ice drills, hot-water drilling ensures stronger penetration, higher efficiency, less disturbance to the ice, easier access to large boreholes and clean operations. It has become a mainstream technology for investigating deep environments in polar ice sheets and ice shelves.

Li Yuansheng, a visiting professor at East China Normal University's School of Geographic Sciences in Shanghai, described the achievement as "groundbreaking and pioneering, positioning China as a leader in polar hot-water drilling".

"The successful experiment of deep and fast hot-water drilling has laid the foundation for in situ

detection and sampling of deep subglacial lakes in Antarctica, achieving world-leading progress," Li said.

He added that the system integrates multiple pieces of equipment designed for polar conditions and addresses key technical challenges to meet the requirements for high-precision, large-borehole and clean drilling in Antarctica.

Li said the hot-water drill system is capable of rapidly reaching designated depths exceeding 3,000 meters and creating clean boreholes to support subsequent exploration and sampling of subglacial lakes.

He emphasized that the system complies with the Antarctic Treaty's requirements of peaceful use and environmental protection. Measures taken include using locally sourced snow to control external pollutants, employing anti-contamination materials and implementing strict sterilization procedures to prevent biological contamination.

The Ministry of Natural Resources said the operation achieved efficient, stable and clean deep polar hot-water drilling, filling a technological gap in China's polar research capabilities that reflects its commitment to green and environmentally friendly exploration.

China will actively share relevant technologies and data with other countries to support the international community in better understanding, protecting and utilizing the polar regions, the ministry said.

Lu Kai, a postdoctoral researcher at the Chinese Academy of Sciences' Institute of Geology and Geophysics, highlighted the significance of the breakthrough for advancing polar research.

"Polar ice cores preserve high-resolution records of water hydrogen and oxygen isotopes, which document past changes in temperature, atmospheric circulation and global ice volume. These unique archives are fundamental for reconstructing global climate dynamics," Lu said.

He added that the drilling breakthrough is crucial for extracting kilometer-thick polar ice cores that represent extended time periods and for studying long-term paleoenvironmental changes, noting that open data sharing is essential for driving global progress in the field.

# TIBET'S ECOLOGY & RIVER WATERS

## China building ultra-high-voltage power transmission project in Tibet to supply coastal South China

29 April 2026, Tibetan Review

China has begun on Apr 28 the construction of the Tibet section of an ultra-high-voltage power transmission that will transmit "clean energy" from the Chinese ruled Himalayan territory all the way to its southern coastal province of Guangdong and beyond. Tibet has become China's rising power generation hub in recent years, propelled by the nation's rapidly evolving clean energy technologies, noted China's official *Xinhua* news agency Apr 28.

But unfortunately, China's mammoth wind, solar, and, especially, hydropower projects across Tibet remain highly controversial for their environmental devastation, utter disregard for the socio-economic future of the local Tibetans, brutal repression and persecution of those who protest any such violations, and for their massive imports of Chinese labourers and technicians that adversely affect the demographic profile of the region.

Construction of the Xizang section of the Xizang-Guangdong ultra-high-voltage (UHV) power transmission line was kicked off Tuesday (Apr 28) in the city of Qamdo (Tibetan: Chamdo) in Xizang Autonomous Region (TAR), the report said, using the Sinicized name "Xizang" for "Tibet".

The report said the line will stretch over a distance of 2,681 km to supply the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area with power, thanks to TAR's vast clean energy capacity.

The report said that with a total investment of 53.2 billion yuan (about $7.76 billion) and a transmission capacity of 10 million kW, this transmission project will serve as a major energy artery linking TAR and south China's Guangdong via Yunnan Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.

The TAR section is scheduled to achieve power transmission capacity by 2028 and become fully operational in 2029. It will include two UHV transmission lines totalling 301.7 km at elevations ranging from 1,900 metres to 4,800 metres, and two converter stations with capacities of 8 million kW and 5 million kW, respectively, the report said.

The State Grid Xizang Electric Power Co. has said that once completed, the project will supply 43 billion kWh of clean electricity annually from TAR to the Greater Bay Area, and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 33 million tonnes.

The report said that by the end of 2025, total installed power capacity in the TAR, including both completed and under-construction projects, had exceeded 33 million kW, while the installed capacity of completed projects alone had surpassed 13 million kW.

Construction of the Guangdong section of the project was stated to have started in Sep 2025.
The Greater Bay Area, formed in 2017, is a high-level strategic city cluster in southern China consisting of 9 Guangdong cities (Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Foshan, Dongguan, Huizhou, Zhongshan, Jiangmen, Zhaoqing) and the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macao.

## How China is Deploying Its Green Energy & EV Playbook to Lead the Protein Transition

29 April 2026, Green Queen

A new report explores how China is aligning policy, capital and technology to become the world's alternative protein capital, following its lead from the green energy and mobility sectors.
China is in "year zero" of a food systems transition, with the government making alternative proteins a strategic priority amid its bid to turn into a major food exporter.
That's according to new analysis by Systemiq and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, which charts the East Asian country's path to becoming an alternative protein leader by 2050.
It points out how China's population grew by 450 million and per capita income expanded 25-fold between 1978 and 2020, which helped drive a dietary shift away from starchy roots and pulses to animal proteins, processed foods and convenience products.
In fact, animal protein intake increased tenfold during this period, with meat, dairy, fats and sugars driving the rise in per-capita food consumption. However, animal-based foods require far more land, water, and feed than the plant-based staples they replaced, so the growth in consumption has "tightened the link between diets, environmental stress, and food security", the report states.
The country has been at the centre of global agriculture demand for the last two decades, and is currently the world's largest agricultural importer, with a trade deficit of $124.5B. It accounts for 60% of all soy imports and a quarter (24%) of beef.
However, climate shocks, geopolitical tensions and trade disputes have led China's policymakers to make food sovereignty a core pillar of national security. Systemiq predicts that the demand for animal protein will plateau in 2030, before declining through to 2050 and beyond. That, in turn, will have immense implications for the global protein landscape.



*Courtesy: Systemiq/Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation*

**Tapping the green energy and EV playbook**
According to the report, early indicators suggest that China is applying the same industrial strategy to agriculture as it did to the green energy and mobility sectors, where it is an undisputed leader.
Global solar energy capacity has expanded by more than 30-fold over the last decade, and sales of electric vehicles (EVs) have increased 50-fold – they now make up 7% and 20% of global electricity and vehicle use, respectively.
China has been a catalyst for both transitions, rising from zero to 70% of global solar energy and electric vehicle (EV) production within 15 years. This speed reflects the efficacy of its strategy and its ability to act decisively in response to global signals.
Its policymakers elevated solar power within strategic industrial plans, mobilising export incentives and concessional finance to build capacity well ahead of domestic demand. As global deployment accelerated, costs fell and scale expanded, transforming China from a marginal producer to the world's leading solar manufacturer.
In both transitions, incumbent systems continued to function, though they could no longer be optimised to resolve their underlying constraints. At the same time, alternative technologies already existed, but were commercially immature, so their success hinged on the alignment of targets, capital, regulation and manufacturing.
Systemiq noted that agriculture is fundamentally different from the energy and mobility sectors – the food system is influenced by biological and physical constraints, deeply embedded in culture, and politically sensitive in ways other industries aren't. That makes substitution more complex.
Still, it is important to draw parallels with other transitions, since the differences don't preclude large-scale change. With solar power and EVs, the goal was to achieve technological leadership and reduce dependence on fossil fuels. Similarly, with food, China aims to become more self-sufficient and build capabilities for future-friendly innovations.
Its policymakers recognise this: food security was placed alongside energy and finance in the country's 14th five-year plan (2021-25). The latest plan, running until 2026, deepens this focus, emphasising food security, agricultural




*Courtesy: Systemiq/Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation*

modernisation, protein diversification, and novel foods.




*Courtesy: Systemiq/Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation*

## China's future food playbook

The government's embrace of alternative proteins indicates that China is now in "year zero" of its food system transformation, with Systemiq laying out a strategic playbook of five mutually reinforcing mechanisms driving this shift.

The first element involves a strategic and coordinated vision, with national five-year plans cascading from the centre to provinces, state-owned enterprises, and financial institutions. These targets shape direct investment decisions and administrative actions, and signal intent.

The report then points to an entrepreneurial environment in which dense supplier ecosystems, close industry-university partnerships, and intense competition drive rapid iteration and cost reduction. Once a sector is prioritised, entry barriers are lowered and competition encouraged. As weaker players exit, leading firms can scale and engage in value-chain consolidation.

Financial support is critical. Low-cost capital from state-owned banks, targeted subsidies, and sustained R&D funding can reduce early-stage risk and the cost of failure. This enables companies to invest at scale before commercial viability is fully proven, speeding up learning curves and enabling rapid expansion.

Policy and regulatory support are equally important tools. Clear political signalling reduces long-term uncertainties, and the country's ability to rapidly amend regulations in response to global developments allows policy to evolve alongside technology. Meanwhile, proactive infrastructure build-out creates the physical and institutional landscape for new industries to scale.

Finally, the playbook hinges on inducing consumer demand, instead of waiting for it to materialise. China does so by ensuring early uptake through procurement and usage standards, providing firms with the certainty to invest in novel technologies and helping accelerate learning and lowering costs. Mandates, quotas and fleet or deployment targets actively create markets for these emerging technologies.

## The three phases of China's protein transition

Following year zero, the report envisions how this strategy could play out over the next few decades, turning China into a major food exporter and a leader in the alternative protein ecosystem.

2030 is all about optimisation

Daily food consumption will look much the same at the end of the decade as it does today, with demand for animal protein largely unchanged; China's efforts to reduce import dependencies will lead to a 25% drop in soybean imports.

Alternative proteins are set to remain niche in 2030, having yet to significantly change consumer habits or reduce meat and dairy consumption, thanks in large part to their still-higher price tag. However, consistent signalling from China's leadership will drive the industry to keep innovating.

As experience and scale expand, costs will fall and businesses across retail and foodservice will experiment with alternative proteins. Fermentation-derived ingredients will be the first to reach price parity with their animal-based counterparts (by 2028), and plant-based alternatives will account for a 19% share of the overall dairy market.

2040 will kickstart structural change

By 2040, as they scale from pilot to commercial deployment, plant-based and fermentation-derived proteins will have disrupted the most expensive animal protein categories first. They will reach parity with beef and high-value seafood, capturing 14% and 16% of those markets, respectively.

Genetically modified and engineered crop adoption will continue to improve yields for maize and soy, whose imports will be 30% lower than in 2025. Fermenting the mazine can increase its native protein content, making it a suitable soy substitute and a key input for alternative protein production. Notably, China will become a net exporter of animal protein by this year.

**2050 will usher in a new equilibrium**

China's food system will look vastly different come mid-century. A "third wave" of innovation in the preceding decade will make cultivated meat commercially viable, unlocking large segments of the animal protein market. In fact, alternative proteins would be responsible for 37-54% of meat and dairy consumption by 2050.
Soy imports will be down by 32% from a 2025 benchmark, though maize imports will double thanks to its role as a feed crop and key feedstock for microbial and cultivated proteins. Other sources of sugar will also be necessary, so alternative protein producers will adopt potatoes and sugarcane and test cellulosic inputs such as grasses and agricultural residues.
The country's investment in biomanufacturing will make it a global leader of another of the 21st century's defining technologies. It will be the world's leading producer of amino acids and other




*Courtesy: Systemiq/Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation*

inputs, as well as the dominant supplier of alternative protein infrastructure, making the food system more stable and diverse.

**How will this impact the global food system?**
China's dominance of the future food economy will have major implications for stakeholders worldwide. It currently purchases the majority of soy exported by Brazil, Argentina, and the US, and a significant amount of beef from Brazil, Argentina, and New Zealand. A sustained contraction in Chinese demand not only reduces volumes in these countries but also risks price declines and export revenue losses.
These producer countries will be the first to feel the effects of China's transition, and can strengthen their resilience by improving productivity on existing farmland, advancing deforestation- and conversion-free commodities, diversifying markets, and avoiding investments that may not generate expected returns.
For the alternative protein industry, the East Asian country's industrial approach can accelerate the path to price parity faster than the sector currently anticipates, posing both an opportunity and a challenge for existing producers (especially in Europe and the US).
Following the solar energy and EV model could significantly reduce the cost of bioreactors and fermentation systems. While that may be a win for the industry overall, it could erode the advantage of early movers who built at higher costs, Systemiq suggests.
Future food players must be prepared for Chinese alternative protein products to enter export markets, potentially leading to direct competition with established players. In addition, they must keep pace with regulatory advancements, with novel food approvals and labelling requirements set to shape the pace of consumer adoption.
"For years, China has been the engine of global agricultural demand, but recent climate shocks, geopolitical tensions and trade disruptions have exposed the vulnerability of that model," said Shenggen Fan, chair professor at the China Agricultural University.
"The new Five-Year Plan signals that Beijing has taken note, responding with characteristic resolve and embedding food security and sovereignty as a core strategic priority," he added. "Those who have watched China's previous industrial transitions know not to underestimate what could come next."

## China Introduces Four-Tier Penalty System for Rare Earth Control

29 Aprik 2026, Chosun

China has established detailed punishment standards for violations across the entire process of rare earth mining, refining, and distribution. The country accounts for 60–70% of global rare earth mining production, 85–90% of refining and separation processes, and over 80% of the market for finished rare earth magnets. Analysts interpret Beijing's move to subdivide administrative penalty criteria as a signal of its intensified state control over a core strategic resource, with dominance spanning the entire rare earth industry chain.
The state-run Global Times reported on the 29th that the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology had publicly released a draft "administrative penalty criteria table" under the Rare Earth Management Regulations on its official website the previous day. This draft follows the implementation of the Rare Earth Management Regulations in October 2024. The ministry explained that the measures aim to "strengthen the enforcement of the regulations, standardize legal implementation, and enhance the rule-of-law-based industrial management system."
The draft identifies violations of total quantity control regulations during mining and refining/separation processes as primary targets for punishment. Unauthorized entities engaging in refining/separation activities, comprehensive rare earth utilization companies using mineral products as raw materials, and the purchase, processing, or sale of illegally mined or refined products are also classified as violations.
Notably, failure to record or report distribution data for rare earth products, as well as non-cooperation or obstruction of supervisory

investigations, are included in the penalty framework. This reflects Beijing's intent to monitor not only production volumes but also raw material usage, distribution channels, and transaction data.
Authorities plan to apply a four-tier penalty system —no penalty, reduced penalty, standard penalty, and severe penalty—based on the severity of violations. Penalties include confiscation of illegal profits, related products/equipment, fines, and revocation of business licenses. In severe cases, entities could effectively be forced out of the market. The draft does not introduce new sanctions beyond existing rare earth regulations. The October 2024 Rare Earth Management Regulations already included provisions for penalties related to total quantity control violations, unauthorized refining/separation, illegal product distribution, and failure to report traceability information. The significance of this draft lies in its subdivision of penalty levels for practical enforcement, standardizing inspection and punishment criteria to enhance the effectiveness of state management across the rare earth industry.

## CHINA UNIONPAY LAUNCHES "GARBAGE EXCHANGE FOR DAILY NECESSITIES" FILM DIRECTED BY JODY XIONG

28 April 2026, Campaign Brief Asia




The Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, one of the world's most pristine environments, is increasingly threatened by household waste and plastic pollution. Each year, large volumes of garbage make their way into this fragile ecosystem.

As China's largest bank card payment institution, China UnionPay has long championed environmental protection. To address this issue, it commissioned Jody Xiong to create a campaign that would encourage more Tibetans to participate in waste collection.
Xiong, founder of The Nine Shanghai and visual effects director of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, was ranked the No.1 most awarded Chinese creative leader in Campaign Brief Asia's 2025 Creative Rankings. His previous work Magnificent for the ancient city of Yotkan in Xinjiang earned widespread acclaim, drawing millions of tourists and winning major global awards, including the first-ever Grand Prix for Greater China at the 2025 Clio Music Awards.
Located in a remote western region of China, the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau sits at an average altitude of 4,500 metres, where daily necessities are often scarce. However, much of the waste scattered across the plateau is recyclable. Based on this insight, China UnionPay and Xiong's team developed the core idea: Garbage Exchange for Daily Necessities.
In collaboration with the Sanjiangyuan Ecological Protection Foundation, the campaign introduced a first-of-its-kind "Garbage Exchange Supermarket" on the plateau. Built using discarded glass bottles, the initiative transforms waste into a form of currency, allowing local communities to exchange collected garbage for essential goods. In doing so, it not only improves everyday living conditions but also helps protect the surrounding environment.
To bring the idea to life, Xiong adopted a poetic, semi-documentary style, capturing real moments of Tibetans collecting waste across the plateau.
At an altitude of 4,600 metres, a young rider bends from his horse to pick up a plastic bottle. In temple squares, rooftops, and open landscapes, men and women gather litter – sometimes quietly, sometimes in shared moments of laughter. Under fluttering prayer flags, two young women rest beside baskets filled with collected waste. A father prepares his son for a journey, loading a motorcycle with bottles to exchange for daily necessities. These scenes transform simple acts of rubbish collection into moments of dignity, care, and quiet beauty.
Complementing the film, Xiong collaborated with photographers Zhang Xinhua and Liu Junhao to produce a series of images and posters inspired by these moments, extending the campaign into visual art.
Filmed over 15 days at altitudes reaching 5,000 metres, the project reflects a powerful idea: every small act, every time someone bends down to pick up litter, contributes to protecting the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau.

## China to expand environmental monitoring network to over 50,000 sites

27 April 2026, CGTN

China will expand its national environmental monitoring network to more than 50,000 sites during the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-2030), up from the current 33,000, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment said on Monday.
The move is part of efforts to accelerate the building of a modern environmental monitoring system and achieve full coverage in carbon reduction, pollution control and ecological restoration.



*Environmental monitoring staff conduct air quality and ecological factor monitoring in central China's Hubei Province, March 31, 2026. /VCG*

Zhang Dawei, head of the ministry's environmental monitoring department, said China will focus on four key areas: network development, technology, management and support capacity.

Several integrated monitoring stations capable of performing multiple functions will be established in ecologically sensitive regions, such as the Three-River-Source area, as well as in key economic zones, including the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and the Yangtze River Delta. These stations will conduct coordinated monitoring of air, water and ecosystems.

China also plans to develop and launch six environmental satellites and build 30 ground verification stations, aiming to raise the accuracy of major domestically produced satellite data products to above 80%.

During the same period, the country will advance the digital and intelligent transformation of its monitoring system. Around 10 comprehensive "lights-out laboratories" will be set up nationwide, while more than 3,000 automated water and air monitoring stations will undergo smart upgrades.

By 2030, China aims to cut manual involvement in key national monitoring operations by 70% and improve efficiency by more than five times.

## Hindu Kush Himalaya snowpack down to record low, water shortages imminent: Rep

24 April 2026, Rising Nepal

Snow cover across the Hindu Kush Himalaya (HKH) has fallen to 27.8 per cent below the long-term average, breaking last year's record low and marking the fourth consecutive year below-normal snow persistence.

This is stated in the Snow Update Report 2026 released today by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD).

The persistent decline signals a systemic collapse of seasonal snow reserves across the world's highest mountain range, posing an immediate and escalating threat to water security for nearly two billion people who depend on the 12 major river basins originating in the HKH.




Ten of those basins now have below-normal snow persistence. The Mekong, Tarim, and Tibetan Plateau have recorded their lowest levels in 24 years of monitoring.

"What we are seeing is a persistent trend where the seasonal snow reservoir is shrinking, year after year," said Sher Muhammad, author of the HKH Snow Update 2026. "The 2026 numbers confirm a breaking point: ten out of twelve basins are below normal, and several have hit their lowest recorded persistence in two decades."

Seasonal snowmelt contributes up to 77.5 per cent of annual runoff in the Helmand basin and 74.4 per cent in Amu Darya, meaning reduced snow this year will directly impact water availability for drinking, irrigation, hydropower, and ecosystem. This situation is particularly concerning for water supply and flood management. Reduced snowmelt will lower spring runoff and intensify water scarcity in downstream areas, especially in the western river basins.

Farmers in the Indus, Helmand, and Amu Darya basins face irrigation shortfalls during early growing seasons. Hydropower operators in the Mekong, Yangtze – where the Three Gorges Dam operates – and Brahmaputra should anticipate below-normal generation in the early summer.

Compounding the crisis, consecutive low-snow years have prevented groundwater and soil moisture from replenishing, increasing vulnerability to future droughts. "Every dry spell will hit harder," the report warns. "Regional cooperation on these interconnected issues has now become urgent. We need to shift from emergency response to proactive, science-based governance."

Only two basins recorded above-normal snow persistence: the Ganges at plus 16.3 per cent and the Irrawaddy at plus 21.8 per cent, offering limited local relief but insufficient to offset the regional crisis. In contrast, extreme deficits persist in the Mekong at minus 59.5 per cent, the Tibetan Plateau at minus 47.4 per cent, and the Salween at minus 41.8 per cent.

ICIMOD urges national and local agencies to activate drought preparedness and response plans immediately, integrate real-time snow data into water management decisions, invest in water storage and efficiency measures, and strengthening trans-boundary cooperation on water use.(RSS)

## Hydroelectric project of US$ 170 billion initiated in Tibet with five cascading plants and a potential of 300 billion kWh per year, three times the generation of Three Gorges.

20 April 2026, CPG

**China starts megaproject on the Yarlung Zangbo river with potential of 300 billion kWh per year and regional geopolitical impact.**

In **July 2025**, China officially announced the start of one of the most ambitious hydroelectric projects ever conceived: a complex on the **lower stretch of the Yarlung Zangbo river**, located in the **Tibet Autonomous Region**. The confirmation came on **July 19, 2025**, when Prime Minister **Li Qiang** participated in the groundbreaking ceremony in **Nyingchi**, according to the official Chinese news agency **Xinhua**. Two days later, on **July 21, 2025**, **Reuters** reported that the project is estimated at around **US$ 170 billion** and is expected to become the largest hydroelectric project in the world by planned scale. The most impressive figure is the forecast of annual generation of up to **300 billion kWh**, a volume that could exceed approximately **three times** the production of the **Three Gorges** dam, currently the largest hydroelectric power station in operation on the planet.

According to Reuters, the project will consist of **five cascading hydroelectric plants** along the Yarlung Zangbo, in a region where the river has a drop of about **2,000 meters over 50 kilometers**, a feature that explains the enormous energy potential of the complex.

**Yarlung Zangbo river offers unique conditions for energy generation**

The Yarlung Zangbo is the name given to the upper course of the river, which, upon entering India, becomes known as **Brahmaputra**. The section chosen for the project is located in an extreme mountainous region, where the river makes a sharp turn around the **eastern Himalayas**, forming one of the largest continuous drops on the planet.

Studies indicate that, in this stretch, the river can have a drop of about **2,000 meters over approximately 50 kilometers**, creating one of the largest known natural hydroelectric potentials.This combination of large water volume and steep drop makes the site one of the most strategic points in the world for hydroelectric energy generation.Structure plans for five cascading plants to maximize utilization

The project is not based on a single dam, but rather on a system composed of **five cascading plants**, distributed along the course of the river.

This model allows the same water to be used in multiple stages, significantly increasing the energy efficiency of the system.

Each power plant contributes to the total utilization of the elevation, progressively transforming potential energy into electricity.

This approach is already used in other Chinese rivers, but never on a scale as large as that proposed for the Yarlung Zangbo.

**Estimated capacity surpasses any existing hydroelectric project**

The forecast of **300 billion kWh per year** places the project at an unprecedented level. For comparison, the Three Gorges Dam generates about **88 to 100 billion kWh annually**, depending



*Photo: China starts megaproject on the Yarlung Zangbo River with a potential of 300 billion kWh per year*

on hydrological conditions.This means that the new complex could represent a massive expansion of China's energy capacity, with a direct impact on the country's electricity matrix. The generated energy could be distributed to industrial and urban areas, reducing dependence on coal.

Location in Tibet imposes extreme technical challenges

The construction takes place in one of the most challenging regions on the planet from a geographical standpoint. Tibet presents:

- High altitudes
- Unstable mountainous terrain
- Severe weather conditions

These factors complicate the transportation of materials, the operation of equipment, and the execution of large-scale wo

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These factors complicate the transportation of materials, the operation of equipment, and the execution of large-scale works.

The engineering required to make the project feasible demands advanced solutions in geotechnics, logistics, and high-altitude construction. Additionally, the region is

seismically sensitive.Project raises geopolitical concerns among neighboring countries
As it is a transboundary river, the project has implications beyond Chinese territory. After leaving Tibet, the Yarlung Zangbo enters India and continues to Bangladesh, where it is known as the Brahmaputra.
Downstream countries, especially India and Bangladesh, have expressed concerns about possible impacts on water flow.
These concerns include:

- Changes in the volume of available water
- Impacts on agriculture
- Risks during drought or flood periods

The management of shared water resources is a sensitive issue in the region.
**China claims that the project prioritizes generation and not water diversion**
Chinese authorities have stated that the project focuses on energy generation and does not involve significant diversion of the river's course.
According to official statements cited by Reuters, the intention is to harness energy potential without compromising natural flow.
Still, experts point out that any intervention of this scale can alter the dynamics of the river, even if indirectly. The issue continues to be monitored by governments and international organizations.
Environmental impact is a central theme in projects of this magnitude
Hydroelectric megaprojects involve significant transformations in the natural environment. Among the possible impacts are:

- Changes in local ecosystems
- Submersion of natural areas
- Changes in biodiversity

**Environmental impact studies are essential to assess and mitigate these effects.** China has taken measures to balance development and preservation, but the debate remains active.
Hydropower remains a pillar of China's strategy
China is currently the largest producer of hydropower in the world and continues to invest heavily in this sector. The project on the Yarlung Zangbo is part of a broader strategy of:

- Reducing carbon emissions
- Expanding renewable sources
- Energy security

Hydropower provides a stable and large-scale source, complementing other sources like solar and wind. This model is considered essential to meet the country's growing demand.
Project could redefine global standards for energy infrastructure
If completed as planned, the Yarlung Zangbo complex could become a global benchmark in terms of scale and capacity.
The combination of investment, engineering, and energy potential places the project at an unprecedented level in the history of infrastructure.
Other countries may observe this model as a reference for future projects, although few have similar geographical conditions.
Technological development follows the advancement of works
Projects of this magnitude require technological advancements in various areas, including:

- Construction in extreme environments
- Structural monitoring
- Generation and transmission systems

The execution of the project contributes to the development of new technologies applicable to other areas of engineering. This reinforces the role of infrastructure as a driver of innovation.
**Do you believe that megaprojects of this size are sustainable in the long term?**
The start of construction on the Yarlung Zangbo River represents a milestone in engineering and energy production on a global scale. At the same time, it raises questions about environmental impact, geopolitical balance, and the use of natural resources.
In light of this, a reflection arises: do gigantic projects like this represent the future of global energy, or will it be necessary to seek less concentrated and more distributed alternatives?

## Visiting Chinese vice-premier calls Tibet mega dam safe and top priority, but fails to allay major concerns

14 April 2026, Tibetan Review

Can the world's largest dam be designed and built to withstand a catastrophic earthquake of the kind the Himalayan region is all too familiar with, including the one which struck the Mt Everest County of Dingri in Tibet early last year? How can it not be said that the dam itself will not cause an



earthquake, given the sheer volume of water it will hold in the new lake formation and our knowledge of the phenomenon known as reservoir-induced seismicity?
These questions continue to beggar answer as Chinese Vice-Premier Zhang Gouqing, who visited Tibet Autonomous Region from Apr 10 to 12, stressed Beijing's commitment to the "landmark project" when visiting the Yarlung Tsangpo construction site.

The dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo will be the world's largest hydropower facility. It is a key element of China's plans to exploit the potential of the Tibetan Plateau by boosting regional growth through green energy and infrastructure. Zhang stressed Beijing's commitment to the project during his visit, saying it would be a "major landmark project of the new era",




reported *scmp.com* Apr 13.
The project officially started last July, when Premier Li Qiang told the opening ceremony that it should be the national landmark "of a century". It is the world's most ambitious and costly dam construction to date, with a total investment estimated at 1.2 trillion yuan (US$175 billion), the report noted.
While not raising the above key questions, the report did note that India has frequently expressed concerns that the project could lead to water shortages and ecological damage downstream, where the river is a lifeline for millions of people – or even allow control of water resources to be weaponised.
"We must prioritise quality and safety above all else, strictly implementing construction standards and ecological environmental protection requirements," the report quoted Zhang as saying, citing China's state news agency *Xinhua*.
He has called for the "intensive and standardised use of resources and funds" to ensure the project remained a "clean project" free of corruption, to "collectively serve national strategies and bolster economic and social development in Tibet".
The project, being overseen by the China Yajiang Group, is a cornerstone of President Xi Jinping's regional strategy. In his New Year's message for 2026, Xi said it was a vital component of China's plans to reach peak emissions by 2030.
Chinese officials have repeatedly described the project as a routine development that does not consume water and will not negatively impact downstream flows.
Still, apart from a lingering earthquake danger, China's potential to use the world's largest reservoir as a water bomb remains real to downstream India and these cannot be allayed by mere assurances.
India is therefore not taking chances and has proposed a 10-gigawatt project on the Brahmaputra in downstream Arunachal Pradesh state, where it is known locally as the Siang river. It is also pushing for the faster development of the Subansiri Lower Dam on the tributary of the same name to assert their own control over water resources.
And on Apr 8, the Indian government approved a massive investment proposal for the US$3.1 billion Kamala Hydro Electric Project in the state, the report noted.

## Ignoring Tibet's fragile ecosystem, the Chinese Communist Party authorities continue to promote the "Tibetan electricity transmission" plan through solar power projects.

7 April 2026, VOT

Ignoring Tibet's fragile ecosystem, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) yesterday held a groundbreaking ceremony for a solar power plant in Damxung County, Tibet, continuing its "Tibetan electricity transmission" plan. Environmental researchers in the Tibetan exile community have repeatedly warned that the construction of large-scale solar facilities will disrupt Tibet's ecological balance, preventing herders from grazing their livestock, depriving wildlife of habitats, and ultimately damaging the natural ecosystem. Commentators have also pointed out that while the CCP heavily promotes solar energy development as a green energy project, China's green transformation means the plundering of Tibet's ecology and the suppression of local voices; it has long lost its meaning as "green."In recent years, under the guise of developing Tibet and developing green energy, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities have been constructing large-scale solar power plants in the region, restricting livestock numbers and damaging the ecological environment of Tibet's mountains and grasslands. Just yesterday (April 6), the CCP authorities held a groundbreaking ceremony for a 50-megawatt parabolic trough solar thermal power plant in Damxung County, Tibet, with plans to complete it in 2027.
Dechen Bam, an environmental researcher at the Tibet Policy Research Center under the Central Tibetan Administration, told our reporter that in recent years, the Chinese authorities have been forcibly seizing land belonging to Tibetan farmers and herders in various regions of Tibet under the pretext of developing and exploiting green energy. This land is being used to build dams, solar power plants, and other facilities, and to restrict livestock farming, severely impacting the traditional lifestyles of Tibetan herders. These constructions will disrupt Tibet's ecological balance, preventing herders from grazing their livestock, leaving

wildlife without habitats, and ultimately damaging the natural ecosystem.

Another researcher at the Tibet Policy Research Center, Tenzin Wangmo, also wrote an article exposing the severe ecological damage in Tibet behind the CCP's green energy transition. She pointed out that while China is widely recognized as a global leader in clean energy, Tibet is paying a heavy price for this seemingly glamorous "green transition." Although these projects are touted as "green" and "sustainable," their environmental assessments and community participation processes lack transparency. Local Tibetan communities are often excluded from decision-making, and ecological protection and social interests are marginalized during development. China's green energy achievements should not come at the expense of ecology and human rights. A true sustainable transition should balance environmental protection, social justice, and local participation. Tenzin Wangmo emphasized, "If a green transition means the plunder of the ecosystem and the suppression of local voices, then it loses its meaning as 'green.'"

In promoting news about the Damxung County solar power plant, Chinese state media claimed that once the project is fully completed, it "will provide stable and clean power support for the Tibetan power grid." Furthermore, the CCP has long promoted the idea that the development of various "clean energy" sources in Tibet has benefited Tibet and solved the electricity problems of many remote villages and towns. However, in reality, the CCP has been plundering Tibet's natural resources for decades, including developing solar energy, and the primary beneficiary behind this is China.

Last September, the official Chinese Communist Party media outlet, the Tibet Daily, reported on the first-ever cross-regional transmission of green electricity from Tibet to Shanghai. The transmission of electricity from Tibet to other regions had already reached a considerable scale more than a decade ago. Chinese state media reports have indicated that this transmission has covered more than ten provinces and municipalities, including Shanghai, Beijing, Hunan, and Jiangsu. Chinese officials have even stated that "the large-scale development of clean energy in Tibet not only meets local demand and generates significant economic benefits, but also plays an increasingly important role in my country's energy structure transformation and carbon neutrality process."

## A solar plant seven times the size of Manhattan in Tibet is reshaping the local microclimate and even 'growing' solar sheeps

15 April 2026, Eco Portal

Yet another benefit of the clean energy revolution has been revealed.

The mountainous Tibetan region has developed a reputation for pragmatic energy projects. The latest energy development in Tibet is a solar plant that is seven times the size of Manhattan and has **reshaped the local environment and animal life.**

What has led Tibet to construct this massive solar power facility?How the majority of the world has turned to the renewable energy sector

Most nations across the world have developed an energy transition in recent years.

Last year, the renewable energy sector reached a remarkable milestone as it overtook coal **as the world's primary energy resource.** This proves that we are, in fact, on the right track to leave the oil and coal industry behind.

The global acceptance of reality has led to several nations investing massive sums of money into renewable energy projects.

In 2025, the international community **invested roughly $2.2 trillion in renewable energy projects**, which is double the amount that the conventional energy sector received in the same time frame.

From deserts to gardens: The unforeseen wins of the green revolution

The need to balance our collective growth as a society with the conservation of animal life has become a priority for mankind.

And while the world adopts the new and exciting world of renewable energy, **a few unexpected benefits have emerged**. Such as how solar panel farms are creating near-perfect conditions for plant life to thrive around them.

The green energy transition has been gaining serious momentum over the last few years.

And with war playing a key role **in our ability to generate energ**y, the overarching consensus is to develop more and more clean energy projects over the coming decades.

Unforeseen developments can reshape renewable energy projects dramatically. Like how solar panels are creating unexpected rainfall clouds directly above them.

The world has had enough time to develop a clear understanding **of the impact of our reliance on oil**. But as the renewable energy transition continues, we are making remarkable discoveries about the benefits of this clean energy transition.

A Tibetan solar power project has brought the benefits of clean energy to our attention

Solar power has become the undisputed king of the renewable energy sector.

As many of us share the dream of living a life disconnected from the national grid, solar panel arrays can provide the energy needed for everyday life without the **need to rely on the national grid** at all.

For the smaller nations around the world that do not have the same kind of funds that we do to

develop energy projects, solar power is the best choice.
Tibet is one such nation that has opted to turn to the renewable energy sector, in particular, solar power. **It is the cheapest to install,** and requires far less maintenance than wind power, for instance.
Solar power project in Tibet has developed a few unforeseen benefits
The Talatan solar power base in the Tibetan Plateau is a remarkably large energy project that is roughly seven times the size of the island of Manhattan.
Researchers have recently found that the solar project is transforming the local environment by drastically **reducing wind speeds and soil evaporation** in the iconic region high up in the mountains.
The transformation of the region in and around the Talatan solar project has enabled substantial environmental growth.
It has been so successful in that regard that **"solar sheep" have been introduced to graze** on the new grass that has grown around the solar panel array in recent years.
This development offers a sustainable solution for energy generation as well as new grasslands for the "solar sheep" to graze on. Some solar energy projects place the environment at risk, but this project has had an unexpected but welcome effect on the local wildlife.

## Visiting Chinese vice-premier calls Tibet mega dam safe and top priority, but fails to allay major concerns

14 April 2026, Tibetan Review

Can the world's largest dam be designed and built to withstand a catastrophic earthquake of the kind the Himalayan region is all too familiar with, including the one which struck the Mt Everest County of Dingri in Tibet early last year? How can it not be said that the dam itself will not cause an earthquake, given the sheer volume of water it will hold in the new lake formation and our knowledge of the phenomenon known as reservoir-induced seismicity?
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## Photovoltaic-Pastoral Complementarity" Ushers in a New Era

13April 2026, xzxx

On the vast land of Yiqing Township, Baxu County, Changdu City, the wind sweeps across the meadows at an altitude of 4,558 meters, always stirring up fine sand and gravel. This place, once



*Changdu Yiqing Photovoltaic Project Helps Rural Revitalization and Green Development Achieve a Win-Win Situation*

considered a challenge for project construction, is now ushering in a revolution in clean energy. The picture shows a corner of the Yiqing Photovoltaic Project.

The Baxu Yiqing 300 MW photovoltaic project covers a total planned area of approximately 5,364 mu (about 358 hectares) and has a total investment of 980 million yuan. It is a key project of the Eastern Tibet Clean Energy Base and a crucial step in upgrading the energy structure of Changdu. Since construction began in August 2025, the builders have been racing against the high-altitude climate and battling against the oxygen-deficient environment, steadily accelerating the progress of the project.

To date, the construction of the pile foundation and the substation foundation has been fully completed, the installation of photovoltaic modules has reached 85%, and the installation of substation equipment has reached 90%. It is planned to start production in mid-April this year and be fully completed in June.

What supports this "plateau speed" is the scientific and technological thinking hidden in the project construction.

The Yiqing photovoltaic project site is located at a high altitude, and its unique geographical location means that the suitable construction period is only five months. Rain, snow, and hail are common occurrences, which makes manual labor arduous, inefficient, inaccurate, and risky. "The most physically demanding part of installing photovoltaic panels is lifting and mounting them. After a day of manual labor, our backs and legs are exhausted," recalled a staff member at the project site.

Faced with numerous difficulties, the project team made a groundbreaking decision—to introduce and apply intelligent photovoltaic module installation robots on the plateau for the first time, empowering plateau photovoltaic construction with intelligent technology.

"The project has introduced four intelligent photovoltaic module installation robots, mainly for pilot construction on the plateau, to accumulate experience for subsequent large-scale development and construction," said Yang Shuanglong, the project manager. He explained that the robots can easily move photovoltaic modules weighing up to 39 kilograms and can complete the installation of approximately 100 photovoltaic panels per hour, achieving twice the overall work efficiency of manual labor. The robots adopt a "remote electronic control operation + on-site assistance" mode, combining autonomous navigation, precise positioning, and integrated installation functions, resulting in high construction accuracy and strong safety.

As construction accelerates, the changes brought about by the project are quietly extending beyond the construction site. The Yiqing photovoltaic project, located beside the national highway, has brought considerable economic benefits to the local area. To date, the project has generated nearly 15 million yuan in revenue for local residential rentals, machinery and equipment rentals, building material procurement and transportation, and catering services. This revenue is expected to continue to grow steadily before the project's completion in June of this year.

The more noticeable changes occurred in Yangda Village and Echong Village, which provided the site for the project.

Amidst the stacked photovoltaic panels that have not yet been installed, villagers from Yangda Village sat on the ground, eating tsampa and butter tea they had brought with them, chatting and laughing. "We can earn 260 yuan a day," said Dawajiang Villager from Yangda Village happily.

Before the photovoltaic project started construction, the villagers of Yangda and Echong villages mainly relied on herding and odd jobs to make a living. Since the project started, it has employed more than 100 villagers from the two villages, enabling them to increase their income by more than 300,000 yuan by working near their homes.

The tangible income and the quiet transformation of families have made this highland photovoltaic project more than just an energy project; it has become a "money-making workshop at the doorstep" for the local people.

At an altitude of 4,558 meters on the plateau, the fragile ecological environment cannot withstand the slightest damage. In order to enable technology to empower green development and achieve mutual prosperity, and to ensure that project construction and ecological protection work together for a win-win situation, the builders integrated "green protection" into the details during the construction process. They used palm mats to isolate the meadows from mechanical compaction, so as to keep them undisturbed. They peeled off 20-40 centimeters of turf and nutrient soil, and stored them in layers "root to root" and covered them with non-woven fabric for maintenance. They used soil bags to block the slopes and temporary drainage ditches to divert rainwater, so that not a drop of muddy water

would flow away. Every detail was designed to withstand the test of the ecology.
This long-term "gentleness" is further reflected in the long-term planning of the Yiqing photovoltaic project after its completion. To achieve a win-win situation for clean energy and livestock production, the project incorporated the wisdom of "solar-livestock complementarity" into the details of the support structure from the very beginning of its design. The photovoltaic support structure was specially designed with a height of 2 meters at the front and 4 meters at the back, which not only ensures the optimal power generation angle of the photovoltaic modules, but also leaves ample space for the passage of personnel and livestock in the future, so as to achieve both power generation and livestock farming.
As the sun once again sweeps across the vast grasslands of Yiqing Township, rows of photovoltaic panels gleam and reflect dazzling light, illuminating not only the clean energy path of the plateau but also the happy journey of local people towards increased income, prosperity, and a better life.

## China starts work on solar plant built under extreme conditions, amid global energy crisis

07 April 2026, SCMP



China has broken ground on a 50-megawatt concentrated solar power plant in Tibet at an altitude of 4,550 metres (14,900 feet), making it the world's highest-altitude parabolic trough solar thermal facility.
The project, located in Dangxiong County, incorporates a 400-megawatt photovoltaic system and is scheduled for full operation by 2027, Xinhua reported. Preparatory digging at the site began on Monday.
Global energy supplies have grown increasingly volatile in recent years, due to climate variability and geopolitical tensions – including ongoing conflicts in the Middle East – which has pushed countries to seek more reliable and diversified electricity sources.
China's rapid renewable energy expansion, particularly in high-altitude regions like Tibet, forms a key part of its strategy to enhance energy security and mitigate such volatility.
Rapid renewable energy development is extending the power grid into remote high-altitude areas, forming an ultra-high-voltage network centred on 500-kilovolt main lines with coordinated sub-grids to ensure more stable and flexible power delivery, according to local authorities.
Technically, the Dangxiong plant uses parabolic trough technology with heat-transfer oil, covering 242,000 square metres (2.6 million square feet) across 68 collector loops. Eight of these loops feature China's self-developed 8.6-metre-wide troughs, the largest to be used in commercial solar thermal projects worldwide.
The plant also integrates molten salt storage, which can convert excess daytime solar energy into heat for storage and release at night or during periods of low sunlight, providing a more continuous power supply.
Once operational, the integrated project is expected to supply an average of 719 million kilowatt-hours annually, equivalent to the total annual electricity consumption of around 220,000 modern Chinese urban households.
This follows the June 2025 launch of a 100-megawatt solar thermal plant in Anduo, northern Tibet, at an altitude of roughly 4,650 metres, making it the world's first solar thermal plant constructed under such extreme high-altitude, low-temperature and weak-grid conditions, according to Xinhua.
In recent years, Tibet's clean electricity has been transmitted to Beijing, Chongqing, and Jiangsu, supporting China's regional energy coordination strategies.
In September 2025, Tibet's green power was delivered across regions to Shanghai for the first time, with the initial cross-regional transaction covering 7.85 million kilowatt-hours, expected to save 24,100 tons of standard coal and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 60,100 tons.
Clean energy investment in Tibet grew rapidly in 2025, with total investment in electricity, heat, gas and water production and supply up 33.1 per cent year-on-year, driving overall investment growth by 7.3 percentage points, official data showed.
Investments in hydropower and wind power rose by 299 per cent and 137 per cent, respectively.

As outlined by President Xi Jinping at the UN Climate Action Summit, China's share of non-fossil fuels in total energy consumption targets to reach over 30 per cent by 2035, while the total installed capacity of wind and solar power will exceed six times the 2020 levels, striving to reach 3.6 billion kilowatts.

## China's Battle for the Dead: Guangdong Villagers Oppose Crematorium Project, Clash with Police

01 April 2026, Bitter Winter

Residents of Shuikou Town protest for days as authorities deploy riot police and tighten control. It is another chapter in a "war" about burial practices in rural China.

by Zheng Liqin



*Protesters throw stones at the police in Shuikou Town.*

On March 17 to 19, 2026, hundreds of residents from Shuikou Town, Xinyi City, Guangdong Province, protested for three days after discovering that local officials planned to build a crematorium near their village. This project, part of China's ongoing funeral reform campaign, sparked immediate anger in a community where traditional burial practices are central to their cultural identity. Villagers demanded that the plan be scrapped, claiming the facility would violate ancestral customs, harm the environment, and add financial burdens to families already grappling with rising funeral costs. For rural Han communities, burial is more than a custom; it is a deeply rooted spiritual duty linked to honoring family and ensuring the continuity of family lines. The belief that the body must remain whole and be buried in ancestral soil is key to respecting the dead and maintaining harmony between the living and their ancestors. Cremation, especially when forced by the government, is viewed as a violation that disrupts this sacred bond.



*The crowd confronts the police.*

The government's campaigns for cremation have been more or less accepted in large cities but are actively resisted in the countryside. By imposing cremation and placing crematoriums near villages without consent, authorities are seen as violating not only traditions but also the religious and moral foundations of rural life.

The protests quickly escalated. On two occasions, villagers clashed with police as officers tried to break up the demonstrations. Videos shared online before censorship showed residents throwing stones while police advanced with shields and batons. Witnesses reported several villagers were injured in these clashes, but the exact number is unclear. Despite the unrest, authorities continued preparations for construction, increasing local resentment.




*The police attack the protesters.*

In the days that followed, the government responded with a heavy security presence. Special police units were sent to villages, and checkpoints were established at key intersections, including the road to the crematorium site. Vehicles were stopped and checked, and residents reported that Renmin Road, in front of the Xinyi Municipal Government building, remained blocked by police. Tensions grew in Shuikou as officers monitored streets and movements, creating an atmosphere of intimidation to prevent further demonstrations.

Yet on March 25, villagers gathered again to protest, unwilling to be silenced. Their renewed march faced another harsh crackdown, and the crematorium project now seems almost certain to proceed. Still, the determination of Shuikou's residents has highlighted a larger struggle across rural China.



*New protests and arrests on March 25.*

The events in Xinyi reflect earlier incidents, including the widely reported 2025 confrontation in Guizhou's Mushan Village, where residents successfully resisted efforts to exhume and cremate a recently deceased villager. Earlier, as reported by the Taipei Times, "in 2016, some elderly residents in Anqing, a city in Anhui Province, reportedly killed themselves to ensure they were buried before a new cremation mandate. A 2018 campaign against burials in Jiangxi Province sparked an outcry, including from state media, after videos showed officials destroying coffins."

Even if the villagers of Shuikou do not stop the crematorium, their resolve reveals a truth that China's censors work hard to hide. Even under great pressure, ordinary citizens continue to defend their homes, customs, and dignity.

# MILITARY AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

## China's Fighter Jet Surge After India-Pakistan Clash Redraws Global Airpower Balance as AVIC Chengdu Profits Soar

30 April 2026, Defense Security Asia

Combat claims involving J-10CE fighters and PL-15 missiles during the 2025 India-Pakistan clash are accelerating global demand for Chinese airpower systems, reshaping procurement strategies and challenging Western dominance in the fighter jet market.



China's defence-industrial complex is entering a decisive expansion phase as combat validation from the 2025 India-Pakistan clash reshapes global fighter jet procurement calculations and accelerates demand for Chinese airpower systems across multiple theatres.

China's defence-industrial complex is entering a decisive expansion phase as combat validation from the 2025 India-Pakistan clash reshapes global fighter jet procurement calculations and accelerates demand for Chinese airpower systems across multiple theatres.

The record-breaking financial performance of AVIC Chengdu Aircraft Co reflects not merely corporate growth but a structural shift in global defence markets where combat-proven systems increasingly override legacy Western dominance in export-oriented fighter segments.

Analysts assess that battlefield claims surrounding Operation Sindoor have transformed perception dynamics, particularly after Pakistan's deployment of Chinese-origin platforms allegedly altered the tactical balance in beyond-visual-range aerial engagements.

This convergence of combat exposure, industrial restructuring, and geopolitical signalling has elevated China's aviation sector into a more competitive position against entrenched Western suppliers, particularly in price-sensitive and strategically non-aligned markets.

The implications extend beyond sales metrics, shaping force posture decisions, alliance dependencies, and long-term procurement strategies among states seeking cost-effective yet technologically credible air combat capabilities.

At the centre of this transformation is the operational narrative surrounding Chinese-built fighter jets, whose reported battlefield

performance has become a critical driver of both perception and procurement momentum.

The rapid amplification of these narratives across defence analysis circles and procurement agencies suggests that perception warfare is now functioning as a force multiplier, directly influencing acquisition timelines and compressing decision cycles among emerging air forces.

Simultaneously, the integration of missile-range superiority concepts into procurement discourse indicates that beyond-visual-range dominance is being prioritised as a decisive determinant of airpower credibility in contested theatres.

**Perang moden Ukraine**

This evolving demand signal is also forcing competing manufacturers to reassess cost-performance ratios, particularly in markets where affordability intersects with the need for credible deterrence against technologically advanced adversaries.

Consequently, China's aerospace expansion is no longer confined to industrial output metrics, but is increasingly shaping the strategic calculus of airpower modernisation across regions where procurement choices carry direct geopolitical alignment implications.Combat Validation Drives Demand Surge

The 2025 financial performance of AVIC Chengdu Aircraft Co represents a convergence of industrial scaling and strategic signalling, as revenue surged to 75.4 billion yuan (approximately USD $11 billion or RM41.8 billion), marking a 15.8 percent year-on-year increase.

Net profit rose to 3.4 billion yuan (approximately USD $497 million or RM1.89 billion), reflecting a 6.5 percent increase, indicating that operational efficiency gains accompanied the company's expansion rather than being offset by production scaling costs.

The nearly 80 percent surge in first-quarter 2026 sales underscores a continuation of demand momentum, suggesting that the effects of the 2025 conflict are not transient but structurally embedded in procurement pipelines.

A significant driver of this performance was an internal asset reorganisation that consolidated jet manufacturing operations, effectively increasing production throughput and aligning industrial capacity with rising global demand signals.

However, analysts attribute the more decisive catalyst to combat visibility gained during the India-Pakistan clash, which provided real-world exposure for Chinese fighter platforms under contested operational conditions.

The integration of production capacity with combat credibility has positioned AVIC Chengdu Aircraft Co to capitalise on a market segment increasingly driven by demonstrated battlefield performance rather than purely technical specifications.

This dynamic reflects a broader shift in defence procurement behaviour, where operational validation increasingly outweighs marketing narratives and simulation-based performance claims.

Consequently, the company's financial trajectory is being interpreted not only as a commercial




success but as a strategic indicator of China's expanding influence in the global aerospace defence market.

*PL-15E*

**J-10CE and PL-15: Tactical Performance and Strategic Messaging**

The deployment of the J-10CE during the 2025 conflict marked the first combat use of this export-oriented platform, providing a critical test of its operational capabilities under real combat conditions.

Equipped with the PL-15, the J-10CE was positioned as a beyond-visual-range engagement platform capable of challenging advanced Western-origin aircraft.

Pakistan's claims that these systems successfully engaged and downed multiple Indian aircraft, including the Dassault Rafale, significantly amplified global attention toward Chinese missile and sensor integration capabilities.

These claims, while contested and lacking independent verification, nonetheless created a perception shift that has influenced procurement discussions in multiple regions.

China's subsequent confirmation in January 2026 that the J-10CE achieved its "first combat victory" further reinforced this narrative, embedding it within official strategic messaging.

The operational emphasis on beyond-visual-range engagements highlights a doctrinal shift toward long-range air superiority, where missile range, radar capability, and data-link integration become decisive factors.

This shift aligns with broader global trends in air combat, where engagements increasingly occur before visual contact, prioritising sensor fusion and missile performance over traditional dogfighting manoeuvrability.

The combination of the J-10CE platform and PL-15 missile system thus represents not only a technological offering but a doctrinal package that appeals to air forces seeking to modernise rapidly within constrained budgets.

**Operation Sindoor: Conflict Dynamics and Perception Warfare**

The May 2025 India-Pakistan clash, lasting approximately four days, was triggered by India's launch of strikes targeting alleged militant infrastructure following a civilian-targeted attack in Pahalgam.

Pakistan's response, involving aerial intercepts, artillery exchanges, and counter-strikes, escalated the confrontation into a multi-domain engagement that tested both countries' airpower capabilities.

Within this context, the use of Chinese-origin fighter jets by Pakistan introduced a new variable into South Asian airpower dynamics, effectively transforming the conflict into an indirect showcase of competing defence ecosystems.

Both India and Pakistan claimed operational success, reflecting the contested nature of modern conflict narratives where information operations play a central role alongside kinetic engagements.

The ceasefire that followed did not resolve underlying tensions but instead solidified competing interpretations of the conflict's outcomes, each reinforcing domestic and international strategic narratives.

For China, the conflict provided an opportunity to observe the performance of its export systems in real-world conditions without direct involvement, allowing for both technical assessment and strategic messaging.

The integration of these observations into official narratives, particularly the claim of combat success without losses, has contributed to the global perception of Chinese systems as increasingly viable alternatives.

This perception, regardless of its full factual accuracy, has become a key driver of interest among countries evaluating procurement options outside traditional Western supply chains.

**Industrial Strategy and Aerospace Scaling**

The asset reorganisation undertaken by AVIC Chengdu Aircraft Co reflects a broader Chinese strategy of consolidating aerospace production capabilities to achieve economies of scale and enhance industrial efficiency.

By integrating additional jet manufacturing operations, the company effectively increased its production capacity, enabling it to respond more rapidly to rising international demand.

This approach aligns with China's long-term objective of establishing a self-sustaining and globally competitive aerospace industry capable of rivaling established Western manufacturers.

The financial results indicate that this strategy is yielding measurable outcomes, with revenue growth outpacing profit growth, suggesting ongoing investment in capacity expansion and technological development.

Such investment is critical in maintaining competitiveness, particularly as global demand increasingly emphasises advanced avionics, stealth features, and integrated weapons systems.

The ability to scale production while maintaining cost competitiveness provides China with a significant advantage in markets where budget constraints limit access to high-end Western systems.

This advantage is further amplified by China's willingness to offer flexible financing arrangements and technology transfer options, which enhance its attractiveness as a defence partner.

The combination of industrial capacity, cost efficiency, and combat validation positions AVIC Chengdu Aircraft Co as a central player in the evolving global fighter jet market.

**Global Implications for Airpower and Procurement Trends**

The surge in demand for Chinese fighter jets following the 2025 conflict reflects a broader recalibration of global airpower procurement strategies.

Countries seeking to modernise their air forces are increasingly evaluating Chinese platforms as viable alternatives to Western systems, particularly in regions where political alignment or cost constraints limit access to traditional suppliers.

This trend has implications for alliance structures, as defence procurement decisions often influence long-term strategic partnerships and interoperability frameworks.

The perceived success of Chinese systems in combat scenarios, even if partially contested, enhances their credibility and reduces perceived risk among potential buyers.

At the same time, the lack of independent verification of combat claims introduces uncertainty, highlighting the need for cautious evaluation of performance narratives.

Western manufacturers may face increased competition in export markets, particularly in the mid-tier fighter segment where cost-performance ratios are a decisive factor.

This competition could drive innovation and pricing adjustments, potentially reshaping the global defence market landscape over the coming decade.

Ultimately, the rise of AVIC Chengdu Aircraft Co underscores a shift toward a more multipolar aerospace industry, where technological capability, cost efficiency, and strategic signalling converge to influence procurement decisions.

**Strategic Uncertainty and Future Trajectory**

Despite the strong financial performance and growing international interest, significant uncertainties remain regarding the long-term trajectory of Chinese fighter jet exports.

The absence of independently verified combat data limits the ability to fully assess the operational effectiveness of systems such as the J-10CE and PL-15 missile.

Political considerations, including potential sanctions and geopolitical alignment pressures, may also influence the willingness of certain countries to procure Chinese systems.

At the same time, continued investment in aerospace technology and production capacity

suggests that China is committed to sustaining its competitive momentum in this sector.
The integration of combat lessons from the 2025 conflict into future platform development could further enhance the performance and appeal of Chinese fighter jets.
As global demand for advanced air combat capabilities continues to grow, the balance between cost, capability, and political alignment will shape procurement decisions.
In this context, AVIC Chengdu Aircraft Co's performance serves as both a reflection of current trends and a potential indicator of future shifts in global airpower dynamics.
The evolving interplay between combat validation, industrial capacity, and geopolitical signalling will determine whether China's fighter jet surge represents a temporary spike or a sustained transformation of the global aerospace defence market.
A further layer of uncertainty stems from the potential for counter-narratives by competing defence powers, which may seek to challenge or discredit combat claims in order to preserve their own export market share and strategic influence.
At the same time, the trajectory of Chinese fighter jet exports will likely depend on the extent to which future conflicts either reinforce or undermine the perceived credibility of these systems under increasingly complex, electronically contested, and multi-domain operational environments.

## China advances space industry to new stage of high-quality development

24 April 2026, Xinhua

BEIJING, April 24 -- China's space industry is entering a new stage of high-quality development, with accelerated progress set to be made in the legal environment, sci-tech innovation, industrial ecosystems and international cooperation, said the head of the China National Space Administration (CNSA) ahead of the country celebrating its 11th Space Day on Friday.
During the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-2030), China will foster new quality productive forces in the space industry, and build a new pattern of space development, noted CNSA Administrator Shan Zhongde in an article published in the People's Daily on Thursday.
Shan said China will speed up the construction of space-related legal frameworks and establish a comprehensive policy and regulatory system to provide safeguards for various space activities, particularly the development and utilization of space resources, space traffic management and the governance of the space environment.
To further optimize the innovation environment and promote the integration of industry, academia and research, China will explore cutting-edge space technologies, develop new systems and cultivate new business forms. Emphasis will be placed on developing original technologies and building innovation platforms such as national key laboratories and innovation centers in the space sector.
The administrator said China will implement major space projects including manned spaceflight, lunar exploration, the second phase of planetary exploration and the national satellite internet program. It will also develop reusable heavy-lift launch vehicles, and plan and implement a new generation of civil space infrastructure, the near-Earth asteroid defense program and a number of other new space projects.
He also pointed out the need to build and improve the national space security system, accelerate the development of space traffic management and space debris environmental governance capabilities, and effectively safeguard the security of space activities, assets and the environment.
He said efforts will be made to speed up the high-end, intelligent and information-based development of the space industry. The country will promote the application of artificial intelligence and other new technologies in space R&D design, testing and manufacturing, build digital flexible production lines and intelligent manufacturing workshops, and develop the capability for rapid, low-cost, large-volume delivery of space products.
Concerning the commercial space sector, Shan highlighted that this sector will gradually unlock its potential on the premise of ensuring safety, via the guiding role of the government and the leading role of the market.
The commercial space sector will expand satellite application scenarios and cultivate new business models integrating sensing, communication, computing and application across space, air and ground. It will also promote the cross-sector integration of space technologies to empower other industries.
The administrator emphasized that China will continue to actively participate in global space governance and promote the formulation of fair and reasonable international space rules under the UN framework.
The country will deepen international cooperation in space engineering technologies, such as lunar and deep space exploration and space science, and jointly carry out mission planning, technical exchanges and data sharing. It will also provide satellite remote sensing, communications and navigation application services for Belt and Road partner countries, and contribute to global sustainable development.

## China's deep-sea cable-cutting technology threatens the world; experts call for international sanctions.



*On November 20, 2024, the Chinese cargo ship "Yipeng 3" (right) was anchored in the Kattegat Strait near the Jutland Peninsula in Denmark, monitored by a Danish naval patrol vessel. Two underwater cables in the Baltic Sea were severed on November 17 and 18; according to ship tracking websites, the "Yipeng 3" was navigating in that area at the time of the incident. (Mikkel Berg Pedersen/Ritzau Scanpix/AFP via Getty Images)*

Chinese state media and research institutions recently confirmed that their independently developed submarine cable cutting device has successfully completed testing at a depth of 3,500 meters. Analysts point out that this technological breakthrough not only unsettles international security experts but also threatens Taiwan in the first island chain and jeopardizes the strategic security of Guam in the second island chain. Experts recommend strengthening international coordination and sanctions mechanisms.

**China's deep-sea cable cutting device has drawn international attention.**

According to a report by Xinhua News Agency citing the Ministry of Natural Resources of the People's Republic of China, the research vessel "Haiyang Dizhi 2" completed its first deep-sea mission of the year on April 11, which included cutting cables in an extremely deep sea area of 3,500 meters (about 2 miles) using a "deep-sea underwater electro-hydraulic actuator".

Chinese state media claimed that "this is the first time in the world that a country has publicly acknowledged its ability to cut cables in such deep waters, with a diving depth that is even twice the average of existing seabed communication infrastructure."

According to reports, the device was developed by the China Shipbuilding Science and Research Center and its affiliated Deep-Sea Manned Equipment National Laboratory, which are subject to US sanctions.

The public release of this technology has attracted significant attention from the international community.

The South China Morning Post, citing an official statement on April 15, reported that the deep-sea cable cutter "is capable of severing the world's most heavily protected underwater communication or power cables, potentially shaking up the global maritime power structure."

Stephen Silver, a veteran American journalist, warned in an article published on the military media outlet "19fortyfive" that although the Chinese Communist Party has announced that the device was developed for civilian salvage and seabed mining, experts believe that its "dual-use" intentions are extremely obvious.

**Threat of undersea cable cutting to Taiwan and Guam**

Silver warned that this Chinese technology poses a direct challenge to the U.S. military's strategic deployment in the Indo-Pacific region. Guam, as a cornerstone of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and a hub of the second island chain, is strategically positioned to contain China. The island hosts more than 12 fiber optic cables serving private companies like Google and the U.S. military.

The South China Morning Post reported that if Beijing were to use the aforementioned device to cut cables near strategic hubs, it "could paralyze global communications during a geopolitical crisis."

**For Taiwan, the threat is even more urgent.**

Hsu Yu-jen, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a former legislator in Taiwan, explained the role of submarine cables in potential conflicts at a hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) in early March this year.

He stated that, in fact, 97% to 99% of global intercontinental internet traffic is carried by submarine cables. He cited Chinese military documents indicating that, should a conflict break out in the Taiwan Strait, the PLA would most likely target submarine cable infrastructure before invading Taiwan.

Hsu Yu-jen stated that while low Earth orbit satellites such as SpaceX's Starlink have been effective in Ukraine, they face significant limitations in Taiwan.

In another cybersecurity hearing last November, TeleGeography's chief research officer, Timothy Stronge, explained that satellites are only an important emergency backup for mission-critical use and cannot replace the absolute advantages of fiber optics in terms of capacity and cost-effectiveness. "The reason is simple: the cost per unit of cable capacity is 2,800 times cheaper than that of a satellite."

Hsu Yu-jen further warned that the PLA Navy does not even need to cut all of Taiwan's cables; it only needs to precisely cut three key cable clusters near the Bashi Channel, which in theory could reduce Taiwan's bandwidth by 99%.

He said such a “digital blockade” would lead to chaos in military command and control, paralysis of financial markets and public panic, and would hinder the real-time transmission of information between Taiwan and the international community.

Data from the Chinese Communist Party obtained by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University lists several strategic points in Taiwan, including numerous submarine cable landing sites, indicating that the PLA has conducted extensive intelligence gathering.

Hsu Yu-jen's testimony mentioned that the CCP has long been actively upgrading its cable destruction technology into a systematic wartime capability. PLA-affiliated institutions have applied for related patents for over 10 years: a 2013 patent for a deep-sea optical cable cutting and retrieval device; a 2022 patent for cutting and securing both ends of a cable; and a 2025 patent for an underwater cutting device and towing cutting system.

In addition, the China Shipbuilding Scientific Research Center will release a design for an electric cutting device that can operate at a depth of 4,000 meters in early 2025; in mid-2025, the CCP will unveil a new type of submarine cable cutting vessel equipped with a diamond-coated grinding wheel with a diameter of six inches and a speed of 1,600 revolutions per minute, which can penetrate the strongest reinforced outer sheath at a depth of 4,000 meters.

These are now seen as new weapons of war by Beijing to "disrupt global communications and global order".

**Gray Zone: Underwater Sabotage Tactics Under Sino-Russian Cooperation**

Besides high-tech specialized cutting vessels, the CCP has also been accused of using civilian ships to exploit loopholes in international law and conduct sabotage operations in the gray area. A 2025 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) states that submarine cables have become a key arena for power struggles, vulnerable to "deliberate sabotage that can be excused," accidental cutting, and eavesdropping. Beijing often attributes cable damage to accidents, but the frequency and timing of these actions have raised suspicions among experts.

The report's authors, Erin L. Murphy and Matt Pearl, noted that what is even more worrying is the formation of a "China-Russia gray zone axis."

From the end of 2024 to the beginning of 2025, the Chinese-flagged "Shun Hsing 39" and the Russian-operated "Vasili Shukshin" loitered around Taiwan and near cable landing stations, suspected of conducting reconnaissance.

In European waters, the "Yipeng 3" incident in November 2024 shocked the world. The Chinese vessel towed its anchor for more than 100 miles (160 kilometers) in the Baltic Sea, severing two critical cables connecting Finland to Germany and Sweden to Lithuania.

The CSIS team believes that such operations using "shadow fleets" and identity manipulation provide Beijing with multiple "legitimate excuses," allowing it to assist Russia behind the scenes while accumulating practical experience for its own operations focused on Taiwan.

**The Rise of the Submarine Cable Industry – The CCP's "Digital Silk Road" Strategy**

The submarine cable industry is driven by commercial interests, with investors deciding when, where, and how to build new cables rather than based on national or international security needs.

Beijing is rapidly expanding its global market share through its "Digital Silk Road" initiative. It is estimated that Amazon, Google, Meta, and Microsoft currently own or lease approximately half of the world's undersea bandwidth.

Huahai Communications, formerly a subsidiary of Huawei, is now the world's fourth largest submarine cable builder and the fastest growing, having completed more than 100 projects in 78 countries.

Currently, China's four leading optical fiber companies—YOFC, Hengtong Optic-Electric, Fiberhome Telecommunication Technologies, and Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology—have collectively controlled over 35% of the global market share, with Beijing setting an ambitious goal of capturing 60% of the market.

Unlike semiconductors, which are subject to export controls, the Chinese Communist Party has the complete technology to independently build and deploy cables, which increases its risk of installing eavesdropping devices (taps) within the cables, intercepting data, or carrying out strategic sabotage in the event of conflict.

In addition, Beijing has used its nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea to seize cable project licenses from competitors, forcing Google and Facebook's parent company Meta to reroute their large cable projects.

**US lawmakers propose a submarine cable resilience bill; experts say it strengthens international sanctions against China.**

In response to the growing threat, Hsu Yu-jen made specific policy recommendations to the U.S. Congress, such as authorizing and strengthening sanctions powers, promoting the updating of international conventions, and establishing clear norms for violations, mandatory investigations, and accountability mechanisms.

He also mentioned that he expects the US to allocate funds to support the "Indo-Pacific Submarine Cable Surveillance Network" and authorize the purchase of cable repair vessels to make up for the lack of military and commercial repair capabilities in Taiwan and the Western Pacific region.

CSIS experts suggest that given the vastness of the ocean, it is necessary to strengthen cooperation between the government and the private sector, and to carry out measures such as joint patrols with allies, funding surveillance satellites, and deploying sensors on cables to create a substantial deterrent against vandals.

In addition, U.S. Republican Senator John Curtis and Democratic Senator Jacky Rosen introduced the "Taiwan Submarine Cable Resilience Initiative Act" last year to protect Taiwan's critical communications infrastructure and deter China's malicious "gray zone" operations.

According to the bill, the Secretary of State should coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense to develop and deploy an advanced submarine cable monitoring system for Taiwan, and, where appropriate, provide Taiwan with early warnings from global intelligence networks.

The bill also requires the Secretary of the Navy and the Coast Guard Commander to work with the Taiwan Coast Guard and regional allies to focus on detecting suspicious vessels or activities near key undersea cable routes; monitoring potential threats; and preventing acts of sabotage.

If any individual or entity damages submarine cables that are related to Taiwan's national security, the "Taiwan Submarine Cable Resilience Initiative Act" authorizes sanctions such as freezing assets in the United States or banning entry, and requires the executive branch to regularly report to Congress on threats and response measures.

"We cannot stand idly by as Beijing intensifies its efforts to isolate Taiwan, including sabotaging its vital undersea cables," said Kuang Xiheng. He added that the bipartisan bill sends a clear message that "the United States stands with Taiwan and our allies in defending shared infrastructure, sovereignty, and freedom."

## Xi Jinping Launches First-Ever Military-Wide Senior Officer Training Program

15 April 2026, CCA

On April 8, Xi Jinping attended the opening ceremony of the first-ever military-wide training program for senior PLA officers held at the National Defense University. Xi delivered a speech emphasizing the need for "ideological rectification" (思想整风) and "political consolidation" (政治整训) within the PLA. The only remaining CMC Vice Chairman, Zhang Shengmin (张升民) hosted the ceremony, with top PLA leadership, including Defense Minister Dong Jun (董军) and Central Theater Command Commander Han Shengyan (韩胜延) in attendance.

Eastern Theater Command Commander Yang Zhibin (杨志斌), who was promoted to full general with Han Shengyan in December 2025, was not present. On the same day, an article authored by Yang was published in the Central Party School's newspaper, referencing the need to draw lessons from the cases of disgraced senior military officials involved in "serious discipline and law violations"


习近平在全军高级干部培训班开班式上发表重要讲话强调
开展思想整风 深化政治整训
以崭新政治面貌迎接建军一百周年

*PLA Daily front page coverage of the Military-Wide Senior Officer Training Program. / PLA Daily on April 9, 2026*

(汲取军队落马高级干部严重违纪违法问题深刻教训).

Xi's remarks centered on three topics. First, officers must ground their political loyalty in the theoretical study of Marxism and Xi Jinping Thought. Second, Xi stressed that the Party represents the fundamental interests of the people and holds "no special interests of its own," emphasizing that "all acts of self-interest and corruption are fundamentally incompatible with the Party's nature and purpose." He also called on senior officers to restore the military's "revolutionary roots," and said that CCP regulations apply "equally to all," with no "special status" (没有特殊) and "no exceptions" (没有例外) in their implementation. Third, Xi invoked the historical observation that the Party and military have grown stronger through sustained struggle against "erroneous ideological and behavioral tendencies" (各种错误思想作风), expressing confidence that the PLA would achieve "unprecedented unity" (空前团结统一) heading into 2027.

**CCA Analysis:** This is indeed notable, as it represents the first-of-a-kind military-wide training program overseen by Xi. It marks a significant escalation of Xi's effort to consolidate CMC authority over the officer corps. The term *zhengfeng* (ideological rectification, 整风) harkens back to Mao's Yan'an Rectification Movement during the 1940s, which Xi revitalized during the 2024 CMC Political Work Conference in Yan'an. Xi is positioning the program within a longer tradition of Party self-renewal through top-down political discipline and ideological consolidation.

Xi's repeated emphasis on "struggle" against "ideological and behavioral tendencies" can be read multiple ways. There are rumors that the recent purges in the PLA are related to Xi's dissatisfaction with PLA training and modernization. To the extent that those rumors are true, this new training course could be Xi's way of strengthening oversight and discipline over PLA training. Second, it suggests that Xi is dissatisfied

with feedback on training metrics and standards within the PLA. In that sense, it could be read as a signal that the PLA must step up its game or else come under additional scrutiny.

The program is clearly designed to respond to pervasive corruption within the PLA. Xi's emphasis that regulations apply "equally to all" is an admission that some senior leaders in the PLA enjoyed special treatment. It is a direct response and a warning to the deep-seated patronage networks and rent-seeking culture of the PLA that business as usual is no longer tolerated. By connecting the campaign to the 2027 centenary milestone, Xi has elevated military compliance from a disciplinary matter to a historical obligation. The key question is whether this campaign will strengthen command cohesion and discipline through frank feedback or prompt senior officers to become even more risk-averse to avoid scrutiny.

## While the World Fights over Oil, China Has Found an Alternative: It's Building 'Water-Powered' Airplanes

14 April 2026, Daily Galaxy

China says it flew a plane powered by water, but the real story behind the test flight and the fuel inside is even more surprising than it sounds



*© China Is Moving Ahead With 'water Powered' Airplanes. Image credit: Airbus*

The aircraft lifted off from an airport in Zhuzhou, climbed to 300 meters, and stayed aloft for 16 minutes. By the time it landed, China had completed the world's first test flight of a **megawatt class hydrogen turboprop engine**.The 7.5 tonne unmanned cargo aircraft carried the AEP100 engine, developed entirely by the **Aero Engine Corporation of China**. It covered 36 kilometers at 220 kilometers per hour. The engine operated normally throughout, maintaining stable performance from takeoff to landing. After completing all scheduled maneuvers, the aircraft returned safely to the airport.What makes this test different from most Western hydrogen aviation projects is what happened inside the engine. The AEP100 burns **liquid hydrogen** directly in a turbine cycle, similar to how conventional jet engines burn kerosene. It does not use hydrogen fuel cells to generate electricity for electric motors.Direct Combustion Versus Fuel Cells

**Airbus** has taken the opposite path. The European manufacturer selected **hydrogen fuel cell technology** for its **ZEROe project**, which aims to bring a hydrogen powered commercial aircraft to market by 2035. Fuel cells convert hydrogen into electricity through a chemical reaction, producing only water vapor as exhaust. Airbus has tested a 1.2 megawatt fuel cell demonstrator on the ground but has not yet flown a full scale hydrogen combustion engine on an aircraft.

China chose direct combustion for a specific reason. Turbine engines offer higher **power density** and scalability, which matters for larger aircraft. The challenge is managing the fuel. Hydrogen burns hotter than kerosene and requires storage at cryogenic temperatures near minus 253 degrees Celsius. The AEP100 uses liquid hydrogen, and keeping it cold enough during flight remains one of the engineering hurdles.

AECC experts said the successful flight demonstrates that China has established a complete technological chain for **hydrogen aviation engines**, covering everything from core components to full engine integration.

Global Energy Crisis Provides Backdrop

The April 4 flight did not occur in a vacuum. Global energy markets have been under pressure. Reports cite disruptions related to Iran and their impact on oil transit routes including the **Strait of Hormuz**. The International Energy Agency announced the release of 400 million barrels of strategic reserves. Brent crude prices rose sharply.

Chinese state media and AECC experts frame hydrogen as both an environmental measure and an **energy security** tool. For Beijing, reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels has become a stated priority, particularly for aviation, where kerosene remains the dominant fuel and electrification is not yet practical for long haul flights.

The timing also reflects a longer strategic view. A peer reviewed paper published in the Chinese Academy of Engineering's journal outlines a national roadmap for hydrogen aviation power. The authors, researchers from AECC Hunan Aviation Powerplant Research Institute, set phased goals: key technology validation by 2028, regional aircraft applications by 2035, and widespread use in mainline commercial aircraft by 2050.

Freight and Island Logistics Come First

Do not expect to board a hydrogen powered passenger jet soon. According to AECC experts cited by Xinhua, the technology is expected to enter service first in what officials call the **low altitude economy**: unmanned air freight, island logistics, and cargo routes where infrastructure can be controlled more easily than at major passenger airports.

The immediate challenges are substantial. Real world operating costs remain unknown. Hydrogen refueling infrastructure at airports does not exist

outside experimental settings. Certification for passenger flight will take years. The April 4 test lasted only 16 minutes, long enough to prove the engine works but not long enough to answer questions about durability, maintenance intervals, or fuel efficiency at scale.

The academic paper from the Chinese Academy of Engineering identifies specific technical hurdles: integrated aircraft engine design, precise hydrogen metering and control, **thermal management** of cryogenic fuel systems, and stable **low emission combustion**. The authors also recommend establishing a national hydrogen aviation development alliance, creating safety and standards systems, and accelerating airport hydrogen infrastructure.

Two Technical Paths May Converge

While China pushes direct combustion, Airbus continues developing its fuel cell architecture. The company has partnered with more than 220 airports worldwide through its Hydrogen Hubs program to address production, storage, and distribution.

The two approaches may eventually meet. Airbus previously explored hydrogen combustion before selecting fuel cells as its primary path in 2025. The company has stated it does not rule out future investment in combustion technology. China, for its part, continues to research fuel cells for smaller aircraft applications.

For now, each path has its own timeline. Airbus targets 2035 for a commercial fuel cell aircraft. China's AECC has not announced a target date for passenger service but has stated that as **green hydrogen** production costs fall, hydrogen aviation engines will show growing economic advantages.

## People's Daily: China Advances "Space Computing" to Support Future AI and Data Needs

10 April 2026, China Scope

China is accelerating the development of "space computing," an approach that places data centers and AI processing capabilities on satellites, allowing data to be processed directly in orbit rather than transmitted back to Earth.

At the recent "2026 Space Computing Industry Conference," China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology stated that it will support forward-looking research in space computing technologies and promote the development of an industry ecosystem. China also established its first collaborative platform for the sector—the "Space Computing Professional Committee."

Space computing enables satellites to analyze and process data in real time, reducing transmission demands and improving efficiency. It includes models such as space (in-orbit) data processing, ground data processing, and integrated space–ground computing networks. Compared with ground-based data centers, space systems offer broader territorial coverage and stronger real-time capabilities.

Although initial costs—such as satellite launches and hardware—are high, long-term advantages include lower energy consumption, thanks to solar power and natural cooling in space, as well as reduced data transmission costs. Estimates suggest that a space-based computing center could reach cost parity with ground-based facilities within about 15 years.

China views space computing as a strategic frontier, driven by rapidly growing demand for computing power in areas such as AI, autonomous driving, and remote sensing. The country is already among the global leaders in deploying space-based computing networks and aims to leverage its early-mover advantage to strengthen its position in next-generation digital and aerospace industries.

## China Expands Nuclear Infrastructure amid Global Arms Control Breakdown

06 April 2026, Politics Today

A new investigation by CNN has found evidence that China is significantly expanding its nuclear weapons infrastructure, raising concerns among analysts about a potential new global arms race as major arms control agreements weaken.

According to the report, satellite imagery and Chinese government documents indicate that entire villages in Sichuan province were demolished and residents evicted beginning in 2021–2022 to make way for expanded nuclear facilities.

Local residents reportedly received minimal explanation for the land seizures, with officials citing "state secrecy."

The construction includes large reinforced industrial structures, upgraded transportation links, and expanded facilities believed to be connected to nuclear weapons production and research.

The investigation highlights extensive development at sites identified as Site 906 and Site 931, part of a broader network of facilities linked to China's nuclear program.

Among the most notable additions is a large dome-like structure described by experts as potentially designed for handling highly radioactive materials such as uranium and plutonium.

Analysts cited in the report say the scale and design of the facilities suggest a major modernization effort that could significantly increase China's nuclear production capacity.

**China's growing arsenal and strategic shift**

China is currently estimated to possess over 600 nuclear warheads, placing it behind the United States and Russia, but ahead of other nuclear powers such as France.

Defense analysts say China is the fastest-growing nuclear power globally, even as it maintains its official policy of "no first use."

Beijing has repeatedly stated that its nuclear strategy is defensive in nature, with its Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejecting claims of weapons escalation and insisting China does not engage in nuclear threats against non-nuclear states.

The report comes at a time of increasing global uncertainty over nuclear arms control. The expiration of the New START Treaty between the United States and Russia has further weakened the international framework limiting strategic weapons.

Former U.S. President Donald Trump has previously called for a new arms control agreement that would also include China, though Beijing has shown little indication it is willing to join such negotiations.

Some analysts believe China's expansion is linked to broader geopolitical tensions and a desire to strengthen deterrence, particularly in relation to Taiwan and rising military competition with the United States.

**Concerns over a new arms race**

Experts warn that the simultaneous modernization of nuclear forces by multiple major powers could lead to a more complex and unstable arms race than during the Cold War era.

Analysts also suggest that perceptions of China's capabilities—whether accurate or exaggerated—could influence U.S. defense planning and potentially accelerate global nuclear proliferation.

Meanwhile, tensions in other regions, including conflicts involving Iran, are also seen by some experts as factors contributing to rising global nuclear insecurity.

## Buy a Chinese Cleaning Robot, Have Your Home Watched by Beijing

06 April 2026, Bitter Winter

An incident shows that robot vacuums made in China might regularly collect and send data back to their country. There was a time when the biggest threat in your home was the dust bunny under the sofa. Those were simple days. Now, thanks to global manufacturing and the Chinese Communist Party's creativity, the once-humble cleaning robot has turned into something much more ambitious: a roaming, Wi-Fi-enabled, camera-equipped reconnaissance drone disguised as a household appliance.

The latest scandal began last month when a Spanish tech enthusiast, someone who can't resist tinkering with gadgets, decided to experiment with his Chinese-made robot vacuum. Using a PlayStation controller, he managed to steer it like a small tank. This was amusing, but then he unintentionally unlocked access to thousands of similar devices worldwide. Suddenly, he was not




just cleaning his living room; he was exploring the layouts of strangers' homes in 24 countries.

It turned out the robot vacuums were not only cleaning floors but also gathering data: live camera feeds, indoor maps, device IDs, battery levels, and enough metadata to make any intelligence agency happy. The flaw was glaring. It was like leaving the front door open with a neon sign saying, "Come in; we're spying."

The manufacturer, a Chinese company called DJI (Shenzhen Da-Jiang Innovations Sciences and Technologies Ltd)—which, by the way, was also a defense contractor, producing drones for the Chinese army—claimed it was all a misunderstanding and quickly "fixed" the issue. Of course, they did. Nothing reassures the public like a military-connected company announcing that the backdoor you weren't meant to know about is probably closed now.

But this story doesn't end with one rogue vacuum. China, never satisfied with half measures, has also acquired the world's best-known cleaning robot brand, iRobot, which manufactures the market leader, Roomba, found in more than 6 million homes. Yes, the same company whose devices have been mapping Western homes for years is now under Chinese ownership. If Beijing ever wanted to find out how many carpets you have in your home, the data is probably already stored in the cloud.

The implications are shocking. Imagine a future where your vacuum cleaner not only knows the layout of your home but also recognizes your face, your pets, your furniture, and that embarrassing pile of laundry you promised to fold last week. With higher-resolution cameras, it could casually glance at your computer screen as it rolls by. With microphones, it could listen in on your arguments about whose turn it is to take out the trash. With 3D scanning, it could create architectural-grade blueprints of your living room.

And all of this would be uploaded, helpfully and silently, to servers in China.

Some people dismiss this as paranoia. Others call it "unrestricted warfare."

The reality is that the modern home is already a surveillance paradise. Smart speakers listen, smart TVs watch, and smart refrigerators judge your eating habits. Adding a smart vacuum that reports to Beijing is simply the next logical step in the evolution of domestic embarrassment.

Many Western countries have welcomed these devices with open arms and unsecured Wi-Fi networks. This has led to a nation where millions of households may already be unknowingly creating the world's largest interior-design intelligence archive. Somewhere in a data center, an algorithm is probably evaluating whether you wash your underwear often enough.

We will not lose privacy in a dramatic cyberattack or a Hollywood-style hacking scene. We will lose it because people want cleaner floors without lifting a finger. The Chinese Communist Party didn't need to infiltrate governments or corporations; it just needed to sell vacuum cleaners.

And so, as your robot moves across the room tonight, humming innocently, remember: it may not be looking for dust; it may be searching for secrets. Or worse, for your unflattering angles.

## China Expands Fleet of Zubr-Class Hovercraft to Boost Amphibious Capabilities

06 April 2026, China Scope

The Zubr-class (known in China as Type 728, NATO reporting name: Pomornik-class) air-cushion landing craft is a large hovercraft designed by the Soviet Union in the late Cold War period, reflecting a focus on large-scale military transport. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine modified the design for export. In 2009, China signed a $315 million agreement with Ukraine to acquire four vessels—two built in Ukraine and two assembled in China from kits—along with the transfer of production technology. By 2017, Chinese defense firms had reportedly overcome key technical barriers and begun domestic production. In 2023, reports indicated that domestically built Zubr-class vessels had entered service with the PLA Navy's Eastern Theater Command. China is believed to have produced at least five such vessels on its own and plans to further expand to 10–12 units, surpassing Russia (2 vessels) and Greece (4 vessels) to become the largest operator of this class.

The Zubr-class landing craft measures approximately 57 meters in length and has a full-load displacement of about 555 tons, making it the largest hovercraft in the world. Each vessel can carry up to 500 fully equipped troops, or three main battle tanks (MBTs), or ten light armored vehicles (AFVs) along with 230 troops. With a top speed exceeding 55 knots (about 102 km/h), it can rapidly deploy forces directly onto beaches that are inaccessible to conventional landing craft. Compared with traditional amphibious vessels, the Zubr-class is less vulnerable to certain types of naval mines and is capable of making multiple crossings of the Taiwan Strait within a single day, offering high mobility and strong assault capabilities.

This development suggests that China is continuing to expand its amphibious assault capabilities, with potential implications for future operations in areas such as the Taiwan Strait.

Source: Newtalk, March 30, 2026

## China's Ministry of State Security Warns Officials: "The Dining Table Is Not a Safe Zone"

04 April 2026, China Scope

China's Ministry of State Security (MSS) has issued a public warning through its official WeChat account, cautioning government officials with access to classified information about the espionage risks lurking at social dinners. The statement signals a continued push by Beijing to tighten internal security among personnel handling sensitive state matters.

According to the MSS, foreign intelligence operatives may use the guise of friendly gatherings, consultations, or business investment meetings to host banquets, using the relaxed atmosphere to gradually extract classified information from unsuspecting officials. By building rapport over food and drink, spies can subtly probe for details about sensitive and classified projects.

The ministry stressed that "the dining table is not a vacuum zone," and that those in classified positions must remain vigilant in every word and action. It noted that some officials, when flattered or loosened by alcohol, have lowered their guard and casually disclosed state secrets in an attempt to appear important or knowledgeable.

The MSS also warned that foreign spies may attempt to lure classified personnel into bringing sensitive documents or electronic devices to such gatherings. Officials are instructed to decline any dinner invitations that could compromise their impartiality, avoid contact with individuals of unclear identity, and follow the principle of "no contact unless absolutely necessary."

The statement reminded officials to "remember that careless words cause trouble," and to refrain from discussing state secrets, internal work matters, undisclosed policy documents, key data, or personnel arrangements in casual settings. The MSS reaffirmed that China's Law on Guarding State Secrets explicitly prohibits the disclosure of

classified information through private social interactions or personal communications.

The warning reflects Beijing's broader and intensifying counterintelligence campaign targeting everyday social situations as potential security vulnerabilities.

