Sushant Singh
The Indian Express
June 1, 2015
White paper stresses maritime defence; not all convinced China doesn’t plan incursion into India waters.
China released its latest defence white paper, its ninth so far, on May 26. With the last paper in 2013, China changed the format from an all-encompassing paper to a thematic focus on a specific topic. The current paper focuses on “China’s Military Strategy”. It has not caused as much of a stir as the last one, which was ambivalent about China’s “No First Use” policy for nuclear weapons.
“The 2013 paper focused on ‘The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces’ and therefore was not designed to thoroughly delineate China’s nuclear policy,” says Tong Zhao of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing.
The 9,000-word paper names only three countries — Japan, Taiwan and the US — and all three in confrontational terms. As India is not mentioned, does it mean China does not view it as a primary military concern? Indian defence officials see no clear message. They note an emphasis on “maritime preparation for military struggle”, where the Chinese Navy would become more active through a combination of “offshore waters defence” with “open seas protection”.
“White papers always entail an element of public diplomacy, signalling, and posturing,” says Shashank Joshi of Royal United Services Institute at London. “But in this case, China’s actual posture — the hardware it is procuring or building, the way it is deploying forces, and its behaviour — is consistent with the paper’s assertive tone and substance,” Joshi says while noting a clear Chinese emphasis on blue-water capability and maritime struggle.
Asked about the white paper, Navy chief Admiral R K Dhowan recently noted that the tasks mentioned are “a normal activity for any navy”. He added, “There would be aspects related to defensive operations, surveillance, and all kinds of operations which spread out during the period of peace and during hostilities. So it is natural for any navy to have its plans which covers the spectrum of entire operations.”
Joshi feels the paper is a reminder of China’s emphasis on military modernisation — as “information” or “informatisation” is mentioned 22 times — and the inevitability of increasing Chinese incursions into India’s maritime space. The Indian Navy does not seem to share those fears. “PLA Navy’s activities are minutely monitored by the Indian Navy and our belief is that the responsibility of protecting Indian Ocean and our coastline lies with the Navy. Our ships and aircraft are always on alert so that this responsibility is carried out well,” Admiral Dhowan said.
Japan, Korea, Australia, the UK and the US bring out defence white papers and national security strategies while India does not.
“India has service doctrines, but these lack credibility and weight because they do not represent a comprehensive view of national priorities. The purpose is really twofold. The first is to signal to both adversaries and friends… The second purpose is to give an overall sense of strategic direction to the Indian military and other instruments of national power,” Joshi argues. “The Raksha Mantri’s operational directive does not seem like a substantial document up to this task.”
The paper refers to the PLA’s Track 1.5 Xiangshan Forum; India has no such global interactive mechanism. No Indian agency organises an event similar to Singapore’s Shangri La dialogue. This year’s Shangri La dialogue saw a last-minute participation of India’s MoS for Defence, Rao Inderjit Singh, when all other major countries were represented by top defence officials.
