Phunchok Stobdan
The Indian Express
November 2, 2013
The India-China border pact is unlikely to prevent new incidents or fix differences locally.
The prime minister’s visit to Beijing and the dialogue with the Chinese leadership indicated a sense of optimism about the future of bilateral relations. Some of that optimism may be due to the more amiable persona of the new Chinese leadership. A scrupulous display of assertion and adjustment on key issues, plus ably managing media-induced negativity by our mandarins, was among the hallmarks of the visit.
Significant among the nine agreements were CBMs in the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), including cooperation on trans-border rivers. The BDCA is a positive move, but it should be assessed for its implications for India. The proposal was first put forward by China, with some sense of hurry, in March 2013 ahead of Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India. Li seemed sure when he said, “We hope that the seeds we have sowed today in spring will be harvested in autumn.”
New Delhi may have responded after great scrutiny. Confusing as it may have been for India to decide whether to view the BDCA as a sign of sincerity and intent by the Chinese or as yet another deception and denial tactic to stretch India along the LAC, the draft, followed by the Depsang incursion in April, did not create a favourable first impression.
The new architecture admittedly is a rehash of previously signed (1993, 1996, 2005 and 2012) de-escalatory measures to thwart military face-offs along the LAC. Most of the clauses outline mechanisms for exchanging information, consultations about military activities and enhancing communications between border personnel and headquarters. Of the nine, only Article VI (not to tail each other’s patrols along the disputed borders) may become relevant in tackling real-time incidents. Equally significant is Article II, addressing impending issues like the movement of nomadic herders. Components enshrined in the previous pacts failed to avert the PLA’s misadventures along the LAC.
While the intent is to make the BDCA serve as a new template to boost military interface and fix differences locally, the pact is unlikely to prevent new incidents. The past CBMs only served China in consolidating in disputed areas. There have been, an average, 250-300 incursions by the PLA intrusions annually. The government admitted 500 Chinese transgressions in the last two years, 90 per cent them in Ladakh. The present spin is that they are not intrusions but cases of transgression due to differing interpretations of “border”. In reality, incursions occur due to China’s neverending clamour for fresh claims.
Expectations from the pact differ. Premier Li wants the BDCA to “ensure peace and tranquillity” along borders without affecting bilateral relations. Prime Minister Singh calls for more “predictability” on the borders, as a precondition for growth in the bilateral relationship.
The risk of the BDCA’s failure may stem mainly from India’s (belated) zest to boost border infrastructure to match China’s. The deal covering this aspect has been denied. Given the topographical challenges and corruption that mire these border roads-building projects, robust infrastructure remains a distant dream. However, pretensions of enhanced access even during winter may have provoked a response from the PLA at Depsang. Remember, China demanded removal of India’s fortified positions for its retreat.
The agreement is also silent on the deployment of troops on the LAC. In practice, even the previously committed demilitarisation process may be on a reverse trend. China’s military build-up is well known; India too may be expanding logistical capabilities and troop mobilisation, including artillery units close to the LAC. After reactivating old airfields and advanced landing grounds, the air force demonstrated its reach by landing C 130J-30 Super Hercules aircraft at the frontier zone. The Indian army may be moving battle tanks to remote border points, while creating a Mountain Strike Corps along the border may incite an equivalent Chinese response.
Military intrusion is only one aspect of the Chinese assertions along the border. China has long embarked on several non-military intrusions (cultural, economic, etc) which, if not countered, may become more threatening. Given the asymmetry of these challenges, managing the borderland only through military force may no longer be a solution. For an enduring peace, people-to-people interactions should also be encouraged. In July 2014, the Dalai Lama may gather around two lakh people in Ladakh for his Kalachakra initiation. China could create disruptions or confusion, or even try to manoeuvre the event to its benefit. In the absence of a more nuanced borderland strategy, we will have to continue relying on military mechanisms. It is to be hoped that with the BDCA in place, incidents like Depsang never occur again and that the government will spend less time firefighting.
The writer is a former ambassador.