# CYBER INTELLIGENCE

## Report sheds light on Chinese phishing campaigns against journalists, activists

30 April 2026, SCworld

Chinese state-backed freelance hackers have launched a pair of phishing campaigns aimed at journalists and opposition activists in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and China's Uyghur region in a span of nine months, according to The Record, a news site by cybersecurity firm Recorded Future.
First of the campaigns was GLITTER CARP, which involved the targeting and spoofing of International Consortium of Investigative Journalists members, a report from the Citizen Lab and the ICIJ revealed. Uyghur Canadian activist Mehmet Tohti, who was one of those targeted by the campaign, reported receiving a WhatsApp message claiming to be from a famous Uyghur filmmaker who sought to obtain his email address. While Tohti did not provide his Google credentials upon clicking a link included in the supposed filmmaker's email, he was sent a fake Chinese-language Google security alert.
On the other hand, the SEQUIN CARP campaign, which entailed more comprehensive social engineering, was aimed at ICIJ journalist Scilla Alecci and other reporters focused on China-related issues. Such operations have allowed China to not only reduce costs for transnational repression intrusions but also obtain a "layer of plausible deniability," said the report.

## How Chinese Cyber Operations Have Evolved

28 April 2026, MBTMag

A closer look at how these attacks have evolved from isolated intrusions into long-term strategic access.
After three years investigating dozens of Chinese-nexus intrusions, Darktrace's threat researchers found these actors aren't running one playbook - they're running two simultaneously.

1. A "smash and grab" model - rapid intrusions completing IP theft within 48 hours, hitting manufacturing, telecom, and logistics sectors that map closely to Chinese industrial policy.
2. Also, "low and slow" - attackers embedding into identity systems and remaining dormant for months or years inside transportation networks, telecoms, and critical infrastructure. Some security teams discovered they'd been hosting intruders for 600-plus days.

The research details how an existing malware - Chaos - has been adapted. to target 64-bit Linux servers. Chaos has previously only been able to target routers and edge devices.

The move toward 64-bit Linux server targeting is significant because it suggests Chaos may be expanding from lower-value edge devices into more capable server infrastructure, which could give attackers more useful footholds for proxying, persistence, and follow-on activity. i.e. bigger attacks.

**How Chinese-Nexus Cyber Operations Have Evolved – And What It Means For Cyber Risk and Resilience**

Darktrace's latest threat research reveals how Chinese-nexus cyber operations have evolved from isolated intrusions into long-term strategic positioning, with attackers prioritizing persistent access to critical infrastructure and digital ecosystems to gain lasting operational and economic advantage.

Cybersecurity has traditionally organized risk around incidents, breaches, campaigns, and threat groups. Those elements still matter—but if we fixate on individual incidents, we risk missing the shaping of the entire ecosystem. Nation-state–aligned operators are increasingly using cyber operations to establish long-term strategic leverage, not just to execute isolated attacks or short-term objectives.

Our latest research, *Crimson Echo*, shifts the lens accordingly. Instead of dissecting campaigns, malware families, or actor labels as discrete events, the threat research team analyzed Chinese-nexus activity as a continuum of behaviors over time. That broader view reveals how these operators position themselves within environments: quietly, patiently, and persistently—often preparing the ground long before any recognizable "incident" occurs.

**How Chinese-nexus cyber threats have changed over time**

Chinese-nexus cyber activity has evolved in four phases over the past two decades. This ranges from early, high-volume operations in the 1990s and early 2000s to more structured, strategically-aligned activity in the 2010s, and now toward highly adaptive, identity-centric intrusions.

Today's phase is defined by scale, operational restraint, and persistence. Attackers are establishing access, evaluating its strategic value, and maintaining it over time. This reflects a broader shift: cyber operations are increasingly integrated into long-term economic and geopolitical strategies. Access to digital environments, specifically those tied to critical national infrastructure, supply chains, and advanced technology, has become a form of strategic leverage for the long-term.

**How Darktrace analysts took a behavioral approach to a complex problem**

One of the challenges in analyzing nation-state cyber activity is attribution. Traditional approaches often rely on tracking specific threat groups, malware families, or infrastructure. But these change constantly, and in the case of Chinese-nexus operations, they often overlap.

*Crimson Echo* is the result of a retrospective analysis of three years of anomalous activity observed across the Darktrace fleet between July 2022 and September 2025. Using behavioral detection, threat hunting, open-source intelligence, and a structured attribution framework (the Darktrace Cybersecurity Attribution Framework), the team identified dozens of medium- to high-confidence cases and analyzed them for recurring operational patterns.

This long-horizon, behavior-centric approach allows Darktrace to identify consistent patterns in how intrusions unfold, reinforcing that behavioral patterns that matter.

**What the data shows**

Several clear trends emerged from the analysis:

- Targeting is concentrated in strategically important sectors. Across the dataset, 88% of intrusions occurred in organizations classified as critical infrastructure, including transportation, critical manufacturing, telecommunications, government, healthcare, and Information Technology (IT) services.
- Strategically important Western economies are a primary focus. The US alone accounted for 22.5% of observed cases, and when combined with major European economies including Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, over half of all intrusions (55%) were concentrated in these regions.
- Nearly 63% of intrusions of intrusions began with the exploitation of internet-facing systems, reinforcing the continued risk posed by externally exposed infrastructure.

**Two models of cyber operations**

Across the dataset, Chinese-nexus activity followed two operational models.

The first is best described as "smash and grab." These are short-horizon intrusions optimized for speed. Attackers move quickly – often exfiltrating data within 48 hours – and prioritize scale over stealth. The median duration of these compromises is around 10 days. It's clear they are willing to risk detection for short-term gain.

The second is "low and slow." These operations were less prevalent in the dataset, but potentially more consequential. Here, attackers prioritize persistence, establishing durable access through identity systems and legitimate administrative tools, so they can maintain access undetected for months or even years. In one notable case, the actor had fully compromised the environment and established persistence, only to resurface in the environment more than 600 days after. The operational pause underscores both the depth of the intrusion and the actor's long-term strategic intent. This suggests that cyber access is a strategic asset to preserve and leverage over time, and we observed these attacks most often inin sectors of the high strategic importance.

It's important to note that the same operational ecosystem can employ both models concurrently,

selecting the appropriate model based on target value, urgency, intended access. The observation of a "smash and grab" model should not be solely interpreted as a failure of tradecraft, but instead an operational choice likely aligned with objectives. Where "low and slow" operations are optimized for patience, smash and grab is optimized for speed; both seemingly are deliberate operational choices, not necessarily indicators of capability.

**Rethinking cyber risk**

For many organizations, cyber risk is still framed as a series of discrete events. Something happens, it is detected and contained, and the organization moves on. But persistent access, particularly in deeply interconnected environments that span cloud, identity-based SaaS and agentic systems, and complex supply chain networks, creates a major ongoing exposure risk. Even in the absence of disruption or data theft, that access can provide insight into operations, dependencies, and strategic decision-making. Cyber risk increasingly resembles long-term competitive intelligence.

This has impact beyond the Security Operations Center. Organizations need to shift how they think about governance, visibility, and resilience, and treat cyber exposure as a structural business risk instead of an incident response challenge.

**What comes next**

The goal of this research is to provide a clearer understanding of how these operations work, so defenders can recognize them earlier and respond more effectively. That includes shifting from tracking indicators to understanding behaviors, treating identity providers as critical infrastructure risks, expanding supplier oversight, investing in rapid containment capabilities, and more.

Learn more about the findings of Darktrace's latest research, Crimson Echo: Understanding Chinese-nexus Cyber Operations Through Behavioral Analysis, by downloading the full report and summaries for business leaders, CISOs, and SOC analysts here.

## Alleged Chinese State Hacker Extradited to US

28 April 2026, Security Week



A Chinese national accused of being part of a notorious state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) group was extradited from Italy to the US over the weekend, the Department of Justice announced.

The individual, Xu Zewei, 34, was arrested in July 2025 after being charged in the US for participating in multiple cyberattacks mounted by Silk Typhoon (also known as Hafnium and Murky Panda), including attacks against US universities.

Xu, the DOJ says, conducted cyberattacks on behalf of China's Ministry of State Security (MSS) and Shanghai State Security Bureau (SSSB), while working for Shanghai Powerock Network, a company known for supporting the country's cyber offensive activities.

According to court documents, between early 2020 and early 2021, Xu and his co-conspirators targeted US universities, immunologists, and virologists conducting COVID-19 research and reported successful compromises to SSSB officers.

After hacking into the network of a Texas university, Xu was directed to access the email accounts of virologists and immunologists, and he later reported to the SSSB officer that he exfiltrated information from the targeted inboxes.

Starting late 2020, Xu and his co-conspirators allegedly exploited Microsoft Exchange Server zero-day vulnerabilities in a broad campaign targeting thousands of systems worldwide, including computers at another Texas university, as well as a law firm with offices worldwide.

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university, as well as a law firm with offices worldwide.
Following the successful exploitation of vulnerable Exchange servers, the hackers deployed web shells to achieve remote access. In April 2021, the FBI executed a court-authorized cyber operation to clean web shells from hundreds of systems in the US.
Xu appeared in a District Court in Houston this week. He is charged with nine counts of wire fraud, computer hacking, information theft, identity theft, and damaging protected computers, and faces many years in prison.
Another Chinese national named in the indictment, Zhang Yu, 44, remains at large.

## China-Linked APT GopherWhisper Abuses Legitimate Services in Government Attacks

A newly uncovered APT is relying on legitimate services for command-and-control (C&C) communication and data exfiltration, ESET warns.
Tracked as GopherWhisper (PDF) and active since at least November 2023, the hacking group is operating out of China, as timestamp inspection of chat messages and emails has revealed.
The APT came to the spotlight in January 2025, during the investigation into a Go-based backdoor found on the systems of a governmental entity in Mongolia, which led to the identification of several other backdoors, custom loaders, and injectors associated with the group.
Dubbed LaxGopher, the backdoor uses Slack for C&C communication and can execute commands via command prompt, exfiltrate victim data, and fetch and execute additional payloads on the infected machines. GopherWhisper, ESET says, mainly used LaxGopher to enumerate drives and files.
An injector named JabGopher is used to execute the backdoor in the memory of a newly spawned instance of svchost.exe.
One of the tools that LaxGopher can deploy is CompactGopher, a file collector written in Go that can compress files from the command line and send them to the file.io file-sharing service using a public REST API.
Another tool in GopherWhisper's arsenal is RatGopher, a Go-based backdoor. Unlike LaxGopher, it uses Discord for C&C communication. It can open new instances of the command prompt and upload or download files from file.io.
The APT also relies on a C++ backdoor called SSLORDoor, which uses OpenSSL BIO for communication via raw TCP sockets. The malware can spawn a hidden command prompt process, enumerate drives, execute commands related to file manipulation, and create new socket connections.
ESET's investigation uncovered two additional tools that GopherWhisper deployed against the same Mongolian government organization, namely the BoxOfFriends Go backdoor that relies on the Microsoft Graph API for communication via draft Outlook messages, and the FriendDelivery DLL injector that loads it.
The BoxOfFriends backdoor can exfiltrate files, manipulate ports, and execute supplied commands through a shell opened on the host.
The China-linked APT infected roughly 12 systems within the victim Mongolian governmental institution. According to ESET, dozens of other victims were likely targeted as well.
"Due to the lack of similarities in code, TTPs, and targeting to any existing APT group, we have created GopherWhisper as a new group and attribute the described toolset to it," ESET notes.

## Translation: "Scaling the Great Firewall"? You've Crossed the Line

23 April 2026, CDT

China's technical internet controls are complemented and reinforced by public messaging that frames them as necessary protection for the country's citizens. As well as justifying the controls' existence, this messaging supports their function by deterring people from even attempting the kinds of activities that might otherwise be blocked. In this way, the messaging itself is an integral part of the dynamic, layered overall control system. **The example translated below** was published by the military-affiliated National Defense Times on April 15. It portrays the wild Western internet as a wretched hive of scum and villainy, mirroring other official messaging on physical travel abroad.
The legal status of VPNs and other circumvention tools is less clear-cut in practice than the article suggests, with enforcement having tended to focus heavily on service providers rather than users. The reference to people held in Southeast-Asian scam compounds is notable: Chinese authorities have faced some criticism for failing to do enough to combat these criminal enterprises. Here, the "Great Firewall" is presented as a protective measure that those lured into the compounds had deliberately rejected. The enthusiastic use of so-called "scare quotes" is also a prominent feature of the article, and of official messaging as a whole.
Some martial embellishments aside, the article is typical—in fact, it closely parallels a 2021 post from a WeChat account affiliated with the PLA Daily. The timing of this iteration may be notable, however: it coincided with signs of escalation in official efforts to fight "wall-scaling," as well as other ominous developments including moves by Apple to more effectively confine PRC-based users to its Chinese app store, and reports of a sharp drop in activity among Chinese-language

communities on X, which has remained an important platform for PRC-based wall-scalers.

The world's so big! I want to go see it all. Gaming is more fun on overseas servers! I want to go play on them. There are so many great online resources overseas! I want to go search through them. Foreigners are so friendly online! I want to go chat with them. Foreign websites are awesome! I want to go take a look. How can I do this? By "scaling the wall." Public security warning: Hold it right there! You're breaking the law.

Article 6 of the [1996] Interim Provisions of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of International Networking of Computer Information Networks states: "computer information networks directly connecting to international networks must use entry and exit channels provided by the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications' national public telecommunications network. No work unit or individual may independently establish or employ other channels for cross-border network connections. Relevant rules in the Party's internal disciplinary regulations and related statutes also expressly prohibit Party members and cadres from engaging in the unlawful act of "scaling the wall."

But what is "scaling the wall"? The "wall" in question refers to the "National Public Network Monitoring System" (GFW), commonly known as China's national firewall. "Scaling the wall" or "net-breaking" refers to users employing virtual private network (VPN) technology to evade state network oversight, breaking through the firewall's IP blocks, content filters, DNS hijacking, traffic restrictions, etc. for activities such as accessing overseas websites in violation of national law. More simply, "scaling the wall" means using special tricks to bypass domestic internet restrictions and access blocked or otherwise restricted foreign websites. Deliberate or not, it constitutes an illegal act.

Why is "scaling the wall" prohibited? Just look at the news. In February 2025, Chinese and Thai police successfully rescued 61 victims, including 39 Chinese citizens, who had been lured to scam compounds in Myanmar. Most of these victims had illegally "scaled the wall" with VPNs to register on foreign social media platforms like Telegram, where they were lured abroad by fake ads promising "high-paying customer support work in Thailand, with flights reimbursed." Upon reaching the border, they were trafficked to scam compounds in Myanmar by snakeheads, held captive, tortured with electric shocks, and forced to defraud their own families.

Broadly speaking, there are three main dangers in "scaling the wall." First, one can easily fall into "political traps." As China's international status has risen, nearly all foreign countries have websites specifically targeting Chinese citizens, publishing so-called alternative political history, shocking exposés, and exclusive scoops with ulterior motives. "Scaling the wall" to browse these sites, one can easily be led astray by reactionary discourse, decadent thinking, and erroneous ideology, and become a conduit for false views, a porter for disinformation, or even a mouthpiece for hostile forces, acting in ways that jeopardize national political security.

Second, one can easily be lured into "collusion traps." Due to the internet's highly virtual and anonymous nature, and the continuous emergence of new "wall-scaling" tools, the net has become another key battlefront for recruitment and subversion by our enemies. State security departments have exposed many recent cases of foreign spies conspiring to steal our secrets, incidents in which our own people illegally "scaled the wall," were ensnared in traps that had been laid for them, and ended up falling into criminality.

Third, one can easily sink into "illegality traps." Foreign websites are saturated with obscene, violent, and vulgar content, as well as links to gambling, drugs, and money-lending sites. The moment you "scale the wall," you're vulnerable to exploitation by foreign criminal elements and risk being drawn into activities that can lead to prosecution, such as online gambling, illegal money-lending, drugs, soliciting prostitutes, etc.

The consequences of "scaling the wall" and net-breaking can be severe. In legal terms, illegal "wall-scaling" may violate sections of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China pertaining to the crimes of espionage or illegal provision of state secrets or intelligence; or may violate the Espionage Law of the People's Republic of China or the Interim Provisions of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of International Networking of Computer Information Networks, incurring a prison sentence or substantial fine. In terms of [Party] discipline, illegal "wall-scaling" is subject to punishment under the Regulations on Disciplinary Action of the Communist Party of China or the [PLA] Disciplinary Regulations. At the individual level, this kind of legal or disciplinary violation will become part of your personal record, a black mark that will follow you for your whole life, and may even exact a heavy toll at critical junctures in your children's lives, affecting their eligibility to enlist in the army or qualify for the civil service exam or civil service employment.

The way to avoid the dangers of "scaling the wall" is essentially with "a wall in your heart": strengthen your awareness of enemy presence, maintain political vigilance, hone your ability to discern right from wrong, and never forget: "The internet harbors traps and harbors enemies, and is subject to politics and subject to discipline." The key is adherence to the rules: obey the laws and regulations, regulate your online activity, and strengthen your awareness of legitimate net use. Make sure to avoid clicking or visiting links from unclear sources; registering for, purchasing, or using "wall-scaling" extensions, tools, or software;

downloading or using foreign software for registering social-media accounts or joining group chats; downloading or using game accelerators to play international editions of online games; using accelerators or search engines with network proxy functions; and investing or speculating in virtual currencies. Focus on consistency and persistence. Strengthen network management, and carry out frequent self-inspections: check your app lists for any "wall-scaling" software tools or foreign apps installed on your phone or computer; check game accelerators to see if there are connections to foreign servers; check email for records of overseas account registration; and conscientiously put a stop to all rule-and-regulation-breaking "wall-scaling" and net-breaking activity.

[Xi Jinping said,] "If you can't pass the test of the internet, you can't pass the test of our times." We must maintain a sober awareness that "gambling on not getting caught is never a safe bet." And we must be especially vigilant against letting habit or complacency turn us into criminal victims or criminal accomplices. Don't ignorantly or carelessly blunder into a trap, and ensure that in the great online tide, you stand firm instead of being swept off your feet.

## Global Cyber Agencies Warn of Expanding China-Linked Botnet Strategy

24 April 2026, Linkedin

International cybersecurity agencies have issued an urgent Cybersecurity Advisory, warning of a major evolution in state-linked cyber operations tied to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Authorities say threat actors are increasingly relying on vast networks of compromised everyday devices—often called botnets—to obscure their activities, making detection and defence significantly more difficult.

**A Strategic Shift in Cyber Warfare**

Cybersecurity officials, including the UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), alongside partners such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), say the change marks a turning point in how cyber espionage and attacks are conducted.

Historically, state-backed hackers relied on dedicated infrastructure—servers and domains directly controlled by the attackers. However, investigators now report a widespread pivot toward hijacking consumer and enterprise devices at scale. These include home routers, internet-connected cameras, and storage systems.

The trend is both cost-effective and difficult to attribute, giving attackers plausible deniability while expanding operational reach.

Covert Networks: A Growing and Elusive Threat

These so-called "covert networks" function by routing malicious traffic through thousands—or even hundreds of thousands—of compromised devices worldwide. Each device acts as a node, masking the origin of cyber operations.

Officials say these networks are now used across the entire attack lifecycle—from reconnaissance to data theft. For example:

- The group Volt Typhoon has used such infrastructure to infiltrate critical infrastructure systems.
- Another group, Flax Typhoon, leveraged similar networks for espionage campaigns.

One notable case involved a botnet dubbed *Raptor Train*, which reportedly infected more than 200,000 devices globally. Investigators linked its operation to a Chinese technology firm, raising concerns about state-private sector collaboration in cyber activities.

While botnets are not new, their scale, persistence, and strategic use represent a significant escalation.

## Advisory details shifting tactics of Chinese cyber actors using covert networks for malicious activity

24 April 2026, AhA.COM

A joint advisory released April 23 from U.S. and international cybersecurity agencies, including the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, FBI, National Security Agency and other global partners, warns that China-nexus cyber actors have significantly shifted their tactics, now posing heightened risks for hospitals and health systems that rely on connected devices and complex networks. According to the advisory, Chinese state-aligned threat actors are increasingly using large-scale "covert networks" of compromised devices to hide and route malicious activity. These networks, often composed of vulnerable small-office or home-office routers, Internet of Things devices and other edge hardware, enable attackers to disguise their origins, evade traditional defenses and operate at a massive scale.

"For hospitals, this is particularly relevant. Health systems are considered critical infrastructure and have been exposed to China-affiliated malware campaigns such as Volt Typhoon and Flax Typhoon. These 'Typhoon' campaigns have used covert networks to conduct espionage and pre-position for disruptive attacks against other health care dependent critical infrastructure," said John Riggi, AHA national security advisor for cybersecurity and risk. "Many of the compromised devices involved are 'end-of-life' technologies that no longer receive security updates, which can be commonly found in health care environments. Health systems should review their inventories for outdated or unpatched connected devices, review work-from-home technology policies, strengthen network monitoring for abnormal traffic patterns

and adopt more behavior-based defenses rather than relying solely on known threat indicators."

## AI model Zeta to expand use of Tibetan language

24 Apr 2026, China Daily

The debut of a new Tibetan language artificial intelligence model is expected to expand digital access and public services across Tibetanspeaking regions, offering enhanced support for sectors ranging from healthcare and education to governance and cultural preservation.

Unveiled in Beijing on Wednesday, the model — named Zeta — was developed by the State Key Laboratory of Tibetan Intelligence at Qinghai Normal University. It has been filed under national regulations for generative AI services and has entered public testing and pilot application, becoming Qinghai's first large-scale model designed for full multimodal processing of the Tibetan language.

Dorlha, the lab's executive deputy director, said the regulatory filing marks a new starting point for applying the technology to realworld needs. Unlike traditional AI systems typically designed for text translation or speech recognition, Zeta takes a comprehensive, multidimensional approach to language processing.

"Its advanced capabilities span listening, speaking, reading, writing and translating across the three main Tibetan dialects — Amdo, U-Tsang and Kham," Dorlha said.

The system incorporates innovations such as mixed-language document recognition, audiobook production, ancient literature retrieval and intelligent subtitle transcription, among others, he said.

In addition, industry-specific features like digital broadcasting and subtitle transcription make it a valuable tool for sectors ranging from media to agriculture and tourism.

Technologically, Zeta integrates Tibetan, standard Chinese and English within a multilingual framework. It is supported by an expansive dataset including a 150gigabyte high-quality Tibetan text corpus, 87 million multilingual parallel sentences and 30,000 hours of multi-dialect audio recordings.

Coupled with self-developed algorithms and compatibility with domestic AI infrastructure, the model demonstrates technical maturity and scalability, Dorlha said.

With versions available in 7 billion, 50 billion and 122 billion parameters, Zeta is designed to tackle a range of challenges, including linguistic translation, voice recognition, medical assistance and literature preservation.

Nyima Tashi, a professor at Xizang University and director of the State Key Laboratory of Tibetan Intelligence, said the launch of Zeta and its application products will contribute to high-quality economic and social development in Tibetan regions of China.

"The laboratory will continue to deepen Tibetan language AI research, increase scientific investment, strengthen talent development and enhance collaboration among industry, academia and research institutions," he said.

Moving forward, the team aims to refine the model by deploying multimodal capabilities through open application programming interfaces and fostering collaboration across academic institutions and private enterprises, building a broader ecosystem for Tibetanlanguage AI.

Zeta's release comes about a month after the launch of DeepZang,

the first Tibetan large language model launched in the Xizang autonomous region, offering more options for users.

Tenzin Palden, a Tibetan student at Shandong Agricultural University, said Zeta offers hope for preserving his linguistic identity in an increasingly digital world.

"By addressing historical challenges like limited datasets and diversity in Tibetan dialects, this innovation provides much-needed momentum for bridging the wisdom of Tibetan traditions with modern development," he said.

"It is not just a technological achievement but also a reflection of the protection and transmission of ethnic culture."

## Chinese hackers using everyday devices to target UK firms, warns cybersecurity agency

23 April 2026, The Guardian

Britain's National Cyber Security Centre says companies must step up vigilance to prevent espionage attacksBritish businesses are being urged to step up their vigilance against a China-linked hacking ploy that uses everyday devices for espionage.

The UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and agencies in nine other countries have warned of persistent attempts by Beijing-backed groups to hack equipment such as wifi routers to launch cyber-attacks.

Known as "covert networks" or "botnets", they typically target vulnerable equipment – for instance devices that have not had a software update or are old – as a base for staging activities such as surveillance and data theft.

The NCSC said the technique was used by the majority of China-linked hackers. Richard Horne, the centre's chief executive, said on Wednesday that China's intelligence and military agencies had an "eye-watering level of sophistication in their cyber-operations". Speaking at his NCSC's annual conference in Glasgow, he said: "We face more than just a capable cyber-threat but a peer competitor in cyberspace."

The advisory notice from the NCSC and cyber-agencies in countries including the US, Australia, Canada and Germany warns there has been a "major shift" in Chinese tactics to using devices linked to the internet as a means of obscuring where an attack comes from. The most commonly hijacked devices are routers but printers and web cameras are also vulnerable.

Security officials compare routers to virtual private networks, which allow web users to obscure their location. They say a household's wifi router could be used as a conduit for attacking an unrelated major company.

While the NCSC guidance is not directed at members of the public who might be unwittingly providing a launchpad for espionage, it urges companies and organisations to take a number of steps such as mapping out their IT systems, including connections to consumer broadband networks. It also recommends multifactor authentication – where users are asked to give another form of verification along with their password – for members of staff trying to access a system remotely. They also advise limiting network connections to external devices.

The centre said in the advisory notice published on Thursday: "The NCSC believes that the majority of China-nexus threat actors are using these networks, that multiple covert networks have been created and are being constantly updated, and that a single covert network could be being used by multiple actors. These networks are mainly made up of compromised small office home office routers, as well as internet of things [connected devices] and smart devices."

A China-backed group, dubbed Volt Typhoon by western authorities, has been flagged by agencies as a user of covert networks and has quietly burrowed into key US infrastructure including rail, aviation and water systems. The NCSC said these covert networks were now built and maintained by private Chinese companies. In one example, a Chinese business created a covert network by infecting 200,000 devices worldwide.

This year, Google announced it had disrupted a "residential proxy" network where cybercrime groups and state actors used hacked household and IT devices to launch attacks.

## Chinese APT Targets Indian Banks, Korean Policy Circles

21 April 2026, Dark Reading

If you knew only two things about China's state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) Mustang Panda (aka TA416, Bronze President, Stately Taurus), they would probably be, first, that it frequently shifts its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and second, that its focus is solely on geopolitical espionage.

But Mustang Panda seems to have diverged from that target and has trained its sights on India's banking sector.

Square that with its most newly discovered campaign, which employs no interesting TTPs, and though partly focused against American and Korean public policy circles, is aimed largely at financial organizations in India. Despite the differences, researchers at Acronis believe this string of activity belongs to Mustang Panda, thanks to shared code, operational patterns, and more.

**Mustang Panda's Attack Chain**

The spear-phishing Mustang Panda has been performing ranges from halfway convincing to totally uninspired. Messages sent to targets in India seem to be disguised as basic IT help desk issues, though the researchers lacked any window into whatever email or text messages victims might have received.

While investigating the attacks in India, the researchers also found that the threat actor was also running a Google account impersonating the American political scientist Victor Cha. Cha, formerly the director for Asian affairs for the National Security Council (NSC) during the George W. Bush administration, remains a highly influential figure on North Korea and South Korea, and Indo-Pacific security more generally. The threat actors used a headshot of Cha, and a generically faked email address — victorcha707@gmail.com — to target individuals involved in the US-Korea diplomatic community and policy circles.By one means or another, in India, Korea, or the US, victims were prompted to open a malicious file. Viewing the file triggered a stereotypically Chinese dynamic link library (DLL) sideloading attack. After persistence was established via the Windows Registry, victims were rewarded with a variant of LotusLite, a backdoor built and maintained by this particular threat cluster within Mustang Panda, which it uses to establish shells, access files, and perform other remote operations for espionage.

This latest variant of LotusLite featured some minor edits to slightly more easily evade cybersecurity detection tools, nothing more. It was also superficially disguised to mimic legitimate banking software in the region where many of its targets were based. In a pop-up window message and an internal code function, the program used the name "HDFC Bank," referring to the largest private bank in the largest country in the world. It appears that the Korean and American targets of this campaign also received the ostensibly India-oriented malware.

**Why Lazy TTPs Still Work**

Mustang Panda's tradecraft may be stale, but it's not unique in that respect. "A significant portion of nation-state activity relies on simple, well-understood techniques executed with discipline," says Santiago Pontiroli, team lead for the Acronis Threat Research Unit (TRU). "Organizations that focus only on advanced or novel threats risk

leaving themselves exposed to exactly this kind of campaign."

The group's evident laziness is understandable, he argues. "Even in environments with formal security programs, these techniques persist because basic controls are often inconsistently implemented. Most organizations, regardless of geography, still struggle with the fundamentals: maintaining visibility into endpoint activity, monitoring for unsigned or improperly loaded DLLs, and detecting abuse of legitimate signed binaries."

Investing less in remarkable new tools and techniques doesn't just save on time and effort in the short term, it also allows threat actors more flexibility in the long term. "It lowers development overhead and keeps tooling disposable. When a campaign is exposed, they can rotate minor indicators, swap the lure, and redeploy quickly. They are not investing in sophistication because they do not need to," Pontrioli explains.

**China Spies on Indian Banks**

Though the Korean policy-related targeting is more neatly up its alley, Mustang Panda's attacks against India's financial sector are also almost certainly motivated by intelligence gathering, not financial gain.

Pontrioli notes, "We did not observe LotusLite capabilities typically associated with banking malware, such as credential harvesting or payment interception. So the question is not 'Why target a bank for theft?' but 'Why target it for intelligence?'"

To that question, he answers, "India's banking sector, particularly institutions like HDFC Bank, sits at the intersection of several strategic intelligence interests. Financial institutions have visibility into cross-border transactions, government-linked accounts, infrastructure financing, and trade flows, all of which are valuable to a state-aligned actor. Access to this type of data can provide insight into capital movement, economic relationships, and internal policy direction."

He adds, "It may also support broader reconnaissance objectives, such as mapping critical infrastructure or expanding collection beyond traditional government and diplomatic targets."

## 10 petabytes of sensitive data stolen from China's National Supercomputing Center, hackers claim — daring heist would be largest ever China hack, covering 6,000 clients across science, defense, and beyond

09 April 2026, Tom's Hardware

A hacker (or hacker group) claims to have extracted more than 10 petabytes (1PB = 1000 TB) of highly sensitive information from China's National Supercomputing Center (NSCC) in Tianjin, which could be the largest known data breach involving Chinese infrastructure. Although the incident remains unverified, its nature and scale — data was stolen from 6,000 state-controlled entities — may point to a systemic weakness in China's critical infrastructure, which has serious implications, reports CNN.

The dataset is said to originate from China's National Supercomputing Center, a centralized high-performance computing facility that supports over 6,000 entities from research, industrial, and defense sectors. Indeed, the alleged content spans multiple disciplines, including aerospace engineering, bioinformatics, fusion modeling, and other fields studied using supercomputer simulations. The individual or group behind the breach, which goes by the name of FlamingChina, released a sample in a Telegram channel in February, claiming the archive contains research tied to such organizations as the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC), and the National University of Defense Technology.

The exposed materials include files labeled 'secret' in Chinese, along with engineering documentation, simulation results, and rendered models tied to weapons systems such as bombs and missiles, according to analysts who reviewed portions of the leak. Access to portions of the dataset is reportedly being sold for thousands of dollars in cryptocurrency, while full access is priced at hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The scale of the alleged breach raises questions about the attacker and represents a significant interest from an intelligence point of view. First up, stealing 10PB of data undetected requires exceptional skills, plenty of time (six months), and dedication. Secondly, processing 10PB of data requires significant computing resources that are not usually available to individuals or hacking groups. Thirdly, given the requirements for significant computing capabilities, meaningful analysis of the dataset can indeed be limited to governments or large organizations. Yet, researchers questioned by CNN suggested that while global governments may show interest in such data, some may already possess the information through other means.

According to the alleged attacker, they gained access through a compromised VPN domain, then deployed a botnet to extract data. Instead of transferring data in bulk, the attacker distributed the exfiltration across multiple systems and moved 'smaller' amounts over about six months to avoid detection. Such a method relies more on exploiting system architecture than on advanced hacking techniques, which in part helped the perpetrator to avoid detection.

Although *CNN* could not confirm the source of the leak or whether it was real, multiple cybersecurity experts say that the samples appear authentic and match what they would expect to see from a centralized supercomputing facility. If the attack is real, the incident highlights ongoing

cybersecurity weaknesses in China's critical infrastructure, which means that some of its secret technologies can end up in the hands of foreign governments or terrorist organizations, which may use them to harm not only China but other countries as well.

## Documents on China's Crackdown on Cross-Border Internet Access and VPN Use

08 April 2026, China Scope

Recently, based on reports from some internet users, the Chinese government launched a new and strict crackdown in early April 2026 targeting cross-border internet access and censorship circumvention (such as Virtual Private Network (VPN) use). Unlike previous scattered blocking efforts, this campaign appears highly coordinated across multiple government departments and involves more aggressive technical restrictions.
Leaked or reported documents (shared by *China Digital Times*) suggest the following:

1. Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)
   The CAC scheduled a meeting on April 16 to study and implement President Xi Jinping's "cyber power" strategy, inviting relevant officials to attend.
2. Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT)
   A meeting was held on April 7 with major telecom companies (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom) to strengthen regulation of cross-border data lines and prevent unauthorized internet connections.
3. Shaanxi Telecom and CDN provider notice
   A directive ordered a complete ban on all overseas internet traffic, including Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and other countries. It also strictly prohibited any VPN or proxy-related services. Key requirements and consequences:
   - All IPs must block access to non-mainland destinations
   - Immediate self-inspections for VPNs, proxies, or abnormal traffic
   - Violations will result in instant service termination and IP bans
   - No refunds or compensation will be provided
   - Users are responsible for backing up their data
   - Restoration of services is uncertain and depends on telecom authorities

## Digital Humans vs. Human-like AI

4 April 2026, China Law Translate

It was only a few months ago, in late December, that China released draft provisions on "human-like interactive AI" services for public comment, so it was something of a surprise when a new, similar-sounding draft on "digital virtual human" services was released on April 3. Despite their related titles, however, the documents address very different, albeit overlapping, technologies and risks.

**Scope**

The earlier "**human-like AI"** draft addresses AI services that simulate human personalities, thinking, and communication to interact emotionally with human users through text, images, audio, video, or other media.
The new "**digital human**" draft is concerned with visual representations of humans, operated either by a human or a machine, that exist only in the virtual world and have characteristics such as speech, personality, OR interactive capacity.
By these definitions, a text or voice-only chatbot could be a human-like AI, but not a digital virtual human. By contrast, a virtual news anchor, pop star, or livestreaming avatar can be a digital-human even if it isn't automated at all, but merely controlled by a human puppeteer via motion capture sensors and filter overlays. Virtual digital humans also do not need to be interactive, and might just appear in online content.
The definitions are not mutually exclusive. Article 18 of the new digital virtual humans draft acknowledges situations where digital virtual humans (likenesses) are used to provide human-like AI services (interactive machine relationships); ie, an interactive AI that includes a visual human avatar
In sum, the **human-like AI** draft is about machines (AI) that *act like humans*, and the psychological impact of users' relationships with them. The **digital human** draft is about regulating visual portrayals that *look like humans* as a new medium for conveying information online. Regulatory focus:
The earlier human-like AI draft is an ambitious first effort to construct an overarching framework for a new type of human-machine relationship that blurs the line between tool and companion, but also brings novel risks to users. It focuses on service providers' liability for the AI's design and activity, emphasizing requirements to protect user mental-health and prevent excessive dependence.
The digital-human draft is more typical of other Chinese regulations addressing new means of sharing information online. China often releases technology-specific regulations (such as on instant messaging, livestreaming, online fiction, and even user comment sections) that incorporate and apply broader rules to the specific new context. They can also assign regulatory responsibilities among the relevant state agencies and introduce new enforcement mechanisms such as administrative penalties.
The digital-human draft thus focuses on digital virtual humans primarily as digital works and means of conveying information, rather than the unique challenges of their 'humanity'. It

incorporates rules for protecting personal information, personality rights (no clones of people without their consent), intellectual property, and data security in the creation of use of such avatars. It adapts content moderation requirements and other regulatory obligations that apply to broader media, such as algorithm filing requirements. Where violations are not covered by other laws, Article 24, authorizes a number of penalties including fines of up to 200,000 RMB, and shutting down the service.

Rather than go through each obligation, I have loosely annotated a translation below, linking to some prior sources of the protections and innovations.

First, however, it is worth considering a few of the more unique provisions:

**1.** Government digital persons:

Article 19 addresses the use of digital virtual persons to provide government services or participate in public management or judicial activities. Digital avatar civil servants and even judges have already been put into service, although their functions are usually limited to providing public information rather than decision-making.

The new draft requires that

1. Citizens can opt out of the digital virtual human service.
2. There are mechanisms for manual oversight, and
3. their use should be guided by the principles of necessity and reasonableness (as well as legality).

These requirements feel like a chastening reminder that not every situation needs automation, and that automation is a supplement, rather than a substitute, for government responsiveness to the public.

**2.** Identity Concealment

Article 11(5) addresses the use of digital virtual persons to evade legally required identity verification systems using tech such as facial or voice recognition. Providing and verifying real-name identity information is a requirement for receiving many online services in China, but this provision adds a more specific focus on the unique use of digital humans to evade biometrics.

This article, and Article 11(7)'s recitation of existing prohibitions on improperly registering and trading accounts, are also reminiscent of the recent draft Cybercrime Law's efforts to reinforce the real-name system.

**3.** Protections for Human Operators

Article 11(6) contains a brief acknowledgment of the rights of the human drivers of some digital humans. It bars infringement of the drivers' rights and interests, such as in their personal information or the right to freely choose employment.

This brief provision may conceal some big issues. As with traditional performers, the real person operating a digital human may become inextricably associated with the character they perform. And in an employment relationship, the blurred identity of actor and character, operator and avatar, can create difficult questions.

For example, when does actors' subsequent work infringe the employer's rights in a proprietary character? Is Harrison Ford infringing on the Indiana Jones IP if he wears a fedora (or carries a whip, etc.) to film an unrelated cola ad? Are there any limits on what the employer can portray the character, with Mr. Ford's likeness, doing?

These issues aren't new to digital humans, but could become more prominent. A digital human may be created by capturing a performer's face, voice, motions, or other biometric information, making it even more visually associated with the character. At some point, disputes over control of a digital human may become disputes over the performer's personal information, reputation, and freedom to choose future work.

**4.** Protection of Minors.

Many of the requirements of Article 10 incorporate existing protections for minors online:

- No inducements to spending (Law on the Protection of Minors 74)
- No inducements to religion (Internet Religious Information Services regs art. 14)
- Prohibit content that might impact minors' physical or mental health. (Measures for Categorizing Online Information that Might Impact Minors' Physical and Psychological Health)
- Prevent Addiction (Regulations on the Protection of Minors Online, 42)

More interesting, however, are **requirements that minors must not be provided with emotionally resonant digital virtual human services, such as virtual family or companions**. This seems to address the emotional dependence risks that are more typical of the Human-like AI provisions than this draft regulation. The draft of those provisions, however, stopped short of banning the provision of AI-driven companions to minors, only requiring additional guardian controls. (Article 12) The closest proposal is a prohibition of AI-simulated relations for elderly users, not minors (Article 13), in a paternalistic effort to prevent fraud.

One way to make sense of this distinction is that the concern here might not be emotional attachment at all, but a different danger unique to human-operated digital persons: adults using virtual avatars as disguises to befriend or groom minors.

UPDATE: Shortly after the publication of this article, the Human-like AI rules were finalized with important changes to the relevant content. The prohibition on virtual relatives and partners for minors is now a part of that regulation as well, and similar prohibition for elders has been removed.

**5.** Labeling Requirements:

Article 13 creates an obligation to prominently label digital virtual human services with the text "digital human" written in the area where the

avatar is displayed for the entire duration of the service. This is a new labeling requirement, beyond the more detailed labeling requirements for AI-generated content, which still apply separately.
Even though virtual digital human services are not necessarily AI-generated or controlled, most will fall within the scope of China's deep synthesis regulations, that covers tools for generating or editing faces and voices, and also include labeling requirements. (articles 16,17). The AI labeling rules require both 'explicit' labels, which can be perceived by humans, and "implicit" metadata labeling. As in the AI-labeling rules, the service providers, users, and information publication platforms all bear some responsibility for this new labeling requirement.
6, Additional annotations

## China using digital governance to shape narratives, suppress dissent: Report

04 April 2026, Social News

China has, over the past two decades, built an extensive digital governance system that tightly controls online expression while simultaneously amplifying voices in favour of the government.
At the core of this ecosystem lies the '50 Cent Party' in China - also known as Wumao Dang - a loosely organised yet highly effective network of commentators numbering in the millions, tasked not only to counter criticism but to actively shape pro-state narratives and discredit dissenting voices, a report detailed this week.
"Contrary to popular belief, Chinese digital censorship is not solely about deleting content. It is equally about distraction and redirection. Research has shown that a significant portion of pro-government online activity avoids direct confrontation with critics; instead, it floods platforms with positive or irrelevant content to dilute critical discussions. This strategy creates an illusion of consensus while marginalising opposing views," a report in 'Times of Bangladesh' detailed.
"The architecture of China's internet further reinforces this system. The 'Great Firewall' effectively isolates domestic users from global platforms such as Facebook, Twitter (now X), and YouTube, replacing them with tightly controlled alternatives like WeChat, Weibo, and Douyin. These platforms operate under strict regulatory frameworks where content moderation is both automated and human-driven, often guided by opaque state directives," it added.
According to the report, a wide range of sensitive topics in China — ranging from Xinjiang and Tibet to Hong Kong and Tiananmen — are strictly censored, with those crossing red lines facing risk of account suspension, surveillance, or severe consequences.
"In this environment, freedom of expression exists within clearly defined — and constantly shifting — boundaries. Citizens are not entirely silent; rather, they engage in a form of 'coded speech,' using metaphors, satire, and linguistic creativity to navigate censorship. However, such expressions are fragile and often short-lived, as authorities continuously adapt their monitoring mechanisms," it mentioned.
The report stressed that the presence of "troll-like behaviour" becomes particularly evident in discussions on sensitive issues, such as the treatment of Uyghur Muslims, where online narratives are regulated by the Chinese authorities, and coordinated efforts frame criticism as "foreign interference" and "misinformation".
The convergence of state policy, digital control, and mass participation, it said, creates a powerful ecosystem that suppresses and delegitimises dissent, with implications extending far beyond China.
"As governments and political actors worldwide observe and, in some cases, emulate aspects of this model, the line between organic public opinion and manufactured consensus becomes increasingly blurred. The rise of algorithm-driven engagement further exacerbates this trend, as outrage and polarisation are often rewarded with visibility," the report noted.

## Wondering where China's cyber effort will go next? Just read the five-year plan

01 April 2026, Aspistrategist

Most cyber analysis begins with incidents. It should begin with intent.
Adversaries sometimes declare strategic priorities, yet cyber incidents that align with them are not assessed accordingly. We should in fact be guarding against intrusions before they happen by taking note of foreign and industrial policies that indicate where they're likely to concentrate.
This methodology is especially useful for countries and companies defending against Chinese intrusion. China's five-year plans for economic development can indicate priority terrain. They show where Beijing intends to concentrate effort, reduce external dependencies and close capability gaps over time. From a cyber perspective, declared technology priorities point to where pressure is most likely to build.
Technology features prominently in China's current planning cycle. Semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, AI-enabling infrastructure and industrial software are consistently elevated. These sectors underpin economic and military capability and sit at the centre of global competition. They're also areas where China faces sustained external constraint through export controls, standards pressure and supply-chain dependence. That combination makes the areas logical focal points.

This is not unique to China. The United States and Australia similarly publish national cyber strategies and technology policies that link industrial resilience with strategic priorities. Western governments put their strategic priorities in writing. Beijing does the same.

Cyber activity – such as network exploitation campaigns, compromise of identity systems, and cyber-enabled intellectual property theft – supports this scheme of manoeuvre. It's not a substitute for domestic investment or industrial reform; it's a supporting function. State-aligned cyber espionage enables access to intellectual property, industrial processes and supply-chain insight, reducing uncertainty and shortening development timelines in ecosystems identified as strategic priorities. Crucially, this activity can occur without crossing thresholds that would normally trigger escalation or coordinated responses.

China operates on long horizons: cyber offers a way for it to apply low and slow pressure and accumulate an advantage.

The pattern is established. Previous five-year plans that emphasised development in aerospace, healthcare, advanced manufacturing and semiconductors were followed by sustained state-aligned cyber espionage targeting those same sectors. Alignment is not always explicit, but the consistency between declared priorities and observed activity suggests more than coincidence. This was evident in China's 13th five-year plan, which prioritised rapid advancement in 5G and telecommunications infrastructure. State-aligned cyber groups subsequently conducted espionage campaigns against global telecommunications providers to obtain sensitive technical data related to 5G networks and equipment. In several cases, cyber activity has preceded overt competitive friction. This reinforces the role of cyber as an enabling function rather than a crisis trigger.

The 13th five-year plan also marked a broader shift in China's technology policy. Domestic innovation and technological self-reliance were increasingly framed as matters of national security, particularly in sectors such as telecommunications, semiconductors and advanced manufacturing. As these priorities hardened in policy, the urgency to close capability gaps increased, strengthening the incentive to obtain foreign technical knowledge.

For Australian government and critical infrastructure entities, the relevance lies in anticipation. Attribution explains who caused the disruption; motivation explains why it was done, why the activity persists and where it is likely to concentrate. Foreign industrial and technology priorities can reveal where cyber activity is most likely to support broader objectives.

This exposes a persistent blind spot in cyber decision-making. Many organisations acknowledge strategic competition in principle but continue to assess cyber activity primarily through corporate risk models that are mainly concerned with financial motives and technical effects. Cyber operations are too often assessed in isolation from foreign policy and technology objectives that shape them. The consequence is not ignorance, but delay, as patterns are recognised only after leverage has been established and options have narrowed.

When disruption or theft is visible, response pathways are comparatively straightforward. Legal, regulatory and operational mechanisms can be activated with clarity of purpose. Persistent low-level access is different. Years of observation may not generate headline incidents, public breaches or clear escalation points because, technically, nothing has happened.

But that familiarity alters the strategic balance. Decision-makers are left navigating ambiguity rather than crisis, and ambiguity hampers decisiveness. By the time activity is recognised as strategic positioning rather than isolated access, the scope for proportionate and credible response has already contracted.

Integrating foreign policy and industrial priorities into cyber prioritisation won't require new authorities or dramatic reform, but rather a shift in how existing information is weighted. Without that shift, cyber incidents tied to long-term strategic objectives will continue to be approached as isolated events rather than as components of a broader campaign. The difference between reaction and anticipation determines whether pressure is recognised early or only after advantage has been secured elsewhere.

# International and CTA

## Chinese Liaison Officer Tsultrim Gyatso Attends 19th Annual Roll Call of Nations Wreath Laying Ceremony by Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation

30 April 2026, CTA



*Chinese Liaison Officer Tsultrim Gyatso Attends 19th Annual Roll Call of Nations Wreath Laying Ceremony by Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation*

On 23 April, representatives from the Office of Tibet in Washington, DC took part in the 19th Roll Call of Nations Wreath-Laying Ceremony organised by the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation.

The event brought together representatives from 17 government offices, including the European Union's office in the United States, the Government of Taiwan, and Chinese Liaison Officer Tsultrim Gyatso from the Office of Tibet. They were joined by 40 non-governmental organisations, all participating in the wreath-laying ceremony to express solidarity with the victims of communism.

Among the speakers at the gathering were event organiser Eric Patterson, former US Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom Sam Brownback, and US Congressman Joe Wilson, each of whom addressed the audience in support of the cause.

During the 19th Annual Roll Call of Nations Wreath-Laying Ceremony, the Viet American Foundation was honoured with this year's Flame of Liberty Award in recognition of its contributions.

## Sen. Rick Scott, Sen. Jeff Merkley Introduce Tibet Atrocities Determination Act

29 April 2026 Rick Scot Senate

**WASHINGTON, D.C.** — Today, Senator Rick Scott and Senator Jeff Merkley introduced the Tibet

# TIBET IN EXILE

Atrocities Determination Act. April 29th is observed by the Tibetan Youth Congress as Martyr's Day to commemorate and honor the lives of Tibetans who have sacrificed their lives for the freedom of Tibet. This legislation requires the Secretary of State make a formal determination on whether China is committing a genocide or crimes of humanity against the Tibetan people.

**Senator Rick Scott** said, "Communist China is committing genocide in Tibet. There is no way around it. The regime in Beijing has engaged in systematic killings, torture, forced sterilization, forced displacement, government sanctioned kidnapping, and a myriad of other crimes against humanity in its oppression of the Tibetan people. This is par for the course for an evil regime that is simultaneously waging a genocide against the Uyghurs, suppressing Christianity, and locking up political prisoners like my friend Jimmy Lai. The bloodshed needs to end, and China needs to be held accountable for all of it.

I am glad to be partnering with Sen. Merkley on this effort to hold the Chinese government accountable."

**Senator Jeff Merkley** said, "In the face of China's continued assault on Tibetans—escalating cultural erasure, child separation, surveillance, imprisonment, and torture—America can't stand silent As the Chinese government continues to ignore the rights of the Tibetan people under international law, we must be clear that these crimes will not be ignored."

**BACKGROUND:**

After the 1949 revolution in China, the CCP moved to take control of Tibet, sending the PLA into the region in 1950 and cementing its authority through the 1951 Seventeen Point Agreement, which in practice ended Tibetan self-rule. Tensions continued to rise and came to a breaking point during the 1959 Lhasa uprising, which resulted in mass arrests and heavy loss of life. The Dalai Lama fled to India, along with many Tibetans who formed a lasting exile community that continues to document abuses. In the decades since, Chinese authorities have imposed tight restrictions on Tibetan religion and culture – closing or tightly regulating monasteries, imprisoning monks and nuns, punishing expressions of support for the Dalai Lama, and advancing "Sinicization" policies that place Tibetan Buddhism, language, and education firmly under state control.

Reports from the U.S. State Department and human rights organizations also describe ongoing enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture, and targeted repression of Tibetans, including the still-unresolved 1995 disappearance of the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama as the 11th Panchen Lama. There have also been reports of a widespread boarding school system that separates Tibetan children from their families, limits Tibetan language and cultural education, and subjects students to political indoctrination and surveillance. Given the growing body of evidence, there is a compelling interest in examining whether the CCP's state-directed policies meet the legal definition of genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention, or otherwise crimes against humanity.

## UN experts warn new 'ethnic unity' law in China risks entrenching forced assimilation

29 April 2026, ISHR

In a letter to the Chinese government dated 16 April 2026, eight UN human rights experts raised concerns about the new 'Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress', adopted by China's rubber-stamp National People's Congress on 12 March 2026 and due to enter into force on 1 July. The law significantly restricts the exercise of a range of social and cultural rights in violation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, both of which have been ratified and are binding upon China.

The experts warned that, in its national application, the law could 'transform temporary or experimental regional measures into binding nationwide obligations' with serious implications for linguistic, cultural and religious rights and autonomy of ethnic groups and peoples, including Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongols.

The law codifies at the national level the Chinese leadership's new assimilationist approach to 'ethnic integration', so far only tested through provincial and local regulations in predominantly Tibetan and Mongolian areas.

The letter comes as the European Parliament prepares to debate and vote on a resolution on the law and on 'the intensified suppression of ethnic identities'.

The debate is scheduled for 29 April 2026, with a vote expected on 30 April.

A shift towards a homogeneous national identity

The eight UN experts highlighted that several provisions of the law may contradict China's Constitution and its 1984 Regional National Autonomy Law (also referred to as the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law)1, including protections relating to the use and development of languages.

The new law codifies a shift in Beijing's ethnic policy, moving away from the Mao-era approach of nominal ethnic autonomy modelled on the Soviet Union. As legal scholar Carl Minzner notes, this marks a steep departure from the 1984 framework.

While in practice the party-state has long maintained a firm and repressive grip over Tibetan, Uyghur and other autonomous regions –

preventing any meaningful form of political autonomy – the 1984 framework still recognised, at least on paper, distinct cultures, languages, religions and ways of life, and provided for nominal autonomous governance and preferential treatment for ethnic groups then officially referred to as 'nationalities'.

Accelerated under President Xi Jinping, this policy shift moves towards forced assimilation. As Minzner points out, this reflects what scholars call 'second-generation ethnic policies', with the legislation explicitly aiming at 'melting' diverse identities into a singular, homogeneous Chinese identity. It enshrines practices long described by Uyghur and Tibetan rights groups, UN experts, and scholars as the 'sinicisation' of religion and culture. Furthermore, the law's heavy use of Xi's ideological slogans, particularly in its preamble, further erodes the boundary between Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policy and State legislation.

Minzner also warns that the new law risks worsening ethnic tensions across the country. When the government attempted to implement similar measures in Inner Mongolia in 2020, it sparked widespread protests and boycotts, ultimately resulting in the removal of local ethnic Mongolian officials who failed to strictly enforce Beijing's directives.

The International Campaign for Tibet's analysis of the new law concludes that its adoption marks the 'culmination of a decades-long CCP effort to dilute the unique identity of the Tibetan people and codify forced assimilationist policies'. It outlines how the authorities 'used the Tibetan community to test and fine-tune this [policy] for more than a decade before formalising it at the national level' and 'impose a top-down vision of "ethnic unity" which upholds Chinese identity as the norm.'

Restrictions on language, culture and religion

In their letter to China, the eight UN experts observed that the law would 'restrict minority language education' by requiring schools and other educational institutions to use Mandarin Chinese as the basic language for teaching. They also noted the risk that provisions could be applied to penalise parents for 'solely educating their children about their own minority culture, language, or religion'.

While the previous legal framework allowed for bilingual education, the UN's treaty committees on women's rights and on economic, social and cultural rights had already urged China in 2023 to 'abolish immediately the coerced residential (boarding) school system imposed on Tibetan children and allow private Tibetan schools to be established.'

They further called on China to 'ensure that Mandarin is not the only language of instruction, secure 'access to instruction in mother tongues' for Kazakhs, Tibetans and Uyghurs, and 'reverse the closure of schools providing instruction in minority languages'.

The eight UN experts further raised concerns that requirements for religious groups to follow the 'direction of Sinicisation' could interfere with religious doctrine, the independence of religious institutions, and the ability of individuals and communities to manifest their beliefs.

They warned that provisions appear to 'centralise interpretive authority over what constitutes acceptable cultural expression', and that measures promoting 'change of conventions' and 'new trends' could be used to suppress or alter practices, traditions and customs central to the identity of ethnic groups.

Risks of transnational repression and heightened social control

The UN experts also warn that article 63, which allows authorities to prosecute individuals and organisations outside China for acts deemed to 'undermine national/ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division' could create risks of transnational repression.

They note that the law does not clearly define what constitutes 'undermining ethnic unity and progress', giving authorities wide discretion to interpret and enforce its provisions. This raises concerns about arbitrary enforcement and a chilling effect on the exercise of rights.

Under China's sweeping national security legislation, cultural rights defenders such as Tibetan activist Tashi Wangchuk and Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti have been jailed on charges of 'ethnic separatism.'

Worryingly, the law's article 20 imposes a legal obligation on parents to 'educate and guide minors to love the CCP, the motherland, the people, and the Chinese nation', while requiring them to refrain from instilling ideas deemed detrimental to national unity. Coupled with a new right for citizens to 'report acts that undermine ethnic unity and progress' under article 54, the law builds a model of ideological enforcement that entrenches strict social control within families and society.

Uyghur and Tibetan organisations warn of deepening repression

Uyghur, Tibetan and Mongolian groups warn that the law formalises policies already experienced on the ground.

ISHR calls on States to take urgent steps to press China to suspend implementation of the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, and to either repeal the law or amend it to ensure full compliance with international human rights standards.

States should further urge China to implement, as matter of priority, recommendations by the CERD, CEDAW and CESCR committees with regards to the rights of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols and other peoples.

ISHR also calls on the High Commissioner for Human Rights to

continue monitoring the law's implementation, including its impact on Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols and other peoples, and to publicly report on any measures that may restrict fundamental rights or enable transnational repression.

## US report: 'Tibet' continues to be China's most restricted region for foreign visitors, overseas Tibetans

27 April 2026, Tibetan Review



Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), the western half of Tibet proper, remains the only People's Republic of China territory where access is banned for non-mainland Chinese foreign visitors, including especially diplomats, journalists, researchers, and others, unless they obtain special permits in addition to their Chinese visas. The restrictions are even more severe for overseas Tibetans seeking to visit their homeland, noted the US State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs in its latest annual report to the Congress made under the Reciprocal access to Tibet Act of 2018. The Act mandates reciprocal denial of access to visitors from China in addition to the possibility of imposing sanctions on responsible officials.

Restriction on travelling to Tibetan areas outside the TAR, though less severe, are seen to be just as daunting.

Chinese government regulations and procedures that have historically impeded travel to the TAR and Tibetan areas outside the TAR for US diplomats and officials, journalists, and tourists remained in place in 2025, said the report which was released on Apr 24. International visitors' travel to the TAR continued to require the approval of TAR government travel permits.

Even in Tibetan areas outside the TAR where diplomats and officials did not require a permit, Chinese security forces intimidated and harassed US diplomats, officials, and other foreign visitors through conspicuous surveillance. Besides, Tibetan Americans regularly have faced restrictions on their travel to these Tibetan areas. And access even to these Tibetan areas for journalists remained restricted and limited, the report said.

The report, which covered the calendar year 2025, said that the TAR continued to be the only area of the PRC that the authorities required foreigners, including diplomats and other foreign officials, to formally request permission to visit.

In 2025, Consular officials from the US Embassy in Beijing were permitted to make the first official visit to the TAR since 2019. The five-day visit included meetings with the TAR Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) and major tour operators, and visits to hospitals and cultural sites visited by U.S. citizens. The report did not give any further information about the visit but said a single visit is not a full return of consular access, and that the US Embassy in Beijing had requested additional visits to the TAR in 2026.

Regulations imposed by Beijing control travel of international visitors to the TAR for tourism, a restriction applied to no other provincial-level entity in the PRC, the report noted. Since 1989, international visitors have been required to obtain an official confirmation letter issued by the TAR government before entering the TAR. The TAR government reports to and is accountable to the Chinese central government. Most confirmation letters are arranged through travel agencies officially registered with the Chinese government, which mandate designated tour guides to accompany international tourists while in the TAR. Foreigners rarely obtained permission to enter the TAR by road.

Besides., authorities deny access to the TAR for many international tourists during periods they deem politically sensitive, such as the anniversary of the Mar 10, 1959, Tibetan Uprising and the Dalai Lama's Jul 6 birthday.

* * *

US citizens of Tibetan heritage undergo a stricter screening process than other US citizens when applying for Chinese visas or travel permits to visit the TAR, the report noted. Their applications are processed through the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and often require a letter from a relative or host in the Tibetan area, an in-person interview with the Chinese Embassy or Consulate, and submission of personal documents such as naturalization certificates, birth certificates, school and work records, affidavits, and other materials.

Even when a permit is finally granted, Tibetan Americans reported more frequent harassment by security officials in Tibetan areas than in other parts of the PRC. Some Americans with Tibetan heritage reported being interrogated at local UFWD offices and being forced to download invasive Chinese apps on their phones. Some members of the Tibetan American community reported they self-censored their behaviour in the United States out of fear of retribution against themselves or their family members in Tibet.

Despite these barriers, ethnic Tibetans also reported increased access to the TAR compared to previous years, particularly for those who hold United States or European passports, the report said.

* * *

Journalists and human rights monitors are especially targetted with denial of access. The report noted that Chinese regulations did not regularly require international journalists to obtain prior permission to travel to any part of the country other than the TAR. The government rejected almost all US journalists' requests to visit and report from the TAR, the report said, citing the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (FCCC), the professional organization for the international press corps based in China.

According to the FCCC, Chinese officials refused at least five requests by foreign journalists to visit the TAR. Ninety-three percent of correspondents who attempted to travel to the TAR and other Tibetan areas of the PRC faced difficulty in reporting. While the government occasionally organizes press tours of the TAR, they do not provide opportunities to report independently, the report said.

Although journalists were permitted to travel to Tibetan areas outside the TAR, they have been subjected to invasive surveillance, physically blocked from certain areas, and intimidated by the government. According to the FCCC's 2024 annual report, foreign journalists experienced harassment while reporting in Tibetan areas outside the TAR, the report noted.

* * *

The report said Access to Americans in Tibet improved slightly compared to 2024, with the US consular officials being able to perform some routine consular functions during a visit in Sep 2025. While the PRC arranged tours for foreign diplomats and held events in the TAR, such arrangements are strictly arranged and managed by the government and are designed to prevent meaningful interaction with the people of the TAR.

Besides, in addition to the permits and other restrictions described above, approved visitors still faced additional access barriers once they arr in the TAR. The report cited travel agents operating in the TAR as saying some areas of the TAR were generally closed to visitors and required supplemental permission from the TAR Public Security Bureau. Tourists planning to visit certain border areas, such as Mount Everest, sometimes required a separate permit from the Military Affairs Office.

The Chinese government has not disclose its decision-making process for granting permission to travel to the TAR, nor shared the names of officials involved in issuing travel permits to US citizens to visit the TAR.

China appears to consider any official request for a visit from the US, and by extension other counties as well with great sensitivity. The report said: "The TAR FAO required a diplomatic note for any official visit. Once the TAR government received a request, it reportedly informed a foreign affairs leading committee, consisting of representatives at the prefectural, provincial, and central levels from the UFWD, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Public Security, People's Liberation Army, and MFA. This committee reviewed requests, although rarely provided specific responses."

## Macron touches Beijing's nerves on Taiwan and Tibet as he heads for the exit

25 April 2026, SCMP



From Taiwan to Tibet, French President Emmanuel Macron has touched Beijing's nerves on a range of sensitive issues over the past few weeks.

On a trip to Japan earlier this month, he and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi "emphasised the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and urged a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues through constructive dialogue".

The irritation for Beijing was less about the language and more about the timing, with the joint statement coming less than six months after Takaichi's controversial comments in November about possible Japanese military intervention in a Taiwan contingency.

In an interview with Japanese public broadcaster NHK on April 1, Macron also said that "we do not want to be under the hegemony of China or the United States of America", though he added that Paris should "create a mutually beneficial situation" with Beijing.

At Yonsei University in Seoul two days later, Macron referred to Beijing and Washington, saying: "Our objective is not to be the vassals of two hegemonic powers."

Macron also briefly spoke with the Dalai Lama's representative to the EU, Genkhang Rigzin Choedon, at a cultural event in Paris in late March, expressing his "high esteem" for the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, Genkhang wrote on social media.

Beijing views the Dalai Lama as a separatist and accuses him of inciting unrest in Tibet – particularly in the 1980s and during protests in

2008 – allegations that exiled Tibetan spiritual leader denies.
Observers see these gestures by Macron as an attempt to cement his image as a standard-bearer of European strategic autonomy before he leaves office next year.
However, they say the actions are unlikely to fundamentally shake the relationship between China and France, which could potentially move in a more positive direction if the far-right wins power in 2027.
"This series of moves from Macron … objectively speaking, are not positive [for bilateral ties]," said Song Luzheng, a research fellow with Fudan University's China Institute.
"But it remains tolerable within the framework of the China-France strategic relationship and will not fundamentally alter relations between the two countries."
He noted that Macron's contact with the Dalai Lama's envoy was unlikely to be a chance encounter but might only amount to a symbolic move to assure the Tibetan exile community, which had some influence in France.
Song also said that Macron's remarks in South Korea were consistent with his long-held position that Europe should engage in benign competition with both China and the US, while the joint statement on Taiwan did not cross Beijing's red lines.
Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US and France, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-governed island by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons.
Macron's provocative moves are not out of character.
Soon after a high-profile state visit to China in December – his fourth to the country – Macron also warned Beijing that Europe would impose tariffs on Chinese products if trade imbalances were not addressed.
China had developed ample "mental preparation" for French "two-sidedness", said Wang Yiwei, director of Renmin University's Centre for European Studies in Beijing, though he added that the growing trade deficit with China was a widely held concern in Europe.
Wang agreed that the French president's moves could be read as a manifestation of the "strategic autonomy" agenda he has long pushed for.
"[Macron's] Asia tour came against this backdrop – US allies are strengthening ties among themselves and huddling together for warmth to hedge against the risks posed by … a China-US bipolarity, the so-called G2," he said.
Song said that since Macron's governing coalition lost ground in the 2024 legislative elections, he had put more energy into foreign affairs to shore up his domestic popularity and secure a political legacy.
According to the latest poll published on April 11 by market research firm Ipsos BVA in partnership with the French engineering school CESI, Macron's approval rating in France rose by 1 percentage point this month from March to 23 per cent.
Even though Macron had become something of a "lame duck" president, China was likely to want to stay on good terms with him, Wang said.
"Macron is still young," Wang said, suggesting that Macron could seek to lead the European Commission in the future.
But while Macron might be looking ahead to a change in role, analysts pointed out that the future of the countries' ties was in the hands of the French electorate.
"The outcome of next year's presidential election will really affect China-France relations, more so than Macron's recent actions," Song said.
Far-right leaders Jordan Bardella and Marine Le Pen are still the most popular potential candidates, according to the Ipsos BVA-CESI poll.
"If figures like [Marine] Le Pen come to power, they could free up thinking and genuinely cooperate strategically with China. There is little hope for that from the establishment," Wang said.
A court in Paris found Le Pen and several members of her party guilty of embezzling European Union funds last year, ruling her out of the 2027 election. She is awaiting the final verdict of her appeal, due in July.
If the far-right were to win, China-France ties could reach a "third peak" following the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1964 and the elevation to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2004, Song said.
He added that France's far-right tended to deal with China pragmatically, through the lens of economic interest and cooperation, rather than focusing on conflicts over differing values.

## China's ethnic unity law sparks alarm in Europe over cultural erasure, transnational reach

25 April 2026, Tributen India

Following Beijing's adoption of a controversial "ethnic unity" law on 12 March 2026, the Office of Tibet in Brussels has ramped up its outreach to European policymakers, warning of sweeping consequences that extend beyond China's borders. The legislation poses a serious threat to Tibetan identity and could institutionalise what officials describe as the "systematic erasure" of Tibetan civilisation, as reported by the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA).According to CTA, Rigzin Genkhang, representative of the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration, along with EU Advocacy Officer Tenzin Phuntsok, has led multiple high-level briefings in Brussels. These engagements have focused on raising awareness among lawmakers about the law's

broader implications, particularly its potential to suppress cultural and linguistic freedoms under the pretext of national cohesion.A central concern is the law's emphasis on enforcing Mandarin Chinese as the dominant language across education and public life. Critics argue that such provisions could further sideline the Tibetan language, which is already under pressure, and may even penalise informal or community-led efforts to preserve it. Equally troubling is the legislation's extraterritorial dimension. The law reportedly allows Chinese authorities to target individuals and groups outside their borders who are deemed to be undermining "ethnic unity."This provision is being viewed as a mechanism for transnational repression, potentially affecting Tibetan activists, scholars, and diaspora communities worldwide. Despite these concerns, advocacy efforts appear to be gaining traction. Engagements with members of the European Parliament have reportedly resonated, with discussions expected to translate into formal responses in the near future, as cited by CTA.

With the law scheduled to come into force on 1 July 2026, Tibetan representatives in Brussels say they will continue pressing European governments and institutions to adopt concrete measures. They argue that the urgency of the situation demands a coordinated international response to address what they see as a growing challenge to cultural rights and freedoms, as reported by CTA.(ANI)

## UN experts challenge China's "Ethnic Unity and Progress Law," citing numerous rights violations

24 April 2026, ICT

The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) welcomes the statement released this week by eight United Nations special mandate holders challenging China's enactment of its "Ethnic Unity and Progress Law" as the latest tool for the Chinese Community Party to further its "Sinicization" goal of forced cultural and linguistic assimilation of Tibetans and members of other communities.

"We would like to draw attention to risks that the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress could entrench a uniform approach to ethnic relations across all regions of China, thereby potentially amplifying restrictions on minority rights," the Special Rapporteurs said. The Law, which goes into effect on July 1, "…could transform temporary or experimental regional measures into binding nationwide obligations, which could have serious implications for the linguistic, cultural, and religious autonomy of ethnic communities, including Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongols."

On the Law's treatment of language education, the Special Rapporteurs pointed out that requiring Tibetan to "be subordinate to Mandarin 'in position, order, and so forth' in public settings reinforces linguistic hierarchy." Furthermore, the experts said that the Law's vague prohibition on "obstructing" individuals in the PRC from learning Mandarin "could be turned against educators, parents, or advocates who prioritize" learning the Tibetan language.

On cultural preservation, the Special Rapporteurs said the Law "appears to centralize interpretive authority over what constitutes acceptable cultural expression, which could constrain the practical exercise of cultural autonomy, contradicting Article 38 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy."

On freedom of religion, the Special Rapporteurs said the Law "would appear to undermine" its enjoyment because "it conditions religion or belief practice on State-mandated ideological alignment, while interfering with the autonomy of religious doctrine, the independence of religious and belief institutions, and the right of individuals and communities to manifest their beliefs free from State coercion."

On transnational repression, Article 63 of the law provides a pretext for Beijing to target individuals outside of China for acts which "undermine ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division." Such vaguely defined language could lead to an expansion of China's transnational repression against members of the Tibetan, Uyghur, and Mongolian diaspora, among others, who exercise their internationally recognized right to speak freely and criticize China's policies.

The Special Rapporteurs' observations track closely with ICT's independent analysis that the Law reflects China's abandonment of its domestic and international human rights commitments. The CCP's intention to forcibly assimilate Tibetans and members of other communities is made even more clear in its 15th Five-Year Plan.

"ICT welcomes these expert findings as they clearly expose and unmask the CCP's intention to erode Tibet's unique cultural, linguistic and religious heritage and assimilate Tibetans. The long list of serious rights violations resulting from this law is breathtaking," said ICT President Tencho Gyatso. "ICT is grateful for the professional, independent and unbiased analysis conducted by these UN Special Rapporteurs."

ICT joins UN experts in calling for unhindered access to China and Tibet for independent UN human rights mechanisms. At the same time, ICT appeals to the United States, the European Union, likeminded governments and other international partners to integrate the findings of the UN experts into upcoming meetings with Chinese officials and within United Nations and other multilateral venues.

Eight UN special rapporteurs collaborated to reach these findings. They are the Special Rapporteur on minority issues; the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights; the Special Rapporteur on the

right to development; the Special Rapporteur on the right to education; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context; and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief. These individuals are independent human rights experts appointed by the UN Human Rights Council.

## Amnesty raises alarm over Tibetan religious leader's alleged detention by Chinese authorities

24 April 24, 2026, ANI



Amnesty International has issued an urgent appeal to Chinese authorities, demanding answers on the whereabouts of Tibetan spiritual leader Choktrul Dorje Ten Rinpoche, who has reportedly been missing since his detention in December 2025, as reported by Phayul.

According to Phayul, in a letter addressed to Qinghai Communist Party Secretary Wu Xiaojun, Amnesty expressed serious concern over the lack of transparency surrounding the case. The lama, known for his work in religious and vocational education, was reportedly taken into custody on or around December 4 in Chikdril County of Golog Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.

Since then, Chinese authorities have provided no official details about his detention, including his legal status, location, or any charges against him. Sources indicate that informal claims surfaced in January suggesting he was "under investigation," but no formal confirmation has followed. Amnesty stated that holding individuals incommunicado violates international human rights standards and increases the risk of torture or ill-treatment.

The organisation also raised alarm over reports that local officials have discouraged individuals from sharing information about the case, an approach it described as part of a broader pattern of suppression in China. The detained religious leader is regarded as an influential figure in Tibet, having established both a monastery and a vocational training centre that supports local communities. His disappearance has intensified concerns about restrictions on Tibetan religious figures, as highlighted by Phayul.

Amnesty has called on Chinese authorities to immediately disclose his whereabouts and either release him or present credible evidence of a legitimate criminal offence. It also urged that he be granted access to legal counsel and allowed contact with his family. The case has drawn wider international concern, with rights groups highlighting it as indicative of ongoing repression in Tibetan regions, as reported by Phayul. (ANI)

## Issue sensitive, but hosting of Tibetan refugees to continue – Nepal to visiting US assistant secretary

22 April 2026 Tibetan Review

Apart from discussing US investment in Nepal as the main agenda of his visit, US Assistant Secretary of State Samir Paul Kapur has also raised the plight of Tibetan refugees languishing in the country without any documentation during his three-day visit which began on Apr 20.

Kapur, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, was stated to have met with the Tibetan refugee community in the country before his official meetings. His meetings included those with the ruling Rastriya Swatantra Party Chair Rabi Lamichhane, Foreign Minister Shishir Khanal and Finance Minister Swarnim Wagle, with the discussion centred mainly on strengthening bilateral relations and improving Nepal's investment climate.

While appreciating Nepal's generous support for the Tibetan refugees, he also urged the issuance of identity cards to the refugees so that they come under the tax net. The refugee community has communicated about the difficulties in doing business, opening bank accounts, accessing nursing education, and engaging in economic activities, reported the *kathmandupost.com* Apr 21.

The report noted that Kapur's raising of the plight of Tibetan refugees came a week after the Chinese ambassador had cautioned Nepal's Home Minister Sudan Gurung over "refugee activities" in Nepal.

The report said that during a meeting with Gurung on Apr 13, the Chinese Ambassador Zhang Maoming had urged him to curb Tibetan and Taiwanese activities in Nepal and sought assurances that Kathmandu would not become a platform for foreign interests hostile to Beijing.

Khanal was stated to have told Kapur Apr 21 that the Tibetan refugee issue was sensitive, one that concerned Nepal's northern neighbour, China. The Nepal government is doing its best for their welfare, the minister was reported to have said.

"We are hosting them on humanitarian grounds and will continue to do so."

## China's transnational repression in Canada "not abstract concern": CTC Director Sherap Therchin

22 April 2026, Phayul




Sherap Therchin, the Executive Director of the Canada Tibet Committee (CTC), delivered a stark and personal testimony before Canada's Subcommittee on International Human Rights, warning of the expanding reach of China's transnational repression and its direct impact.

Appearing before the parliamentary body under the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (16:01:47 to 16:07:27), Sherap spoke during a hybrid session held in accordance with parliamentary procedure, alongside fellow witnesses including Maria Cheung, Grace Wollensak, Zaha Hassan, Marcos Kolga, Peter Mattis, and Zumretay Arkin.

Opening his remarks, the Tibetan activist revealed that he is among 20 Canadians sanctioned by the Chinese government on December 21, 2024—an action he described as both symbolic and deeply consequential. While calling the sanctions "a badge of honour" reflecting his commitment to human rights, he emphasized that they have brought "real and lasting consequences." Branded by Chinese authorities as a threat to national security and sovereignty, he said, those targeted have become subjects of sustained harassment and intimidation.

He detailed the increasingly hostile environment he has faced since the sanctions were imposed. He reported frequent phishing attacks, malware infections targeting the CTC's website, and a steady stream of threatening online messages from anonymous sources. To mitigate risks, he and his colleagues have adopted heightened digital security measures, including the use of VPNs—tools that, while necessary, have disrupted daily operations and serve as a constant reminder of the threats they face.

"These are not abstract concerns," he told the committee, stressing that such pressures affect every aspect of life—from communication and work to personal safety and mental well-being.

The repercussions extend beyond the digital realm. He said international travel has become fraught with uncertainty, forcing sanctioned individuals to carefully consider destinations, interactions, and potential risks—particularly in countries with close ties to China. He also highlighted the psychological toll of worrying about family members in Tibet or other regions under Beijing's influence, noting that sanctions can be "weaponized at any moment." This persistent anxiety, he said, subtly undermines freedom of expression and, at times, even the courage to speak openly.

He acknowledged the Canadian government's support, including consultations, safety workshops, and expressions of solidarity. However, he stressed that such measures cannot fully offset the impact of being targeted by what he described as "one of the world's most powerful authoritarian regimes." "Despite our best efforts to remain strong," he said, "our lives have never been the same."

Placing his experience within a wider context, he warned that his case is emblematic of a broader pattern of behavior by the People's Republic of China. He cited findings from Canada's Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference, which identified China as the most active state actor targeting the country's democratic institutions.He also referenced Canada's 2026 National Cyber Threat Assessment, which describes China as the most sophisticated and persistent cyber threat facing the country, engaging in espionage, intellectual property theft, and malign influence operations.

"This is not simply about disagreement with criticism," he said. "It is about a state with a documented record of foreign interference, cyber aggression, transnational repression, and intimidation."

While acknowledging the importance of trade and engagement with China, he urged Canada not to normalize arbitrary sanctions or detentions. He called for the establishment of "solid guardrails" in bilateral relations, including supply chain transparency, independent fact-finding access, and reciprocal travel rights.

He raised concerns over Canada's visa-free travel arrangement with China, noting that some Tibetan-origin Canadians who attempted to visit Tibet or mainland China were denied entry and sent back without explanation. "Reciprocal access is essential," he said, arguing that openness must be mutual if relations are to be fair and just.

He pointed to high-profile cases that illustrate the risks faced by Canadian nationals, including the detention of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor in China for nearly three years. He also referenced the 2014 detention of Kevin and Julia Garratt, as well as the long-term imprisonment of Huseyin Celil, a Canadian citizen of Uyghur origin held since 2006.

Concluding his testimony, Sherap delivered a stark warning: China's repression is no longer confined

within its borders. “It has gone transnational,” he said. “The threat is already here in Canada.”

## Freedom House: The CCP has once again become the world's leading perpetrator of transnational repression.

22 April 2026, VOT

A special report by Freedom House reveals that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has once again become the primary perpetrator of transnational repression globally. The report documents how authoritarian regimes systematically persecute dissidents across borders, including the forced repatriation of Uyghurs to Thailand under pressure from the CCP, and the CCP's increasingly sophisticated abuse of Interpol mechanisms. Freedom House calls on democratic nations to immediately coordinate action, employing both sanctions and institutional reforms to address this threat.




The international human rights and democracy research institution Freedom House recently released a special report, "Collaboration and Resistance: Tracking Transnational Repression in 2025," *which* lists the Chinese Communist Party authorities as the primary perpetrator of transnational repression worldwide.

Freedom House's report recorded 126 new documented cases of transnational repression in 2025, bringing the total number of cases in its database from 2014 to 2025 to 1,375. Among the new records, cases involving the Chinese Communist Party once again rank first globally.

The report points out that the CCP's transnational repression is large-scale, systematic, and continues to expand through regional cooperation among authoritarian states. The main entities involved in the new cases in Southeast Asia are all closely related to cross-border cooperation by Chinese authorities—Thailand, in cooperation with Chinese and Vietnamese authorities, has carried out detention and repatriation operations against "ethnic minorities." Just this February, under pressure from the CCP, Thailand forcibly deported 40 Uyghur men and repatriated them to China, further solidifying China's position as the primary implementer of transnational repression globally.

At the same time, the report reveals that the CCP has systematically abused the Interpol mechanism, using it as an institutionalized tool to hunt down dissidents overseas. Some authoritarian governments, including the CCP, control Interpol's law enforcement network to conduct cross-border arrests of political opponents on charges such as "terrorism" or "endangering national security."

In its report, Freedom House called on governments to impose sanctions and visa bans on officials of regimes such as the Chinese Communist Party that carry out transnational repression, and to increase financial support for Interpol's oversight bodies to enhance their ability to identify and remove politically motivated law enforcement applications.

## Senior US diplomat urges stronger support for Tibetan refugee during Nepal visit

22 April 2026, Phayul



*L-R) US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs S Paul Kapur with Finance Minister Swarnim Wagle at the Ministry of Finance April 21, 2026 (Photo/The Kathmandu Post)*

US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Samir Paul Kapur, drew attention to the challenges faced by Tibetan refugees in Nepal during his April 20–22 visit to Kathmandu, urging the Nepalese government to strengthen support measures amid ongoing humanitarian concerns.

During his three-day trip, the senior US diplomat met with members of the Tibetan community in Kathmandu. Members of the refugee community highlighted persistent challenges, including barriers to running businesses, opening bank accounts, accessing nursing education, and engaging in broader economic activities.

In discussions with Foreign Minister Shisir Khanal, Kapur raised the issue directly, calling for increased assistance for the estimated 10,000 Tibetan refugees residing in the country. He also emphasized the importance of issuing identity cards to refugees, noting that formal documentation would enable them to enter the tax system and participate more fully in the economy.

Nepali authorities acknowledged the sensitivity of the matter, particularly in light of Kathmandu’s

diplomatic ties with China. Minister Khanal reportedly reaffirmed Nepal's commitment to supporting Tibetan refugees on humanitarian grounds while noting the broader geopolitical considerations. "We are hosting them on humanitarian grounds and will continue to do so," he stated.

Kapur's remarks come shortly after Zhang Maoming, China's ambassador to Nepal, urged tighter restrictions on Tibetan and Taiwanese activities during an April 13 meeting with Home Minister Sudan Gurung. Beijing has consistently pressed Kathmandu to prevent its territory from being used for activities it deems politically sensitive.

The visit also unfolded amid broader diplomatic engagement with Nepal's new government under Prime Minister Balen Shah, with discussions centered on regional stability and managing China's expanding influence—factors that have, in recent years, contributed to increased surveillance and movement restrictions on Tibetan refugees.

Separately, Kapur held talks with Finance Minister Swarnim Wagle and Foreign Minister Khanal to explore avenues for strengthening economic ties. Discussions focused on boosting US investment in sectors such as tourism, clean energy, and information technology, with Nepali officials pledging reforms to improve the country's business environment.

Following the meetings, Kapur noted on the social media platform X that closer economic cooperation could enhance Nepal's infrastructure and drive mutual growth. He also highlighted discussions on expanding bilateral trade and addressing issues such as illegal immigration and human trafficking, reaffirming Washington's commitment to deepening its partnership with Nepal.

## UN Experts Raise Concerns Over People's Republic of China's Ethnic Unity and Progress Law

21 April 2026, CTA

On 16 April 2026 Geneva, a group of UN Special Rapporteurs from the United Nations raised serious concerns about China's newly adopted Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which is scheduled to take effect on 1 July 2026. While the law is officially intended to strengthen national unity and social cohesion, UN experts warn it may undermine fundamental human rights, especially for ethnic minorities.

The law reflects a broader policy shift in China toward prioritising a unified national identity over ethnic diversity. This could significantly impact minority groups such as Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongols, despite existing constitutional protections for cultural and linguistic rights.

A key concern is the law's vague language, including prohibitions against actions that "undermine ethnic unity." The UN warns that such ambiguity could allow authorities to suppress freedom of expression, academic work, and cultural practices through broad or arbitrary interpretation.

Education provisions are also controversial. The law promotes Mandarin as the primary language of instruction, potentially limiting minority languages in schools. Experts caution this could erode linguistic diversity and weaken cultural identity, particularly among younger generations.

The law also raises concerns about cultural and religious freedoms. Policies encouraging the "Sinicisation" of religion and the transformation of cultural practices may place state control over spiritual and cultural life, potentially violating freedom of religion and belief. Additionally, measures promoting "integrated" communities could affect housing choices and social organisation.

Further risks include restrictions on freedom of assembly and association. Broad references to maintaining public order could be used to limit peaceful gatherings, cultural events, and community advocacy, creating a chilling effect among minority populations.

From an international legal perspective, the UN experts argue the law may conflict with China's obligations under treaties such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which protect cultural participation, education rights, and non-discrimination.

The UN has requested clarification from the Chinese government on how the law will protect minority rights and whether affected communities were consulted. They also offered technical assistance to ensure compliance with international standards.

Responding to the development, Representative Thinlay Chukki, Tibet Bureau in Geneva, welcomed the UN's communications. She described the law as a troubling move toward enforced assimilation and warned it could suppress cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity. She urged China to halt implementation and revise the law in line with human rights standards.

The communication was jointly signed by Prof. Nicolas Levrat (minority issues), Alexandra Xanthaki (cultural rights), Surya Deva (right to development), and Farida Shaheed (right to education). It was also signed by Irene Khan (freedom of opinion and expression), Gina Romero (freedom of peaceful assembly and association), Balakrishnan Rajagopal (adequate housing and non-discrimination), and Nazila Ghanea (freedom of religion or belief).

## Russia deports Tibetan Buddhist monks from India on baseless missionary work allegation

17 April 2026, Tibetan Review

Russia, whose war of aggression against Ukraine is said to be sustained by China's help, has caused the cancellation of a Buddhist festival in capital Moscow after it deported on Apr 8 a group of Tibetan monks from India, accusing them of conducting "unauthorized missionary work".

Moscow police on Apr 6 raided a Buddhist festival at the Rassvet cultural hub in the city center, detaining several participants and organizers, Russian media reported *themoscowtimes.com* Apr 16.

The Buddhist Festival of Good Fortune was scheduled to take place over Apr 4-15 in Moscow, but its organizer, the Nalanda Foundation, has said Apr 12 that the event would not go on following the raid.

"We think it would be inappropriate to continue the festival in the absence of its main participants, the monks of the Gyudmed Tantric Monastery," Nalanda has said on *Vkontakte,* a Russian social media and networking platform similar to *Facebook*, widely used in Russia and Eastern Europe.

The organizers have said the monks entered Russia on religious visas and their documents "were processed in compliance with all required procedures." Nevertheless, law enforcement have said they were being deported because they had not obtained a special license to hold a religious event at a secular venue.

The group of Tibetan monks from India was only to lead group worship and create mandalas, with nothing remotely resembling a missionary work being on planned.

"Offending Buddhists, especially on such a flimsy pretext, is a measure of last resort. They [authorities] are ignorant people, and there's nothing we can do to help them," Dina Kozhukhova has written under Nalanda's *VKontakte* post.

The report said that while dozens took to social media to decry the abrupt closure of a popular festival, the news hit especially hard in the Buddhist-majority republic of Kalmykia in southern Russia.

The report noted that before Nalanda announced the monks' deportation, several media outlets offered an alternative reason for the festival's shutdown: the organizers' decision to sell a book by Telo Tulku Rinpoche, the former Supreme Lama of Kalmykia who was forced to resign in 2023 after being labelled a "foreign agent" for criticizing the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Around 1% of Russia's population identifies as Buddhist, according to an Oct 2025 survey by the Levada Center, the country's last major independent pollster. Most of them live in the Siberian republics of Buryatia and Tyva, as well as in Kalmykia, where Buddhism is the traditional religion of local Indigenous communities, the report said.

## The Tibetan Arts Association has been established with the aim of enhancing the international influence of Tibetan culture

16 April 2026, VOT

Yesterday, on World Art Day, the Tibetan exile community announced the establishment of the "Tibet Art Association." The association's president, Bujong Sonam, told this station that the association was established with the support of the Tibet Foundation and currently has over two hundred members. The association's purpose is to promote the development of Tibetan art and strengthen the influence of Tibetan culture in the international community.April 15th is World Art Day. On this occasion, a group of exiled Tibetans, with the support of the Tibet Foundation, announced the establishment of the "Tibet Art Association," whose president is the exiled Tibetan writer Bujong Sonam.

