Minxin Pei
The Indian Express
May 21, 2015
Outcomes from Modi’s China visit are not spectacular. But they are substantial.
A fair assessment of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to China is impossible without considering alternative policies that might deliver better results. New Delhi essentially has three choices in dealing with Beijing. One is to treat it as an outright adversary and adopt a confrontational policy. The second is to jump on the Chinese bandwagon and become Beijing’s junior partner. The third is to avoid a premature and costly conflict, seek opportunities for cooperation, but maintain vigilance at the same time. Obviously, the first is risky, costly, and dangerous, while the second is not appealing.
What is notable about Modi’s China policy is that, despite his hawkish rhetoric, he has preferred the third — and quintessentially pragmatic — approach to Beijing. Such pragmatism will disappoint many of his supporters, who want to see him take a harder line and bring back more concessions (such as progress on the unresolved border disputes and changes in China’s policy towards Pakistan). But, given the low probability of this outcome, because of China’s relative strength vis-à-vis India and the high price Modi will have to pay (such as severe deterioration in bilateral relations and even more hostile Chinese behaviour), advocates for pragmatism have a much stronger case.
Judging by Modi’s accomplishments, his China visit has vindicated pragmatism. Yes, Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping made no breakthroughs on the border disputes. The joint communique also fails to make any references to security issues most sensitive to India, such as Chinese activities in Pakistan. The failure of these two strong leaders in making real progress on these difficult issues merely underscores the limits of improving Sino-Indian relations in a context of mutual distrust, unresolved territorial claims and intertwined triangular strategic ties: US-China-India and China-India-Pakistan.
When Indian pragmatists met their Chinese soulmates in Beijing last week, they had the wisdom of not allowing these entrenched obstacles to hold the overall Sino-Indian relationship hostage. If anything, the Modi visit has revealed the broad outlines of a China strategy that focuses on stability maintenance and incremental improvement in relations in the absence of mutual trust and the resolution of border disputes. This is the same strategy Beijing has adopted towards New Delhi.
The centrepiece of Modi’s China strategy is conflict avoidance and stability. During his visit to Beijing, he managed moderate progress towards that goal. In the joint communique, both sides pledge not to allow border disputes to impede the development of bilateral relations. They also commit to implementing existing agreements on the border issue and maintaining peace in border areas. More specifically, India and China will “seek” to set up a military hotline and establish “meeting points” along the
existing lines of control.
A significant achievement is a set of measures to improve bilateral military ties. According to the joint communique, this year, India will host one of the two vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission, the high command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In all likelihood, it will be General Fan Changlong, the most senior professional soldier in charge of the PLA’s day-to-day affairs. The Indian defence minister will also visit China in 2015. In addition, the Indian and Chinese militaries will carry out joint exercises. Of course, these measures are more symbolic than substantive and their actual impact on boosting confidence and preventing accidental conflict is uncertain. But when we assess how far the two countries have travelled, the direction in which the security relationship is moving should be the dominant criterion.
Another way to maintain stability and avoid conflict is to keep channels of communication at high levels open. The joint communique agrees to hold a regular exchange of visits by the heads of state and government
of the two countries and conduct consultations during multilateral international conferences. Existing high-level dialogue, such as the India-China Strategic Economic Dialogue, will continue. The establishment of the China-India Think Tank Forum will add another platform for the exchange of views between the two countries’ experts.
Finally, there is the fast-growing bilateral economic relationship. Modi’s visit yielded contracts worth more than $22 billion. And the joint communique has set ambitious, albeit unspecific, objectives to reduce trade barriers, increase investment and address the large trade imbalances that favour China. Based on the language, it appears that certain Indian economic sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, information technology
tourism, textile and agriculture, could reap significant benefits from the further liberalisation of China’s trade policy towards India.
When we total up Modi’s list of accomplishments from his China visit, the fairest assessment is that they are substantial but not spectacular. Then again, those hoping for more might not have been very realistic. Given that Indian and Chinese leaders have to balance competing objectives, the smartest thing to do is to keep the India-China show on the road. This means doing one’s best to get as much as possible out of a reasonably workable relationship.
The writer is professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and non-resident senior fellow of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
