Vincent Wei Cheng Wang
The Indian Express
September 29, 2014
The Xi-Modi interaction marks the first step towards dynamic India-China ties.
Riding on his historic election victory premised on revitalising India’s economy, Prime Minister Narendra Modi spent a very busy month of September on diplomacy.
In early September, he visited Japan, building a personal rapport with Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and strengthening the economic and security ties between India and Japan. Both Modi and Abe have been called “nationalists” who understand the links between their nations’ domestic economic strengths and external power and prestige.
Then he received China’s president and Communist Party of China’s General Secretary, Xi Jinping, who visited India between September 17 and 19. Modi also sought to build a personal relationship with Xi, by inviting him to celebrate his birthday in Gujarat. Modi has now embarked on a visit to the United States to meet with US President Barack Obama, congressional leaders, and the Indian-American community.
A recent New York Times editorial cartoon likens Modi to the dancing Shiva, simultaneously engaging Japan and the US, while also reaching out to Xi, who is carrying a suitcase (symbolising business opportunities). This flurry of diplomatic moves may help shed light on the Modi administration’s global aspirations and define the complex geostrategic and economic landscape of Asia-Pacific for years to come. Of these complex moves, the Indo-Chinese dance deserves the closest attention.
Despite the slogan, “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai”, avidly promoted in the early 1950s by the then prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indo-Chinese relationship has been a complex affair. The unresolved territorial disputes, the long shadow cast by the 1962 war, China’s relationship with Pakistan and other countries in South Asia surrounding India, India’s support of the Dalai Lama, both countries’ geopolitical aspirations and quest for energy to fuel their economic growth all point to a competitive relationship, or even an emerging rivalry that could involve other major powers. In this regard, Modi’s complex diplomatic dance can be seen as attempts to shore up India’s position vis-à-vis China’s.
Yet, both countries also often talk about a “Chindia” (more often from the Indian side) that is built on perceived “natural complementarity” between the two economies, purported affinity between two ancient civilisations, and common desire to play more significant roles in a global order that was defined by the West and is perceived to continue reflecting Western dominance. On this count, Xi’s visit helped rekindle the prospect of “Chindia”.
Ever since Modi was elected, the Chinese government has been sending high-ranking officials (in words or in person) — first, Premier Li Keqiang, then, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and now, Xi — to meet with the new leader. This courtship reflects the Chinese leader’s desire to seize the opportunity occasioned by Modi’s decisive victory to improve Sino-Indian relations. Although the fact that both Xi and Modi are “new” (Xi came into power in November 2012 and has gradually consolidated power) and “decisive” makes it possible to reconfigure the Indo-Chinese relationship, this imperative takes on greater urgency as China interprets the US “pivot to Asia” policy promoted by the Obama administration as aimed at containing its rise and fears that India might be wooed into joining this American-led coalition. Hence, Xi reasoned he had to visit Modi before Modi visits Obama. Xi broke tradition this time by not visiting China’s traditional ally — Pakistan. However, to balance the perception that his trip was all (or primarily) about India (or Modi), he would first attend the summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Although India is an observer in the SCO, China plays a leading role in it. The SCO is quickly evolving into the main security organisation in Eurasia and a potential counterweight to the US-dominated North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato).
For his part, Modi made sure he would first lock in a personal rapport with Abe and forge closer India-Japan ties before extending his welcome to China’s Xi. A major source of capital and technology that also shares concerns about a rising and assertive China, Japan figures very prominently in India’s “Look East” policy. Japan under Abe is busily developing relationships with countries in Asia-Pacific (such as Vietnam and India) that potentially could be enlisted in a coalition to counter China’s rise. Although India may understandably be expected to seek strategic independence by avoiding being drawn into an explicitly anti-China coalition, Indo-Japan relations will likely grow under Modi.
Xi’s visit yielded some notable achievements, including the setting up of two industrial parks with investment from China amounting to $20 billion in the next five years, an agreement to consult on bilateral economic issues (including the contentious trade imbalance favouring China and the rupee-renminbi currency swap) and on regional security issues (Afghanistan, West Asia, Africa, Central Asia, and counter-terrorism). Both sides also reiterated their support for a multipolar world and vowed to cooperate on climate change, the Doha Development Round of the WTO, energy and food security, the reform of international financial institutions and global governance. However, some agreements seem a little far-fetched, such as China’s participation in (and assistance of) India’s railway projects and cooperation on civilian nuclear power (which would offset or dilute the US-India civilian nuclear agreement). To Xi, this trip also importantly attested to his concept of “developing great power relations”, which includes the demand to acknowledge China’s “core interests” (related to sovereignty and territorial integrity).
The Indo-China diplomatic dance belies a competition for power, despite references to civilisational affinity. While decades-old irritants, such as border disputes and the Pakistan factor remain, they are compartmentalised. That is, no single issue can seriously derail the bilateral relationship. New sources of potential competition and cooperation are added to this complex mix. Will India and China move to war, “Chindia” or a rivalry? It’s too early to tell, but the delicate courtship, as seen in the frenzied diplomacy this September, arguably helps launch a positive first step.
The writer is professor of political science, University of Richmond, US, and president, American Association for Chinese Studies .