In an interview with Voice of Tibet, Bujong Sonam explained that the Tibetan Arts Association was founded by seven exiled Tibetans from various professional fields, including filmmakers, poets, writers, and journalists, and currently has over two hundred members. He pointed out that the association's purpose is to promote the development of Tibetan art and the creative abilities of Tibetan artists, and to strengthen the influence of Tibetan culture in the international community.

Bujong Sonam stated that Tibetan exiles are scattered around the world. The association hopes to bring Tibetan artists together and promote Tibetan art to the international stage through exchanges and mutual assistance in music, film, literature, and other arts, not only within the exile community but also on the international stage.

At the press conference, the Tibetan Arts Association also mentioned that it will become a platform for Tibetan artists to build close connections, providing each artist with a stage and creative inspiration. The association's vision is to support artists' innovative paths, enhance the image of Tibetan art and individual artists, and present them to the international public.

Bujong Sonam stated that the association's establishment is of historical significance, emphasizing that Tibetans should tell their stories through art, especially as the Chinese Communist Party intensifies its disinformation campaign about Tibet. They called upon Tibetan artists worldwide to join in contributing to Tibetan art and creating lasting value through culture.

## Gyalwang Drukpa visits Vietnam for peace prayers, Dharma ceremonies

15 April 2026,VNexpress



*Gyalwang Drukpa, head of the Drukpa lineage of Tibetan Buddhism, is welcomed after touching down at Noi Bai airport in Hanoi, April 15, 2026. Photo by Drukpa Vietnam*

Gyalwang Drukpa, head of the Drukpa lineage of Tibetan Buddhism, is visiting Vietnam for a number of activities focused on prayers for peace, including a major Dharma assembly at Tay Thien Mandala.

His delegation arrived at Noi Bai Airport in Hanoi on the morning of April 15, and was welcomed by hundreds of Buddhist monks, nuns and followers.

It is the 13th visit to Vietnam by the supreme spiritual head of the 1,000-year-old Drukpa Lineage over nearly two decades.

He has previously described his repeated visits as driven by the sincerity of Vietnamese followers.

"Vietnamese people are kind, strong and united, which is reflected in their historical traditions."

During his stay he is scheduled to meet with Buddhist leaders, deliver Dharma lectures for monks, nuns and the public and attend a Dharma assembly from April 25 to 27 at Mandala Tay Thien in Phu Tho Province.

The assembly coincides with the Hung Kings' Commemoration Day, which he described as "a symbol of the inner strength, wisdom and power of the Vietnamese people," reflecting both historical continuity and national unity.

He said: "Personally, I deeply respect this tradition and am proud to preside over this Dharma assembly praying for national peace and prosperity, and world peace, on such a meaningful occasion. I consider it a small contribution to Vietnam."

The ceremony on April 25 will include the ringing of a bell for peace prayers and the unveiling of a more than 200-meter meditation scroll written in Tibetan on Himalayan dó paper.

Other rituals include the unveiling of a thongdrol (Buddhist scroll), prayers dedicated to Tara, an important Bodhisattva in Vajrayana Buddhism, and a Medicine Buddha blessing ceremony for health and well-being.

According to Gyalwang Drukpa, the rituals emphasize compassion and wisdom as core values.

He noted that peace should begin at the individual level, encouraging reflection even among those unable to attend in person.

"We talk a lot about world peace, but often forget the important thing: inner peace. If a person has inner peace, those around them can easily feel it too, so remember to cultivate inner peace."

The Dharma assembly will take place at the Western Heaven Mandala stupa complex, a Vajrayana Buddhist site inspired by Himalayan architecture. The complex is designed as a symbolic mandala representing key philosophical elements of the tradition.

The Drukpa lineage is a major branch of Vajrayana Buddhism, and plays a central role in Bhutan's cultural and spiritual life.

In recent decades it has expanded its presence beyond the Himalayan region, including into Southeast Asia and western countries.

Born Jigme Pema Wangchen, the 12th Gyalwang Drukpa is recognized not only as a spiritual leader but also for his engagement in cultural and social initiatives internationally.

## Tibetan director Kangdrun's 'Linka Linka' wins top honours at 50th Hong Kong International Film Festival

14 April 2026, Phayul

*Linka Linka*, the debut feature film by Tibetan screenwriter and director Kangdrun, has garnered international acclaim by winning both the Firebird Award for Best Film and the FIPRESCI Prize at the 2026 Hong Kong International Film Festival, held from April 1 to 12.

The film had its world premiere in the Asian Future competition section of the 38th Tokyo International Film Festival, where it first drew attention for its nuanced storytelling. In Hong Kong, the jury praised the film for "adeptly portraying the freedom and confusion inherent in the journey of youth."

Set against the evolving urban landscape of Lhasa, *Linka Linka* follows Samgyi, a novice filmmaker attempting to create her first feature—an introspective work rooted in her own adolescence. The title refers to a traditional Tibetan picnic. According to the film's synopsis, after years of drifting in Beijing, Samgyi returns to Lhasa to reconstruct her past through film. However, her creative process is disrupted by unresolved memories and recurring conflicts with her father. As she revisits the painful experiences of her childhood friend Lhamo, suppressed truths begin to surface. A chance reunion between the estranged friends leads to a quiet yet profound confrontation, where differing recollections of a

shared past challenge notions of memory and truth.
Kangdrun's earlier short film, *Orlo with Karma*, which explores the lives of Lhasa's younger generation, was selected at both the FIRST International Film Festival and the Vancouver International Film Festival in 2025, marking her as a promising voice among emerging Tibetan filmmakers.



*(From left to right) Kangdrun with cast members Tsering Yangkyi and Ze Ren Dun Zhu during a Q&A session at the 38th Tokyo International Film Festival (Photo_TIFF)*

Speaking during a Q&A session following the film's Tokyo premiere on November 3, 2025, Kangdrun addressed audience perceptions of Tibet. She emphasized her intention to present Lhasa authentically, beyond stereotypical imagery of mountains and nomadic landscapes.
"I depicted Lhasa as I see it today," she said. "I wanted to show it exactly as it is, and to someone who has never been to Tibet, they may only think of the mountains and the steppes, but Lhasa is like any other city, and it has lots of young people."
She further highlighted that many of the film's actors share experiences similar to their characters —growing up in Tibet before pursuing education elsewhere in China, only to return to a homeland transformed in their absence. This sense of dislocation and adaptation forms a central theme in the film.
Critics have lauded *Linka Linka* as an intelligent and visually compelling work, with strong performances and a distinctive portrayal of contemporary Lhasa, setting it apart as a significant contribution to Tibetan cinema.

## Tibetan activists protested in front of the Chinese consulate in the United States, demanding the repeal of the "National Unity and Progress Promotion Law".

13 April 2026, VOT

Tibetan activist Dampa Jamyang, in exile in the United States, recently held a protest in front of the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco, demanding that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) immediately repeal the "National Unity and Progress Promotion Law," a new law that legalizes Sinicization policies. Dampa Jamyang told this station that the CCP's new law is a matter of life and death for Tibet, and exiled Tibetans must rise up in protest, at least to let the international community see clearly what the CCP is doing in



Tibet.Tibetan activist Dampa Jamyang, who is in exile in the United States, recently held a protest in front of the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco, demanding that the Chinese Communist Party immediately abolish the "National Unity and Progress Promotion Law," a new law that legalizes the Sinicization policy.
The Law on Promoting National Unity and Progress was introduced in March this year during the "Two Sessions" of the Chinese Communist Party. The law requires children of "ethnic minorities" to learn Mandarin from preschool education and to "basically master" it by the age of 15. The law also provides the government with a legal basis for cross-border crackdowns, requiring the pursuit of legal responsibility for overseas individuals or organizations that "undermine national unity and incite ethnic separatism."
With the introduction of the Law on Promoting National Unity and Progress, the status of the Tibetan language in Tibet has declined sharply. Tibetan-language signs have begun to be removed in many places.
In an interview with Voice of Tibet, Danba Jiangyang explained that the new law will further exacerbate the dire situation in Tibet, threatening the Tibetans' unique culture and identity. Exiled Tibetans must rise up in protest, at least to make the international community clearly see what the CCP is doing in Tibet.
He stated that since 2012, he has personally held weekly protests at the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco every Wednesday. His demands include an end to the CCP's human rights abuses in Tibet, the release of the Panchen Lama, and protests against the CCP's forced enrollment of millions of Tibetan children in boarding schools, an attempt to erase Tibetan identity, religion, culture, and language. He said he has conducted over 711 protests to date. This is his second time protesting at the Chinese Consulate against the new CCP law.
Danpa Jamyang emphasized that if exiled Tibetans do not engage in protests on the Tibet issue, the

CCP's disinformation campaign about Tibet, spread internationally, may be mistaken for fact. Therefore, every Tibetan around the world has a responsibility to stand up and launch more forms of protests.

## ICT and partners prepare to galvanize Congressional support during Tibet Lobby Day 2026

13 April 20206, ICT




*Past participants of Tibet Lobby Day in Washington, DC.*

The International Campaign for Tibet and partner organizations are organizing Tibet Lobby Day (TLD) on June 8 and 9, 2026, when hundreds of Tibet supporters and Tibetan Americans from across the United States will come to Washington, DC to meet with their Members of Congress.
In face-to-face conversations with their elected officials, volunteer activists will ask for decisive and concrete action in the 119th Congress to promote Tibet-China dialogue and to preserve Tibet's unique cultural, linguistic and religious heritage. Previous TLDs have been integral to protecting Tibet funding and passing legislation including the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act, the Tibetan Policy and Support Act and the Resolve Tibet Act. Supporters of Tibet can learn more about TLD at https://tibetlobbyday.us.

## Reincarnation of Dodrupchen Rinpoche Officially Confirmed After Ceremony in Tibet

10 April 2026, FB

The reincarnation of the revered 4th Dodrupchen Rinpoche, Jigme Thupten Trinley Palzangpo, has been officially confirmed following a ceremony held on April 5, 2026, at Dodrupchen Monastery in Tibet.
According to an official letter issued by the monastery after the ceremony, the young reincarnation (Yangsi), identified as H.E. Zhonnu Donkun Drubpa Rinpoche, was formally received through traditional rituals, including the offering of Khata (ceremonial silk scarves), Mandala offerings, and auspicious welcome prayers (Tashi Shokpa). The announcement of the reincarnation had




earlier been made in mid-March, with the formal confirmation circulated following the completion of the ceremony.
Monastic sources indicated that the reincarnation was initially recognized at Ser Tengye Monastery before being invited to Tibet, where the formal reception took place. Officials from Chorten Monastery in Gangtok confirmed that the announcement is authentic and in line with established religious practices. They further stated that the reincarnated Rinpoche was brought from his birthplace to the Tibetan monastery, where the ceremonial rites were conducted.
The late Rinpoche had made Gangtok his permanent residence after arriving in 1957 and established Chorten Monastery at Deorali, where he spent his later years and passed away in 2022. Monastery officials also described Chorten Monastery as the second seat of the Dodrupchen lineage, while the monastery in Tibet remains the principal seat.
The recognition comes more than four years after the passing of the previous Rinpoche, marking a significant continuation of the lineage. The development has been welcomed with devotion by followers in Sikkim and across the Himalayan Buddhist community, symbolizing the continuation of an important spiritual tradition.

## New Czech Senate resolution challenges China's interferences in Dalai Lama's succession

10 April 2026, ICT

The Senate of the Czech Republic last month adopted a resolution opposing Chinese interference in the succession of the Dalai Lama

and affirming the Tibetan people's right to choose their own spiritual leader.

The resolution, adopted on March 25 with 40 votes in favor and none opposed, clearly states that the People's Republic of China has no legitimate authority to select the successor to the 14th Dalai Lama, and calls on the Czech government to support the Tibetan people's free choice of the 15th Dalai Lama. It also expresses grave concern over China's recently adopted Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which the Senate described as an instrument "openly advocating assimilation" that restricts cultural, religious and linguistic freedoms, including for Tibetans.

Wangpo Tethong, Executive Director of ICT Europe, welcomed the adoption of the resolution, stating: "With this resolution, the Czech Senate has made clear that Czech support for Tibet remains steadfast. It sends a strong signal that the selection of the Dalai Lama's reincarnation is solely the prerogative of the Tibetan people, and that Beijing's unacceptable attempts to control it will face international scrutiny."

The adoption of this resolution reflects a collective effort, made possible through the sustained engagement of Tibet support groups like Czechs Support Tibet, as well as the Office of Tibet in Geneva and committed Czech parliamentarians.

With this move, the Czech Senate joins a growing list of governments and parliaments that have publicly affirmed Tibetan religious freedom and the right of Tibetans to determine their spiritual leadership, including in the United States, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and the European Union. In July 2025, UN independent human rights experts expressed their concern over the Chinese government's stated intention to appoint a person of their choice as the next Dalai Lama.

The resolution is the latest expression of the Czech people's longstanding solidarity with Tibet, illustrated by regular parliamentary delegations' visits to Dharamshala, India (the seat of the Central Tibetan Administration) and an historic meeting between Czech President Petr Pavel and His Holiness the Dalai Lama in India in July 2025. The recent re-establishment of the Czech parliamentary group for Tibet following elections further demonstrates sustained and broad-based political support for Tibet and a renewed commitment to stand firmly with the Tibetan people in their struggle for freedom and justice.

Read below the full resolution of the Czech Senate (also available here). Please note that this is an unofficial ICT translation of the draft version. The final version will be available on the Senate's website shortly.

The video recording of the debate on the resolution is available here (in Czech).

**Resolution of the Senate**

Delivered at the 22nd session held on March 25, 2026

On the selection of the new 15th Dalai Lama and the situation of minorities following the adoption of the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress in the People's Republic of China

The Senate

1. **recalls** the long-standing warm relations between the people of the Czech Republic and the people of Tibet, as well as the private meeting of the President of the Republic on 27 July 2025 in Leh, Ladakh and the meeting of the Czech parliamentary delegation in Dharamsala on 10 December 2025 with the Nobel Peace Prize winner the 14th Dalai Lama;
2. **recalls** that the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC) guarantees the rights of national minorities, including the right to use their own language and to develop their own culture, which also applies to the inhabitants of the Tibet Autonomous Region;
3. **considers** Buddhism and the spiritual traditions of Tibet as a unique expression of culture, which must be protected and developed, inter alia, in the spirit of the commitments voluntarily undertaken by the PRC as a Member State of UNESCO, in particular through its adherence to the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001) and the ratification of the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which establishes the principle of equal dignity and respect for all cultures (Article 2(3)), the obligation to create conditions for the cultural expressions of indigenous peoples (Article 7(1)(a)), and certain limits on the formulation of cultural policy by States Parties (Article 2(2)), since State sovereignty should not restrict or erase cultural diversity but rather protect and promote it;
4. **notes with concern** information that the People's Republic of China adopted, on 12 March 2026, a new Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which openly promotes assimilation and imposes restrictions on culture, religious freedom and education in minority languages, which was also criticised by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;
5. **expresses concern** regarding reports of long-term efforts by the People's Republic of China to influence the selection of the incoming 15th Dalai Lama and shares the concerns of the Central Tibetan Administration, the Tibetan Diaspora and the Tibetan Buddhist community about interference by the People's Republic of China in the Tibetan people's free choice of the 15th Dalai Lama;
6. **respects** the religious freedoms of the Tibetan people within their unique Buddhist

tradition, including the freedom to choose their religious leaders without interference from the People's Republic of China;

7. **supports** free discussion by the Central Tibetan Administration and the Tibetan people on the selection of the next spiritual leader, the 15th Dalai Lama, without pressure or interference from the People's Republic of China; and
8. **declares** that the People's Republic of China has no legitimate authority to appoint the successor to the 14th Dalai Lama and that the selection of the 15th Dalai Lama is the exclusive matter of the Tibetan people;
9. **recommends** that the Government of the Czech Republic support the free selection of the 15th Dalai Lama with regard for the religious freedom of the Tibetan people; and
10. **authorizes** the President of the Senate to forward this Resolution to the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.

Miloš Vystrčil, acting President of the Senate
Martin Krsek, acting Auditor of the Senate

## The 43rd Sakya Trizin, Kyabgon Gyana Vajra Rinpoche Meets with Australian Federal Minister for Finance, Inaugurates Temple of Peace

10 April 2026, CTA



*The 43rd Sakya Trizin, Kyabgon Gyana Vajra Rinpoche Meets with Australian Federal Minister for Finance, Inaugurates Temple of Peace*

The 43rd Sakya Trizin, Kyabgon Gyana Vajra Rinpoche, held a series of spiritual engagements in Melbourne, Australia, following his arrival on 6 March 2026.

At the request of Sakya Choekhor Lhunpo and the Tibetan Community of Victoria, Kyabgon Gyana Vajra Rinpoche bestowed the combined empowerment of the Three Wrathful Deities, granted a public audience, and gave teachings on the Phurpa (Vajrakilaya).

On 18 March, the Rinpoche visited the SIBA Retreat Centre of Lama Choedak Rinpoche, where he gave teachings, including the Hevajra initiation and other dharma teachings.

On 28 March, the Rinpoche graced the inauguration of the newly constructed Sakya Temple of Peace. Distinguished guests at the ceremony included the Australian Federal Minister for Finance, the Honourable Katy Gallagher; the Representative of the Office of Tibet in Canberra, Karma Singey; a senior archbishop of the region; and many other local dignitaries. It was also attended by Lama Choedak Rinpoche and many of his centre's patrons, as well as local Tibetan residents and other devotees, totalling around 300 turnouts.

Following the speeches by Kyabgon Gyana Vajra Rinpoche and Honourable Katy Gallagher during the gathering, Representative Karma Singey read the message from His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama for the occasion.

The event also featured the presentation of *thangka*s to the ten patrons and the formal inauguration of the temple. Vibrant cultural performances by the Canberra-based Tibetan and Bhutanese devotees.

On 30 March, Kyabgon Gyana Vajra Rinpoche bestowed a long life initiation on the general public and granted a special audience to the members of the ACT Tibetan Community and bestowed the Vajrakilaya Kago blessing and words of advice at the Sakya Temple of Peace in Canberra, the capital of Australia.

In the afternoon, the Rinpoche arrived in Milton, a town on the south coast of Australia, from Canberra. There, Rinpoche bestowed the Vajrakilya Kago blessing and audience to the members of the Tibetan community of Nowra. Later in the afternoon, Rinpoche gave a talk on Educating the Heart and Mind at Ulladulla High School. And in the evening, Rinpoche bestowed initiation of the Avaloketeshwara from the Tsimbu tradition and imparted the Refuge vow to a fortunate group of new Dharma entrants.

Lama Choedak Rinpoche, who oversaw the project of building Temple of Peace, emigrated to Australia in 1985. While pursuing higher academic studies, he simultaneously introduced Buddhism and taught meditation and related practices, establishing over ten dharma centres, including the Sakya Losal Chod Zong, and invited His Holiness the Dalai Lama; Kyabgon Sakya Gongma Rinpoche; as well as the 42nd and 43rd Sakya Trizin Rinpoches; and the late Sakya master Chogye Trichen Ngawang Khyenrab Thupten Lekshe Gyatso, thereby planting the seeds of liberation for many thousands of devoted followers. He has also taught Buddhist psychology and ethics in numerous Australian schools and rendered extensive community service, for which he has received many awards and recognition from both local and federal governments.

In 2017, the Australian government granted a plot of land in the national capital territory for the establishment of a Temple of Peace. Over the

years, a beautifully designed Tibetan-style temple complete with all interior and exterior sacred objects was constructed. A stupa of enlightenment in memory of the late Chogye Trichen Ngawang Khyenrab Thupten Lekshe Gyatso, standing 28 feet tall, was also completed. The 43rd Sakya Trizin, Kyabgon Gyana Vajra Rinpoche, performed a one-day consecration through the Hevajra ritual, and a three-day Khön tradition Vajrakilaya (Dorje Phurpa) practice was held in Australia for the very first time, dedicated to the flourishing of the teachings and the long life of the reverend lamas.
According to a report filed by Tibetan Parliamentarian Ven. Lopon Thubten Gyaltsen, this is also aligned with the celebration of the Year of Compassion.

## Documentary exposing China's ongoing colonisation of Tibet nominated for Emmy Award

09 April 2026, Phayul




The *FRONTLINE PBS* investigative documentary *Inside China: Battle for Tibet*, produced in collaboration with ITV, has been nominated for an Emmy Award in the *Outstanding Hard News Report: Long Form* category at the 47th News & Documentary Emmy Awards. The nomination is part of the 47th News & Documentary Emmy Awards, where the film is recognized alongside other major investigative works.
The documentary exposes truths about China's ongoing colonisation of Tibet, featuring undercover footage detailing mass state surveillance, the expansion of coercive boarding school systems, and the decades-long disappearance of the 11th Panchen Lama. It further delves into the politically sensitive issue of the succession of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
It also includes powerful testimonies from former political prisoner Namkyi who escaped to India in 2023 and shares her first-hand account of repression in Tibet, as well as experts like Dr. Gyal Lo, a Tibetan educational sociologist turned activist and leading expert on China's assimilation and education policies who exposes the widespread use of colonial-style boarding schools designed to indoctrinate and forcibly assimilate Tibetan children into Han Chinese culture.
The film has already received international recognition, having won the 2025 Foreign Press Association (FPA) Media Award in the Arts and Culture Story of the Year category. Director and producer Gesbeen Mohammad, a BAFTA- and Emmy-winning journalist, acknowledged the risks involved in producing the documentary, noting the immense challenges of filming in one of the world's most tightly controlled and surveilled regions, as well as the increasing reach of China's transnational repression.
"Deeply honoured that Battle for Tibet has received an Emmy nomination. Featuring rare footage from within the region, the documentary examines China's rule over Tibet. I am profoundly grateful to those who bravely shared their voices with us," Gesbeen wrote following the nomination announcement.
In a prior discussion with *FRONTLINE* editor-in-chief and executive producer Raney Aronson-Rath, Mohammad emphasised the urgency of documenting developments in Tibet. She described the region as "one of the world's most tightly guarded," adding that the project sought to examine mounting concerns over policies that threaten Tibetan religion, identity, and cultural survival.
Hardcash Productions, the company behind the documentary, described the film as a ground breaking exposé, "For the first time in nearly 20 years, documentary cameras go undercover inside Tibet to investigate China's growing control over its population. The film investigates the mystery of a missing boy, the 11th Panchen Lama, abducted by Beijing 30 years ago, whose role now holds the key to the Dalai Lama's successor and to Tibet's future. At stake is the unique culture of some seven million Tibetans as evidence grows that it faces being wiped away under Chinese rule. The film tells the definitive story of the Dalai Lama's succession and reveals the restrictions Tibetans face daily under Chinese President Xi Jinping's rule."

## ICT and global Tibetan community remember groundbreaking life of Dr. Schwarz-Schilling

08 April 2026, ICT

The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) has learned with great sadness that Professor Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling, former German Federal Minister and Parliamentarian, passed away on April 6, 2026, at the age of 95. Professor Dr. Schwarz-Schilling was known for his international mediation and conflict prevention work through his Schwarz-Schilling Foundation, and for his support of Tibetan-Chinese dialogue. From 2006 to 2007, he served as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, where he oversaw the civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

In 2013, His Holiness the Dalai Lama presented the prestigious Light of Truth Award of the ICT to Professor Dr. Schwarz-Schilling, in recognition of his outstanding contributions to the public understanding of Tibet and the fight for human rights and democratic freedoms for the Tibetan people.

ICT President Tencho Gyatso said, "Professor Christian Schwarz-Schilling was a steadfast friend and supporter of the Tibetan people. He generously shared his vast experience, his knowledge and insight to find a peaceful solution of the Tibet-China conflict. He will not be forgotten. His legacy will be deeply cherished."

## Tibetan activists launch 90-hour hunger strike outside UN HQ to spotlight Tibet

08 April 2026, Phayul




*Tibetan activists launch a 90-hour hunger strike protest outside the UN Headquarters in New York from April 6-10, 2026 (Photo/TYC NY&NJ)*

Tibetan activists from the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) chapters of New York and New Jersey have launched a 90-hour hunger strike protest in front of the United Nations Headquarters, aiming to draw urgent international attention to the deteriorating situation inside Tibet. The protest commenced on April 6 at 5 PM and is scheduled to continue until April 10 at 12 PM.

Speaking to Phayul, Lobsang Tsering, President of the TYC New York and New Jersey chapters, said the protest marks the 19th edition of the ongoing "10th Day Movement," a monthly campaign initiated by the 18th executive committee. Since assuming office in June 2024, the group has observed the campaign consistently on the 10th day of each month beginning in August 2024. "Since its inception, the movement has included a wide range of activities such as marches, relay runs, and demonstrations outside the Chinese Consulate, carried out regardless of weather conditions or varying levels of participation," he said.

Tsering expressed concern over what he described as limited engagement from the broader Tibetan community, noting that New York and New Jersey are home to at least 15,000 Tibetans. "Despite the significance of the campaign, participation levels remain modest. A small group of dedicated individuals continues the hunger strike, but wider community involvement has been limited," he stated. He emphasised the importance of collective responsibility, urging Tibetans worldwide to contribute in any capacity—through active participation, financial assistance, or expressions of solidarity.

The protest, he added, is intended to highlight the critical situation inside Tibet and to warn that continued inaction could weaken the Tibetan struggle for freedom and cultural survival. "The United Nations remains a key avenue for raising global awareness and pressing for accountability," he said.

Outlining the key demands of the protest, Tsering told Phayul that the current demonstration calls for the immediate and unconditional release of 11th Panchen Lama, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, who was detained at the age of six on May 17, 1995, and has remained disappeared for over three decades.

The activists further call for an end to policies they describe as harmful, including the establishment of colonial boarding schools aimed at erasing Tibetan language, culture, and religious identity. Environmental concerns also feature prominently, with demands to halt Chinese government projects, such as deforestation, mining, and dam construction, on the Tibetan Plateau, which activists say pose serious risks to regional and global ecological stability.

The protesters additionally urged China to refrain from interfering in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition of recognizing reincarnations, asserting that such authority rests solely with His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama and the Gaden Phodrang Trust. They also called for the repeal of the recently enacted "Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress," which they argue enforces assimilation policies targeting minority nationalities, particularly Tibetans.

Furthermore, the activists condemned all forms of transnational repression, including intimidation and coercion directed at Tibetan families both inside Tibet and in exile. The demonstrators will also appeal to the United Nations and the broader international community to extend stronger and sustained support for the Tibetan cause, urging governments to pressure China to engage in meaningful dialogue without preconditions to resolve the Tibet-China issue.

## Chinese censorship authorities forced the Victoria and Albert Museum in the UK to delete sensitive content from its exhibition catalogue

16 April 2026, VOT




The Victoria and Albert Museum (V&A) in the UK has been forced to remove several maps and images deemed sensitive by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) due to its commissioning of an exhibition catalogue to a Chinese printer. British media reports indicate that other museums that have commissioned Chinese printers to publish exhibition catalogues must also comply with CCP censorship by removing content related to sensitive topics such as Tibet and Taiwan.

Under pressure from the Chinese Communist Party, the Victoria and Albert Museum in the UK has removed maps and images deemed sensitive by the Chinese authorities from at least two recently published exhibition catalogues.

According to The Guardian, prominent British institutions such as the V&A Museum and the British Museum have long commissioned Chinese companies to print catalogs. As a result, both the printers and the museums are required to comply with Chinese censorship and remove content that is considered "sensitive," such as Buddhism, Taiwan, Tibet, Tiananmen Square, and the democracy movement.

The report points out that the exhibition, titled "Music is Black," was originally scheduled to open on Friday. The exhibition catalog used a map of British Empire trade routes from the 1930s, but the Chinese printer informed them that the map had been rejected by the State Press and Publication Administration of China because it showed Chinese border outlines that were not recognized by the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese government's standard map had to be used instead.

According to internal emails obtained by The Guardian, the V&A museum's production team was deeply perplexed. One employee wrote that it was a historical map depicting British colonial rule, with nothing to do with China—the mere fact that China appeared on the map seemed sufficient grounds for rejection.

The museum was also forced to remove a map and a photograph of Lenin from the 2021 catalog of its exhibition, "Fabergé: Romance to Revolution," because Chinese printers claimed that the Lenin-related content was considered "sensitive" by Chinese authorities.

To date, British and many other international museums have maintained an ambiguous stance on the Tibet issue, deliberately avoiding the topic and appeasing the Chinese Communist Party's position. For example, in 2024, the British Museum used the Chinese Communist Party term "Tibet Autonomous Region" in its "Silk Roads" exhibition section concerning Tibetan culture. In September of the same year, the Musée du Quai Branly and the Guimet Museum of Asian Art in France changed "Tibet" to "Xizang" in their respective catalogs and exhibitions, sparking protests from various sectors. Commentators believe that the CCP's influence has now openly infiltrated British soil, blatantly interfering in British domestic affairs.

## China's War On Truth Suffers A Setback As Stanford Secures Li Rui's Diaries

03 April 2026, TRC




*Mao Zedong aide Li Rui*

In a significant blow to Beijing's long standing efforts to control historical narratives a California court has ruled that Stanford University will retain the private diaries of Li Rui a former insider of the Chinese Communist Party who later became one of its most fearless critics.

This is not merely a legal victory for Stanford It is a decisive moment in the global struggle between authoritarian censorship and the preservation of truth.

**A Legacy the CCP Tried to Contain**

Li Rui was once part of the very system he would later challenge As a senior Party official and former aide to Mao Zedong he had rare access to the inner workings of power But unlike many of his contemporaries Li chose documentation over silence.

For over 80 years he recorded events decisions and personal observations creating an extraordinary archive of modern Chinese political history Crucially these writings did not align with the CCP's carefully curated version of events.

**Why Beijing Wanted Them Back**

At the heart of this dispute lies a simple question why would a state go to such lengths to reclaim the personal diaries of a deceased official.

The answer is equally simple control

The California court recognized that Li Rui feared his writings would be censored redacted or destroyed if they remained within China's reach His decision to have them transferred to Stanford's Hoover Institution was deliberate to ensure public access and safeguard historical truth.

Among the most sensitive entries are his firsthand accounts of the Tiananmen Square Massacre a subject still heavily suppressed in China Li documented the violence in detail describing troops opening fire on civilians and the brutal clearing of the square.

**A Pattern of Suppression**

This case fits into a broader and well documented pattern The Chinese Communist Party has consistently exercised tight control over information from censoring books and media to rewriting historical narratives that challenge its authority.

Li Rui himself experienced this firsthand His publications were banned his criticisms silenced and his voice marginalized within the country he once served.

The attempt to reclaim his diaries is not an isolated incident It is part of an ongoing effort to ensure that inconvenient truths never reach public scrutiny.

**Stanford Draws a Line**

By ruling in favor of Stanford the court has effectively rejected attempts to extend censorship beyond China's borders It also sends a clear message academic institutions cannot be compelled to surrender historical materials to political pressure.

The decision ensures that Li Rui's work will remain accessible to scholars researchers and future generations free from interference.

**The Bigger Picture**

This is about more than a set of documents It is about who owns history.

When governments decide which truths are acceptable history becomes a tool of power rather than a record of reality Li Rui understood this risk His final act was to place his life's work beyond that reach.

## Office of Tibet in London Vows to Strengthen and Promote Tibetan Language and Cultural Identity

01 April 2026, CTA

On 12 March 2026, China introduced a sweeping "Ethnic Unity and Progress" law. This legislation mandates the use of Mandarin as the primary language of instruction from preschool through high school for ethnic minority groups, including Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongolians. The law prioritises Mandarin in education, public life, and media, alongside a revised "Standard Language Law" that further strengthens state control and promotes the sinicisation of culture.

In particular, this policy enforces mandatory Mandarin education for children from ethnic minority backgrounds from before kindergarten through to the end of high school, replacing native language instruction in many core subjects. This development poses a significant challenge to the preservation of Tibetan language and culture.



*(File image) Representative Tsering Yangkyi Making an Inspection Visit to Sunday School for Tibetan Language and Culture in London on 1 December 2024.*

In response to this law and the need to protect and promote Tibetan heritage, the Parents Committee (2025–26) of the London School of Tibetan Language and Culture, under the guidance of the Representative Tsering Yangkyi, Office of Tibet, London, has launched a weekly inter-house reward initiative. The programme encourages students to speak Tibetan at school, and those who make a genuine effort to speak in Tibetan are awarded 5 points in the form of £5 prop money by adult members of the school.

Each morning, the parent's committee distributes this prop money to adults, who then reward students accordingly. Students submit their earnings to their house prefect, and weekly totals are calculated by the parent's committee. Winners are announced during the following Sunday's morning assembly.

To further support this initiative, students are given simple topics to prepare at home and discuss in Tibetan at school, such as "My School", "My Family", and "My Country Tibet". The initiative has been very well received, with students actively engaging and making sincere efforts to use Tibetan in their daily interactions at school.

Building on this success, and following further guidance from representative Tsering, the school will introduce additional measures from 1 July 2026 as follows:

1. In addition to rewards, a gentle corrective approach will be introduced when non-Tibetan languages are used, particularly by adults, to set a strong example.
2. Short video messages of His Holiness the Dalai Lama played during morning assembly will now be in Tibetan.
3. Gyalrab (Tibetan history) lessons, currently taught in English, will transition to being taught in Tibetan.

4. Parents are strongly encouraged to speak Tibetan at home and to gently insist on responses from their children in Tibetan.

With the introduction of these policies in Tibet, Tibetan language and culture face greater risk of systematic erosion. The office vows to strengthen individual efforts at home, at school, and within the Tibetan community to preserve and promote Tibetan language and cultural identity. Furthermore, the office believes, through collective commitment and action, Tibetan language and heritage continue to thrive for future generations.

# Domestic and CTA

## China-linked disinformation campaign fails to disrupt Tibetan elections: DFRLab

30 April 2026, Phayul



*Tibetan monks casts their votes at Tsuglakhang Temple during the final round of elections on April 26, 2026 (Phayul photo)*

A China-linked online disinformation campaign reportedly attempted to undermine the 2026 Tibetan general elections held across 27 countries but failed to gain traction, remaining largely ineffective, according to researchers at the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab).

In its findings, DFRLab identified the operation as part of "Spamouflage," a long-running influence network linked to Beijing. The campaign employed coordinated tactics across major social media platforms, including Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and Instagram. These efforts involved the use of fake accounts, AI-generated content, and synchronized messaging aimed at discrediting Tibetan leadership and undermining confidence in the democratic process.

Researchers uncovered 90 Facebook accounts and 13 Instagram profiles associated with the network. Among the dominant narratives promoted was a targeted attack on the re-election of the Central Tibetan Administration's President Penpa Tsering, portraying him as "corrupt and power-hungry." Another line of messaging sought to delegitimize the electoral process itself, framing it as manipulated while amplifying existing internal disputes.




*Compilation of various posts from the Spamouflage network on Facebook targeting the CTA elections (Photo/DFRLab)*

The campaign also attempted to portray the exile administration as disproportionately influenced by monastic figures and the Tibetan spiritual leader His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama. According to the report, the broader objective was to sow division within the Tibetan community, erode trust in the exile government, weaken its international credibility, and cast doubt on its ability to represent Tibetans independently.

Despite the scale of the effort, the campaign generated negligible organic engagement. Researchers noted that most of the identified accounts were low-visibility profiles rather than established pages, limiting their reach. Content amplification largely occurred within the network itself through repetitive sharing by inauthentic accounts.

The report situates this activity within a broader pattern of Spamouflage operations targeting Tibetan groups. In 2025, the same network circulated corruption allegations against the International Tibet Network, with several accounts traced back to earlier campaigns dating to 2022.

DFRLab further observed that the network frequently repurposes its assets to target multiple geopolitical contexts. Some accounts recently pivoted to content related to the Philippines, while similar campaigns have previously focused on the United States, Taiwan's 2024 elections, and Japanese domestic politics.

The final phase of the 2026 Tibetan parliamentary elections was held on April 26, with results expected to be declared on May 13. Around 91,000 exile Tibetans registered to vote from across 27 countries. Meanwhile, Chinese state

media and officials dismissed the elections as an “institutional illusion,” characterizing the process as a “separatist” activity.

## 'Xi Has Removed 110 Generals': Tibetan Leader Flags Beijing's "Power Struggle”

30 April 2026, NDTV

In an interview with NDTV, Tibetan government-in-exile President Penpa Tsering said Xi Jinping had removed "more than 110 military generals" since taking control of the Communist Party.

Tibetan government-in-exile President Penpa Tsering has claimed that China is facing signs of serious internal strain, pointing to sweeping purges inside the People's Liberation Army as evidence of a deeper power struggle under President Xi Jinping.

In an interview with NDTV, Tsering said Xi had removed "more than 110 military generals" since taking control of the Communist Party, officially in the name of anti-corruption. But, he argued, the campaign was also aimed at eliminating political opponents and reflected instability within the Chinese system.

"The military is the backbone of the Communist Party," Tsering said, adding that repeated purges in the armed forces pointed towards a "power struggle" and "symptoms of a bigger malaise" inside China's leadership structure.

His remarks come at a sensitive moment, as US President Donald Trump is expected to visit China amid efforts to reset trade ties with Beijing. Tsering said trade remains essential for the global economy but warned that China's words and actions often move in opposite directions. He said the world should judge Beijing "not by what they are saying, but by how they are doing things."

The Tibetan leader described China as an "autocratic capitalist" system operating under the "garb of communism," saying Beijing speaks of peace, dialogue and global governance abroad while tightening control at home. He linked China's regional military assertiveness to what he called its "hegemonic ambitions," beginning with the invasion of Tibet in 1950.

Tsering painted a grim picture of life inside Tibet, saying the region remains heavily restricted, with little access for diplomats, journalists or independent observers. He said China's recently passed "Ethnic Unity and Progress Law" was designed to erase distinct identities of Tibetans, Mongolians and Uyghurs under the language of national unity.

"Chinese always have a very nice name when they do bad things," he said, arguing that the law provides a legal framework to suppress cultural, religious and linguistic identity.

He compared the atmosphere in Tibet to East Germany under the Stasi, saying surveillance had penetrated families and communities. "Every family member is spying on another family member," he said, adding that people could not trust each other because anyone could be reported under anti-espionage laws.

Tsering also accused Beijing of undermining Tibetan Buddhism by reshaping religious education to serve Communist Party goals. He said the Tibetan language was being pushed out of schools, while monasteries and religious institutions were being forced to promote loyalty to the Chinese state.

A major part of the interview focused on the future of the Dalai Lama and China's likely attempt to interfere in his reincarnation. Tsering said it was "most likely" that Beijing would appoint its own Dalai Lama after the 14th Dalai Lama, even though the Communist government does not believe in religion.

"A government that does not believe in any religion... is ordering His Holiness not to be reborn outside China," he said, calling the position "absurd".

He rejected Beijing's claim that the reincarnation must be found within China and approved through the so-called Golden Urn process. Tsering called the Golden Urn narrative a "creation of a myth" by the Chinese government, arguing that several Dalai Lamas were recognised before the method was ever claimed as tradition.

He said the Tibetan side is preparing for this contest by building international support for the Dalai Lama's right and the Tibetan people's right to decide the reincarnation process without Chinese state interference.

Tsering said several countries had already spoken in support of religious freedom for Tibetans and that the Tibetan leadership-in-exile was reaching out to the wider Buddhist world, including Himalayan communities, Mongolia and Russian republics with Tibetan Buddhist traditions.

On the Dalai Lama's health, Tsering said His Holiness, now in his nineties, remains mentally sharp and continues to meet hundreds of people several days a week. He said the Dalai Lama had spent decades preparing Tibetans to take responsibility for their own cause through democratic institutions in exile.

"When His Holiness is alive, we have to try to find a solution," he said, adding that the Central Tibetan Administration is working to institutionalise ties with governments, including India, so that the Tibetan movement remains strong in the future.

On India, Tsering expressed deep gratitude, saying the Tibetan government-in-exile exists because of the government of India and the Indian people. He said Tibetans are culturally, religiously and linguistically closer to India than any other country because Tibetan script and Buddhism came from India.

While acknowledging India's national interests and strategic compulsions with China, Tsering said

Tibetans believe India will remain "on the right side of history."

## China-linked online disinformation campaign targetted the exile Tibetan election

28 April 2026, Tibetan Review

A China-linked online influence campaign attempted to undermine elections for the Tibetan parliament-in-exile for which polling was held over the weekend (Apr 26) in some 27 countries, but was largely ineffective, reported *therecord.media* Apr 27, citing researchers a the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab).

DFRLab has said the operation identified by it was part of Spamouflage, a long-running influence network linked to Beijing.

China's state media also targetted the exile Tibetan elections, with *globaltimes.cn* Apr 7 mocking as well as criticising them, citing contents of the kind posted in the Spamouflage fake accounts.




*Screenshots of Instagram posts from Spamouflage accounts. (Source: scotttravel0340and mtu102026)*




*Screenshots of a post with no engagement and hundreds of shares. Note that all the accounts are trying to promote the same hashtags. (Source: Aasdaw Tghag)*

Compilation of various posts from the Spamouflage network on Facebook targeting the




CTA elections. (Source: Dương Ngọc Mai, Rose Doris, Nancy Gibson, Omar Johnson, and Nguyễn Tố Uyên)

The DFRLab researchers have found that despite deploying increasingly sophisticated tactics, including AI-generated images, the campaign largely failed to gain traction.

The report said the DFRLab researchers identified 90 Facebook accounts and 13 Instagram profiles tied to the Spamouflage campaign. The accounts were stated to have pushed several narratives, most commonly personal attacks against the already re-elected Sikyong Mr Penpa Tsering by portraying him as corrupt and power-hungry.

Penpa Tsering won re-election as the Sikyong (executive head) of the Central Tibetan




*Screenshots of posts attacking the ITN. (Source: ธนัฏ ธมน จันทร์สูง and Nguyễn Tố Uyên)*

Administration by winning 61.03% of the votes in the preliminary poll held on Feb 21, thus avoiding a final poll which was therefore held only for the 45-member Tibetan Parliament in Exile on Apr 26.

Other posts were stated to have attempted to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the elections themselves, amplifying internal debates within the Tibetan diaspora and portraying the vote as manipulated.

Spamouflage accounts were stated to have amplified these narratives by repeatedly sharing posts across the network and inserting them into existing discussions within Tibetan Facebook groups. The accounts also reportedly attempted to broaden their reach by posting in multiple diaspora groups.

But the researchers have found that most posts received little or no authentic engagement — likely because the operation relied on ordinary-looking Facebook profiles with limited reach rather than established pages with more followers.

The activity was stated to continue a broader pattern of Spamouflage targeting Tibetan

organizations online. The report noted that in 2025, the network circulated accusations of corruption against the International Tibet Network, a global coalition of Tibet-related non-governmental organizations, with some of the same accounts having participated in earlier campaigns dating back to 2022.

The network was stated to frequently repurposes the same accounts to promote narratives targeting other countries. For example, researchers have found that some profiles recently shifted to content about the Philippines, while Spamouflage campaigns have also targeted the United States, Taiwan's 2024 elections and Japanese politics.

DFRLab is part of the Atlantic Council which promotes constructive leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the Atlantic Community's central role in meeting global challenges. DFRLab is a first of its kind organization with technical and policy expertise on disinformation, connective technologies, democracy, and the future of digital rights and it was incubated at the Atlantic Council in 2016.

## CTA's first 'Tibet Freedom Fighters' Conclave' in Dharamshala honours 89 veterans, adopts 28 resolutions

27 April 2026, Phayul



*First 'Tibetan Freedom Fighter's Conclave' from April 24 to 25 held at the Administrative Training and Welfare Society Centre in Dharamshala (Photo/tibet.net)*

The Department of Security of the exile Tibetan government, officially known as the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), convened its first-ever two-day "Tibet Freedom Fighters' Conclave" from April 24 to 25 in Dharamshala.

A total of 89 veterans attended the conclave, representing a wide spectrum of Tibet's resistance history. Participants included former political prisoners, veterans of an independent Tibet, members of the Chushi Gangdruk ("Four Rivers, Six Ranges"), former fighters of Lodrik (an organisation established in 1960 by Tibetan guerrilla fighters), ex-servicemen of the Special Frontier Force (SFF), also known as Establishment 22 ("Two Two"), former bodyguards of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and officials from the Department of Security.

The conclave concluded with a formal ceremony on Monday at the Main Tibetan Temple, where the CTA honoured all 89 participants with medallions as a national tribute to their lifelong service to the Tibetan cause, through both armed resistance and political resilience.



*Security Minister Gyari Dolma with medallion recipients at the Main Tibetan Temple on April 27, 2026 (Phayul photo)*

Addressing the ceremony, Security Minister Gyari Dolma stated that a total of 28 resolutions had been adopted during the conclave. She noted that participants unanimously expressed gratitude to individuals associated with the Gaden Phodrang, the private office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. According to a press statement issued by the Department of Security, discussions focused on ensuring the successful fulfilment of His Holiness's vision and aspirations. Deliberations drew upon historical experiences, the current geopolitical context, and the lived realities of Tibetan patriots, while also examining the strategic direction of the Department of Security.

Department of Security Secretary Karma Rinchen told Phayul that the resolutions encompassed a wide range of issues, some of which may be made public, while others may remain confidential. "If I were to summarize the essence of these points," he said, "the most important aspect of the resolution was how to effectively carry out and fulfill the vision and guidance of His Holiness the Dalai Lama."

He further highlighted that participants stressed the importance of recognising both the challenges and opportunities facing Tibetan society today, as well as identifying their sources. Several attendees emphasised the need for the Department of Security to enhance public awareness regarding potential threats, particularly pointing to efforts by the Chinese government to create divisions and influence public sentiment within the Tibetan community.

Following the ceremony, Phayul spoke with a few former veterans to learn about the suggestions they put forward during the two-day conclave. Phayul learned that among the most prominent recommendations was the call for the establishment of a dedicated Tibetan military force and a designated training camp, which they argued is vital for national security. Participants

also voiced concern over the declining number of Tibetans joining the SFF, attributing the trend to increasing migration to Western countries within the exile community.

Dawa, an SFF veteran and recipient of the prestigious Shaurya Chakra for gallantry, noted that under the current arrangement with the Indian government, Tibetans serving in the SFF receive stable salaries, without financial burden on the exile administration. He added that SFF personnel contribute significantly in taxes to the Tibetan administration and that recruitment into the force could help support families economically, potentially curbing migration and encouraging Tibetans to remain in refugee settlements in India.

The 91-year-old veteran said that if he were given the choice between sending his children abroad or into the army, he would undoubtedly choose the latter.

Responding to questions about the relevance of a military institution in the future—particularly in light of the exile government's policy of non-violence and its pursuit of a resolution within the framework of China, the 88-year-old veteran Kalden Choesang reflected that Tibet lost its land despite having an army, as it lacked sufficient strength, proper infrastructure, and institutional support, with families themselves bearing the burden of sustaining it.

## EC Finds Fraud, Punishes Nepal-Choejor Constituency — But Counts Tainted Votes

25 APRIL 2026, Tibet Express

Following grave and multiple violations in the preliminary phase of the 2025-2026 Tibetan General Election, the Election Commission(EC) has countermanded the final election in the Choejor (Boudha and Jorpati) constituency in Nepal, as a penalty for the misuse of ballot papers through a conspiracy that affects the overall integrity of the election.

The EC has communicated this desision in a directive it issued to the additional regional election officer-in-charge of the Choejor (Boudha and Jorpati) in Nepal on 23 April, after it found the practice of classic ballot stuffing, including a voter casting multiple ballots, or multiple ballots cast with the same handwriting- which the EC said it found practised 10, 20,40,70, or 100 times in such cases.

The EC has found forged or fabricated ballots, and ballots filled with the same handwriting or two different handwritings on a single ballot alongside a procedural violation- the failure to conclude the election on the mandated day. Additionally, invalid ballots were counted for by officials- whether from gross negligence or deliberate misconduct by counting officials- amounting to a rigging of the count.

The EC stated that in some areas, a single committee member independently handled both ballot distribution and collection during the preliminary. The EC also found that a US-registered voter had cast ballots across all three regional jurisdictions — India, Nepal, and Bhutan.

Despite its findings, the EC stated that its three rounds of inquiry produced the same denial response from the local officials, who claimed that no violations had occurred during the election in Choejor, and that the election had been conducted in full compliance.

The subsequent denial, the EC stated, followed justification from the local officials claiming that approximately 60% of the Choejor electorate are monks and nuns from the same monastery and disciples of the same lama, and therefore, it was possible their handwriting would look the same.

Despite local officials from Choejor being fully aware that an investigation was ongoing, the EC said in the directive that they repeatedly contacted the EC in a manner it described as applying pressure and obstruction to interfere with the investigation.

Though the EC acknowledges that elections in Nepla are conducted under exceptionally difficult political circumstances, following its thorough investigation conducted in accordance with Articles 51 and 68(2) of the Election Regulations, it found grave and multiple violations in the preliminary phase which has forced the EC conclude that a free, fair, and secret election could no longer be guaranteed in the Choejor constituency under these circumstances- forcing the EC to countermand the final election.

The EC said it launched the investigation into the conduct of the preliminary election in Nepal's Choejor constituency after receiving multiple formal complaints from Tibetan Parliament standing committee members who were present as observers during the preliminary ballot counting, as well asd written and verbal complaints from key figures, individuals, journalists and members of the public.

Though the EC took measures after its investigations, the ballots from the constituency had already been counted and included in the preliminary round. The incumbent *Sikyong* (President) of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), Penpa Tsering, secured a second consecutive term by winning the preliminary round with over 60% of the votes (61.025%), thereby clinching the seat outright without the need for a final round.

While the incumbent *Sikyong* — widely regarded as the frontrunner — would in all likelihood have secured his second term even in a final round, the question remains: why did the EC find malpractice, penalise the constituency, yet count the tainted votes?

Calls to the EC went unanswered and the EC has not yet addressed this question directly. Exiled Tibetans head to the polls tomorrow, 26 April, to

cast their votes in the final round for the members of the 18th Tibetan Parliament in Exile.

## As Tibetans vote for their 18th parliament in exile, a polling station in Nepal annulled for irregularities during prelim poll

26 April 2026, Tibetan Review

Just days ahead of the final poll for the election of the 18th Tibetan Parliament in Exile (TPiE), the Election Commission of the Central Tibetan Administration has communicated a finding of serious irregularities in the conduct of the preliminary poll back on Feb 1 by electoral officers in the Choejor settlement area of Nepal's capital Kathmandu.

According to the Tibetan media in Dharamshala, the finding was communicated on Apr 23 to the concerned settlement electoral officer, with the decision to annul for this time the settlement polling station as a venue for the final poll which is being held today. What this means is registered voters at this polling station will have to vote at some other polling station in Kathmandu or elsewhere.

The number of questionable preliminary votes cast in that polling station, which includes Boudha and Jorpati, apparently was was apparently not large enough to affect the final results, which means that Mr Penpa Tsering's re-election as the Sikyong after winning 61.03% of the total number of votes in the preliminary poll stands, as does the lists of the various provincial and religious constituency candidates.

The investigation was stated to have been carried out following complaints of irregularities filed by outgoing TPiE members, election observers, media personnel, and members of the public.

The serious violations of the Electoral Rules and Regulations seen to have taken place at this station were stated to include numerous individuals casting multiple votes that numbered as high as more than 100, direct copying of serial numbers and names and descriptions of would-be candidates in a large number of cases in same handwriting, same ballot papers containing different hand-writings, ballot papers being distributed to households and community groups and collected days later in plastic bags, and ballots Papers being counted despite lacking proper candidate identifications or containing inconsistent details.

A US-registered voter was stated to have voted as a voter for registrees in India, Nepal, and Bhutan, thus voting for provincial candidates rather than for his current residential constituency candidates.

The election Commission has accordingly determined that the polling in that station has not been conducted in a free, fair, and secret manner as required, potentially affecting the outcome.

The election commission has noted that the concerned electoral officer, who has not been named, has not only denied any wrong-doing or irregularity in the conduct of the preliminary poll, but also tried to interfere in the investigation.

## Tibetans-in-Exile mark 37th birthday of 11th Panchen Lama in Shimla, renew call for his release

25 April 20206, ANI



*Tibetans-in-exile observe the 11th Panchen Lama (Photo/ANI)*

Shimla (Himachal Pradesh) [India], April 25 (ANI): Tibetans-in-exile in Shimla on Saturday celebrated and observed the 37th birthday of the 11th Panchen Lama, Gendhun Choekyi Nyima, with prayers and offerings, expressing hope of celebrating his next birthday in his presence.

The observance was jointly organised by the Jonang Monastery, Shimla chapters of the Tibetan Women's Association and the Tibetan Youth Congress. Monks, along with members of the Tibetan community, gathered at the Dingu Hill prayer site near the monastery to offer prayers for his long life and immediate release.

Speaking with ANI, the Chief Representative of the Central Tibetan Administration, Lhakpa Tsering, said the day holds deep significance for Tibetans and the global Buddhist community.

He stated that the Panchen Lama, born on April 25, 1989, in Tibet, was recognised at a young age by the Dalai Lama as one of the highest spiritual figures in Tibetan Buddhism, second only to the Dalai Lama.

He recalled that the 10th Panchen Lama had endured hardships and had raised concerns about Tibetan rights through a detailed communication with Chinese authorities, for which he faced imprisonment.

Referring to the 11th Panchen Lama, Lhakpa said that at the age of six, he and his family were taken away by Chinese authorities, and since then, there has been no information about his whereabouts or well-being.

Tsering added that while Tibetans celebrate the birthday with devotion, there remains a deep

sense of concern and sadness due to the uncertainty surrounding his status.
He emphasised that the Panchen Lama recognised by the Dalai Lama continues to be accepted by Tibetan Buddhists worldwide, while the alternative appointed by China is not recognised by the community.
He further said that Tibetan communities across the world observe the day to promote their culture, language and traditions, and to keep alive the message associated with the Panchen Lama.
He also called upon the international community, including the United Nations and other global institutions, to send a delegation to Tibet to ascertain his condition and secure his release along with other political prisoners.
Tenzin Nangyal, a freedom activist, said the occasion is important not only for Tibetans but also for Buddhists worldwide. He noted that despite the passage of decades, the whereabouts of the Panchen Lama remain unknown. He said the community continues to celebrate his birthday symbolically and expressed hope that future celebrations would take place in his presence.
Tibetan Buddhist monks say that the cultural and spiritual importance of the Panchen Lama.
Acharya Kunga Choephel described the Panchen Lama as one of the two central spiritual pillars of Tibetan Buddhism, likening them to the sun and the moon.
He said prayers offered on the occasion are aimed at ensuring the continuity and preservation of Tibetan culture and religion, along with wishes for the long life of the Panchen Lama. He said that they are looking forward to meeting him someday. "This is the dream and wish of every Buddhist."
According to historical records, Gendhun Choekyi Nyima was born in Lhari village in the Nagchu region of the Tibetan Autonomous Region. In 1995, at the age of six, he was recognised as the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama by the Dalai Lama. However, China rejected the recognition and appointed its own Panchen Lama, Gyaincain Norbu.
Soon after the recognition, Chinese authorities allegedly took Gendhun Choekyi Nyima and his family into custody. Since then, his whereabouts have remained unknown, making him one of the world's longest-held political prisoners. Tibetan groups and human rights organisations have repeatedly called for transparency regarding his condition and for his immediate release.
The Tibetan community continues to urge the international community to press for his release. The peaceful observance in Shimla, while marked by prayers and reflection, also served as a quiet but firm expression of resistance against religious suppression and a reaffirmation of faith and identity. (ANI)

## China: Ensure Immediate Medical Care for Imprisoned Tibetan Political Prisoners

24 April 2026 TCHRD



*Gangkye Drupa Kyab in an undated photo*

The Chinese government should urgently ensure that imprisoned Tibetan political prisoners Gangkye Drupa Kyab and Tsering Dolma are provided with timely, adequate and appropriate medical care and treatment. They remain in detention under conditions that raise serious concerns about their physical well-being, particularly in light of reports indicating limited access to necessary healthcare services. Continued incarceration without proper medical attention places them at heightened risk of serious and potentially irreversible health deterioration. Gangkye Drupa Kyab, 47, is a Tibetan writer and teacher who was held at Mianyang Prison in Sichuan. In 2024, his family was permitted a visit; however, all subsequent requests have been denied, and his family has received no official information regarding his condition or current whereabouts. Sources have informed TCHRD that he is in critical health as a result of torture endured in prison. He is reportedly suffering from cardiac and renal complications, as well as vision loss and amnesia.
He was arbitrarily detained and arrested on 23 March 2021 by the Serta County Police and was sentenced to 14 years in prison in 2022 on politically motivated charges of "inciting separatism" and "endangering national security". He had earlier been detained twice in 2012 and 2016. Following his detention on 15 February 2012, he was subjected to enforced disappearance until his sentencing on 1 August 2013, when the Nyagchu People's Court handed him a prison term of five and a half years. The charges stemmed from allegations that he was a member of an underground group known as "Margol Tsogpa" (Anti-Communist Association) in Nyagchu (Ch: Yajiang) County, Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. After completing his sentence, he was released on 16 September 2016. However, he was detained again the same day for holding a portrait of His Holiness the Dalai Lama above his head

during a public banquet organized to mark his release.



*Tsering Dolma in an undated photo*

Tsering Dolma, mother of two, from Serthar County is also reported to be in a critical condition, suffering from a fractured hip, worsening memory loss, and severe cardiac issues as a result of repeated abuse by Serthar County police authorities. Given her history of torture and long term health complications, the aggravation of abuse raises urgent concerns about the irreversible impact on her health.

She was arbitrarily detained on 2 April 2021 and sentenced to 8 years in prison in 2022. Following her initial detention in 2008 along with her father for partaking in the 2008 Tibet uprising, she was subsequently arrested multiple times between 2008 and 2012. During her detention, she was subjected to prolonged beatings and torture for "disobedient behavior", resulting in a broken leg and lasting health complications, including amnesia and heart disease. After her release, she remained under strict surveillance, with her movements closely monitored and frequent summons issued by the local police. China has a longstanding pattern in which Tibetans have died in custody as a result of severe torture, ill-treatment, and the denial of adequate medical care as evidenced by multiple documented cases. In May 2020, former political prisoner Choekyi died after authorities repeatedly denied him access to medical treatment for serious health complications from torture endured during his four-year imprisonment. Despite suffering from extensive organ damage, he was not permitted to seek hospital care. Similarly, Lhamo, mother of three, died in police custody in August 2020 after being subjected to severe beatings following her detention for sending money to family members in India. Her death highlights the acute risks faced by Tibetan detainees, particularly in environments where protection from abuse and access to medical care are systematically denied.

As a state party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, China is legally obligated to prevent acts of torture and ill-treatment, conduct prompt and impartial investigations into credible allegations of abuse, and ensure effective remedies where violations occur. The reported denial and obstruction of medical treatment for Drupa Kyab and Tsering Dolma constitutes a flagrant violation of these obligations.

"We are deeply concerned about the condition of Tibetan political prisoners, Gangkye Drupa Kyab and Tsering Dolma, and call on the international community to intensify pressure on the Chinese government to secure their immediate and unconditional release," said Dawa Tashi, researcher at the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy.

## TYC concludes 25-day 'Black Hat March' in Delhi, submits appeals to UN and PMO

24 April 2026, Phayul




*TYC activists after they reach Delhi's Majnukatilla on April 23, 2026 (Photo/TYC)*

The Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), one of the largest pro-independence organizations in exile, concluded its 25-day "Black Hat March" in New Delhi on Friday, culminating in a final protest action at Jantar Mantar. The march, which covered more than 570 kilometres across four Indian states, was launched to oppose China's recently adopted law, ostensibly "Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress," set to come into effect on July 1.

A group of 65 activists representing 20 Tibetan regions across India arrived in the national capital on Wednesday after nearly a month of marching, demonstrations, and public outreach. The march began on March 31 from Lhagyal Ri in Dharamshala and was initially scheduled to conclude on April 25, coinciding with the 37th birthday of the 11th Panchen Lama.

However, due to a change in circumstances—particularly as April 25 falls on a Saturday when key offices in Delhi such as the United Nations and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) remain closed—the organizers advanced their concluding protest and submissions.

Speaking to Phayul, TYC Vice President Tashi Targyal said the group successfully submitted appeal letters to both the United Nations office and the PMO. "In these submissions, we clearly outlined the four main objectives of the Tibetan Youth Congress's Black Hat March," he stated.



*Photo/Tibetan Youth Congress*

He noted that the delegation received a positive and encouraging response. "Representatives from the United Nations office came out to meet us and accepted our appeal. They assured us that they are paying attention to the situation inside Tibet, particularly regarding the imposition of laws that unjustly target Tibetans, which we do not accept. They stated that they will continue to monitor the situation and do what they can," he said.

He further added that representatives from the PMO acknowledged ongoing attention to the Tibetan issue. "They emphasized concerns, including the current laws affecting Tibet, environmental issues in Tibet, and the condition of Tibetan political prisoners. They also expressed appreciation for the peaceful efforts and thanked both the Indian government and the public," he said. According to him, officials also commended the activists' dedication to carrying out the campaign despite harsh weather conditions and encouraged the continuation of such initiatives.

Reflecting on the broader impact of the march, Tashi Targyal said the campaign succeeded in raising awareness across the four states it traversed. "This gives us a sense of encouragement and fulfillment. That said, this is just one phase of our movement. The ultimate goal is to establish truth and justice inside Tibet. Until that truth prevails, we must continue our efforts and activism," he remarked.

Addressing the challenges faced during the journey, he acknowledged that difficulties are inevitable in such prolonged campaigns. "From the very beginning, we were mentally prepared. The main motivation behind this movement has been to keep in our hearts the suffering and hardships faced by Tibetans inside Tibet—people who live without freedom and continue to endure immense difficulties," he said.

While no major obstacles arose, participants endured several minor hardships, including physical strain such as pain and swelling in their legs, as well as extreme weather conditions ranging from intense heat to cold. Despite these challenges, Tashi Targyal expressed gratitude to all participants and supporters for maintaining a strong sense of purpose and commitment throughout the march.

"At this stage, it is difficult to say that we have achieved complete success. However, considering the entire course of this campaign, we feel that it has yielded meaningful and encouraging results," he said, adding, "This sense of achievement is shared by everyone who took part in and contributed to the movement."

## Sikyong Penpa Tsering Inaugurates Thangthong House, Addresses Infrastructure Challenges and Cultural Preservation at TIPA

17 April 2026, CTA



*Sikyong Penpa Tsering inaugurated the newly constructed 'Thangthong House' (student hostel and staff residential quarters) at the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts (TIPA) on 17 April 2026.*

The inauguration programme was attended by Secretary Dhondul Dorjee of the Department of Religion and Culture, Joint Secretary Tenzin Kunsang from the Department of Home (incumbent Secretary), and Secretary Tsering Dhondup Gyangser of the Department of Finance. Other dignitaries present included Sonam Sichoe, President of the Tibetan Children's Villages (TCV), former Director of TIPA Shusur Sonam Chomphel, and former Secretary of the Department of Home Tsewang Dolma.

A delegation from German Aid to Tibetans (GAT), led by former President Heide Meyer, also attended the programme, accompanied by Dr Franziska Schlarmann and Anna Wiencek, new members of the organisation.

They were received with traditional Tibetan ceremonial welcomes upon arrival. Monks from Gyuto Tantric Monastery conducted prayers and consecration rituals, following which the Sikyong formally inaugurated and inspected the Thangthong House facilities and residential units.

The project team included architect Matthias Daxi from Germany, along with architects Shraddha and Rita from Mumbai, structural engineer Manjeet Singh, and contractor Mohinder Singh.

The inauguration programme began with a welcome address by TIPA Director Dhondup Tsering, who presented a brief report on the background and completion of the project.

In his address, he noted that the existing student and staff residential quarters, originally

constructed in 1970, had exceeded their functional lifespan after more than five decades of continuous use. He highlighted that significant structural deterioration, particularly roof leakage and seepage during the monsoon season, had resulted in unsafe and inconvenient living conditions for both students and staff.

He further explained that due to financial constraints, full funding from the Central Tibetan Administration was not feasible; however, it was agreed that partial support would be provided. Consequently, over 50 percent of the total project cost was covered by the Central Tibetan Administration, while the remaining funds were generously contributed by German Aid to Tibetans.

He extended his sincere gratitude to all supporters for their generous financial and institutional contributions, which made the successful completion of the project possible.

Following this, former GAT President Heide Meyer delivered congratulatory remarks, sharing that she had been associated with the project from its initial stages and was familiar with the architectural plans from the beginning. She noted that she had personally contributed by donating a water heater and tea cups, and emphasised the importance of proper maintenance to ensure the building's long-term sustainability.

She further expressed her sincere gratitude to all those who contributed, both directly and indirectly, to the successful completion of the construction project.

Addressing the gathering, Sikyong Penpa Tsering highlighted the longstanding support extended by German Aid to Tibetans, particularly in the area of infrastructure development, which he noted remains one of the most challenging sectors to secure funding for.

Sikyong also expressed appreciation to German architect Matthias Daxi for his technical expertise and guidance in the design, along with other engineers and collaborators involved in the project.

He also mentioned that currently, enrolment at TIPA is declining, and that if TIPA can maintain high standards in training and all aspects of education, graduates can lead complete lives and shoulder the great responsibility of preserving Tibetan culture. He noted that the current administration is working to create as many opportunities as possible for TIPA students and other aspiring artists. Sikyong shared that in the future, the Board of Directors will convene to finalise the institute's constitution and regulations.

Sikyong further highlighted the importance of providing safe and adequate residential facilities for students and staff, noting that "a conducive living environment plays a vital role in supporting artistic learning and personal development at TIPA."

Concluding his remarks, Sikyong Penpa Tsering acknowledged the contributions of engineers and long-time associates, including those involved in the construction of the building of Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile, reaffirming that "collective effort remains essential in advancing community development."

The programme concluded with Sonam Chophel, Secretary of TIPA, expressing sincere gratitude to all supporters, noting that the development strengthens infrastructure, improves living standards, and supports the preservation of TIPA's cultural legacy.

## Public Service Commission Organises Workshop on Policy Dissemination to Senior Civil Servants of Central Tibetan Administration

17 April 2026, CTA



*Public Service Commission Organises Workshop on Policy Dissemination to Senior Civil Servants of Central Tibetan Administration*

The Public Service Commission (PSC) of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) inaugurated a one-day training-cum-workshop on policy dissemination this morning for secretaries and training nodal officials of the respective CTA offices at Norbu House in Dharamshala, aimed at strengthening institutional capacity and standardising training practices across departments.

The opening session was attended by Chairman of the Public Service Commission Karma Yeshi, along with training instructor Vivek Sharma, a PSC consultant with over 25 years of experience in capacity building, training system design, and institutional development. The workshop seeks to promote systematic skill development and continuous professional growth among CTA staff, while building a cohesive training ecosystem that integrates people, technology, culture, and strategy.

The training also focuses on familiarising officials with key provisions of the newly introduced CTA staff Training Policy, which came into effect on 24 February 2025 and is set for full implementation by 22 April 2026. Applicable to all CTA employees under relevant Charter provisions and

PSC rules, the policy provides a structured framework for planning, implementing, and monitoring training programmes. It consists of six chapters and around 100 provisions, developed in consultation with the Kashag, CTA departments, and autonomous bodies.

In his address, Karma Yeshi, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission underscored the importance of grounding administrative work in the Tibetan Charter, urging all staff to study key sections, particularly Chapter Ill and related clauses on governance and welfare. He highlighted that these principles emphasise resolving the Tibetan issue, promoting social justice and equality, safeguarding the environment, and ensuring the welfare of Tibetans in exile. The Chairman noted that the new training policy aligns closely with these Charter values and will enhance the efficiency and potential of CTA officials.

He further pointed out that while trainings have been conducted in the past, the absence of a formal policy limited their impact. The new framework aims to address this gap by standardising training approaches, ensuring that all staff undergo at least three trainings during their service, and improving competencies in administration, technology, language, and cultural preservation. He also stressed that the policy remains flexible, allowing for future amendments based on feedback and evolving needs.

The workshop is designed to equip departmental secretaries and nodal officers, who will play a key role in executing the policy with a clear understanding of different types of training. Departments will later develop their own training modules within this unified framework.

PSC Secretary Tenzin Legdup briefly explained that the initiative distinguishes between general and job-specific training, with each department responsible for organising programmes through designated training officers. The overarching goal, he said, is to establish a consistent and effective training system across the CTA.

The one-day workshop serves as an initial policy dissemination stage which includes policy understanding, training systems and its implementations and monitoring.

The workshop-cum-training is supported by US state department, the Tibet Fund, and SARD, reflecting a collaborative effort to strengthen institutional development within the Tibetan administration.

## Exhibition Titled "Democracy: A Gift of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to the Tibetan People" Held at Tibetan Children's Village School

16 April 2026, CTA

As part of the Year of Compassion celebrations commemorating the 90th birth anniversary of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile organised a three-day exhibition titled "Democracy: A Gift of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to the Tibetan People" at the Upper Tibetan Children's Village (TCV) in Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh.

The exhibition officially commenced at 9:30 AM on 13 April, with the opening attended by TCV's Administration General Secretary Mingchung, Director Tsultrim Dorjee, Principal Tenzin Choekyi, Headmaster Dorjee, Headmaster Dhondup Gyalpo, and students. Throughout the event, staff members from the Parliamentary Secretariat took turns providing informative briefings, offering students from classes third to twelfth guided introductions to the exhibition in a



systematic rotation.

More than 750 students from Upper TCV visited the exhibition. The event effectively enhanced awareness of the lifelong contributions of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, particularly highlighting



the development and evolution of Tibetan democracy.

As part of the year-long Year of Compassion initiative, the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile has successfully organized eleven exhibitions at prominent institutions and locations, including the Main Temple of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Tsuglagkhang, Dharamshala), Sambhota Tibetan School (Shimla), Gaiety Theatre Art Gallery

(Shimla), Himachal Pradesh University (Shimla), Jawaharlal Nehru University (Delhi), St. Stephen's College (Delhi), Tibetan Youth Hostel (Delhi), Panjab University (Chandigarh), Lovely Professional University (Punjab), Government College (Dharamshala), and the College for Higher Tibetan Studies (Dharamshala).
The organising team from the Tibetan Parliamentary Secretariat included staff members Tenzin Paljor, Rinchen, Lobsang Tsomo, and Ashe Bomo.

## Dalai Lama's presence gives state global identity: Himachal Governor Kavinder Gupta

14 April 2026, Tribune India



*Himachal CM Sukhvinder Singh Sukhu with Governor Kavinder Gupta.*

Governor Kavinder Gupta on Monday said the presence of Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala had given Himachal a distinct identity on the global stage.Dalai Lama's presence gives state global identity: Himachal Governor Kavinder Gupta
The Governor made the remarks when a Tibetan delegation led by Lhakpa Tsering, Chief Representative of the Central Tibetan Administration in Shimla, called on him at Lok Bhavan. "The life of the Dalai Lama is a living example of compassion, non-violence, peace and universal human welfare. His teachings continue to inspire not only the Tibetan community but humanity at large," Gupta said.
He noted that Himachal had always shared a deep and harmonious relationship with the Tibetan community and lauded its significant contribution to the social, cultural and economic development of the state. On the occasion, Lhakpa Tsering honoured the Governor. Senior officers of Lok Bhavan were also present.
On the occasion, Lhakpa Tsering honoured the Governor. Senior officers of Lok Bhavan were also present.

## The Dalai Lama met with former Indian Vice President Jagdeep Dankar.

14 April 2026, VOT



His Holiness the Dalai Lama received former Indian Vice President Jagdeep Dankar in Dharamshala today. His Holiness told Dankar that India is a free country where different religions can live in harmony, and that he felt immense joy in living in such a free nation. Dankar expressed his great fortune in being able to bring his family to meet His Holiness in person, calling it a truly unforgettable moment.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the supreme leader of the Tibetan people, received former Indian Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar in Dharamshala, northern India, on April 14. The Dalai Lama's office released a video of the meeting.
During his meeting with Dankar, His Holiness the Dalai Lama praised India's freedom of religion. He pointed out that India is a country with freedom of religion, and it is very rare that different religions can coexist harmoniously on this land.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama also pointed out that India is a free country, and he felt immense joy to be able to live in such a free country.
Dankal told His Holiness that he felt very fortunate to be able to bring his family to meet His Holiness up close today, and that it was a truly unforgettable moment and memory to sit and talk with one of the wisest, most compassionate and greatest people in the world.
Besides Dankar and his family, His Holiness the Dalai Lama also met with more than 700 followers and visitors over the past two days, including the Tibetan Buddhist high lama Aja Rinpoche.
In an interview with Voice of Tibet, Aja Rinpoche stated that His Holiness the Dalai Lama emphasized the importance of cultivating Bodhicitta and the correct view of emptiness when giving him teachings. He also mentioned that he presented His Holiness with two autobiographies, documenting his experiences in Tibet, his exile, and historical accounts related to the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama.

A follower told our station that His Holiness taught him the "Three Principal Aspects of the Path" and instructed him to deeply contemplate the "Dharma of Dependent Origination." He also said that he came to pay his respects to His Holiness on the occasion of His Holiness's 90th birthday and the "Year of Compassion," praying that His Holiness would live a long life and return to Tibet soon.

## Secretary Dhondul Dorjee Attends Enthronement Ceremony of Geshe Lharampa Thupten Tsephel as New Abbot of Geden Choeling Nunnery

13 April 2026, CTA



Secretary Dhondul Dorjee of the Department of Religion and Culture (CTA) attended the enthronement ceremony of Tehor Geshe Lharampa Thupten Tsephel as the new abbot of Geden Choeling Nunnery on 8 April 2026.

Geshe Lharampa Thupten Tsephel was born in 1968 into the Dovar Tsang family in Dovar Village, which falls under the jurisdiction of Lha Monastery, a branch monastery of the Tashi Yangkhyil Monastery in Dragyab, Kham. He is the son of Gyal Gyal and Tsedon.

At the age of 14, he became a novice monk under his teacher, and at 16, he received full ordination, taking the monastic name Choechok Tsultrim. He joined Lhomlha Monastery and, from the age of 10 to 18, relied on his spiritual teacher, Lamrim Lama Loten. During this period, he received repeated initiations (*Wang*), scriptural transmissions (*Lung*), and oral instructions (*Men-ngag*), including teachings on the "Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment" (*Lamrim Chenmo*) from the renowned Tantric master Jamyang Tashi.

In 1989, he enrolled at Gaden Jampa Ling Monastery in Chamdo, where he studied for about four years under several eminent teachers. These included the Abbot of the Monastery, Jampa Chodrak Palzangpo; the learned master Muge Samten, Geshe Doga and other respected teachers such as Venerable Sherab, Jampa Yonten, Jampa Kalden, Gyaltsen Rabten, and Nyakden. Under their guidance, he completed the introductory curriculums of dialectical disputation and other Tibetan Buddhist monastic education. He also received numerous empowerments, oral transmissions, and instructions.

In 1991, at the age of 23, he received full monastic vows from Kyabje Jetsun Jampa Choedak. Two years later, in 1993, he came to India and joined Sera Monastery, where he studied under the guidance of distinguished spiritual masters, including His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Kyabje Choden Rinpoche, Venerable Orgyen Tseten, former abbots Lobsang Thupten and Lobsang Palden, Venerable Trinley Dorje, Teacher Lobsang Tsering, and Venerable elder Lozang Drime.

From 2008, over a period of about 17 years, he pursued advanced studies based on the monastic college curriculum, focusing on the five great treatises. In 2009, he joined Gelugpa University, where he undertook six years of advanced Buddhist philosophical studies until 2014. During this time, he completed two-year Karampa, Lopon, and Lharampa degrees. On 1 December 2014, he successfully completed his Geshe examination.

On 5 March 2015, he passed the rigorous final examinations held during the Monlam Chenmo at Drepung Monastery. Later, on 25 March 2015, he joined Gyuto Tantric Monastery. There, while pursuing regular studies of tantric, he further studied other interpretations of Vajrayana texts from Khen Rinpoche Jado Chokdrul Rinpoche and Geshe Khedup Norsang.

In 2017, in accordance with the guidance of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, he served as a Philosophical teacher at the Bandra Norgyeling Tibetan Settlement for one year, during which he delivered 38 introductory teachings on Buddhism for the public and carried out various religious responsibilities. From 2018 to 2021, he served as the monastery's librarian for three years. He is currently serving as the abbot of Geden Choeling Nunnery.

## TIPA Admits 12 Students from Arunachal's Menchukha in Landmark Cultural Initiative

13 April 2026, CTA

The Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts (TIPA) on Saturday formally inducted 12 students from Menchukha in Arunachal Pradesh under a special initiative aimed at preserving and promoting Himalayan cultural heritage.

The induction ceremony was held at 10:00 AM in the institute's main hall, in the presence of dignitaries, faculty members, students, and a delegation from Menchukha, including family members of the newly admitted students.

The initiative stems from a cultural exchange visit in February 2025, when a TIPA delegation





participated in Losar celebrations in Menchukha and staged traditional Tibetan performances at the invitation of the local cultural association. The visit highlighted the deep-rooted linguistic, religious, and cultural ties between the Memba community and Tibetan traditions, while also drawing attention to concerns over the gradual decline of these traditions amid generational change.

Following appeals from local leaders and community representatives, TIPA approved the admission of 12 students-six boys and six girls-after detailed deliberations during its 50th executive meeting. The selected students have been offered free education, subject to a minimum six-year commitment to training at the institute.

The ceremony was graced by the Secretary of the Department of Religion and Culture, Dhondul Dorjee, as chief guest. Representatives from the Menchukha cultural association, including General Secretary Sangey Sona and Deputy Chairman Cheeden Goiba, were also in attendance.

Proceedings began with traditional ceremonial offerings, including the presentation of Khataks (ceremonial scarves) and the lighting of butter lamps before a portrait of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, followed by formal addresses.

In his welcome remarks, the Director of TIPA underscored the significance of the initiative and urged students and their families to remain committed to the full duration of the training program. He also emphasized discipline and adherence to institutional guidelines as key to their success.

Representatives from Menchukha expressed their appreciation to TIPA for extending the opportunity and briefly outlined the process that led to the collaboration.

In his address, chief guest Secretary Dhondul Dorjee stressed the importance of safeguarding Tibetan religion, culture, and language, and highlighted the role of the Department of Religion and Culture in supporting such preservation efforts. The program concluded with a vote of thanks by Tenzin Phuntsok, artistic director, followed by the presentation of ceremonial scarves and mementos to the guests and teaching staff.

Officials described the admission of Memba students as a historic, marking a significant step in its institutional history. The initiative is expected to not only support cultural preservation but also strengthen ties between Tibetan and Arunachal Pradesh communities.

An appreciation letter from Shri Pasang Dorjee Sona, Hon'ble Minister for Education, Parliamentary Affairs, Rural Works, Tourism, and Public Libraries, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, further commended the effort, describing it as a meaningful step toward fostering mutual understanding and cooperation.

## TCHRD hosts debate for parliamentary candidates ahead of final elections phase

11 April 2026, Phayul

Rights and advocacy group Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy on Friday, ahead of the final phase of the Tibetan general election, organised a debate series titled *'Democratic Dialogue'* in Dharamshala at Norbu House. The event brought together nine candidates contesting for seats in the upcoming 18th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile elections, scheduled for April 26. The debate was structured into two sessions, with five candidates participating in the morning session and the remaining four engaging in the afternoon session.

The debate covered a wide range of key issues, including the candidates' individual capabilities, their approaches to fulfilling parliamentary responsibilities, and strategies to strengthen democratic institutions. Participants also addressed the role of youth and the younger generation in advancing the Tibetan cause, fostering unity within the Tibetan community, and measures to counter transnational repression.

Phayul raised a question in reference to a resolution adopted during the recent budget session of the 17th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile, which condemned China's law on "Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress." The resolution had prompted concerns among some members of parliament that the legislation could further erode prospects for genuine autonomy.

In this context, the candidates were asked whether the Central Tibetan Administration should continue to uphold the Middle Way Policy. They were further invited to explain the reasons for supporting its continuation, or alternatively, to state whether they would seek to introduce a

resolution in the House to amend the CTA's official position, if elected, in order to advance the Tibetan cause in light of the current political realities in Tibet.

Responding to the question, Lhatse Dawa Tsering stated that differing views currently exist on whether the Middle Way Policy can effectively resolve the Tibetan issue. He emphasised that any meaningful resolution must ultimately involve engagement with China, noting that there are broadly only two possible approaches—conflict or dialogue.

He dismissed the possibility of armed conflict as neither viable nor practical when advocating for full independence, citing the vast disparity in strength and resources, which would render such an approach both unrealistic and harmful. While acknowledging that there may be limited immediate hope for progress under the current Chinese leadership, he drew attention to his own professional experience over the past decade. Through sustained engagement with Chinese citizens, he observed that a significant majority—around 70 percent of approximately 300,000 individuals reached—expressed support for the Middle Way Policy. Based on these interactions, he argued that it would be incorrect to assume a lack of hope or confidence in the policy.

He further asserted that the Middle Way approach is not only beneficial for resolving the Tibetan issue but could also offer advantages to China, including fostering internal unity, promoting spiritual and ethical values such as Buddhism, enhancing domestic stability, and improving China's international standing. On the question of whether the Middle Way Policy requires revision, he maintained that any call for change must be accompanied by a clearly defined and more effective alternative. In the absence of such a viable option, he sees no compelling reason to alter the current policy.

Fellow MP contender Lharong addressed the issue in the context of China's recently introduced law on "Promoting Ethnic Unity." He stated that, rather than diminishing confidence, the law has reinforced his belief in the Middle Way Policy by highlighting its continued relevance.

He noted that while the law reflects China's stated aim of building a unified nation, its implementation is fundamentally flawed, as it imposes uniformity at the expense of ethnic diversity. From the Tibetan perspective, he warned, the new law poses a serious threat to religion, culture, and language, with its enforcement indicating an attempt to erode these foundations at their core. This, he said, has heightened concerns about the increasingly precarious state of Tibetan identity.

Lharong emphasised that the Middle Way Policy, grounded in the framework of the Chinese constitution, seeks genuine autonomy that would safeguard Tibetan religion, culture, and language. He argued that alternative approaches do not currently offer stronger guarantees for protecting these essential aspects of Tibetan identity, and therefore saw no justification for a major policy shift at this time.

Other candidates stated that the Middle Way Policy provides an effective framework for safeguarding the core aspects of Tibetan identity. They further expressed the view that, at present, they do not see any alternative approach that could offer stronger or more reliable guarantees than the Middle Way Policy.

MP contender Sonam Tobgyal, responding to a question from an attendee during the second debate session on how to bring China back to the negotiating table with Tibetan representatives despite prolonged stalled dialogue and an evident power imbalance, said that it is also important to consider the question of full independence. Addressing the question of independence, he stated that while it remains a legitimate aspiration, historical experience shows that such struggles are often shaped by broader geopolitical conditions.

Smaller nations, he noted, have typically achieved independence when larger powers weakened or when favourable international circumstances emerged. Citing the example of India's independence, he observed that several neighbouring countries also gained independence during the same period, largely due to the decline of British power—illustrating a broader pattern in political history.

He concluded by emphasising that political struggles are deeply tied to real-world conditions and societal dynamics. While the desire for freedom and independence is universal, achieving it requires not only aspiration but also the right conditions and opportunities.

## EC invalidates Nepal's Choejor Tibetan settlement polls over "serious violations"

11 April 2026, Phayul




Days ahead of final elections of the Tibetan parliament in exile, the Central Tibetan Administration's Election Commission, in an official communication dated April 23, stated that it has found "serious violations" in the conduct of preliminary polls of the Choejor Tibetan Settlement in Nepal, including areas such as

Boudha and Jorpati, and has withdrawn the final election for the Choejor polling station.

According to the statement, the Commission received multiple complaints from parliamentarians, election observers, media personnel, and members of the public alleging that the elections were not conducted according to established Electoral Rules and Regulations. Due to logistical constraints, the Commission remotely reviewed ballot papers, official documents, and testimonies from local authorities, which revealed widespread procedural irregularities.

Among the most serious findings, individual voters cast multiple ballots, with some reportedly filling out 10, 20, 40, 70, or even up to 100 ballot papers. A large number of ballots also appeared to be written in the same handwriting, raising concerns of manipulation. Investigators further found that ballots had been distributed to households and community groups and collected days later, directly violating the one-day voting requirement.

Additional irregularities included instances where a single committee member handled both the distribution and collection of ballots, undermining procedural safeguards. Ballots lacking proper candidate identification or containing inconsistent details were nevertheless counted. In some cases, single ballots showed multiple handwriting styles, while a voter residing in the United States was reportedly allowed to vote under multiple constituencies.

The Election Commission stated that such actions severely compromised the integrity of the electoral process, making it impossible to ensure the vote was conducted in a free, fair, and secret manner.

The local election commissioner in Choejor settlement, however, denied any wrongdoing during three separate inquiries, maintaining that the elections were conducted properly. The official attributed similarities in handwriting to the settlement's demographic composition, noting that approximately 60 percent of residents are monks or former monks trained under the same teacher.

The Commission rejected these explanations, citing clear and compelling evidence of violations. It also expressed concern over repeated attempts by the local official to contact central authorities during the investigation, characterizing such actions as undue pressure. In a letter dated April 22, the official reportedly sought a statement declaring no legal evidence of wrongdoing, an act the Commission described as inappropriate and potentially intimidating.

While acknowledging the challenging political environment in Nepal and recognizing the efforts of local officials, the Commission concluded that the deliberate misuse of ballots by certain individuals had likely influenced the election outcome.

Invoking provisions under the Charter of Tibetans in Exile and the Election Rules, which empower it to investigate and adjudicate electoral disputes, the Commission determined that the polling process in Nepal failed to meet the required standards of fairness, transparency, and secrecy. In light of these irregularities and breaches of election rules, the Commission said it has withdrawn the final election for the Choejor polling station in Nepal.

The incumbent President Penpa Tsering secured the necessary majority of over 60% of the votes (61.025%) to secure a second term during the preliminary election. The apex electoral body earlier announced that 91,042 Tibetans have registered as voters for the 2026 general elections from across the globe.

## Official Release of the Standardised Tibetan National Anthem (WAV Formats)

10 April 2026, CTA

The standardised versions of the Tibetan National Anthem—available in group vocal, solo, and instrumental formats—can be downloaded below in WAV format for public use. The numbered and symbolic musical notations of the anthem are also provided below for reference.

These versions represent the officially standardised forms of the Tibetan National Anthem in three formats, following the adoption of the *Rules and Regulations for the Use of the Tibetan National Flag, Emblem, and Anthem* by the 17th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile during its 11th session.

## CTA Rejects China's Election Criticism, Calls Out China for Crafting Laws Purely for Political Control

09 April 2026, Tibet Express

The Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), also known as the Tibetan government in exile, has rejected China's critique of the first phase of the 2026 Tibetan general election, emphasising that the criticism overlooks ongoing repression in Tibet and the historical context of Chinese occupation.

