Mark Inkey
Asian Correspondent
June 30, 2015
On June 25 the Burmese parliament rejected five proposed constitutional amendments, including the removal of a clause that effectively gives the army a veto over constitutional change.
After three days of discussion in parliament a vote was taken on six proposed amendments to the constitution, of which only one was approved.
The most important change to be rejected was the proposed changes to Articles 436 (a) and 436 (b) which state that any constitutional change has to be approved by over 75 percent of the members of both the upper and lower houses of the parliament.
The reason this constitutional law is so important is because 25 percent of the seats in both houses of parliament are set aside for army officers who are nominated by the army. This block of soldiers is strictly controlled by the army and will vote how the army command tells them to.
This means that the army can easily block any proposed constitutional amendment that would weaken their power and control over the country. So, it was unsurprising that the army voted against constitutional change that would effectively remove their constitutional veto.
Another constitutional amendment that was suggested, the change to Article 59 (f), was also rejected.
This article directly affects opposition leader and democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi. It says: “[Neither the president] himself [nor] one of the parents, the spouse, one of the legitimate children or their spouses should owe their allegiance to a foreign power or be a subject of a foreign power or a citizen of a foreign country. They shall not be persons entitled to enjoy the rights and privileges of a subject of a foreign government or citizen of a foreign country.”
This means that Suu Kyi cannot become president as she is ineligible for the job because her two sons hold British passports. This Article has received a lot of foreign media coverage because it is believed that the military included it in the constitution solely to prevent Suu Kyi from ever becoming the Burmese president.
Whilst the upholding of Article 59 (f) may be a personal blow to Suu Kyi, politically it does not have the ramifications of Article 436. If, as expected, her national League for Democracy (NLD) do well in the upcoming elections, Suu Kyi, as their leader, will still be very powerful and have a large say on policies, whether she is president or not.
The army have quite clearly flexed their muscles and shown that they are unwilling to contemplate any meaningful change to the constitution, particularly any changes that would see a reduction of their powers.
On the surface it appears that constitutional change for the time being is impossible with the army being so intractable, but there are two alternative ways that the constitution can be changed outside parliament, though any constitutional change brought about this way would still need the approval of the Army Commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.
The first extra-parliamentary way to bring about constitutional change is if the six leaders agree on it at a six leaders’ meeting.
The first time such a meeting was held was last October, just before U.S. President Obama’s visit to Burma (Myanmar). The second and most recent of these meetings was held on April 10.
The April meeting was called after Suu Kyi had, in a Reuters’ interview, been particularly scathing about what she called Thein Sein’s “hard-line regime” and had threatened that the NLD might boycott this year’s elections, planned for November, if there were no improvements.
The people who attended the six leaders’ meeting were: the President Thein Sein; the Upper House Speaker Khin Aung Myint; the Lower House Speaker, Shwe Mann,, the army commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing; Aung San Suu Kyi; and representing the ethnic groups Dr Aye Maung from Arakan State.
The details of what was discussed at the brief two-hour meeting are not known. Aye Maung told Reuters: “We discussed three things: the constitutional amendment, the upcoming election and the peace agreement in a very friendly and cordial atmosphere.”
The meeting was generally agreed to be a positive step and another meeting was planned for before parliament opened on May 10, but it never took place.
Theoretically if everyone at a six leaders meeting agreed on changing articles of constitutional law those articles could be changed. Any changes would still have to be ratified by parliament, but as Min Aung Hlaing would already have approved them the soldiers in parliament would not block the constitutional changes.
Another extra-parliamentary way to change the constitution would be during the political dialogue that will follow the signing of a nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA).
Once the NCA is signed, participants have to decide on a framework for political dialogue and the political dialogue which has to start within 60 days.
As the political framework has not yet been discussed it is hard to know exactly what form the political dialogue will take and who will be involved, but it is safe to assume that it will include Min Aung Hlaing or another very senior army representative, senior parliamentary representatives and senior representatives from ethnic armed organisations.
Again any constitutional changes decided on would have to be passed by parliament, but seeing as Min Aung Hlaing or his proxy would already have approved of them the army representatives in parliament would likely not block the amendments.
Normally any constitutional changes have to be put to a national ballot and approved by at least 50 percent of the people who cast a vote, but if the constitutional amendments were agreed upon at a six leaders meeting or as part of the NCA they do not have to go to a national referendum.
At present the chances of constitutional reform seem slim and it is very unlikely that there will be any meaningful constitutional change before the elections.
The army view, expressed after the constitutional reforms were rejected by parliament, is that the army is not opposed to changing the constitution, but now is not the right time to do so as it could cause instability.
As Brigadier General Tin San Hlaing, a military MP, put it: “We are making the country’s situation stable by putting 25 percent of military MPs in parliament.”
For now, it does seem as if the best chances for constitutional reform may be through these extra parliamentary routes because it is at such meetings that those who want constitutional reform will be able to have discussions, make concessions and cut deals directly with Min Aung Hlaing or other senior army representatives.
The other constitutional reforms voted on by parliament on June 25 were Article 59 (d) which says that anyone who becomes president or vice-president “shall be well acquainted with the affairs of the union such as political, administrative, economic and military”.
This was the only proposed constitutional change that passed through the parliament and it now needs to be put to a national referendum before it can be ratified.
The other constitutional articles that parliament voted not to amend were Article 418 (b), which states that under a state of emergency if the president hands power over to the army commander-in–chief, any MPs (except the president and the vice presidents) who have had duties and roles assigned to them by the parliament will be relieved of those duties and roles, irrespective of what it says in the constitution.
The amendment of Article 60(c) was also rejected. This states that those nominated to be president and vice-presidents do not need to be members of parliament.