Obja Borah Hazarika
South Asia Monitor
June 12, 2015
The Indian military carried out two strikes on camps of NSCN (K) and KYKL (Meitei Kanglei Yawol Kunna Lup) groups along the Nagaland and Manipur borders which resulted in significant causalities being inflicted on the insurgents on June 8-9, 2015. Theses strikes came close on the heels of the killing of 18 Indian soldiers on June 4, in Chandel, Manipur by insurgents.
Reports have surfaced that these strikes by India were preemptive in nature as they were launched to prevent another ‘imminent’ attack by the insurgents, about which “credible and specific” intelligence was received by India.
Close communication with Myanmar’s authorities has been reported in relation to these strikes. Sources state that New Delhi received assent from the Myanmar government on Monday for its plan to fly in special forces to attack three insurgent camps 15-20 km across the border. According to one report, details of the operation were shared with Myanmar’s military by the defence attache at the Indian Embassy, Colonel Gaurav Sharma, after Ambassador Gautam Mukhopadhyay secured high-level clearance.
Praising the operation, Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore even articulated that “western disturbances will also be equally dealt with”. The Indian Army officially declared that “while ensuring peace and tranquility along the border and in the border states, any threat to our security, safety and national integrity will meet a firm response”.
However, India’s equation and relations with Myanmar are not the same as between India and Pakistan or China. India and Myanmar have a history of cooperation on border issues ranging from tackling terrorism, insurgency, trafficking among other menaces which take advantage of the porous border between the two nations.
Braving US discontent, India reneged on its earlier policy of benign neglect towards the then military-junta ruled Myanmar in order to initiate cooperation with the regime against insurgent camps. In April-May 1995, a MoU for maintaining peace and tranquility in border areas was signed. Following this MoU, Myanmar and India conducted a joint military operation “Operation Golden Bird” in 1995 in which the Indian Army’s 57 Mountain Division blocked a column of around 200 Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) militants moving through the Myanmar-Mizoram border towards Manipur, after it picked up a consignment of weapons on the Bangladesh coast near Cox’s Bazar.
Further, a Free Movement Regime between India and Myanmar permits locals on either side of the border to come and go across it within a range of 15 km on either side. India had an agreement in 2010 with Myanmar to allow troops to enter each other’s territory in search of terrorists, but with consent. In 2014, a MoU was signed between the two countries on patrolling and sharing of intelligence about cross border criminal activities.
These antecedents cast India-Myanmar relations in a vastly different light as compared to India’s relations with Pakistan and China. Joint operations have also been carried out along the Bhutan and Bangladesh borders.
Apart from the absence of a history of cooperation on cross-border insurgency with China and Pakistan, it is also necessary to point out that Pakistan and China are both nuclear nations, and have a very different relationship with India on security and diplomatic levels. Thus, the same model of operations as with Myanmar is unfeasible with India’s northern neighbours.
Determination shown by the Modi government to crack down on insurgents along the eastern border has been matched by Myanmar which has of late shown great vigour on taking a hard stand on cross-border insurgency as was evident by the March 2015 bombing by a Myanmar Air Force jet of the Chinese city of Lincang, in which the target was the drug trafficker and insurgent leader Phone Kya Shin, who attempted to seize Laukkai, the capital of the self-administered Kokang region.
Insurgency along the eastern border has of late gained impetus with the formation of the United National Liberation Front of West South East Asia in which at least three groups- NSCN (K), ULFA faction headed by Paresh Baruah and Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO) have joined. These developments make it pertinent for India and Myanmar to step up their cooperation on tackling these issues.
The Modi government’s firm stand on insurgents as evidenced by the recent strikes is a welcome move. However, since the covert operation is no longer a secret, great care should be taken to ensure government correspondence is unambiguous and factual to avoid unnecessary speculation which could be detrimental to further cooperation between India-Myanmar on cross-border issues.
Obja Borah Hazarika is an Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Dibrugarh University, Assam.