In a recent article published by Chinese state media *Global Times* on Tuesday, the exile polity's democratic election was labeled "Election without a land, an institutional illusion created by separatist groups in exile." The article cherry-picked the low voter turnout in the preliminary election to portray the CTA as a foreign-funded separatist organisation lacking institutional legitimacy, while bypassing the fact that Tibetans remain in exile due to China's colonial occupation of their ancestral homeland.

CTA spokesperson Tenzin Lekshay clarified in a media engagement that, under the leadership of the Dalai Lama, Tibetans have been building and sustaining a democratic system in exile for the past

66 years, ever since China's complete occupation of Tibet in 1959.

He emphasised the futility of merely labeling the polity as "separatist" without engaging in meaningful dialogue, reaffirming the CTA's political stance under the Middle Way Policy. A policy he described as a mutually beneficial approach aimed at achieving genuine autonomy for all Tibetans — as the only meaningful path to resolving the Tibetan-Chinese problem.

CTA spokesperson Lekshey further emphasized that China could observe and draw lessons from the experience of the Tibetan exile democratic polity to support its own long-term stability and peace.

While the Chinese state media report spoke of development and economic growth in Tibet, Lekshay countered that China has benefited greatly by causing severe damage to Tibet's natural environment and that this too must be part of the conversation.Expressing concern over the growing repression of Tibetans inside Tibet, he also criticised China for crafting laws solely to serve its own political stability and security, laws that violate both international law and China's own Constitution.

The spokesperson added that it is evident that whatever laws China makes, they are only further intensifying repression of Tibetans both inside Tibet and in exile. "We categorically reject this."

The preliminary election of the 2026 Tibetan general election, for the post of *Sikyong* (the political head of the CTA) and the 18th members of the Tibetan Parliament in Exile, took place on 1 February across Tibetan diasporic communities worldwide. The incumbent *Sikyong*, Penpa Tsering, secured a decisive victory, receiving more than 60% of the vote—surpassing the threshold to avoid a final round—while the final voting for parliamentary candidates is scheduled for 26 April.

Of the 91,042 registered voters, 51,140 cast their ballots in the preliminary election. During the announcement of the results, the Election Commission of the CTA expressed concern over the relatively low voter turnout, while also acknowledging the seasonal challenges faced by Tibetans.

The commission noted that the election period coincides with the winter months, when many Tibetans are engaged in seasonal livelihood activities, including the sweater trade across India, often far from their Refugee settlements. The commission further noted that the election schedule could be adjusted to accommodate these challenges, though any changes would require broader consensus.

## China takes a potshot at exile Tibetan election exercise

08 April 2026 Tibetan Review

Anyone who is not a "useful idiot" of China knows that Beijing's so-called "whole process people's democracy" to describe the country's government system in glowing terms lacks any substance, and is, in fact, nothing but a euphemism for justifying its brutal authoritarian rule. But that has not prevented China from taking a potshot at the exile Tibetans' elections for choosing their leaders, with its official *globaltimes.cn* Apr 7 calling it an "election without a land" and "an institutional illusion created by separatist groups in exile".

Employing an occupying power's yardstick for determining the legitimacy of the exile Tibetan setup, the unusually lengthy report cited Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespersons as having repeatedly stressed that "the so-called Tibetan government-in-exile is entirely an organized separatist political group with a political platform and an agenda for 'Tibet independence'."

It is an illicit organization that violates China's Constitution and laws. No country in the world recognizes it, the report maintained.

And in dismissing Mr Penpa Tsering's elections as the Sikyong of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) in the Feb 2026 preliminary poll, the report said that the turnout of about 56%, was a notable decline compared with the election in 2021, and fell far short of lending broad credibility to the group's "self-proclaimed" representation.

However, the report did not offer any comparison of this percentage visi-a-vis elections in other democracies to justify claiming that it lacked broad credibility. What is glaring in this assertion, however, is the fact that the Chinese people don't get to vote for the party leaders who wield the real power behind the facade of the government leaders. Xi Jinping is the most powerful person in China not because he is the state president but, rather, because he is the Party General Secretary.

So, the report's argument that the exile Tibetans' polling record appears even less persuasive when set against the 3.66 million permanent residents of Tibet Autonomous Region and the more than 6.28 million Tibetan people living in the PRC, holds no water.

The report gave full airing to the dissenting voices within the exile Tibetan community to supposedly discredit the election result, forgetting that this is what democracy is all about. It said, "Some personal commentary blogs on Medium, an online publishing platform that hosts individual opinion pieces, including posts by authors claiming to be from the overseas Tibetan community, also expressed dissatisfaction with Penpa Tsering's 'leadership' after the "election" results, questioning both his capabilities and the effectiveness of his so-called policies."

The report also said, "They also cast doubt on the fairness of the election, arguing that the process prioritized loyalty over competence." The question, then, is, will China accept the results, if the exile Tibetan election process does prioritize competence over loyalty?
Tellingly, the report is silent on the one big issue which really divides the exile Tibetan community and what its elections are fought for: independence versus autonomy under Chinese rule. Why?
While the report supposedly focuses on the election, its lengthiness is due to the fact that it is a sort of critique on the funding and functioning of the CTA, which China calls the Tibetan "Government in Exile" with the inverted commas, and on how supposedly wondrously Tibet under its occupation rule is governed.
Regarding this, Zhu Weiqun, former head of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, has said, "Even with all the high-sounding rhetoric used to gloss over its 'election,' the 'CTA' cannot conceal an obvious fact: its so-called 'voters' are in no way representative of the Xizang people," using the Sinicized name for Tibet.
Clearly, the wide publicity the exile Tibetan election has received internationally has piqued China where it really hurts: the glaring lack of electoral democracy in China and even in occupied Tibet.

## Sikyong Penpa Tsering Expresses His Heartfelt Condolences on the Passing of Long-time Tibet Supporter Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling

08 April 2026, CTA



On behalf of the Central Tibetan Administration and the Tibetan people, Sikyong Penpa Tsering conveyed his heartfelt condolences on the passing of Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling, a longstanding friend and supporter of the Tibetan cause. He passed away on 6 April 2026 at the age of 95.
Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling held key roles in German and international politics, including serving as a member of the German Bundestag for more than two decades and as the Federal Minister for Post and Telecommunications. He also served as an international mediator and was appointed as the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In a condolence letter addressed to the bereaved daughters of late Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling, Sikyong acknowledged, "In addition to these remarkable accomplishments, he was a true and steadfast friend of Tibet, who advocated earnestly for Sino-Tibet dialogue. Over the many years during which I had the honour of engaging with him at numerous roundtable conferences on the Tibetan cause, I came to know him as a man who was not merely a distinguished German statesman but a man of unwavering commitment to peaceful resolution of conflict."
The letter continued, "As the founder of the Schwarz-Schilling Foundation and a dedicated champion of Tibet, he engaged with Kashag and the Tibetan leadership for many years. In recognition of his enduring contribution, he was presented the ICT Light of Truth Award in 2013, by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, an honor that reflects his legacy. I am especially grateful that our paths crossed one final time last year, where I had the opportunity to thank him for all that he has done for us."
"We mourn the loss of a cherished friend, a loyal advocate, and a wonderful human being. His passing leaves a void in the hearts of all those whose lives he touched. Please know that our prayers are with you and your family during this difficult time. May he attain a swift rebirth," the letter concluded.

## Central Tibetan Administration pays tribute to Tibetan monk Thupten Nyendak, recalls sacrifice for religious freedom

07 April 2026, ANI News

The Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) commemorated Tibetan monk Thupten Nyendak on the anniversary of his self-immolation protest, renewing concerns over religious freedom and cultural preservation in Tibet.
In a post shared on the social media platform X, the CTA's Tibet Advocacy Section remembered Thupten Nyendak, also known as Tulku Athup, as a revered spiritual leader, a Tulku and an abbot, who sacrificed his life at the age of 47 on April 6, 2012, in Dartsedo, Karze, Tibet.
According to the CTA, Thupten Nyendak set himself on fire at his residence along with his niece, Atse, in protest against what it described as repressive Chinese policies in the region. Both later succumbed to their injuries.
The administration highlighted that the incident was part of a broader wave of self-immolation protests by Tibetans, reflecting deep anguish over restrictions on religious practices and the erosion of Tibetan cultural identity. It also alleged that Chinese authorities intensified crackdowns in the

aftermath, imposing strict controls across the region and leading to injuries and detentions among local Tibetans.

Remembering his life and legacy, the CTA noted that Thupten Nyendak was a staunch advocate of Tibetan culture, religion, and unity. He began his monastic journey at Lhakang Dragkhar Monastery in Minyak, Kham, and later pursued studies at prominent institutions, including Drepung Monastery in Lhasa and Kirti Monastery in Ngaba.

Recalling his final moments, the CTA shared that on the day of his protest, he told his family over the phone, "Today I feel at ease and ending my life by offering butter lamps for all those Tibetans who have set themselves on fire for the cause of Tibet."

The CTA continues to observe such anniversaries to honour those it calls "self-immolators" and to draw global attention to the Tibetan cause and demands for religious freedom and cultural rights.

## 16th Executive Council Meeting of Asian Buddhists Conference for Peace Endorses His Holiness the Dalai Lama's Affirmation of Continuation of the Institution of Dalai Lama

04 April 2026, CTA



*16th Executive Council Meeting of Asian Buddhists Conference for Peace Endorses His Holiness the Dalai Lama's Affirmation of Continuation of the Institution of Dalai Lama*

On 1 April, coinciding with the Year of Compassion, the Asian Buddhists Conference for Peace (ABCP) held its 16th executive Council Meeting in Bodhgaya on the theme of "Bodhisattva, Wisdom and Compassion."

Dhondul Dorjee, Secretary of the Department of Religion and Culture, Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), attended the 16th Executive Council meeting of ABCP and the ABCP's celebration of His Holiness' 90th Birthday.

At 9:00 a.m., the inaugural programme commenced upon the arrival of Chief Guest Shri Vinai Kumar Saxena, Lieutenant Governor of Ladakh UT, at the venue. Joined in by Kyabje Yongzin 7th Ling Rinpoche, Kyabje Kundeling Tatsak Jedrung Rinpoche, Kyabje 20th Kushok Bakula Rinpoche, and Nechung Kuten, the Chief Guest then lit ceremonial butter lamps while the gathering offers of auspicious words in both traditions of Mahayana and Theravada.

Following the opening ceremony, ABCP Secretary Sonam Wangchuk Shakspo delivered the welcome address, which was followed by a speech from the most Venerable Khensur Lama Gabju Demberel Choijamts, President of the APCP. Following that, the chief guest was presented with mementos as token of appreciation by ABCP President.

The event then proceeded with dance performance depicting the life of the Buddha, presented by an artist Madhushree Choudhary.

Kyabje 19th Lochen Tulku then read out the message from His Holiness the Dalai Lama for ABCP's 16th Executive Council meeting, while Deputy Secretary Sonam Wangchuk Shakspo conveyed a message from Kyabgon Sakya Gongma Rinpoche. Messages from Shri Kiran Rijiju ji, Minister of Parliamentary Affairs and Minister of Minority Affairs, Honourable Anura Kumara Dissanayake, President of Sri Lanka, Jetsun Dorjee, Abbot of Gandantegchinlen Monastery in Mongolia; Pandito Khambo Lama Damba Ayusheev, Head of the Buddhist Traditional Sangkha of Russia; and Most Venerable Buddhapriya Mahathero, head of the ABCP Bangladesh Center, were also delivered.

Kyabje Yongzin Ling Choktrul Rinpoche, Kyabje Kundeling Tatsak Jedrung Rinpoche, and representatives from various participating countries delivered speeches in celebration of His Holiness the Dalai Lama's 90th birthday, followed by an address by the Chief Guest.

Shri Maling Gombu, Chairman of the Arunachal Pradesh Khadi & Village Industries Board (APKVIB), delivered the vote of thanks, marking the successful conclusion of the ceremony celebrating the 90th Birthday of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.

After lunch, the 16th Executive Council meeting of ABCP proceeded. The meeting convened with participation from 14 member countries, with North Korea not in attendance. At 1:00 p.m., President most Venerable Khensur Lama Gabju Demberel Choijamts delivered introductory remarks, followed by the ABCP Secretary General's briefing of the progress report for the period 2024 to 2026. The deputy Secretary of the Asian Buddhists Council then addressed the current state of ABCP Gaya-based coordinator office and the budget of ABCP was presented by another senior member.

During discussions on the Bodhgaya Declaration, Dhondul Dorjee, Secretary of the Department of Religion and Culture, CTA, spoke about life and achievements of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama and CTA initiatives undertaken during the Year of Compassion. He also highlighted His Holiness' reaffirmation on continuation of his reincarnation

during the 15th Tibetan Religious Conference held in Dharamshala last year. The Secretary further expressed his appreciation to the ABCP for organising a celebration of His Holiness' 90th Birthday during this Executive Council Meeting.
Among 11 points of the said declarations that received unanimous approval at the meeting, the 5th point felicitated His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the occasion of his 90th birthday and acknowledged his lifelong contributions to the promotion of peace, non-violence, interfaith harmony, and universal values.
The 6th point reiterated the decision adopted at the 12th General Assembly of ABCP to observe every 6 July (birthday of His Holiness the Dalai Lama) as the Universal Day of Compassion. Likewise, the 7th point unanimously endorsed His Holiness the Dalai Lama's statement regarding his reincarnation, issued on 2 July 2025 in Dharamshala, reaffirming that the institution of the Dalai Lama will continue and that the Gaden Phodrang Trust is the sole authority to recognise the future reincarnation. The Executive further emphasised that no government, organisation, or individual has the authority to interfere in this longstanding sacred spiritual process, which remains the sole prerogative of the Gaden Phodrang Trust.
The declaration received a resounding majority from the participants. Following the meeting, participants gathered at the Council's regional office, introduced themselves, and took a group photograph, marking the conclusion of the 16th Executive Council meeting of ABCP.

## The Tibetan exile community unveiled its first modern Tibetan language center, aiming to improve mother tongue teaching capabilities.

02 April 2026, VOT

The Sangpo Tsering Demonstration School in Dharamshala, northern India, officially inaugurated the first fully equipped Tibetan Language Center and a brand-new Mathematics Laboratory in the exile community yesterday. The center is equipped with advanced modern teaching equipment, including large-screen TVs, computers, color printers, and a sound system, aiming to comprehensively improve students' native language skills in listening, speaking, reading, and writing through a combination of multimedia and traditional reading methods.On April 1, the Sangpo Tsa Demonstration School in Tibet, located near Dharamshala in northern India, held a ceremony to officially unveil the first fully equipped modern Tibetan language center and a brand-new mathematics laboratory in the exile community. Talan Drolma, Minister of Education of the Central Tibetan Administration, was invited



*Voice of Tibet Images*

to attend and delivered a speech to the teachers and students.
The Tibetan Language Center was built with funding from the Tibetan Foundation in Utah, USA. As the first specialized teaching facility of its kind in a school within an exile community, the center is equipped with state-of-the-art teaching facilities, including large-screen televisions, computers, color printers, and a sound system. In addition, the center houses a large collection of Tibetan fairy tales and academic books from both within and outside the country, aiming to comprehensively improve students' Tibetan listening, speaking, reading, and writing skills through a combination of multimedia and traditional reading methods.
In her address at the unveiling ceremony, Education Minister Talan Drolma emphasized that Tibetan language is not only a tool for communication but also the lifeline of the Tibetan people. She pointed out that facing the severe political environment within Tibet and the survival crisis of its language, students and parents in the exile communities must shoulder their responsibility and consciously protect their mother tongue. Even for Tibetan students within Tibet who wish to learn Tibetan, the environment is becoming increasingly challenging.
Talan Drolma urged the students that no matter where they go, they should never forget their homeland, Tibet, and should take His Holiness the Dalai Lama's teachings as their guide, diligently studying while also cultivating the qualities of integrity, honesty, and humility.
In an interview with Voice of Tibet, Ouzhu Danba, head of Tibetan language education at the Ministry of Education, stated that the establishment of the center is a crucial step in implementing the resolutions of the Seventh National Education Conference and its annual meeting. The successful implementation of this project, supported by former Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile Pema Chokyi Gyaltsen and the Utah Tibetan Foundation, has met the long-standing and urgent need for modern teaching methods among Tibetan language teachers.
Some teachers interviewed said that as model schools for the Central Tibetan Administration's

implementation of the "Basic Education Policy," the completion of the language center and mathematics laboratory in Sangpoza schools marks a more solid step forward in the integration of traditional cultural preservation and modern quality education.

## Representative Thinlay Chukki Attends a Memorial Prayer Ceremony Held at Rikon Monastery in Honour of Late Ngari Rinpoche Tenzin Choegyal

01 April 2026, CTA

On 28 March 2026, a memorial prayer ceremony was held at Rikon Monastery in Switzerland, organised by the executive members of the Swiss Domey Association in honour of His Holiness the Dalai Lama's late younger brother, Ngari Rinpoche Tenzin Choegyal.

At the memorial service, Representative Thinlay Chukki, Abbot of Rikon Monastery Tenzin Jangchub, along with several former Tibetan parliamentarians and members of the local community, were in attendance.



Similar prayer services were also held by the Central Tibetan Administration, as well as several Tibetan NGOs and communities, for the late Ngari Rinpoche Tenzin Choegyal, who passed away on 17 February 2026 at the age of 80 in Dharamshala.

Likewise, an official resolution of condolence was also passed during the Eleventh Session of the 17th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile.

-Report filed by Office of Tibet, Geneva

## Australian-Chinese Delegation Engages with Tibetan Democracy, Art, and Dialogue in Dharamshala

01 April 2026, CTA

In line with the Central Tibetan Administration's designation of 2025– 2026 as the *Year of Compassion*, honouring the 90th birth year of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the Tibet Information Office led an Australian-Chinese delegation to Dharamshala from 9 –13 March 2026. The delegation, accompanied by Chinese Liaison Officer Dawa Sangmo, included Cheng Lei, a Chinese-born Australian journalist and television presenter at Sky News Australia, and Badiu Cao, an Australian-Chinese political artist and human rights activist.



*Cheng Lei and Badiu Cao, accompanied by Chinese Liaison Officer Dawa Sangmo with His Holiness the Dalai Lama.*

On 10 March, the delegation joined Sikyong Penpa Tsering and his cabinet, along with international delegations from Europe and North America, as hundreds of Tibetans gathered at the Tsuglagkhang courtyard to mark the 67th anniversary of the Tibetan National Uprising Day. Prior to the event, the delegation was granted a private audience with His Holiness the Dalai Lama. During the meeting, the delegation had the opportunity to interact with His Holiness, while artist Badiu Cao presented an artwork in honour of His Holiness' recent receipt of a Grammy Award for a spoken-word album on compassion and peace. Chenglei, as a special guest, also delivered a speech during the Central Tibetan Administration's official function of the day.

That evening, the Tibet Information Office, in collaboration with Khadhok Art, organised an exhibition titled *"Snow Lion, Sun"*, featuring works by Badiu Cao and Tibetan satirical artist Cacus. The well-received exhibition highlighted themes of censorship and human rights repression in China.

On 11 March, the delegation met with Sikyong Penpa Tsering and Kalon (Minister) Norzin Dolma, of Department of Information and International Relations, in a separate meetings as well as the Speaker Khenpo Sonam Tenphel and Deputy Speaker Dolma Tsering Teykhang of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile.

The delegation also took part in an expert talk series organised by the Tibet Policy Institute, titled "Understanding China's System of Political Repression: Voices of Resistance through Art and Journalism."Later that evening, Tibet Radio hosted an exclusive talk show, "Exile: The Art of Resistance," featuring Badiu Cao alongside Tibetan writer, poet, and translator Bhuchung D. Sonam.

On 12 March, the delegation visited Tibet TV, where Cheng Lei sat for an interview for *In Conversation with Tibet TV*. This was followed by a China-focused expert discussion co-organised by the China Desk of the Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR) and the Tibet Information Office at Lhakpa Tsering Hall. In the afternoon, the delegation engaged with representatives of local non-governmental organisations at the headquarter of the Tibetan Youth Congress, followed by a podcast interview with Khyeltam.

On 13 March, the delegation travelled to New Delhi for their final engagement, attending a seminar organised by the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, chaired by Professor Srikanth Kondapalli. The discussion were held under the themes *"What Lies Beneath China's Glossy Facade?"* and *"How to Be a Political Artist at the End of the World."*

Over the course of the week-long visit, the delegation gained deeper insights into Tibet's contemporary history, the evolution of democratic governance in exile, and the structure and functioning of the Central Tibetan Administration, as well as the Middle Way Approach to addressing the Sino-Tibet conflict. The discussions also addressed broader contemporary challenges, including ways to counter China's repression and censorship using advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence.

## Sikyong Penpa Tsering Inaugurates the New Staff Quarters at Gangchen Kyishong

01 April 2026, CTA

Sikyong Penpa Tsering on Tuesday inaugurated newly constructed staff quarters designated for the Secretary, Additional and Joint Secretaries of the Central Tibetan Administration at Gangchen Kyishong. The residential facilities have been developed under the supervision of the Tibetan Administration Welfare Society (TAWS) and Department of Home, CTA, as part of ongoing efforts to enhance staff welfare and infrastructure.

The inauguration ceremony commenced with a brief prayer ceremony conducted by monks from the Nechung Monastery, followed by the formal ribbon-cutting. Sikyong toured both buildings, inspecting the residential quarters and associated facilities alongside CTA secretaries. The visit provided an opportunity to review the quality and readiness of the accommodations intended to support senior administrative staff.

The event concluded with a modest tea reception hosted by Home Secretary Palden Dhondup. During the gathering, the Sikyong presented ceremonial khatas in appreciation of the contributions made by Government contractor Puran Chand and architect Amardeep,



acknowledging their roles in the successful completion of the project.

## Seventeenth Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile Concludes Final Session with Adoption of Rules and Regulations for National Symbols

01 April 2026, CTA



The budget session of the 17th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (TPiE) concluded successfully today under the chairpersonship of Speaker Khenpo Sonam Tenphel, with several key legislative measures adopted.

The final day of the session began with the third reading and adoption of important legislative frameworks, including the Rules and Regulations for the Use of the Tibetan National Flag, Emblem, and Anthem, as well as the Rules and Regulations for Salaries and Allowances for the Supreme Justice Commissioner and other Justice Commissioners.

The Revised Appropriation Act for 2025–2026 and the Appropriation Act for 2026–2027 were presented by Deputy Speaker Dolma Tsering Teykhang and supported by Budget Estimate Committee Chairperson Choedak Gyatso. Both bills were passed unanimously.

According to Document No. 30, the Revised Appropriation Act for 2025–2026 authorises a total expenditure of Rs. 3,752,428,054 from the consolidated fund, covering both the annual and interim budgets. Similarly, Document No. 31 states that the Appropriation Act for 2026–2027

approves a total allocation of Rs. 3,408,836,304 for the annual budget from the consolidated fund.
The session proceeded with Secretary-General Sonam Dorjee of the Tibetan Parliamentary Secretariat reading out the leave of absence for Members of Parliament.
In his concluding address, the Speaker outlined the key resolutions and bills passed by the House. These included an official obituary in honour of Ngari Rinpoche Tenzin Choegyal, a resolution of solidarity regarding the critical situation inside Tibet, condemnation of the PRC's Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, financial matters, reports submitted by two committees, and major legislative measures, most notably the historic adoption of the Rules and Regulations for the Use of the Tibetan National Flag, Emblem, and Anthem.
The Speaker also presented the five-year report of the 17th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile, highlighting the TPiE's major initiatives during this period. These included periodic visitation programs aimed at raising political awareness among the Tibetan diaspora and documenting public grievances for submission to the administration, as well as significant legislative actions involving the adoption and amendment of rules and regulations to clarify previously ambiguous provisions. He further noted the parliament's role in approving annual budgets, the contributions of various parliamentary committees, initiatives undertaken by the TPiE in commemoration of the Year of Compassion (90th birth anniversary of His Holiness the Dalai Lama), revival of the All Party Indian Parliamentary Forum for Tibet (APIPFT), and advocacy efforts for Tibet across India and in its capital city New Delhi, among other activities.
Additionally, the Speaker emphasised that the 17th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile successfully organised two major international parliamentary conventions on Tibet: the 8th World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet (WPCT) held in Washington, D.C. in 2022, and the 9th WPCT held in Tokyo in 2025. Both events saw strong participation from parliamentarians across numerous countries and contributed to the establishment of new parliamentary support groups, including Mexico's first-ever lawmakers' Tibet support group in South America.
The Speaker thanked the Secretary-General, Additional Secretaries, and the staff of the Parliamentary Secretariat, for their valuable contributions over the past five years. The Speaker also expressed gratitude to the Department of Finance, the Department of Information and International Relations, the Department of Security, the Department of Home's electrician, and the Parliamentary Secretariat for their assistance during the final session of the 17th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile.

## Exhibition on Tibet's independence and diplomatic history opens at CTA Tibet Museum

03 April 2026, CTA




The exile Tibetan government, officially known as the Central Tibetan Administration's Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR), inaugurated a four-month long temporary exhibition titled *"Frontier Diplomacy: Britain, Tibet and Sir Basil Gould"* on Friday at the Tibet Museum.
The event was attended by CTA President Penpa Tsering as the chief guest. He was joined by distinguished guests, Mrs. Frances C. Cutler, granddaughter of Sir Basil Gould, and her husband, Mr. Jonathan M. Cutler.
Sir Basil Gould served as the British Political Officer in Sikkim from 1935 to 1945, a key interlocutor between Tibet and British India, and earlier as the British Trade Agent in Gyantse, Tibet, from 1912 to 1913. He was also among the distinguished guests at His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama's enthronement ceremony in 1940. Last year, two rare historical documents from his personal collection were formally handed over to President Penpa Tsering in Office of Tibet, London. The handover took place amid growing concerns over the dispersal of Tibet-related historical artefacts, particularly following an auction held by Bonhams on June 4, 2025, which featured an extensive collection belonging to Sir Gould and renowned Indian artist Krishna Kanwal. His archival records offer significant documentation of Tibet's diplomatic and political status prior to the Chinese illegal invasion of Tibet. These materials are regarded as important historical evidence supporting Tibet's de facto independence before 1950 and serve to counter official Chinese narratives regarding Tibet's historical status.
At the heart of the exhibition are two letters—a 1947 correspondence from the 14th Dalai Lama and the 3rd Taktra Rinpoche, Regent of Tibet, addressed to Sir Basil Gould during the historic Tibetan trade mission led by W. D. Shakabpa, then Finance Minister of Tibet. The letters emphasise Tibet's independent conduct of foreign relations, demonstrating its direct diplomatic engagement

with international representatives as a distinct political entity.



Addressing the gathering, the CTA President noted the importance of such archival materials in reinforcing Tibet's historical narrative. He traced the longstanding relationship between Tibet and Britain, noting that formal interactions date back to 1774 with the visit of Scottish envoy George Bogle. He highlighted subsequent engagements involving British officials, explorers, and missionaries, emphasizing that these interactions form a crucial part of Tibet's diplomatic history.

The Tibetan political leader also recalled the 1948 Tibetan trade delegation, which travelled to India, China, the United States, and the United Kingdom, marking a significant moment in Tibet's international outreach. Reflecting on the historical trajectory, he noted the irony that Tibet lost its independence just two years after this diplomatic mission.

Emphasizing the strategic importance of historical awareness, he urged younger generations of Tibetans to engage deeply with their history. He noted that a strong understanding of Tibet's past is essential for effective advocacy, particularly in countering increasing narratives about Tibet's status. He further revealed ongoing efforts to engage scholars in the United Kingdom to document the historical relationship between Tibet and Britain, with the aim of influencing contemporary political understanding.

Speaking at the event, Frances C. Cutler offered a personal reflection on her grandfather's legacy, drawing from his memoir *"The Jewel in the Lotus."* She recounted how a chance circumstance led Gould to Tibet, where he began a lifelong association with the country and its people. During his tenure, Gould accompanied the 13th Dalai Lama on part of his return journey from exile in India and played a role in facilitating educational opportunities for Tibetan students in Britain.

Reflecting on the archival discovery, Cutler explained that the documents had remained untouched for over seven decades before being identified as historically significant by experts. She expressed pride in handing them over to the CTA, noting that they provide compelling evidence that both the United States and Great Britain regarded Tibet as an independent and sovereign state in 1947.

Speaking to Phayul, Cutler elaborated on her family's decision to transfer the documents to the Tibetan administration. She stated that the move was guided by a recognition of their historical importance and their relevance to the Tibetan people. "These documents show that at that point, the world saw Tibet as a proper sovereign state and not part of China," she said, adding that contributing them was both a responsibility and an honour.

Expressing emotional resonance upon seeing the documents displayed at the museum, she acknowledged the limited awareness among the British public regarding Tibet's history and current realities. She described her family's gesture as a modest contribution to the Tibetan cause, expressing hope that it would support Tibetans in their aspiration to reclaim their country.

# SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

## India, China discuss LAC stability, regional security on SCO sidelines

29 April 2026, The Hindu



The two sides discuss maintaining peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control, and exchange views on regional security, including the West Asia situation

Union Defence Minister Rajnath Singh met China's Defence Minister Dong Jun on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Defence Ministers' Meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.The two sides discussed maintaining peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and exchanged views on broader regional security issues, including the West Asia situation, the spokesperson of the

*Defence Minister Rajnath Singh interacts with the Defence Minister of China, Admiral Dong Jun during the SCO Defence Ministers' Meeting, in Bishkek on April 28, 2026. Photo: @rajnathsingh X/ANI Photo*

Chinese Embassy in India posted on social media platform X.

## Aksai Chin for Arunachal: Ex-Indian Army chief Naravane backs revival of 1950s China offer on border row

25 April 2026, The Print

Gen Manoj Naravane (retd) said in an exclusive interview with ThePrint that India should focus on getting more experts who understand China's psyche and its workings




*Former Indian Army chief General Manoj Naravane speaks with ThePrint*

Noting that China and India will always compete, which can lead to confrontation, former Army

chief General Manoj Naravane told ThePrint that the country must be prepared against the better player.He said that Pakistan was the short-term challenge and China remains the long-term challenge for India.Gen Naravane (retired) said the only reason India was "surprised" by Chinese border aggression in Eastern Ladakh in 2020 was because the country needs more experts on China.
Speaking about the 2020 standoff with China, which has persisted in lower intensity, the former Army chief said that the boundary dispute is the problem and the solution lies in reviving a proposal shared by China in the late 1950s. This proposal suggested New Delhi give up claims on Aksai Chin and Beijing give up claims over Arunachal Pradesh.
"Well, if you go back, you know, into history and read more and more about these boundary issues, as far back as the late 50s, early 60s, even before the 1962 war, the Chinese had proposed some kind of a boundary.
"Some sort of agreement precisely along the lines that you just mentioned, that Aksai Chin is theirs and Arunachal is ours… Perhaps the solution lies in reviving that offer and discussing the nitty-gritties of that to the mutual satisfaction of both sides," he said in an interview to ThePrint.
Gen Naravane was responding to a question on whether the current holding line at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) could become the de-facto boundary between the two countries.
"And not only then, it was during various parlays and discussions that the offer has come to the forefront. But, of course, it was put to a backburner for some time. There is no harm in reviving that proposal. And as I said, iron out those kinks," he said.
Talking about the reasons for Chinese aggression in 2020, he said the military and the government could not pin down any specific reasons for it..
"Whether it was to divert attention from the Covid-19 pandemic, which everyone was saying was of Chinese origin from Wuhan. Or whether it was because of the bifurcation of the state of J&K into Union territories of Ladakh and J&K.
"Because of which J&K, which would otherwise have been a trilateral issue between Pakistan, China and India, became only a bilateral issue of Ladakh UT and China. Whether that set some kind of alarm bells ringing in their establishment, I"s really very difficult to say," he said.
Asked if there could be more confrontations down the road between the two countries, he said that India and China will always be competitors on the world stage.
"That competition sometimes can tilt towards confrontation. And because of the unsettled nature of our boundary, those confrontations are always just below the surface. So, in the long term, while we must always look towards China, the interest of both nations lies in resolving this irritant which is an impediment to normalising and deepening of the relations," he said.
Gen Naravane said that until the boundary issue remains, it will always happen that "we will look at them (China) with a little jaundiced eye".
Talking further about the 2020 aggression by China, the former Army chief said India needs to study Beijing in more detail to understand what makes them tick.
"You know, that we were surprised. We were not surprised… We were surprised because we don't know their manner of working and thinking. So, more China experts are needed in the country. And more China experts are needed," he said, asserting that much of India's knowledge about China is dependent on western literature.
"So, if you know their psyche, then perhaps we will be able to anticipate their moves in a better manner," he added.
Asked what was the bigger challenge between Pakistan and China, Gen Naravane referred to the game of chess and said one should always prepared for the better player.
"If you want to improve at chess, you must play a better player. So, obviously, we must try to compete with China. But in the short term, because of the terrorist angle, we cannot ignore Pakistan. I would say in the short term, Pakistan is where we have to look at. But in the long term, focus on China," he said.

## Why China will see India's latest defense deal with South Korea as 'inevitably sensitive'

26 April 2026, Korea Times



*Hanwha Aerospace's K9 self-propelled howitzer / Courtesy of Hanwha Aerospace*

China would see India's attempt to expand defense industry cooperation with South Korea in artillery and anti-aircraft guns as "inevitably sensitive" given Beijing's border dispute with New Delhi in the Himalayas, according to analysts.
After meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Monday as part of his three-day visit to India, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung announced that Seoul and Delhi had agreed to upgrade their economic cooperation, focusing on

vital sectors such as shipbuilding, defense and artificial intelligence.

Lee said South Korea fully backed India's "Atmanirbhar Bharat" or self-reliant India policy and hoped to "actively" support the production and operation of Indian defense equipment and discuss cooperation such as in technology development.

He cited the K9 Thunder, a South Korean howitzer, as an example of the two countries' defense cooperation.

Delhi operates about 100 of the K9 Vajra-T 155mm self-propelled howitzer units and plans to acquire 100 more.

The K9 Vajra-T is made in India and based on South Korea's K9 Thunder design. Its system was produced through a technology transfer from Hanwha Aerospace and optimized for the Indian Army's desert and high-altitude environments.

The Indian Army has deployed the howitzers in the country's northern Ladakh region, aiming to boost long-range firepower amid India's border tensions with China and Pakistan.

According to the Times of India newspaper, Periasamy Kumaran of Delhi's Ministry of External Affairs said on Monday during Lee's visit that India sought to expand defense industry cooperation with South Korea into a "third phase".

Moving beyond direct acquisition and progressive localization of the K9 howitzers, India would go "even further" with advanced manufacturing and technology transfer, Kumaran said.

Joint development and technology transfer as well as co-design of next-generation defense systems were "some other areas where we want to explore cooperation", he said.

Indian news outlets also reported that talks were under way on developing air-defense systems, including anti-aircraft guns and missile platforms, to tackle new aerial threats such as drones.

Nishant Rajeev, a senior analyst at the South Asia program at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said the howitzers and anti-aircraft guns were "critical" to Indian defenses as its South Korean K9 artillery system boosted firepower along India's disputed borders.

Rajeev said the joint production of the K9 howitzer was likely a "model of cooperation" that the two countries could look to expand on.

"As demonstrated by the conflict last year with Pakistan, India recognizes the need to develop a layered air-defense system as well ... India faces a multitude of threats from drones, cruise missiles and fighter aircraft."

Noting that drones "featured prominently" in the Pakistani conflict, Rajeev said "it is not clear what specific systems the two countries are looking to co-develop or co-produce, but it is definitely an area India will have a keen interest in".



*President Lee Jae Myung and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi shake hands prior to a meeting at Hyderabad House in New Delhi, India, April 20. EPA-Yonhap*

Kang Jun-young, a professor of international relations at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, said Beijing was "highly likely" to view defense and supply-chain cooperation between South Korea and India "very critically".

This was because Seoul might be viewed as playing a "substantial role in the U.S.' containment of China", Kang added.

"In particular, as India is engaged in a border dispute with China, Beijing is inevitably sensitive to the fact that South Korea's weapons systems could lead to an increase in India's military power," he said.

"Since pursuing technology transfer and local production beyond simple exports has the potential to dramatically advance India's defense self-sufficiency capabilities, China is likely to regard this as a strategic move that threatens its geopolitical interests and security."

Jagannath Panda, head of the Stockholm Centre for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs at the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Sweden, said India's defense cooperation with South Korea reflected a "broader transition" from simple arms imports to industrial partnerships.

"The success of the K9 Vajra-T demonstrated that South Korean systems can be adapted for Indian terrain and manufactured domestically," added Panda, who is also the principal investigator of the "Silk Cage" project covering China's influence operations in the Indian Ocean region.

"Expanding this model into air-defense guns and missile systems suggests New Delhi now values Seoul as a dependable technology partner."

India has been involved in border conflicts with its neighbours Pakistan and China in recent years, and has ramped up its autonomous military technology and strength to prepare for possible future clashes.

The howitzers are likely to play a pivotal role along the Line of Actual Control or in the contested Kashmir region, both situated in the Himalayas and the site of a number of military stand-offs in recent years.

Self-propelled howitzers are highly efficient in mountainous terrain because they can be fired at steep, high-angle trajectories, allowing shells to clear mountain ridges and descend into deep valleys.
They also serve as an all-weather, high-firepower alternative to air support, which is often hindered by weather and high altitude.
In 2020, Indian and Chinese troops engaged in hand-to-hand combat in Eastern Ladakh, near the Galwan Valley, resulting in the first casualties between the two sides in more than four decades.
And in May last year, New Delhi and Islamabad engaged in a border clash near the disputed Kashmir region. Both countries' air forces scrambled their fighter jets and reportedly shot down each other's aircraft.
Panda described artillery, air defense and mobile firepower as "highly relevant" to the China-India border dispute, considering that mountain warfare and border stand-offs required quick deployment, survivable systems and precision fires.
For this reason, he saw India-South Korea cooperation as "not merely commercial".
"It is tied to India's preparation for sustained continental and aerial competition with China while maintaining readiness against Pakistan," Panda said.
"The China factor is central. Following repeated border crises with China ... India needs faster modernization cycles. It cannot wait for slow procurement pipelines.
"South Korea's defense industry is known for speed, manufacturing scale and modern engineering - qualities India values in a deteriorating regional environment."
According to Ian Hall, an international relations professor at Griffith University in Australia, India is "certainly" looking to improve military capabilities in multiple areas following the 2020 conflict with China and last year's clash with Pakistan.
"South Korea would be a good partner, given the strength of its defense industry," Hall said.
"If India can achieve a mutually satisfactory deal with South Korea, that could have a big long-term impact on India's capacity to deter threats from the north and west."

## China critical of India welcoming Japan's scrapping of its lethal arms export policy

25 April 2026, Tibetan Review

China, which has the world's second largest defence budget and the largest navy in terms of number of war ships, and which is a key security threat to Japan has condemned the latter for scrapping its ban on lethal weapons export policy and criticised India, victim of its frequent border aggressions, for welcoming Tokyo's move.
Japan scrapped a ban on lethal weapons export in a dangerous breach of its postwar "pacifist constitution" and security framework, but India welcomed the shift, said China's party mouthpiece *globaltimes.cn* Apr 24, citing "observers".
India on Thursday (Apr 23) welcomed Japan's decision to scrap a ban on lethal weapons exports, and its Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) claimed that defence and security cooperation forms an "important pillar" of the India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership, the report said, citing local Indian media *Business Standard*.
The report went on to cite a spokesperson for MEA as saying that "as part of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan, both sides have committed to increase practical cooperation in the interest of their national security and continued economic dynamism."
Japan is ignoring today's geopolitical realities in the Asia-Pacific by seeking to revise its pacifist framework, opening lethal weapons exports, recklessly provoking confrontation with China, and even attempting to return to the old road of militarism. Such actions damage regional geopolitical stability and will inevitably arouse vigilance and opposition from countries, including China, that suffered from Japanese aggression, Qian Feng, director of the Research Department at the government-run Tsinghua University's National Strategy Institute, has said.
Qian has said Tokyo's move effectively breaks the postwar order, threatens regional stability, and risks undermining Asia-Pacific prosperity, while urging India not to forget history or seek strategic balancing by loosening constraints on Japan.
China's perception of the postwar order, regional stability, and Asia-Pacific prosperity is obviously based on its military and economic domination with the other countries in the region having little choice but to follow its lead and dicta, including when it calls almost the whole of the South China sea its territory.
"India hopes to… deepen ties with Japan in service of its 'Indo-Pacific' strategy, and even attempt to use Japanese strength to balance China's influence in the Asia-Pacific and pursue strategic containment," Qian has maintained.
Although India was also invaded by Japan during World War II, it has chosen at this moment to support Japan's mistaken move. India should not forget history and should clearly see Japan's true intentions, Qian has added.
Under its postwar "pacifist constitution", Japan enjoyed decades of peace, economic prosperity and social stability under that framework. Now that it is abandoning this principle and even revisiting the path of militarism, India should carefully consider the true consequences of such acts made by Japan's Takaichi government, Qian has warned.
China's provocative patrolling of Japan's Senkaku Islands which Beijing insists are its Diaoyu Islands, and its rising threats to invade the self-ruled

democratic island of Taiwan have been major sources of friction between the two countries.
Any acquisition of arms by India would obviously be targeted primarily against Pakistan, its arch-enemy and China's close ally, and China itself, its only other Major military adversary.

## India's strategic Zojila Tunnel nears breakthrough amid China, Pakistan tensions

22 April 2026, Deccan Herald

As India sharpens its strategic posture along its borders with China and Pakistan, the long-delayed Zojila Tunnel is nearing a decisive milestone, promising to end Ladakh's winter isolation and ensure year-round military and civilian access to the sensitive frontier region.
The project has entered its final excavation phase, with the "breakthrough"—when the two ends of the tunnel meet—expected by the end of May, according to Union Road Transport and Highways Minister Nitin Gadkari.
The development marks a major step forward in building one of India's most critical high-altitude infrastructure projects. Once completed, the 13.15-km tunnel will provide all-weather connectivity between Kashmir and Ladakh, bypassing the treacherous Zojila Pass, which remains shut for nearly six months annually due to heavy snowfall and avalanches.
The tunnel is expected to reduce travel time across the stretch to about 15 minutes, ensuring uninterrupted movement of people, goods and essential supplies. Beyond its civilian utility, the tunnel carries immense strategic importance. Ladakh's location along contested borders has long posed logistical challenges, particularly during winter months when road access is cut off.The tunnel will enable year-round troop deployment and supply movement to forward areas, significantly enhancing India's operational readiness.
The progress was reviewed in a recent meeting between Gadkari and Ladakh Lieutenant Governor Brigadier B. D. Mishra, who also flagged safety concerns along the existing Zojila top stretch. He stressed the urgent need for avalanche protection measures, noting that the route will continue to be used even after the tunnel becomes operational. The concern follows a recent avalanche incident in the area that claimed seven lives, underlining the vulnerability of the corridor.Officials cautioned that the breakthrough will not immediately open the tunnel to traffic. Significant work remains, including installation of ventilation, safety systems, and road surfacing.The project timeline has already been revised, with full completion now expected around early 2028, after earlier deadlines proved unrealistic due to extreme weather conditions and complex geology. Once operational, the Zojila Tunnel is expected to serve as a lifeline for Ladakh, boosting economic activity while reinforcing India's strategic infrastructure in a region of growing geopolitical importance.

## India fixes map showing Arunachal Pradesh town as Chinese territory

18 April 2026, Economic Times

The Registrar General of India on Saturday said that the "issue" related to a self-enumeration map showing Pasighat in the East Siang District of Arunachal Pradesh as a Chinese town 'Medog' has been resolved.
The issue was flagged by an X user, Mohonto Panging Pao (@MontyPanging), who posted about the lapse through a post to draw the attention of the authorities.
While attempting self-enumeration on the portal se.census.gov.in, maps depicted Pasighat in Arunachal Pradesh as Medog.
"Medog is a town in China! CEO of Google @sundarpichai is Indian! Even official Govt portals are virtually ceding our territory! Needs urgent intervention!" Pao posted.
In the evening, the RGI issued a clarification saying, "An issue was mentioned during Self-Enumeration on se.census.gov.in regarding map location in Pasighat, East Siang District in Arunachal Pradesh today."
"The issue was raised with Map services provider and it has been resolved," the census commissioner posted on X. The 15-day window to self-enumerate opened on April 16 for Arunachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, and Chandigarh, allowing citizens to answer the listed questions on a specially developed portal for the process.
The citizens will have to generate a special ID after filling in the necessary details and questions, which they will provide to enumerators who visit their home during the houselisting and housing census process for verification.
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The field visits for houselisting process will begin immediately after the self-enumeration window is over and will continue for one month, as notified by each state.The census, the eighth since Independence, is being conducted in two phases -- the first stage is known as houselisting and housing census, and the second stage is the population census.
The housing listing and housing census systematically lists all structures, houses, and households throughout the country to provide a sound framework for the conduct of the population enumeration.

In a first, the exercise will be completely digital, with enumerators using a mobile application created for the purpose to collect the information.
During the housing listing operations, the enumerators will physically visit each house and building and pose 33 questions to the citizens regarding basic facilities in their houses, information about the head of the household, such as the name and sex, and the ownership status.
The second phase of the census, which will do a headcount of the country's population, will start next year.

## China defends Arunachal renaming exercise despite angering India, says relations remain stable

15 April 2026, Tibetan Review




As on the previous occasions, China has on Apr 14 defended its latest move, the sixth since 2017, to assign "standardised" Chinese names to places in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. It has also asserted that its policy of improving relations with India remained unchanged despite drawing a strong rebuff from New Delhi.
China considers Arunachal Pradesh to be part of its territory on the basis of its bogus narrative that Tibet has been an integral part of it since ancient times, although the two are patently different civilisations.
"India categorically rejects any mischievous attempts by the Chinese side to assign fictitious names to places which form part of the territory of India," India's External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal had said Apr 12 after China published the list of 23 Arunachal placenames on Apr 10.
Responding to the Indian remarks, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun reiterated Beijing's stance, stating that Zangnan—for Arunachal Pradesh—is its territory and that China does not recognise the Indian state, reported the *PTI* news agency Apr 14.
"It is entirely within China's sovereignty to standardise the names of some places in the Zangnan (southern Tibet) region," Guo has said, defending China's decision to publish multiple batches of names for locations in Arunachal Pradesh.
Despite the tensions, Guo has maintained that bilateral ties remain stable and emphasised continuity in China's approach toward India.
"We hope the two sides will work in the same direction and act more in ways conducive to bilateral relations," he has added.

## 'China has never recognised...': Beijing reacts after India rejects naming of places in Arunachal

14 April 2026, MSN



*'China has never recognised...': Beijing reacts after India rejects naming of places in Arunachal*

China on Tuesday defended its decision to rename places in what it calls the "Zangnan" region, repeating its claim over Arunachal Pradesh and saying the move is within its rights.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said, "Zangnan is China's territory, and China has never recognized the so-called 'Arunachal Pradesh' illegally set up by India. It is entirely within China's sovereignty to standardize the names of some places in Zangnan region."
His remarks came after China released the sixth batch of standardised names in the region on April 10, which triggered a strong response from India.
China, however, said overall ties between the two countries remain stable. "At present, China-India relations are generally stable. China's policy committed to improving and develop China-India relations remains unchanged," Guo said.
He added, "We hope the two sides will meet each other halfway and do more things that are conducive to bilateral relations."
China has been releasing such lists for years. The first list, covering six places, came out in 2017. This was followed by a list of 15 places in 2021 and another list of 11 places in 2023. In its latest move, China has again renamed several locations in the region it refers to as "Zangnan".
China claims Arunachal Pradesh as part of southern Tibet, a claim that India has consistently rejected.
Relations between the two countries have been tense since the 2020 eastern Ladakh border row. In the past one-and-a-half years, both sides have taken steps to improve and stabilise ties.
India rejects 'fictitious names', says reality cannot be changed

India on Sunday strongly objected to China's move, calling it an attempt to create "baseless narratives" and warning that it could affect efforts to improve relations.

External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said, "India categorically rejects any mischievous attempts by the Chinese side to assign fictitious names to places which form part of the territory of India."

He added, "Such attempts by China at introducing false claims and manufacturing baseless narratives cannot alter the undeniable reality that these places and territories, including Arunachal Pradesh, were, are, and will always remain an integral and inalienable part of India."

Jaiswal also said, "These actions by the Chinese side detract from ongoing efforts to stabilise and normalise India-China bilateral ties."

Calling for restraint, he added, "China should refrain from actions which inject negativity into relations and undermine efforts to create a better understanding."

## China releases more names to assert its Tibet-claim on Arunachal Pradesh

13 April 2026, Tibetan Review




For the sixth time since 2017, China has released a list of what it calls "standardized" names for places in Arunachal Pradesh to assert its territorial claim over the Indian state which New Delhi has dismissed as "mischievous" and "baseless".

China claims that Arunachal Pradesh is "Zangnan" (southern Tibet) on the basis of its bogus assertion that Tibet has been part of it since ancient times.

The list, published by China's ministry of civil affairs on Apr 10, covers a total of 23 mountain passes, peaks, rivers, and settlements. Each is assigned a name in Chinese characters, Tibetan script, and pinyin, with precise GPS coordinates, noted *Indiansentinels.com* Apr 13.

India on Apr 12 called the Chinese exercise a "mischievous attempt", adding such "baseless narratives cannot alter the undeniable reality" on ground.

"India categorically rejects any mischievous attempts by the Chinese side to assign fictitious names to places which form part of the territory of India," ministry of external affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said.

"Such attempts by China at introducing false claims and manufacturing baseless narratives cannot alter the undeniable reality that these places and territories, including Arunachal Pradesh, were, are, and will always remain an integral and inalienable part of India," he added, responding to media queries.

He said such move undermines efforts to stabilise ties between the two countries.

"These actions by the Chinese side detract from ongoing efforts to stabilize and normalize India-China bilateral ties. China should refrain from actions which inject negativity into relations and undermine efforts to create better understanding," he said.

* * *

Noting a pattern in China's release of such lists, the *Indiansentinels.com* report said that China first issued "standardised" names for six Arunachal locations in Apr 2017, shortly after the Dalai Lama visited Tawang monastery. Others followed with a list of 15 in Dec 2021, 11 in Apr 2023, 30 in Mar 2024, and 27 in May 2025. With the latest 23 entries, the total now comes to 112.

The report noted that the Mar 2024 move coincided with Prime Minister Modi's inauguration of the Sela Tunnel, an all-weather high-altitude link to Tawang that improves troop mobility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The latest list arrives during a period of active diplomatic engagement – lending it the character of a calibrated signal rather than a routine update.

The report further noted that at least eight of the 23 entries in the latest, Apr 10, 20206 list are strategically sensitive terrain – mountain passes – suggesting the exercise is guided as much by security calculus as by administrative impulse.

* * *

While India administers the entirety of the 83,743 sq km state, China has invested heavily in road networks and military infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau immediately north of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). India has responded in kind, accelerating its own border infrastructure programme.

Scholars describe China's approach as "cartographic aggression" – the incremental normalisation of territorial claims through maps and administrative lists, a strategy also deployed in the South China Sea, the report noted.

India's position is based on the Shimla Convention of 1914, which took place among Kuomintang ruled China, Tibet, and British-ruled India, which, among other things, demarcated the McMahon Line border between Tibet and India.

## China sets up new county in Xinjiang near Pak-occupied-Kashmir, Afghan border

13 April 2026, MSN

China has set up a new county in its volatile Xinjiang province near Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and the Afghanistan border in an apparent move to beef up security along the narrow Wakhan Corridor to curb infiltration of Uyghur separatist militants.

The county, named Cenling, is located near the Karakoram Mountain range and close to the borders with PoK and Afghanistan, underscoring its strategic significance.

This is the third new county established by China in Xinjiang, a predominantly Muslim Uyghur region, in just over a year.

India last year lodged a protest with China over the creation of Hean and Hekang counties, stating that parts of their jurisdiction fall within its union territory of Ladakh.

Hean includes much of the disputed Aksai Chin plateau, which is part of Ladakh, occupied by China in the 1962 war and has remained a focal point of the India-China border dispute.

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Government announced the establishment of Cenling on March 26, though details of its administrative divisions and exact boundaries were not specified. It will be administered by Kashgar prefecture, according to a report in the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. Kashgar, a historic city located on the ancient Silk Road, is a strategic gateway connecting China with South and Central Asia.

It is also the starting point of the controversial $60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which passes through PoK and has been opposed by India. Experts say the creation of Cenling reflects Beijing's growing focus on border security and governance. Lin Minwang, a professor at the Institute of International Studies in Shanghai-based Fudan University, said the move "reflects China's deeper recognition of the strategic importance of this region".

"At a broader level, the decision signals China's emphasis on its borderlands," Lin was quoted as saying by the Post.

He noted that the new county is geographically connected to Afghanistan's narrow Wakhan Corridor, a 74-km strip bordering Xinjiang that separates Tajikistan and PoK, highlighting China's security and counterterrorism concerns.

Beijing in the past has expressed concern about Uyghur militants of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) using the Wakhan Corridor as a route to enter Xinjiang from Afghanistan.

Yun Sun, a senior fellow at the Stimson Centre in Washington, said the new county represented a drive towards a "stronger grass-roots level Government structure for effective governance and control".

"It helps to strengthen the stabilisation efforts by the Government in the frontier region, which is traditionally more subject to ethnic turbulence and potential infiltration of foreign militants from Central Asia," she said.

## China's 'fictitious names' mischievous, says India

13 April 2026, MSN

With China undertaking another exercise to rename places in Arunachal Pradesh, India has categorically rejected "any mischievous attempts by the Chinese side to assign fictitious names to places which form part of the territory of India".

In a statement, ministry of external affairs (MEA) said such actions detract from the ongoing efforts to stabilise and normalise India-China ties. Govt further said that China should refrain from moves which inject negativity into relations. Beijing has given Chinese names to 23 places in Arunachal in what is the 6th such exercise in the past 10 years to reinforce its claim over the Indian state it calls Zangnan.

"Such attempts by China at introducing false claims and manufacturing baseless narratives cannot alter the undeniable reality that these places and territories, including Arunachal Pradesh, were, are and will always remain an integral and inalienable part of India," said MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal.

India's response also followed reports from Beijing that China had set up a new county in its Xinjiang province, apparently to ramp up security along the narrow Wakhan Corridor to curb infiltration of Uyghur separatist militants. A PTI report said the county named Cenling is located near the Karakoram mountain range and close to the borders with Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Afghanistan, underscoring its strategic significance.

This is the third new county established by China in Xinjiang, a predominantly Muslim Uyghur region, in just over a year. India had last year lodged a protest with China over creation of Hean and Hekang counties, stating that parts of their jurisdiction fall within Ladakh.

China has in the past renamed places in Arunachal Pradesh five times - in 2017, 2021, 2023, 2024 and 2025. On the last occasion - in 2025 - India had described the exercise as preposterous, saying that creative naming will not alter the undeniable reality that Arunachal Pradesh remains an integral and inalienable part of India.

China claims not just Tawang in Arunachal but effectively the entire state, saying it's a part of south Tibet, even as the Tibetan govt-in-exile holds that Arunachal Pradesh is a part of India. China cites examples like the second-most important Tibetan Buddhism monastery being in Tawang and the 6th Dalai Lama being born there to back its claim.

## Official Spokesperson's response to media queries regarding China giving fictitious names to places

April 12, 2026, MEA

In response to media queries regarding China giving fictitious names to places, Official Spokesperson Shri Randhir Jaiswal said:

India categorically rejects any mischievous attempts by the Chinese side to assign fictitious names to places which form part of the territory of India.

Such attempts by China at introducing false claims and manufacturing baseless narratives cannot alter the undeniable reality that these places and territories, including Arunachal Pradesh, were, are, and will always remain an integral and inalienable part of India.

These actions by the Chinese side detract from ongoing efforts to stabilize and normalize India-China bilateral ties. China should refrain from actions which inject negativity into relations and undermine efforts to create better understanding.

New Delhi

April 12, 2026

## India is building 'South Asia's Hormuz'; from here China's lifeline will be controlled – What is happening in Indian Ocean?

09 April 2026, Zee News

Located near an important sea route used by ships from around the world, India's Great Nicobar project is developing into a strategic hub that could improve surveillance, logistics and military reach across the Indian Ocean

India is advancing a major infrastructure and defense project on Great Nicobar Island. The island is strategically located near the crucial Strait of Malacca, a sea route through which much of China's oil and trade passes.

With Beijing increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean through port projects, research vessels and closer ties with neighbouring countries, India is expanding its own capabilities in the region. The Great Nicobar project is expected to improve surveillance, logistics and air operations, giving India a stronger position in the eastern Indian Ocean. The Strait of Malacca is one of the most important sea routes in the world. A large share of China's oil imports and trade shipments pass through this narrow corridor. Because of this, the route is often described as a strategic vulnerability for Beijing, sometimes referred to as the "Malacca Dilemma".

Great Nicobar Island lies close to the western entrance of this sea lane. This location allows India to monitor ship movement and strengthen maritime awareness across the region. In a crisis, control over nearby waters could influence shipping routes and supply chains.

The island's position therefore gives India an advantage in tracking activity and improving its response capabilities in the Indian Ocean.

**Expanding surveillance and monitoring**

A major part of the Great Nicobar project is setting up modern radar and surveillance systems. These will help monitor ships and activities in the eastern Indian Ocean more effectively.

Submarine movement in the region could be tracked more closely. Naval vessels passing through nearby routes can also be monitored. This information will support naval operations and help India maintain awareness of maritime developments.

With improved sensors and radar coverage, India aims to expand its ability to observe activity across a wide stretch of the Indian Ocean.

**Dual use airbase and extended reach**

The proposed international airport at Great Nicobar is expected to serve both civilian and military purposes. Along with commercial flights, the facility could support Indian Air Force aircraft and naval surveillance planes such as the P-8I.

Aircraft operating from Great Nicobar could cover large parts of the eastern Indian Ocean and reach areas closer to Southeast Asia. This would improve India's ability to conduct reconnaissance missions and respond to developments in the region.

The dual-use nature of the airbase also adds flexibility and allows both civilian and defence operations from the same infrastructure.

Strengthening Andaman and Nicobar command

India's only tri-service command, which brings together the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, is located in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The Great Nicobar project is expected to further strengthen this command.

Plans include developing deeper ports capable of handling large naval ships and aircraft carriers. The island is also being prepared as a logistics hub where fuel, supplies and equipment can be stored for extended operations.

This infrastructure would help Indian forces operate more effectively in the eastern Indian Ocean.

**Responding to China's expanding presence**

China has developed port infrastructure and partnerships in several countries around the Indian Ocean under what is often described as the "String of Pearls" strategy. These developments include facilities in countries such as Myanmar and Sri Lanka.

India's Great Nicobar project is seen as part of New Delhi's effort to strengthen its own presence and maintain balance in the region. With improved surveillance, air operations and logistics support, the island could play a larger role in India's maritime planning.

As development moves forward, Great Nicobar is expected to become an important hub for

monitoring shipping routes, supporting naval operations and strengthening India's position in the Indian Ocean.

## India's New Certification Rules Block Chinese Surveillance Equipment

01 April 2026, China scope

Reports from Indian media indicate that India will implement a "soft ban" on Chinese surveillance equipment starting April 1. Under the new rules, all surveillance products sold in India must pass security certification under the STQC (Standardization Testing and Quality Certification) framework. Industry sources say devices using Chinese chipsets are unlikely to receive approval, effectively freezing sales of major Chinese brands such as Hikvision and Dahua, which have long held a significant share of the Indian market.

Rather than issuing a direct ban, India is using technical regulations to restrict market access. The new requirements mandate vulnerability testing and disclosure of key components, particularly the country of origin of system-on-chip (SoC) components. According to industry reports, authorities are effectively denying certification to products that rely on Chinese chips. Since leading Chinese brands depend heavily on such supply chains, the policy cuts off their ability to comply with the new standards.

The rules were introduced in April 2024 with a two-year transition period, Chinese companies have tried but been unable to obtain certification. As the April 1 deadline approaches, uncertified products will lose market access. The policy has already begun reshaping the market: Chinese brands, which previously accounted for roughly one-third of market share, are seeing a sharp decline, while Indian manufacturers—using non-Chinese components and localized systems—are rapidly expanding their presence. While the government frames the move as a cybersecurity measure, industry observers widely view it as a form of industrial protection under the "Make in India" initiative.

# CHINA IN THE REGION

# EAST TURKESTAN-PRC

## China's global crackdown shadows Uyghur activism, rights advocacy

26 April 2026, Tribune India

The World Uyghur Congress (WUC) has released its weekly brief, highlighting a series of international engagements aimed at exposing what it describes as China's ongoing repression of Uyghurs, intensifying global attention on China's policies in East Turkistan.The Uyghur community is mourning the death of prominent intellectual and activist Ahmet Igemberdi, who passed away on April 20 in Adelaide at the age of 89. Born in East Turkistan in 1937, Igemberdi dedicated decades to defending Uyghur identity and rights. His resistance to Chinese state policies led to a decade-long imprisonment. After moving abroad, he became a key figure in diaspora advocacy and helped found the East Turkistan Association of Australia in 1992. WUC paid tribute to his lifelong commitment to the Uyghur cause.Meanwhile, concerns over China's expanding repression beyond its borders were raised in Canada. WUC Vice President Zumretay Arkin testified before a parliamentary human rights subcommittee, warning that China's transnational repression continues to target Uyghurs abroad. She argued that existing safeguards remain too narrow, often excluding everyday harassment and coercion faced by diaspora communities, and urged stronger legal frameworks and protections.Arkin also participated in an advocacy week in Ottawa, engaging with Canadian lawmakers and civil society groups. Discussions focused heavily on allegations of forced labour involving Uyghurs and the need for stricter enforcement of legislation such as Bill C-251. Meetings included senior political figures across party lines, highlighting growing international scrutiny of China's policies.

The human cost of these tensions remains stark. April 22 marked the birthday of Yalkun Isa, who remains imprisoned in China on what activists describe as politically motivated charges. His detention, along with the life sentence of his brother, reflects what campaigners call a broader pattern of punishing families of outspoken Uyghur figures abroad.

At the United Nations in New York, Dolkun Isa addressed ongoing human rights violations, citing cultural suppression and mass detentions. His remarks were disrupted by Chinese representatives, who attempted to discredit him and called him a "separatist" and "terrorist."

Separately, an investigation by The New York Times found that some Labubu dolls contained cotton sourced from East Turkistan, raising fresh concerns over forced labour in global supply chains. The findings add to mounting pressure on companies to ensure ethical sourcing amid allegations tied to China's Xinjiang policies.(ANI)

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## Kazakhstan: Stop submitting to transnational repression from China

24 APRIL 2026, article19



*China-Kazakhstan Border Crossing at the New Khorgos Port of Entry, Xinjiang. Credit: Akira CA / Wikipedia*

ARTICLE 19 is deeply concerned by the recent conviction of 19 activists in Kazakhstan for their involvement in peaceful protest in 2025 against ongoing gross human rights abuses in China's Xinjiang Province. We are doubly alarmed that the conviction appears to follow direct pressure from Beijing urging Kazakh authorities to crack down on peaceful protest of China's human rights record. Such actions are part of Beijing's broader campaign of transnational repression of protesters around the world, as documented in our 2025 report *Going Global: China's transnational repression of protesters worldwide*. ARTICLE 19 calls on Kazakh authorities to immediately and unconditionally release the imprisoned Kazakh activists, uphold the right to peaceful protest, which is protected under international human rights law, and resist transnational repression from China.

On 13 April a court in Kazakhstan sentenced 11 of the activists to five years in prison for criminal incitement, while meting out non-custodial sentences restricting liberty for the remaining eight defendants. According to Radio Free Europe, some family members were ordered to leave the courthouse during the proceedings, while journalists were barred outright and forced to follow proceedings via a live feed.

The charges originated following a protest in November 2025, during which activists affiliated with the Atajurt movement burned Chinese flags, portraits of China's leader Xi Jinping, and demanded the release of Kazakh citizens detained in Xinjiang. Atajurt often organises protests in Kazakhstan to raise awareness of China's human rights abuses against Kazakhs, Uyghurs, and other marginalized ethnicities in the region., including in front of the Chinese embassy or consulate, and during Chinese officials' state visits to the country.

There are approximately 1.6 million ethnic Kazakhs in China's Xinjiang Province – the human rights community prefers to use the name East Turkistan – making them the second largest ethnic group in the province, second to the region's estimated 11 million Uyghurs. Like Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Western China, Kazakhs have faced persecution, surveillance, torture, and mass internment. Some of those who have been targeted are citizens of Kazakhstan.

Reportedly, a day after the November protest the Chinese consulate in Almaty, Kazakhstan's largest city, lodged a diplomatic note with Kazakh authorities elevating Beijing's position that the protest was an 'open provocation' against China and 'an insult to the Communist Party of China and China's leader' and called on Kazakhstan to 'seriously investigate'. While initially having filed lesser administrative charges against the protesters, following the diplomatic note, Kazakh authorities escalated to the more serious incitement to 'social, national, ethnic, racial, class or religious hatred' under Article 174 of Kazakhstan's Criminal Code. Radio Free Europe has reported that the diplomatic note is explicitly cited as a key justification for the criminal charges.

China's mounting influence fuels rising transnational repression

China has become Kazakhstan's largest trading partner under the Belt and Road Initiative, investing considerable economic and political capital to influence Kazakhstan, especially in areas of infrastructure and technology. In return, Kazakhstan has offered assurances that it will not join any alliances or treaties that could harm 'the sovereignty and security of China', and that it is committed to deeper cooperation in supporting China on Taiwan- and Uyghur-related affairs, including 'to arrest activists opposed to China's expanding economic influence in Kazakhstan'.

This is not the first case of Kazakhstan authorities persecuting activists who protest against China's human rights abuses. For example, as noted in our report *Going Global*, activists have faced ongoing harassment and reoccurring arbitrary detention, including a case of one activist dying in detention. Some of those targeted have fled the country. 'Because I protested outside the Chinese Embassy in Kazakhstan, I believe that it's the Chinese government that put pressure on the Kazakh government to target me,' activist Baibolat Kunbolat told ARTICLE 19. 'As it's threatening to my family, I have no choice but to find ways to leave Kazakhstan.'

The recent mass prosecution appears to send a signal to civil society activists in Kazakhstan: if you protest against China, you will face serious consequences.

ARTICLE 19 reiterates that the right to peaceful protest is protected under international human rights law, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Kazakhstan is a party. Any restrictions must meet strict tests of legality, necessity, and proportionality. The criminal prosecution of individuals for participating in a peaceful protest, including through expressive acts such as flag burning, violates these standards and risks having a chilling effect on civic space.

Authorities in Kazakhstan continue to disproportionately apply overly broad terrorism and 'extremism' legislation as a common tool to silence dissenting voices in Kazakhstan. We have previously raised concerns about Article 174 of the Kazakh Criminal Code, which criminalises a broad range of offences, including incitement to 'social, national, tribal, racial, class, or religious discord'. This provision is vague, overly broad, and open to abuse, enabling authorities to suppress freedom of speech and target civil society under the pretext of combating 'hate speech', including in cases involving peaceful expression such as satire or criticism, and to impose disproportionate penalties such as fines or imprisonment.

ARTICLE 19 calls on the Kazakhstan authorities to immediately and unconditionally release the 11 activists sentenced to prison and dismiss the charges against them and the other targeted activists. Kazakhstan should protect, promote, and ensure the right to peaceful protest, including those exercising their rights to draw attention to China's gross human rights abuses. The authorities should review all laws and policies related to the exercise of the right to protest, repeal Article 174 of the Criminal Code, and make other necessary amendments in line with international human rights law.

Kazakhstan must resist escalating pressure from Beijing to be complicit in mounting transnational repression.

## Some Labubu dolls contain banned cotton from Chinese region known for forced labor: investigation

24 April 2026, NYPost

A new investigation found some Labubu dolls contain cotton that is banned in the US because it comes from a region in China known for its forced-labor laws.

The plush monster toys have enjoyed a Cabbage Patch Doll-like craze around the globe, seen hanging off the luxury bags of celebs like Rihanna and Kim Kardashian.



*A new investigation found some Labubu dolls contain cotton that is banned in the US because it comes from a region in China known for forced labor laws.*
*Gabriella Bass*

But an investigation commissioned last year by the Campaign for Uyghurs, a Washington, DC-based nonprofit, found that samples from Labubu dolls contained cotton grown in Xinjiang – despite a ban on imports from that region.US lawmakers, journalists and human rights organizations have accused the Chinese government of forced labor, forced sterilization, surveillance, torture and the persecution of the Uyghurs, a mostly Muslim minority group, in Xinjiang.The New York Times confirmed the results of the nonprofit's investigation, with independent experts who found that 16 of 20 Labubus purchased by the news outlet contained cotton from the region, mainly in the dolls' t-shirts.Such imports would violate the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which Congress passed in 2021 to ban any products made in Xinjiang. That could lead to punitive actions including bans on imports of the dolls.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio, spearheaded the bill when he was a senator, saying at the time that there was a "genocide against the Uyghur people" and other Muslim groups "at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party."

The dolls containing the illicit cotton were bought from Amazon, eBay, Shein, AliExpress and directly from Pop Mart, the Chinese retailer behind the dolls, according to the Times. The dolls were from the Labubu lines "Fall in the Wild" and "Flip With Me."

The Trump administration continues to monitor for any violations of US law by importers, and has initiated a robust Section 301 investigation into the importation of forced-labor goods by our trading partners," White House spokesman Kush Desai told The Post. He did not comment specifically on the Labubu allegations.

US Customs and Border Protection – which would be responsible for enforcing any bans on Pop Mart imports – declined to comment.

Several nonprofits have submitted information about the use of the banned cotton to the customs department, according to the report.

Pop Mart did not immediately respond to The Post's request for comment.

A spokeswoman for Pop Mart told the Times it would conduct an investigation into the presence of Xinjiang cotton, adding that only a small percentage of its dolls use cotton and it is planning to switch over to alternative materials in its products for the US market.

The alleged illicit imports could be a test of the Trump administration's relations with China, as the president is planning to visit Beijing next month.

Liu Pengyu, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, told the Times that the Uyghur Forced Labor Protection Act was "one of the most notorious and egregious laws in the 21st century," calling it "a tool for US politicians to destabilize Xinjiang."

The ugly-cute Labubu doll – created by Hong Kong-born artist Kasing Lung, who collaborated with Chinese toymaker Pop Mart – costs about $20 to $40.

Pop Mart's move to package the collectibles in "blind boxes" – so shoppers don't know the color of their doll until they purchase and open the toys – has helped fuel the trend.

Earlier this year, customers waited in hours-long lines to snap up the items, while resales fetched thousands of dollars – and one doll even sold for $150,000 at an auction in Beijing.

Pop Mart's largest market is still China, but the Americas weren't far behind last year, with revenue in the region rising more than 700% in the first half of 2025 – sending the stock high enough to dwarf Barbie-maker Mattel and Hello Kitty-owner Sanrio.

The Labubu train has started to slow down, though Sony is still planning a feature film starring the iconic doll, as Pop Mart has struggled to find its next hit toy.

## Uyghur Suffering Persists as Global Accountability Stays Stuck

20 April 2026, Impact Policies

Uyghur suffering persists under a sustained State Policy in Xinjiang, while global accountability remains stalled despite years of evidence and official concern. The issue sits at the intersection of Human Rights, repression, forced labor, surveillance, family separation, and the failure of international pressure to produce meaningful consequences.

**A long-running campaign of control**

The repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang has continued for years and is widely described as a systematic campaign rather than a temporary security crackdown. Reports have pointed to mass arbitrary detention, unjust imprisonment, intrusive surveillance, and forced labor as central elements of that system. The scale remains enormous, with references across reporting to hundreds of thousands affected and earlier estimates reaching more than one million detained at the height of the campaign.

The personal cost is equally severe. Families have been separated for years, with some relatives sentenced to long prison terms and others disappearing into detention systems with little or no information available to loved ones. That human toll turns the broader political crisis into a lived reality shaped by fear, silence, and uncertainty.

**Human rights and state policy**

The key point is that the repression is not being treated as accidental abuse; it is understood as a deliberate State Policy built around control, assimilation, and punishment. Religious practice, cultural expression, and ordinary forms of Uyghur identity have been treated as threats, which makes the issue fundamentally about governance and power rather than public safety alone. This is why the crisis continues to be framed as a major Human Rights emergency rather than a narrow regional dispute.

The international legal dimension is also significant. The UN human rights office concluded in 2022 that the scale and pattern of violations in Xinjiang may amount to international crimes, including crimes against humanity. That finding did not resolve the crisis, but it did confirm that the concern had moved far beyond ordinary diplomatic criticism.

**Why accountability has stalled**

Global accountability has struggled because recognition has not been matched by enforcement. While international bodies have acknowledged the seriousness of the violations, political pressure from Beijing has helped block stronger multilateral action. As a result, condemnation has often outpaced consequences, allowing the system of repression to continue with little disruption.

This gap between documentation and action is one of the most important themes in the Xinjiang debate. The facts are no longer in serious dispute among rights groups and many governments, yet meaningful accountability remains elusive. That is why the issue is increasingly seen as a test of whether the international human-rights framework can still function when confronted by a powerful state resisting scrutiny.

**China's narrative and external pressure**

China continues to reject the allegations, presenting its Xinjiang policy as anti-terrorism, anti-extremism, and social stability management. Officials have disputed claims of forced labor, denied abusive intent, and argued that outside criticism is politically motivated. That counter-narrative has been central to Beijing's effort to control how the situation is understood internationally.

At the same time, access restrictions, propaganda tours, and pressure on critics have made independent verification difficult. This has allowed competing narratives to persist, even though the overall pattern described in rights reporting remains consistent: detention, surveillance,

coercion, and suppression of Uyghur identity. The result is a prolonged information battle layered on top of the human-rights crisis.

**Diaspora suffering and family separation**

Uyghur families outside China continue to experience the effects of repression through loss, fear, and enforced silence. Many are unable to contact relatives for years, while others have learned that family members were imprisoned or disappeared after ordinary acts such as communication with people abroad. That makes the crisis transnational, affecting not only those inside Xinjiang but also the diaspora living in exile.

The emotional force of this issue comes from the combination of personal testimony and broader structural abuse. A father missing for years or a family receiving harsh prison sentences is not just a private tragedy; it is evidence of a coercive system that reaches into homes and relationships. This is one reason the crisis remains deeply resonant even after international attention has faded.

**Forced labor and global supply chains**

Forced labor is one of the most consequential parts of the broader repression network because it links Human Rights abuses with global trade. Reporting and policy material have tied Xinjiang to coercive labor systems that supply products into international markets, raising concerns about complicity and import exposure. That makes the issue not only a diplomatic problem but also a commercial and regulatory one.

For that reason, calls for import bans, due diligence, and supply-chain restrictions continue to feature in advocacy around Xinjiang. If governments want to reduce their exposure to forced labor, then public statements are not enough; they need enforcement tools that affect trade and procurement. This is where the debate shifts from moral concern to policy design.

**What the broader crisis shows**

The Xinjiang case shows how a State Policy can persist when political cost is low and international attention is uneven. It also shows how Human Rights concerns can be documented in detail yet still fail to generate sustained intervention. That combination explains why the issue remains unresolved even after years of reporting, advocacy, and official concern.

The broader lesson is that human-rights systems depend not only on facts but on enforcement, coalition-building, and political will. Without those, repression becomes durable, and accountability remains stuck. The situation in Xinjiang is therefore not only about one region; it is about whether the global order can respond when repression is organized at state level.

## Former Chinese Detainee Describes Mass Arrests and "Untrustworthy" Charges Against Uyghurs

19 April 20216, Uyghur Times

Based on a personal account published in Chinese on matters.town

A Chinese individual identified as Yang Sheng (杨升) has published a personal account describing conditions inside detention facilities in Xinjiang during the early phase of the mass crackdown on Uyghurs in 2017.

In the account, titled "Uneasy" (不放心), Yang recounts being detained in the spring of 2017 on suspicion of "picking quarrels and provoking trouble," and held for a period in a newly built, provincial-level detention facility reportedly capable of holding up to 30,000 to 40,000 people. His account provides rare details about the large-scale detention of Uyghurs and conditions faced by those held in prisons and so-called "study centers."

Mass Detentions and the Emergence of "Untrustworthy" Charges

According to Yang's account, a dramatic shift occurred in April 2017 following a wave of arrests. The number of detainees surged rapidly, with prison cells that previously held 10 to 12 people suddenly crowded with nearly 70 individuals. Most of the new detainees were described as members of "local ethnic groups," referring primarily to Uyghurs.

Authorities reportedly implemented a policy emphasizing early and widespread detention, described as "arrest early, arrest young, arrest those who should be arrested, and leave no one behind," leading to large-scale preventive arrests.

Initially, detainees were accused of offenses such as "obstructing law enforcement using religion," "financing terrorism," or "participating in terrorist organizations." However, as the number of detainees grew, a new and unusual label—"untrustworthy" (不放心)—began appearing on detention records, despite not being a formally defined criminal charge. Many Uyghurs were reportedly detained under this designation.

Many detainees, according to the account, were unable to clearly explain why they had been arrested. The alleged "evidence" often involved ordinary activities, including:

- Sending money to children studying abroad or engaging in informal financial transactions
- Attending weddings or circumcision ceremonies
- Performing religious functions such as officiating marriages or reciting prayers without official certification
- Even attending a circumcision ceremony decades earlier, which had alr

Strict Controls on "State Security" Detainees

The account describes particularly harsh treatment for detainees labeled as threats to state security, most of whom were Uyghurs detained for the reasons above.

Measures reportedly included:

- **Constant physical restrictions:** detainees were forced to wear black hoods over their heads 24 hours a day, with only the mouth area exposed for eating
- **Identification measures:** yellow vests were used to distinguish political detainees, who were required to wear them even while sleeping
- **Shackling:** some detainees were reportedly kept in leg irons for one to two years without removal

A system known as "surrounding control" (包夹) was also implemented, in which three to four criminal inmates—typically Han Chinese—were assigned to closely monitor each Uyghur detainee. Uyghur detainees reportedly had to seek permission even for basic activities such as eating, sleeping, or using the toilet, and were prohibited from speaking with one another.

Daily restrictions included a complete ban on speaking the Uyghur language and performing prayers.

Additional measures aimed at preventing covert religious practices reportedly included forcing detainees to use only one hand while washing, while keeping the other behind their back. Removing body hair—considered part of religious observance—was also strictly prohibited.

Detainees were further required to write monthly "four reports," including confessions of wrongdoing, expressions of remorse, severing ties with relatives accused of similar offenses, and pledges not to reoffend.

Individual Cases Highlighted

Yang's account also describes several individual detainees:

- **A 23-year-old man** who had briefly studied religion at Al-Azhar University in Egypt was detained on charges of "participating in terrorism" after returning to Ürümqi.
- **A young man named Osman**, born in 1998, was classified as an unregistered individual due to being born outside family planning policies. Lacking official identity documents, he struggled to find work and survived through informal means. After minor theft offenses, authorities reportedly assigned him a temporary identification number solely for sentencing purposes, highlighting systemic barriers to legal existence.
- In another case, a Han Chinese detainee who refused to confess to corruption charges was sent to a "study center." There, dozens of Uyghur detainees reportedly selected him as a group leader, believing he might act fairly as an outsider. However, due to the harsh conditions and indefinite detention, he eventually confessed in order to be returned to prison.

Context of the "Untrustworthy" Label

The account suggests that the term "untrustworthy" may have been linked to a broader classification system that divided individuals into categories such as "trusted," "ordinary," and "untrustworthy." During the mass arrests, the "untrustworthy" designation appears to have been used as a catch-all label for Uyghurs who could not be immediately assigned formal charges, effectively serving as a basis for detention.

The account offers a rare inside perspective on detention practices during the early stages of the Xinjiang crackdown. While the claims cannot be independently verified, they align with numerous reports documenting mass detention, arbitrary charges, and extensive restrictions on religious and cultural expression in the region.

This article was originally published in *Uyghur Post* and has been translated into English for publication in *Uyghur Times*.

Balbal is an analyst at *Uyghur Post*, writing on politics, culture, and diaspora issues.

## Former Xinjiang policeman flees to Germany to expose the dark side of concentration camps

17 April 2026, Epoch Times



*In leaked photos, armed personnel at Xinjiang concentration camps are seen pointing assault rifles at detainees. (Screenshot by Adrian Zenz)*

A former Xinjiang policeman who deserted his post while traveling in Germany last year has recently publicly revealed that the Chinese Communist Party authorities are imprisoning and torturing Uyghurs in Xinjiang.The police officer, named Zhang Yabo, successfully absconded with his tour group at Neuschwanstein Castle while on a tour in Germany in August 2025.

Successfully escaped the group at Neuschwanstein Castle

According to a report by Der Spiegel on April 16, Zhang Yabo was carrying an inconspicuous gray backpack when he fled, containing a laptop computer with documents on its hard drive

showing evidence of the Chinese Communist Party's persecution of Uyghurs during his tenure.

The report described the details of Zhang Yabo's successful escape. He walked at the very back of the group, rehearsing the moment of his escape countless times in his mind: in the hotel, on the bus, even in the toilet. Finally, in a place where no one noticed him, he turned around, walked back, and took a train to Munich.

Zhang Yabo then located the World Uyghur Congress in the Schwabing district of Munich.

Recounting the dark side of human rights in Xinjiang based on personal experience

In recent years, the Chinese Communist Party has been accused of establishing concentration camps (also known as "re-education camps") in Xinjiang to detain Uyghurs, a minority ethnic group, in violation of human rights. The authorities have consistently denied these accusations.

Zhang Yabo spent nine years as a prison guard and policeman in northwestern Xinjiang, where the Chinese Communist Party has established a system of concentration camps, digital surveillance, and political indoctrination, primarily targeting Uyghurs.

Since 2017, numerous camps have been revealed in the area, surrounded by barbed wire, watchtowers, and roadblocks. Reports indicate that hundreds of thousands, even nearly a million people, were once held there.

Zhang Yabo is responsible for ensuring that no one goes to the mosque, searches mobile phones, and establishes records; any incidents must be reported immediately.

The ID card stored on the computer's hard drive shows that Zhang Yabo was born on October 15, 1986, in Henan Province, China. He worked as a primary school teacher in Xinjiang from 2009, became a prison guard in 2014, and later became a policeman in a village.

Zhang Yabo provided a photo of his police ID, as well as a photo of himself standing in front of the prison in a black uniform.

He confirmed that in the concentration camps, any act of disobedience would result in torture by the authorities as "so-called extremists."

Zhang Yabo's task in the prison was to take prisoners under investigation for questioning. Most of them were Uyghurs. The police beat the prisoners with batons, breaking the wooden boards in the process. Zhang Yabo said he watched from the sidelines and did not participate in the beating.

“A guard repeatedly kicked a young man in the testicles, and the man later died,” Zhang Yabo said. “I can still hear those screams to this day. I have nightmares about them.”

He said that people die in prison almost every week with little to no medical care.

On one occasion, he was guarding a prisoner whose arms were handcuffed for several hours until he wet his pants. This kind of punishment happened frequently.

In 2016, Zhang Yabo was transferred to a village with approximately 1,700 residents to serve as a police officer. He created files for suspects, recording their names, contacts, religious activities, and even blood sample results. He also recorded messages in the village committee's chat group, noting who was sick and when, who missed mandatory Chinese classes, and reported the information to higher-level public security authorities weekly.

He said anyone could be taken away at any time. Anyone who exercises or works out becomes a suspect. There are also quotas for reporting suspects: whoever reports enough suspects gets leave, otherwise they have to work overtime.

One of the documents provided by Zhang Yabo is an instruction issued in August 2022 concerning how to handle so-called mentally ill patients. The document requires village-level administrative departments to conduct "screening and risk assessments." As for "who is considered mentally ill?" Zhang Yabo said it's those who are "unmarried," and "homeless people who drink alcohol and disobey village instructions."

Regarding forced marriages, Zhang Yabo said that if a Uyghur and a Han Chinese marry, the couple receives money. One colleague received 5,000 or even 10,000 yuan (RMB) for this.

Relatives in China harassed

Zhang Yabo became increasingly apathetic at work, including skipping daily briefings that determined arrest lists. He had his salary docked, his vacations canceled, and his superiors threatened to fire him.

In September 2023, Zhang Yabo resigned from his public office, citing "family and health reasons" in his resignation letter. He later went to Guangzhou in the south, where he learned English and hairdressing, and was baptized as a Christian.

Zhang Yabo joined a European tour group, which cost 35,600 yuan, approximately 4,500 euros. Before departure, he separated from his wife and sold his furniture and appliances. He also bribed officials to obtain an exit permit.

A screenshot shows that Zhang Yabo's domestic bank accounts have been frozen by the authorities for "legal reasons".

Zhang Yabo said his family is currently unable to leave China, his father was detained overnight by the police, and one of his friends was taken away for questioning.

Zhang Yabo also said that his mother was forced to call him, pleading with him to return to China. The authorities threatened his mother with imprisonment.

"I told the truth."

When Zhang Yabo resigned, he signed a confidentiality agreement to remain silent about the "state secrets he obtained." But now he has spoken out; he wants to tell the truth. He has submitted an asylum application in Germany.

When asked why he fled and spoke out, Zhang Yabo said it was because he was a Christian. He

produced a certificate of baptism, saying, "I am a Christian, and I want to answer to Jesus after I die." He added, "If one day I am asked what I did about the injustices there, I hope I can at least say: I told the truth."
The Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation (VOC) stated that the testimony of this Han Chinese former policeman is one of the most operationally detailed witness testimonies obtained to date from within Xinjiang's security system. This demonstrates that after Ma Xingrui succeeded Chen Quanguo as Xinjiang Party Secretary in December 2021, the authorities shifted from high-profile centralized detention to decentralized, routine detention, making it more difficult for outsiders to detect.
Dr. Adrian Zenz, a senior researcher at VOC, said that Zhang Yabo's testimony confirms that after the high-profile mass detentions ceased, forced labor went underground and was embedded by the authorities into the state's daily administrative machinery.

## Former Xinjiang police officer flees to Germany with classified information, revealing the inside story of the CCP's persecution of Uyghurs.

