South Asia Monitor
June 8, 2015
In May 2015, even before Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi set his foot in China, the ‘expectations’ bar from the visit was inordinately raised by analysts from different backgrounds.
In May 2015, even before Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi set his foot in China, the ‘expectations’ bar from the visit was inordinately raised by analysts from different backgrounds. One of the most important issues which has been consistently discussed was: What steps the two leaders are going to take to settle the decades-old row over border demarcation? Though this issue dominates whenever the leaders from the two countries meet, this time it gained additional attention because India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj during her ‘preparatory’ visit to China in February 2015 talked about the need for an “out-of-the-box” solution to resolve the long-pending territorial dispute between India and China.
The genesis of the India-China border dispute lies in the Simla Accord of 1914 between the plenipotentiaries of British India and Tibet. Though the representative of Yuan Shi Kai-led Chinese government was part of the discussion, he did not sign the accord. The problem in this accord occurred in 1930s when Tibet showed reluctance to accept the McMahon Line as a border and give up Tawang to British India. It wanted the British government to force the Chinese to accept the Tibet-China clause outlined in the Simla Accord. This did not happen. Instead, Chinese raised a question over the authority of the Tibetans to sign that accord.
Primarily, the border map was sketched out to secure the colonial interests of British India in south and central Asia. In 1954, sovereign India recognised and accepted the McMahon line as a border between India and China. This is being contested by China, which desires for a border demarcation along the lines of pre-1914 accord. The 1962 war was the result of those differences, though many other factors too were responsible for it. Fortunately or unfortunately, the war could not settle the border row. After the war, India and China paused their diplomatic relationship, which was re-established in 1979.
A real breakthrough over the border issue was made during the visit of then Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988. During that visit, in a meeting Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping had expressed his intention to leave the settlement of the territorial dispute to a “future generation”. Working in that spirit to address their border disputes the two countries agreed to establish a Joint Working Group (JWG) in 1988. As a follow on, in 1993 they set up an expert group comprising diplomats, military officials, cartographers etc for the purpose of making a closer scrutiny of each side’s position and clarifications on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Later on, to help the JWG, Special Representatives (SR) were appointed in 2003 after the then Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China and stressed the importance of including political viewpoints in the solving of border disputes.
Since 1988, more than a quarter century has passed but the dispute has not been satisfactorily resolved or managed. Although in 2005 certain guiding principles were accepted to manage incidents at the border, intrusions and skirmishes do take place. Later, in 2013 India and China signed a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement to ensure that border patrolling could not trigger exchange of fire between the border guards of two sides. A major balancer in managing India-China ties is their economic rise, especially since 1991 when India too adopted the liberal economic order. By saying this, the author does not substantiate the Kantian logic and theory that mutual economic interests strengthen political relationships too, though they manage disputes from crossing beyond an accepted level.
At present, the two main areas of dispute along the Himalayan frontier are the Western Sector (Aksai Chin, around 37,250 sq km/14,380 sq miles); and Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh, around 83,740 sq km/ 32,330 sq mile). India reportedly has been insisting on a ‘LAC plus’ solution; the “plus” was a limited concession, possibly in the Western sector. On the issue of persisting border disputes between India and China, Taylor Fravel, of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, maintains: “Beijing has often been very flexible about principles in reaching territorial settlements with other states. The decisive factor is the judgment of China’s leaders about what best serves their national interests – flexibility or inflexibility on principle. In relation to India, rather than being flexible Beijing has chosen to stand on inflexible principle, making a solution of the territorial conflict less likely”. This quote can be supported by a fact that after disintegration of the Soviet Union when Central Asian Republics emerged, the first step China took was to settle its border disputes with them. In a few cases, it even made compromising adjustments on its pre-1990 territorial demands.
After the Indian prime minister’s visit to China, delivering the annual K.F. Rustamji lecture, India’s National Security Adviser Ajit K. Doval made a statement that India needs a ‘larger plan’ for ‘tackling’ China to resolve all ticklish matters. He also said “McMahon line was agreed by China till Burma, the same was not accepted thereafter”. Reacting to it, the Chinese foreign spokesperson Hua Chunying said that McMahon line is ‘illegal’, and “it is not easy to resolve the China-India boundary question, as it is an issue left over from history”. The two opposite statements shows the complexity of the border issue where one recognises the line, the other does not.
Any step to settle the border demarcation demands compromise, adjustments and political determination. This is possible only when there is a consensus to do so among the political leadership, institutions and dominant political constituencies. It is a difficult exercise because of bitter memories of the past and existing socio-political narratives about each other in respective countries. A move to address the bitterness requires a re-negotiation with history and review of the past to sketch out a draft for the future. Unless it happens there is a bleak possibility of settling the India-China border issue through a series of incremental measures.
