After you took over as Sikyong (Prime Minister) in your second term last year, you spoke about the five-fifty strategy as a means to take the Tibetan movement forward? What does it involve?
There are two things behind this — how the narrative of the Tibetan struggle should shape up, and also the mindset of the people. Our older generation had the mindset that we will return to Tibet either tomorrow or day after or within a year. That mindset had its advantages. It kept the issue alive and the passion burning for the cause. But at the same time, we overlooked quite a few things, like the lease of some of the settlements are not fully formalised. People have been in an uncertain mindset, and consequently have not been able to plan well. The five-fifty strategy defines our goals: In the next five years, our goal is to get the envoys of the Dalai Lama to have a dialogue with the Chinese in order to resolve the issue of Tibet peacefully. At the same time, our objective is to plan and invest resources to sustain the Tibetan govt-in-exile for the next 50 years so that China is compelled to acknowledge that Tibetan people are there for the long haul in this fight. Essentially, our goal is to preserve identity and pursue dignity. Tibetan identity — our religion, language and culture — is very important. If we have that, then we can pursue our dignity, and seek genuine autonomy.
Aren’t you acknowledging through this strategy that it may take several decades for the Tibet issue to get resolved?
Not really. We are not saying that the issue is beyond solution till the next 50 years. What we are saying is that we are prepared to be in exile for the next 50 years and are making appropriate investments for the long haul. That said, we want to achieve our primary political objective within five years and are working towards that goal. That’s why, five and fifty are both integral to our plan.
What is the current state of the Tibetan movement?
There are a lot of challenges before us. China has become more powerful with access to different governments around the world. But at the same time, it has also become involved in various contentious issues like the South China sea, border incursions in India, and opposition to India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. What this has done is to get people to ask questions about China. That helps us. We tell people: If you want to know China, you can’t do it without understanding the Tibet issue. China has interfered in our country and is now doing so in other neighbouring countries as well.
The Dalai Lama’s ‘Middle Way’ approach has been about granting autonomy to Tibet rather than freedom. Now that the demand has shifted from independence, what prevents the Chinese from considering autonomy?
The main reason is obviously territory. The land area of Tibet is 2.5 million square km. Xi Jinping and various Chinese leaders have said that the security and stability of China lies in the security and stability of Tibet. So, they consider Tibet as a cornerstone of their security strategy. Also, all the mineral resources and the hydropower, forests etc are in Tibet. Most importantly, there is lack of trust which is preventing them from initiating a dialogue.
You have been a proponent of Track II diplomacy as a means to build trust with the Chinese. Is it working?
When I was at Harvard (Law School as a senior fellow), I had initiated this with Tibetan and Chinese scholars. But now, we want to spread it on a people’s level. For example, there is a Tibetan-Chinese Students’ Union Dialogue Forum in a number of cities in the US where Chinese and Tibetan students meet regularly and have dialogues. Also, we have Chinese liaison officers whose main job is to reach out to Chinese students and scholars. Every Tibetan association — let’s say in America where there are 30 of them — has a volunteer to reach out to the Chinese. In fact, many Chinese people who come to America think that Tibet has always been part of China. When we interact with them, they realise their mistake.
You are now about to complete one year of your second term (in May) as Sikyong. Has the second innings so far been easier for you than the first one?
I really can’t say. My job itself is a difficult one (laughs). However, in the second term, I am more familiar with the system and the administration. I am also more aware about many issues and what needs to be done. So, I can’t say if things have become easier but yes, the anxiousness and anxiety that I had in the first term, has decreased.
In what way?
In my first term, I had limited understanding of the bureaucracy (within the Central Tibetan Administration). Therefore, I had to be more hands-on. But now, I call relevant bureaucrats and staff members directly if I want to expedite things. Also, when I travel abroad, I am able to network better since I have more contacts. Essentially, now I know what to expect and am able to create awareness of the Tibetan cause and get support in a better manner.
What kind of support are you getting from the Dalai Lama? Has he completely cut himself off from political decision-making?
Yes, since 2011 when I took over as Sikyong of the Tibetan government-in-exile, he has been completely devolved. I make all the administrative and political decisions, and am also accountable for them. But obviously, I get audience regularly with him and have interactions, sometimes at length, and seek his advice.
How do you view concerns on what will happen after the Dalai Lama is not there, as the Chinese may plant their own candidate as the new Dalai Lama.
Many feel that India can play a more pro-active role in the Tibet movement…
We are guests here, so we don’t complain to our hosts. Obviously, the desire is to see a more pro-active role. If India acknowledges Tibet as a core issue with China and supports the ‘Middle Way’ approach, it will send a major message to the Tibetans.