17 April 2026, VOT

Former Xinjiang police officer Zhang Yabo fled to Germany with classified evidence, exposing the Chinese Communist Party's repression and persecution in Xinjiang. He had nine years of law enforcement and detention experience in Xinjiang and personally participated in the surveillance and arrest of Uyghurs. Zhang Yabo described to the media the daily surveillance methods, including preventing people from entering mosques, searching personal mobile phones, and establishing detailed surveillance files.According to a report by the German magazine Der Spiegel on April 16, a former police officer from Xinjiang fled to Germany with classified evidence exposing the Chinese Communist Party's repression and persecution in Xinjiang. The US-based Human Rights in China provided a detailed account of this story on its official X account. Zhang Yabo, who served as a police officer and prison guard in Xinjiang for nine years, escaped from Neuschwanstein Castle in Bavaria during a tour group trip, bringing with him a large number of classified documents revealing the inner workings of Beijing's repressive apparatus.
Zhang Yabo has nine years of law enforcement and detention experience in Xinjiang, and has personally participated in the surveillance and arrest of Uyghurs. He described to the media the routine surveillance methods, including preventing people from entering mosques, searching personal mobile phones, and establishing detailed surveillance files.
The day after his escape, Zhang Yabo appeared outside the headquarters of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) in Munich. Human Rights in China pointed out that although the WUC has been designated as a "separatist and terrorist organization" by Beijing and has been heavily smeared domestically, Zhang Yabo chose this place as the final destination of his escape and is prepared to publicly release the evidence of persecution he possesses.
The report states that this incident is extremely rare and of great significance. As a grassroots executor of the state apparatus, Zhang Yabo is not only a participant in policy but has now become a key whistleblower. He risked immense personal danger to bring crucial evidence out of China, which will not only provide the international community with firsthand internal evidence, filling the gaps in external evidence gathering, but also once again expose the cracks within China's vast stability maintenance system.

## New city established in Xinjiang

17 April 2026, China Daily

The people's government of Northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region on Friday announced the establishment of Caohu city.
The establishment of the county-level city, which is directly administered by the autonomous region, has been approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council.
The seat of the city government is Caohu township.

## Global pharma giants escape US regulation while testing drugs in China`s Xinjiang

14 April 2026, Investment Guru India

Multinational pharmaceutical giants -- with R&D investments and human trials running in China's **Xinjiang** region and at Chinese military hospitals -- are escaping **US** regulation that prohibits drug development or clinical testing, according to an article in The Wire, a New York-headquartered global digital magazine.
Data put together by The Wire China and WireScreen from ClinicalTrials.gov, a medical trial database maintained by the US National Library of Medicine, shows that multinational companies have for years actively been sponsoring medical trials taking place in Xinjiang and at **People's Liberation Army**-affiliated sites.
The true scope of this testing is difficult to measure. ClinicalTrials.gov requires registered trials to conform to regulations from regional authorities, but some trials only list the city where the test is held, not the hospital. PLA hospitals also do not always openly identify their military affiliation. China has 165 PLA hospitals across

each of its provinces, according to **WireScreen** data.

Testing at multiple locations allows companies to collect data on how medicine impacts a variety of people under different conditions. The results are used by companies seeking approval from regulatory agencies to market the final product.

The report cites the example of a Covid-era treatment, developed by UK-headquartered **AstraZeneca**, which illustrates the role Xinjiang played in the testing of a medicine that received regulatory approval in the United States. The treatment, which was eventually sold under the name Evusheld, was trialed at a hospital in Xinjiang and at other sites across China, the United States, Europe, Latin America, and Japan.

Evusheld's Xinjiang clinical trial was just one of hundreds sponsored by AstraZeneca between 2021 and 2023. Yet, its example illustrates how the pharmaceutical industry can operate in Xinjiang and bring products to market in the United States without facing regulatory requirements addressing forced labour concerns in the region. Several foreign governments and the **United Nations (UN)** have said that human rights violations are rife in Xinjiang, the article states.

Unlike agricultural and technology firms operating in the region, drug manufacturers were exempt from sanctions under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, according to a 2024 report from the Washington-based research group Center for Advanced Defense Studies. The act, passed in 2021, prevents the import of all goods mined, produced, or manufactured in Xinjiang unless a forced labour-free supply chain is otherwise proven.

As a result, the industry has been able to continue testing medicines on patients in Xinjiang and at military hospitals. Data identified by the report shows the top multinational sponsors of trials over the past fifteen years.

The article highlights that the lack of oversight prompted the House of Representatives' bipartisan Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party to address the Food and **Drug Administration (FDA)** in 2024 and call for more information on pharmaceutical trials conducted in Xinjiang and at PLA hospitals.

"China runs trials at PLA military hospitals and in Xinjiang, where there has been a documented history of people being coerced into medical studies amid the Chinese Communist Party's genocide targeting Uyghur Muslims and other minorities," the select committee's chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI) said in a March 18 hearing on the generic drug supply chain, according to the article.

"In spite of this forced testing, the FDA currently allows companies to use data from uninspected Chinese trial sites to advance drug applications in the United States," he added.

## Dubious Uyghur "Testimonies" Hail "Conversions" to Atheism—Through Marriage

14 April 2026,Bitter Winter

A series of nearly identical videos by Uyghur women married to Han men reveals a state-aligned narrative disguised as individual expression.



*Two of the "happy spouses" who appeared on Douyin.*

The "Kashgar Times" deserves credit for noticing what many observers had only sensed: a sudden flood of Douyin videos in which Uyghur women, all married to Han Chinese men, deliver strikingly similar monologues about love, loyalty, and belief. While the newspaper's irony is sharp, the real story—and what matters most to readers—is the videos themselves. They form a coordinated campaign that uses the aesthetics of personal confession to advance a political message.

Across dozens of clips, the structure barely changes. Each woman begins by claiming she is under attack online for marrying a Han man. She describes accusations of betraying her people, her religion, or her ancestors. She then pivots to a declaration that she does not practice Islam, often adding that many young Uyghurs no longer believe in religion at all. She concludes by affirming that her true faith lies in the Communist Party or the national flag and that her marriage contributes to "ethnic unity." Even the defensive refrain, "this is my life, this is my freedom," appears with uncanny regularity.

The uniformity is not subtle. One woman says she has a "clear conscience" because all ethnic groups are "one Chinese family." Another proclaims her "faith is the Communist Party." A third insists that marrying a Han man "should be encouraged more." A fourth declares that the five-star red flag is her only belief. These are not variations on a theme; they are the same theme, repeated with minor cosmetic differences.

Equally telling is the narrative of online harassment. The women describe torrents of abuse, private messages condemning them to hell, and strangers calling them traitors. Yet in Xinjiang's tightly controlled digital environment, where comments on religion or identity are quickly removed and sometimes punished, such widespread criticism would be unlikely to last long enough to become a trend. It is probably not

even real. The lack of visible evidence for this backlash is part of the story. The videos require the viewer to accept a conflict that cannot be independently verified.
The campaign also reframes intermarriage as a civic duty. These marriages are not shown as personal relationships but as contributions to national cohesion. The women insist that critics are jealous, ignorant, or extremist—categories that, in Xinjiang, carry serious implications. Dissent is unacceptable, and the only response is celebration.
A second article of the "Kashgar Times" documents how matchmaking companies incite Uyghur women to marry Han Chinese men and break free from their families' alleged religious strictness.
Obviously, the videos do not acknowledge the documented pressure on Uyghur women to marry Han men or the consequences of refusing. They do not mention the broader context in which religious practice has been restricted, Islamic expression discouraged, and political loyalty elevated as the main marker of identity. Instead, they present a world where rejecting Islam, embracing the Party, and marrying across ethnic lines are simply natural choices for modern young women.
Beyond the mechanics of the campaign, the videos themselves tell the deeper story: a narrative constructed through repetition, where personal testimony becomes a vehicle for political messaging, and where the boundaries of "freedom" are defined by how closely one's words align with official ideology.
The challenge for viewers is not to watch these videos as isolated expressions but to recognize the choreography behind them. Their sameness is not accidental. It is the point.

## China has mapped out a third new county in Xinjiang. Why?

11 April 2026, SCMP

China has established a third new county in its Xinjiang region, this time along vital transport routes linking the country to South and Central Asia.
Analysts said the move underscored Beijing's focus on governance and security along its far-flung western borders.
Sitting in southwestern Xinjiang near the Karakoram Range, Cenling county is a linchpin for China's frontier security and regional development.
Its strategic value stems from its proximity to the borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the disputed western sector of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India.
The government of the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region announced the establishment of Cenling county on March 26.
Although the announcement did not specify the county's exact administrative divisions and boundaries, it said it would be administered by Kashgar prefecture.
Kashgar, a historic city on the ancient Silk Road, is a strategic gateway connecting China with South and Central Asia.
It is also the starting point of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, an important component of the Belt and Road Initiative, the Beijing-led transcontinental infrastructure and trade project.
Yun Sun, a senior fellow and director of the China Programme at the Stimson Centre in Washington, said the new county represented a drive towards a "stronger grass-roots level government structure for effective governance and control".
"It helps to strengthen the stabilisation efforts by the government in the frontier region, which is traditionally more subject to ethnic turbulence and potential infiltration of foreign militants from Central Asia," she said.
Xinjiang is home to several ethnic minorities, including the mainly Muslim Uygurs, as well as Tajiks, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs. It remains a sensitive focus for Beijing after its campaign to root out Uygur separatism and militancy while navigating international scrutiny over human rights.
Beijing is also wary of risks that Afghan-based terror groups might exploit the region's deep cultural and linguistic links to Central Asia.
Lin Minwang, a professor and vice-dean at the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, Shanghai, said Cenling held significance on multiple levels.
"It reflects China's deeper recognition of the strategic importance of this region," he said. "At a broader level, the decision signals China's emphasis on its borderlands."
The jurisdiction of the new county was geographically connected to Afghanistan's Wakhan Corridor, he noted, which signalled China's security and counterterrorism considerations in the region.
The corridor – a narrow Afghan strip separating Tajikistan, Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir – borders Xinjiang for 74km (46 miles). Beijing has repeatedly voiced concerns about Uygur militants using it as a springboard to enter Xinjiang from Afghanistan.
The birth of Cenling county reflects Beijing's efforts to strengthen governance and development in Xinjiang's border areas through administrative adjustments.
The county seat is Xinhua township, established in June last year to lay the groundwork for Cenling.
By doing so, county-level governance and public services have essentially been brought closer to the frontier, boosting border management, development and security.




Cenling is also the third new county set up in Xinjiang since December 2024, following Hean and Hekang under Hotan prefecture.

The three counties form an administrative belt along the G219 highway, bolstering China's border security and stability efforts while offering belt and road access to Central and South Asia via Kashgar.

The national highway corridor runs along China's western and southern border from Xinjiang to Guangxi province for 10,000km, boosting regional connectivity and external outreach. It remains central to Xinjiang's transport priorities under China's latest five-year plan, covering 2026 to 2030.

Last year, India formally protested against the establishment of Hean and Hekang, arguing that parts of their jurisdiction fell within its union territory of Ladakh.

Hean encompasses much of the disputed Aksai Chin plateau, which sits directly on the G219 highway.

Administered by China but claimed by India as part of Ladakh, Aksai Chin is a focal point of their border dispute in the western Himalayas.

## China's energy dominance plan is built on the backs of forced labor

11 April 2026, The Hill

As Beijing unveiled its 15th Five-Year Plan this March, headlines focused on the Chinese government's ambitions to dominate semiconductors, clean energy and artificial intelligence. Yet too little attention is being paid to the dark infrastructure underlying those ambitions.

The new plan is explicitly designed to expand and entrench a state-imposed forced labor system targeting Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, badly exploiting these workers as an engine of economic growth.

China's continued exploitation of Uyghur people is central to its ambition to dominate global critical mineral markets. With access to cheap energy and coerced labor in Xinjiang, this creates a structural advantage that U.S. companies cannot fairly compete with. When President Trump meets with Xi Jinping in May, he should take advantage of the vital opportunity to raise these concerns directly.

Our organization analyzed the policy documents released at this year's two sessions, the annual gathering where China's leadership sets its national agenda. We found alarming strategic dependencies quietly accumulating inside the Western technology and defense industries — all built on terrible abuses.

The new plan's overriding priority is to position China at the "forefront of global science and technology," by eliminating critical technological dependencies and ensuring that its development trajectory cannot be disrupted by external pressure or supply chain coercion. The success of these goals depends on securing reliable access to raw materials at scale. The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is central to that.

For example, Xinjiang holds 83.5 percent of China's beryllium reserves, a material with no substitute in semiconductor manufacturing. China controls 99 percent of global lithium iron phosphate battery production, much of it anchored in Xinjiang's mineral wealth.

The Chinese Communist Party also exploits Xinjiang's abundant coal reserves to provide subsidized energy that enables mineral processing. Industrial electricity in Xinjiang costs approximately 2.7 cents per kilowatt-hour. In the U.S., it's roughly 7.5 cents, and 22 cents in the European Union. Since energy accounts for 40 to 60 percent of processing costs for materials like titanium, magnesium and lithium, this gap creates a structural competitive advantage that Western producers simply cannot match on their own terms.

Xinjiang's advantage in minerals doesn't just come from subsidized energy: It comes from how those resources are processed from systemic reliance on state-imposed forced labor programs. China's economic plans depend heavily on forced labor. That's why the government intends to expand them, make them more deeply embedded in the system and use more advanced technology to enforce them.

China is using artificial intelligence to monitor and profile Uyghur workers, classifying them in real time and directing them into forced labor. Non-compliance is not an option. Refusal can be viewed by the government as sympathizing with "extremist" ideologies, which could lead to incarceration.

At this year's two sessions, the Chinese government also passed the Ethnic Unity and Progress Law. This is a sweeping piece of legislation that establishes Mandarin-first policies across all official and educational settings and standardizes teaching materials to promote a single Chinese identity. The law turns the stated

goal of "ethnic unity" into a legal requirement across society. It limits what people can say and see, while increasing surveillance and tightening government control.

This isn't mere rhetoric — when policies are set in five-year plans, local governments move quickly to carry them out. On the same day the new five-year plan was released, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps and 18 state owned companies signed 92 agreements across energy, critical minerals, computing and manufacturing. These developments point to a broader push to scale up Xinjiang's role across the full industrial chain.

By the time critical minerals from Xinjiang reach global markets, their price already reflects the hidden inputs of electricity generated under coerced conditions and labor extracted through state compulsion. Producers who don't benefit from either cannot compete on price. And once electricity enters China's national grid, it loses its origin, meaning products manufactured far from Xinjiang can still carry the hidden subsidy of forced labor while appearing fully compliant with regulators and buyers.

When Trump heads to China next month, he can make clear that the U.S. will only compete on the basis of free and fair trade and will not tolerate efforts to manipulate critical mineral markets through systemic forced labor.

The administration has already begun taking important steps in this direction, calling on key trading partners to demonstrate how they are preventing goods made with forced labor from entering their markets and, in turn, indirectly entering the U.S. The administration should also follow through to ensure these commitments from partners are credible and effective.

The U.S. also has an opportunity to respond by more systematically enforcing the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act — a law passed in 2021 to prohibit the importing of any products linked to forced labor from Xinjiang. Most importantly, we must continue to support Uyghur, Kazakh and other Turkic communities in the face of China's ongoing repression and genocide.

China is taking a whole-of-government approach to dominate critical mineral markets by using forced labor. The U.S. must act vigorously to counter this threat.

## Conference in Ankara Highlights Global Concerns Over Uyghur Rights and Geopolitics

09 April 2026, Uyghur Times

A high-level conference titled *"Uyghur Turks in the World and Human Rights Violations Against Uyghur Turks in Asia"* was convened in Ankara by the Center for Uyghur Studies, bringing together leading scholars, policymakers, and advocates to examine the ongoing crisis facing Uyghur Turks.

The event opened with remarks from Abdureshid Abdulhamit, Vice President of the World Uyghur Congress, who addressed what he described as the continuing Uyghur genocide. He emphasized the urgency of sustained international attention and accountability.

Additional opening speeches were delivered by Mahmut Cömert, President of Yesevi Hareketi, and Abdulhamit Karahan, President of the Uyghur Academy Foundation.

The conference featured participation from prominent academics representing major Turkish universities. Speakers included Bülent Aksoy of Gazi University, Işık Kuşcu Bonnenfant of Middle East Technical University, Ragıp Kutay Karaca of Istanbul Aydın University, and Ömer Kul of Istanbul University. They were joined by Abdulhakim Idris, who contributed to the policy-oriented discussions.

Panel discussions focused on the geopolitical importance of East Turkistan, particularly its role in the Belt and Road Initiative, regional energy dynamics, and China's broader Central Asia policy. Speakers underscored how these strategic considerations intersect with ongoing human rights concerns affecting Uyghur Turks.

The session was moderated by Miraç Gür, who guided discussions on both academic and policy dimensions of the issue.

Organizers expressed their appreciation to the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy for its support in making the conference possible. They also extended thanks to Yesevi Hareketi, İsa Yusuf Alptekin Vakfı, and Uyghur Academy Foundation for their collaboration.



The conference concluded with a call for continued international engagement, deeper academic research, and stronger advocacy efforts to address the human rights situation of Uyghur Turks and their place within evolving global geopolitics.

## Uyghur Refugee's Testimony Challenges Canada's China Policy

07 April 2026, Turkestan Press

A Uyghur refugee who arrived in Canada just eight weeks ago has delivered a powerful first-hand account of forced labour, trafficking, and torture — testimony that directly challenges Prime Minister Mark Carney's pursuit of a Chinese electric vehicle deal and Liberal MP Michael Ma's parliamentary denial of Uyghur forced labour.

Sulayman, speaking through community leader and interpreter Rukiye Turdush, described growing up in East Turkistan's Kashgar region under a system of compulsory, unpaid agricultural labour known as "hashar," where elderly women were forced to sleep in the open desert for months at a time with no food, shelter, or pay. In December 2021, he was conscripted into a state-run labour transfer program and held without pay at a poultry processing factory in inland China for over two years.

In March 2024, he was trafficked by a man named Amao through Vietnam into Cambodia, where he was sold to a Chinese criminal compound for $17,000. There, he was forced to work as a scammer, beaten with a thick rubber whip by a former Chinese soldier, and repeatedly electrocuted for failing to meet fraud quotas — the shocks deliberately prolonged because he was Uyghur.

After a year of desperate outreach, Turdush negotiated his release for $5,000 from her own funds. He arrived in Canada in February 2026 and signed a sworn statement on March 21 before the Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide Against the Uyghurs, naming four relatives detained, tortured, or disappeared by the Chinese state.

On Carney's electric vehicle deal with China, Sulayman was blunt: "If you're driving that car, that car is blended with Uyghur blood." Of MP Michael Ma's parliamentary denial of forced labour, he said: "I don't see any difference between him and those Chinese officials."

Turdush described the forced labour system as a deliberate genocidal strategy — separating young Uyghur men and women across different provinces to prevent families from forming and fracturing those that already exist.

Now attending school in Toronto, Sulayman described the simple act of passing two police officers on a Toronto street who smiled and said hello — a moment of quiet disbelief for a man who spent his life in fear of uniformed authority.

"I feel so free," he said. "Canada saved my life. And at the same time, when they deal with China like that, that makes me a little bit sad."

## Uyghur Diaspora Marks 36th Anniversary of the Barin Uprising Across the Globe

07 April 2026, Uyghur Times

The Barin Uprising, which took place on April 5, 1990, in Barin Township of Akto County in East Turkistan, is remembered as a heroic act of resistance by the Uyghur people against the Chinese government's policies of oppression, repression, and assimilation. It marked a clear and direct expression of long-standing resistance to systematic oppression.

Led by **Zeydin Yusuf**, the uprising began with clear demands: "End the family planning policy, protect religious freedom, and put an end to Chinese oppression." With these slogans, the rebels launched an armed resistance against Chinese rule.

The Chinese government responded with a violent crackdown. Barin, a village of about 19,000 people, was surrounded by more than 30,000 Chinese troops, supported by tanks and helicopters. Despite having very limited weapons, the fighters led by Zeydin Yusuf inflicted significant damage during five days of intense fighting.

This turning point in modern Uyghur history resulted in the martyrdom of Zeydin Yusuf, his companions, and hundreds of Uyghurs. Thousands were arrested, and in some villages, even women and children were killed. According to accounts by Nizamidin Huseyin, a former reporter, many people in Kashgar, Yarkand, Guma, Poskam, and surrounding areas were later sentenced—without fair trial—to long-term imprisonment or death.

The Barin Uprising opened a new (phase) of awakening in Uyghur resistance against Chinese occupation. It demonstrated the Uyghur people's unwavering determination not to submit to oppression and left an enduring mark in history through the sacrifices of its martyrs.

For Uyghurs, the Barin Uprising is not just a historical event—it symbolizes courage, resistance, and the enduring aspiration for freedom. The martyrs of Barin left behind a legacy: to stand firm against injustice, to struggle for justice, and never to give up on freedom.

Each year, Uyghur diaspora communities commemorate this day through protests, gatherings, and memorial events. On the 36th anniversary, similar activities were held worldwide.

In **Germany**, demonstrations were organized by the World Uyghur Congress in Munich's Max-Joseph Square and in Berlin, where Uyghurs, along with Turkish and German supporters, protested in front of the Chinese Embassy.

In the **United Kingdom**, a panel discussion was held in London at the Yunus Emre Institute,

organized by Uyghur organizations, with participation from prominent Uyghur leaders.In the **Netherlands**, a commemorative seminar was held with the participation of Uyghur activists and camp survivors.In **Belgium**, a protest and photo exhibition took place in Brussels, drawing public attention and questions from passersby.In **Australia**, Uyghurs gathered in Sydney for demonstrations and exhibitions marking the anniversary.In **Kazakhstan**, a memorial event was held in Almaty on April 5, where participants honored the martyrs and prayed for those who sacrificed their lives for the nation.Speakers at the event discussed the historical significance of the uprising and emphasized the importance of international cooperation against ongoing repression.
In **Türkiye**, multiple Uyghur organizations jointly held commemorative events in Istanbul. In Ankara, a panel titled *"The April 5 Barin Uprising and the Uyghur Genocide"* was organized with the participation of Uyghur institutions and foundations, honoring the martyrs and reflecting on the legacy of the uprising.
The Barin Uprising continues to stand as a powerful symbol of Uyghur resistance and the enduring struggle for freedom.

### Uyghur Detainee Bahtiyar Omer Dies Shortly After Release from Camp

05 April 2026, Ughyur Times

This news article was originally reported by Shohret Hoshur for the Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service, translated into English, and published by Uyghur Times.
A Uyghur man who had previously been detained in a re-education camp has died under unclear circumstances shortly after his release, according to information obtained by family members and confirmed in part by local authorities.
Ilyar Omer, a Uyghur living in Austria, told the media that his older brother, Bakhtiyar Omer, who resided in the Ili River neighborhood of Ghulja city, died suddenly at home not long after being released from a detention facility. Ilyar said he had been unable to contact his brother or family for more than seven years and only recently learned of his brother's death through former neighbors.
A police officer from the Ili River precinct in Ghulja, who answered a phone inquiry, did not deny that Bakhtiyar Omer had died after being released from detention. However, the officer declined to provide details regarding the cause of death, stating that such information would require authorization from higher authorities.
According to Ilyar Omer, his brother, a father of three, was 53 years old. He reportedly died on March 18 after experiencing sudden breathing difficulties and suffering for several hours at home.
Bakhtiyar Omer had previously worked as a staff member of a local residential committee near the Ili River in Ghulja. He was detained in 2018 after authorities discovered that he had engaged in religious practices, including prayer.
After years without information about his brother, Ilyar began participating in protests against China in Vienna and gave interviews to international media to raise awareness about his brother's situation. Seven days after one such interview—five years after Bakhtiyar's detention—he received information that his brother had been released that same day. Fearing further repercussions for his family, Ilyar refrained from contacting them again.
Only last week, Ilyar learned from a former Chinese classmate who had lived in the same neighborhood that his brother had died suddenly.
He emphasized that his brother had no known prior health issues, suggesting that the years spent in detention may have contributed to his death.
Previous investigations have indicated that detainees in the camps are often released only after their health has significantly deteriorated to the point that they can no longer endure camp conditions. Some of those released reportedly die within days or months.
While Ilyar stated that his brother died two years after his release, another local source from the same neighborhood claimed that Bakhtiyar had been detained a second time earlier this year and was released again just two months prior to his death. Authorities declined to comment on this alleged second detention.

## HONG KONG - PRC

### Hong Kong Sends Uncharged Protesters to Mainland China Under 'Rehabilitation' Program, Critics Cite Coercion

20 April 2026, Vision Times

When Hong Kong police cracked down on the 2019 protests against a proposed extradition law, which would have allowed Hong Kong residents to be sent to mainland China to face trial in courts controlled by the Communist Party, they arrested more than 10,000 people. Of those, roughly 3,000 faced prosecution. The remaining 7,000 were left in legal limbo, with no charges filed and no resolution announced.
Tang Ping-keung, who serves as Hong Kong's secretary for security and is responsible for the city's policing and national security apparatus, broke that silence in an interview broadcast by Cable TV Hong Kong on April 11. Tang said the government had launched a "special program" one to two years earlier, targeting those arrested but not charged. Its stated purpose was to give them "rehabilitation" opportunities outside the

courtroom while remaining, Tang insisted, within the law.

The program's centerpiece is organized trips to mainland China. Participants are taken across the border to experience life in the country and, in Tang's framing, to "understand national security." Tang acknowledged that some participants were reluctant or worried they might be detained once on the mainland. In those cases, authorities offered to accompany them personally. Back in Hong Kong, participants could be placed in government internship positions and, Tang suggested, might even qualify for civil service jobs if they met eligibility requirements.

Asked whether participants would be shielded from future prosecution, Tang said the government had handled these cases in a manner that did not require a court appearance, in compliance with existing law. He declined to give figures on how many people had entered the program, but said a number of participants had gone on to help promote "national security" within the community.



*Hundreds of thousands of protesters assemble during Hong Kong's 2019 天滅中共 (Tian Mie Zhonggong) "Heaven Will Eliminate the Chinese Communist Party" movement. While sacked by an unprecedented wave of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases, hospitalizations, and deaths, Hong Kongers were roused from bed by a 4.1 earthquake on March 14. (Image: Carl Court/Getty Images)*

**Human rights lawyers describe program as ideological coercion outside legal framework**

The program has drawn sharp condemnation from legal professionals and human rights advocates outside mainland China's jurisdiction.

Wu Shaoping, director of the Overseas Human Rights Lawyers Alliance, a group of Chinese legal professionals practicing in exile, told overseas Chinese-language media that the program's purpose is to make Hong Kong people internalize loyalty to the Party's political authority. The Hong Kong government, he said, is using the threat of unresolved prosecution as leverage: offering a way out of legal uncertainty in exchange for participation in supervised ideological programs on the mainland. Wu said the approach reduces international scrutiny while achieving similar outcomes through administrative means. "Using a so-called 'rehabilitation program' to achieve total thought control over Hong Kong people is, in substance, the CCP's political re-education and brainwashing," he said.

Lai Jianping, a former Beijing-based lawyer and independent legal scholar, was more direct. The program treats people as political subjects to be reshaped, subjecting them to "political, psychological, and personal transformation." The authorities are substituting political management for the legal process, he argued: "They use politics to replace law, punishing these so-called suspects in their hearts, with the goal of making them submit to the CCP's authoritarian rule."

These individuals were never convicted of anything. The Hong Kong government has constructed an off-books arrangement in which avoiding prosecution is tied to compliance with ideological requirements, including supervised travel to mainland China and participation in state-linked activities, without any court proceeding subject to public scrutiny or appeal.



*Singer Hins Cheung King-hin performs during the half time of the Legends Assemble match between Real Madrid Legends and Barcelona Heroes at Hong Kong Stadium on Dec. 20, 2024 in Hong Kong, China. (Image: Yu Chun Christopher Wong/Eurasia Sport Images/Getty Images)*

**Pop star's apology highlights scope of 'rehabilitation' program**

The workings of the "rehabilitation" program became visible this week through the public behavior of Hins Cheung, one of Hong Kong's most popular Cantonese-language pop singers, who was born in the southern Chinese city of Guangzhou and built his career in Hong Kong.

Cheung spent years on the visible side of Hong Kong civil society. In 2014, when Taiwan was convulsed by the Sunflower Movement, a wave of student-led demonstrations against a proposed trade agreement that critics said would tie Taiwan too closely to the mainland, he posted a black-and-white image of clasped hands on Instagram with the caption: "To the students across the strait, keep going." The post was read widely as an expression of solidarity with Taiwan's protesters. Later that year, when Hong Kong erupted in its own mass pro-democracy demonstrations, known as the Umbrella Revolution, a separate movement from the 2019 protests that first put the question of Hong Kong's political future onto the world's front

pages, Cheung joined a group of Hong Kong entertainers in recording "Who Has Not Yet Spoken Up."

The song's title was a pointed public challenge to the many celebrities who had calculated that silence was safer than solidarity. Recording it carried real professional risk: the mainland Chinese market is the dominant revenue source for Hong Kong's entertainment industry, and any public association with pro-democracy politics can close that market permanently. He paid exactly that price: nationalist voices on the mainland labeled him a supporter of Hong Kong independence, and when he appeared on "Singer," a nationally televised mainland talent competition with enormous commercial stakes, in 2017, the backlash was strong enough that he withdrew from the program and deleted the recordings he had already made.

That background did not fully anticipate what followed. Cheung issued a public apology to Hong Kong media, saying he regretted his past criticism of the Hong Kong government and was sorry for his earlier statements. He then announced he would personally lead a group of young people arrested during the 2019 protests, but never charged, on an exchange trip to mainland China. The announcement placed him inside the government's "rehabilitation" program, as a high-profile escort for the group Tang had described.

The apology coincided with a mass unfollowing on Instagram. Cheung removed dozens of people from the list of accounts he follows, including fellow entertainers Sammi Cheng and Joey Yung, who are among Hong Kong's most prominent pop figures, as well as singer-songwriter Terence Lam, musician Tyson Yoshi, actress Gillian Chung, and prolific lyricist Wyman Wong. The unfollowing swept across a wide range of his professional and personal contacts.

The pattern quickly drew attention among his followers and across Hong Kong media. Comments flooded in: "Something feels very off here." "I'm heartbroken. How did it come to this?" "Was he threatened?" "Why unfollow so many people? There must be more to this." "In the end, he just couldn't hold on."

Many observers interpreted the developments in similar terms: the apology appeared to have been made under pressure, the mainland trip announcement was seen as linked to official arrangements, and the unfollowing was viewed either as distancing or as a signal to those he cut off, or both.

**Program applies beyond protesters to individuals with public record of dissent**

Cheung was not among those arrested in 2019. His public profile and his earlier statements, rather than any criminal case, appear to have contributed to his involvement.

His career gave him influence among younger audiences in Hong Kong and recognition in Taiwan. A court case, had one taken place, would have been part of the public record and subject to legal procedures. His participation in a mainland exchange program is different: it is public and presented as voluntary, though in the broader context of pressure on dissenting voices in Hong Kong, that characterization has been questioned. It also suggests that figures associated with earlier pro-democracy activity are now appearing in state-linked initiatives. The "rehabilitation" framework, as described by Tang, applies to individuals seen as posing political risk, whether or not they face formal charges.

The scale and speed of the unfollowing point in a similar direction. Social media connections among Hong Kong entertainment figures carry political implications in the current environment, and visible associations can create risk. The unfollowing was broad and rapid, extending across Cheung's network rather than focusing on specific individuals. It marked a visible separation from earlier associations, observed publicly in a context where such signals are closely watched.

## United Nations must take action to protect human rights defenders from digital transnational repression

16 April 2026, Hong Kong Watch

Today, Hong Kong Watch participated in a United Nations online consultation convened by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), presenting evidence of technology-facilitated transnational repression targeting Hong Kong human rights defenders and calling on UN member states to take action.

The consultation forms part of the OHCHR's broader process, mandated following the 58th Human Rights Council session in March 2025, to assess the risks digital technologies pose to human rights defenders and identify best practices to address those risks across different regions.

Drawing on our written submission and report *Invisible Decline: Violations of Digital Rights in Hong Kong and their Impact*, Hong Kong Watch's Advocacy Officer Landson Chan described an escalating trend of technology-facilitated acts of repression. Attacks against Hong Kong activists are no longer confined to the digital sphere, but increasingly extend across sovereign borders to persecute exiled individuals in their new countries of residence.

Mr Chan provided examples on how technology-facilitated attacks reach beyond the digital sphere. In the UK, Carmen Lau was targeted with sexually explicit deepfake images that were printed and sent to her former neighbours. In Australia, a fabricated poster of the wife of former Hong Kong legislator and Hong Kong Watch Advisor Ted Hui, depicting her as a sex worker offering sexual services, was distributed near their home. In

Canada, activists have received Telegram messages revealing personal details alongside explicit threats of violence, creating a climate of fear around continued advocacy.

These incidents form part of a broader pattern. Doxxing campaigns have exposed sensitive personal information, including home addresses and family details, while waves of anonymous threats from fake accounts and spoofed identities are used to overwhelm targets.

Based on this evidence, Mr Chan put forward three concrete asks to the United Nations:

1. Formal recognition of technology-facilitated transnational repression: UN member states must recognise technology-facilitated transnational repression as a distinct and serious category of harm. This category warrants the same urgency as direct physical threats when attacks are coordinated across borders, carry physical consequences, and target individuals for their human rights work.
2. Practical, accessible protection for defenders: Defenders need safe and trusted reporting mechanisms, funded access to digital security support, and clear legal pathways for recourse when attacks originate from foreign state actors or their proxies.
3. Platform accountability: Social media companies and messaging services must be required to detect, disrupt, and act swiftly on coordinated harassment campaigns targeting human rights defenders in exile.

Hong Kong Watch urges the United Nations to recognise and take seriously digital attacks that are happening against the Hong Kong diaspora and other dissidents worldwide.

Landson Chan, Advocacy Officer at Hong Kong Watch, said:

"What we presented to the United Nations today is not a collection of online incidents but a documented pattern of coordinated, cross-border intimidation. Doxxing, deepfakes, and threatening messages are tools designed not just to harm individuals, but to send a message to every Hong Kong activist in exile that nowhere is safe, and nothing they do online stays online. The physical consequences are real. The fear is real. And the international community must treat it as such. We urge the United Nations to take concrete steps to make the digital space a safe forum for free expression."

You can read our full written submission to the OHCHR here.

**香港監察參與聯合國網上諮詢　呼籲採取行動保護人權捍衛者免受數碼跨國鎮壓**

香港監察今日參與由聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處（人權高專辦）召開的聯合國網上諮詢，提出以科技手段跨國鎮壓香港人權捍衛者的證據，並呼籲聯合國成員國採取行動。

香港監察倡議及傳訊主任Landson Chan引用香港監察書面意見書和報告《隱形衰退：香港數碼權利侵害行為及其影響》（Invisible Decline: Violations of Digital Rights in Hong Kong and their Impact），講述以科技手段施行鎮壓不斷升級的趨勢。針對香港社運人士的攻擊不再局限於數碼領域，而是愈來愈跨越主權邊界，迫害流亡到新居國的人士。

Landson舉例說明科技助長型攻擊如何超越數碼領域。英國方面，劉珈汶受到寄給她舊鄰居的深偽裸露照片騷擾。澳洲方面，有人偽造海報，誣蔑前香港立法會議員、香港監察顧問許智峯的太太為提供性服務的性工作者，並在多處分發。加拿大方面，社運人士收到揭露個人資料並附有明確暴力威脅的Telegram訊息，在持續倡議中營造恐懼氣氛。

這些事件是更廣大行為模式的一部分。「起底」行動洩露住家地址和家人詳細資料等敏感個人資料，而假戶口和偽造身分發動的一波又一波匿名威脅則用來壓倒目標對象。

根據這些證據，Landson向聯合國提出三項具體要求：

1. 正式承認科技助長型跨國鎮壓：聯合國成員國必須承認科技助長型跨國鎮壓為獨特且嚴重的傷害類別。當攻擊經跨境協調，會造成現實後果，並針對人權工作者時，這類傷害與直接現實威脅一樣需要緊急應對。
2. 向人權捍衛者提供實際且容易取得的保護：當攻擊源自外國行為者或其代理人時，人權捍衛者需要安全可靠的舉報機制、獲資助的數碼安全支援，以及明確的法律追索途徑。
3. 推行平台問責制：社交媒體公司和通訊服務商必須要偵察、中斷並迅速採取行動應對針對流亡人權捍衛者的經協調騷擾行動。

香港監察促請聯合國承認並認真看待針對世界各地海外港人社群及其他異見人士的數碼攻擊。

香港監察倡議及傳訊主任Landson Chan表示：

「我們今日向聯合國提出的不是一系列網絡事件，而是有案可稽的經協調跨境恐嚇行為模式。起底、深偽和威脅訊息等工具不但旨在傷害個別人士，而且意圖向所有香港流亡社運人士傳達信息：無地方是安全的，他們在網上做的事情不會停留在網上。現實後果實際存在，恐懼亦實際存在。國際社會必須正視這一點。我們促請聯合國採取具體措施，讓數碼空間成為言論自由的安全論壇。」

香港監察向人權高專辦提交的書面意見書全文可在此處閱覽。

## Hong Kong Expands National Security Powers to Include Forced Device Decryption

06 April 2026, China Scope

Hong Kong authorities have introduced new implementation rules under Article 43 of the National Security Law (NSL), granting police the power to compel designated individuals to unlock electronic devices such as phones and computers. The amendments took effect on March 23 and were enacted by Chief Executive John Lee and the Committee for Safeguarding National Security, bypassing the Legislative Council.

Under the new rules, a "specified person" — broadly defined to include not just suspects but anyone who owns, has access to, or knows the password of a relevant device — must provide decryption information upon police request. Refusing or providing false information is a criminal offense. Penalties for refusal reach up to HK$100,000 (approximately USD $12,800) and one year in prison, while providing misleading information carries up to HK$500,000 (approximately USD $64,100) and three years imprisonment.

The government insists the changes will not affect ordinary residents' daily lives or legal rights, and points to similar laws in the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and Singapore as precedent. Additional amendments also expand customs officers' powers to seize items deemed seditious, and allow authorities to order platforms to remove content deemed a threat to national security.

Critics, however, have raised serious concerns. Legal scholars warn that the broad definition of "specified person" could sweep in entirely unrelated individuals — such as family members sharing a device. Georgetown University researcher Eric Yan-ho Lai noted that even judicial oversight under the NSL may be insufficient, as courts can be overridden by a certificate from the Chief Executive declaring national security relevance.

Legal commentators also highlighted that while the government cited foreign laws as models, procedural safeguards in those jurisdictions — such as requiring separate warrants specifically for password disclosure — appear stricter than what Hong Kong's new rules require.

## Hong Kong applies to seize Jimmy Lai's 'offence-related' properties on national security grounds

02 April 2026, HKFP

The Hong Kong government has filed an application to seize "offence-related" properties owned by jailed pro-democracy media tycoon




*Hong Kong pro-democracy media mogul Jimmy Lai. File photo: Kelly Ho/HKFP.*

Jimmy Lai on national security grounds. It is unclear what the properties are.

The statement mentioned Lai's earlier convictions under the Beijing-imposed national security law, saying the High Court had found that he was the "mastermind and driving force behind the case, consciously using Apple Daily and his personal influence" to undermine local and Beijing authorities.

The announcement comes a week after the government designated three companies linked to Lai's now-defunct Apple Daily tabloid "prohibited organisations" and removed them from the corporate registry.

Police cordoned off the Apple Daily building in Tseung Kwan O a day later.

The three firms were tried and convicted alongside the Apple Daily founder in his high-profile national security case. Lai was sentenced to 20 years behind bars while the firms were each fined HK$3,004,500.

Thursday's statement cited a national security law provision that proceeds obtained from security offences, "including financial aid, gains and rewards, and funds and tools used or intended to be used in the commission of the offence shall be seized and confiscated."

The High Court will order the forfeiture order "only if it is satisfied, after an application is made by the Secretary for Justice, that the property to be forfeited meets relevant conditions."

The forfeiture order would cut "funding chains" and prevent further acts that could endanger national security, the statement read. Six former Apple Daily executives were jailed alongside Lai for up to 10 years. Two of them, Fung Wai-kong and Lam Man-chung, have lodged an appeal.

The jailing of the media tycoon and his staff has drawn international rebuke. United Nations human rights chief Volker Turk deplored the 20-year jail sentence handed to Lai, demanding that the verdict be "promptly quashed". In contrast, Hong Kong officials and lawmakers have lauded the jail term. Chief Executive John Lee said Lai "deserves his punishment," adding that the tycoon had "committed numerous heinous crimes and his evil deeds were beyond measure."

## Closing statements in Tiananmen vigil group trial set for May, as activist again barred from referring to 1989 'massacre'

01 April 2026, HKFP

The national security trial of Hong Kong's now-defunct Tiananmen vigil group has been adjourned to May after the defence called its last witness to the stand.Chow Hang-tung, a barrister and a former leader of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, continued representing herself in her case at the West Kowloon Law Courts Building on Tuesday.She is one of three defendants – along with activists Lee Cheuk-yan and Albert Ho – charged with inciting subversion. She and Lee pleaded not guilty, while Ho pleaded guilty.

Chow called Kwan Chun-pong, a former standing committee member and volunteer of the Alliance, to testify as a defence witness.

Kwan, 54, told the court he works at a supply chain company. He said he began volunteering for the Alliance in December 1989, and was part of the group's standing committee from 1998 to 2014.

Addressing the court, he recalled feeling touched by Hongkongers braving a typhoon 8 signal in May 1989 to march for the students. The same month, he said he attended a protest and witnessed the establishment of the Alliance when an activist announced the formation of the new group at Happy Valley Racecourse, where the march ended.

While Kwan was testifying, the judges interrupted him a number of times, saying he was going into too much detail, as they questioned Chow as to how his testimony related to the case. Judge Alex Lee also asked him to bring his evidence to "more recent" times, adding that he was recalling things from 30 years ago.

"The court will not allow you to make political statements," Lee told Chow in Cantonese. Chow replied that she was not doing so.

When Chow referred to the crackdown as the "June 4 massacre," Lee told her this was not accurate.

"If you use phrases like this, I will need to consider whether to allow you to continue asking questions," he said, correcting the phrase to "June 4 incident."

Lee then told Kwan to leave the courtroom so he could ask Chow what else she planned to question Kwan about, and the relevance of his testimony to the case.Chow said that – since Kwan had long-time involvement with the Alliance – he could testify about how the way the group operated remained the same over the decades.

Lee then said he needed to discuss with the other two judges as to whether to allow Chow to continue questioning Kwan. After a five-minute court break, Lee said the court had decided that she would only be able to ask him questions about matters from 2018 onwards.

Candlelight vigils

When court resumed, Kwan said that in 2018 and 2019, he attended the candlelight vigils in Victoria Park as a volunteer marshal. He said he and other marshals helped to maintain order in the park and also distributed candles and event pamphlets.




*The Tiananmen vigil in Victoria Park on June 4, 2019. File photo: Holmes Chan/HKFP.*

Kwan added that, while police were also present in Victoria Park during the vigils, their work was largely outside the park, where they oversaw crowd control.

He said that, during those two vigils, the Alliance did not have any issues with police.

Chow also asked Kwan how he understood the Alliance's political platform, which consists of five points – including releasing detained activists, demanding accountability for the crackdown and ending one-party rule in China.

Kwan said he thought of the five points as "interconnected," like the Olympic rings.

After Chow finished her questioning, government prosecutor Ivan Cheung cross-examined him.

Cheung asked him about his involvement with the Alliance after the 2019 vigil. He said he attend some of the group's other events that year, and was also present at the meeting in 2021 in which representatives voted to disband.Closing submissions

The judges had initially set aside 75 days for the national security trial, but the proceedings moved at a faster pace than expected. Tuesday marked the 22nd day of the trial.

Kwan was Chow's third and final witness. On Monday, Chow called a former journalist who witnessed the Tiananmen crackdown, as well as an elderly woman who attended the vigils almost every year, to testify.

Co-defendant Lee Cheuk-yan's lawyer finished presenting the activist's arguments earlier this month.

Judge Lee adjourned the case to May 18 for the prosecution and the defence to present their closing submissions.

Chow, Lee Cheuk-yan and Ho face up to 10 years in prison if convicted of inciting subversion.

In June 2020, Beijing inserted national security legislation directly into Hong Kong's mini-constitution – bypassing the local legislature – following a year of pro-democracy protests and unrest.
While activists say the law has stifled civil society groups, the authorities maintain it has restored stability and peace to the city.

# NEPAL-PRC

## Nepal objects to China over construction of a safety wall along Bhote Koshi River

28 April 2026, Kathmandu Post



*Post file photo*

The matter was first taken up by the District Administration Office, Sindhupalchowk, with the Ministry of Home Affairs about two weeks ago.
The government has asked the Chinese side to immediately halt construction of a safety wall along the Bhote Koshi River, which may force a change in the river's course and cause damage on the Nepali side.
The matter was first taken up by the District Administration Office, Sindhupalchowk, with the Ministry of Home Affairs about two weeks ago. An official at the District Administration Office in Sindhupalchowk told the Post that they received information from locals that the Chinese side was constructing a safety wall on its side of the border. The construction site is very close to the Nepal-China international border.
"We then wrote to the Home Ministry asking whether such unilateral construction is covered by the bilateral agreement between Nepal and China, and whether it requires prior approval from the other party," said the official.
Based on communication from the local administration, the Home Ministry raised the matter with the foreign ministry. The foreign ministry wrote to the Chinese side asking to halt the erection of the wall.
According to the officials, the construction is being carried out near marker (border pillar) number 53 of the Nepal-China international border. As per the boundary protocol signed between Nepal and China in 1963, either party shall prior inform the next party in case of construction of any structure along the international border, and both parties shall not attempt to change the course of boundary rivers.
"The local immigration office in Kodari, Sindhupalchowk, had reported the case to the district administration office, and later they communicated it to us (Home Ministry)," said Ananda Kafle, the home ministry spokesperson.
The protocol clearly states that both signing parties should prevent changing boundary rivers as per the established protocol. This applies to both sides of the India-China border, according to an official at the Department of Survey. Marker number 53 on the Nepal-China border is located near the construction site.
The boundary protocol also stated that both contracting parties should not deliberately change the course of the boundary river, and should prevent such changes. It further states that both sides should adopt joint measures to prevent loss. And there is also a provision of compensation if any contracting party causes damage on either side of the border due to a change in the river's course.
Kathmandu has yet to communicate with Sindhupalchowk after registering its formal reservation with the northern neighbour. The Bhote Koshi River lies in one of the most disaster-prone areas, and any construction along the river or attempt to alter its course would have a major impact on the Nepali side of the border during the monsoon, officials say.

## Nepal's New Govt Probing Infrastructure Deals Signed With China

26 April 2026, Ommcomnews

China has used its economic ties with Nepal as a stepping stone for political interference in the Himalayan country, and several deals signed with the Asian giant are now being looked into with the new government taking over in Kathmandu.
"In recent years, China's growing role in Nepal has moved beyond economic cooperation into areas that increasingly resemble strategic and political interference. From diplomatic pressure on issues related to Tibet and Taiwan to attempts at influencing internal decision-making, Beijing's footprint in Kathmandu has expanded significantly," according to an article published by the Institute for Conflict Research and Resolution (ICRR), a Delhi-based think tank.
It points out that during the tenure of K. P. Sharma Oli, Nepal signed several agreements with China,

which were projected as transformative steps toward economic independence.
However, these deals are now being scrutinised by the country's new government to investigate why several China-linked projects initiated during the Oli era were stalled, delayed or effectively stopped without clear reasons.
The new government has also announced that no new agreements with China will be considered until a full review of these projects is completed.
The turning point in Nepal-China relations came between 2016 and 2018, when Nepal moved closer to Beijing under the Belt and Road Initiative. The Oli government projected these agreements as a historic opportunity to transform Nepal into a regional connectivity hub. However, these infrastructure projects were not always backed by realistic planning or financial clarity, which sowed the seeds for future delays and complications.
In the list of stalled projects, the article lists the Budhi Gandaki Hydropower Project, awarded to China Gezhouba Group in May 2017, which was cancelled in November 2017, reinstated in 2018 and has remained effectively frozen since 2022 with no meaningful progress.
The proposed Kerung-Kathmandu railway, announced around 2016-2017, remains at the feasibility stage even in 2026, reflecting both technical challenges and a lack of financial closure.
Similarly, the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network, launched under BRI between 2017 and 2018, has not moved beyond conceptual discussions. Cross-border transmission line projects discussed between 2018 and 2020 remain unexecuted.
Similarly, infrastructure at the Rasuwagadhi-Kerung border pushed between 2017 and 2020 has seen only partial and slow development. Northern highway connectivity projects initiated between 2016 and 2018 remain incomplete, while the majority of BRI-linked initiatives identified during 2018-2019 have not been implemented even by 2026.
Digital expansion efforts involving Huawei and ZTE since 2017 have also progressed unevenly, raising concerns over both execution and strategic implications, the article points out.

## Giant ice tower delays opening of Everest climbing route

24 April 2026, Reuters

Hundreds of mountaineers are stranded at the Himalayan base camp for Mount Everest as a crevasse strewn with chunks of ice, including one towering block, delays the opening of the route to the world's tallest peak, officials and climbers said on Friday.
The annual climbing season for the 8,849-metre (29,032-foot) summit runs from April to May, when the weather conditions are most suited to reaching the windswept, icy peak.
But a 100-foot (30-metre) serac, or dangerous chunk of ice, blocks the path above base camp this year.
Seasoned Sherpa climbers, known locally as "icefall doctors", have so far been unable to fix their ropes, place ladders and carve a safe route through the treacherous Khumbu icefall to Camp II. Meanwhile the climbers, chafing to start their ascent while the weather is at its best, can only wait.
"Expeditions are all being delayed because of the impasse," Garrett Madison of U.S.-based Madison Mountaineering told Reuters from base camp.
"It looks likely to fall imminently, however, it could take some time," said Madison of the ice tower. He is leading a team of international climbers on his 16th ascent.

**ROUTE USUALLY HAS OPENED BY NOW**

The route typically opens by the third week of April, said Himal Gautam of Nepal's Department of Tourism.
"If the serac melts or collapses now, allowing the 'icefall doctors' to open the route, climbers could still make their summit bids on schedule," Gautam added.
If not, he said, authorities would send more Sherpa climbers to assess the risk and explore alternative routes. Officials said a team of eight "icefall doctors" is at base camp.
Mingma Sherpa, an 11-time Everest summiteer leading an international team at base camp, said acclimatisation rotations and the ferrying of gear to upper camps have been delayed.
Everest straddles the border between Nepal and China's Tibet region and can be climbed from both sides, though most climbers approach from the Nepali side.
Mountain climbing is a major source of income and employment for Nepal, home to eight of the world's 14 highest peaks. Authorities have issued 410 Everest permits so far this season, at a cost of $15,000 each. There is no limit on how many permits are issued, which has led to criticism from mountaineering experts about the risk of long queues forming in what is known as the death zone because the air is dangerously thin.
Among those waiting to ascend were 98 climbers, including 24 women, from China, the most from any country so farOfficial data also showed 49 from the United States and 46 from India.
Lukas Furtenbach of Furtenbach Adventures, based in Austria, who is leading a group of 40 international climbers, said he expected the number of climbers from the Nepal side to rise as China has closed the Tibetan side for climbers this year for unknown reasons, prompting them to come to the south.

## Love thy neighbours (and America)

23 April 2026, Nepal Times



*EAST AND WEST: Chinese Ambassador Zhang Maoming with PM Balendra Shah, and US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Samir Paul Kapur with RSP chair Rabi Lamichhane. Photos: ZHANG MAOMING / X, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs / X*

Just three weeks in, Prime Minister Balendra Shah has already shed two ministers, and is having to contend with the economic fallout of the West Asia war plus the global order that it has upended.

The new dispensation in Nepal has aroused interest in New Delhi, Beijing as well as Washington. The ouster of Home Minister Sudan Gurung, whose first act in office was to arrest former prime minister K P Oli, has foreign policy wonks scratching their heads.

The US sent Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Samir Paul Kapur on a special mission to figure out what is happening in Kathmandu. In town at the same time was Cao Jing, Deputy Director General of the Asian Affairs Department of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And Prime Minister Shah is preparing for an official visit to India.

For the Americans, it is mostly about containing China and looking after the welfare of Tibetan refugees, while pushing its own MCC Compact and State Partnership Program (SSP). Beijing is mindful of the post-Dalai Lama era, and does not want instability in Nepal to encourage free-Tibet activities. India lately seems more wary of American activity in what it considers its backyard.

The Chinese appear relieved to see Sudan Gurung go. Only last week, Ambassador Zhang Maoming met Gurung during which he raised the issue of Tibetan and Taiwanese activities in Nepal, seeking firm commitment that Kathmandu would not harbour activities hostile to Beijing.

"Geographically we are close to Tibet and not to the Mainland, so China remains suspicious of us, especially after the TOB and free-Tibet components that emerged from the GenZ protests," says geopolitical analyst Indra Adhikari.

Kapur, for his part, met RSP Chair Rabi Lamichhane, Finance Minister Swarnim Wagle and Foreign Minister Shishir Khanal. Although investment and infrastructure was on the agenda, the main issue seems to have been about Tibetan refugees. In nearly parallel meetings with ministers, Cao Jing warned Nepal not to be too cosy with the Americans.

For Indian academic and Nepal watcher Sukh Deo Muni, all this harks back to American activity in Nepal during the height of the Cold War. He tweeted: 'US senior diplomat Paul Kapur's statement in Kathmandu must be understood carefully in New Delhi. He said the US does not want China or any other country to dominate Nepal.'

'Any other country' could be a pointed reference to India, and what this means is that Nepal may now have to navigate even more carefully a tri-polar world order reshaped by the West Asia war.

Nepali journalist based in New Delhi Akanshya Shah agrees that the United States may not be seeing Nepal through the Indian lens anymore, while New Delhi does not want heightened US activity in what it considers its sphere of influence. All this is further complicated by recent frostiness in Washington-New Delhi ties.

"New Delhi doesn't have that familiarity factor it used to with old leadership in Nepal, but it is curious about what the young Balen Shah will do and what kind of relation he will pursue with India," she adds. "Certain decisions of the Balen government such as ending VIP culture and delivering passport at homes have hugely resonated with the Indian people, he has in some ways become a role model among the youth in India as well."

India has invited Prime Minister Shah for an official state visit, which will be his first foreign trip as per tradition. Shah graduated in structural engineering from a college in Bengaluru, and knows India well. Shah has injected religious elements into his public exposure as prime minister and this could help project Nepal's 'soft power' in dealing with India.

But he has also been a nationalist on the Limpiyadhura map dispute, and there are other thorny issues like air connectivity, river projects and power exports that need to be ironed out.

Sukh Deo Muni warns that the old Indian diplomatic approach based on religio-cultural stakeholders in Kathmandu may not work anymore. He wrote: 'India's Modi government must prepare itself well to deal with new Nepalese leadership and their empowered support base, which is self-confident, highly nationalist, aspirant and impatient.'

The RSP's 22-page National Commitment document said Nepal should abandon its historical 'buffer state' identity to serve as a 'vibrant bridge' between regional and global powers. Much of this debate is theoretical, and there is much navel-gazing that distracts from regional realpolitik.

"Whether we are a buffer state or a vibrant bridge, in today's heightened geopolitical scenario we

have to have good relations with good neighbours," explains Akanshya Shah. "What is of paramount importance is that our ties are based on the aspirations of the young generation, so that they are engaged."

Indra Adhikari goes as far as to say that the concepts of "buffer state" and "vibrant bridge" have both failed and Nepal is neither. "We have had zero roles in mediating or de-escalating the tensions between India and China to call ourselves a buffer state. As a vibrant bridge, we cannot facilitate trade of the two countries. The new government should have researched and consulted more before proposing the same outdated and failed foreign policy concepts."

What will be much more important for Prime Minister Shah is to continue Nepal's traditional policy of 'equidistance' and convince his interlocutors that it is not an anti-Indian stance.

"At a time when there is increased interest of big powers in Nepal, we need to do a bit of our own homework for the systemic reforms we want," says Akanshya Shah. "As for India, we first need to clearly define what we want on connectivity, energy and culture. But most importantly, we have to capitalise on the goodwill of India which we haven't been able to in the past."

Adds Indra Adhikari: "When it comes to fundamental aspects of foreign policy that ensures and enhances the well being of our citizens, national parties should all have one unified voice that doesn't change when the government does. Only then the future generations can own it."

## China envoy cautions Nepal home minister against govt participation in oath-taking of Tibet leader in exile

15 April 2026, MSN




*China envoy cautions Nepal home minister against govt participation in oath-taking of Tibet leader in exile*

The Chinese ambassador to Nepal, Zhang Maoming, has 'warned' newly elected Nepal Home Minister Sudan Gurung against government participation in the upcoming Tibetan leadership programme in the country, Kathmandu Post reported.

According to officials quoted in a Kathmandu Post report, the ambassador's most pointed warning concerns the upcoming swearing-in ceremony of Penpa Tsering, the head of the Central Tibetan Administration who is set to begin a second five-year term on 27 May in Dharamshala, India. Tsering secured more than 60 percent of the vote in February. The Chinese ambassador has cautioned against any official participation by the Nepal government.

"They might invite the government of Nepal to the oath-taking ceremony, so I would like to draw your attention to this matter," the ambassador said, according to one of the officials quoted anonymously in the report.

Nepali authorities said the government reiterated its longstanding position. Anand Kafle, a Home Ministry spokesperson who attended the meeting, said Gurung clarified that Nepal would not allow its territory to be used against China and would act to contain such activities.

The home minister also reaffirmed Nepal's adherence to the "one-China" policy, telling the ambassador that the country remained committed to its sovereignty and would not become "the pawn of any foreign power," according to the report.

The ambassador reportedly also said that Beijing had noted pro-Taiwan activities in Kathmandu. The talks between the two were described as "very candid but straightforward". According to the report, officials present during the meeting said that the Chinese ambassador raised issues of continued "separatist" activities by Tibetans on Nepali soil and the registration status of Tibetan refugees in Nepal.

"He also drew Gurung's attention to reports of Taiwan-related activity in Kathmandu, citing a cultural event in the capital last month where a Taiwanese flag was briefly displayed," the report said.

The incident cited by the ambassador took place on 28 March during the 13th International Folk Festival organized by the Everest Nepal Cultural Group. The event featured participants from 11 countries and territories, including Taiwan, Germany, South Africa and Estonia. A Taiwanese flag was briefly waved before being removed following a protest.

Gurung has previously faced accusations of supporting Tibetan refugee youth during last year's Gen Z protests, an allegation he has repeatedly denied. In October, in a Facebook post he publicly rejected claims linking his political campaign to the Free Tibet movement and foreign powers.

Chinese officials have also previously raised concerns about visits to Kathmandu by Tibetan Buddhist figures, including Jhonang Gyaltsab Rinpoche. At one point, the government led by former prime minister Sushila Karki moved to restrict such visits.

According to the report, messages of congratulations from the Dalai Lama and Tsering to Nepali leaders, including Prime Minister Balendra Shah, have drawn scrutiny in Chinese

strategic circles, which interpret recent political changes in Kathmandu as a possible shift toward closer ties with Western countries.
The report further mentions that during the meeting, Ambassador Zhang also raised broader concerns about the involvement of third countries in Nepal, suggesting such dynamics could contribute to China's strategic encirclement. Officials said he did not name any specific country. (Edited by Nardeep Singh Dahiya)

## New Nepal government assures policy continuity to concerned China

09 April 2026, Tibetan Review

Following visits earlier by multiple delegates from the Communist Party of China (CPC) and a congratulations meeting from Chinese ambassador Zhang Maoming on Apr 7, Nepal has assured Beijing that its stance towards China, including the "one China" policy, will remain unchanged under the new administration led by Prime Minister Balendra Shah of RSP, reported the *kathmandupost.com* Apr 8.
While the "one China" policy – which is taken to also include the stance of Tibet being part of China – is a common position among all major political parties in Nepal, governments led by the communist parties have been particularly sensitive towards any activity not only by the Tibetan refugee community but also by the country's Tibetan Buddhists that might be perceived as offensive to China, including celebrating the Dalai Lama's birthday.
The communist governments of Nepal have also ignored repeated complaints and even official findings of recent Chinese encroachments on the country's territory while playing up the historical territorial disputes with India.
While ambassador Zhang called on Foreign Minister Shisir Khanal to extend a congratulations for assuming the post, he also discussed a host of issues of bilateral interest. The issues he raised included the new government's foreign policy, its attitude towards China, and the status of the past agreements between the two states in the past and among others, the report said, citing officials present at the meeting.
Khanal has assured Zhang that Nepal's principled position towards China would remain unchanged and the government upholds both the letter and spirit enshrined in the constitution of Nepal and its foreign policy doctrine.
The report noted that earlier, after the RSP's landslide victory in the elections, delegates from the CPC arrived in Kathmandu to understand the foreign policy orientation of the new government. They held talks with Khanal and other leaders and sought assurances that relations between Kathmandu and Beijing would remain smooth.
In his latest meeting, the report quoted Khanal as having assured Zhang, "We will continue to uphold our principled position enshrined in the constitution regarding foreign policy. Our stance and standards would remain the same. As always, we will support the one-China principle and will not allow our territory to be used against any country, including China."
The report noted that In order to get assurance from the new government, the CPC had earlier sent multiple delegations to Kathmandu to engage with the new RSP government and leaders.

## New Nepalese govt. reaffirms 'One China' policy as ties with Beijing deepens

08 April 2026, Phayul



*FM Shisir Khanal with Chinese envoy Zhang Maoming on April 7, 2026 (Photo/The Kathmandu Post)*

Nepal's newly appointed Foreign Minister Shisir Khanal on Tuesday assured Chinese Ambassador Zhang Maoming that Kathmandu's position toward Beijing would remain unchanged honouring 'One China' policy under the new administration led by Prime Minister Balendra Shah. The assurance came during the envoy's visit to Nepal's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
During the meeting, Ambassador Zhang conveyed messages from Chinese leaders and sought clarity on the new government's foreign policy direction, particularly its stance toward China and the status of previously signed bilateral agreements. According to reports, discussions also touched on key strategic and economic interests shared by both countries.
"We will continue to uphold our principled position enshrined in the constitution regarding foreign policy. Our stance and standards would remain the same. As always, we will support the one-China principle and will not allow our territory to be used against any country, including China," Foreign Minister Khanal reaffirmed, highlighting the priorities of the new administration.
Earlier, delegations from the Communist Party of China visited Kathmandu following the RSP's electoral victory to gain a better understanding of the new government's foreign policy orientation. These engagements came amid speculation

regarding potential shifts in Nepal's diplomatic stance.

With Beijing keen to safeguard its strategic interests, investments, and prior agreements, multiple delegations were dispatched to engage with Nepal's new leadership and ensure continuity in bilateral relations.

Ambassador Zhang, in turn, assured full support and cooperation from Beijing and welcomed Nepal's reaffirmation of its longstanding foreign policy commitments. Both sides also discussed the resumption of stalled bilateral mechanisms, including the Bilateral Consultative Mechanism (BCM) at the foreign secretary level, likely to take place in the coming months.

Additionally, talks covered enhancing connectivity projects, boosting trade and tourism, and expanding investment opportunities. The Chinese envoy also raised the prospect of advancing joint projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework and extended an invitation to Foreign Minister Khanal to visit China at a mutually convenient time.

The development follows congratulatory messages sent by Chinese Premier Li Qiang, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the Communist Party of China, and China's Foreign Ministry to Prime Minister Shah, Foreign Minister Khanal, and the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), expressing Beijing's readiness to work closely with Nepal's new leadership.

In Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian reiterated China's longstanding support for Nepal's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and development during a press briefing on March 28. He further emphasized China's willingness to deepen bilateral cooperation and advance the strategic partnership defined by "everlasting friendship for development and prosperity."

Nepal's renewed commitment to the 'One-China' policy under Foreign Minister Shisir Khanal mirrors similar assurances made by previous administrations, including that of former Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli, who was widely seen as pro-Beijing.

However, the deepening ties between Kathmandu and Beijing have raised growing concerns over the treatment of Tibetan refugees in Nepal, with rights groups pointing to increasing restrictions in recent years.

A 2023 report titled *Languishing in Limbo: Tibetan Refugees in Nepal*, published by the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy and the Asian Dignity Initiative, documented a significant deterioration in refugee rights. The report noted that Nepal's economic dependence on China, particularly following its participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2017, has led to stricter enforcement of policies aligned with the 'One-China' principle. These include halting the issuance of Refugee Cards, restricting cultural and religious activities, and banning public celebrations such as the birthday of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama.

## Nepal International Film Festival faces backlash over Chinese propaganda segment "Xizang Panorama"

06 April 2026, Phayul




The Nepal International Film Festival (NIFF), held from April 3 to 5 in Kathmandu, has come under intense scrutiny for featuring a controversial segment titled "Xizang Panorama." The festival, organised in collaboration with the Pan-Himalayan Cultural Research Center, is widely recognised for promoting global storytelling and fostering cross-cultural exchange. However, this year's programming sparked strong backlash from Tibetan activists.

The controversy centers on the use of the term "Xizang," widely regarded as a colonial term imposed by the Chinese government for Tibet. Scholars and activists argue that this shift forms part of a calculated, long-term strategy to reinforce Beijing's sovereignty claims over the region, which has remained under Chinese occupation since the 1950s. They further describe the renaming as a deliberate effort to accelerate the Sinicization of Tibetan culture, language, and religion.

The "Xizang Panorama" program featured six films: *Warrior King* by Lu Qi, *Snow Leopard* by Pema Tseden, *Home Away Home Close* by Guo YiFei, *Learners from the Top of the World* by Jacques Malaterre, *Sunrise Over the Plateau* by Xiao Xiaowai, and *Discovering Xizang 2026*.

Members of Students for a Free Tibet (SFT) strongly condemned the festival and its collaborator, alleging that the segment functions as "a Chinese propaganda operation funded by a Chinese government university." The group asserted that several films in the lineup fail to represent independent Tibetan voices and instead serve to whitewash China's policies in Tibet.

SFT specifically criticised *Learners from the Top of the World*, claiming it portrays colonial-style boarding schools—where, according to advocacy groups, large numbers of Tibetan children have been separated from their families—as "progressive development." Similarly, *Discovering Xizang 2026* was accused of depicting

environmental degradation in Tibet as sustainable or "green" development.

Footage shared by SFT from a post-screening discussion further intensified the controversy. During a Q&A session, an audience member questioned the contradiction between wildlife conservation narratives and the political situation of Tibetans, asking why "independence" is recognised as necessary for snow leopards but not for the Tibetan people. In response, a speaker at the event claimed that Tibetans have been "free for 61 years" and described the region as modern and developed, asserting that "everybody is free, except the prisoners."




Rejecting this narrative, SFT countered that expressions of Tibetan identity, including language, religious practice, and even possession of images of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, can lead to imprisonment. The group further warned that recent legal measures, including China's "Ethnic Unity" policies, risk criminalising even minimal expressions of Tibetan cultural identity.

Calling on the festival to uphold its stated mission, SFT urged organisers not to provide a platform for what it described as state propaganda. "NIFF exists to platform independent voices outside of state control," the group stated. "Screening Chinese state propaganda betrays that purpose."

This controversy echoes similar criticism faced by the Kathmandu International Mountain Film Festival (KIMFF), which also featured a segment titled "Xizang Panorama" during its 21st edition. That program likewise drew backlash from artists, filmmakers, and activists for showcasing Chinese-produced films on Tibet.

# PAKISTAN-PRC

## China-Pakistan Relations: Pakistani president visits Hainan to boost cooperation in green energy

30 April 2026, CGTN

Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari is on a week-long trip to China aimed at boosting economic and strategic cooperation. During a meeting in Sanya earlier today, President Zardari invited Wang Jian, the CEO of Hangzhou Jinjiang Group, to invest in priority sectors in Pakistan including green energy, water treatment, and EV battery systems. After visiting central China's Hunan Province, he landed in Southern China's Hainan Province yesterday. Hangzhou Jinjiang Group is a major Chinese industrial conglomerate specializing in environmental energy, non-ferrous metals like aluminum, and chemical production.

## Chinese Frustration Grows Over Pakistan's Failure to Protect its Interests

29 April 2026, Irrawaddy



*Security personnel inspect the site of an attack where five Chinese nationals were killed by a suicide bomber in northwest Pakistan on March 26, 2024. /*

China is getting nervous about Pakistan amid growing attacks on Chinese workers and projects there, to the point where cracks are appearing in the Chinese Communist Party's narrative of an "iron brotherhood" with the South Asian country. And while Chinese state diplomacy still frames Pakistan as an "all-weather strategic cooperative partner," Chinese reportage and academic analysis show that security threats to Chinese nationals have become a source of wariness and frustration.

The immediate source of this growing disillusionment are repeated deadly attacks on Chinese citizens in Pakistan. In March 2024, a suicide bombing struck a vehicle convoy tied to a Chinese project in Pakistan, killing six people including five Chinese nationals.

It was one of three terrorist attacks in Pakistan within a single week, reinforcing the sense that

violence against Chinese interests is not an isolated event but part of a broader insecurity pattern. For Chinese readers, such reports turned the bilateral relationship from an abstract geopolitical success story into a concrete question of whether the Pakistan government is capable of protecting Chinese lives.

Chinese academics have cautioned about this problem for years. In 2021, a Peking University paper on security risks facing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) argued that separatist violence, religious extremism, and broader regional uncertainty all directly threaten corridor projects and expose Chinese personnel.

The paper added that even though Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts have reduced some overall violence, attacks on Chinese projects and staff continue and often become more targeted and more politically damaging. Chinese frustration, then, is not just an emotional reaction to one bombing but rests on a gradual accretion of threats.

The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), meanwhile, identified Baluchistan as one of the most dangerous regions for Chinese overseas interests, where attacks on Chinese targets are used indirectly to pressure the Pakistani state.

From 2001 to the 2021 Dasu attack, Pakistan saw at least 32 terrorist incidents targeting Chinese interests, underlining how long-running and visible the problem has become. Even where Chinese analysts differ in emphasis, they agree that Pakistan is not merely a valued partner—but also the site of some of the biggest overseas security risks for Chinese enterprises.

Chinese firms face not only terrorism but also local political instability, corruption, center-province tensions, and non-traditional political risks, all of which complicate projects under the CPEC framework.

Beijing's growing frustration with Islamabad is not only about grief or anger after attacks; it also reflects a more practical concern that China is investing heavily in a partner whose risk profile remains stubbornly high.

That concern does not automatically translate into wholesale hostility toward Pakistan. Much elite Chinese commentary still defends the strategic logic of the partnership and emphasizes the sacrifices Pakistan has made in its counterterrorism effort. But it could be said that the tone has become more conditional.

A 2026 Peking University commentary on South Asian instability notes that the Pakistani wing of the fundamentalist Taliban—the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—has become a major threat to regional security, and that extremists are exploiting wider geopolitical tensions. This renders the environment around Chinese interests there a great deal more fragile. In other words, Pakistan's internal disorder is increasingly being regarded in Beijing as one of the relationship's defining limitations.

This is where the gap between narrative and actual sentiment becomes most visible: official statements still repeat the language of the special friendship and joint anti-terror cooperation, yet a harder reality is being more and more openly acknowledged: Pakistan is simultaneously one of China's closest partners and one of the places where Chinese nationals and projects face the most persistent security threats.

The "iron brother" ideological jargon remains politically useful, but repeated violence has made many Chinese observers read the relationship less as a sentimental bond—and more as a risk-management problem.

## Pakistani president seeks to bolster 'full spectrum' of ties with China on visit

27 April 2026, SCMP



Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari is on a week-long visit to China with a focus on economics and trade.

Zardari arrived in China on Saturday. The Pakistani foreign ministry said he would be visiting Changsha in the central province of Hunan before heading to Sanya in the southern island province of Hainan on Tuesday, where he would stay until heading home on Friday.

"During the visit, the president will hold meetings with provincial leadership to review the full spectrum of Pakistan-China ties, with particular focus on economic and trade cooperation as well as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor," the ministry said, referring to the flagship project of the Beijing-led multinational Belt and Road Initiative.

The Chinese foreign ministry echoed the sentiment. "Beijing will work with Islamabad to advance friendly cooperation across all levels and localities and to build a closer China-Pakistan community with a shared future," ministry spokesman Lin Jian said on Monday.

He added that relations between the two countries had maintained a strong momentum, but did not confirm whether Zardari would meet senior members of the Chinese leadership.

Pakistan has taken on the role of a mediator between the United States and Iran as their military conflict roils global energy supplies, hosting negotiations in Islamabad earlier this month while also staying in close contact with China over the issue.
Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar has already visited China twice this year, the second time in late March when the two countries unveiled a five-point peace plan aimed at ending the war.
In Changsha, Zardari visited Sany Heavy Industry, a leading heavy equipment manufacturer, and the Hunan Tea Group.
The presidential office said he was focused on boosting industrial cooperation and modernising infrastructure in areas such as smart manufacturing, construction and clean energy.
The visit is also expected to see more agreements and memorandums of understanding being signed with Chinese firms, with a particular focus on collaboration at the provincial level.
China and Pakistan share a long-standing "all-weather" strategic cooperative partnership and Beijing is one of the biggest investors in its neighbour, committing an estimated US$25.9 billion to the economic corridor.
The project, launched in 2013, includes infrastructure, energy and industrial projects designed to enhance Pakistan's connectivity and economic development while providing China with improved access to the Indian Ocean through the port of Gwadar.
According to Pakistani media, the project has boosted power capacity by over 8,000 megawatts and led to the development of 510km (315 miles) of roads.
Its second phase also covers sectors such as agriculture, technology and artificial intelligence, minerals and industrial relocation.
Islamabad's efforts to mediate in the current conflict in Iran have been bolstered by its status as a regional power without US military bases, as well as the personal connections Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and armed forces chief Asim Munir have worked to build up with US President Donald Trump.
The country also used its close Cold War-era relations with China and the US to help bring about the rapprochement between the two countries in the 1970s.

## Pakistan's President Zardari to visit China on Saturday

25 April 2026, Tribune India

Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari is scheduled to travel to China on Saturday with an aim to discuss bilateral ties between the two countries with special focus on economic and trade cooperation.Zardari will travel to Changsha, Hunan province, from April 25 to 27, and to Sanya, Hainan province, from April 28 to May 1, according to a statement issued by the Foreign Office (FO) on Saturday.
"He will hold meetings with provincial leadership to discuss Pakistan-China bilateral relations, with a particular focus on economic and trade cooperation and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)," it said in a social media post.
The visit holds special significance as Pakistan and China commemorate the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations this year, it added.
According to FO, the trip reflects the deep commitment of both sides to further strengthening the "All-weather strategic Cooperative Partnership."
The visit comes amid speculations of a possible second round of talks between Iran and the US in Pakistan.
Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi arrived here late Friday for engagements with the Pakistani leadership. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said that US Special Envoy on the Middle East Steve Witkoff and President Donald Trump's adviser Jared Kushner would be leaving for Pakistan on Saturday "to engage in direct talks" with representatives of the Iranian delegation.
There is no official word on whether direct talks between Washington and Tehran will take place during the visit.

## China reaffirms firm support for Pak sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity

24 April 2026, The News

The Consul General of China in Lahore, Sun Yan, on Thursday underscored the enduring strength of China-Pakistan relations describing them as an "All-weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership" rooted in mutual trust shared development and unwavering support through decades.
Addressing a certificate distribution ceremony for officers of the 53rd Common Training Programme at the Civil Services Academy, Walton campus, the envoy congratulated the probationers on completing their training, particularly the Chinese language course, and lauded their role as future custodians of bilateral ties.
Sun noted that 2026 marks the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Pakistan, recalling that Pakistan was the first Islamic country to establish diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China. Over the decades, he said, the two nations had stood by each other in moments of both challenge and opportunity.
He highlighted Pakistan's consistent support to China in key historical phases, including efforts to break external isolation and restore China's lawful seat at the United Nations, as well as during China's reform and opening-up era. In return, he said, China had firmly backed Pakistan in

safeguarding its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.
On economic cooperation, Sun said the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor had brought over $25 billion in direct investment to Pakistan, contributing significantly to infrastructure and energy development. He noted that CPEC projects had added 510 kilometres of highways, generated 8,200 megawatts of electricity, and laid 886 kilometres of key transmission lines.
Speaking on the occasion, Director General of the Civil Services Academy, Farhan Aziz Khawaja, appreciated the role of the Chinese consul general in promoting language learning among probationers and emphasised the growing importance of China in the global landscape.
He urged the young officers to harness their expertise, noting that future civil servants of Pakistan would increasingly engage with their Chinese counterparts, as “this is the Chinese century”.

## China selects Pakistani candidates as 1st foreign astronauts for Tiangong Space Station

24 April 2026, WION



*China selects Pakistani candidates as 1st foreign astronauts for Tiangong Space Station* ***Photograph: (Credit: X/@CMShehbaz)***

Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on Thursday (Apr 23) held a high-profile meeting with Commander Khurram Dawood and Wing Commander Muhammad Zeeshan Ali, the two Pakistan Air Force officers selected as the nation’s first astronauts to train for missions aboard China’s Tiangong space station. The meeting, held at the PM House, marks a definitive shift in the Pakistan-China strategic partnership.Describing the selection as a "landmark achievement," the Prime Minister congratulated the duo on their historic milestone. "I am confident that you are about to write a new chapter in Pakistan’s history," PM Shehbaz stated, emphasising that their journey carries the "hopes and aspirations of the entire nation."A high-level delegation, including Deputy PM and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, Planning Minister Ahsan Iqbal, and Chinese Ambassador Jiang Zaidong attended the meeting. The presence of the Chinese envoy underscored the geopolitical weight of the collaboration. PM Shehbaz remarked that the space research partnership signifies a friendship that is truly "reaching for the stars."
Pak PM posted on X, "This remarkable achievement reflects the immense talent of our people and the growing strength of Pakistan–China cooperation in space technology. I wish them great success as they embark on this inspiring journey, carrying the hopes and aspirations of the entire nation."
While Pakistan has long relied on Chinese Long March rockets for satellite launches—most recently the PAKSAT-MM1 in 2024—this mission represents the first time Pakistani personnel will participate in a crewed orbital program.
Following the Prime Minister’s send-off, the two candidates are set to depart for the Astronaut Centre of China (ACC) in Beijing. After completing intensive training and evaluations, one of the two will reportedly be selected as a payload specialist for a Shenzhou mission, tentatively scheduled for late 2026. This individual will become the first foreign astronaut to board the Chinese space station.
In the global landscape of 2026, Pakistan is currently transitioning from a satellite-using nation to a space-participating nation. As of date, Islamabad does not yet match the independent launch or deep-space capabilities of the US, China, Russia, and India.

## Pakistan undertakes high-stakes Iran peace bid with China’s help

11 April 2026, The Arab Weekly

Pakistan is under huge pressure to pull off what some diplomats regard as mission impossible: broker a peace deal between Iran and the United States to stabilise the world economy while safeguarding delegates already arguing over a fragile truce.
Army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif engaged in weeks of diplomacy to halt a war that could deepen instability along Pakistan’s western border with Iran and Afghanistan, with which it has recently exchanged fire.
Pakistan’s role marks a stunning reversal in fortunes, with the country relegated to the diplomatic margins until only a year ago. Success in Saturday’s dialogue would go a long way toward maintaining its newfound prominence, while failure could erode the veneer of success.
“Pakistan has publicly invested political capital in mediation; if talks collapse, it risks being seen as over-promising and under-delivering,” said

Muhammad Faisal, a security analyst at the University of Technology Sydney.
"Given those risks, the lack of preparation time, and the high-profile nature of these talks, this is a very challenging visit from a security perspective and speaks to the importance this administration places on the negotiations," said Elizabeth Threlkeld, director of the South Asia Programme at the Stimson Centre.
The challenge for Pakistan is not just to protect the venue, but to prevent the diplomacy from being overtaken by forces outside the room, security analyst Zahid Hussain said.
"There are indications that Israel has accepted the ceasefire rather conditionally," he said, adding that any renewed escalation could quickly narrow the space for meaningful negotiations.
On Saturday, Islamabad will likely raise the grievances of Gulf nations allied with the US that were hit by Iranian strikes during the conflict, analysts said.
It will also attempt to push the US to extend the ceasefire to Lebanon, whose prime minister sought Sharif's support for bringing an immediate end to Israeli attacks. Iran said it had been on the verge of responding to strikes on Lebanon on Wednesday when Pakistan intervened.
While Pakistan now has sufficient access and credibility to mediate and perhaps keep the process alive, it may not have enough power to guarantee the outcome the world is waiting for: the reopening of vital shipping route, the Strait of Hormuz.
"What it lacks is meaningful leverage to compel concessions if the US and Iran are not willing to come to terms," Threlkeld said.
"That remains a fundamental limitation to the role it is able to play, and one it must navigate carefully."
It is there that China is likely to step in.

- Chinese factor

Beijing helped pave the way for the negotiations and will be a crucial component in securing a permanent truce.
Pakistan has received praise, and some surprise, on the global stage for its last-ditch clinching of a temporary ceasefire between the warring sides.
But Pakistani officials say Beijing's quieter role would now prove to be as essential as it was in striking the down-to-the-wire agreement that had looked set to fail on Tuesday night.
"On ceasefire night, hopes were fading, but China stepped in and convinced Iran to agree to a preliminary ceasefire," said a senior Pakistani official source familiar with the negotiations.
"While our efforts were central, we were falling short of a breakthrough, which was ultimately achieved after Beijing persuaded the Iranians," said the source, who requested anonymity to speak openly on a sensitive diplomatic matter.
That echoed President Donald Trump, who shortly after announcing the two-week ceasefire on social media, said that China had been key to getting Iran to the negotiating table.
The planned talks had raised fragile hopes of an end to the war that has claimed thousands of lives and jolted the global economy since Israel and the United States launched strikes on February 28 and Iran responded with attacks on the Gulf as well as Israeli cities.
Pakistan, which has deep cultural and religious ties with neighbouring Iran and whose leaders share close personal rapport with Trump, will facilitate both sides.
To get a lasting agreement, it will need to steer the rival sides through fractious issues, including on the opening of the strategic Strait of Hormuz and the continuation of Iran's nuclear programme.
"Pakistan has formulated a team of experts to facilitate the two sides in negotiations, on navigation, nuclear and other related matters," said a diplomatic source familiar with the matter, requesting anonymity as they were not authorised to speak publicly.
Another source, along with several experts and former officials, said that as Pakistan sets the negotiating table, all eyes were on China's role.
"China was requested to be a guarantor. Iran wants a guarantor," said the source.
The main alternative, Russia, which is fighting a war in Ukraine, would not have been accepted by Western players, especially the European Union, meaning China was "best placed".
Beijing shares close ties with Islamabad and Tehran, and has been Iran's largest trading partner during years of crippling US-led sanctions.
China has also invested billions into infrastructure projects in Pakistan as part of President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road initiative and the two governments call themselves "ironclad brothers."
"As close partners and neighbours, Pakistan and China have been coordinating closely from day one to end hostilities," said Mushahid Hussain Sayed, a former Pakistan senator and head of the upper chamber's defence and foreign affairs committees.
"China's role would remain indispensable in clinching any final peace agreement as the ultimate guarantor, given the fact that Iran doesn't trust the Trump/Netanyahu duo," he added, in reference to Israel's prime minister.
After Pakistan's foreign minister quickly flew to Beijing last month following de-escalation discussions with Saudi, Turkish and Egyptian counterparts, China said it backed Pakistan's efforts to mediate.
It then launched talks to help ease Pakistan's own spiralling armed conflict with Afghanistan, hosting Afghan government delegates and Pakistani officials in Urumqi in China after weeks of fighting.
China, with Russia, also took a key step likely to be warmly received in Tehran hours before the ceasefire, vetoing a UN Security Council resolution on reopening the Strait of Hormuz

where Iran has imposed an effective blockade since the war began.
China has not sought the limelight in peace building efforts, reiterating only that it has been mediating and encouraging an end to hostilities.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had held 26 calls with counterparts from relevant countries while Beijing's Middle East envoy had "shuttled across" the war-torn region, a foreign ministry spokesman said.
Analysts and officials said the prospect of China openly stepping in to a formal guarantor role in coming weeks was also uncertain.
"They have their own considerations, they do not want to be dragged into this conflict" publicly, a second source said, in a nod to Beijing's strong behind-the-scenes role.
Talks face an uphill battle in resolving the vast differences in the warring sides' positions.
A major sticking point is over Lebanon, which Pakistan's prime minister and Iran have insisted is included in the ceasefire and Israel has denied.
Israel, which Pakistan does not formally recognise, has continued to launch deadly strikes it says target Iran-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah, though the United States has said it will host its separate talks in Washington between Israeli and the Lebanese officials next week.
"Negotiations are very com complicated, sensitive … to reach consensus all sides will have to makepainful compromises and concessions," the source added.

# SOUTHERN MONGOLIA-PRC

## China advances Inner Mongolia as a key hub for northern opening up

30 April 2026, ALwihda

Furthermore, Inner Mongolia is exploring new growth areas such as biomanufacturing and developing new quality productive forces tailored to local conditions, turning its geographic strengths into opening up advantages and policy benefits into real economic momentum.



*Mongolian trucks enter China via the Erenhot Port in Inner Mongolia autonomous region. (Photo/Guo Pengjie)*

Nestled along China's northern border, Inner Mongolia autonomous region boasts a unique geographical advantage: it spans northeast, north and northwest China, connects eight provincial-level regions within the country, and serves as a vital gateway linking China to Europe and Asia.
Recently, China's State Council issued an overall plan for China (Inner Mongolia) Pilot Free Trade Zone (FTZ), bringing the total number of China's pilot FTZs to 23 and further improving the overall layout of its FTZ network.
Yuan Xiaoming, assistant minister of commerce, stated that the overall plan supports the Inner Mongolia FTZ in leveraging its geographical advantages to fully utilize both domestic and international markets and resources. It prioritizes seven key areas, including developing major trade hubs, enhancing bilateral investment quality , deepening domestic and international connectivity , and facilitating the cross-border flow of production factors.
The blueprint outlines 19 reform measures, such as upgrading goods trade structures and strengthening international logistics services. Its vision is to build the FTZ into an information exchange hub , a transportation and logistics center, a platform for factor and resource

allocation, a hub for scientific and technological innovation, and an industrial cooperation center in key fields, thereby linking domestic and international markets while driving regional growth.

Efforts will focus on developing northern international transport corridors to expand global connectivity. In 2025, cargo throughput at Inner Mongolia's land ports reached 132 million tons, up 8.3 percent year on year and exceeding 100 million tons for three consecutive years.

The overall plan proposes upgrading port infrastructure, strengthening international logistics services such as aviation, postal delivery , and China-Europe freight trains, and exploring smart new cross-border transport corridors, including those featuring autonomous driving.

The FTZ is expected to enhance the development of an open economy and help strengthen China's domestic economic cycle. In 2025, Inner Mongolia handled 9,557 China-Europe freight train trips, a year-on-year increase of 16.9 percent, accounting for nearly half of the national total. There remains significant room to improve its role in serving the domestic economy and upgrading from a "corridor economy" to a "hub economy" and an "industrial economy."

The overall plan calls for deep er reforms to integrate domestic and foreign trade, promoting development in border areas, and improving the well-being of people in border and ethnic regions. It will also promote coordinated regional development and mutually reinforcing domestic - international connectivity.

The FTZ will accelerate implementation of the land-sea intermodal "express rail clearance" model, facilitating resource sharing between Inner Mongolia's Manzhouli Port and coastal ports including Dalian Port and Qinhuangdao Port, so as to optimize logistics networks.

