The Economist
November 17, 2012
China shuffles its leadership, putting a “princeling” in command.
For the first time since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China’s most important reins of power have been handed over at the same time to a single man: Xi Jinping. The decision, revealed on November 15th, that Hu Jintao has stepped down not only as the Communist Party’s general secretary, but also as head of China’s army, was part of the biggest shake-up of the party’s leadership in a decade. But, although Mr Xi now has the titles of power, his ability to use them will be heavily constrained.
That Mr Xi, who is 59, would succeed Mr Hu as party chief has been in little doubt since 2007. There was also little doubt that one day he would take over Mr Hu’s other important position as chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission, which controls the armed forces. But it was uncertain until the announcement was made whether Mr Hu would relinquish both titles at the same time.
Mr Hu is constitutionally obliged to step down from his other post, as China’s president, next March, but that is a far less substantial job. His predecessors, Jiang Zemin and the late Deng Xiaoping, both kept the military post for a couple of years after leaving the Politburo, ostensibly to ensure a smooth transition. Not since Hua Guofeng took over on Mao’s death have both jobs been transferred simultaneously.
Hua turned out to be little more than a transitional figure. Few people expect Mr Xi to be the same. But his new jobs by no means give him absolute power. Crucially, his two predecessors, Mr Hu and Mr Jiang, are still alive. Both will wield considerable influence: Mr Jiang, at the age of 86, probably even more than the 69-year-old Mr Hu. The membership of the Politburo Standing Committee, the party’s ruling body, bears Mr Jiang’s imprint. Mr Xi and the man expected to succeed Wen Jiabao as prime minister next March, Li Keqiang, are the only two left from the outgoing committee, which has been reduced from nine members to seven. Of the five newcomers, all but one are considered to be protégés of Mr Jiang.
This is unlikely to displease Mr Xi, himself counted a Jiang-ist. Mr Li will be less enthused. Many observers believe that at one time Mr Hu was keen Mr Li should succeed him, not Mr Xi. As prime minister, Mr Li’s chief responsibility will be overseeing the economy. But he might find it difficult to get his way given the presence of two others in the standing committee who are Jiang’s men. One is Wang Qishan, who has played a central role in economic management for more than four years, and has now acquired a very powerful role as the party’s chief anti-corruption official. The other is Zhang Gaoli, the party leader in the port city of Tianjin, who is expected to take over Mr Wang’s economic portfolio.
The body’s new membership does not suggest any clear policy shift. Reformers will be disappointed at the omission of two men once thought frontrunners for elevation: the party chief of Guangdong province, Wang Yang, and the head of the party’s Organisation Department, Li Yuanchao. Both are seen as Mr Hu’s men and are reputed to be relatively liberal.
None of this necessarily means that Mr Xi will shy away from economic, or even political, reforms. Mr Hu has been widely criticised by liberals in China for letting reforms stagnate, especially in his second term. Some allow themselves a smidgen of hope that Mr Xi may prove bolder. As a “princeling”, the child of a senior leader, Mr Xi is assumed to be rather more self-confident than Mr Hu. His father was close to Mao (until he fell out with him), as well as to Deng. This gives Mr Xi clout that Mr Hu, a commoner, lacked in his dealings with China’s ruling families.
Mr Xi offered little evidence of such confidence, however, in his remarks to journalists after the rubber-stamping of his appointment by the party’s newly chosen 376-member central committee. He seemed relaxed and upbeat in his delivery (in the purest Mandarin tones of any of China’s supreme leaders since the party came to power in 1949). But his comments were bland. After a year of huge scandal, involving the purge of a Politburo member, Bo Xilai, for alleged corruption and complicity in the cover-up of a murder, Mr Xi referred only briefly to the “serious challenges” the party now faces, including that of corruption and becoming “divorced from the people”. He took no questions.
The party’s worries about Mr Bo’s unusually populist approach may explain why the new standing committee is filled with conformist faces. One is Zhang Dejiang, who took over from Mr Bo as party chief of the south-western region of Chongqing. Mr Zhang, a likely new head of the legislature, is thought to be relatively conservative. So are two other new appointees: Liu Yunshan, the party’s propaganda chief (a Hu-ist); and Yu Zhengsheng, party chief in Shanghai, who trained as a missile engineer. As many as four of the seven leaders are deemed princelings.
China’s kingmakers may have decided to play safe for now, but leadership issues will again loom large in 2017 when the party’s next five-yearly congress is due to be held. By then the newcomers to the standing committee will be considered too old to carry on (all of them are in their mid-to-late 60s). Some of the powerful elders might have faded from the scene. Mr Xi and Li Keqiang might then have a freer hand to promote their own people, and perhaps more daring ones. If, that is, they manage to keep control until then.
