Gopilal Acharya
Kuensel Online
Even as the new chapter of Bhutan-China relations was opened in Rio, theories on who took the lead for the meet and who is set to gain what abound. Does China want diplomatic relations with Bhutan as a ‘quid pro quo’ for border settlement? Does PM Jigmi Y.Thinley think China’s support would be crucial for Bhutan’s bid for the United Nations Security Council non-permanent seat? Or was the meeting spurred by India’s new shift in South Asia policy?
Was India behind the Rio move?
A few South Asia think tanks asked if the Rio meeting was Bhutan’s unilateral decision or one backed by India. One of India’s most respected newspapers the Hindu believed the initiative had New Delhi’s support, and that the move meant “a new approach to regional diplomacy”.
The Hindu quotes Chinese experts with Beijing-based think tanks like the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) saying the move would not have been possible without India’s backing. “Without Indian permission, Bhutan would not take this step,” says Li Li, a South Asia scholar at CICIR, a state-run Beijing think-tank.
Experts like Li Li could be right if looked from the prism of recent positive developments between India and China. For example, as Bhutan was preparing for its first-ever democratic elections in January 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was in Beijing reaffirming President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao about “a shared vision on the 21st Century”. And then in May 2010, former President Pratibha Patil visited China. In fact, it could be said that the last 10 years have been one of the best periods in the history of India-China relations. By the way, India also follows ‘one-China’ policy, favoring the People’s Republic of China over Taiwan.
Is this, therefore, the dawn of India’s new regional diplomacy? Is this the beginning of a new political discourse for Bhutan?
India’s Bhutan policy
In her essay ‘Political Economy of South Asia’, Edelgard Mahant, a Canadian academic who teaches political science in York University, describes Bhutan as India’s only ‘client state’ in South Asia.
For a long time India’s neighborhood policy hinged on political imperatives, chiefly based on its perceived threat of China. However, that changed with its economic liberalization and subsequent launch of ‘Look East Policy’ in 1992. Now, its South Asia policy hinges more on economic imperatives and cultural diplomacy, what is today known as ‘soft power’ approach.
Bhutan’s friendship with India, to be precise, started with the visit of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1958, and formal diplomatic ties were established in 1968. From then on, writes David M. Malone, a scholar-diplomat and Canada’s High Commissioner to India and non-resident ambassador to Bhutan and Nepal from 2006 to 2008, “…the essential bargain between India and Bhutan involved considerable Indian assistance in exchange for Bhutanese deference to India’s foreign policy and defence concerns, notable as related to China. (…) Indian troops remain stationed in strategic parts of northern Bhutan.”
Therefore, India’s policy on Bhutan is an uneven mix of old ‘reciprocity’ approach and the contemporary ‘soft power’ approach. The ‘reciprocity’ approach expects Bhutan to be sensitive to India’s security concerns even as it reaps huge benefits from its relation with India; the ‘soft power’ approach is seen in the establishment of Nehru-Wangchuck Cultural Center and the annual India-Bhutan literary festival called ‘Mountain Echoes’, among many others. And of course, one shouldn’t forget the substantial financial support to Bhutan’s five-year plans.
Indian presence in Bhutan is even more pervasive with construction workers, traders, teachers and hundreds of other occupational workers. Add to this its sprawling embassy (dubbed the ‘India House Estate’) in Thimphu, a consulate in Phuentsholing and several Dantak and IMTRAT premises across the country.
On its part, the Bhutanese government has made it clear that its relation with India is integral to its national interest. Therefore, the local media tries its best not to hurt the Indian sentiments. News on Indo-Bhutan relations is handled sensitively, and India and its policies are not questioned or criticized publicly. Only on online forums will one see some criticisms of India.
Time for a new South Asia policy?
Many Indian foreign policy analysts have pointed out that India has failed to lead South Asia. It has also fiercely resisted China’s membership to South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), although the country has been granted the observer status. The request for China’s observer status was made by Pakistan, following which New Delhi invited U.S. to participate as an observer.
In his book ‘Does The Elephant Dance?: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy,’ David M. Malone notes that “the challenge for Indian diplomacy lies in convincing its neighbors that India is an opportunity, not a threat. (…) But has India done enough to make this option attractive? Judging from (….) its lackluster leadership of SAARC, the answer would have to be not yet.”
Reviewing Malone’s book, the Economist writes: “India’s biggest weakness…is in its own region. (…) As the local hegemon it should be doing much more to foster economic ties and stability all over its back yard. Instead relations with all its neighbours, with the exception of a couple of minnows like Bhutan and the Maldives, are mostly sour….”
With its often-dismissive attitude towards its smaller neighbors, anti-India sentiments have never been clearer in the region. David M. Malone recalls his conversation with one senior member of India’s security and foreign policy establishment who tells him that India’s neighbors are mere “thugs and crooks”.
In his recent opinion piece, the diplomat-politician, Shashi Tharoor, says New Delhi can no longer turn a deaf ear to the claims that India’s relations with its neighbors have been ill managed. Using two negatives, Tharoor writes: “The charge that relations with most of them have been generally unsatisfactory is not untrue.”
Many South Asia analysts have called on India for renewed engagement with its neighbors. They say India’s prioritization of relations with the United States and other global powers has led to increasingly conspicuous fissures in its relations with the South Asian neighbors.
Look East Policy vs. String-of-Pearls Strategy
India looks at South Asia as its sphere of influence, while China more or less sees Southeast Asia as its sphere of influence. However, both have tried to test the uncharted waters and spread their sphere of influence further. Therefore, by the time the rising China spread its feelers to South Asia, mostly through economic investments and infrastructure development, India had already launched its ‘Look East Policy’.
What would eventually result from China’s forays into South Asia is what the classified Booz-Allen report revealed in 2005 as China’s so-called “string-of-pearls” or “encirclement” strategy. Today, the “string-of-pearls” strategy is generally understood as China’s attempt to establish naval bases and intelligence stations throughout littoral South Asia thereby encircling the subcontinent. For example, Chinese state-owned corporations have financed commercial ports in Pakistan (Gwadar), Sri Lanka (Hambantota and Colombo), Bangladesh (Chittagong) and Burma (Sittwe and Kyaukpyu).
As a result, India has pursued its ‘Look East Policy’ with new energy and vigor. China recently appeared provoked as the military dimension of the ‘Look East Policy’ became more pronounced with India seeking closer military ties with Vietnam and Japan. China, however, at least publicly, continues to maintain a rather dismissive air towards the ‘Look East Policy’ and the Chinese media have labeled the ‘Policy’ a failure. However, the Chinese government understands that the ‘Look East Policy’ has both economic and military dimensions, and that one of its primary objectives is to secure India’s position in South Asia.
More recently, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has asserted that “India’s Look East Policy is not merely an external economic policy, it is also a strategic shift in India’s vision of the world and India’s place in the evolving global economy. Most of all it is about reaching out to our civilizational neighbors in South East Asia and East Asia.”
However, some have argued that China’s foray into South Asia will ultimately force India to seek new avenues of cooperation with its neighbors and redefine its relations with each of these countries on a more equal term.
The Sino-Indian relationship, what analysts have called the “contest of the 21st century”, will continue to rock on a fragile cradle as one seeks to counter or balance the other’s growing geo-economic and geopolitical influence in the region.