Cross-border cooperation with neighboring countries will expand in agriculture, energy, and ecological governance to build transnational industrial chains. Tailored institutional innovations will strengthen Belt and Road cooperation in infrastructure connectivity, standards alignment, and cultural exchanges , better positioning itself as China's bridgehead for northern opening up.

"In 2025, Inner Mongolia's total foreign trade grew 6.4 percent, and notably, border residents' mutual trade surged by 65.4 percent year on year. These figures demonstrate a solid foundation for developing Inner Mongolia into a highland of opening up along the border," said Luo Qing, director general of the Department of Commerce of the Inner Mongolia autonomous region.

The plan includes high-value institutional reforms to upgrade goods trade, revitalize services trade, and foster innovative development of border residents' trade.

Inner Mongolia is rich in natural resources. How can these advantages be transformed into dividends for modern industrial development?

As a national leader in agriculture, with grain output exceeding 40 billion kilograms for two consecutive years and ranking first nationwide in beef, mutton, and milk production, Inner Mongolia is solidly positioned as a "granary," "meat base," and "dairy hub . " It aims to build a major national base for agricultural and livestock products. The overall plan outlines measures to develop eco-friendly agriculture and animal husbandry, promote green food certification, and introduce high-quality breeds and resources.

In the energy and minerals sector, Inner Mongolia leads the country in installed capacity for new energy, coal production capacity, total power generation capacity, electricity transmitted to other regions, and reserves of 20 key minerals. Its technically exploitable wind energy resources account for about 57 percent of the national total, while solar resources make up about 21 percent.

The overall plan proposes improving policies for the consumption and utilization of green electricity, promoting trading of green electricity certificates, and refining standards for equipment recycling to upgrade the energy sector.

At the same time, Inner Mongolia is actively fostering future-oriented industries. As a national hub in China's integrated computing power network, the region led the country in both total computing power and intelligent computing capacity in 2025.

The overall plan outlines pilot initiatives including building edge computing centers, conducting AI large model training and applications, and expanding green computing scenarios. These will enable the FTZ to deliver fast, efficient computing services to a wider market.

Furthermore , Inner Mongolia is exploring new growth areas such as biomanufacturing and developing new quality productive forces tailored to local conditions, turning its geographic strengths into opening up advantages and policy benefits into real economic momentum.

## China begins construction of 4 GW renewable transmission project in Inner Mongolia

28 April 2026, Alcircle

The project is part of the Mengxi–Tianjin South ultra-high voltage (UHV) transmission corridor. It will run from the 500-kV Dalu Substation to the 500-kV Buertao Substation, and further connect to the 1,000-kV Ordos UHV Substation.

The development includes two new 500-kV substations at Dalu and Buertao, along with 279 kilometres of transmission lines and 340 towers. The total investment for the project is RMB 1.94 billion (around USD 283 million).

Once completed, the project will strengthen the transmission of renewable energy from Ordos to the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei region. It is expected to

deliver around 14 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually, helping meet rising power demand.

## China Shenhua Energy : Inner Mongolia's First Key Laboratory for Underground Space Energy Storage Was Launched at Shendong

16 April 2026, Market Screener

Inner Mongolia's First Key Laboratory for Underground Space Energy Storage Was Launched at Shendong

Author: Liang Xiaoyan, Lu Zhen, Wu Changquan Source: Shendong Coal Pubdate: 2026-04-17 Font size: 【L M S】

Recently, the first key laboratory for underground space energy storage in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was officially inaugurated and put under construction at Shendong Coal. The launch marked an important step in exploring new energy storage technologies based on mine underground spaces and supporting the energy transition.

The laboratory was approved by the Department of Science and Technology of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and built under the leadership of CHN Energy, in collaboration with four universities and research institutes including the Inner Mongolia Research Institute of China University of Mining and Technology (Beijing) and Chongqing University, fully leveraging the mine resources and engineering practice scenarios of the Shendong mining area.

As a core subsidiary of China Shenhua, Shendong boasts a strong research foundation and solid platform advantages. Focusing on three key fields covering gravity energy storage, compressed air energy storage and pumped storage, the laboratory will tackle five core technologies, including intelligent detection of underground spaces, accurate site selection assessment for energy storage, airtightness control and safety monitoring, multi-source data fusion monitoring, and development of multi-energy complementary systems. These efforts aim to break through technical bottlenecks in energy storage for the large-scale grid connection of new energy.

As an important platform for CHN Energy to implement national strategies and boost local development, the laboratory plans to invest 10 million yuan annually over the next five years to build a 7,000-square-meter innovation platform, complete five to ten national research projects, and commercialize three core technologies, thereby establishing a mature and complete technical system for underground space energy storage. Meanwhile, the laboratory will strive to build a research hub that is first-class in China and influential internationally, and foster a professionalenergy storage talent team. Through technological innovation, it will consolidate the foundation for the development of new energy storage during the 15th Five-Year Plan period, support the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in building an important national energy and strategic resource base, and promote the green and low-carbon energy transition.

## How Chinese Propaganda Erased Mongolian Identity—and Much More

08 April 2026, Bitter Winter

Every so often, a project emerges that shifts our understanding of the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda system. PropagandaScope, created by Soyonbo Borjgin—a journalist from Southern Mongolia (which China calls Inner Mongolia) now living in New York City whose story "Bitter Winter" covered last year—stands out as a unique tool. "Bitter Winter" is pleased to welcome it as a valuable partner in the global effort to document, expose, and study the CCP's ideological operations.

PropagandaScope is simple in concept but effective in execution. It contains a database of over 400,000 articles from twenty provincial Party newspapers, updated daily, searchable by keyword, and capable of tracking how political terms spread from Beijing to the provinces. It acts like a microscope for propaganda, revealing patterns that were previously visible only in fragments. On a deeper level, it serves as a record of what the CCP chooses to name and what it chooses to erase.

Borjgin's introduction to the project is based on personal experience. In 2020, he was forced into a political re-education class where he was told that Mongolian was a "backward" language, unfit for science or modern life. He understood that Mongolian identity was not just discouraged but delegitimized. Five years later, PropagandaScope has given him the ability to quantify what he once could only sense. When he searched the database for "Mongolians," he found only one mention in more than 400,000 articles—and that was in the title of a conference. The term had been systematically removed.

What replaced it was a sanitized geographic label: "Northern Frontier Culture." In the CCP's language, Mongolians are no longer a people but a location. PropagandaScope also shows how the Party's ideological campaigns seep into minority regions long before they become national policy. The phrase "forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation," now a cornerstone of China's ethnic policy, appeared in Xinjiang's official newspaper at seventeen times the rate of "People's Daily." Tibet and Ningxia followed closely. By the time the National People's Congress formally adopted the phrase into law, the propaganda groundwork had already been laid.



*Soyonbo Borjgin. From X.*

The law did not start a campaign; it confirmed one.

The project's technical development tells its own story. When Borjgin used boundary data from Alibaba Cloud to create a map of China, the map would not render unless it showed the nine-dash line and Taiwan as a province. In the data source's logic, a China without these claims did not exist. Even a tool designed to analyze propaganda was, by default, built on propaganda. Only by replacing the dataset with a neutral, public-domain source could the map be drawn accurately. This small detail highlights the depth of the CCP's informational structure: the Party's worldview is not just asserted—it is embedded.

PropagandaScope is now live, and its potential is vast. Researchers can track the spread of political slogans, monitor changes in ideological focus, and document the disappearance of entire categories of identity. Activists can use it to reveal the mechanics of cultural erasure. Journalists can look at it to verify patterns that would otherwise go unnoticed. And ordinary readers can see firsthand how the CCP manufactures consensus.

The project serves as a reminder that the struggle for truth in China increasingly relies on data as well as testimony, on code as well as courage. It also stands as a testament to the resilience of those who have lived through repression and choose to respond not with silence but with documentation.

# TAIWAN-PRC

## Taiwan tops Beijing's agenda for Trump-Xi summit

29 April 2026, Reuters

For 23 million Taiwanese, the most consequential diplomatic meeting of 2026 may be one to which they are not invited.

When U.S. President Donald Trump travels to Beijing next month, his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping has made clear that Taiwan will sit at the top of his agenda, a stark departure from their South Korea meeting last year, where he deliberately set the issue aside.

Taipei will be watching for any sign that Trump, who has unnerved partners with his transactional approach to alliances, could soften or reframe longstanding U.S. policy on Taiwan in return for China buying U.S. aircraft or farm goods and easing economic pressures."Regarding Taiwan, the logic is simple: if the U.S. does not want to fight a major war with China over Taiwan, it should not support Taiwan independence," said Wu Xinbo, dean of Fudan University's Institute of International Studies, who serves on the policy advisory board of China's foreign ministry.

"Trump has no interest in going to war with China. To avoid a major conflict that involves the U.S., he should make it clear that he won't support independence or take actions that encourage a separatist political agenda."

China's foreign ministry said in a statement that Taiwan isChina's "core of core interests" and the "basis of the political basis of China-U.S. relations".

"'Taiwan independence' and peace in the Taiwan Strait are as incompatible as fire and water," it added, saying China and the U.S. remain in communication about Trump's trip.

The U.S. State Department did not respond to requests for comment.

The U.S. follows a "one China policy" by which it officially takes no position on Taiwan's sovereignty and only acknowledges, but does not accept, China's position, which claims the island as its own. The U.S. says it "does not support" Taiwan's independence but will help it maintain self-defence.

Semiconductor powerhouse Taiwan sits at the heart of the military balance in the western Pacific, so even a nuanced change in U.S. wording could affect Beijing's assessment of American resolve to continue its support to the island, experts say. It would unsettle Taipei, and raise fresh questions about Washington's security commitments in Asia.

Trump administration officials have repeatedly said there has been no change on Taiwan policy,

and have routinely condemned China for its pressure against the island.
Privately, they stress that Trump has approved considerably more in weapons sales to Taiwan in just over a year in his second term than his predecessor Joe Biden did throughout his presidency.

**CHINA REQUESTED CHANGE IN U.S. LANGUAGE ON TAIWAN**

At a summit with Biden in 2024, Xi asked him to change U.S. language on Taiwan to "we oppose Taiwan independence," from the current version.
The U.S. has declined to make the change.
People involved in the preparations for Trump's trip say privately that China has been constantly sending similar signals at a working level ahead of the summit, but declined to discuss the details, citing confidentiality of the talks.
Officials in Taiwan, whose government rejects Beijing's sovereignty claim, are on high alert.
"We will be watching whether the U.S. makes any changes to its position on Taiwan Strait issues as a result of that meeting," said Shen Yu-chung, a deputy minister at Taiwan's China-policy-making Mainland Affairs Council.
"We will use the remaining time to intensify policy communications with the U.S."
Taiwan Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hsiao Kuang-wei said this week that since Trump took office, his administration "has continuously reaffirmed its support for Taiwan".
China has never renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control. It last held war games around the island in late December, following the U.S. announcement of an $11 billion arms sales package for Taiwan, the largest ever.
China has used both the carrot and the stick in the run-up to the meeting.
It has offered "benefits" for Taiwan in trade and tourism. Then, last week, Taipei accused China of pressuring three African countries to block overflight rights for President Lai Ching-te's trip to Eswatini, causing it to be cancelled.
The U.S. strongly criticised China's actions.

**'ROCK SOLID' COMMITMENT**

Lai says Taiwan is already an independent country called the Republic of China, its official name. Beijing views Lai as both a "separatist" and illegitimate leader who is pushing the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to the brink of war.
The top U.S. diplomat in Taiwan, Raymond Greene, has been offering public reassurances in the run-up to the meeting that U.S. commitments, including under the Taiwan Relations Act which mandates arms sales, remain "rock solid".
Former Trump adviser Robert O'Brien said he would not become "the first American president to lose Taiwan. That would not be a Donald Trump goal to have in mind. That's not the legacy he wants."
The stakes for the U.S. are high too given Taiwan's strategic location as the site where Washington discreetly makes use of the island's advanced radar stations and listening posts high up in Taiwan's mountains that are pointed at China, according to security sources.
"Does the United States really want to lose one of its best locations for gathering intelligence on China?" said a Western security source, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of discussing security matters.
Reporting by Antoni Slodkowski and Ben Blanchard; Additional reporting by Michael Martina in Washington; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan and Stephen Coates

## Fake Press, Real Spies: How China Tried to Infiltrate Taiwan's Civil Society

28 April 2026, Taiwanology

As Taiwan's mass recall movement dominated headlines, a fraudulent interview request impersonating CommonWealth Magazine's editor-in-chief — sent under the ICIJ's name — contacted media outlets, think tanks, and legislators' offices, sustaining conversations for nearly a year and even offering a free Samsung phone. An investigation by CommonWealth, ICIJ, and the University of Toronto's Citizen Lab exposed the scheme as a transnational Chinese espionage operation, with IP addresses linked to hackers who targeted semiconductor companies last year.The message looked entirely routine. At least at first.
In May 2025, as Taiwan's mass recall movement (Read: *Taiwan's "Mass Recall" Movement Explained* ) was consuming headlines, an interview request landed in the inbox of Hung Kuochun, chief operating officer of Watchout, a Taiwanese online civic media outlet. The sender identified herself as "Yi-Shan Chen", a journalist with the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), citing the political turmoil surrounding the recall and impeachment campaign against President Lai Ching-te as the reason for reaching out.
Yi-Shan Chen is, in fact, the name of the editor-in-chief of *CommonWealth* Magazine. In 2016, *CommonWealth* was invited to participate in ICIJ's Panama Papers investigation (Read: *Panama Papers Open New Era of Megaleaks | Can Tax Havens be Rooted Out?*). Chen joined ICIJ as a full member the following year and has continued working on cross-border investigations since. An interview request from her, bearing the ICIJ name, would hardly seem unusual.
His instincts were right. A six-month investigation by *CommonWealth*, conducted in partnership with ICIJ and the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto, has uncovered that "Yi-Shan Chen" was not the editor-in-chief of *CommonWealth* at all,

but a front for a Chinese state-linked intelligence operation — one with digital fingerprints connecting it to the same hacker infrastructure used to target Taiwan's semiconductor industry.

**A Network of False Identities**

Hung was not the only target. Over the past year, at least five individuals in Taiwan were contacted by the same impersonator: media workers, think-tank analysts, a Democratic Progressive Party city councilor, a legislative aide, and one person with prior experience at Taiwan's National Security Council. Targets were also reached in the United States, including a worker at an American nonprofit organization.

Beyond Taiwan, ICIJ confirmed that two of its other journalists were separately impersonated in operations targeting Uyghur, Tibetan, Taiwanese, and Hong Kong human rights communities. Even Taiwan's overseas representatives received overtures from individuals posing as ICIJ members based in Europe and North America.

ICIJ journalist Scilla Alecci, who leads the organization's "China Targets" investigation series (https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-targets/) on Beijing's transnational repression of dissidents, believes the timing may be related. "It could be connected to our April investigation into how China suppresses dissidents abroad," she said. *CommonWealth* had no involvement in that series, yet its editor-in-chief's identity was still borrowed as cover.

The real Chen Yi-shan filed reports with Taiwan's police and Bureau of Investigation on April 11 of last year after learning of a second impersonation incident. The fake "Yi-Shan Chen," however, continued making contact with new targets using virtually identical methods.

**The Hook: An Interview That Was Never an Interview**

The initial approach followed a consistent playbook. Consider the case of Hsiao Wei (a pseudonym), a legislative aide who had been in his post for just one month when, last March, he received an unprompted message on Line from someone claiming to be *CommonWealth's* editor-in-chief.

The account displayed a profile photo of the real Chen Yi-shan, listed her titles and credentials — albeit with small inaccuracies in her Chinese name and job description — and opened with a question about whether the relationship between Ukrainian President Zelensky and U.S. President Trump might affect Taiwan. When Hsiao Wei asked why he had been chosen, the impersonator explained she was gathering broad perspectives from regular Taiwanese citizens, and the conversation continued.

Within minutes, the tone shifted: "Your perspective is quite unique. I'd love to conduct a more in-depth interview with you over email."

A week later, Hsiao Wei received a message from a Proton Mail address — the encrypted email service — with what appeared to be an interview outline, protected by a password and prompting him to download and open the file.

That download, investigators later determined, contained malware.

In Hung Kuochun's case, the operation was more visually sophisticated. The "interview outline" he received was a meticulously crafted fake Google Document, built using Google's drawing tools. It was designed to look identical to a genuine Google file, but it prompted Hung to enter his real Google account credentials to access it — a classic credential-harvesting phishing page.

**Targeting People, Not Systems**

"This is a classic social engineering attack," said Chang Che-cheng, a threat intelligence analyst at Taiwanese cybersecurity firm TeamT5, who has long tracked Chinese hacking groups. "The attacker first disguises themselves as someone you know or trust, to get you to open a file or link carrying malicious code."

Unlike conventional cyberattacks — which target system vulnerabilities, plant malware on servers, or exploit software flaws — social engineering exploits human trust. The attack surface is not a firewall. It is a relationship.

Fortunately, *CommonWealth* found no evidence that any of the contacted individuals had fallen for the trap. Nearly all of them reached out to the magazine's editorial team to verify the communications before taking further action. Taiwan's Bureau of Investigation is continuing to look into the impersonated Line accounts.

But the breadcrumbs left behind by the operation proved valuable in another direction: they gave investigators a thread to pull.

**The Trail Leads to Semiconductors**

Working with the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto and TeamT5, *CommonWealth* traced the malicious domains linked to this campaign and found that all of them were hosted on cloud and network infrastructure commonly used by Chinese threat actors.

More significantly, while these domains appeared to be ordinary websites on the surface, they all resolved to a single master domain: entruhub.com. Beneath it, a cluster of seemingly random subdomains all pointed to the same IP address — many doors, one building.

That IP address had appeared before. In July of last year, U.S. cybersecurity firm Proofpoint published a report identifying a cluster of Chinese hacking groups, including one tracked as "UNK_SparkyCarp," that had targeted between 15 and 20 Taiwanese semiconductor companies. The attackers posed as job seekers and investors to send inquiries —



Source: Kuochun Hung

laced with malicious links and attachments — to semiconductor firms and industry analysts.

The parallels with the ICIJ impersonation campaign are striking: nearly identical phishing techniques, and the same IP infrastructure.

Citizen Lab's investigation revealed even broader scope. Over the past year, more than 100 similar domain structures have been identified, targeting over a dozen human rights workers across Uyghur, Tibetan, Hong Kong, and Taiwanese communities, using a range of false identities such as journalists, film directors, and members of the European Parliament.

| Community Targeted | Primary Method |
|---|---|
| Taiwan human rights and political groups | Impersonation of ICIJ journalists |
| Uyghur human rights groups | Impersonation of journalists, film directors, European Parliament members; fake security alert emails leading to phishing pages |
| Tibetan human rights groups | Fake security alert emails leading to phishing pages |
| Hong Kong human rights groups | Fake security alert emails leading to phishing pages |

Source: Citizen Lab, University of Toronto

It has not been possible to definitively confirm whether "UNK_SparkyCarp" operates under the direction of China's Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Public Security, the United Front Work Department, or the People's Liberation Army. What is clear is that the intelligence community has already categorized this operation as part of China's broader transnational espionage apparatus.

In response to ICIJ's inquiries, a spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington stated: "Tracing the source of cyberattacks is technically complex. We hope relevant parties will act with professionalism and responsibility, and base their characterizations of cyber incidents on solid evidence rather than speculation and accusation. China consistently opposes and cracks down on all forms of cyberattacks."

**The Long Game**

What distinguishes this operation from ordinary cybercrime is its patience. In at least two cases, the impersonator even offered to send physical Samsung smartphones to the targets — ostensibly to make communication easier. No phone was ever actually delivered, but the gesture underlines the resources and commitment being invested.

The questions being asked were not, by themselves, sensitive: contact information for human rights organizations, opinions on the recall movement, general political observations — information largely available through public sources. The intelligence value of any single response may have been limited. The goal, analysts believe, was network mapping: constructing detailed profiles of key individuals in Taiwan's civil society, political circles, and media ecosystem before any direct recruitment or higher-stakes approach.

Legislator Puma Shen (沈伯洋), who has long tracked Chinese information operations, noted that similar patterns emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic, when groups posing as think-tank scholars began approaching Taiwanese politicians and retired officials. "Our hypothesis is that during the pandemic, when they couldn't send people physically, their visibility into Taiwan dropped sharply," he said. "They shifted to this model to compensate."A national security official confirmed that similar protracted contact patterns have appeared in cases prosecuted under Taiwan's National Security Act. But prosecuting this particular campaign faces serious obstacles: while domestic laws on personal data protection, document forgery, and defamation offer potential legal pathways, they are largely ineffective when the perpetrators are beyond Taiwan's jurisdiction.

Outsourcing the Spy Work

Two years ago, TeamT5 stumbled upon leaked contracts and internal communications from i-Soon, a Chinese cybersecurity company. Those documents revealed that i-Soon had contracted with the PLA, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of Public Security to conduct cyber espionage — offering the clearest public evidence

yet of how private Chinese firms have been integrated into the state's intelligence operations, functioning as commercial subcontractors in what amounts to a full intelligence-industrial complex.
The ICIJ impersonation campaign bears similar hallmarks of private-sector involvement.
A Taiwanese national security official observed that the impersonator appeared to follow a standard working schedule — responses came only during business hours — and noted that the conversational content felt more like that of a commercial online opinion-monitoring company than a trained intelligence officer. "It doesn't feel like it comes directly from China's security services," the official said. "There seems to be an additional layer in between."
That intermediate layer is increasingly the norm.
China's intelligence collection network now operates through a layered public-private architecture, extending far beyond traditional military and government targets to encompass journalists, civil society actors, and anyone connected to networks of political relevance.
The Limits of the Surveillance State
History offers a cautionary counterpoint. East Germany's Stasi built what was, at its peak, arguably the most comprehensive domestic intelligence apparatus in history — a surveillance machine that permeated every corner of society. Yet that vastness did not make the regime more stable. It generated enormous volumes of low-quality intelligence, consumed extraordinary resources, and ultimately accelerated the hollowing out of the system it was meant to protect.
As China expands its intelligence-gathering reach — outsourcing operations, widening target lists, investing in long-horizon social engineering campaigns — it is also accumulating the inefficiencies, distortions, and blind spots that accompany any system built on suspicion and control.

## Beijing's hidden hand in Taiwan's November election

19 April 2026, Sunday Guardian

When Taiwan heads to the polls this November, the contest will not be confined to Taipei's streets or the island's airwaves. China is already manoeuvring to tilt the playing field—most visibly by channelling covert support towards the Kuomintang (KMT). This interference is not an aberration but part of a long-term strategy: weaken the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), elevate Beijing's preferred interlocutors, and erode confidence in Taiwan's democratic resilience.China's interference is multifaceted. Taiwan's National Security Bureau has documented foreign influence in KMT leadership races, including coordinated disinformation campaigns on TikTok and YouTube. These operations are designed to appear organic, masking their origin while amplifying narratives favourable to Beijing.

Financial channels are harder to trace but equally potent. Beijing deploys front companies, cultural associations, and business intermediaries to funnel resources into Taiwan's political ecosystem. These funds often arrive disguised as "cross-strait exchanges" or "economic cooperation projects," but their political intent is unmistakable: to strengthen the KMT's organizational capacity and campaign reach.
The logic is straightforward. A KMT victory would give Beijing greater leverage in cross-strait negotiations, potentially slowing or reversing Taiwan's moves toward deeper international alignment. By presenting the KMT as the "responsible" choice for stability, Beijing seeks to frame the election as a referendum on peace



versus provocation.Equally important is the psychological dimension. Demonstrating that Taiwan's democracy is porous to external manipulation reinforces Beijing's claim that unification is inevitable, and that Taiwan's institutions cannot withstand sustained pressure.
The United States cannot dictate Taiwan's electoral outcomes, nor should it. But it can help ensure that voters make their choice with full knowledge of the forces at play. Three steps are critical: i) Expose funding channels: Washington can share expertise in forensic accounting and campaign finance oversight, helping Taiwan trace illicit flows. US agencies have decades of experience closing loopholes exploited by foreign actors; adapting these frameworks to Taiwan would strengthen transparency. ii) Support legal reform: Taiwan's campaign finance laws need updating to address indirect funding and digital influence operations. US legal experts and NGOs can provide technical assistance, ensuring reforms are both effective and politically viable. iii) Diplomatic backing: Just as the US has supported Taiwan's diplomatic resilience through legislation like the Taiwan Allies Fund Act, it should extend this support to election integrity. Publicly exposing Beijing's interference would not only protect Taiwan but also signal to other democracies that

covert funding will be met with coordinated resistance.
Beijing will deny involvement, framing US exposure efforts as "foreign interference." Domestically, highlighting KMT's ties to Beijing risks deepening Taiwan's internal divisions—precisely the fissures China exploits. Yet silence is more dangerous. Allowing covert funding to shape Taiwan's elections unchallenged would normalize Beijing's interference and weaken democratic legitimacy.
Taiwan's November elections are not merely a domestic contest; they are a test of whether democracies can withstand authoritarian influence. Beijing's covert funding of the KMT is part of a broader strategy to erode Taiwan's sovereignty from within. The United States, by helping expose and publicize these hidden channels, can ensure that Taiwan's voters confront Beijing's hidden hand in the open light of day.

## Xi Jinping stresses 'patience' on Taiwan reunification in talks with opposition leader

16 APRIL 2026, SCMP

Communist Party chief Xi Jinping appears to be taking a patient approach to reunification with Taiwan, according to the island's opposition leader and a member of her delegation who attended a rare meeting with Xi in Beijing.
Xi met Cheng Li-wun, who leads Taiwan's main opposition Kuomintang, and her delegation at the Great Hall of the People on Friday – the first talks between sitting leaders of the two parties in nearly a decade.
Discussing the cross-strait relationship, Xi said the issues had built up over a long period of time and had not happened overnight, Cheng told Taiwanese radio network the Broadcasting Corporation of China.
According to Cheng, Xi said that resolving those issues would take "the perseverance and patience of the foolish old man removing the mountains", referring to a Chinese fable about an old man trying to dig away two mountains that were blocking the road in front of his home.
Cheng said Xi quoted another Chinese fable about determination and patience during their meeting – the story of Jingwei, a bird that tried to fill the sea with twigs and pebbles, carrying one at a time.
Xi also said he understood and respected that Taiwan had developed an entirely different social system and lifestyle to mainland China's, according to Cheng, and that "shouldn't Taiwan also acknowledge and respect the mainland's achievements?"

Lee Hong-yuan, deputy head of KMT-affiliated think tank the National Policy Foundation and part of Cheng's delegation at the meeting, said Xi's bottom line was that there should not be any move for "Taiwan independence" or foreign forces involved.
"[Xi said] there's nothing that can't be talked about since we are family, and all other issues between the two sides could be worked out slowly," Lee told CTi News.
Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including the United States, Taiwan's main international backer, do not recognise the self-governed island as an independent state. However, Washington is opposed to any attempt to take Taiwan by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons.
Lee said that Xi did not mention "one country, two systems" – Beijing's proposed reunification model for Taiwan – and there was no detailed discussion of reunification with the island during the meeting.
State news agency Xinhua reported that Xi had told Cheng the two parties should work together to create a "beautiful future" in a reunified country.
Xi also accused Taiwan independence forces of destroying cross-strait peace and said Beijing was willing to reach beyond the KMT in Taiwan, predicated on an agreed opposition to Taiwan independence.
Cheng told reporters in Beijing after the meeting that a KMT victory in the next election in 2028 would be the mandate needed to officially represent the people of Taiwan in formal negotiations with the mainland.

She added that she would invite Xi to visit Taiwan if the KMT won the election.
Beijing stopped high-level exchanges with Taipei after the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party took power in 2016, when then-leader Tsai Ing-wen refused to accept the one-China principle. There has been no formal dialogue with the current leader, William Lai Ching-te.

## Taiwan Opposition Trip to Beijing Sparks Accusations of CCP Influence Operations

10 April 2026, Vision Times

According to Reuters, Kuomintang (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wen led a delegation to China on what was described as a "peace trip," during which she held a "Cheng–Xi meeting" with Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping. Italian scholar Aurelio Insisa, an expert on cross-strait relations, stated that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using the KMT to conduct information warfare. Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) criticized the move, saying, "They talk about peace, but military drills have never stopped," and "Believing the CCP is either foolish or malicious."
Aurelio Insisa previously taught in Hong Kong for more than a decade and has conducted research

in Taiwan multiple times. He currently serves as a senior researcher at the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI). On the 8th, he gave an exclusive interview to the Central News Agency, analyzing the implications of Cheng Li-wen's visit to China from the perspective of information warfare.

Insisa pointed out that Cheng's visit to China is a very significant development in current cross-strait relations. In simple terms, he believes this is first and foremost "a victory for the CCP in the information domain." Many people in Europe are not familiar with Taiwan's domestic politics and tend to overlook a key point—namely, how Cheng Li-wen's visit was organized and presented. Whether to Taiwanese society or to international audiences, the main narrative of her visit aligns with China's security discourse regarding Taiwan.

Insisa analyzed that "the Chinese side aims to create a narrative that the United States and the Trump administration are the root causes of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, the rhetoric of the Kuomintang (KMT) leadership closely mirrors Beijing's position, portraying the United States as the instigator of Taiwan Strait security issues, and claiming that President Lai Ching-te and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government are complicit. Through this, the KMT seeks to position itself as the party most capable of ensuring peace in Taiwan and of maintaining stable relations with Beijing."

Insisa believes that the DPP's consecutive election victories and long-term governance have paradoxically made it a victim of its own success, as voters tend to have short memories. Many people no longer recall the KMT's period in power, or were too young at the time to vote. As a result, he argues, the KMT's current strategy appears to be an attempt to "turn back the clock" to the administration of former President Ma Ying-jeou.

He stated that the KMT's cross-strait engagement policies may have reflected mainstream opinion around 2010, but they were not well received by the Taiwanese public. This dissatisfaction led to the outbreak of the Sunflower Movement in 2014, and later contributed to the Democratic Progressive Party's landslide victory in the 2016 presidential election.

Insisa warned that the CCP's invitation for Cheng Li-wen to visit China represents a short-term gain, as it helps construct an image of division within Taiwan. However, he cautioned that one should not overlook the fact that over the past decade, due to the KMT's primary election mechanisms, its leadership has often come from the "deep blue" faction. This does not necessarily reflect the party's full political spectrum. As a result, KMT chairpersons frequently express strongly pro-China positions, while grassroots members and other key figures may not share the same views. Even former KMT chairperson Hung Hsiu-chu and some of her policies have been seen as "not representative" of the party as a whole.

He questioned whether the CCP's invitation to the KMT chairperson achieves more than just a short-term information warfare victory, particularly in terms of controlling the broader KMT or influencing Taiwan's 2028 presidential election. The "prelude" to the 2028 election will be the year-end local "nine-in-one" elections, which will serve as an indicator of whether the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the opposition KMT adjust their political strategies.

DPP: 'They talk about peace, but military drills never stop'

Regarding Cheng Li-wen's "peace trip," the DPP posted on Facebook on Wednesday April 8, stating: "They talk about peace, but military drills never stop. Peace cannot be granted by a dictator."

The DPP said that Cheng Li-wen went to China in high spirits, and upon arrival was seen smiling broadly and sharing drinks with Taiwan Affairs Office Director Song Tao, speaking enthusiastically about what they called a "historic peace trip," immersed in a self-satisfying atmosphere. However, experience shows that discussions about peace with the Chinese Communist Party often end in deception.

The DPP also pointed to historical examples where the KMT was "publicly contradicted" by the CCP. According to the party, there have been countless such cases in recent years. For instance, in 2022, Chiang Wan-an stated before the Taipei mayoral election that "as long as PLA aircraft and ships stop disturbing Taiwan, the Twin City Forum can proceed."

Yet after the election, PLA activities continued as before, and the forum still went ahead. The KMT, they said, "willingly accepted being contradicted once." In 2025, Chiang Wan-an visited Shanghai, where he spoke at the forum about how "the Taiwan Strait should not have turbulent waves." However, immediately after his departure, the PLA announced large-scale "encirclement Taiwan" military exercises, once again leaving the KMT publicly contradicted.

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) stated that in 2026, it will be Cheng Li-wen's turn to loudly advocate "peace" and "lying flat," but the much-anticipated "Cheng–Xi meeting" has yet to formally take place. Meanwhile, PLA aircraft incursions and PLA Navy damage to undersea cables have already arrived as an initial show of force. This time, it seems the Kuomintang (KMT) is again expecting to be publicly contradicted.

"Facts are very clear: while the CCP talks about peace, its military drills against Taiwan have never stopped."




*A display shows Taiwan's President-elect Lai Ching-te and his running mate Hsiao Bi-khim during a rally outside the headquarters of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taipei on Jan.13, 2024, after Lai won the presidential election. Taiwan's ruling party candidate Lai Ching-te, branded a threat to peace by China, on Jan.13 won the island's presidential election, a vote watched closely from Beijing to Washington. (Image: Yasuyoshi CHIBA / AFP)*

'Believing the CCP is either foolish or malicious'

The DPP stated, "Peace cannot be granted as a gift by a dictator. Moreover, throughout history, the CCP has never fulfilled promises of granting peace to Tibet or Hong Kong."

The DPP emphasized that peace ultimately depends on strength, and only strength provides bargaining power. It therefore called on the KMT to promptly support the passage of a special national defense budget bill to strengthen Taiwan's capabilities and leverage.

It further challenged Cheng Li-wen, saying that if she has "guts," she should publicly urge the CCP to renounce the use of force to annex Taiwan. Otherwise, the DPP said, the Taiwanese people can only continue to agree with an old saying: "Believing the CCP is either foolish or malicious."

## Is Taiwan's opposition KMT splitting into pro-US and pro-Beijing camps?

04 April 2026, SCMP

Big differences have emerged over defence spending just as the party's chairwoman prepares to set off for the mainland

Taiwan's main opposition Kuomintang (KMT) is showing signs of internal strain ahead of its leader's planned visit to mainland China, with divisions over defence spending and ties with Washington and Beijing raising questions over the party's strategic direction.

KMT chairwoman Cheng Li-wun is set to go to mainland China with a delegation from April 7 to 12 on a trip that could include a meeting with Communist Party leader Xi Jinping.

The trip comes as the party remains divided over a contentious special defence budget, exposing what some analysts describe as an emerging split between more US-leaning and Beijing-friendly camps.

At the centre of the debate is a proposed NT$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion) special defence budget put forward by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration to boost the island's resilience and asymmetric capabilities.

Much of the special funding has been earmarked to buy US weapons, following White House pressure for the island to take on more responsibility for its defence.

The KMT caucus has proposed a significantly smaller "NT$380 billion plus N" framework – with the final figure subject to negotiation – but several senior figures have signalled support for a higher range closer to the government's proposal.

Taichung mayor Lu Shiow-yen, widely seen as a potential KMT contender in the island's 2028 leadership race, said on Monday soon after returning from a visit to the United States that a "reasonable" budget should fall between NT$800 billion and NT$1 trillion.

Describing arms procurement as "buying insurance", Lu said Taiwan should acquire the most advanced systems as early as possible within its financial capacity – remarks widely seen as an attempt to reassure Washington about the party's support for big-budget spending.

**PLA kicks off military exercises around Taiwan**

PLA kicks off military exercises around Taiwan

Former KMT chairman Eric Chu Li-luan has also been linked to proposals budgeted in the NT$900 billion range, reinforcing perceptions of a more US-friendly line among key party figures.

The contrast has sharpened scrutiny of Cheng's position, which critics say reflects a more cautious approach towards Washington as she prepares for her trip across the Taiwan Strait.

Cheng has advocated embracing the 1992 consensus, arguing it could "significantly reduce the likelihood of military confrontation" – a position rejected by the DPP and viewed with unease by some Taiwan-centric voices within the KMT.

The term refers to a verbal understanding between the KMT and Beijing that both sides recognise "one China", but with each side interpreting what that means.

**DPP officials have seized on the differences within the KMT.**

DPP secretary general Hsu Kuo-yung said arms procurement was "not like buying vegetables at a market", warning that treating defence spending as a bargaining exercise could put Taiwan's security at risk.

"Is it Cheng Li-wun or Lu Shiow-yen who calls the shots?" Hsu asked, pointing to the wide gap between competing figures.

He said the NT$1.25 trillion proposal was the result of more than two years of discussions with the United States and based on Taiwan's defence needs, including training and maintenance.

Some DPP figures have suggested that Cheng's preference for a smaller budget risks aligning with Beijing's opposition to US arms sales, especially a large scale, to Taiwan.
Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China, to be reunited by force if necessary. The US, in common with most countries, does not recognise Taiwan as an independent state. But Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-governed island by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons.
DPP legislator Lin Chun-hsien said the timing of Cheng's visit and her possible meeting with Xi – announced shortly after a bipartisan US Senate delegation arrived in Taipei on Monday – suggested that Beijing was seeking to pre-empt a potential shift within the KMT.
"This reflects concern that the KMT could be drawn closer to the United States," Lin said, adding that Lu's higher budget proposal signalled internal differences.

**Trump downplays Taiwan dispute in China talks**

Trump downplays Taiwan dispute in China talks
Cheng has sought to downplay the differences.
She said the "NT$380 billion plus N" framework did not cap spending, with the "N" representing additional funding once more details – including US letters of offer and acceptance – became available.
"The KMT is not saying it only supports NT$380 billion," she said, adding the party would "immediately review" arms purchases once further information was provided.
Cheng also stressed that she and Lu remained in close communication, saying the Taichung mayor conveyed the party's position clearly during her US trip.
Yet, there have been signs of unease.
Cheng hosted two dinners in mid-March to rally support for the party's defence proposal but the events were poorly attended, with more than one-third of lawmakers absent from the first gathering.

However, a separate dinner hosted by Chu days later drew a much higher turnout.
Some KMT lawmakers have openly acknowledged there are divisions.
"Many – particularly those preparing for local elections later this year – remain cautious about the political impact of closer engagement with Beijing," one legislator said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Others, including legislator Lo Chih-chiang, are more conciliatory, saying that maintaining cross-strait communication channels remains important despite the timing.
Tensions have also surfaced in a parallel dispute involving figures linked to former leader Ma Ying-jeou.
One of those figures is Hsiao Hsu-tsen, a KMT vice-chairman and close ally of Cheng.
Hsiao is a former executive director of the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation who has been accused of financial misconduct and unauthorised activities on the mainland – allegations he denies.
The foundation has cut ties with Hsiao and referred the case for a legal review. However, Cheng has publicly backed Hsiao, who is expected to join her delegation to the mainland, further underscoring divisions among party elites.
Analysts said the developments pointed to a broader contest over the KMT's direction.
Yeh Yao-yuan, a professor at the University of St Thomas in Houston, said Cheng's Beijing-leaning position contrasted with a more moderate line that emphasised maintaining strong ties with Washington.
"To be frank, this shows that there are now two different forces within the KMT that are gradually competing," he told the BBC.
Chu Chao-hsiang, a mainland studies professor at Chinese Culture University in Taipei, said grass-roots supporters and local candidates were uneasy.
"That is understandable, because Cheng is not fundamentally a party chair who manages election strategy, and her focus is not on elections," he said.
He added that while Cheng has prioritised cross-strait ties, local candidates must contend with electoral realities where the US factor remained unavoidable.
Yeh said Beijing might be seeking to use the Cheng-Xi meeting to reinforce ties at a time when the party's internal balance was shifting, but warned the move could backfire given limited public support in Taiwan for closer alignment with Beijing.
"If pro-US voices within the KMT continue to be suppressed, it could hurt the party's prospects in coming elections," he said.

Others rejected the idea of a major split.
Max Lo, executive director of the Taiwan International Strategic Study Society, said the differing approaches reflected a "division of labour" rather than conflicting strategies.
"The core objective remains the same – to safeguard the Republic of China and maintain peace and stability," he said, referring to the island's official title.
He argued that maintaining ties with both Washington and Beijing was a pragmatic response to Taiwan's position between major powers.
Huang Huei-hua, director of Taiwan Global Talk, a Taipei-based think tank, echoed that view, saying the party's outreach to both sides should be seen as complementary.
"Through Lu's US visit, the KMT has demonstrated that it is a party capable of engaging internationally," she said, adding there was no need to overstate differences.
She argued the KMT's approach – being at peace with mainland China, friendly to Japan and pro-US – was more moderate than the DPP's.

"Whichever party can maintain cross-strait peace and the status quo will win voter support," she said.

Huang added that Cheng's mainland visit could help bolster perceptions that the KMT was better placed to preserve stability across the Taiwan Strait.

But she cautioned that while local elections tended to focus on grass-roots issues, a poor showing could still carry consequences.

"If the KMT performs badly, Cheng may have to step down to take responsibility – which could cost her leadership of the party," she said.

## Poll Shows 94.4 Percent of Taiwanese Refuse to Be Part of the Communist China

02 April 2026, ChinaScope

Taiwanese newspaper *Business Today* recently reported that the Taiwan Inspirational Association (TIA) just released the results of its public opinion poll. Public satisfaction with the government's administration continued to rise to 57.6 percent, while dissatisfaction with the Legislative Yuan reached a high of 59.3 percent. On the issue of Taiwan's future, if the factor of war is excluded, a high percentage of the public, 94.4 percent, support the Republic of China (Taiwan) maintaining its democratic, free, sovereign, and independent status quo, while only three percent hope to become part of communist China.

Over 60 percent of respondents supported the TWD$1.25 trillion (around US$39 billion) national defense special budget (primarily to acquire military equipment from the United States), and nearly 60 percent surveyed were satisfied with war preparedness.

The Legislative Yuan's satisfaction rate was only 38.6 percent, while 59.3 percent expressed dissatisfaction, making it the worst-performing category in this poll. Partisan infighting is the primary cause.

In addition, the Taiwan-Japan security alliance received 60 percent approval.

## Senators introduce bipartisan bill to ban Chinese vehicles and auto parts

30, April 2026, NBC News

A bipartisan Senate duo introduced a bill on Wednesday to ban the importation of Chinese-made vehicles and auto parts, weeks ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump's planned sit-down with Chinese President Xi Jinping.Sens. Bernie Moreno, R-Ohio, and Elissa Slotkin, D-Mich., introduced the Connected Vehicle Security Act, which would ban automobiles, parts and vehicle software made in China or in partnership with China, as well as other adversarial nations, from the U.S. market.

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The Commerce Department last year issued a rule that restricted such vehicles and parts from the U.S. market, but both Moreno and Slotkin spoke of the importance of codifying the effort into law. On Tuesday, more than 70 House Democrats signed a letter urging Trump to block Chinese automakers from the U.S. market ahead of his meeting with the Chinese leader next month. In January, Trump suggested an openness to allowing Chinese automakers into the U.S. market during a speech before the Detroit Economic Club.

In an interview, Slotkin said Trump's upcoming meeting with Xi was the impetus for introducing the legislation now.

"We are watching very closely what deals come out of that summit," she said.

Moreno, who touted Trump's support for U.S. automakers, said he did not expect this effort to be on the agenda for Trump's meeting with Xi, which is slated to take place in mid-May.

"What we do is we take that model of the [Commerce Department's] Connected Vehicle Rule and expand it so that [it covers] basically the entire supply chain, but also clarify we don't allow the importation of the cars, even on a temporary basis, into the U.S.," he said in an interview. "So we are hermetically sealing the U.S. market from the Chinese auto industry."

The bill is being introduced with the backing of labor and General Motors.

By building on and strengthening the existing connected vehicles rule, this legislation puts common sense guardrails on a major threat to our nation's auto industry," United Auto Workers President Shawn Fain said in a statement.

Moreno and Slotkin said the bill was necessary both on national security grounds and to protect U.S. automakers from being undercut. They said the Chinese-made internet-linked cars were a surveillance risk.

Meanwhile, the war in Iran, which has triggered rising fuel prices, could be a boon for Chinese auto manufacturers. The nation commands most of the global electric vehicle market.

"We all understand that with the economy the way it is in the United States that people are

looking for cheaper cars," Slotkin said. "People are really, really pressed right now from every direction, and the one thing that had come down in price over the past year was gas, and now that's spiked up because of the war."
"But as leaders, we have a responsibility to say, 'Look, this is a driving surveillance package, it's like TikTok on wheels," she added. "We all understand the price constraints, but we have a responsibility to protect people's security."

## Some groups ask US trade agency for new duties, import bans to fight forced labor

28 April 2026,Reuters

Pro-tariff and human rights groups asked the Trump administration on Tuesday to impose new import bans, duties and quotas to combat forced labor practices in China and other countries and to press trading partners to adopt U.S.-style enforcement mechanisms.
Some 60 witnesses are scheduled to testify
, opens new tab
at a two-day public hearing on the U.S. Trade Representative's "Section 301" unfair trade practices investigation into what it calls the failure of 60 countries to enforce bans on imports of goods produced with forced labor.
The probe, along with a separate investigation into excess industrial capacity, is part of an effort by President Donald Trump's administration to rebuild tariff pressure on trading partners after the U.S. Supreme Court struck down his global tariffs imposed under a national emergencies law in February.
The forced labor investigation, launched in mid-March, could result in new tariff actions on countries such as China and Russia, but also U.S. allies, including Australia, Canada, the European Union, Britain, Israel, India, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer has said he wants to complete the probes by July, when a temporary 10% tariff is due to expire.
The witnesses span advocacy groups, human rights groups, U.S. industry groups and representatives of foreign governments, according to USTR's schedule.
The Coalition for a Prosperous America, a pro-tariff group representing domestic industries, called on USTR to "complement tariff action with quantitative import management tools suited to the forced labor problem."
These include import licensing for supply chains with documented forced labor risks, putting the onus on importers to prove that their goods were not produced with forced labor before clearing customs, CPA senior economist Mihir Torsekar said in prepared testimony.
"Forced labor operates as a hidden production subsidy," Torsekar said. "When a producer pays workers nothing, or suppresses wages through debt bondage, document confiscation, or state-imposed coercion, the cost savings flow directly into lower unit production costs."
New tariff rate quotas for certain sectors like solar products, cotton textiles and seafood would cap import volumes in these high-risk areas, and quotas could be allocated based on demonstrated compliance with forced-labor provisions, he added.

**CHINA'S XINJIANG TARGETED**

The U.S. already has imposed a general ban on imports from China's Xinjiang region, which produces a fifth of the world's cotton and nearly half of its polysilicon, a key ingredient in solar panels. The U.S. has accused China of detaining millions of Uighurs and other Muslim minorities in work camps producing such goods, which cannot be imported into the U.S. under the Uighur Forced Labor Prevention Act.
But some witnesses at the hearing said that other countries have failed to take similar steps to ban products from Xinjiang, which is growing as a center of critical minerals production.
Samir Goswami, director of forced labor programs at Global Rights Compliance, a human rights non-profit group, said that Britain's Modern Slavery Act focuses on corporate supply chain transparency, "but it does not prohibit the import of goods made with forced labor."
An EU regulation is stronger, but it will not fully apply until 2027, Goswami said.
"Without tools comparable to the U.S. rebuttable presumption for high-risk regions like Xinjiang, authorities may face significant challenges in identifying forced labor in opaque supply chains," Goswami said, adding that the U.S. should seek enforceable forced labor import bans as part of its trade agreements.

**TECH GROUP URGES TARIFF CAUTION**

But some industry groups cautioned against using the forced labor investigation to reimpose broad tariffs.
The Consumer Technology Association said that USTR needs to demonstrate a clear link between a country's forced labor enforcement regulations and a burden on U.S. commerce.
"The relevant question is whether forced-labor goods enter the U.S. market, not whether they enter foreign markets," CTA Vice President of International Trade Ed Brzytwa said in public comments submitted to USTR.
The group, which represents importers of consumer electronics to tech startups, said USTR should consider alternatives to more tariffs, such as coordinated international actions to help countries build up forced labor bans.
"USTR should avoid measures that shift costs onto workers rather than addressing the underlying practices of forced labor," Brzytwa said.
Reporting by David Lawder; Editing by Daniel Wallis

# Why Trump Should Call For The Release Of Political Prisoners In Negotiations With China – Analysis

27 April 2026, Eurasiareview

President Donald Trump and Xi Jinping are scheduled to meet in Beijing on May 14–15.[1] With the summit on the horizon, negotiations over a potential trade deal are underway. Economic priorities, however, should not be the only issues the United States raises. As the two leaders prepare to meet, securing the release of political prisoners should be a top priority.

At their most recent meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in October 2025, Trump raised the case of Jimmy Lai, the founder of *Apple Daily* and a prominent Catholic political prisoner from Hong Kong.[2] More recently, Trump reiterated his continued desire to see Lai released.[3]

Family members of political prisoners across China, including Lai's daughter Claire Lai and Ziba Murat, the daughter of detained Uyghur doctor Gulshan Abbas, also featured prominently at the State of the Union, where they attended as guests of Speaker of the House Mike Johnson.[4] Since then, Congress has issued a bipartisan, bicameral letter urging the president to negotiate for the release of imprisoned Chinese Christian pastor Ezra Jin.[5] The House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has likewise sent letters to President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio calling for greater prioritization of the release of several prisoners of conscience, including urging sanctions on Hong Kong officials involved in Jimmy Lai's imprisonment.[6]

The US Senate also adopted a bipartisan resolution urging President Trump to secure the release of political prisoners in negotiations with the CCP.[7] Taken together, this sustained attention from the executive and legislative branches signals the importance of these cases and demonstrates political will to press for their release.

The May summit and three subsequent meetings that President Trump and Xi are planning for later this year present multiple opportunities to secure the release of high-profile political prisoners across China.[8] Top-priority cases, including Jimmy Lai, Gulshan Abbas, and detained Christian pastor Ezra Jin Mingri, should feature prominently in US-China negotiations. These cases are not internal affairs, as the CCP so often falsely claims, but matters of high priority to the United States. This is especially true of Gulshan Abbas and Pastor Jin—both of whom have several American family members who long to be reunited with their loved ones.

No meeting between US and Chinese counterparts should take place without raising the issue of political prisoners by name. Nor should US officials limit themselves to naming cases: senior leaders, including the president, should demand the immediate and unequivocal release of these individuals and their safe return to their families. Congress also has a critical role to play, through issuing additional resolutions and public statements of support, holding hearings, and advocating through public and private means on behalf of political prisoners and their families.

Securing the release of political prisoners is not only a moral imperative but also a strategic one. There is nothing the CCP fears more than its own people. By advocating forcefully for their release, the US can help shift the balance of power away from the Party and toward the Chinese people at a critical moment.

Why Now Is the Right Time To Prioritize Political Prisoners

As President Trump and Xi prepare to meet several times over the course of this year, there will be multiple opportunities to press for the release of high-priority political prisoners across China. Critically, the US has leverage.

In the lead-up to the APEC summit, the CCP made a significant misstep. Before the meeting, Beijing threatened to restrict global exports of rare-earth minerals as part of its negotiation strategy.[9] The threat was later abandoned during talks last October, but at no significant cost to China.

That threat put the CCP on its back foot. It appeared like a bluff, and when the United States called them on it, Beijing retreated. China should not be able to recover from such a miscalculation; merely walking back the threat is not enough.

The CCP's blunder presents a clear opportunity for President Trump to make a concrete request: that Xi, as a gesture of good faith, release several of China's high-priority political prisoners, including Jimmy Lai, Gulshan Abbas, and Pastor Jin. Every summit, every bilateral meeting between US and Chinese officials—particularly at the leader level—is an opportunity to secure the freedom of additional prisoners.

Trump has made the release of political prisoners a notable priority of his second-term foreign policy. Recent examples include the first lady's role securing the return of Ukrainian children from Russia,[10] Trump's efforts to obtain the release of Venezuelan and Belarusian political prisoners,[11] and negotiations that resulted in the release of the remaining living Israeli hostages held in Gaza.[12]

Given this track record, the president risks appearing weak if he travels to China without raising these cases and ideally bringing several of them home. In contrast, securing their release—especially those with American citizen family members—would underscore American strength and leadership.

**A Spotlight on Political Prisoners**

Every political prisoner merits sustained efforts to secure their release and ensure a safe return to family members, wherever they may be. Extrajudicial detention is antithetical to freedom

and liberty. Securing the freedom of even one political prisoner is a broader win for all political prisoners: it sharpens US tools of statecraft, strengthens US resolve to bring captives home, and signals clearly to those still behind bars that they have not been forgotten.

As the US government considers elevating political-prisoner release ahead of the Trump-Xi summits, the following three cases are emblematic of the severe plight facing all detainees across China. Together, they demonstrate that the CCP does not merely target a single people group but rather anyone it perceives as a threat to the Party's power. To that end, the US government should therefore press for their release, and that of others, to the fullest extent possible.

**Jimmy Lai.** A 78-year-old billionaire and founder of the well-known news outlet, *Apple Daily*, Lai is of high importance to the US government. He has become both an icon of the pro-democracy movement and a symbol of the precipitous decline in human rights and freedom in Hong Kong since the implementation of the National Security Law (NSL) in 2020.

Lai is one of nearly 2,000 political prisoners detained under the NSL, alongside Gwyneth Ho,[13] Joshua Wong,[14] and Kwok Yin-Sang, the father of well-known US-based Hong Kong pro-democracy advocate Anna Kwok.[15] Recently, Lai was sentenced to 20 years in prison on two counts of "collusion with foreign forces" and one count of publishing "seditious" material.[16]

He has spent approximately 23 hours a day in solitary confinement despite his advanced age and deteriorating health.[17] Under the United Nations' Mandela Rules, holding prisoners in solitary confinement for more than 15 consecutive days constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Yet the CCP has confined Lai in prolonged isolation for most of the past five years.[18] Unless the US secures his release, his 20-year sentence is effectively a death sentence.[19]

**Pastor Ezra Jin Mingri.** In October 2025, the CCP detained Pastor Jin, the lead pastor of Zion Church, along with 28 other pastors and associates. The arrests marked the largest crackdown on a single unregistered church in more than 40 years.[20] Chinese authorities have charged Pastor Jin and 17 church associates with illegally disseminating information online, though none have yet to be sentenced.[21]

Since their detention, Pastor Jin and other defendants have been granted access to legal counsel. Their lawyers, however, have faced persecution for defending them, including nighttime home raids, threats of license revocation, and actual loss of their licenses to practice law altogether.[22]

The Zion Church arrests have taken place amid a broader national crackdown on the Christian church across China. In January 2026, the CCP launched a renewed crackdown on Early Rain Covenant Church, detaining dozens of members, including current lead pastor Li Yingqiang.[23] The church's previous lead pastor, Wang Yi, has been imprisoned for the past seven years.[24]

Pastor Jin has numerous health issues, including diabetes.[25] Since his detention, authorities have denied him access to prescribed medication and proper medical care, despite his relatively poor health. He and other male detainees, surprisingly, have been permitted access to a Bible while in prison. Pastor Jin is the father of three US-citizen children, and his entire nuclear family lives in the United States.

**Gulshan Abbas.** Gulshan Abbas is a 63-year-old Uyghur mother, sister, and grandmother who has been extrajudicially detained for the last eight years. She was taken into custody within days of her sister publicly speaking about the ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity facing Uyghurs during an event at Hudson Institute.[26] Her detention is yet another act of the CCP's transnational repression.

A retired medical doctor with no history of political activism, Abbas was nevertheless sentenced to 20 years in prison on fabricated charges of "participating in a terrorist organization," "aiding terrorist activities," and "gathering a crowd to disrupt social order."[27] She is among the nearly 1.8 million Uyghurs the CCP has detained in a system of camps and prisons across China.[28] Other prominent Uyghur detainees include Ilham Tohti, Ekpar Asat, and Renagul Gheni.

Abbas remains in poor health. She suffers from high blood pressure, osteoporosis, and an eye condition that requires annual monitoring to prevent blindness. She has 24 family members who are US citizens—all of whom want her home.

Many political prisoners merit the United States strongest efforts to secure their release. The CCP has imprisoned countless Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, Christians, Falun Gong adherents, human rights activists, political dissidents, and many others.[29] Securing their freedom will require sustained effort over many years. Excluding political-prisoner advocacy from US strategy and diplomacy toward China in the year ahead would represent an enormous missed opportunity.

Why Freeing Political Prisoners Is a Priority for the US Government

Political prisoner advocacy has been, and will remain, a feature of US foreign policy as authoritarian governments continue to arbitrarily detain individuals, including American citizens and their family members. It is essential, however, to understand why political-prisoner advocacy is a vital and strategic component of US foreign policy:

- **It is a practical way to alleviate suffering in China and counter the CCP.** When the United States is unable to change the system of governance that results in arbitrary detention, securing the release of political

prisoners remains the most tangible and immediate way to alleviate suffering. Freeing detainees and, where possible, offering them safe haven in the United States mitigates harm while denying the CCP one of its most coercive tools.[30]

- **It is an opportunity to reunite US citizens with their detained loved ones.** Many American citizens become victims of transnational repression when the Chinese government detains family members vindictively in an effort to silence criticism of the Party. The CCP falsely claims that hostage-taking and political imprisonment constitute internal matters when, in reality these practices carry international consequences. The US government has a duty to protect the rights of its citizens, and the detention of relatives across China inflicts pain on Americans, placing these cases squarely in the US government's interest to remedy this harm and injustice.
- **It demonstrates US strength in defending freedom and human rights.** When the US advances and protects human rights, it reveals our adversaries' weakness and demonstrates American strength. The defense of universal human rights is not secondary to national security and economic priorities but an essential component of US foreign policy. Each successful effort to secure the release of a political prisoner restores the agency and dignity of the detained person and demonstrates US strength and vitality. Ronald Reagan famously described the US as a "shining city on a hill." Maintaining that reputation requires clearly signaling to the CCP that defending human rights remains a core US commitment.

Next Steps Amid Trump-Xi Trade Negotiations

As Trump and Xi prepare to meet, both leaders should understand that trade will not be the only item on the agenda. The US government should make clear that securing the release of political prisoners is among its top priorities, not only to deliver justice for American family members desperately seeking reunion with their extrajudicially detained loved ones, but also because it is the right thing to do.

To that end, the US government should take the following steps.

1. Call for the release of high-priority political prisoners in every meeting between US and Chinese counterparts.

President Trump himself has multiple opportunities to secure the release of political prisoners in his meetings with Xi. No meeting should occur in which the president and other US leaders fail to request the release—by name—of political prisoners and their safe return to their families, including high-profile individuals like Jimmy Lai, Gulshan Abbas, and Pastor Jin. Working-level meetings likewise present additional opportunities to raise individual cases and press for their release as part of diplomatic negotiations.

2. Identify and use points of leverage to secure political prisoners' release.

At root, the CCP is at the negotiating table because the Party wants something, continued US-China economic cooperation among its central objectives. US leaders should fully consider mutual dependencies between the two countries when negotiating. The CCP desires, perhaps even needs, access to the US market, credibility, and a range of other advantages to achieve one of its core foreign policy goals: maintaining internal stability. If the Party wants something badly enough, it will also be willing to give something in return. The US government should therefore consider a range of leverage points, including financial and visa sanctions (both the threat of additional sanctions and the potential for targeted relief), tariffs, and prisoner swaps.

- **Sanctions and visa restrictions.** The use of US economic and diplomatic tools of statecraft to advance human rights is not unprecedented. Global Magnitsky sanctions enable the United States to impose financial penalties on individuals and entities responsible for gross human rights violations and corruption. Washington can draw on existing documentation of human rights abuses by CCP officials and impose additional financial sanctions on key perpetrators if the Chinese government refuses to release political prisoners during negotiations. The US should also make full use of Section 7031(c) visa restrictions to bar perpetrators of gross human rights violations and corruption from entering the country. These restrictions can extend to family members, making it more difficult for children of sanctioned individuals to study and travel in the United States or other dollar-denominated jurisdictions.[31]
- **Tariffs.** Since the CCP seeks tariff relief, the United States could consider offering limited and conditional relief in exchange for the release of a substantial number of high-profile political prisoners.
- **Prisoner swaps.** The United States could explore offering the return of former spies and nonviolent criminals in exchange for political prisoners.

No matter what tools are employed, the United States should identify points of leverage, communicate them clearly, and be prepared to escalate pressure and press for the release of political prisoners at key diplomatic moments.

3. Request wellness visits for political prisoners by the US embassy or consulates and/or humanitarian organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Catholic Charities, and others.

The administration could also issue an intermediary request while political prisoners remain detained in the form of a wellness check. These checks could be conducted by a consular officer from the US embassy in Beijing or consulates throughout China. It could also be carried out by a neutral third party like the ICRC, Catholic Charities, or another humanitarian organization with a track record of making these types of visits. This is especially vital for political prisoners like Jimmy Lai, Pastor Jin, and Gulshan Abbas, who have ongoing health challenges that could threaten both their livelihood and even their lives.

4. Ramp up efforts to prioritize the release of political prisoners through both public and private advocacy.

Members of Congress should adopt political prisoners through the Defending Freedoms Project and commit to advocating on their behalf through all public and private means available to them.[32] This should include holding press conferences focused on prominent political prisoners, issuing additional resolutions advocating that their cases be raised during ongoing diplomacy, sending additional letters to the administration urging their continued championing of the issue, and holding hearings at which family members of political prisoners can testify. Congress could also call administration officials to testify about their ongoing efforts to secure the release of political prisoners amid negotiations.

5. Mobilize allies and partners to coordinate political prisoner advocacy.

Many US allies and partners have a vested interest in seeing political prisoners freed. The US should coordinate closely with allies like the UK, given that Jimmy Lai is a British National Overseas, with regional allies like Australia, Japan, and Korea for intelligence-sharing purposes, and in cases like Pastor Jin's, where he is of Korean-Chinese descent, and with religious organizations like the Vatican, which may have a vested interest in seeing Catholics and Protestants freed. Activating these networks will help ensure sustained and diversified advocacy and burden-sharing on a matter of diplomatic importance.

6. Establish an Office of Political Prisoner Advocacy.

At present, the US executive branch has no centralized office responsible for prioritizing the release of political prisoners. As such, the United States should consider establishing an Office of Political Prisoner Advocacy, led by a Senate-confirmed special envoy of ambassadorial rank, responsible for ensuring that political prisoner advocacy is fully integrated into broader US diplomatic efforts. The Special Envoy for Political Prisoner Advocacy would work to ensure the prioritization of political prisoner release in diplomacy with adversaries as well as continued action and political momentum within the executive branch. The office would also liaise with family members of political prisoners, coordinate efforts across the executive and legislative branches, and ensure cooperation vis-à-vis political prisoners, and more.[33]

Conclusion

The United States has an unprecedented opportunity in the year ahead to advance the cause of political prisoners across China. President Trump and other senior US officials will have multiple moments to press for their release. Securing freedom for political prisoners would signal American strength and a commitment to defending those most vulnerable at the hands of the CCP.

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## Trump administration vows crackdown on Chinese companies 'exploiting' AI models made in U.S.

24 April 2026, PBS

The Trump administration is vowing to crack down on foreign tech companies' exploitation of U.S. artificial intelligence models, singling out China at a time that country is narrowing the gap with the U.S. in the AI race.

In a Thursday memo, Michael Kratsios, the president's chief science and technology adviser, accused foreign entities "principally based in China" of engaging in deliberate, industrial-scale campaigns to "distill," or extract capabilities from, leading AI systems made in the U.S. and "exploiting American expertise and innovation."

The administration, Kratsios wrote, will work with American AI companies to identify such activities, build defenses and find ways to punish offenders.

The memo arrives at a time when China is challenging U.S. dominance in artificial intelligence, an area where the White House says the U.S. must prevail to set global standards and reap economic and military benefits. But the U.S.-China gap in performance of top AI models has "effectively closed," according to a recent report from Stanford University's Institute for Human-Centered AI.

China's embassy in Washington said it opposed "the unjustified suppression of Chinese companies by the U.S."

"China has always been committed to promoting scientific and technological progress through cooperation and healthy competition. China attaches great importance to the protection of intellectual property rights," said Liu Pengyu, the embassy spokesperson.

In Beijing, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun told reporters Friday that the U.S. claims are groundless and were smearing the achievements of China's artificial intelligence industry.

"China firmly opposes this. We urge the U.S. to respect facts, discard prejudice, stop suppressing China's technological development, and do more to promote scientific and technological exchange and cooperation between the two countries," he said.

Kratsios' memo also came the same week that the House Foreign Affairs Committee offered unanimous, bipartisan support for a bill to set up a process to identify foreign actors that extract "key technical features" of closed-source, U.S.-owned AI models and to punish them with measures including sanctions.

"Model extraction attacks are the latest frontier of Chinese economic coercion and theft of U.S. intellectual property," said Rep. Bill Huizenga, R-Mich., who sponsored the bill. "American AI models are demonstrating transformative cyber capabilities, and it is critical we prevent China from stealing these technological advancements."

Last year, the Chinese startup DeepSeek rattled U.S. markets when it released a large language model that could compete with U.S. AI giants but at a fraction of the cost.

David Sacks, then serving as President Donald Trump's AI and crypto adviser, suggested that DeepSeek copied U.S. models. "There's substantial evidence that what DeepSeek did here is they distilled the knowledge out of OpenAI's models," Sacks said then.

In a February letter to U.S. lawmakers, OpenAI, the developer of ChatGPT, made similar allegations and said China should not be allowed to advance "autocratic AI" by "appropriating and repackaging American innovation."

Anthropic, the maker of the Claude chatbot, in February accused DeepSeek and two other China-based AI laboratories of engaging in campaigns to "illicitly extract Claude's capabilities to improve their own models" using the distillation technique that "involves training a less capable model on the outputs of a stronger one."

Anthropic said distillation can be a legitimate way to train AI systems but it's a problem when competitors "use it to acquire powerful capabilities from other labs in a fraction of the time, and at a

fraction of the cost, that it would take to develop them independently."
But it can go both ways. San Francisco-based startup Anysphere, maker of the popular coding tool Cursor, recently acknowledged that its latest product was based on an open-source model made by Chinese company Moonshot AI, maker of the chatbot Kimi.
Kyle Chan, a fellow at the Washington-based think tank The Brookings Institution and an expert on China's technology development, said it will be like "looking for needles in an enormous haystack" to separate unauthorized distillation from the vast volume of legitimate requests for data. But information sharing and coordination among U.S. AI labs could help, and the federal government can play an important role in facilitating anti-distillation efforts across labs, Chan said.
It's hard to assess how far the House bill can go, but Chan said Trump may not want to rock the boat with Chinese President Xi Jinping ahead of a planned mid-May state visit to Beijing.

## Scholar unpacks 'Beijing's campus spy game'

23 April 2026, The College Fix

Quaint Midwestern campuses are an unlikely setting for a spy drama—usually reserved for exotic locales and boardrooms. Yet this past month, two suspected Chinese spies were pulled from campuses in Indiana and Michigan.
Youhuang Xiang, a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who worked as a postdoctoral student at Indiana University, was sentenced to four months in prison for smuggling E. coli into the U.S. and concealing it in a "shipment" of women's underwear.
Last month, Danhao Wang, another Chinese researcher at the University of Michigan, died after falling from a building on campus and after being questioned by U.S. law enforcement. Wang's death is being investigated as a potential suicide. Wang was well-published in fields of electrical engineering, materials science, chemistry, photonics, and semiconductors.
Beneath the intrigue, the work of Xiang and Wang reveals more about China's interest in American higher education.
Before Xiang's arrival in the U.S. and obtaining a "Non-Immigrant student (J-1) visa" to study biology in Indiana, he obtained a PhD from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). The CAS is led by CCP political appointees, and has been working with China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) since 2018.
CAS is known for its innovation in jet engine technology, underwater radar development, and interdomain warfare. CAS is also working on the China Brain Project, working at the "intersection" of brain science and artificial intelligence (AI).
Xiang's shipments from Guangzhou Sci-Tech Innovation and Trading, a Chinese company, of undergarments was suspicious enough to capture the attention of U.S. Customs and Border Protection at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport while returning to the U.S. from Europe. Xiang hid his CCP affiliation from immigration authorities by simply lying. The penalty for all of it amounted four months in prison, a $500 fine, and an order for removal along with the revocation of his student visa.
Before coming to the U.S., Wang studied at the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC), where he received a PhD in electrical engineering. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute notes that the USTC is overseen by the CAS. USTC is heavily involved in China's "nuclear and space programs," and is working heavily to advance Chinese interests in AI and quantum computing.
CCP propaganda is heavily integrated into USTC's campus life and learning. The university's anthem is titled "Greetings to the eternal east wind/Raise the red flag high!", and is on sanctions lists from the U.S. Department of War, the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). Why the University of Michigan felt at ease with keeping Wang's affiliation is just as suspicious as his death.
One of China's defenders in the U.S. is blaming the Federal government. In response to Wang's death, Megan Russell, the "China campaign coordinator" for CODEPINK, "a feminist grassroots organization working to end U.S. warfare and imperialism," said it is "not an isolated incident" but is "a series of repeated targeting of Chinese scholars."
CODEPINK repeatedly deploys its activism in support of China, Cuba, and Iran. The co-founder of CODEPINK, Jodie Evans, is the wife of pro-CCP mogul Neville Roy Singham. In response to CODEPINK's remarks: yes, Chinese scholars are under scrutiny, and for precisely the reasons listed here.
There are roughly 123,000 Chinese graduate students in U.S. colleges and universities. Statistically, there are plenty more security risks waiting to be discovered.

## Freedom House Experts on What Trump Should Discuss with Xi in Beijing

22 April 2026, Freedom House

A planned summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping is now set to take place May 14–15 in Beijing. While US officials have indicated that trade relations are at the top of the agenda, the high-level meeting comes as the CCP is deepening political and economic relationships around the world, continuing to clamp down on freedoms at home, using its

growing military to threaten China's neighbors, and enabling authoritarian states, including Iran.

"The US-China relationship will define the fate of global security in the 21st century," said Jamie Fly, CEO of Freedom House. "A China where the Chinese people can exercise their universal rights will be a better partner for the United States and the rest of the free world. Any engagement of the CCP should recognize this fact and ensure that American leverage is applied to seek the release of political prisoners, protection of Taiwan's autonomy, and Beijing's respect for ethnic minorities."

As Xi tightens his grip over domestic affairs while asserting the CCP's presence abroad, we asked Freedom House experts to identify key issues that merit attention at the upcoming Trump-Xi summit —and which Freedom House will continue to track closely, given the serious consequences if they go unaddressed.

Katie LaRoque, Director for Policy and Advocacy

Press for the release of political prisoners and an end to persecution of minority groups.

China has long been recognized as the global leader in political imprisonment. In recent years, the CCP regime has solidified its claim to this title through the mass imprisonment of activists, lawyers, religious believers, minorities, and anyone else it views as a threat. With an estimated half-million Uyghurs detained in Xinjiang alone—which the first Trump administration determined constitutes a crime against humanity—the scale of political imprisonment in China is truly unrivaled.

President Trump has a unique opportunity to score a major diplomatic win for the United States by securing the release of some of the world's highest-profile political prisoners held by the CCP, including Hong Kong publisher Jimmy Lai and Pastor Ezra Jin, founder and pastor of Zion Church, a large underground network in China that has refused state registration. This tangible outcome—returning to the United States with Jimmy Lai and Pastor Jin on Air Force One—would be a powerful and highly visible demonstration of US leadership. Building on the administration's commendable record of securing the release of political prisoners worldwide, a breakthrough in these cases could help unlock diplomatic pathways to securing the release of others unjustly detained in China and Hong Kong.

President Trump should also raise the CCP's repression of Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other ethnic minorities, making clear that these concerns are rooted in core American values and cannot be set aside. Under Xi, authorities have intensified restrictions on freedom of religion and expression, targeting communities for practicing their faith, speaking their language, or expressing their identity—forms of repression the United States cannot accept. A new "ethnic unity" law further entrenches this campaign by mandating Mandarin-language instruction in schools, replacing education previously offered in native languages like Uyghur and Tibetan.

As Freedom House's Fred Hiatt Program to Free Political Prisoners program has found, political imprisonment is a key tool for limiting dissent and free expression by facilitating the removal from society of those who challenge the regime. If relations between the United States and China are to improve, the United States should make clear that it expects to see meaningful progress in both the release of political prisoners—including Jimmy Lai and Pastor Ezra Jin—as well as an end to policies of repression against ethnic minorities.

Kevin Slaten, Research Lead, *China Dissent Monitor*; Manager, Taiwan Office

Signal that the United States will deter adventurism in Taiwan.

I'll be watching whether the United States chooses to check or accommodate Xi Jinping's authoritarian ambitions. Xi's rule has become characterized by a deepened autocracy with power centralized in his own hands. He has led the dismantlement of independent civil society, mass arbitrary internment of Uyghurs, and intensified surveillance and censorship throughout the country. Recent years have proven that it is an expansionist authoritarianism couched in nationalism. As economic and demographic headwinds mount in China, contributing to a nearly 50 percent rise in protest, according to Freedom House's *China Dissent Monitor*, focusing domestic attention on external adventures has become even more critical to Xi maintaining power. This is what drove him to disregard international obligations and crush freedom in Hong Kong. And it is what underlies his continual march toward using coercion to threaten Taiwan's democracy.

If the United States understands that Xi's machinations against Taiwan are domestically and ideologically motivated, then there is no amount of dealing that will make him desire otherwise. To ensure the continued survival of one the strongest democracies in Asia, the United States must signal through rhetoric and action that it will deter Xi's efforts to change the status quo with Taiwan.

Yana Gorokhovskaia, Research Director, Strategy and Design

Confront Xi about the CCP's aggressive campaign of transnational repression.

It is in the United States' interest for President Donald Trump to raise directly with President Xi that China's campaign of transnational repression is an unacceptable threat to fundamental freedom and national security. According to Freedom House's data, China is responsible for almost a quarter of all recorded cases of physical transnational repression in the world since 2014. The Chinese government targets a broad range of individuals and groups, including human rights defenders, journalists, international students, former political insiders, as well as members of religious and ethnic minorities. It relies on tactics

like digital surveillance, forced returns, assault, assassinations, and threats against families. As a new report from ChatGPT, the generative artificial intelligence chatbot developed by OpenAI, reveals, intimidating overseas activists is an everyday task for some Chinese security officials.

People living in the United States are not safe from this campaign. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has said that China's transnational repression is becoming more brazen and includes setting up secret overseas police stations in American cities, recruiting criminal groups and private investigators to surveil and harass dissidents, and destroying artwork that is critical of the Chinese Communist Party.

The United States pioneered much of the security and communications strategies currently used by democratic countries to combat transnational repression. Leader-to-leader public diplomacy remains one of the most important tools for pushing back on this tactic of global authoritarianism.

Samy G., Senior Program Manager

Emphasize that the United States believes religious freedom is a universal right.

In recent years, Chinese authorities have increased control over how people practice their religion, including through advanced surveillance technologies such as facial recognition, and they have implemented policies that try to make religion fit within the CCP's ideology and ensure loyalty to the regime. Groups that do not follow the state's rules, like house churches, have been targeted. Many of these groups have been stopped from meeting and their leaders have been harassed, detained, or put on house arrest, and their places of worship have been subject to destruction.

In this context, Freedom House is calling for the immediate release of Pastor Ezra Jin, along with approximately 18 other pastors associated with Zion Church, who have remained in detention since an October 2025 crackdown and face charges that carry up to three years in prison.

Authorities have also sent members of religious minorities, especially Uyghur Muslims, to "reeducation" centers, where they are subjected to political and religious indoctrination and pressured to abandon their faith. Tibetan Buddhists or Chinese who practice Falun Gong are also being targeted all over China. Freedom House has been active in assisting those targeted by helping them access lawyers, supporting their families while they are in detention, enabling families to afford visiting prisoners, offering them basic supplies, and sometimes even helping them relocate to a safe place. Freedom House also works closely with diaspora communities, maintaining support and direct connections with survivors and rights defenders facing religious persecution in China. This engagement supports the ongoing documentation of cases and enables quicker responses when new incidents occur.

US authorities should communicate that religious freedom is a universal human right. They should also make clear that the US government will impose targeted sanctions against those who violate that right and will seek to support affected communities, both inside China and abroad.

Masha Donnelly, Chief of Staff

Confront Xi about China's role facilitating sanctions evasion.

Recent investigations show that Chinese and Hong Kong-based firms supplied roughly 76 percent of battlefield goods reaching Russia and that more than 4,000 Chinese companies have engaged with sanctioned Russian defense entities. Chinese actors also serve as the primary economic lifeline for the Iranian regime, purchasing the vast majority of its sanctioned oil and enabling financial networks that convert those revenues into funding for its nuclear program, missile development, and affiliated armed groups. The decision to temporarily lift sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil, taken to manage energy-market fallout from strikes on Iran, further cedes leverage. The illicit financial channels that corrupt and repressive governments rely on also enable authoritarian regimes in Latin America, and accelerate the development of parallel financial infrastructure outside of US visibility.

Instead of providing adversarial regimes access to additional revenue and giving away bargaining chips, the United States should reassert its ability to punish authoritarian actors by making clear to Beijing that sanctions will be enforced.

The key to effective enforcement of US sanctions lies in regulatory tolerance and financial channels that sit within Beijing's control. Chinese authorities could restrict these flows, but Chinese state-linked institutions facilitate cross-border payments tied to sanctioned trade. This is a direct challenge to US interests and one that should be addressed at the highest level between President Trump and Xi Jinping.

Kian Vesteinsson, Senior Research Analyst for Technology and Democracy

Revive export controls on advanced semiconductors and fabrication equipment to thwart digital authoritarianism.

The president should use the summit to ensure that US companies and artificial intelligence (AI) expertise do not fuel the CCP's apparatus of censorship and surveillance. The imposition of export controls on state-of-the-art semiconductors, often referred to as chips, and the equipment needed for their fabrication offers one point of leverage. Chinese firms have lagged in the race to develop state-of-the-art semiconductors. Export controls on advanced semiconductors and fabrication equipment could be revived to include licenses that limit end-uses involving military or law enforcement activities.

China has ranked as the world's worst environment for internet freedom for over a decade in Freedom House's *Freedom on the Net* index, as the CCP has built a repressive regime of censorship and surveillance designed to silence dissent and maintain control. These tools are increasingly powered by artificial intelligence, as with movement-tracing technology for retribution against protesters and speech-recognition software tailored to surveil minority ethnic groups. These technologies process an enormous volume of data, requiring significant computational power to carry out the CCP's agenda for repression. Regardless of the policy mechanism, the president should seek to prevent US AI expertise from being abused for the CCP's agenda of digital authoritarianism.

## A Conviction and a Suspicious Death are the Latest in Beijing's Campus Spy Game

22 April 2026, Minding the Campus

Quaint Midwestern campuses are an unlikely setting for a spy drama—usually reserved for exotic locales and boardrooms. Yet this past month, two suspected Chinese spies were pulled from campuses in Indiana and Michigan.

Youhuang Xiang, a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who worked as a postdoctoral student at Indiana University, was sentenced to four months in prison for smuggling E. coli into the U.S. and concealing it in a "shipment" of women's underwear.

Last month, Danhao Wang, another Chinese researcher at the University of Michigan, died after falling from a building on campus and after being questioned by U.S. law enforcement. Wang's death is being investigated as a potential suicide. Wang was well-published in fields of electrical engineering, materials science, chemistry, photonics, and semiconductors.

Beneath the intrigue, the work of Xiang and Wang reveals more about China's interest in American higher education.

Before Xiang's arrival in the U.S. and obtaining a "Non-Immigrant student (J-1) visa" to study biology in Indiana, he obtained a PhD from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). The CAS is led by CCP political appointees, and has been working with China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) since 2018.

CAS is known for its innovation in jet engine technology, underwater radar development, and interdomain warfare. CAS is also working on the China Brain Project, working at the "intersection" of brain science and artificial intelligence (AI).

Xiang's shipments from Guangzhou Sci-Tech Innovation and Trading, a Chinese company, of undergarments was suspicious enough to capture the attention of U.S. Customs and Border Protection at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport while returning to the U.S. from Europe. Xiang hid his CCP affiliation from immigration authorities by simply lying. The penalty for all of it amounted four months in prison, a $500 fine, and an order for removal along with the revocation of his student visa.

Before coming to the U.S., Wang studied at the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC), where he received a PhD in electrical engineering. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute notes that the USTC is overseen by the CAS. USTC is heavily involved in China's "nuclear and space programs," and is working heavily to advance Chinese interests in AI and quantum computing.

CCP propaganda is heavily integrated into USTC's campus life and learning. The university's anthem is titled "Greetings to the eternal east wind/Raise the red flag high!", and is on sanctions lists from the U.S. Department of War, the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). Why the University of Michigan felt at ease with keeping Wang's affiliation is just as suspicious as his death.

One of China's defenders in the U.S. is blaming the Federal government. In response to Wang's death, Megan Russell, the "China campaign coordinator" for CODEPINK, "a feminist grassroots organization working to end U.S. warfare and imperialism," said it is "not an isolated incident" but is "a series of repeated targeting of Chinese scholars."

CODEPINK repeatedly deploys its activism in support of China, Cuba, and Iran. The co-founder of CODEPINK, Jodie Evans, is the wife of pro-CCP mogul Neville Roy Singham. In response to CODEPINK's remarks: yes, Chinese scholars are under scrutiny, and for precisely the reasons listed here.

There are roughly 123,000 Chinese graduate students in U.S. colleges and universities. Statistically, there are plenty more security risks waiting to be discovered.

Chinese state interests continue to intersect with an open—and often naïve—American university system.

## Lawmakers Demand Clarity on 48 Group Club's Ties with CCP

11 April 2026, Devidcourse

Leading U.S. and UK lawmakers, including John Moolenaar and Jeff Merkley, have requested the 48 Group Club to disclose its connections with China's Communist Party and its influence network. The letter seeks transparency on the organization's potential role in advancing Beijing's strategic objectives through elite engagement.

n a bipartisan move, U.S. and UK legislators have reached out to the 48 Group Club, demanding transparency regarding its alleged deep ties with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The coalition,

led by John Moolenaar (R-MI) and Jeff Merkley (D-OR), alongside UK parliamentarians, underscores concerns about the organization's involvement in Beijing's 'United Front' strategy, which reportedly aims to manipulate international political landscapes to benefit China.

The lawmakers, part of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), cautioned that the 'United Front' initiative represents a sophisticated blend of influence and intelligence operations. Their formal communication stresses the group's role in shaping narratives and exerting influence over UK elites, potentially affecting both national policies and public opinion globally. This raises alarms regarding transparency and accountability within the 48 Group, given its extensive membership and political connections.

As highlighted in the release, the 48 Group is believed to function as a networking hub fostering ties with China's allies, an arrangement exploited by the CCP to further its strategic intents. The legislators' letter advocates for the release of compliance, risk, and due diligence documents related to the group's collaborations with CCP-affiliated entities, aiming to shed light on any undue influences and to ensure an unbiased stance in international discourse.

## Chinese embassy in US confirms death of semiconductor researcher Wang Danhao

07 April 2026, SCMP

Scientist described by dean as a 'promising and brilliant young mind' took own life after questioning by US federal law enforcement

Chinese semiconductor researcher Wang Danhao died at the University of Michigan last month, shortly after being questioned by US federal law enforcement.

Liu Pengyu, a spokesman for China's embassy in Washington, confirmed to the South China Morning Post in an email on Monday that Wang had taken his own life.

"We are deeply distressed by this tragedy," Liu wrote, adding that the US had "overstretched" the concept of national security and subjected Chinese students and scholars to unwarranted questioning and harassment.

He called on the US government to conduct a thorough investigation, provide a responsible explanation to Wang's family and the Chinese side, and end what he described as discriminatory law enforcement practices.

Wang, a postdoctoral research scientist at the university's College of Engineering since 2022, died after a fall inside the George G. Brown Building on campus late on March 19.

University police responded to a report at around 11pm and later pronounced him dead, according to a public information officer with the University of Michigan Division of Public Safety and Security. The police did not identify the deceased.

The embassy had been in contact with Wang's family in China to offer assistance, Liu added. He also urged Chinese students in the US to stay vigilant and contact Chinese diplomatic missions if they encountered issues with law enforcement.

China's foreign ministry first commented on the case on March 27, saying it was "deeply saddened" and had raised "solemn representations" with the US side.

In a follow-up statement on March 30, China's consulate in Chicago said the Chinese scholar died by suicide "the day after being questioned by US law enforcement".

Chinese-American scientists fear US racial profiling

In a collegewide email sent on April 1, Karen Thole, dean of the College of Engineering, also identified Wang as the victim.

Thole described him as a "promising and brilliant young mind", according to Michigan-based local news website MLive.

"His loss is felt deeply … not only by those who knew him here at the University, but also everyone who understands his potential to have contributed to breakthroughs in science that would have positively impacted people around the world," Thole wrote.

Wang worked in the lab of Zetian Mi, the Pallab K. Bhattacharya Collegiate Professor of Engineering who specialises in semiconductors, nanomaterials and optoelectronics. The SCMP has reached out to Mi and Thole for comment.

Wang's LinkedIn page shows he earned his PhD from the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) in Hefei in June 2022, before moving to Ann Arbor, Michigan.

His PhD work used a semiconductor material called AlGaN to build tiny structures for advanced light-detecting and electronic devices, and his thesis was among the top 30 that year.

His Google Scholar profile shows Wang's research has been cited more than 4,000 times. His recent work, highlighted by the University of Michigan in 2024 and 2025, shows how certain nitride semiconductors remain stable under extreme conditions, paving the way for more efficient, high-power electronics.

"My research stands at the intersection of electrical engineering, material science, chemistry and photonics/optoelectronics," Wang wrote on ResearchGate, a website where researchers share their work.

He said his work focused on developing III-nitride semiconductor thin films and nanostructures for next-generation electronic and light-based devices.

A report on March 31 by World Journal, one of the largest Chinese-language newspapers in North America, said Wang had planned to return to China after the semester ended in May to take up a university position, but was allegedly barred by US authorities from leaving the country.

The report also cited claims that federal agents had surrounded the building while he was in the lab and intended to take him away for questioning.
The SCMP has not been able to independently verify these claims.
Why are more Chinese scientists leaving the US to return to China?
Scrutiny of Chinese-American scientists in the US began in the early 2010s, with high-profile cases such as hydrologist Sherry Chen, who was accused of spying for Beijing, and physicist Xiaoxing Xi, who was charged with sharing sensitive US company technology.
Both scientists were later cleared of wrongdoing, while Chen received a payout of almost US$2 million for wrongful termination from the US government.
In 2018, President Donald Trump formally launched the China Initiative, aimed at countering alleged economic espionage and technology transfers linked to China.
Although many cases were dropped or collapsed in court, the programme damaged careers and left hundreds of researchers facing severe financial and professional hardship. The initiative was ended in 2022, following widespread criticism over racial profiling and its chilling effect on scientific collaboration.
Recent cases have continued to raise concerns. In 2024, neuroscientist Jane Wu of Northwestern University died by suicide after her laboratory was shut down, even though she had been cleared in a federal investigation into her China ties, according to her family's ongoing lawsuit against the university.
Separately, Arizona State University professor Nongjian Tao died in 2020 after falling from a campus parking garage, with police later ruling it a suicide. A police report said he had been under significant work-related stress, and questions have lingered over whether scrutiny of his China ties may have played a role.

## Chinese Hackers Breached FBI's Secret Surveillance System; National Security Threat Declared

04 April 2026, Military

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has officially classified the recent breach of its surveillance system, carried out by Chinese hackers, as a 'Serious Incident.'
This was reported by Politico.
This status is assigned only to cyber intrusions that pose a significant threat to US national security, foreign policy, or the country's economic interests.
The hackers gained access to the digital data collection network, also known as DCS-3000 or Red Hook.
This system stores the results of lawful data interception, including phone numbers, call metadata, and information about the internet traffic of subjects under investigation.
This 'supply chain attack' method allowed the hackers to remain undetected for some time. FBI analysts first detected suspicious activity on February 17, 2026, at the bureau's offices in the Virgin Islands.
Under the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), classifying the event as a 'Serious Incident' requires the agency to notify Congress within seven days and involve the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) in the response.
Currently, the White House and intelligence agencies are continuing to assess the full extent of the breach and are attempting to determine whether the hackers gained access to data regarding active counterintelligence investigations.
Earlier, Militarnyi reported that Iran-linked hackers from the Handala Hack Team had hacked into FBI Director Kash Patel's personal email and published some of the data online.
A representative of the US Department of Justice confirmed to the publication that Patel's email had been hacked and noted that the published materials appear to be authentic.

# COMMENTARIES

## How India should prepare for a future war with Pakistan and China

30 April 2026, The Print

The ongoing Iran War has settled an important question about modern conflict. An air campaign by a superior power ensures its dominance in the opening phase—but not a decisive victory. The stronger side will endeavour to seize the initiative, strike first and degrade visible military capability with an air, missile and drone campaign, backed by all the supporting force multipliers to bring about defeat through psychological collapse. A resilient weaker side will absorb the initial onslaught and adopt an asymmetric strategy to prolong the war and impose costs. This model becomes more relevant for nuclear-weapon-armed states, which must fight wars below the nuclear threshold of the adversary. This generally includes major territorial, economic or military combat potential losses.For India, this is not just a theory. In a future conflict, China will aim for a short, high-technology, decisive war. Pakistan will seek to turn it into a prolonged asymmetric contest. Both will operate under a nuclear shadow that constrains escalation but encourages risk-taking below the threshold. In an India-Pakistan conflict, Chinese support is likely to be restricted to Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), including space resources and electronic/cyber warfare. But in an India-China conflict, Pakistan will certainly open a second asymmetric front.This article is a sequel to my previous article on ThePrint—Iran war has given India a blueprint for the next conflict.

**Pakistan's asymmetric strategy**

Pakistan has little incentive to fight India symmetrically. Its approach will mirror the logic demonstrated by Iran—avoid decisive engagements, impose persistent costs, and exploit escalation limits.

It gave a glimpse into its thought process during Operation Sindoor. After imposing costs on the Indian Air Force through counter-air operations in the first hour of the conflict, the Pakistan Air Force remained cocooned in hardened shelters for the next 87 hours. Pakistan switched to drone swarms launching approximately 600 attacks over the next 72 hours, but only focused on military targets saturated with India's integrated air defence. In the same period, the IAF focused on the destruction of Pakistan's air defence, electronic warfare and deception—enabling air strikes on the night of 9 May 2025, going into 10 May 2025, with impunity across the length and breadth of Pakistan. Pakistan's strategy was correct, but execution was poor. Moreover, Pakistan lacked missile power and quality drones.

But here's what my experience tells me Pakistan will do in the next round. It will upgrade its fighter aircraft with long-range air-to-air missiles, thicken its air defence, acquire better missiles and drones,

harden its defence infrastructure and adopt subterranean warfare to the extent possible. Its asymmetric strategy will manifest in target selection, proxies/agents in the Indian hinterland and maritime operations.

Pakistan will use air, missile and drone attacks not only on military targets, but will deliberately target major cities for psychological and political impact. It would dare India to lose its moral high ground by replicating the same, creating a dilemma for decision makers.

Pakistan will also target critical infrastructure, like power grids, oil refineries, petroleum depots, transport hubs, and communications networks, to disrupt daily life.

In conjunction with China, it could launch cyber attacks on the economic and financial networks of banks, digital payment systems and stock exchanges. The aim is not destruction, but temporary paralysis with disproportionate effect.

Pakistan has been waging a terrorism driven proxy war in J&K and in major cities of India since 1990. This war was symbolised by an AK-47-wielding and grenade-throwing terrorist who could also plant improvised explosive devices. These terrorists/agents are now likely to be armed with the most democratised high-end military technology—drones—in the hinterland of India. With drones cheaper than an AK-47, all military, civilian, economic, infrastructure and leadership targets will face attacks from the rear.

The maritime domain is another arena for asymmetric warfare. Of course, rival navies will fight for sea control/denial, but in the asymmetric domain, it may extend to targeting of commercial ships and tankers using drones and missiles. Harbours used by commercial ships can be mined. Up to 500-600 km, "mosquito navy" will play a big role in sea denial for commercial shipping. Its range can be extended by refuelling.

**India's asymmetric strategy against China**

Empirically, great powers seek a quick victory based on their military prowess. In my view, due to the uncertainty of the outcome, the probability of a limited war with China is low. However, keeping in view India's rise and assertion on the borders, China may use force to embarrass India and reassert its hegemony.

Like the US, it would seek a quick victory in a conflict, limited in time and space, without hard-slogging conventional operations in the mountains. India's political aim would be to impose a strategic defeat by sustaining China's technology-driven attack and neutralising any gains with an asymmetrical operational strategy.

During the crisis in Eastern Ladakh, we responded passively to China's preemptive offensive to secure control of approximately 1000 square km with a massive counter deployment. It achieved a strategic stalemate but failed to restore the status quo ante during negotiations due to a lack of leverage. Geography allows China a first-mover advantage, so India has to go beyond passive confrontation.

I highlighted in my last article that the best defence against the air campaign of a superior adversary is the adoption of subterranean warfare. It must be adopted in letter and spirit. In addition, we must create an optimum air defence capability. Our conventional response, in the form of a counter-air campaign and ground operations, must escalate to other sectors of the vast border where we have a terrain advantage.

The Strait of Malacca is China's economic lifeline. The Andaman and Nicobar islands are strategically located west of the strait. The Indian Navy can blockade the strait or impose "denial" on China-related commercial shipping. A similar action in the Arabian Sea to deny access to Gwadar, Pasni, and Karachi ports will have a cascading impact on the Chinese economy. The advantages of creating a "mosquito fleet" for interfering with commercial shipping are obvious.

The Dalai Lama, the religious and political head of the Tibetan nation, and a government in exile are based in India. In the public domain, there are reports of 10,000 to 12,000 Tibetan troops trained as Special Forces who, so far, have been used conventionally in our conflicts. In relation to our borders, Tibet is China's Achilles Heel. If China does not respect our sovereignty, I find no reason why the war must not be taken to Tibet. Consequently, our asymmetrical targets must be carefully chosen and focus primarily on the PLA. The Tibetan Special Forces can be infiltrated to target the PLA's rear areas and coordinate the Tibetan freedom struggle.

**A word of caution**

Asymmetric strategies attack vulnerabilities not appreciated by the adversary or capitalise on limited preparation against the threat. They rely primarily on concepts of operations fundamentally different from those of the adversary and from those of recent history. This is not new. Military history is replete with examples from the Trojan **War to the Strait of Hormuz.**

There is no compartmentalisation between conventional and asymmetric strategies. It is just that nations and militaries get conditioned to fighting wars in a particular way. And anything done differently produces asymmetry, for which little or no preparation has been done. Of course, asymmetric strategies can be countered, but a reaction as opposed to preemption has obvious disadvantages.

China, India, and Pakistan are modern armies that have to wage conflict below the nuclear threshold. Keeping in view the nuclear threshold, there are obvious constraints in the way conflict will manifest. Asymmetric strategies enable the weaker military to stalemate the adversary and impose a strategic defeat. The military challenge is to preempt or neutralise the asymmetric strategy of the weaker adversary and exploit it against a superior adversary.

## Why Tibet Remains Closed to Foreigners Despite Global Pressure

28 April 2026, Open The Magazine

A recent report by the United States State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs highlights that Tibet continues to be one of the most tightly controlled regions in China for foreign access. According to the findings, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) "remains the only territory in the People's Republic of China (PRC) where foreign visitors, including diplomats, journalists, researchers, and tourists, face extraordinary access restrictions requiring special permits in addition to Chinese visas."

This makes Tibet unique within China, where most other provinces are accessible with standard visas.

**Why are special permits required to visit Tibet?**

Unlike other parts of China, visiting Tibet involves a layered approval system. Foreign travellers must secure permits issued by regional authorities, often arranged through state-approved travel agencies. These agencies typically require visitors to follow fixed itineraries and travel with designated guides.

The restrictions are not new. Since 1989, foreign travellers have needed official confirmation letters, and access is frequently curtailed during politically sensitive periods such as the anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan Uprising and the Dalai Lama's birthday.

**Are restrictions the same for everyone?**

The report suggests that access conditions vary significantly depending on who you are. It notes that restrictions are "even harsher for overseas Tibetans, particularly Tibetan Americans," who face heightened scrutiny when applying to visit.

These applicants may need additional clearances, including approval from Chinese authorities, embassy interviews, and detailed personal documentation. Even after gaining entry, they reportedly face questioning, surveillance, and pressure to install monitoring applications on their devices.

What challenges do diplomats and officials face?

Even foreign diplomats encounter barriers. The report points out that Tibet is "the only area in China where foreigners, including diplomats, must formally request permission to visit."

While there was a small shift in 2025—when US Embassy officials were allowed a five-day visit to the region, their first since 2019—the report cautions that "one visit does not amount to full restoration of access." The visit included meetings with officials and tours of select sites, but it was tightly controlled.

How are journalists affected by these restrictions?

Journalists remain among the most restricted groups. The report cites the Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (FCCC), which said Chinese authorities rejected nearly all requests by **US journalists to report from Tibet**.

It further notes that "93 per cent of correspondents attempting to report from Tibetan regions faced major obstacles." Even outside the TAR, journalists reportedly encounter surveillance, intimidation, and physical obstruction while trying to report.

What happens in Tibetan areas outside the TAR?

Restrictions are not confined to the Tibet Autonomous Region alone. Tibetan-populated areas in other provinces also see heavy monitoring. According to the report, foreign visitors in these regions face "surveillance, harassment, and intimidation" by security forces.

This broader control limits independent observation of cultural, political, and social conditions across Tibetan regions.

**What is the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act?**

The findings are part of an annual report mandated by the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018. This US law calls for equal access for American officials and citizens to Tibetan areas and allows sanctions against Chinese officials responsible for restricting entry.

It aims to pressure China into allowing greater transparency and international presence in the region.

**What are the broader implications of these restrictions?**

The report concludes that, despite some minor improvements like the 2025 consular visit, overall conditions have not significantly changed. It states that China's policies continue to obstruct "transparency, independent reporting, and genuine international engagement with the region."

## Beijing's United Front and the Quiet Transfer of Western Technology

27 April 2026, War on the Rocks

The military modernization and technological ambitions of the People's Republic of China dominate headlines in Washington. Hypersonic missiles, AI breakthroughs, and an expanding navy are the visible symbols of competition with the Chinese Communist Party. But if the United States is serious about long-term competition, it should prioritize — or at least pay equal attention to — the Chinese Communist Party's other weapon: united front.

Understandably, military power and advanced technology feel urgent and concrete. The united front — a system of political influence, co-optation, and mobilization — sounds abstract.

Yet the Chinese Communist Party's objective has always been political. Its military and technological advances serve a broader aim: shaping the political environment at home and abroad to achieve its ultimate ambition of replacing the United States as the dominant global power and annexing Taiwan.

America's objective is to preserve democratic sovereignty, institutional integrity, and the rule of law. These outcomes depend on the resilience of

the political environment as much as on military and technological strength. If this competition is ultimately about political power and influence, then the Chinese Communist Party's primary political weapon deserves equal scrutiny.

The party itself has never treated the united front as secondary. As Mao Zedong put it: "The united front and armed struggle are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. … And the Party is the heroic warrior wielding the two weapons, the united front and the armed struggle, to storm and shatter the enemy's positions." This prioritization persists today. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized united front work as a central task of the party and warned against the mistaken belief that "doing united front work would not get you great success."

Armed struggle was not designed to stand alone. It was to be enabled and amplified by political work: building coalitions, neutralizing opponents, and fracturing the enemy camp before the shooting even started.

Today, that political weapon is institutionalized in the party's United Front Work Department, a powerful organ under the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Its mandate is to build relationships and mobilize groups outside the party, including business leaders, academics, diaspora communities, students, and political elites, and align them, when possible, with Beijing's objectives.

In my recent report, I document how the Chinese Communist Party has built a network of more than 2,000 organizations across just four democracies: the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany. These include hometown associations, chambers of commerce, cultural centers, student organizations, and media outlets.

Not every member is aware of the system's logic. In fact, many overseas ethnic Chinese people are victims of the Chinese Communist Party's united front work because the party intentionally targets this community with propaganda, emotional appeals, and sometimes coercion. But at the leadership level, all maintain ties to the united front system. Its day-to-day activities may look benign, but it remains a carefully cultivated network that the party can mobilize when needed. It is directly used as a tool by the party for military-linked cooperation and illicit technology transfer.

On military-linked transfer, for example, Huang Leping was involved in a conspiracy to illegally export high-performance integrated circuits to a subsidiary of the China Electronics Technology Group, a Chinese military-linked state-owned company. She held leadership roles in multiple united front-linked chambers of commerce. This overlap matters. The same chambers of commerce that function as community and business platforms can also provide access, credibility, and insulation for individuals engaged in sensitive technology transfer to the Chinese military.

On technology transfer, the Chinese Communist Party views overseas ethnic Chinese experts as a "treasure trove of talent" and enlists them to either return to the People's Republic of China or acquire and transfer foreign technology. This is carried out by professional organizations like the Chinese Association for Science and Technology USA, which "facilitate the implementation of technological achievements" from the United States back to China.

One case highlighted in the report was that of Yan Wengui, a research geneticist at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, who was caught conspiring to steal rice seeds for a visiting Chinese delegation. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, a key united front body later folded into the United Front Work Department, appointed Yan to a consultant committee long before his crime. Not every appointee commits espionage, but it is a way of bringing people into the party's network. The same infrastructure used for outreach and talent cultivation can, in some cases, intersect with illicit acquisition, blurring the line between influence work and hard-power objectives.

The network also shapes the political environment in which military and technological competition takes place. If lawmakers fear backlash from organized community groups, they may hesitate to take critical actions on military and technology policy. According to an article released by the National Association for China's Peaceful Unification — a Washington D.C.-based entity controlled by the United Front Work Department — "opposing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is an important part of overseas pro-reunification efforts." In other words, influencing U.S. policy debates, including on core security issues, is treated as part of the broader political mission.

If universities internalize the narrative that collaboration is purely academic and apolitical, they may overlook dual-use risks. For example, U.S. researchers have co-authored work with academics affiliated with People's Liberation Army-linked institutions, including several of the "Seven Sons of National Defense" universities — a group of Chinese universities with longstanding ties to the military and its research and development — on topics ranging from computer vision to autonomous systems. These are areas that have obvious civilian value, but also clear military application. The tendency to view these as purely academic, even when the military affiliations are clearly listed, creates opportunities for the party to access technology with direct military relevance.

If U.S. local officials treat Beijing-linked business associations as ordinary civic actors, scrutiny may be limited. At the state level, reporting in 2023 showed how party-linked intermediaries used civic and academic channels to cultivate relationships with U.S. lawmakers in Utah, organize delegations to China,

and promote resolutions aligned with Beijing's preferred narratives.

The Chinese Communist Party understands that wars are not won by hardware alone: They are won by shaping the terrain — political, social, and institutional — on which hardware is built and deployed. If Beijing sees the united front as fundamental to defeating its adversaries, Washington should treat it as fundamental to defending democracy.

Transparency matters, but transparency alone is not enough. Laws such as the Foreign Agents Registration Act are important tools. Yet enforcement is inconsistent: More than 900 organizations in the United States identified in my research with ties to the united front system are not currently registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Effective implementation should include systematic monitoring of activities, regular compliance audits, and meaningful penalties for violations. Without credible enforcement mechanisms, disclosure risks becoming a procedural formality rather than a deterrent. Disclosure without enforcement does little to change behavior.

More importantly, institutions need knowledge and capacity. State and local officials, university administrators, and corporate compliance teams should understand how united front networks operate and intersect with military-civil fusion, and how political influence can precede technological transfer. Building that capacity is not about stigmatizing communities. It is about safeguarding institutional integrity.

Building this capacity goes beyond country-agnostic rules and procedural safeguards. Institutions, including non-governmental actors like private companies, universities, and civil society organizations, need language capability and familiarity with China's political and organizational systems to apply safeguards effectively. In practice, this requires professionals who can separate meaningful signals from the background noise of routine engagement.

Three concrete steps can move this effort forward. First, the Foreign Agents Registration Act enforcement should be strengthened and clarified. This includes issuing clearer guidance on when community, business, and cultural organizations engaged in political advocacy must register. A clearer definition of what constitutes "political advocacy" is also necessary, particularly given China's use of ostensibly non-political engagements to build relationships with local officials and other actors.

Second, enforcement should move from reactive cases to systematic oversight. This means establishing routine audit mechanisms and dedicating investigative resources to influence networks rather than isolated violations. One approach would be to adopt an audit framework similar to tax compliance systems, incorporating third-party auditors to assess reporting accuracy and ensure adherence.

Third, capacity building should extend beyond federal agencies. State and local officials, university administrators, and corporate compliance teams should receive regular briefings, guidance, and training on united front structures, including how they intersect with military-civil fusion and technology transfer risks. This could be implemented through federal outreach programs, grant conditions, and partnerships with professional associations.

Ships and chips matter. But so does the political battlefield on which decisions about ships and chips are made. Ignoring the political terrain that Beijing has already spent decades preparing while focusing solely on visible capabilities ensures a U.S. disadvantage before technological or military competition even begins.

## Arunachal isn't 'South Tibet'; it's China's strategic fiction

26 April 2026, First Post

On Tuesday, yet again, the Chinese Foreign Ministry repeated its theatrics, calling Arunachal Pradesh 'Zangnan' and claiming they have full authority to rename "their own territories".

China's claim over Arunachal Pradesh has always sounded less like history and more like insistence. Beijing's claim rests on a surprisingly fragile foundation: a fairly loose imperial association, a selectively remembered treaty, and a modern strategic ambition dressed up as historical grievance.

To understand this, one must begin with the Qing dynasty, which China frequently invokes to anchor its claims. The Qing did exercise suzerainty over Tibet, but suzerainty is not sovereignty. It was a layered, indirect system of influence, reliant on local intermediaries and marked by frequent inconsistencies. Even at its peak, Qing authority in Tibet was uneven. Beyond it, into the eastern Himalayan frontier, it was virtually non-existent.

Empires leave records: administrative orders, taxation systems, military outposts. In Arunachal Pradesh, there are absolutely none that point to sustained Chinese governance. No bureaucracy, no garrisons, no fiscal footprint. What exists instead is silence — both historical and administrative.Tibet's connection to the region was still more tangible, but limited. The western tract, particularly around the Tawang Monastery, maintained religious and monastic ties with Lhasa. Tawang functioned as an important centre of Tibetan Buddhism, with some degree of monastic administration and influence over surrounding areas. However, when it comes to influence, especially religious influence, it is most definitely not the same as territorial sovereignty. Beyond this narrow belt, Arunachal remained a mosaic of tribal societies, governed locally and largely

untouched by any centralised state.Even in the foothills, where the Ahom and Chutia kingdoms in present-day Assam and Arunachal Pradesh left cultural imprints, administrative reach was shallow. What emerges from the historical record is not a region governed by Tibet or China, but one defined by the limits of power — geography dictating governance rather than the other way around.

The 20th century did not so much alter this reality as formalise it. At the Shimla Convention, British India and Tibet negotiated the McMahon Line, placing Arunachal Pradesh within British India. China refused to sign the agreement and continues to cite this refusal as proof of illegitimacy.

But this argument, repeated often enough to sound persuasive, collapses under further scrutiny.

By 1914, the Qing empire had already disintegrated in the wake of the Xinhai Revolution. China was politically fractured, consumed by internal instability, and struggling to assert authority even within its core territories. Tibet, in this vacuum, functioned with de facto autonomy, effectively conducting its own diplomacy and negotiating its own boundaries.

China's absence from Shimla was not a principled stand; it was literally a practical limitation. It lacked both the coherence to negotiate and the capacity to enforce.

And yet, a century later, Beijing invokes that absence as the basis of a claim. This brings us to the real question: if the history is this wafer-thin, why does the claim persist with such intensity?

Because Arunachal Pradesh is not just about history; it is about leverage.

Geography, in geopolitics, is destiny. And Arunachal sits at a particularly sensitive intersection of terrain and vulnerability. From the Tibetan plateau, the land slopes downward into the Brahmaputra valley, one of India's most densely populated and strategically vital regions. Control over Arunachal would not just shift a border — it would alter the military geometry of the eastern sector. Beijing's motive is to compress India's defensive depth while expanding China's operational advantage.

More critically, it brings into play the Siliguri Corridor, famously called the "Chicken's Neck", a narrow, fragile land bridge that connects mainland India to its north-eastern states. At its narrowest, this corridor is barely a few dozen kilometres wide. Any credible military pressure in this region would not merely threaten territory. It would threaten connectivity, logistics, and political cohesion. This is not a theoretical concern. It is a structural vulnerability, and Beijing is painfully aware of it.

Control over Arunachal would place China in a position to apply pressure not just along a contested border, but across an entire region. It would transform a defensive frontier into an offensive staging ground.

There is also a broader regional logic at play. Greater access to India's north-east enhances China's proximity to Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal, key theatres in its expanding maritime and economic strategy. Through Pakistan, via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Beijing already has a western gateway to the Arabian Sea. An eastern vector, even if indirect, strengthens its long-standing objective of strategic access to the Indian Ocean.

Seen in this light, "South Tibet" or "Zangnan" look less like a historical claim and more like a narrative device—a way to normalise what is, at its core, a forward-looking military and economic strategic ambition. And this is where the inconsistency becomes impossible to ignore.

If China's claims were genuinely rooted in rectifying colonial-era injustices, they would not be so selectively applied. The Qing empire lost vast territories to Tsarist Russia through unequal treaties — territories that remain under Russian control today. Yet Beijing shows no interest or urgency in reviving those claims.

Why?

Because geopolitics is not about historical revenge, it is about strategic utility.

Russia is a partner. India is a rival. Arunachal offers leverage. The Russian Far East does not.

This selectivity is not a contradiction; it is a pattern.

Countries rarely pursue history with moral consistency; instead, they deploy it with strategic intent. The past becomes a toolkit, not a point to be proved or a wrong to be made right.

Even the British understood this when they formalised the McMahon Line. Their objective was not to resolve history, but to pre-empt risk to create a buffer against uncertainties emanating from Tibet and China. It was strategy masquerading as settlement.

China's approach today mirrors that logic, but with a crucial difference. Where the British sought to stabilise a frontier, Beijing seeks to destabilise one —not because the past demands correction, but because the present offers opportunity.

So, "South Tibet" persists not as a historical truth, but as a political instrument. A phrase repeated in official statements, embedded in maps, and amplified through diplomacy—not to reflect reality, but to reshape it. But sovereignty is not constructed through repetition. It rests wholly on administration, continuity and control, all of which point unequivocally to India in Arunachal Pradesh.

What Beijing presents as a dispute is, in reality, a strategy. And what it seeks is not the correction of the past, but the advantage of the future — which will not be accepted.

May they enjoy their cartographic fantasy as just that. A fantasy.

## Refuting Beijing's Claims About Tibetan Diaspora and Democracy

24 April 2026, CTA

The Global Times, an official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), recently derided the February voting of exiled Tibetan leaders, president and parliamentarians, saying, "Election without a land—an institutional illusion created by separatist groups in exile."

Although such commentaries are presented as the views of "Chinese experts," their blindness to democracy and to the Tibetan diaspora's elections and their growing recognition worldwide call their expertise into question.

The Global Times article opens by disparaging the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) and its leadership, calling it "an illicit organization that violates China's Constitution and laws."

Yet it should be noted that the CCP itself has recognized the CTA as the so-called "Tibetan government-in-exile" and its purpose as "Tibetan independence."

Who Violated the Constitution First?

There is a saying in India, "a thief scolding the policeman instead of the other way around." This is exactly what the CCP regime is doing. Just recently, they established the Ethnic Unity and Progress law and claimed it was in accordance with the Chinese Constitution, but it was not. Here, it says the Tibetans violate China's Constitution and laws.

Article 4 of the People's Republic of China's Constitution and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (Articles 21, 37, and 49) ensure complete regional autonomy and freedom for the minority nationals to preserve their identity, language, and culture. The 17-point Agreement that the regime imposed on the Tibetans in 1951 also promised these rights.

It was in fact the CCP's violation of the aforementioned documents that coerced Tibetans to revolt in 1959, the 1980s, and 2008. Instead of redressing the ills, Beijing exploited the upheavals to brutally eliminate dissent while ruling the land with an iron fist.

In 1959, H.H. the Dalai Lama and some 80,000 escaped to India, Nepal, and Bhutan and organized themselves in exile to look after the refugees. At the same time, they garnered support from the international community to fight the injustice and repression in the homeland.

Today, after more than 75 years, under the leadership of the Dalai Lama and the CTA, the Tibetans have come a long way, preserving what is being destroyed in Tibet and establishing a vibrant democratic community admired around the world.

**Democracy and Freedom in Exile**

China frequently boasts of democratic reforms, freedom, and development in Tibet. The irony is that, without democracy in mainland China itself, it is hard to see how it can extend it to Tibetans.

The regime brags of democracy and claims that former serfs have become masters. But the reality is that even after 76 years of "democratic reforms," no Tibetan has become the party Secretary of the Autonomous Region. It had always been Chinese. This is a cruel reminder to the Tibetans that they are under foreign subjugation.

Tibetans have no right to elect their leaders in the homeland, while the Tibetan diaspora community is thriving with democracy and freedom.

The Global Times article goes on to say, "The election is increasingly detached from the Tibetan people it claims to represent." That may be true. But the primary cause of this situation is the Chinese occupation of Tibet, which, according to the UNGA Resolution 1723 of 1961, is illegal and against the UN Charter of Human Rights.

Despite the CCP's claims of increased Gross National Product, social stability, and public services, Tibetans in Tibet are not free. Since 2008, the number of Tibetans escaping Tibet has dropped to almost zero. Not because Tibetans are happy and prosperous, but because there is no freedom of movement, borders are sealed, and Tibetans are denied passports to travel.

**The CCP's Hidden Hand**

The article further asserts a decline in participation compared with the last election, dissatisfaction with Penpa Tsering (elected president of the CTA), and doubts about the election's integrity. It must be noted that in all six General Elections held since 2001, the participation has been more than 50%, with the 2021 election at the top with 76%.

The decline this time is not due to a "weakening exile community," as Xiao Jie of the China Tibetology Research Center claims. It is widely believed that the dip stems from CCP influence in undermining the voting process beyond its borders. For example, there were reports of ballot boxes being forcibly confiscated in Nepal, where China wields considerable influence.

As for claims of dissatisfaction with President Penpa Tsering, his securing more than 61% of the vote in the first round without campaigning is clear evidence of voter confidence in his leadership.

Regarding claims of election integrity, Tibetan diaspora elections have won international recognition for their fairness and peaceful conduct.

**The So-Called Chinese Experts**

In the same article, Professor Li Haidong is quoted as saying, "Such an election has no basis in either international law or domestic law, and therefore carries no legal validity."

But on what authority does China speak about the law? The occupation of Tibet and the ongoing repression violate both international and domestic law. The UN Charter has ensured freedom, democracy, and self-determination for all nationals, and Tibetans are forced to exercise these rights in exile.

Pronouncements like "it carries no legal validity" from a professor at China Foreign Affairs University are therefore unbefitting. If the election is not valid, why does China have to beg the neighboring countries not to acknowledge and endorse the Tibetan leadership's election result?

Zhu Weiqun, former executive head of Beijing's United Front Work Department and former head of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee, was also one of the key persons in the Sino-Tibetan Negotiation (2002–2010). He was known for his anti-religious opinion and vituperation against the Dalai Lama.



*Chinese President Xi Jinping appears on a large screen as the National People's Congress opens at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Feb. 5. (©Kyodo)*

"The CTA cannot conceal an obvious fact: its so-called 'voters' are in no way representative of the Xizang people […] There has never been, and will never be, any room for any form of Tibetan independence," Zhu notes in the article.

One thing is very clear: if a Chinese leader like Zhu Weiqun harbors such a view on Tibet, the Dalai Lama, and the CTA, it is not surprising that the Sino-Tibetan Negotiations of 2002-2010 failed.

First, voters in the diaspora do not represent people of Xizang; they represent Tibet of the three provinces of U-Tsang, Amdo, and Kham. "Xizang" is a Chinese fabrication and a mere meronym of Tibet.

Second, regarding Tibetan independence, he should read Prof. Hon-Shiang Lau's book, *Tibet Was Never Part of China Since Antiquity*, and the CTA's Memorandum for Genuine Autonomy. These would clarify the historical context and what Tibetans seek in relation to China. The arguments have also received support from several Chinese scholars.

**Who is Aging and Weakening?**

In the article, Xiao Jie of China Tibetology Research Center derogates the Tibetan Diaspora as "aging leadership" and a "weakening exile community."

Yet as a research fellow, he should know how much the Dalai Lama is being revered around the world for his contribution to peace, compassion, and non-violence. The Tibetan exile community is not weakening. In all these 66 years in exile, what the CCP has destroyed and continues to destroy in Tibet has all been meticulously preserved in exile and shared with the international community. The Tibetan diaspora is thriving with vibrant democracy and has become an icon for all repressed communities around the world.

Xiao Jie further claims that "leaders such as Penpa Tsering lack the religious authority, family networks, and aristocratic background that once conferred influence within the exile circle."

Since when have Chinese experts started looking for these qualifications in leadership? What was the proletarian revolution all about? Was it not to overthrow the traditional bourgeois social system based on social status? So, what the Professor is saying is against the basic principle of the proletarian revolution.

**Nations Belong to the People**

There have been foreign visitors such as Lee Camp, S.L. Kanthan, and Mark Logan who have made favorable comments on the current situation in Tibet. What they say may be true, but only in the sense that it reflects what they were shown and told by the CCP. Their affiliations are also evident from their social media posts.

But there are other recent visitors (name withheld on request), who reported, "Monasteries, Tibetans, and developments are there, but it is all guarded by surveillance cameras and police. Cheerful and frolicking young novice monks of yesteryears are missing. Once friendly and smiling Tibetans in the monasteries and Bakhor areas have now become suspicious, and visitors are not allowed around without local guides. It's like you are in a beautiful garden with a nagging fear of being stung."

Tibet has become a showpiece, like a beautiful cut flower, without any substance or real roots. Monasteries and nunneries are under the control of the CCP cadres. Children and young people are prohibited from visiting and joining monasteries. All Tibetan schools are closed and replaced with Chinese colonial boarding schools, where around one million children as young as 4 are forcefully indoctrinated under the regime's assimilative policy.

The Tibetan language is likewise discouraged. Those promoting the native language are arrested and tortured under false charges. Laws have been enacted to justify the repression and forced assimilation of minority nationalities. To name a few, these include Religious Order No. 5, Religious Order No. 19, the Patriotism Law, and the Ethnic Unity Law. This is the reality behind the development and social stability that the CCP regime and its foreign guests are flaunting.

H.H. the Dalai Lama has on many occasions said that we are all guests on this planet, and we all need to leave after some time and hand over the planet to the next generation. Nations belong to the people, not to the kings, governments, or

political parties. It is the welfare of humanity and the sentient beings that is more important than perverted nationalism and patriotism.
The war and the killings that we are seeing right now are all because of our false view of national interest. We must put humanity first before any race, religion, or nationality.
Tibetans, both inside and outside Tibet, and their supporters aspire to the freedom and well-being not only of Tibetans, but also of the Chinese people and other ethnic minorities. They, in fact, hope for a global community espoused by H.H. the Dalai Lama, where humanity could live in peace and harmony.

## Why China power shake-up risks unsettling India's border calculus

20 April 2026, India Today

In China's tightly controlled political system, the investigation of a top leader often reveals much more than simple corruption. The case of Ma Xingrui, a member of the powerful Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), shows growing strain within president Xi Jinping's inner circle and raises serious questions about influential clandestine networks in the country's military, say analysts.
Ma Xingrui rose quickly under Xi. He served as party secretary of Shenzhen, then became the governor of Guangdong. In 2021, he was appointed party secretary of Xinjiang, considered one of the most sensitive jobs in China.
In October 2022, Ma Xingrui was promoted to the Politburo, giving him a seat at the highest level of power. He also held the position of deputy head of the Central Rural Work Leading Group, a policy mechanism set up by the CCP.But this month, on April 3, the Chinese state media announced that Ma Xingrui was under investigation for serious violations of party discipline and the country's laws. The announcement was unusually cold. It did not call him "comrade" or clarify if the investigation had been approved by the top leadership. In Chinese politics, such minute details carry big meaning.More than a routine disciplinary action, some analysts feel the probe is a significant development in the context of Xi's continuing efforts to tighten control over the party, the military and the networks that bind the two.
Many analysts read this as Ma Xingrui losing protection from the very top. He is now the third sitting Politburo member to face investigation since the 20th Party Congress in 2022. The other two were senior figures from the Central Military Commission, which controls the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The pattern suggests that even the highest-ranking officials are no longer protected.
What makes Ma Xingrui's case even more explosive is the allegation that his wife Rong Li distributed high-value Hong Kong-registered insurance policies to families of senior officials, creating what appears to be an informal web of influence and reciprocal obligations among China's elite circles.
Unlike traditional cash-for-favour corruption cases, this model points to a more sophisticated system of influence operating through family connections and financial instruments, making it harder to detect and politically far more dangerous. Such networks, particularly if they overlap with officials linked to strategic industries and military procurement, pose a direct challenge to Xi's project of centralised authority.
Ma Xingrui's background adds another layer to the case. Before entering politics, he worked in China's aerospace and defence industry. This placed him inside what some call the 'aerospace faction'—a network of officials with close links to military research, defence companies and the PLA. These connections touch areas critical to national security, such as military procurement, funding and strategic industries. There is also speculation about possible links between this network and major property developers who had close relationships with political elites.
At the same time, unusual security moves, including former premier Wen Jiabao being protected by the PLA's Joint Staff Department instead of units loyal to Xi, have raised fresh doubts about control inside the military.
China watchers claim the developments merit close attention by India. Any sign of instability, factional stress or corruption within China's military-linked political establishment has direct implications for regional security, especially at a time when the PLA continues to maintain a sustained deployment posture along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
If the anti-corruption drive is indeed touching Chinese officials and technocrats with links to the defence ecosystem, it could have implications for procurement chains, command confidence and the pace of military modernisation, all of which will have a bearing on China's operational posture on the LAC.
At the same time, India would be mindful that Xi's purges have historically served a dual purpose—eradicating corruption while simultaneously dismantling rival power centres. In that sense, the Ma Xingrui case may be less about financial misconduct alone and more about control over the political and military architecture of the Chinese state. Such moments of internal churn in authoritarian systems often produce external strategic signalling, including muscular military messaging aimed at projecting strength abroad even as uncertainty grows at home, say China watchers.
The investigation, therefore, is not just another corruption story from Beijing. It is a window into possible strains within China's military-political nexus and a reminder that internal power struggles in Beijing can have wider consequences for the

regional security environment. For India, the episode underscores the need to closely track not only the PLA's movements on the ground but also the political tremors within the Chinese system that may shape Beijing's strategic choices.

## In a fractured world, lessons from Mandela, Tutu and the Dalai Lama offer hope

19 April 2026, Daily Maverick

The friendship between the Dalai Lama, Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu once defined how South Africa was imagined — as a place of moral courage and transformative leadership. Today, in a more transactional and fractured world, that legacy raises a sharper question about what kind of global relationships we still choose to value.As a Tibetan, whenever I thought of South Africa, the first things that automatically came to mind were Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu and their friendship with the Dalai Lama. Now?

In today's world fractured by power politics and nationalism, the most enduring alliances are rarely built on shared humanity. The bonds between the Dalai Lama and SA's moral giants – Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu – were never transactional. They came from different traditions, lived on different continents, and faced very different struggles. Yet they all arrived at the same conviction: that compassion, dignity, and a refusal to be consumed by hatred aren't soft ideals reserved for the victorious. They're the discipline of those determined to truly win.

**On Mandela — forgiveness as discipline**

When Nelson Mandela walked out of Victor Verster Prison after 27 years behind bars, he made a choice that history still struggles to fully absorb. He chose reconciliation over revenge – not because he was free of rage, but because he understood that rage, left unchecked, would merely replace one oppressor with another. That decision took something rarer than courage. It took iron discipline.

Forgiveness isn't about forgetting. It''s about refusing to let anger get out of proportion and lose self-control – and to be guided instead by compassion and restraint. This is what the Dalai Lama has long argued, and what Mandela proved in practice. Real liberation is not merely the dismantling of unjust systems – it is the breaking of cycles of bitterness that would otherwise outlast any political victory. Both men understood that the most dangerous prison is the one you carry inside you.

**On Tutu — joy as a moral stance**

Desmond Tutu's friendship with the Dalai Lama felt, to those who witnessed it, almost effortless. There was laughter. There was teasing. There was a lightness that seemed, on the surface, improbable between two men who had spent their lives confronting the worst of human behaviour. But beneath the warmth lay a profound spiritual kinship.

Tutu's idea of ubuntu – the belief that our humanity is inseparable from the humanity of others – echoes what the Dalai Lama describes as the "oneness of humanity" and our deep interdependence. Both men rejected the notion that being morally serious means being distant or detached. Together, they showed something the world needs to be reminded of: that joy is not a retreat from principle – it can be its clearest expression.

Both men placed deep faith in inherited wisdom – not as a fixed inheritance to be preserved unchanged, but as an anchor for societies navigating rapid disruption. Identity and tradition, in their view, need not be obstacles to dialogue. Properly understood, they are its foundation.

The thread that runs through all of it

Beneath all these relationships runs an older thread – one that traces back to Mahatma Gandhi, whose philosophy of nonviolent moral resistance was itself partly forged on South African soil. His conviction that how you fight matters as much as what you fight for ripples forward through every one of these figures.

Mandela's commitment to reconciliation, Tutu's firm belief in justice without revenge, the Dalai Lama's unflinching faith in nonviolence and compassion as real forces for change: none of these ideas are naïve. They are hard-won conclusions – shaped by people who had every reason to take a different path, but chose not to. Their lives remind us that the fight for freedom and dignity isn't new. It's something we've inherited together, part of a much longer human story.

Each of these leaders stood up to systems that demanded resistance. They fought hard against injustice without losing their moral compass – that's what makes them unforgettable.

At a time when global politics feels increasingly transactional – when alliances are driven more by narrow national interests than by principles – all of this prompts a deeper question: What kind of world do we really want to live in? Seen in that light, the friendship between these leaders is more than just nostalgic: it offers a genuinely inspiring example of the kind of path forward we might choose.

Economic partnerships matter. No serious foreign policy can ignore them. But when pragmatism becomes the only language being spoken, something essential is forfeited. SA's international standing was built, above all, on moral authority – on its willingness to stand for human rights and justice. That legacy is not merely sentimental. It is strategic. It is the reason SA's voice has historically carried weight beyond what its economic power alone would command.

**A shared struggle**

The connection between the Tibetan struggle for freedom and dignity, led by the Dalai Lama, and

SA's fight against apartheid stands as one of the most powerful moral alliances of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

For the Dalai Lama, supporting the anti-apartheid movement was never simply a matter of offering occasional rhetorical solidarity. It was deeply rooted in his idea of "Universal Responsibility" – the belief that the Tibetan cause is part of a much bigger, global fight against oppression, racism and the denial of basic human dignity.

Today, as the world faces new forms of inequality and injustice, the examples set by the Dalai Lama and SA's freedom leaders still remain as relevant as ever, reminding us that moral courage can outlast military strength and economic power. Their legacy isn't defined by political barriers or visa restrictions, but by an enduring belief: injustice and oppression don't get the final say. **DM**

## India and China are 'friends', but at what cost?

19 April 2026, First Post

China's repeated assertion that it seeks stable and friendly relations with India stands in sharp contrast to its continuing efforts to rename places in Arunachal Pradesh, consolidate administrative control in territories claimed by India, and sustain the long existing ambiguity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). India is, therefore, right to reject such actions not simply as symbolic irritants but as part of a larger pattern of strategic behaviour.

The issue at stake is not merely one of maps or temporary diplomatic friction and is most definitely not an isolated territorial disagreement awaiting technical settlement – it is a historically layered and politically charged conflict, rooted in incompatible understandings of what 'sovereignty' truly means. In that sense, the real question is not whether India and China can be "friends" but whether the relationship can ever move beyond managed distrust.

This is important because the language of friendship often obscures more than it reveals. It suggests that the central challenge in India-China relations is a deficit of goodwill, when in fact the difficulty lies elsewhere. The boundary dispute is the product of two states approaching the same frontier from fundamentally different historical and political premises. The persistence of the problem, thus, arises from the fact that India and China do not merely disagree over where the boundary lies but also on the very basis upon which the boundary ought to be understood. They differ on the legitimacy of inherited treaties, on the significance of colonial-era arrangements, on the relevance of administrative practice, and even on what constitutes the status quo to be restored or defended. Under such conditions, every cartographic act becomes political, and every diplomatic reassurance is shadowed by deeper conceptual incompatibility.

The roots of this incompatibility can be seen clearly in the early exchanges between Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai. These letters are important not just as historical documents but as evidence that the dispute was foundational from the very beginning. In his December 1958 letter, Nehru wrote that when the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement relating to Tibet was concluded, *"No border questions were raised at that time, and we were under the impression that there were no border disputes between our respective countries."* He added that India's boundaries were *"quite clear and were not a matter of argument"*. These statements reflected India's postcolonial legal position: that the territorial boundaries inherited at independence, however shaped by imperial history, formed the legitimate basis of the modern Indian state.Zhou Enlai's reply of January 1959 proceeded from a visibly different logic. He stated that *"the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimitated"* and that *"differences do exist"* between the two sides. On the McMahon Line, he was explicit: it was *"a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China"* and could not, in strict legal terms, be treated as valid. At most, China might take a "more or less realistic attitude" toward it.

What India had long regarded as a settled inheritance, China, through these statements, made clear that it regarded as the residue of imperial imposition. Legal continuity for one and historical rectification for another.

This is why the problem is so difficult to resolve. It is not simply that the frontier is undemarcated or that the LAC remains unverified. The more serious challenge is that the dispute is entangled with questions of sovereignty and post-imperial identity. Neither India nor China presents itself as bargaining over uncertain or newly acquired claims. Each claims to be defending rights that are historically grounded and morally justified.

Yet it would be a mistake to treat the dispute as 'purely historical'. Its persistence is also sustained by the contemporary geopolitical environment. The boundary question does not exist in isolation from the wider Asian balance of power. At the same time, the dispute is sharpened by contrasting national narratives and media culture. In India, the border question has increasingly come to symbolise territorial integrity, strategic autonomy, and resistance to coercion. This generates a political expectation that the state must insist on reciprocity, parity, and restoration of the status quo ante wherever possible. Under such circumstances, even limited accommodation can be risky, as it can be interpreted domestically as 'weakness'. On the other hand, in China, the official approach often appears more comfortable with deliberate ambiguity.

India must therefore resist two temptations. The first is *romanticism*: the belief that rhetorical civility or economic interdependence can dissolve hard geopolitical contradictions. The second is *performative reaction*: treating every Chinese provocation as an occasion for immediate emotional counter-signalling. A reactive posture may satisfy domestic sentiment, but it also reveals strategic insecurity. This is because it will allow Beijing to set the rhythm of the relationship. India's approach should be to remain firm, factual, and historically grounded. Rather than chasing symbolic parity in every exchange, New Delhi should place sustained emphasis on documentary evidence and the demand that peace on the frontier is the precondition for normalcy elsewhere. In this sense, India's strategic task is not to "befriend" China in any conventional sense.

Yes, the two countries may cooperate where interests converge, communicate to prevent escalation, and maintain selective engagement in trade and diplomacy. But this is not friendship; it is 'cautious engagement'.

If the Nehru-Zhou correspondence has taught us anything, it is that the dispute was never superficial or one-dimensional. China may seek stable ties with India, but stability on Chinese terms often demands that India accommodate ambiguity and absorb pressure. India's task is to engage firmly, without compromising strategic clarity or self-respect.

## AUTHOR AND ACTIVIST TSULTRIM DOLMA WILL NEVER STOP FIGHTING FOR TIBETAN LIBERATION

17 April 2026, JoySauce

As a young girl born in a mountain village in eastern Tibet, Tsultrim Dolma was destined for a certain type of life: no education because her family was poor and married off young because she was a girl.

But Dolma, whose family was barely getting by under Chinese occupation, wanted more for herself. And at the age of 16, she found it when she joined protests to liberate Tibet from the People's Republic of China. But not long after, she was arrested and sent to Gutsa Detention Center, a place infamous for brutally torturing political prisoners, located in Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region in China. Dolma details all of this and more—including being surveilled by the government after being released from prison, as well as her escape to the United States—in her coming-of-age young adult memoir, *Defying China*, which she wrote with Rebecca Wei Hsieh and was published last month.

Despite it being sad for her to revisit that time in her life, Dolma, now 58, decided to write a memoir because it's important for justice and for her country. "I want my people to have their own country. When I was young, I wanted to go to school and be somebody, but that wasn't the life I could have. It wasn't enough," she says. "Then I started fighting for freedom for my country and it all just made sense. Activists made sense. I want the next generation to have more." She adds that she focused on her early life specifically because it was a time when anything could happen. She could have written about the more extreme parts of her experience in an adult book, but she geared her memoir toward young people because they have so much ahead of them—just like she did when she started protesting.

And looking at today's political climate, Dolma is not alone in being young and speaking up and speaking out about things that matter to her. From Stop AA+PI Hate and climate change, to women's rights, Black Lives Matter, and Abolish ICE, many demonstrations are happening around the country, and around the world. And in many cases, young people aren't just participating, they're leading these movements.

When asked what her message to these young folks would be, Dolma says while they are fighting for peace, they also have to try to protect people in the process, adding that this was exactly what she and others did when they were protesting in Tibet and being shot at. She says it's important to be honest when it comes to spreading your message, and to not meet people with violence, as others may use it for their own agenda. And there are many ways to do the right thing, so avoid corruption. "If the protest gets overheated, come back the next day with peace. And the next day. And the next," Dolma says. "People worked for generations to build things, and as you protest, protect the people in your community and what they've built. Come to protests with hope."

Dolma says she always has hope, and one message she wishes readers of all ages get out of her story is to never give up—because she is never giving up on fighting for her homeland. "I work really hard and give it everything, and so I hope that my people can be free," she says. "Lots of people don't have the opportunity to speak for their rights, like my parents or my grandparents, but I always hold onto the hope that my speaking up will help my people."

I had to admit to Dolma that I actually did not know much about Tibet before reading her story (a clear demonstration of how lacking the American education system is). So I asked her what she would like people to know about Tibet.

In response, she talks about everything from the country's many mountains and rich soil, to the farmers who tend to that soil. Dolma also describes the people of Tibet as being very close and looking out for each other. Tibet is a peaceful country with a highly religious culture, with monasteries and lots of land, and a rich history that Dolma admits she is not good at telling—but it is essential to the world. "The world should know what China has done to Tibet. If we lose



*Tsultrim Dolma's passport photo from when she younger. Courtesy of Tsultrim Dolma*

Tibet, we lose another one. We are losing another culture and language and freedom of the Tibetan people," she says. "Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan, are not part of China. And Tibet never wanted to be part of China. Not now and not forever. Lots of people, lots of countries all around the world are going through this, and they don't have to be."

In looking back at her young adulthood, Dolma says it feels like that was a different person—someone she can admire. And she survived and she is happy now. But there is also sadness in the fact that the things she experienced when she was younger are so different from the life she lives now in Massachusetts. "It hurts to not be able to contact my family or people from my life before," she says. "But the experience of reflecting makes me hopeful, to keep fighting, to be able to see and smell and enjoy the things I used to from my land."

This being said, writing this memoir has also been a release for Dolma. Likening the process to heart surgery in that the procedure makes you feel better. "I feel done, I feel good," she says. "When I don't speak about my story, I feel depressed and sick, but getting to talk with Rebecca to help tell my story felt like healing my heart."

## China, Stop Playing With Fire Now

17 April 2026, Strat News Global

China loves to accuse others of distorting history. It's far less comfortable when its own version is questioned.

Even less so when its favourite warning "stop playing with fire" is turned back on itself.

That hypocrisy was hard to miss in a recent interview featuring Victor Gao a former diplomat, aide to Deng Xiaoping, and now a prominent, English-speaking defender of Beijing's positions in global media. Gao is not a detached analyst; he is a polished advocate for the Chinese state's worldview, and he speaks with that authority.

The conversation was hosted by Shen Shiwei a state-affiliated journalist who has built a strong presence on social media amplifying Beijing's narratives for an international audience. His platform is less about probing questions and more about reinforcing a particular line.

Asked about India's position on the McMahon Line, Gao didn't just reject it he mocked it. If India can rely on what he called an "illegal" colonial boundary, he argued, why shouldn't China draw its own line along the Ganges and claim everything north of it?

This isn't just rhetorical flourish. Gao has floated this idea before a deliberately provocative "Victor Gao Line" that imagines vast swathes of Indian territory as Chinese. It's framed as tit-for-tat, but it reveals something more telling: a willingness to stretch historical logic to absurdity when it suits Beijing's narrative.

The interview opened with Tibet or "Xizang," as China insists on calling it.

The conversation quickly moved to one of the most sensitive issues: the succession of the Dalai Lama. Gao repeated the official line that reincarnation is not purely spiritual but requires state approval. Strip away the phrasing, and the message is blunt: the Communist Party reserves the right to decide a religious leader's rebirth.

He spoke of "peace and stability" in Tibet, a phrase that sounds reassuring until you consider what it usually entails control first, consent later.

Then came the familiar pivot. Western criticism, Gao argued, is misinformation designed to undermine China's sovereignty. It's a well-worn defence: dismiss scrutiny as conspiracy, and you never have to answer the substance.

But the sharpest remarks were reserved for India. On Arunachal Pradesh which China calls "Zangnan (Southern Tibet)" Gao stuck to Beijing's script: the McMahon Line is illegitimate, drawn without China's consent, and therefore meaningless today. India, he implied, should accept this reality and negotiate on China's terms.

That's the pattern. Reject existing boundaries. Reframe history. Push new claims. And when challenged, accuse others of provocation.

Yet the contradictions keep piling up.

Gao also tried to draw a stark contrast in military capability, claiming China builds everything while India does not.

That's a selective reading of reality. India's defence ecosystem is expanding steadily from the Tejas fighter to aircraft carriers, missiles, and space systems. Like every major power, India imports where it must and builds where it can. So does

China, especially in areas like semiconductors and advanced aerospace.
The difference is strategic approach. India is working towards autonomy without pretending it already has it. China, meanwhile, projects self-sufficiency while quietly relying on global supply chains.
On the core issues, New Delhi has been consistent. Renaming places in Arunachal Pradesh does not change sovereignty. Drawing new lines on maps does not make them real. And the status of the Dalai Lama's succession remains a matter of faith, not state decree.
This is where Beijing's messaging starts to unravel. It demands that others respect its historical claims and sensitivities, yet shows little regard for those of its neighbours. It warns others not to escalate, even as it tests boundaries territorial, political, and ideological.
**You can't have it both ways.**
If China wants stability, it needs to stop treating history as a tool and borders as suggestions. Because the more it pushes these contradictions, the more its own warning starts to sound like a confession.
Stop playing with fire? That advice might be worth taking by Beijing.

## Jiang Zemin's Secret Pilgrimage and a Monk's Prophecy About the CCP's Fate in 2026

17 April 2026, Vision Times

Jiang Zemin climbed to the top of the Chinese Communist Party by endorsing the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, and the weight of that choice never left him. In his own mind, he had blood on his hands and enemies in every corner, and so he spent the better part of three decades doing something a committed atheist, by official Party doctrine, had no business doing: he searched frantically for spiritual protection.
He visited temples and Taoist shrines across China. He cultivated the friendship of Zhao Puchu, the longtime president of the Buddhist Association of China, a government-controlled body that manages the Party's relationship with Buddhism and has no independence from state authority, and on Zhao's advice commissioned five colossal Buddha statues to be erected at points corresponding to the five cardinal directions, north, south, east, west, and center, in an effort to protect Party rule. Beijing's political circles knew that Jiang marked the first morning of every Lunar New Year by rising before dawn and traveling with his wife, Wang Yeping, to Hongluo Temple, a monastery in the capital's northern suburbs with more than 1,600 years of history, to offer incense before anyone else arrived.
Jiang's obsession with feng shui, the traditional Chinese practice of arranging one's physical environment in alignment with cosmological forces to attract good fortune and deflect bad, ran even deeper. While the Party publicly insisted its members were materialist atheists, Jiang spent public funds on three projects around Beijing designed to manipulate the capital's geomantic energy in his favor: he had the Baiyangdian wetland basin reflooded, raised the height of the flagpole in Tiananmen Square, and relocated an earthen mound inside the Temple of Heaven complex. The goal of each intervention was the same: to extend his hold on power and postpone any reckoning.
Then Deng Xiaoping, the Party strongman whose patronage had put Jiang in power, died in 1997, and Jiang finally stood alone at the top. To mark the moment, he made a secret trip to Mount Jiuhua, one of China's four sacred Buddhist mountains, located in Anhui Province and home to dozens of historic monasteries. He wanted a senior monk to read his political fate, to tell him how long his rule would last and how the Communist Party would ultimately end.
The monk refused to answer. Only after repeated pressing did he lift his eyes and say seven words: "Goat-year people will bring down the Party." Jiang nearly fainted.
**Jiang ordered tighter surveillance of the former party chief he feared most**
"Goat-year people." Jiang's mind went at once to Zhao Ziyang, the former general secretary of the Communist Party who had publicly opposed the Tiananmen crackdown, refused to endorse martial law, and was subsequently stripped of all his posts and placed under house arrest in Beijing. Zhao had been born in 1919, the Year of the Earth Goat in the traditional Chinese zodiac calendar. He was already elderly and under close surveillance. The monk's words sent Jiang into a fresh panic.
On the drive back from Mount Jiuhua, Jiang began planning a tighter cage. By the time he reached Beijing, the orders had been issued. Zhao was forbidden from leaving the capital; he could play golf, but only on Beijing courses. Workers installed a concealed electrified wire perimeter around Zhao's residence at No. 6 Fuqiang Hutong in central Beijing. The guard detachment outside was reinforced. Zhao's telephone lines were placed under covert surveillance.
These were the reflexes of a man who believed a monk's words could chart the future, and who feared that future.
In the end, Zhao died under house arrest in January 2005, never restored to public life, without having brought the Party down. This has been interpreted as indicating that the monk's prophecy may have referred to someone else.



*Deng Xiaoping, Hu Jintao, and Jiang Zemin. (Image: Internet image)*

**The Soviet collapse gave the prophecy historical credibility**

The monk's words struck Jiang so hard partly because they resonated with an older Chinese cosmological tradition that had already attached a pattern of disaster to the Communist Party's history.

Zhao, born in 1919, had in fact come close to ending the Party's rule during the 1989 crisis. He had sided openly with the protesters, refused to endorse martial law, and was removed only because the Party patriarch Deng Xiaoping overruled him. Had Deng not intervened, the outcome at Tiananmen might have been very different.

More striking still, the Soviet Communist Party and virtually every communist government in Eastern Europe had collapsed largely through the actions of two men: Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, both born in 1931, the Year of the Metal Goat. The parallel was hard to dismiss.

Looking further through the Communist Party's current leadership ranks, the pattern multiplied. Among figures born in 1955, the Year of the Wood Goat: Li Keqiang, who would later serve as China's prime minister; Wang Huning, the Party's chief ideologist and a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the Party's top leadership body of seven men who hold ultimate authority over all Chinese governance; Wang Yang, who chairs the Party's political advisory body; and Cao Jianming, who served as China's chief prosecutor. Cai Qi, who by the time this article was written had risen to serve as the Politburo Standing Committee member overseeing day-to-day Party operations as head of the Party Secretariat, was also born in a goat year.

The monk's remark can also be read as referring to a broader generation rather than a single individual.

Traditional Chinese cosmology marks 2026 and 2027 as a sixty-year cycle of fire and calamity

The prophecy drew additional force from a much older Chinese concept: the "Red Horse and Crimson Goat Calamity," known in classical Chinese as chima hongyangjie. The traditional Chinese calendar assigns each year two characters drawn from separate cycles: one from the ten "heavenly stems," which carry elemental properties, and one from the twelve "earthly branches," which correspond to the animals of the zodiac. The stems "bing" and "ding" both carry the elemental property of fire and are associated with the color red. The branch "wu" corresponds to the horse; the branch "wei" corresponds to the goat. When a bing-wu year (Red Fire Horse) is immediately followed by a ding-wei year (Crimson Fire Goat), classical Chinese cosmology treats the pairing as a period of extreme and destructive fire energy, the kind that burns through social order and political stability. This two-year sequence recurs once every sixty years.

The pattern has apparent historical support. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the massive mid-nineteenth century rebellion that killed an estimated twenty to thirty million people and nearly destroyed the Qing imperial dynasty, erupted in full force around 1856 and raged through the bing-wu and ding-wei years that followed. The Cultural Revolution, the decade of political terror that Mao Zedong, China's communist founder, launched in 1966, began in a bing-wu year and is counted among the catastrophes the tradition predicted.

By the traditional Chinese calendar, 2026 is a bing-wu year. 2027 is ding-wei. The Red Horse and Crimson Goat Calamity arrives now.



*The protest movement of students that started seven weeks ago in Tiananmen Square ended in a blood bath with various sources claiming that between 1,500 and 4,000 demonstrators were killed and 10,000 wounded. During the night of June 3 to June 4, 1989 the People's Liberation Army opened fire on the crowd and forced the last blockades with tanks; the students were demonstrating to demand more democracy and freedom of thought from the Chinese government. (Image: Jacques Langevin/Getty Images)*

**The massacre that brought Jiang to power occurred in a cosmologically charged year**

The year 1989 in the traditional Chinese calendar is ji-si, a year whose elemental character is fire of a different kind: the fire of the serpent. The branch "si" corresponds to the snake, which classical cosmology regards as the precursor that ignites the horse-and-goat sequence. Ji-si years carry the warning sign, in classical tradition, of "fire and earth in mutual pressure, with blood easily shed." It was in precisely such a year that the Communist Party massacred its own citizens in Tiananmen Square, and it was on that massacre that Jiang built his career.

The article does not present 1989 itself as the Red Horse calamity. It describes it as a preparatory fire year, positioned at the midpoint between the 1966 catastrophe and the 2026 arrival. Jiang did not come to power as the fulfillment of a prophecy; he came to power by igniting a fire himself and then settling in to wait for the larger conflagration that classical cosmology said was coming. From 1989 onward, the Party's survival strategy shifted definitively toward violence: surveillance, suppression, and the preemptive elimination of any person or force that might serve as the spark. In this framing, the cohort of goat-year officials now in senior Party ranks can be seen as variables that had long been present within the system.

**Jiang's nightmare on the Tiananmen anniversary drove him back to the mountain monastery**

By 2004, Jiang had been out of the post of general secretary for two years, but the fear had not lifted. On the night of June 3 to 4, the fifteenth anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre, he dreamed of hell. Specifically, he dreamed of Avici, the lowest and most unrelenting level of punishment in Buddhist cosmology, reserved for those who have committed the gravest sins. In Buddhist teaching, Avici is described with clinical precision: guards drive burning iron nails into every joint of the condemned; arctic winds strip skin from flesh; the condemned are thrown repeatedly from mountaintops onto forests of blades, their bones shattering and reconstituting only to shatter again, in a cycle without end or respite.

Jiang woke screaming and drenched in sweat. His staff tried to calm him; he refused to wait. Despite it being June 4, the very anniversary he had spent decades trying to erase from public memory, he set out immediately for Mount Jiuhua. He arrived the following morning and made offerings to Dizang Pusa, known in English as Ksitigarbha, the Bodhisattva of the underworld in Buddhist tradition and the figure associated with salvation from exactly the kind of afterlife he had dreamed of. In popular Chinese Buddhism, Dizang Pusa is the guardian of souls condemned to hell and the intercessor through whom the condemned can seek release.

Jiang copied out the Dizang Sutra, a Buddhist scripture dedicated to this figure, by hand. He continued rearranging feng shui. He continued tightening controls over anyone who might serve as the prophecy's fulfillment. Each act reflected the extent of his concern.

Jiang Zemin died on November 30, 2022. The Party announced his death and held a state memorial. On December 11, his ashes were scattered at sea. He left no grave. One interpretation of this choice is that he sought to avoid leaving physical remains behind, reflecting concerns that extended beyond his lifetime.

According to Buddhist teaching, those who commit the gravest offenses are described as facing endless suffering and, ultimately, dissolution beyond the cycle of reincarnation.

Whether the monk on Mount Jiuhua foresaw any of this, no one living can say. What the record shows is that Jiang Zemin heard seven words in 1997 and spent the rest of his life unable to forget them.

## Opinion: Legislating Assimilation- China's 2026 Ethnic Unity Law and the Dimming Prospect of Tibetan Autonomy

16 April 2026, Phayul

**A Law That Closes a Door**

On March 12, 2026, the National People's Congress — widely regarded as a rubber-stamp legislature whose primary function is to formalize decisions made by the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee — adopted the Law on the Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress. Set to take effect on July 1, 2026, the law represents a culmination — the legal codification of a policy of assimilation that has been building steadily since Xi Jinping became the President of China.

For Tibetans, Uyghurs, Southern Mongolians, and other "minority" communities across China, the law's significance lies precisely in what it forecloses. Even as space for cultural survival and limited self-governance narrowed under Xi Jinping, it retained a theoretical existence — space that could be appealed to, negotiated over, or incrementally expanded. The 2026 law eliminates that ambiguity. It establishes a permanent legal foundation for the systematic assimilation of minority cultures, languages, and identities into a single, Han-centered Chinese national identity.

For the Tibetan leadership in exile, the implications are profound. Nearly five decades of diplomacy, dialogue, and calibrated compromise have been anchored in a single proposition: that meaningful autonomy within China remained possible. The 2026 law does not engage with that proposition — it forecloses, one by one, the very possibilities that proposition was designed to secure.

**The Intellectual Roots of Assimilation**

The 2026 law did not emerge in isolation. Its intellectual foundations were laid years before Xi Jinping came to power, in debates within China's policy and academic establishment about the long-term viability of its approach to ethnic minorities.

As early as the 2000s, Ma Rong, a professor at Peking University, argued that China's existing ethnic policies were entrenching divisions rather than building cohesion. He called for "de-ethnicization" — a deliberate shift away from institutionalized ethnic distinctions toward a unified national identity. These arguments were amplified by Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe of Tsinghua University, who in 2011 explicitly called

for a "second-generation ethnic policy" to replace regional autonomy with deep integration: the deliberate absorption of minority nationalities into a single Chinese identity.

This intellectual current found its political home under Xi Jinping. Since consolidating power in 2013, Xi moved China decisively away from even the limited cultural accommodation that had characterized earlier decades. In Tibet, this has meant expanding mass surveillance, restricting the Tibetan language in schools, closing private Tibetan educational institutions, and placing large numbers of Tibetan children in state-run boarding schools where instruction emphasizes Mandarin, Chinese culture, and loyalty to the Party. Religious institutions have come under intensified state oversight and China has been accused of Sinicization of religion.

For those watching Tibet closely, the 2026 law contains few surprises. Its significance lies not in what it introduces but in what it permanently forecloses.

**The Middle Way and the Memorandum**

To understand what the 2026 law forecloses, it is necessary to understand what Dharamsala, the seat of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, spent decades building.

Each morning at around 4 a.m., the 14th Dalai Lama begins his day with tonglen (གཏོང་ལེན་) — a Tibetan meditation and mind training practice in which the practitioner absorbs others' suffering and returns compassion in its place. In this practice, the 90-year-old Tibetan spiritual leader symbolically absorbs the hostility of the Chinese government and responds with compassion and a commitment to dialogue with his adversaries in Beijing. This ethic is not merely spiritual; it has shaped the political strategy of the Tibetan freedom movement for nearly half a century.

In the late 1970s, the Dalai Lama made a decision that would define the Tibetan freedom movement for generations: he renounced the demand for full independence. In its place, he advanced the Middle Way Approach (MWA) — a principled, non-violent path between the two extremes of outright independence and complete assimilation.. What Dharamsala sought was genuine autonomy and self-governance within China: Tibetan control over language, culture, religion, education, environmental protection, population migration, and local governance.

This position was shaped by two forces. The first was the Dalai Lama's identity as a Buddhist monk, for whom non-violence and dialogue are not tactical choices but moral imperatives. The second was hard information from the ground — including reports from four fact-finding delegations sent to Tibet between 1979 and 1985. He also drew encouragement from Deng Xiaoping's reported 1979 statement that "apart from independence, all issues can be discussed," and from the relative openness of the early reform period in Tibet (1978-1987).

Even as that opening closed — most sharply with the crackdowns following the Lhasa protests of 1987–1989 — the Dalai Lama did not waver. International recognition and support, including the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989, did not lead him to escalate his demands. He continued to seek only genuine autonomy and self-governance.

Back-channel contacts, often facilitated by his elder brother Gyalo Thondup, eventually led to the resumption of formal talks in 2002. Between September 2002 and January 2010, representatives of the Dalai Lama and Chinese government officials held nine rounds of dialogue. The fullest expression of the Tibetan position came during the eighth round, in October 2008, with the presentation of the *Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People*.

The Memorandum outlined eleven areas for meaningful self-governance: language, culture, religion, education, environmental protection, natural resource management, economic development and trade, public health, public security, population migration, and international cultural and religious exchanges. Each reflected Tibetan aspirations to preserve a civilization with its own language, a distinct spiritual tradition, and a continuous history stretching back more than a millennium.

The Memorandum made no appeal to international law or the right to self-determination. It was framed entirely within China's own constitutional and legal framework — including the Law on Regional National Autonomy — presenting genuine Tibetan autonomy not as a challenge to Chinese sovereignty, but as a call for existing legal provisions to be genuinely honored. Beijing rejected it as "independence in disguised form."

**What the Law Forecloses**

The incompatibility between the 2026 Ethnic Unity Law and the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy is not a matter of emphasis or degree. It is structural and total. The two frameworks move in opposite directions. Where the Memorandum seeks space, the law closes it. Where the Memorandum appeals to Chinese law, the new law rewrites what Chinese law means in practice.

- **Language**. The Memorandum demands Tibetan as the primary language in education and public life, as provided for in China's own constitution. The new law establishes Mandarin as the dominant medium of instruction and governance, with Tibetan reduced to a marginal, secondary role.
- **Religion**. The Memorandum envisions Tibetans managing their own religious institutions and practices. The law reinforces state oversight and requires Tibetan Buddhism to be adapted to serve the interests of the state and Party.

- **Education**. The Memorandum advocates for local control over curriculum and language of instruction. The law mandates centralized ideological education built around Party loyalty and a unified national identity.

- **Security**. The Memorandum emphasizes local control over internal security. The law consolidates all coercive authority in Beijing.
- **Migration**. The Memorandum reserves Tibetans' right to regulate demographic change within their homeland — a provision of existential importance given the scale of Han migration into Tibetan areas. The law actively promotes population mobility, inter-ethnic marriage, and ethnic "intermingling" policies that in practice accelerate the dilution of the Tibetan demographic presence in Tibet.
- **External relations**. The Memorandum insists on freedom to maintain international cultural and religious exchanges — connections that sustain Tibetan identity and keep Tibet visible to the world. The law subjects all external contacts to central control and frames minority communities' international ties as potential threats to national unity.

On key areas that matter, the law moves in the precise opposite direction from the Memorandum. It does not narrow the distance between Beijing and Dharamsala. It eliminates the ground on which any convergence could stand.

**A Strategic Crossroads**

For nearly five decades, the Middle Way Approach has rested on a core conviction: that Beijing could be persuaded — through dialogue and compromise — to honor its own legal framework and accommodate Tibetan aspirations within it. The Memorandum remains the most comprehensive and legally grounded articulation of that conviction.

The 2026 law calls that conviction into question.

The Middle Way Approach remains a valid moral and political philosophy. Its commitment to non-violence, dialogue, and coexistence retains enduring relevance and commands broad respect and support — among majority of Tibetans and many in the international community including many in the Chinese community. But its principal operational instrument — the Memorandum — now confronts a Chinese legal order that explicitly forecloses the outcome it seeks. The prospect of genuine autonomy and meaningful self-governance has been formally and legally denied. China has now committed itself, in law, to precisely the outcome the Middle Way was designed to prevent: complete assimilation.

The implications are immediate and difficult:

- Can the Memorandum continue to serve as a basis for engagement when the legal ground it stood on has been legislated away?
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These are not questions that challenge the values underlying the Middle Way Approach. They are questions about how those values can find effective expression in a landscape that has changed dramatically and perhaps permanently. The Memorandum was an act of faith — that dialogue was possible, that compromise was achievable, that Beijing's own laws meant what they said. The 2026 law quietly extinguishes each of those assumptions, one by one.

What Comes Next

The 2026 law does not merely constrain Dharamsala's options — it demands strategic reassessment.

A constructive next step would be for the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) to convene a Special General Meeting — bringing together Tibetan representatives from across the diaspora to deliberate collectively on the implications of the 2026 law and chart a future course. The last such gathering, held in Dharamsala in October 2019, brought together nearly 350 delegates to discuss the long-term vision for the Tibetan freedom movement and the relationship between the lineage of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan people. The challenges posed by the 2026 law are no less consequential — and they demand the same seriousness of collective reflection, and perhaps greater urgency.

The Middle Way Approach was conceived as a path between two extremes: independence on one end, assimilation on the other. China has now formally and legally committed itself to the latter. As a result, the foundational assumption underpinning five decades of Tibetan strategy — that genuine autonomy remains negotiable — appears increasingly untenable.

What Dharamsala does next may be the most consequential decision the Tibetan leadership has faced since the Dalai Lama first chose the path of dialogue and compromise over independence, nearly half a century ago.

## Opinion: Legislating Assimilation- China's 2026 Ethnic Unity Law and the Dimming Prospect of Tibetan Autonomy

16 April 2026, Phayul

**A Law That Closes a Door**

On March 12, 2026, the National People's Congress — widely regarded as a rubber-stamp legislature whose primary function is to formalize decisions made by the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee — adopted the




*A delegate in ethnic minority costume holds a document following the closing session of the National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China March*

Law on the Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress. Set to take effect on July 1, 2026, the law represents a culmination — the legal codification of a policy of assimilation that has been building steadily since Xi Jinping became the President of China.

For Tibetans, Uyghurs, Southern Mongolians, and other "minority" communities across China, the law's significance lies precisely in what it forecloses. Even as space for cultural survival and limited self-governance narrowed under Xi Jinping, it retained a theoretical existence — space that could be appealed to, negotiated over, or incrementally expanded. The 2026 law eliminates that ambiguity. It establishes a permanent legal foundation for the systematic assimilation of minority cultures, languages, and identities into a single, Han-centered Chinese national identity.

For the Tibetan leadership in exile, the implications are profound. Nearly five decades of diplomacy, dialogue, and calibrated compromise have been anchored in a single proposition: that meaningful autonomy within China remained possible. The 2026 law does not engage with that proposition — it forecloses, one by one, the very possibilities that proposition was designed to secure.

**The Intellectual Roots of Assimilation**

The 2026 law did not emerge in isolation. Its intellectual foundations were laid years before Xi Jinping came to power, in debates within China's policy and academic establishment about the long-term viability of its approach to ethnic minorities.

As early as the 2000s, Ma Rong, a professor at Peking University, argued that China's existing ethnic policies were entrenching divisions rather than building cohesion. He called for "de-ethnicization" — a deliberate shift away from institutionalized ethnic distinctions toward a unified national identity. These arguments were amplified by Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe of Tsinghua University, who in 2011 explicitly called for a "second-generation ethnic policy" to replace regional autonomy with deep integration: the deliberate absorption of minority nationalities into a single Chinese identity.

This intellectual current found its political home under Xi Jinping. Since consolidating power in 2013, Xi moved China decisively away from even the limited cultural accommodation that had characterized earlier decades. In Tibet, this has meant expanding mass surveillance, restricting the Tibetan language in schools, closing private Tibetan educational institutions, and placing large numbers of Tibetan children in state-run boarding schools where instruction emphasizes Mandarin, Chinese culture, and loyalty to the Party. Religious institutions have come under intensified state oversight and China has been accused of Sinicization of religion.

For those watching Tibet closely, the 2026 law contains few surprises. Its significance lies not in what it introduces but in what it permanently forecloses.

**The Middle Way and the Memorandum**

To understand what the 2026 law forecloses, it is necessary to understand what Dharamsala, the seat of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, spent decades building.

Each morning at around 4 a.m., the 14th Dalai Lama begins his day with tonglen (གཏོང་ལེན་) — a Tibetan meditation and mind training practice in which the practitioner absorbs others' suffering and returns compassion in its place. In this practice, the 90-year-old Tibetan spiritual leader symbolically absorbs the hostility of the Chinese government and responds with compassion and a commitment to dialogue with his adversaries in Beijing. This ethic is not merely spiritual; it has shaped the political strategy of the Tibetan freedom movement for nearly half a century.

In the late 1970s, the Dalai Lama made a decision that would define the Tibetan freedom movement for generations: he renounced the demand for full independence. In its place, he advanced the Middle Way Approach (MWA) — a principled, non-violent path between the two extremes of outright independence and complete assimilation.. What Dharamsala sought was genuine autonomy and self-governance within China: Tibetan control over language, culture, religion, education, environmental protection, population migration, and local governance.

This position was shaped by two forces. The first was the Dalai Lama's identity as a Buddhist monk, for whom non-violence and dialogue are not tactical choices but moral imperatives. The second was hard information from the ground — including reports from four fact-finding delegations sent to Tibet between 1979 and 1985. He also drew encouragement from Deng Xiaoping's reported 1979 statement that "apart from independence, all issues can be discussed," and from the relative openness of the early reform period in Tibet (1978-1987).

Even as that opening closed — most sharply with the crackdowns following the Lhasa protests of 1987–1989 — the Dalai Lama did not waver.

International recognition and support, including the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989, did not lead him to escalate his demands. He continued to seek only genuine autonomy and self-governance.

Back-channel contacts, often facilitated by his elder brother Gyalo Thondup, eventually led to the resumption of formal talks in 2002. Between September 2002 and January 2010, representatives of the Dalai Lama and Chinese government officials held nine rounds of dialogue. The fullest expression of the Tibetan position came during the eighth round, in October 2008, with the presentation of the *Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People*.

The Memorandum outlined eleven areas for meaningful self-governance: language, culture, religion, education, environmental protection, natural resource management, economic development and trade, public health, public security, population migration, and international cultural and religious exchanges. Each reflected Tibetan aspirations to preserve a civilization with its own language, a distinct spiritual tradition, and a continuous history stretching back more than a millennium.

The Memorandum made no appeal to international law or the right to self-determination. It was framed entirely within China's own constitutional and legal framework — including the Law on Regional National Autonomy — presenting genuine Tibetan autonomy not as a challenge to Chinese sovereignty, but as a call for existing legal provisions to be genuinely honored. Beijing rejected it as "independence in disguised form."

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## Arunachal isn't 'South Tibet'; it's China's strategic fiction

16 April 2026, First Post

Beijing's claim on Arunachal Pradesh rests on a fragile foundation: a fairly loose imperial association, a selectively remembered treaty, and a modern strategic ambition dressed up as historical grievance

On Tuesday, yet again, the Chinese Foreign Ministry repeated its theatrics, calling Arunachal Pradesh 'Zangnan' and claiming they have full authority to rename "their own territories".

China's claim over Arunachal Pradesh has always sounded less like history and more like insistence. Beijing's claim rests on a surprisingly fragile foundation: a fairly loose imperial association, a selectively remembered treaty, and a modern strategic ambition dressed up as historical grievance.

To understand this, one must begin with the Qing dynasty, which China frequently invokes to anchor its claims. The Qing did exercise suzerainty over Tibet, but suzerainty is not sovereignty. It was a layered, indirect system of influence, reliant on local intermediaries and marked by frequent inconsistencies. Even at its peak, Qing authority in Tibet was uneven. Beyond it, into the eastern Himalayan frontier, it was virtually non-existent.

## Outrageous Chinese Claim On Arunachal Pradesh

14 April 2026, Tibetrightscollective




The recent statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry has once again drawn sharp criticism after it reiterated Beijing's claim over Arunachal Pradesh, referring to the region as "Zangnan" and asserting that it is an integral part of China. Chinese spokesperson Guo Jiakun further stated that China has the right to "standardize" place names in the region, a move widely seen as an attempt to reinforce its territorial claims through administrative labeling.

India strongly rejects such assertions, viewing them as not only baseless but also provocative, especially at a time when both nations have repeatedly spoken about maintaining stability along the border. New Delhi has made it clear that renaming or reclassifying Indian territory in official Chinese communication does not alter the reality on the ground.

History of Arunachal Pradesh and Its Status Within India

Arunachal Pradesh has long been administered by India and is recognized as one of its northeastern states. The region has deep historical, cultural, and administrative linkages with the Indian Union. After India's independence in 1947, the area continued under Indian governance and was formally constituted as a Union Territory in 1972 before attaining full statehood in 1987.

India maintains that Arunachal Pradesh has always been an integral part of its territory, with local governance structures, democratic institutions, and constitutional recognition firmly established over decades. The people of Arunachal Pradesh actively participate in India's political system, further reinforcing its status as an inseparable part of the country.

Historical Maps and International Recognition

Several historical maps produced by British colonial administrators and early Indian cartographers consistently depict Arunachal Pradesh as part of India's northeastern frontier. These maps predate the modern Sino Indian boundary dispute and show no inclusion of this region within Chinese territorial limits.

Internationally recognized cartographic records and administrative documents from various archives have historically aligned with India's position, showing the region as part of the Indian subcontinent rather than Chinese territory. India has often pointed to such historical documentation to reinforce its claim, arguing that there is no credible basis for China's assertions over the region.

India's External Affairs Ministry Position

The Ministry of External Affairs of India has repeatedly dismissed China's renaming exercises and territorial claims, stating that Arunachal Pradesh is, was, and will remain an integral part of India. In response to earlier instances of similar actions by China, India has consistently protested through diplomatic channels, asserting that such unilateral steps do not change the legal or political status of Indian territory.

The ministry has also emphasized that peace and stability along the border require mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. India has urged China to refrain from activities that complicate the boundary question or undermine trust-building efforts between the two nations.

Map from Hugh Richardson's Tibetan Precis, showing the areas under the w:en:McMahon Line that have Tibetan influences

## India Needs To Talk Tibet With China

16 April 2026, News ABP Live

"If you don't want war, then you had better be an advocate for diplomacy with muscle," Richard Grenell, an American diplomat, had stated in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. This can also be applied in the case of India and China, which are not in a state of war, but have been engaged in a bitter border dispute for over seven decades now. While the roots of the dispute date back to the colonial era, tensions significantly intensified after India gained independence in 1947 and the People's Republic of China was established in 1949.The primary cause is the lack of a mutually agreed-upon Line of Actual Control (LAC) across three major sectors. And at the centre of this dispute lies Tibet. While India's stated policy of 'One-China' remains firm, New Delhi cannot keep brushing under the carpet the fact that the issues of the Dalai Lama, who continues to remain in India, need redressal. India's approach to the 'One-China' policy concerning Tibet is rooted in a series of formal agreements that acknowledge Tibet as part of China.

However, over the past decade, this policy has evolved to become more conditional and strategic in its application. Officially, India recognises the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as part of Chinese territory, but there has been a noticeable shift; India no longer emphasises this recognition in its joint statements with China. This subtle yet significant change reflects India's growing insistence on mutual respect for its own territorial integrity, signalling a more assertive stance on sovereignty issues. As India navigates its complex relationship with China, the implications of this policy shift highlight a careful balancing act between diplomatic engagement and the assertion of national interests.

Earlier this month, India once again categorically rejected China's latest attempt to rename 23 locations in Arunachal Pradesh, calling the move "fictitious," "mischievous," and an attempt to manufacture "baseless narratives". On April 1, 2026, the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs announced it had "standardised" names for sites in what it calls "Zangnan" (Southern Tibet). These sites include mountain peaks, residential areas, and rivers. China has defended the renaming as its "sovereign right," claiming the region is historically significant to China. Despite the renaming, Beijing stated its policy toward improving relations with India remains "unchanged".

All these controversies stem from the fact that India continues to give refuge to the Dalai Lama, who has become a colossal religious figure not just for the Buddhist community but for people across all faiths and religions around the world. As of 2026, the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, has spent 67 years living in India following his escape from Tibet. He arrived on March 31, 1959, seeking political asylum after a failed national uprising against Chinese rule in Lhasa.

He often refers to himself as a "son of India" or the longest guest of the Indian government, highlighting his deep cultural and spiritual ties to the country. In India, he established schools, monasteries, and cultural institutions like the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives to ensure the survival of Tibetan religion and language for the approximately 80,000 refugees who followed him.

In 2011, he officially devolved his political authority to a democratically elected leader, remaining strictly as a spiritual figurehead. The political wing thereafter came under the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), headed by a President, also called 'Sikyong' in Tibetan language. The CTA functions as a "government-in-

exile," though it is not formally recognized by any sovereign nation.

When Dalai Lama came to India and first arrived in Tawang, Beijing knew it was Indian territory. Therefore, the fact that today Beijing is claiming Arunachal Pradesh as its own has its own political connotation and hence the need to deal with the Tibet issue by India with the Chinese in an open and direct manner.

The Tibetan community itself, be it the Office of the Dalai Lama or the CTA, has also made several pleas to the government of the day and all previous governments of India to raise the matter with the Chinese. This is now all the more necessary, not just for strategic reasons or for the settlement of the boundary question but also to address the long-pending issue of the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama.

Beijing, on the other hand, has now put in place a complete process on how the next Dalai Lama will be elected when the current one passes away, and it is also willing to discuss the matter with India, but New Delhi has not relegated the issue to a religious matter. Since 2010, India has stopped using the phrase 'One-China policy' in joint communiqués. This change was a response to China's practice of issuing "stapled visas" to Indian citizens from Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir, which India views as a challenge to its own territorial integrity. Therefore, it is time to take that process forward and institutionalise a dialogue between both sides on how to resolve the issue of the Dalai Lama and then Tibet.

## How Jiang Zemin's Mistress Network Ran China's Shadow Government

15 April 2026, Vision Times

Huang Liman, widely described by political observers and former insiders as a close associate of former Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Jiang Zemin, built a political network in the southern city of Shenzhen.

Analysts have cited her rise as an example of how informal personal relationships—often referred to as "bedroom politics"—have been alleged to shape promotions, loyalty, and power distribution within the Party.

**How Jiang Zemin's associate operated a southern political network from Shenzhen**

Within CCP officialdom, Huang Liman was described by multiple sources familiar with internal Party dynamics as closely aligned with Jiang Zemin. Her influence extended beyond Shenzhen, forming what some observers referred to as the "Huang faction," a network of officials whose careers were reportedly shaped through her connections.

Wang Rong, who later became chairman of Guangdong's political advisory body, is frequently cited as a representative case. Sources familiar with leadership-level personnel movements have said his transfer from Jiangsu to Shenzhen was facilitated through high-level lobbying linked to Jiang's circle. Some accounts also pointed to possible family ties with Jiang's wife, Wang Yeping, though such claims have not been independently verified. After Huang left Shenzhen, Wang remained in key roles, where observers said he continued overseeing financial and administrative channels tied to the region.

Jiang Zunyu, a senior Shenzhen official responsible for internal security, was often described by observers as closely associated with Huang. Accounts circulating among former officials said his promotions were supported through her influence. He was later investigated and convicted on corruption charges, with reports stating that large quantities of valuables were discovered in his residence.

Liang Daoxing, a deputy mayor of Shenzhen, appeared in multiple accounts as an executor of local policy initiatives aligned with Huang's network, particularly in land development projects. Even after Huang moved to a provincial position, sources said Liang continued to report to her.

Xu Zongheng, who later became Shenzhen's mayor, was also described by several sources as benefiting from lobbying efforts connected to Huang's network. Some reports claimed that gifts were presented during the process, though these details come from insider accounts rather than official confirmation.

**The hotel suite reportedly used as a political hub**

During her tenure in Shenzhen, Huang maintained a long-term suite at the Wuzhou Hotel. According to accounts from hotel staff and local officials, the space functioned as more than an office. It was used as a gathering place for visiting officials and associates connected to Jiang's network. A non-public audit referenced by Chinese analysts indicated that expenditures on private banquets were reimbursed through municipal funds, with monthly totals reportedly ranging between 150,000 and 200,000 yuan (approximately



*Hong Kong's number two, Chief Secretary Rafael Hui (L), smiles as Shenzhen Mayor Xu Zongheng (R) speaks to the media in Hong Kong, Sept. 5, 2005. (Image: PHILIPPE LOPEZ / AFP via Getty Images)*

$20,000–$27,000 USD). Lower-ranking officials, according to these accounts, privately criticized the scale of the spending.

Ming Juzheng, a Taiwan-based political scientist, described Huang's role in Shenzhen as tied to safeguarding what he called Jiang's "southern financial base." Cheng Xiaonong, a U.S.-based economist and former policy researcher, pointed to promotion patterns that reflected factional alignment rather than administrative performance.

Miles Yu, director of the China Center at the Hudson Institute, has compared the CCP's internal structure to a system in which authority flows through personal loyalty to senior figures. In that system, control over territory or institutions follows from alignment with a central patron.

How personal relationships were described as tools of power and loyalty

In many political systems, personal scandals can end careers. Accounts from CCP insiders, however, describe situations in which personal relationships served a different function—helping to establish trust, reinforce loyalty, and bind individuals into tightly connected networks.

Observers use the term "bedroom politics" to describe these arrangements, where proximity to senior leaders can outweigh formal procedures. Access itself becomes a form of power, shaping outcomes that would otherwise pass through institutional review.

Huang Liman's trajectory is often cited in this context. According to recollections from retired officials, she advanced from a relatively junior position to a senior Party role in Shenzhen in a short period of time. The official record provides little explanation for this progression, leading observers to point to informal factors.

Some accounts from former insiders also describe arrangements in which multiple officials were linked through the same personal relationships. These situations created shared vulnerabilities, making it difficult for any one participant to break away without exposing others.



*Zhang Yufeng (right) was not only a nurse. In Mao Zedong's later years, only she could understand his speech, and she could also subtly adjust Mao's meaning according to her own interests. (Image: online image)*

**Three cases often cited in discussions of informal power structures**

Mao Zedong and Zhang Yufeng: informal access and gatekeeping

Memoirs by Mao Zedong's personal physician describe how Zhang Yufeng, originally a train attendant, became an important intermediary in Mao's later years. Although she held no formal office, she controlled access to the leader, influencing communication between Mao and senior officials.

Her role is often cited as an early example of how proximity to power could translate into influence within the CCP system.

Reports on Jiang-era figures and policy influence

In addition to Huang Liman, several public figures —including Chen Zhili, who later served as education minister—have been linked in various reports to Jiang's inner circle. During Chen's tenure, policies promoting the commercialization of education drew criticism from segments of the public.

Observers have noted that officials operating within powerful networks may face fewer constraints, though direct links between personal relationships and policy decisions remain debated.

Military-related allegations involving intermediary figures

Following the investigation of Zhou Yongkang, official statements referenced "improper relationships" and exchanges of benefits. Subsequent reports mentioned individuals such as Tang Can, described in some accounts as acting as a liaison within military circles.

According to these reports, information gathered through such connections may have influenced personnel decisions involving senior military leaders, including Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, both later convicted on corruption charges. These claims rely on secondary accounts and have not been independently confirmed.



*Former Chinese regime leader Jiang Zemin (2nd R) is assisted as he leaves after a military parade in Tiananmen Square in Beijing on October 1, 2019, to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. (Image: GREG BAKER/AFP via Getty Images)*

**Structural interpretations of power within the CCP**

Some analysts describe the CCP's internal system as one in which personal loyalty networks play a central role. Advancement, in this view, depends

less on formal criteria and more on alignment with influential figures.
Financial exchange, personal ties, and shared risks appear repeatedly in these accounts, reinforcing connections within elite circles and limiting the possibility of defection.
Historical accounts of Jiang Zemin's leadership period include reports of internal directives related to political campaigns, including the crackdown on Falun Gong beginning in 1999. According to multiple sources, these policies were implemented despite hesitation among some senior officials.
Analysts have suggested that such campaigns also functioned to consolidate loyalty within the system. Participation created shared stakes, making it harder for individuals within the leadership structure to distance themselves from the outcomes.
These informal networks, according to analysts, continue to operate alongside formal Party institutions, influencing decisions in ways that are rarely visible to the public.
**Editor's Note**: This article is based on media reports, publicly shared online videos, blogger statements, and personal testimony cited by overseas media. Allegations related to internal CCP personnel arrangements and sexual relationships have not been independently verified and are presented as claims or descriptions attributed to sources.

## How Global Powers Chose Profit Over Justice After Tiananmen Massacre – OpEd

14 April 2026, Eurasia News

Communist China's violent suppression of the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy protests in Beijing in June 1989 immediately invited global outrage. The global community solemnly declared support for human rights and imposed sanctions on Beijing. But after over three decades, the Tiananmen Square legacy shows not just the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) brutality. It reveals a darker, deeper, and more uncomfortable truth about the international community's miserable failure to sustain Beijing's accountability.
The world did not simply move on from the Tiananmen Square moment. It chose to move on from the Tiananmen episode to meet its own self-interest, ignoring the global principles of human rights and democracy.
Soon after the Tiananmen crackdown by the CCP using the brute force of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the Western governments acted swiftly.
The US, European nations, and international institutions imposed sanctions on Beijing immediately after the Tiananmen massacre. They suspended arms sales, halted high-level exchanges, and froze financial assistance to Communist China.
The World Bank and Asian Development Bank paused all lending to Beijing. This was a rare moment of coordinated Western pressure, though notably many Asian countries and the Soviet Union remained largely silent or stayed on the sidelines. These actions were a clear signal of condemnation of Beijing's use of the PLA against its own citizens.
But this unity among the global community was short-lived. Again, by the early 1990s, geopolitical realities forced the world to change its policy priorities.
Communist China's vast market potential and strategic importance of engaging with Beijing gradually took precedence over human rights concerns.
The world resumed its trade, investment, and diplomacy with Beijing, entirely normalising ties with the authoritarian Communist regime.
Even where the sanctions remained in force, such as restrictions on arms sales, it became more symbolic than transformative. Soon, Communist China was integrated into the global economy, resulting in its membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001.
Thus, the momentum for the CCP regime's accountability for the killing and suppression of its own citizens disappeared. This shift wasn't accidental, but a deliberate recalibration of priorities for the global community.
Faced with a choice between isolating Beijing and engaging with it economically, the world chose the latter. As Communist China's economy grew, Beijing became an indispensable part of supply chains and markets.
The global community relegated human rights concerns, which were once the central discourse in diplomacy with Beijing. As Communist China emerged as an "engine of global economic growth," nations increasingly ignored human rights violations and put them on the back burner in pursuit of economic prosperity.
The consequences of this shift in priorities were devastating. Without the global pressure in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre, Beijing was emboldened to adopt more aggressive and repressive measures in the following decades.
Communist China tightened its control over Tibet and carried out mass detention of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, and eroded civil liberties in Hong Kong.
The pattern was clear: economic interdependence did not moderate authoritarianism. Instead, other nations' readiness to respond decisively was often constrained by their self-interest and economic considerations.
Recent developments in Communist China showcased this transition. Hong Kong was once the bastion of Tiananmen Square massacre remembrance. Now, CCP authorities have dismantled the annual protests to mark the events of the 1989 spring.
Beijing has openly persecuted the pro-democracy activists, citing sweeping national security laws.

Even the very act of mentioning the Tiananmen Square events of June 4, 1989, became a punishable offense, illustrating how historical memory itself was being suppressed.

Such blatant actions of the CCP were not some random developments. These were unfolding in a global environment where economic ties with Beijing were the dominant consideration.

Meanwhile, the Tiananmen Square oppression survivors and advocacy groups continue to demand justice for the victims. Groups, such as the Tiananmen Mothers, continue to call for an independent probe into the June 4, 1989, events. They also seek official acknowledgement and compensation for the victims.

The continued remembrance of Tiananmen Square only highlighted the absence of a formal global reckoning. Though democracies around the world do issue public statements, this symbolism is rarely translated into sustained policy or action.

The repeated failure to hold Communist China accountable for Tiananmen is a cautionary tale about the limits of value-based diplomacy compared to economic interests. It is an erosion of moral clarity when faced with economic and strategic incentives. More importantly, it demonstrates that impunity can shape future behaviour.

## Inside the CCP's Early Strategy: How the Nationalist Party Was Penetrated During China's First United Front

14 April 2026, Vision Times



*Mao Zedong, photographed during his early political career, when he operated within the Kuomintang's central institutions while maintaining ties to the Chinese Communist Party. (Image: Public Domain)*

New evidence and historical accounts suggest that Mao Zedong and other Communist figures operated within the Kuomintang's core institutions in the 1920s, reshaping its structure in ways Sun Yat-sen had explicitly warned against.

The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) United Front strategy in the 1920s is widely described by historians as a calculated effort to penetrate and influence a rival political organization. Figures including Mao Zedong, Li Dazhao, and Zhou Enlai operated within the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang, while remaining under Communist Party direction.

Records of the period indicate that Sun Yat-sen, the founding leader of the Nationalist movement, had set clear conditions for cooperation with Soviet Russia and for the limited participation of Communist Party members. Those conditions, according to multiple historical accounts, were already being tested, and in some cases undermined, from the opening session of the Kuomintang's first national congress in January 1924.

Scholars and researchers have also noted that the full text of the 1923 Sun-Joffe Joint Declaration, in which Sun expressed reservations about introducing communism into China, has rarely been reproduced in official narratives for decades.

*Sun Yat-Sen in the 1910s. (Image: Wikimedia / CC0 1.0)*

**Sun Yat-sen's conditions for cooperation and the early fractures**

The first Kuomintang national congress, held in Guangzhou in January 1924, formalized cooperation with Soviet Russia and allowed Communist Party members to join the party as individuals. In official Communist Party narratives, this arrangement has often been framed as an "alliance with Russia and the Communists."

Some scholars, including historian Xin Haonian, have argued that this phrasing obscures Sun Yat-sen's original formulation. According to their research, Sun's actual position was closer to "alliance with Russia, tolerance of Communists," with explicit constraints attached.

In the Sun-Joffe Joint Declaration, signed with Soviet envoy Adolf Joffe in January 1923, Sun stated that the Soviet system and communism were not suitable for China's conditions. He also called on the Soviet Union to refrain from supporting Mongolian independence and from maintaining military forces in Outer Mongolia.

For Communist Party members joining the Kuomintang, Sun required adherence to the Three Principles of the People and obedience to party discipline. He warned that any attempt to transform the Kuomintang into a vehicle for Communist goals would be resisted.

Subsequent developments suggest that these conditions proved difficult to enforce in practice.

**Mao Zedong's entry into the Kuomintang**

Mao Zedong joined the Kuomintang in 1923, formally as an individual member. Contemporary accounts and later historical analyses indicate that he remained under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party while working within Nationalist structures.

Alongside other Communist leaders, including Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, Mao participated in efforts to reshape the Kuomintang's organizational framework. A joint proposal submitted to Sun Yat-sen called for the creation of centralized executive bodies in Shanghai and Guangzhou, designed to mobilize workers, students, and other social groups.

Afterward, Mao returned to Hunan province, where he worked to expand Kuomintang branch

networks. In practice, this work appears to have overlapped with the expansion of Communist Party influence at the local level.



*Chairman Mao Zedong (1893 – 1976) of the Communist Party of China writing with a brush at his desk in a cave headquarters in north-west China during the Chinese Civil War, 1948. (Image: FPG/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)*

**Interventions at the 1924 congress**

At the Kuomintang's first national congress in 1924, Mao served as a delegate from Hunan and participated in procedural debates that carried broader political implications.

One proposal, introduced by delegate Fang Ruilin, sought to prohibit party members from belonging to other political organizations. The measure would have directly affected individuals holding dual membership in both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

According to records of the proceedings, the proposal encountered immediate resistance. Mao intervened during the debate and called for a vote before further discussion could take place. The motion was defeated.

A second proposal, involving proportional representation in selecting central committee members, was also rejected after opposition from Mao and others. Critics at the time argued that such changes would have limited the influence of Soviet-aligned and Communist-affiliated delegates.

Mao was subsequently elected as an alternate member of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee.

**Control of organizational and propaganda structures**

In early 1924, Mao moved to Shanghai and joined the Kuomintang's Shanghai Executive Bureau, where he worked in the organizational department. Because senior leaders were frequently absent, day-to-day operations reportedly fell largely to him.

Later, in 1925, Mao relocated to Guangzhou and took on a more prominent role within the party's propaganda apparatus. Wang Jingwei, then a leading figure in the National Government, recommended Mao as acting head of the Kuomintang's propaganda department. The appointment was approved by the party's central leadership.

From that position, Mao expanded the department's authority. Directives required that ideological materials be reviewed centrally before distribution, and the department's influence extended across multiple provinces.

He also oversaw the launch of *Political Weekly*, a publication that promoted revolutionary messaging under Kuomintang auspices.

Not all party figures supported these developments. Veteran Nationalist leader Ye Chucang publicly criticized Mao's activities, reflecting broader internal divisions over the direction of the United Front.



*Members of the CCP Soviet Central Bureau pose for a group photo in November 1931, including Gu Zuolin, Ren Bishi, Zhu De, Deng Fa, Xiang Ying, Mao Zedong, and Wang Jiaxiang. (Image: Public Domain)*

**Rising tensions within the Kuomintang**

By late 1925, opposition within the Kuomintang had begun to coalesce. A group of senior figures convened in Beijing and issued resolutions calling for the removal of Communist Party members from key positions and for the termination of Soviet advisory influence.

These actions were quickly challenged by the Kuomintang's left wing. A joint statement signed by leading figures, including Wang Jingwei and Mao, declared the meeting illegitimate. A subsequent party resolution condemned the dissenting group and reaffirmed cooperation with the Soviet Union.

The episode highlighted the growing polarization within the party, as competing factions struggled over its future direction.

**The question of transparency**

At the second Kuomintang national congress in January 1926, concerns about dual party membership resurfaced. Delegates raised complaints that Communist Party members within the Kuomintang were not disclosing their affiliations or activities.

Mao responded by arguing that party members should retain the freedom to join or leave political organizations without restriction. He also suggested that secrecy was necessary because the Communist Party lacked legal status at the time.

The debate underscored unresolved tensions over loyalty, transparency, and organizational control within the United Front framework.

Expansion of communist influence by 1927
By the time of the Northern Expedition, launched in 1926 to unify China, Communist influence within the Kuomintang had grown significantly. Contemporary estimates suggest that Communist Party members and their allies occupied a substantial share of positions within central party organs and administrative departments.
At the same time, Communist organizers were mobilizing rural populations through land reform campaigns, while Kuomintang military forces advanced northward against regional warlords.
In March 1927, Communist-led labor uprisings in Shanghai further intensified the situation. Observers at the time described the scale of worker mobilization as unprecedented, contributing to a sense of political instability in key urban centers.



*Chiang Kai-shek (left) and Bai Chongxi (right) in archival photographs from the Northern Expedition period. (Image: Public domain archival photos)*

**The 1927 break**
In April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, a senior Kuomintang military leader, moved decisively against Communist forces in Shanghai. Backed by allied commanders including Bai Chongxi, Nationalist troops disarmed labor militias and arrested or executed large numbers of Communist activists.
The crackdown effectively dismantled the Communist Party's urban organizational network and marked the collapse of the First United Front.
In response, Soviet authorities organized large-scale demonstrations condemning the actions as "white terror," reflecting the international dimension of the conflict.
**The legacy of the Sun-Joffe declaration**
The Sun-Joffe Joint Declaration remains a key document for understanding the original terms of cooperation between Sun Yat-sen and Soviet representatives.
Some researchers have argued that its full text has not been widely circulated in official historical narratives, particularly sections expressing reservations about the applicability of communism in China.
Sun's own statements in the document continue to be cited in debates over the historical relationship between the Nationalist and Communist movements, and over competing claims of political legitimacy.

## Reality behind a Chinese spectacle

12 April 2026, Sunday Guardian

The National People's Congress (NPC) has long functioned as China's most elaborate stage for political theatre. This spring, the leadership leaned heavily on that tradition, using the NPC to project stability at a time of mounting uncertainty. The centrepiece was the release of the 15th Five-Year Plan, a sweeping document that charts China's development path through 2030. Its emphasis on technological innovation and self-reliance was designed to reassure both domestic and international audiences that the Party remains firmly in command of the nation's trajectory.But the reality beneath the spectacle is far less secure. Industrial overcapacity continues to distort China's economy, producing friction with trading partners and destructive competition at home. Steel, cement, and solar panel production far outpaces demand, eroding profitability and fuelling inefficiencies. These imbalances are not merely economic irritants; they are structural weaknesses that undermine the stability Beijing seeks to project.
Demographic change compounds the challenge. China's birth rate has fallen to historic lows, while its population ages rapidly. The social systems built for a younger, expanding workforce now strain under the weight of pensions, healthcare, and elder care.
These pressures are politically sensitive and economically costly, and they cannot be solved by slogans of rejuvenation or promises of innovation alone.
The new Five-Year Plan's focus on technological innovation is meant to address these twin crises. By investing in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and green technologies, Beijing hopes to leapfrog structural constraints and secure a future less dependent on foreign supply chains. In this narrative, innovation is not just about competitiveness—it is about survival. The Party is betting that science and technology can substitute for demographic dynamism and absorb industrial excess.
Yet technology cannot paper over contradictions. Innovation requires openness, talent mobility, and trust—qualities difficult to foster under tightening political control. Nor can it resolve the fraying social contract. The NPC's spectacle of stability may reassure audiences at home and abroad, but the deeper story is one of fragility. China's leaders are navigating a narrowing path, where the pursuit of control risks undermining the very resilience they seek to display.




## Was there a 'Nepal factor' behind the India-China war of 1962?

12 April 2026, Nepal Times

*King Mahendra of Nepal (center) posing for a photograph at Lakeside, Pokhara with Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai (right) and Defense Minister Marshal Chen Yi (left). Photo source: Du Xiuxian / Xinhua.*

In 1956, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru pledged in India's parliament to defend Nepal from Chinese attack. Six years later, it was China warning India to keep its hands off Nepal. The story of how that reversal happened runs through a royal coup, a Himalayan highway, Khampa guerrillas, and a war that started, and stopped, without satisfying explanation.

"India will consider any attack on Bhutan and Nepal as an attack on itself."

These are the words of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who regarded Nepal and Bhutan as within India's sphere of influence, spoken in the Lok Sabha on 27 March 1957, as Chinese military presence in Tibet was intensifying.

Nehru had already stood in the Lok Sabha around 2005 BS (1948/49) and designated Bhutan as India's satellite state. Given that Bhutan had long since been given that status, it was not difficult to understand that Nehru's fresh statement on Nepal's security in the Lok Sabha was directed against China.

Later, when the India-China border dispute was reaching its peak, Chinese Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi made another unexpected statement on 4 October 1962 – an implicit warning to India over Nepal. He said: "If any foreign power were to attack Nepal, we the Chinese people would stand by your (Nepal) side."

Delivered on the anniversary of the Nepal-China boundary treaty, the Chinese foreign minister's statement struck not only at Nehru but at India's political leadership more broadly. Nehru nevertheless attempted to brush it off in the Lok Sabha, dismissing it as unnecessary propaganda.



It was not difficult to understand that the statements made by Nepal's northern and southern neighbors both reflected each country's security sensitivities as directly tied to Nepal.

*King Mahendra of Nepal laying the foundation stone of the Gandak Project with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Photo source: Agency.*

But what these statements compel one to ask is: how did Nehru, who in 1957 had declared India's commitment to protecting Nepal from potential Chinese attack, find himself on the defensive over Nepal by 1962, hemmed in by China on the very same issue? What bitterness entered India-Nepal diplomatic relations during those six years that put India itself on the back foot?

Less than two weeks after Marshal Chen Yi's statement in Nepal's favor, the India-China war broke out on 20 October 1962. Countless articles have been written on why that war of nearly a month was fought and why it stopped, yet no fully satisfying explanation exists. The Chinese army, which had advanced as far as Tezpur in Assam, turned around and withdrew without occupying the place, by the same route it had come.

Many hold that the India-China war of 1962 was ordered by Mao because of the Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama's taking political asylum in India in March 1959, and because of the crisis created by the failure of China's Great Leap Forward. But were these the only two causes? Studying the period from 1957 to 1962, Nepal emerges as another factor in the India-China war.

Two months before Nehru publicly stated his foreign policy in the Lok Sabha in 1957, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had made his first visit to Nepal. On that occasion he had sought to make clear to India: "We (China) have a blood relationship with Nepal. No one can poison our friendship."

When Nehru helped King Mahendra carry out the coup against democratically elected Prime Minister BP Koirala on 15 December 1960, he

presumably reasoned that Mahendra would serve his plans better than BP.
But Mahendra continued the effort BP had begun in 1959 to resolve the border dispute with China

*Prime Minister Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala in Pokhara with his Chinese counterpart Zhou Enlai. Photo source: Du Xiuxian / Xinhua.*

and pushed further ahead with plans to build the Kathmandu-Kodari Highway. Alarmed by this agreement aimed at enhancing Nepal-China connectivity, Nehru was compelled to say in the Lok Sabha on 25 November 1961: "The road has dealt a serious blow to India's security sensitivities. This is contrary to the 1950 Treaty."
The Indian media also amplified the issue considerably. Under mounting pressure from all sides, King Mahendra issued a statement: "Communism does not come to Nepal by taxi." https://english.nepalnews.com/s/diplomacy/205774/After Nepali Congress secured a two-thirds majority in the first general election of 1959, King Mahendra's first choice for Prime Minister had been Subarna Shumsher Rana. Nehru too had wanted BP Koirala not to become Prime Minister.
In 1960, on returning to Nepal from an American visit with King Mahendra, Subarna had already come to understand that the king's mood was not right and that he could mount a coup at any time. He therefore requested leave and went to Kolkata, India. The coup in Nepal occurred just three days after his departure. Subarna did not return to Nepal after that.
After taking power, Mahendra made full use of the China card. This is when Nehru attempted to play the Suvarna card to cut Mahendra to size. After the coup against the elected government, all of Nepali Congress's top leaders were in prison. No formal party decision had been made, yet an armed struggle suddenly erupted from India.
The late Nepali Congress leader Bharat Shumsher Rana used to say that all the support for that armed struggle against King Mahendra came from Nehru. In an interview given to this writer in Kolkata on 21 July 2016 for Nepal Magazine, Rana had said: "I myself was deployed along the Nepal-India border from Pithoragarh eastward."

*Nawaraj Subedi. Photo: Subedi's Facebook wall.*

This movement had been putting King Mahendra under considerable strain. But China suddenly attacked India over the border dispute, and the movement collapsed midway.
Nawaraj Subedi, former chair of the Rastriya Panchayat who worked with Kings Mahendra and Birendra for 29 years, says that at the time the US and India were jointly engaged in an effort to separate Tibet from China and were supporting the Khampa rebellion.

"China's biggest headache was the Khampa rebellion. The plan was to use Nepal as a base, with American and Indian support, to strike at Tibet," Subedi recalls of that period. "When King Mahendra visited China in 1960, it was Mao



Zedong himself who raised the matter of the Khampa rebels. Mahendra's government had come back having reassured the Chinese side."
Subedi says that UNDP aircraft were used to transport food and weapons to Khampa shelters in the Kalpani area and above Gorkha, numbering in the hundreds. "An airport was even built at Syuchatar. After Mao's request, King Birendra put an end to the Khampa rebellion," he says.
Informed sources say King Mahendra also apprised the Chinese government of the armed movement being conducted against him from across the Indian border.
Viewed in this context, Marshal Chen Yi's statement of 4 October 1962 fits squarely into this surrounding circumstance. At that time India had asserted no claim over Lipulek, Kalapani, or Limpiyadhura as it has since, nor over any other Nepali territory. It therefore becomes clear that Marshal Chen Yi's statement was directed at the armed movement being carried out from India at Nehru's instigation.

## Beijing's naming war needs a rebuttal: Now, Bharat must rename 'Chinese territories'

13 April 2026, First Post

The country should begin renaming places in Xinjiang using their ancient names — Khotan, Kushgar, Kucha, Yarkand, Turfan, et al. The region

itself can be called Bhadrasva, a name firmly grounded in literary evidence, not imagination

Let's begin by getting the basic premise right. What we today call "China" is not a timeless, organic civilisational state. There is, undeniably, a civilisational China, but what we see today is a 20th-century political construct shaped by communism through revolution, conquest and consolidation. The difference is not merely territorial; it is civilisational, ideological and psychological.

Historically, the Chinese polity centred around the Han people — of the Han, by the Han, and for the Han. Over time, it forcibly incorporated non-Han regions such as Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. Yet China continues to retain its Han-centric worldview.

This reveals a central contradiction at the heart of the Chinese state. Geographically, what is today called China is overwhelmingly non-Han in its territorial composition. Roughly two-thirds of its landmass consists of regions — Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia — that were historically distinct in culture, ethnicity and political identity. These regions were not organically assimilated; they were absorbed through force and are maintained through a combination of military control, economic exploitation and demographic engineering.While Tibet and Xinjiang periodically attract global attention, Inner Mongolia remains an under-examined tragedy. Occupying nearly 12 per cent of China's landmass, this northern region is endowed with immense natural wealth, such as coal, rare earth metals and natural gas. Today, Inner Mongolia accounts for roughly a quarter of China's coal production. The cost, however, has been catastrophic: ecological devastation, scarred landscapes and populations forced to endure severe environmental degradation and hazardous air quality.Xinjiang, in the far west, tells a similar story, shaped not only by resources but also by geopolitics. Producing over 10 per cent of China's crude oil and natural gas, Xinjiang is also Beijing's gateway to Central Asia. Its sheer size — three times that of France and constituting about one-sixth of China's territory — underscores its importance.

Tibet, meanwhile, represents yet another dimension of this imperial calculus. The Tibetan plateau is the source of many of Asia's great rivers, making it one of the most strategically vital regions in the world. Author Brahma Chellaney, in his book *Water: Asia's New Battleground*, writes, "Water indeed has emerged as a key issue that could determine whether Asia is headed towards greater cooperation or deleterious competition. No country would influence this direction more than China, which controls the Tibetan plateau, the source of most major rivers of Asia."

That modern China is an artificial construct, forged through expansion rather than continuity, is not a flippant observation. Even relatively recent historical accounts hint at this fragmentation. In the 1930s, British diplomat Sir Eric Teichman, travelling across Inner Mongolia towards Xinjiang, noted how "the traveller finds himself in a new country; China and Mongolia are left behind".

This was less than a century ago. If one goes further back, the distinctions become even clearer. Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet and the Han heartland were historically separate cultural and political entities. Their integration into a single political unit is a relatively recent phenomenon. This raises a critical question: on what basis does the artificial construct called 'communist China' assert territorial claims over territories over which Bharat has absolute sovereignty?

The question requires a degree of self-reflection among Indians, who need to respond to Chinese propaganda warfare far more assertively and with greater purpose, backed by history and culture. Centuries before the Christian era, these areas currently under Chinese control were predominantly Sanskritic cultures, and they continued to flourish until the advent of Islam. Such was the affinity and closeness that Kumarajiva (344-413 AD), a foremost Sanskrit scholar and translator, studied Buddhism in Kashmir but, for the Vedas, chose to visit Kashgar in today's Xinjiang region.

The story of Kumarajiva, born to a Kashmiri father and a Kuchean mother, is a stark reminder not only of Bharat's deep connection with the Central Asian region but also of how much its civilisational and cultural spread has shrunk over the last two millennia. For those not well versed in Bharat's real history, Kucha, in the northern Tarim Basin, was a centre of Buddhist learning, and it was from here that Indian music spread to China. It should also be noted that Yarkand and Khotan (which tradition says was built by King Ashoka's son Kutsan) in the northern Tarim Valley were centres of Mahayana Buddhism, while Kashgar, Kucha and Turfan were hubs of Hinayana Buddhism.

Ancient Indian texts also mention these so-called Chinese regions with great affinity. Descriptions of Uttara Kuru and Bhadrashva, found in both the Puranas and the two great epics, correspond strikingly with regions spanning from the Himalayas to the Arctic and from the Tarim Basin to northern China. According to historian Hemchandra Raychaudhuri, in *Studies in Ancient Indian Antiquities*, "Bhadrashva is the Tarim Basin and Hwangho River region, i.e., the whole of Xinjiang and northern China."

Historical scholarship reinforces these links. Thinkers such as Arnold Toynbee traced cultural connections between the Tarim Basin and the Sanskritic world back to at least 1700 BCE. Explorers such as Ellsworth Huntington pointed to linguistic and ethnographic evidence suggesting that migrations had taken place from northern Bharat into these regions. Early scripts found in the Tarim Basin, such as Kharosthi, also indicate a strong Indian presence in Xinjiang.

The Mongolian world, too, reflects close cultural ties with Bharat. Mongol religious traditions incorporated Hindu-Buddhist elements, with deities such as Mahakala (a form of Shiva), Kartikeya, Brahma, Yama, Hayagriva and Kubera playing central roles. It should also be noted that Shiva's trident adorned the flag of Genghis Khan.

Against this backdrop, China's contemporary efforts to rename places in Arunachal Pradesh — referring to it as "Zangnan" or South Tibet — must be understood as more than symbolic gestures. Renaming is not merely an administrative exercise; it is a political act aimed at reshaping historical memory. Control over narrative precedes control over territory. Once names change, histories can be rewritten and civilisational links obscured.

Consider what has happened with regard to Tibet and Xinjiang. About 110 years ago, Tibet, Bharat and China sat on an equal footing for six months at the conference table in Simla in 1913-14 to discuss the fate of Lhasa. Today, Bharat has all but forgotten its stakes, let alone the history of its connections with Tibet. Even more neglected are Bharat's cultural-historical stakes in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.

China understands the magnitude of narrative warfare. It has, therefore, issued several such renaming lists in recent years — six places were renamed in Tibet in 2017, 15 in 2021, followed by 11 in 2023. Each renaming attempt reinforces its effort to normalise a contested narrative.

Bharat's response thus far has been strong but largely reactive. The Chinese are far more than merely "mischievous". The challenge is not merely diplomatic; it is civilisational. It requires a proactive articulation of history, geography and cultural continuity. Bharat need not invent narratives; it possesses a vast reservoir of historical memory and textual tradition that affirms its roots and connections across Asia.

The country should begin renaming places in Xinjiang using their ancient names — Khotan, Kushgar, Kucha, Yarkand, Turfan, et al. The region itself can be called Bhadrasva, a name firmly grounded in literary evidence rather than imagination. Similarly, merely protesting China's attempt to rename Tibet as 'Xizang' will not be enough. Bharat should start referring to it as 'Trivishtap' (abode of the gods), a Sanskrit term used in the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*, from which Tibet derives its name.

Unlike China, Bharat does not need to fabricate claims. Its historical, cultural and civilisational links across Asia are well documented. What it lacks is not evidence, but assertion; not history, but the will to deploy it.

## The War Against Tibet's Story- Digital repression, disinformation, and what the Tibetan community must do now

10 April 2026, Phayul

In January of this year, I spoke before a panel in Luxembourg about digital repression and the shrinking of civic space. I made the case that Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Hongkongers should not only be cited as case studies in these conversations — they should be recognised as early witnesses whose experiences must shape how the world responds now.

We Tibetans have been living inside this reality for more than two decades since the internet became a worldwide phenomenon. As early as 2009, researchers uncovered GhostNet — a large-scale cyberespionage network that had compromised computers used by the Tibetan government in exile and Tibet-related organisations around the world. Since then, our community has been targeted repeatedly through email hacks, malware, and coordinated disinformation. When Tibetans warned that digital tools could be weaponised against us, those warnings were often dismissed.

The world is catching up. But we cannot afford to wait for it.

In February 2026, the research organisation Graphika documented what we already knew was coming: a coordinated Chinese state-linked influence operation targeting our own democratic elections — AI-generated articles in Tibetan and English, coordinated fake accounts, and direct attacks on the credibility of our Election Commission. And in April, China's state mouthpiece Global Times published a lengthy attack on the same election, calling it "an election without a land" and "an institutional illusion created by separatist groups."

These two operations — one covert, one brazen are not separate phenomena. They are the public and hidden faces of the same campaign. And that campaign has been running, in different forms, for decades. This is not a new war. It is a new phase of an old one.

The campaign against the Tibetan cause is not a collection of random attacks. It is a doctrine with distinct tracks, each targeting a different pillar of our struggle.

The historical track attacks the legal foundation: Tibet was always part of China and that there was no independent Tibetan state.

The moral track attacks the ethical foundation: Tibet was a feudal theocracy built on slavery, Beijing's arrival was liberation.

The personal track targets the Dalai Lama, not with a goal to win an argument, but to make solidarity with him politically uncomfortable.

The institutional track: The newest and most dangerous method targets not individuals but our democratic structures themselves – the Tibetan parliament in exile, the Election Commission, the process. When people distrust institutions, they disengage. Disengagement is the goal.

Two Faces of the Same Operation: Spamouflage and Global Times

During the February 2026 CTA elections, Spamouflage, which is a Chinese state-linked influence network documented by Graphika — published AI-generated articles simultaneously in English and Tibetan targeting specific candidates. On X (twitter), 103 coordinated accounts uploaded AI-generated cartoons using identical hashtags. The Election Commission itself was framed as having failed to investigate legitimate complaints. The goal was not to change the result. It was to make the entire process appear illegitimate before a single final vote was cast.

Two months later, Global Times made the same argument openly. It cited the 56% preliminary voter turnout as evidence of a lack of credibility without mentioning that citizens in China do not have the right to directly elect their top leadership. It pointed to US funding of the CTA as proof of external dependency. It quoted what it described as critical commentary from Tibetan bloggers on Medium as evidence of internal discontent without acknowledging that Spamouflage had been producing coordinated content in Tibetan targeting this very election just weeks earlier.

That last detail deserves to be named plainly. Those Medium posts were manufactured. A researcher has confirmed it. Global Times was amplifying what Spamouflage had planted. The overt propaganda and the covert operation pointing at the same material, toward the same conclusion.

The CTA spokesperson Tenzin Lekshay in an interview to Tibet Times few days back responded with notable composure. He reframed the entire exchange. Sixty-six years of democratic practice in exile, he noted, might itself be worth studying if China were ever to choose a path of peace over hostility. Simply repeating the label "separatist organisation," he concluded, resolves nothing. It never has.

What Beijing's unusual attention to the diaspora election ultimately reveals is the depth of its discomfort. The Global Times piece is a behaviour of a government that finds a functioning democracy, however small, genuinely threatening. What piques China most is the glaring contrast with its own electoral void.

**The Real Target: The Right to Be Believed**

What connects digital surveillance inside Tibet and disinformation outside it is the same destination: self-censorship.

Inside Tibet, when people know their phones can be scanned, their messages read, their contacts scrutinised and leads to behavioural changes. People stop sending messages. They avoid certain topics.

Outside Tibet, the mechanism is different but the endpoint is the same. Disinformation does not only attack truth but it attacks solidarity. It makes allies hesitant. It turns clear cases of repression into endless debates. When people no longer know what is true, they stop caring. And when our own community is flooded with manufactured divisions, coordinated attacks on our candidates, and artificial doubt about our institutions, the same quiet withdrawal follows.

We Are Not Starting From Zero

The good news is that Tibetans are not unprepared.

For example, Tibet Action Institute runs TibCert, a dedicated digital security initiative built specifically for our community. Their mission is to build long-term collaboration between community stakeholders on digital security, to provide regular and accessible guidance on threats we face, and to help Tibetans inside Tibet circumvent censorship and surveillance.

TibCert has been doing this work for years, long before Spamouflage turned its attention to our elections. They carry accumulated knowledge about the specific ways this community is targeted. Supporting them, sharing their resources, and treating digital security as a democratic responsibility is one of the most direct things we can do.

**What Each of Us Can Do**

The final election for the 18th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile takes place on 26 April 2026. The same infrastructure that targeted the preliminary round is still active. What you do in the next two weeks and beyond matters.

You do not need to be a cybersecurity expert. You need three habits.

Before sharing content that attacks a candidate, an institution, or deepens a division in our community — pause. Ask: who published this? How old is this account? Is this trying to inform me, or provoke me? These questions take thirty seconds. They are the difference between participating in our democracy and amplifying someone else's operation.

If you see content that looks coordinated, with the same attack from multiple new accounts, articles in Tibetan that feel off, waves of identical cartoons — report it. Name it publicly when you can. **Silence is how it spreads.**

And talk about this. In your family groups, in your local associations, with the younger generation who live on these platforms far more than we do. The most powerful defence against an information operation is a community that knows it is being targeted and refuses to be used against itself.

The Chief Election Commissioner has already called for stronger civic engagement, particularly from Tibetan students and young people who could not vote in February. That call and this one are the same call: show up, stay clear-eyed, and do not let manufactured noise drown out your own voice.

**A Direct Appeal**

We are a people who have survived occupation, exile, and decades of systematic erasure. We built democratic institutions under conditions no political science textbook anticipated. Imperfectly — our recent governance crises remind us of that. But genuinely, with real commitment, across 27

countries, across generations born far from the land that remains the reason for all of it.
That commitment is precisely why we are targeted. Beijing does not spend resources on movements it considers irrelevant.
For decades, we warned that digital tools could become instruments of repression. For decades, those warnings were treated as the concerns of a small, marginal community. Now that the world is beginning to understand what we understood first, we have an obligation to ourselves and to every community that will face what we have faced to lead from that knowledge, not retreat from it.
When you see a narrative designed to make Tibet seem complicated, or the Dalai Lama seem compromised, or our institutions seem corrupt — ask who benefits from that story spreading. The answer is rarely your neighbor or a fellow Tibetan.
Refusing to share unverified content is not censorship. It is democratic discipline. Questioning the origin of an article that attacks our institutions is not paranoia. It is the basic literacy required to live in the information environment we actually inhabit.
We were the early witnesses. That is not a burden. It is standing.

## Tibet is Not Negotiable: India's Ecological and Civilizational Stakes

05 April 2026, Sunday Guardian

When thinking about the future of India's Tibet policy, two critical things must be taken into account, water, and Buddhism.
The conventional debate over India's Tibet policy has been conducted almost entirely in the language of hard geopolitics—borders, buffer zones, and military deterrence. This framing, while not wrong, is dangerously incomplete. India's interest in the Tibetan cause is not merely a matter of strategic depth or diplomatic leverage against Beijing. It is rooted in two existential stakes that go far deeper than any line on a map: the ecological survival of the Indian subcontinent, and the civilizational integrity of a tradition that was born on Indian soil. To abandon the Tibetan cause would be to surrender not just territory, but the very water that feeds India's rivers and the very soul of its oldest spiritual heritage.

**ROOF OF THE WORLD IS LEAKING, AND INDIA WILL DROWN**

The Tibetan Plateau is, by every meaningful measure, the hydrological heart of Asia. Covering 2.5 million square kilometres—roughly 2% of the earth's land surface—it sits at an average elevation exceeding 4,000 metres and is home to 46,000 glaciers, representing the third-largest concentration of ice on earth after the Arctic and Antarctic. The Tibet Policy Institute's documentation of this reality is unambiguous: Tibet is the source of Asia's six greatest and most important rivers, systems that flow into ten of the world's most densely populated nations and directly sustain 1.8 billion people. For India specifically, the rivers originating on the Tibetan Plateau—the Indus, the Brahmaputra, the Sutlej, the Karnali tributaries of the Ganga—are not merely waterways. They are the circulatory system of an entire civilisation, the same rivers that nourished the Indus Valley Civilisation in 3000 BC and continue to sustain hundreds of millions of Indian farmers, communities, and cities today.
The threat to this system is now acute and accelerating. The plateau is warming at twice the global average—a rise of 0.3 to 0.4 degrees Celsius per decade—meaning that Tibet is heating faster than almost anywhere else on earth. The ecological consequences are not abstract future projections; they are already unfolding in documented, measurable ways. The timing and intensity of the Indian monsoon, on which the agricultural viability of the subcontinent depends, is directly tied to atmospheric temperatures on the Tibetan Plateau. This link was recognised as long ago as 1882, when Sir H.F. Blanford, the chief reporter of the India Meteorological Department, observed that Himalayan snow cover during the preceding winter presaged the quality of the monsoon—a relationship so reliable that it formed the basis for the IMD's first monsoon forecasts. What happens on the plateau does not stay on the plateau. It arrives in India as flood or drought, abundance or catastrophe.Into this already fragile and warming landscape, China is now introducing a dam-building programme of staggering ambition and recklessness. Over 193 large-scale dams are planned or already built in Tibet, capable of generating over 270 gigawatts of hydropower, with 80% classified as large or mega dams exceeding 100 megawatts in capacity. The centrepiece of this programme is the proposed Metok Super Dam on the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo—a project of almost incomprehensible scale. Planned for Metok County in Nyingtri Prefecture, it would generate more than 60 gigawatts of electricity annually, more than three times the output of China's Three Gorges Dam, currently the world's largest power station. Its construction would require drilling at least four 20-kilometre-long tunnels through the Namcha Barwa Mountain. This single structure, sitting upstream of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, would give China unilateral control over the flow of the Brahmaputra—a river on which tens of millions of Indians in the northeast depend for their livelihoods, agriculture, and drinking water.The dangers are not hypothetical. The Yarlung Tsangpo valley has already demonstrated its catastrophic volatility. On 17 October 2018, a massive landslide induced by an ice-avalanche at the Sedongpu Basin blocked the main course of the river near Gyalha, causing a barrier lake to form rapidly. When the natural dam was overtopped on 19 October, it generated a flood with a peak flow rate of 32,000 cubic metres per second. A second massive landslide

struck the same valley on 22 March 2021. The Bolu Twin Landslides of October and November 2018 inundated entire villages. The geology of the region—one of the most seismically active on earth, with historical records showing 18 earthquakes of magnitude 8 or above and over 100 events between magnitude 7 and 7.9—makes the idea of placing a 60-gigawatt dam in this landscape a gamble with the lives of millions of downstream Indians.

The earthquake risk is compounded by the dams themselves. Research cited by the Tibet Policy Institute indicates that the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, which killed 80,000 people, and the 2014 Ludian earthquake in Yunnan were both induced by nearby mega dams—the Zipingpu and Xiluodu dams respectively—through Reservoir-Induced Seismic activity. The precedent set by China's own dam disasters is sobering: in August 1975, the Banqiao Dam and 61 others in Henan collapsed following Typhoon Nina, creating one of the deadliest floods in history, affecting 10.15 million people with an estimated death toll between 26,000 and 240,000. The dam had been designed to survive a once-in-a-thousand-years flood; a once-in-two-thousand-years event destroyed it. With climate change dramatically increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events on the Tibetan Plateau, the statistical foundations of Chinese dam safety calculations are dissolving in real time.

India cannot afford indifference to what is done to Tibet's rivers and glaciers because there is no hydraulic firewall between Tibetan mismanagement and Indian survival. A Tibet whose ecology is destroyed by extraction, whose rivers are weaponised by upstream dams, and whose glaciers are accelerated into retreat by unchecked warming is a Tibet that slowly drains the water security of the Indian subcontinent. Defending the Tibetan cause is therefore not a matter of sentiment towards a displaced people—it is a matter of elementary hydrological self-interest for a nation of 1.4 billion people.

**BUDDHISM WITHOUT TIBET IS INDIA WITHOUT ITS SOUL**

The ecological argument alone would justify India's stake in Tibet's fate. But there is a second dimension that cuts even deeper into what India is as a civilisation—and that is the question of who controls Buddhism.

Buddhism was born in India. The Buddha attained enlightenment at Bodh Gaya in what is today Bihar. The Dharma was first set in motion at Sarnath. The great monastic university of Nalanda, which trained generations of scholars who carried Buddhist thought across Asia, stood on Indian soil. For over a millennium, India was the fountainhead from which Buddhist civilisation flowed northward into Tibet, eastward into China, and across the entirety of Asia. The relationship between India and Tibet in this transmission was not merely historical—it was living, continuous, and intimate. The 7th century Chinese monk Xuanzang's pilgrimage to India, immortalised in Journey to the West, is itself a testament to the fact that Tibet and China both looked to India as the sacred source of the Dharma.

Today, the Tibetan Buddhist tradition represents the most complete and unbroken transmission of the late Indian Buddhist heritage—the Vajrayana lineages that flourished in the great monasteries of Nalanda and Vikramashila before they were destroyed. The Dalai Lamas, the Karmapas, and the entire architecture of Tibetan Buddhist learning are custodians of a tradition that is, in its deepest roots, Indian. When India granted asylum to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile in 1959, it was not merely performing a humanitarian act. It was, consciously or not, reclaiming a piece of its own civilisational legacy.

What China is attempting in Tibet is not merely political occupation—it is the systematic capture of religious authority. Its new "unity and progress law" seeks to diminish and destroy any uniqueness of Tibetan culture and tradition. Beijing's insistence on controlling the reincarnation process of Tibetan lamas, including the Dalai Lama himself, is an unprecedented assertion that a communist, atheist state has the right to determine the succession of one of the world's great spiritual traditions. The Chinese government's appointment of its own Panchen Lama—in direct defiance of traditional Tibetan religious processes—was a declaration that the Communist Party of China intends to own Tibetan Buddhism institutionally, to hollow it out from within, and to present to the world a version of the tradition that has been scrubbed of its independence, its political theology of compassion, and its organic connection to the Indian source from which it sprang.

If India acquiesces to this—if it normalises relations with Beijing on terms that implicitly accept Chinese sovereignty over Tibetan religious life—it would be participating in an act of civilisational self-amputation. It would be handing to an atheist authoritarian state the stewardship of a tradition that represents India's greatest gift to the spiritual history of humanity. The birthplace of the Buddha cannot be diplomatically indifferent to the subjugation of the Buddha's greatest living lineage.

**CONCLUSION**

India's engagement with the Tibetan cause must therefore be understood at both registers simultaneously. At the material level, Tibet is the water tower upon which India's rivers, monsoons, and agricultural survival depend—and China's reckless dam-building, mining, and environmental exploitation of the plateau is a slow-motion hydraulic threat to India's national security that no bilateral trade agreement can offset. At the civilisational level, Tibet is the northern guardian of a spiritual tradition that India gave to the world—and to abandon it would be to surrender the most profound dimension of India's cultural

identity to the custodianship of a state that regards religion as a tool of political control.
The Tibetan cause is not a charity that India extends to a displaced people. It is the defence of India's own rivers, its own rain, and its own soul.

## The War Against Tibet's Story- Digital repression, disinformation, and what the Tibetan community must do now.

10 April 2026, Phayul

In January of this year, I spoke before a panel in Luxembourg about digital repression and the shrinking of civic space. I made the case that Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Hongkongers should not only be cited as case studies in these conversations — they should be recognised as early witnesses whose experiences must shape how the world responds now.
We Tibetans have been living inside this reality for more than two decades since the internet became a worldwide phenomenon. As early as 2009, researchers uncovered GhostNet — a large-scale cyberespionage network that had compromised computers used by the Tibetan government in exile and Tibet-related organisations around the world. Since then, our community has been targeted repeatedly through email hacks, malware, and coordinated disinformation. When Tibetans warned that digital tools could be weaponised against us, those warnings were often dismissed.
The world is catching up. But we cannot afford to wait for it.
In February 2026, the research organisation Graphika documented what we already knew was coming: a coordinated Chinese state-linked influence operation targeting our own democratic elections — AI-generated articles in Tibetan and English, coordinated fake accounts, and direct attacks on the credibility of our Election Commission. And in April, China's state mouthpiece Global Times published a lengthy attack on the same election, calling it "an election without a land" and "an institutional illusion created by separatist groups."
These two operations — one covert, one brazen are not separate phenomena. They are the public and hidden faces of the same campaign. And that campaign has been running, in different forms, for decades. This is not a new war. It is a new phase of an old one.
The campaign against the Tibetan cause is not a collection of random attacks. It is a doctrine with distinct tracks, each targeting a different pillar of our struggle.
**The historical track attacks the legal foundation: Tibet was always part of China and that there was no independent Tibetan state.**
The moral track attacks the ethical foundation: Tibet was a feudal theocracy built on slavery, Beijing's arrival was liberation.
The personal track targets the Dalai Lama, not with a goal to win an argument, but to make solidarity with him politically uncomfortable.
The institutional track: The newest and most dangerous method targets not individuals but our democratic structures themselves – the Tibetan parliament in exile, the Election Commission, the process. When people distrust institutions, they disengage. Disengagement is the goal.
**Two Faces of the Same Operation: Spamouflage and Global Times**
During the February 2026 CTA elections, Spamouflage, which is a Chinese state-linked influence network documented by Graphika — published AI-generated articles simultaneously in English and Tibetan targeting specific candidates. On X (twitter), 103 coordinated accounts uploaded AI-generated cartoons using identical hashtags. The Election Commission itself was framed as having failed to investigate legitimate complaints. The goal was not to change the result. It was to make the entire process appear illegitimate before a single final vote was cast.
Two months later, Global Times made the same argument openly. It cited the 56% preliminary voter turnout as evidence of a lack of credibility without mentioning that citizens in China do not have the right to directly elect their top leadership. It pointed to US funding of the CTA as proof of external dependency. It quoted what it described as critical commentary from Tibetan bloggers on Medium as evidence of internal discontent without acknowledging that Spamouflage had been producing coordinated content in Tibetan targeting this very election just weeks earlier.
That last detail deserves to be named plainly. Those Medium posts were manufactured. A researcher has confirmed it. Global Times was amplifying what Spamouflage had planted. The overt propaganda and the covert operation pointing at the same material, toward the same conclusion.
The CTA spokesperson Tenzin Lekshay in an interview to Tibet Times few days back responded with notable composure. He reframed the entire exchange. Sixty-six years of democratic practice in exile, he noted, might itself be worth studying if China were ever to choose a path of peace over hostility. Simply repeating the label "separatist organisation," he concluded, resolves nothing. It never has.
What Beijing's unusual attention to the diaspora election ultimately reveals is the depth of its discomfort. The Global Times piece is a behaviour of a government that finds a functioning democracy, however small, genuinely threatening. What piques China most is the glaring contrast with its own electoral void.
**The Real Target: The Right to Be Believed**

What connects digital surveillance inside Tibet and disinformation outside it is the same destination: self-censorship.

Inside Tibet, when people know their phones can be scanned, their messages read, their contacts scrutinised and leads to behavioural changes. People stop sending messages. They avoid certain topics.

Outside Tibet, the mechanism is different but the endpoint is the same. Disinformation does not only attack truth but it attacks solidarity. It makes allies hesitant. It turns clear cases of repression into endless debates. When people no longer know what is true, they stop caring. And when our own community is flooded with manufactured divisions, coordinated attacks on our candidates, and artificial doubt about our institutions, the same quiet withdrawal follows.

We Are Not Starting From Zero

**The good news is that Tibetans are not unprepared.**

For example, Tibet Action Institute runs TibCert, a dedicated digital security initiative built specifically for our community. Their mission is to build long-term collaboration between community stakeholders on digital security, to provide regular and accessible guidance on threats we face, and to help Tibetans inside Tibet circumvent censorship and surveillance.

TibCert has been doing this work for years, long before Spamouflage turned its attention to our elections. They carry accumulated knowledge about the specific ways this community is targeted. Supporting them, sharing their resources, and treating digital security as a democratic responsibility is one of the most direct things we can do.

What Each of Us Can Do

The final election for the 18th Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile takes place on 26 April 2026. The same infrastructure that targeted the preliminary round is still active. What you do in the next two weeks and beyond matters.

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Before sharing content that attacks a candidate, an institution, or deepens a division in our community — pause. Ask: who published this? How old is this account? Is this trying to inform me, or provoke me? These questions take thirty seconds. They are the difference between participating in our democracy and amplifying someone else's operation.



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We were the early witnesses. That is not a burden. It is standing.

Civic space does not collapse dramatically. It contracts quietly — unless we refuse to let it.

## How the CCP's Plan to Prevent a Second Cultural Revolution Produced Xi Jinping

09 April 2026, Vision Times

*Hu Yaobang, the CCP's reformist general secretary, designed the "Third Echelon" selection to break with*



*the Cultural Revolution, yet the process ended up placing Xi Jinping on the path to power. (Image: Public domain)*

In the 1980s, the CCP's senior leadership in the Zhongnanhai compound attempted a political experiment called the "Third Echelon," aimed at preventing a repeat of the Cultural Revolution's personality-cult dictatorship. The program was championed by Hu Yaobang, the CCP's reform-minded general secretary, and managed by Li Rui, then a deputy minister at the Party's Organization Department, the CCP body responsible for personnel appointments and promotions throughout the entire Party hierarchy. The selection was supposed to guard against a leftward lurch back toward Maoism. Instead, it became one of modern Chinese political history's cruelest ironies: the list built to keep autocrats out of power placed one directly on the path to the top.

Cultural Revolution record was the decisive test

In 1983, Hu Yaobang formally proposed the "Third Echelon" concept and put Li Rui in charge of execution. The Organization Department selected over 1,100 provincial and ministerial-level reserve cadres under what amounted to a rigorous "political physical exam." Candidates had to hold at least a university degree, which in an era when the Party was still dominated by uneducated revolutionary veterans was itself a small revolution. They had to be under 50 and hold at least a prefectural or bureau-level rank. A strict veto applied to the so-called "three types of people": anyone who had risen through loyalty to the Lin Biao or Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques during the Cultural Revolution, anyone with serious radical factional sympathies, and anyone involved in violent "smash and grab" campaigns. The program gave priority to intellectuals and young cadres who had either resisted the Cultural Revolution or stayed on the sidelines as "free riders." The most critical screening criterion was how the candidate had behaved during the Cultural Revolution.

Hu Yaobang emphasized merit and competence. But under heavy pressure from revolutionary-era military elders and Party patriarchs, many "red second generation" princelings, the sons and daughters of founding-era CCP leaders, were also placed on the list. Among them: Xi Jinping, then the Party secretary of Zhengding County in Hebei province, and Bo Xilai, then serving in Dalian.

**Why Xi Jinping made the list and Bo Xilai was cut**

In 1982, Xi Jinping voluntarily left his position at the Central Military Commission's General Office to "go down to the grassroots" in rural Zhengding County. According to Li Rui's later recollections, Xi presented himself as obedient and composed, unlike other princelings who were brash and entitled. In Hu Yaobang's eyes, this was a sign of reliability: someone who would govern steadily and not cause upheaval. Xi fit Hu's stated goal of selecting cadres who "wouldn't make waves."

Bo Xilai was the opposite: arrogant and aggressive. The Organization Department cut him in the first round. His personality alone would have been sufficient grounds, but according to internal Party accounts, Chen Yun, one of the CCP's most powerful revolutionary elders, had personally crossed Bo's name off the list. The reason was Bo's conduct during the Cultural Revolution.

According to Apple Daily and overseas Chinese media, Bo Xilai publicly denounced his own father, Bo Yibo, a senior CCP veteran, during the Cultural Revolution to demonstrate political loyalty. He beat his father so severely that he broke three of the elder Bo's ribs. Chen Yun's assessment was blunt: Bo was "morally corrupt and would turn on anyone," and would destabilize the Party if he ever gained power.

Japan's Asahi Shimbun also reported that Bo Xilai stole a car and ran over a donkey during the Cultural Revolution, and shoplifted an expensive dictionary from a bookstore to resell. In the screening conducted by Li Rui and Hu Yaobang, these were disqualifying offenses.

**The reformers selected the man who reversed their reforms**

Hu Yaobang was forced from power in 1987 and died in 1989. His death triggered the Tiananmen Square protests, which the CCP crushed with military force. In his final years, Hu expressed deep regret that the "normal state system" he had tried to build had been crushed by the old guard's grip on power. The "Third Echelon" he had poured his energy into was being captured by elite political families. The list that was supposed to produce reformers became the blueprint for the later power-sharing arrangement between the Communist Youth League faction, a network of officials who rose through the CCP's youth organization, and the "princelings," the children of the Party's revolutionary founders.

Li Rui, who had overseen the "Third Echelon" selection, died in 2019. In his later years, he repeatedly expressed disappointment in Xi Jinping, both publicly and in private. In interviews with

*A screen shows the picture of the sentence of Chinese politician Bo Xilai (2nd Right) on Sept. 22, 2013 in Beijing, China. (Image: Feng Li via Getty Images)*

overseas Chinese media and in private conversations, he said bluntly: "I never expected his education level to be this low," and "I misjudged him." Li Rui regretted that he had

valued Xi's apparent docility without recognizing the Maoist dogmatism and authoritarian instincts underneath.

**The party's filter only retains those who protect it**

Ming Juzheng, an emeritus professor of political science at National Taiwan University, put it directly: "The CCP's system works like a filter. Hu Yaobang wanted to filter for reformers, but the system will only ever retain those who protect the Party." Ming argued that Xi Jinping's selection and Bo Xilai's rejection were both expressions of the same logic: the Party was looking for a "safe" successor. The CCP's DNA ensures that anyone who wants to survive and rise within the system must eventually move leftward.

Ming pointed to a pattern of "reverse selection" built into the CCP's personnel system. Xi Jinping was chosen precisely because he appeared mediocre and harmless. But once the system felt its survival was threatened, the person it had selected would inevitably fall back on Marxist-Leninist-Maoist authoritarianism to protect the regime. Hu Yaobang's tragedy was that he believed selecting the right people could change the Party. He failed to see that the Party's nature would assimilate everyone it absorbed.

Cheng Xiaonong, a political economist, was more direct: "The so-called Third Echelon was a hereditary security plan for the red aristocracy." The list ensured that power would keep circulating among the "red second generation" princelings. Xi Jinping and Bo Xilai had different fates in the 1980s, but their underlying orientation was identical: consolidate power, protect Party assets. The reforms of the 1980s were about saving the CCP, not transforming it. Both Xi and Bo were princelings. When economic reform began to threaten the regime's grip on power, leaders from the "Third Echelon" would inevitably choose to "turn left," because that was their only politically safe ground.

Miles Yu, formerly the principal China policy advisor in the U.S. Secretary of State's Office of Policy Planning, argued that this was not about



any individual leader. It was the CCP regime's inevitable "defensive left turn" in the face of global democratic movements. Hu Yaobang and Li Rui tried to fix a broken system by putting good people into it, and the system consumed them. "Hu Yaobang's idealism was no match for the instincts of a Leninist regime." Bo Xilai was sidelined by Hu Yaobang and Chen Yun for his Cultural Revolution brutality, but in a bitter irony, the policies Xi Jinping has pursued since taking power, an intensified version of the "sing red, strike black" political campaigns, are what Bo Xilai was already doing as CCP chief of Chongqing, a major municipality in southwestern China.

**The third echelon shaped decades of CCP rule, then failed**

Hu Yaobang's "Third Echelon" selection produced a large cohort of CCP officials with engineering backgrounds, including Hu Jintao, who later became CCP general secretary, and Wen Jiabao, who became prime minister. This laid the foundation for the era of "technocratic governance" that defined the CCP's transition from a revolutionary party to a managerial one. The vast majority of members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the CCP's supreme decision-making body, during the 17th and 18th Party Congresses came from that original "Third Echelon" list. But even though Hu Yaobang intended the program as a reform measure, under the CCP's one-party dictatorship, the selection remained an internal appointment process. Without genuine democratic elections, the people on the list ultimately owed their loyalty to the CCP's power center, not to the Chinese people. And so, once the list passed through the hands of Party elders and elite families, it produced the man who would take China back toward a second Cultural Revolution: Xi Jinping.

This unprecedented reshuffling of CCP cadres allowed the Party to avoid a Soviet-style collapse caused by collective leadership aging. But because it lacked structural political reform, the process produced the current reality: factional power-sharing that gave way to Xi Jinping's one-man rule. Experts point out that under an authoritarian system, those who suffered during the Cultural Revolution, once they obtain absolute power, often end up imitating the very system that once persecuted them. Hu Yaobang and Li Rui's ideals were, in the end, ground to dust beneath the Party they tried to reform.

## Zhang Guotao: He Helped Build the Chinese Communist Party and By 1927, He Already Had Doubts – Part I

07 April 2026, Vision Times

*In 1938, Zhang Guotao, then chairman of the Yan'an Border Region government, publicly quit the Chinese Communist Party in anger. His unusual trajectory,*



*helping found the CCP and later turning against it, remains both striking and thought-provoking. (Image: background, Adobe Stock; Zhang Guotao image reproduced from My Memoirs)*

On a spring morning in April 1938, Zhang Guotao stood at the Mausoleum of the Yellow Emperor in Huangling, taking part in a solemn national ceremony honoring the legendary ancestor of the Chinese people. He attended in his official capacity as chairman of the communist-controlled border region government in northwest China.

He did not go back.

By the time he reached Hankou, he was a private citizen. Within weeks he had issued a public statement condemning the organization he had spent seventeen years building, with a detailed account of why he believed it was destroying China.

Zhang Guotao (1897 to 1979) ranked third in the Chinese Communist Party at the moment he resigned, behind only Mao Zedong and general secretary Zhang Wentian. He had been present at the Party's founding congress in Shanghai in 1921, helped organize the Nanchang Uprising of 1927, and commanded the Red Army's largest and best-equipped force through the early 1930s. He served as deputy chairman of the CCP's self-declared "Chinese Soviet Republic," a provisional regime it established in territory seized from the Nationalist government. His memoir, *My Recollections*, remains banned on the Chinese mainland to this day. The Party has never explained why. It doesn't need to.

What follows draws on that memoir and on the public record Zhang left behind. To understand why he walked out, you have to start at the beginning.



*Zhang Guotao. (Image: Youyu)*

**A generation that thought China had to be demolished before it could be saved**

Zhang grew up in a scholar-gentry family in Jiangxi Province and enrolled at Peking University in 1916, walking into one of the most turbulent intellectual environments in modern Chinese history. The university's president, Cai Yuanpei, had assembled a remarkable faculty: the New Culture advocates Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi, the writer Lu Xun, and the socialist theorist Li Dazhao. The library was perpetually jammed with students hunting for radical ideas. The thin supply of socialist pamphlets was always checked out.

What drove Zhang and many of his contemporaries was less ideology than desperation. China had been humiliated by foreign powers for decades. The Republic, founded in 1912, had lurched from one failure to the next. For a certain generation of educated young men, every conventional path seemed blocked. Their patriotism was genuine. Their rage at the existing order was genuine. What they lacked was patience, and a clear sense of where the shortcut they were choosing would lead.

Zhang was elected head of the oratory division of the Beijing Student Union during the May Fourth Movement of 1919, the mass protests triggered by China's betrayal at the Paris Peace Conference. He was twenty-one years old and one of the movement's most visible leaders. It was the kind of

beginning that makes a young man feel history is on his side.

**Sun Yat-sen offered him a different road. He turned it down.**

*Sun Zhongyan. (Image: Youyouyu)*

In early 1920, Zhang traveled to Shanghai for a national civic meeting and was twice received at the home of Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic of China. The meetings were brief. In retrospect, they were among the most consequential of his life.

When Sun learned of Zhang's growing interest in Marxism, he gestured to a shelf of English-language books on socialism and told him he was free to borrow any of them. He had studied every major socialist current during his years in Europe, met their leading figures, and drawn on all of them in developing his own Three Principles of the People, the political philosophy on which the Republic was built. He asked Zhang and other young activists to study those principles and join him.

Zhang did not follow up. At the time, Sun struck many young radicals as a man of repeated failure, someone the foreign powers refused to take seriously. The Nationalist road looked slow. The communist road looked fast.



*Zhang Guotao at Peking University. (Image: courtesy of his own film, "My Memories")*

It was not. Years later, Zhang told Chiang Kai-shek that he had "been confused for many years." By then the confusion had cost tens of millions of lives.

**Three men made a decision that changed China forever**

By late 1918, Zhang had grown close to Li Dazhao, the Peking University librarian and one of China's first serious Marxist thinkers. Both men, by their own later admissions, had only a superficial knowledge of Marxism and no direct understanding of the Russian Revolution. Founding a communist party affiliated with Moscow was not yet something either of them had seriously considered.

The push came from Chen Duxiu. After May Fourth, Chen's radicalism accelerated sharply. By mid-1920 he had made contact with the Communist International, the Moscow-directed body that coordinated communist movements worldwide. When Zhang visited Chen in Shanghai in July 1920, Chen brushed aside the idea of further theoretical study. What was needed immediately, he said, was a Chinese Communist Party. Li and Zhang, despite their surprise, agreed.

In the summer of 1921, Zhang helped organize the Party's founding congress in Shanghai, presided over the sessions, and was elected to the three-man central committee alongside Chen Duxiu and Li Da. The CCP was born.

The fates of all three co-founders are worth noting. Li Dazhao was hanged in 1927, convicted of conspiring with the Soviet Union. Chen Duxiu broke with the Party and was denounced as a traitor. Zhang walked out in 1938 and was denounced as a traitor. The Party they created has spent a century insisting its founding was an act of pure patriotic heroism.

**Russia, 1921: what he saw and could never bring himself to defend**

In late 1921, Zhang traveled to Irkutsk as a CCP delegate to a Communist International gathering. The city was destitute. The Bolshevik seizure of power had been built on the violent confiscation of peasants' grain stores, and the population had not forgotten it.

Zhang and other delegates asked overseas Chinese living there why Russians so distrusted their government. The answer was direct: "They already took our property and stripped our grain. What stops them from doing it again? The paper money they print loses value daily. Apart from killing, what else does this government know how to do?"

The delegation's access was tightly managed. The Communist International had no staff with any command of Chinese. Zhang and his colleagues moved through Russia as supervised tourists, taken to approved destinations, and shown approved sights. He reflected later that the delegation served less as observers than as display items: a diverse group of Asian visitors photographed in Moscow could be used to demonstrate the Communist International's reach in the Far East.

Over two months, the Chinese delegates found the Bolshevik model of governance deeply alien. China's political tradition, at its best, had meant winning a revolution and then governing with restraint: reducing taxes, allowing people to recover, and building lasting peace. Marxist-Leninist rule, they observed, meant one campaign of denunciation followed immediately by another, without end.

Zhang returned to China and published nothing about what he had seen. He could not find arguments strong enough to defend it. The questions sat in him, unresolved, for years.

**Moscow ordered the CCP into the Nationalist Party, most of the CCP said 'no'**



In August 1922, seven men gathered at West Lake in Hangzhou: the Communist International representative Maring, the Dutch communist whose real name was Henk Sneevliet, along with Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Zhang Guotao, and three others. Maring announced that all CCP members must join the Nationalist Party as individuals and work within it.

The logic from Moscow's perspective was simple. China was not ready for socialist revolution. The Nationalist Party under Sun Yat-sen commanded real mass support. CCP members operating inside it could pull that support away from its leadership over time. The Communist International expected compliance.

Most of the CCP's early leadership resisted. The question seemed circular: if the Nationalist Party could carry out the democratic revolution, why did the CCP need to exist at all? Chen Duxiu opposed the infiltration policy throughout. Zhang raised objections repeatedly. After a labor strike Zhang had organized collapsed in early 1923, Maring pressed the argument harder and dismissed Zhang and his colleagues as "well-meaning student Marxists."

In his memoir, Zhang described the Party's deference to Moscow with painful honesty: "We always thought of ourselves as students, uncertain of our own views, and came to assume that whatever the Communist International instructed had been formulated with far greater foresight. We surrendered our own positions. We treated every directive from a Communist International representative as sacred." That surrender, he later concluded, cost China the better part of a century.

**The hidden clause that exposed the CCP's betrayal**

The cooperation between the Nationalist Party and the CCP from 1924 to 1927 was built on a foundation the CCP later buried. The Sun-Joffe Manifesto of January 1923, which made the entire arrangement possible, opened with an explicit declaration: "communism and the Soviet system cannot in fact be introduced into China," and stated that the two parties' cooperation aimed at national unification within the Republic.

The CCP, acting on Communist International instructions, spent those three years doing exactly what the manifesto prohibited. CCP members inside the Nationalist Party seized control of its organizational apparatus. Armed trade unions and peasant associations were established as parallel power structures. When the Northern Expedition of 1926 to 1927 began driving northward to unify China, Stalin ordered the CCP to exploit the Nationalist government's momentum, establish communist control in newly captured areas, and divide the Nationalist leadership from within.

A rival Nationalist government stood up in Wuhan with Soviet backing. Supply lines to Nationalist forces in the field were deliberately cut. When Chiang Kai-shek moved to purge the CCP from Nationalist ranks on April 12, 1927, he was responding to five years of infiltration from Moscow. The Wuhan government expelled the CCP that July after a Communist International cable arrived ordering the Party to push China toward full communist transformation.

The CCP had shredded the agreement it sheltered behind, then blamed Chiang for the consequences

**The Nanchang uprising: former classmates fighting to the death**

The CCP marks August 1, 1927, the date of the Nanchang Uprising, as the founding of the Red Army. The official version is heroic. The reality, as Zhang recorded it, was grimmer.

Three commanders led the mutiny. Zhu De had been planted inside the Nationalist Third Army as Nanchang's public security chief. He Long, a Nationalist general, had been incited by the CCP to turn against his own army. Ye Ting commanded a division of the Nationalist Eleventh Corps, was himself a Party member, and had packed his officer corps with Party loyalists. Zhu coordinated all three to strike at night, when the garrison was thin and the larger Nationalist forces were dispersed elsewhere. The mutineers looted the city's Central Bank, ransacked businesses, and arrested Nationalist Party members.

In the fighting that followed at Huichang, junior officers on both sides were Whampoa Military Academy graduates, many from the same class,

*Zhang Guotao in Moscow. (Image: courtesy of the film "My Memories")*

the same platoon, some who had been childhood friends. They fought at close quarters and shouted each other's nicknames as they killed each other. Nationalist soldiers demanded: "Why is the CCP rebelling?" Communist fighters shot back: "Why are you serving the counterrevolution?" Men wept while they fought.

The uprising failed. He Long's force was entirely disarmed. Zhu De led roughly eight hundred survivors to the Jinggang Mountains and merged with Mao Zedong's remnants. Zhang, Zhou Enlai, and others fled to Hong Kong and Shanghai. The Red Army's founding myth rests on a military defeat and a fratricidal battle the Party has never honestly described.

By 1927, Zhang Guotao had seen enough to have serious doubts about the organization he had helped build. He had watched it take orders from Moscow against the judgment of its own leadership. He had seen it infiltrate and betray its Nationalist partners. He had witnessed Chinese soldiers kill former classmates in a failed uprising the Party would later repackage as triumph.
He had not yet walked away. The next decade would show him why he needed to.

## Tibet is Not Negotiable: India's Ecological and Civilizational Stakes

05 April 2026, Sunday Guardian

When thinking about the future of India's Tibet policy, two critical things must be taken into account, water, and Buddhism.
The conventional debate over India's Tibet policy has been conducted almost entirely in the language of hard geopolitics—borders, buffer zones, and military deterrence. This framing, while not wrong, is dangerously incomplete. India's interest in the Tibetan cause is not merely a matter of strategic depth or diplomatic leverage against Beijing. It is rooted in two existential stakes that go far deeper than any line on a map: the ecological survival of the Indian subcontinent, and the civilizational integrity of a tradition that was born on Indian soil. To abandon the Tibetan cause would be to surrender not just territory, but the very water that feeds India's rivers and the very soul of its oldest spiritual heritage.ROOF OF THE WORLD IS LEAKING, AND INDIA WILL DROWN
The Tibetan Plateau is, by every meaningful measure, the hydrological heart of Asia. Covering 2.5 million square kilometres—roughly 2% of the earth's land surface—it sits at an average elevation exceeding 4,000 metres and is home to 46,000 glaciers, representing the third-largest concentration of ice on earth after the Arctic and Antarctic. The Tibet Policy Institute's documentation of this reality is unambiguous: Tibet is the source of Asia's six greatest and most important rivers, systems that flow into ten of the world's most densely populated nations and directly sustain 1.8 billion people. For India specifically, the rivers originating on the Tibetan Plateau—the Indus, the Brahmaputra, the Sutlej, the Karnali tributaries of the Ganga—are not merely waterways. They are the circulatory system of an entire civilisation, the same rivers that nourished the Indus Valley Civilisation in 3000 BC and continue to sustain hundreds of millions of Indian farmers, communities, and cities today.
The threat to this system is now acute and accelerating. The plateau is warming at twice the global average—a rise of 0.3 to 0.4 degrees Celsius per decade—meaning that Tibet is heating faster than almost anywhere else on earth. The ecological consequences are not abstract future projections; they are already unfolding in documented, measurable ways. The timing and intensity of the Indian monsoon, on which the agricultural viability of the subcontinent depends, is directly tied to atmospheric temperatures on the Tibetan Plateau. This link was recognised as long ago as 1882, when Sir H.F. Blanford, the chief reporter of the India Meteorological Department, observed that Himalayan snow cover during the preceding winter presaged the quality of the monsoon—a relationship so reliable that it formed the basis for the IMD's first monsoon forecasts. What happens on the plateau does not stay on the plateau. It arrives in India as flood or drought, abundance or catastrophe.
Into this already fragile and warming landscape, China is now introducing a dam-building programme of staggering ambition and recklessness. Over 193 large-scale dams are planned or already built in Tibet, capable of generating over 270 gigawatts of hydropower, with 80% classified as large or mega dams exceeding 100 megawatts in capacity. The centrepiece of this programme is the proposed Metok Super Dam on the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo—a project of almost incomprehensible scale. Planned for Metok County in Nyingtri Prefecture, it would generate more than 60 gigawatts of electricity annually, more than three times the output of China's Three Gorges Dam, currently the world's largest power station. Its construction would require drilling at least four 20-kilometre-long tunnels through the Namcha Barwa Mountain. This single structure, sitting upstream of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, would give China unilateral control over the flow of the Brahmaputra—a river on which tens of millions of Indians in the northeast depend for their livelihoods, agriculture, and drinking water.The dangers are not hypothetical. The Yarlung Tsangpo valley has already demonstrated its catastrophic volatility. On 17 October 2018, a massive landslide induced by an ice-avalanche at the Sedongpu Basin blocked the main course of the river near Gyalha, causing a barrier lake to form rapidly. When the natural dam was overtopped on 19 October, it generated a flood with a peak flow rate of 32,000 cubic metres per second. A second massive landslide struck the same valley on 22 March 2021. The Bolu Twin Landslides of October and November 2018 inundated entire villages. The geology of the region—one of the most seismically active on earth, with historical records showing 18 earthquakes of magnitude 8 or above and over 100 events between magnitude 7 and 7.9—makes the idea of placing a 60-gigawatt dam in this landscape a gamble with the lives of millions of downstream Indians.The earthquake risk is compounded by the dams themselves. Research cited by the Tibet Policy Institute indicates that the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, which killed 80,000 people, and the 2014 Ludian earthquake in Yunnan were both induced by nearby mega dams —the Zipingpu and Xiluodu dams respectively—

through Reservoir-Induced Seismic activity. The precedent set by China's own dam disasters is sobering: in August 1975, the Banqiao Dam and 61 others in Henan collapsed following Typhoon Nina, creating one of the deadliest floods in history, affecting 10.15 million people with an estimated death toll between 26,000 and 240,000. The dam had been designed to survive a once-in-a-thousand-years flood; a once-in-two-thousand-years event destroyed it. With climate change dramatically increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events on the Tibetan Plateau, the statistical foundations of Chinese dam safety calculations are dissolving in real time.

India cannot afford indifference to what is done to Tibet's rivers and glaciers because there is no hydraulic firewall between Tibetan mismanagement and Indian survival. A Tibet whose ecology is destroyed by extraction, whose rivers are weaponised by upstream dams, and whose glaciers are accelerated into retreat by unchecked warming is a Tibet that slowly drains the water security of the Indian subcontinent. Defending the Tibetan cause is therefore not a matter of sentiment towards a displaced people—it is a matter of elementary hydrological self-interest for a nation of 1.4 billion people.

BUDDHISM WITHOUT TIBET IS INDIA WITHOUT ITS SOUL

The ecological argument alone would justify India's stake in Tibet's fate. But there is a second dimension that cuts even deeper into what India is as a civilisation—and that is the question of who controls Buddhism.

Buddhism was born in India. The Buddha attained enlightenment at Bodh Gaya in what is today Bihar. The Dharma was first set in motion at Sarnath. The great monastic university of Nalanda, which trained generations of scholars who carried Buddhist thought across Asia, stood on Indian soil. For over a millennium, India was the fountainhead from which Buddhist civilisation flowed northward into Tibet, eastward into China, and across the entirety of Asia. The relationship between India and Tibet in this transmission was not merely historical—it was living, continuous, and intimate. The 7th century Chinese monk Xuanzang's pilgrimage to India, immortalised in Journey to the West, is itself a testament to the fact that Tibet and China both looked to India as the sacred source of the Dharma.

Today, the Tibetan Buddhist tradition represents the most complete and unbroken transmission of the late Indian Buddhist heritage—the Vajrayana lineages that flourished in the great monasteries of Nalanda and Vikramashila before they were destroyed. The Dalai Lamas, the Karmapas, and the entire architecture of Tibetan Buddhist learning are custodians of a tradition that is, in its deepest roots, Indian. When India granted asylum to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile in 1959, it was not merely performing a humanitarian act. It was, consciously or not, reclaiming a piece of its own civilisational legacy.

What China is attempting in Tibet is not merely political occupation—it is the systematic capture of religious authority. Its new "unity and progress law" seeks to diminish and destroy any uniqueness of Tibetan culture and tradition. Beijing's insistence on controlling the reincarnation process of Tibetan lamas, including the Dalai Lama himself, is an unprecedented assertion that a communist, atheist state has the right to determine the succession of one of the world's great spiritual traditions. The Chinese government's appointment of its own Panchen Lama—in direct defiance of traditional Tibetan religious processes—was a declaration that the Communist Party of China intends to own Tibetan Buddhism institutionally, to hollow it out from within, and to present to the world a version of the tradition that has been scrubbed of its independence, its political theology of compassion, and its organic connection to the Indian source from which it sprang.

If India acquiesces to this—if it normalises relations with Beijing on terms that implicitly accept Chinese sovereignty over Tibetan religious life—it would be participating in an act of civilisational self-amputation. It would be handing to an atheist authoritarian state the stewardship of a tradition that represents India's greatest gift to the spiritual history of humanity. The birthplace of the Buddha cannot be diplomatically indifferent to the subjugation of the Buddha's greatest living lineage.

**CONCLUSION**

India's engagement with the Tibetan cause must therefore be understood at both registers simultaneously. At the material level, Tibet is the water tower upon which India's rivers, monsoons, and agricultural survival depend—and China's reckless dam-building, mining, and environmental exploitation of the plateau is a slow-motion hydraulic threat to India's national security that no bilateral trade agreement can offset. At the civilisational level, Tibet is the northern guardian of a spiritual tradition that India gave to the world—and to abandon it would be to surrender the most profound dimension of India's cultural identity to the custodianship of a state that regards religion as a tool of political control.

The Tibetan cause is not a charity that India extends to a displaced people. It is the defence of India's own rivers, its own rain, and its own soul.

## China's new ethnic law a tool to expand CCP ideology: Report

04 April 20-26, Hans India

The implementation of China's 'Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress' could have broader regional implications, potentially extending the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) ideological

influence in the neighbouring countries and beyond, a report said on Saturday.
Writing for 'Japan Forward', Tsewang Gylapo Arya, Representative of the Dalai Lama's Liaison Office for Japan and East Asia, called on the international community to oppose the “pernicious and disdainful” law, arguing that it goes beyond the minority rights concern and should not be treated as China’s internal affairs.
Quoting a report by the International Campaign for Tibet (ITC), he said, "The law provides a legal tool for the CCP to establish and enforce a unified national identity and singular idea of China, shaped by the CCP and authoritarian ideology."
According to Arya, Beijing is pushing assimilation under the guise of unity, seeking to enforce patriotism and loyalty not only from the minority communities but also from the people in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau.
This loyalty, he said, is being demanded not to the nation, but to the CCP, as the ultimate authority.
“The law has seven chapters with sixty-five articles. Despite saying 'ethnic unity', the display of Chinese (Han) chauvinism is conspicuous with the repeated use of phrases like ‘Chinese national’ and ‘Chinese nation' nearly eighty times in the text. If this ethnic law is all about forging a strong sense of the Chinese national community, then what is there for other nationals and ethnic communities? The law only addresses the unity of Chinese nationals. It offers nothing to the minority nationals in the region," the official detailed.
Arya noted that the law adopted by China’s National People's Congress (NPC) on March 12 contravened both the Chinese Constitution and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law.
He added that the legislation aims to supersede all the existing laws and represents a deliberate attempt to “make and designate the existing minority nationals as ethnic minorities" and position the Chinese majority as the supreme majority.
“This is in violation of Article 4 of the Constitution and Articles 21, 37, and 49 of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, which guarantee the preservation and promotion of minority languages, religions, and cultures. The NPC first needs to revise the Constitution and the Regional Autonomy Law before implementing the new law,” the official mentioned.
Condemning the move, Arya said, “What China has not been able to achieve through force, repression, and intimidation all these years, China is now establishing laws to achieve its goal by legitimising its repressions.”

## China's New Ethnic Law Legalizes Forced Assimilation, Violates Constitution

03 April 2026, Japan Forward

The Dalai Lama's East Asia representative says the law codifies assimilation, expands ideological control, and violates minority rights and UN conventions.
The Chinese National People's Congress (NPC) has, on March 11–12, passed a new law under a seemingly innocuous title of "Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress."
The law is scheduled to be effective from July 1, 2026. Unity and progress are the foundation of social and national development — making it, at first glance, a welcome initiative.
However, a pertinent question here is why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needs to come up with a new law on ethnic unity after more than seventy years since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

**Assimilation in the Name of Unity**

A quick answer is that despite its claim of liberation, unity, and prosperity, the regime has still not won the trust and loyalty of the minority nationals of Tibet, East-Turkistan, Southern Mongolia, and others.
The regime is now forcing assimilation in the name of unity and demanding patriotism and loyalty not only from the minority nationals but also from the Chinese and the people of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau. This loyalty, moreover, is not to China as a nation, but to the communist party, as the absolute authority.
The law has seven chapters with sixty-five articles. Despite saying ethnic unity, the display of Chinese (Han) chauvinism is conspicuous with repeated use of phrases like "Chinese national" and "Chinese nation," nearly eighty times in the text.
If this Ethnic Law is all about forging a strong sense of the Chinese national community, then what is there for other nationals and ethnic communities? The law only addresses the unity of Chinese nationals. It offers nothing to the minority nationals in the region.



*Members of the organising committee of the long life prayer waiting for His Holiness the Dalai Lama to arrive at the main Tibetan temple in Dharamshala (Photo / Tenzin Choejor / OHHDL via Central Tibetan Administration official website)*

**A Manufactured National Identity**

The new law is all about the Chinese nation and the Chinese national community and is irrelevant to the minority nationals. One need not look further than Article 1 of the law. It says, "This Law is enacted in accordance with the Constitution to

promote ethnic unity and progress, forge a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation, advance the building of the Chinese national community, and propel the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation."

The Article is illogical and incoherent. First, despite its claim, the law is not in accordance with the PRC's Constitution (Article 4), where minority nationals are given freedom and autonomy to maintain and promote their identity, language, and culture. Therefore, it is a gross violation and misinterpretation of the Constitution to legitimize its assimilation policy.

Second, the Law mentions forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation. We must note that China, right now, is not a nation-state. It is a colonial empire with occupied regions. People of the minority nationals are not Chinese, but they have their own distinct national identity. Therefore, the claim of China as a nation-state, and the minority nationals as Chinese nationals are not true. This is an outright invasion and derision of minority nationals' identity and aspiration.

Thirdly, it talks of building the "Chinese national community." If the CCP wants to promote and build a "Chinese nation", it should first revert China to the Chinese people. As of now, China is under the dictatorship of the CCP, and it does not belong to the Chinese people.

If China is to belong to the Chinese people, the Chinese government should be a government of the people, for the people, and by the people. Is the regime ready for this?

**Misinterpretation of Marxism-Leninism**

Article 2 of the Law stipulates adhering to Marxism-Leninism. Yet what the regime is doing is contrary to what the two great helmsmen had taught. The essence of Marxism is based on the removal of labor exploitation, but the CCP regime is known best for labor exploitation, especially in Uyghur and other occupied regions.

*Dr Arya speaking at an anniversary event on March 10, 2022, in memory of the Tibetan uprising.*

Leninism talks of freedom and autonomy of the different nationals, but what the regime is doing is the eradication and assimilation of the minority nationals. So, with what authority is the regime talking about Marxism and Leninism?

"Those who do not agree with and support the equality of nationalities and languages and those who do not fight against nationality oppression and inequality are not Marxists or even socialists" (The Collected Work of Lenin, vol.20).

And Joseph Stalin said that "the people of a certain nationality use their own language because using their own language is the only way for them to develop their own culture, politics, and economy" (The Collected Works of Stalin, vol II) [A Tibetan Revolutionary, The Political Life of Times of Bapa Phuntso Wangye P-296]

Contrary to the principal teachings of Marxism and Leninism, the Law speaks of a singular objective of developing the Chinese national community, Chinese culture, Chinese people, Chinese image, and unity of the Chinese nation.

If the regime thinks that such a law will help achieve unity and the trust and loyalty of the minority nationals, it is totally mistaken. It will only fortify the minority nationals' doubt that the law is made to destroy their identity and existence.

Article-15 is clear about how minority languages should be removed and how Chinese, as a "common and official language" for all purposes, should be promoted. It has made Mandarin mandatory in all educational institutions as a "common language and script" for teaching and learning. It has effectively criminalized the preservation and promotion of minority languages.

**The Sinicization of Religions**

Article 46 of the law openly and boldly calls for "Sinicizing religions in China, guide religions to adapt to socialist society, and guide religious personnel and believers to uphold patriotic traditions, thereby promoting ethnic harmony, religious harmony, and social harmony."

It's worth noting that "Sinicizing" means loyalty to the regime and adoption of Xi Jinping's ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics. It is an open secret that communist ideology and socialism with Chinese characteristics have no place for religious beliefs.

According to Boston University's 2020 World Religion Database, there are 499 million folk and ethnic religionists, 288 million Buddhists, 106 million Christians, 23.7 million Muslims, 7.7 million Taoists and Confucians, 20,500 Sikhs, and 2,900 Jews in China and the occupied regions.

The figure comes to about 924 million believers. This is an enormous figure, nearly 1/8th of the world population. If the CCP is successful in its plan, the world will witness new religions under



the same names with the CCP as the supreme guiding force. This will usher in a new era of religious wars between the world religions and the CCP-fostered religions.

**Legal Contradictions and Violations**

As noted earlier, the law is against the Chinese Constitution and the PRC's Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. The new law is trying to override

all the existing laws. It is a deliberate attempt to make and designate the existing minority nationals as ethnic minorities with Chinese as the supreme majority.

This is in violation of Article 4 of the Constitution and Articles 21, 37, and 49 of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, which guarantee the preservation and promotion of minority languages, religions, and cultures. The NPC first needs to revise the Constitution and the Regional Autonomy Law before implementing the new law.

China invaded Tibet under the guise of "peaceful liberation" and flaunted the 17-point agreement of 1951 as a legal document to legitimize the occupation. The new law is a violation and blatant betrayal of this agreement.

As a member of the United Nations, the CCP regime is violating Articles 15, 26, 28, and 29 of the UN Charter of Human Rights. Therefore, the law is unconstitutional, a betrayal, and against the UN conventions.

What China has not been able to achieve through force, repression, and intimidation all these years, China is now establishing laws to achieve its goal by legitimizing its repressions.

**Repression by Design**

Recognizing the strong faith among Tibetans and Himalayan Buddhists in the reincarnation system of Tibetan lamas, the CCP enacted Religious Order No 5 in July 2007. The order requires state approval for the selection and recognition of reincarnated teachers.

To further legitimize religious interference and tighten control over religious teachings, the regime passed Religious Order No. 19 in July 2024. The measure makes the adoption of CCP ideology and Xi Jinping Thought compulsory in all religious instruction.

These Orders provided the regime with total control over the monasteries, churches, mosques, temples, and the religious teachers. The silence of the international community has emboldened the regime to come up with this new law, "Ethnic Unity and Progress," to erase the minority nationals' identity with impunity.

The international community should protest this law, because this is not about the minority nationals' issue in China. It is not Chinese internal affairs. According to the International Campaign for Tibet (ITC) report, "The law provides a legal tool for the CCP to establish and enforce a unified national identity and singular idea of China, shaped by the CCP and authoritarian ideology."

The successful implementation of this pernicious and disdainful law in China and the occupied region will ultimately bring the dragon's fiery fumes to the neighboring countries and around the world, and engulf the people's mind and consciousness with the CCP's ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics. It would likewise force democracy and rule of law to go hiding behind the bush.