Minxin Pei
The Wall Street Journal
June 9, 2013
Xi Jinping and other ‘neo-Dengists’ are re-asserting the Party’s position above the law.
The weekend’s meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping naturally focused attention on nettlesome security issues, such as cyber espionage and North Korea, that have highlighted the fragility of U.S.-China relations in recent months. But the California summit, however useful it was, is a less important event than the ongoing ideological battle in Beijing that concerns where Mr. Xi plans to take China and what his much-touted “China dream” is really about.
Little noticed by the outside world, the Chinese propaganda machine has, since mid-May, launched a ferocious campaign against the idea of constitutional rule. Nearly all the most important official newspapers, such as the People’s Daily, the People’s Liberation Army Daily, and Party Construction (a journal published by the party’s Department of Propaganda) , have carried lengthy articles denouncing the idea of constitutional rule as bourgeois and subversive. In the Chinese context, “constitutional rule” means no more than placing the Communist Party under the rule of the existing Chinese constitution. But even such a modest proposal seems too radical. The party’s message in response is becoming clear: The Communist Party is above the constitution.
It would be a mistake to dismiss this campaign as a mere bureaucratic exercise by party functionaries eager to please their new bosses. Since Mr. Xi’s installation as party chief in November, one of the most important public speeches he has delivered was the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the 1982 Chinese constitution. During that speech on Dec. 4, Mr. Xi declared that “we must self-consciously abide by constitutional principles, promote the spirit of constitutionalism, and fulfill constitutional missions.” It is inconceivable that mid-level minions in the propaganda apparatus would have the guts to turn Mr. Xi’s language on its head without instructions from the top.
Rather, this anti-liberalism drive appears to be part of a well-coordinated plan. An alleged Communist Party directive issued on May 13 banned discussions on seven topics: universal values, freedom of the press, civil society, citizenship rights, historical mistakes of the party, crony capitalism and judicial independence. The point appears to be to appropriate Mr. Xi’s concept of the “China dream” and interpret its essence as the perpetuation of one-party rule.
All of this sends some disturbing signals about the intentions and inclinations of the new leadership. On its own, such ranting against a fundamental idea of liberty and limited government has to be interpreted as very bad news. It almost certainly reflects the conservative bent of at least some of the top members of the new leadership. The party’s war on constitutionalism provides one more data point indicating the direction sought by the new leadership.
Earlier this year, Mr. Xi reportedly gave an internal speech in Guangdong that reflected on the fall of the Soviet Union. The Soviet regime fell, he reportedly said, because its political elites lacked ideological convictions and personal courage. The new anti-constitutionalism campaign is one sign that Mr. Xi’s audience got the message, and will act to quickly tamp down challenges to the system.
China’s new leadership may condone some economic or administrative reforms compatible with the objective of preserving the Communist Party’s rule. But it will not tolerate any initiatives that could imperil the party’s political monopoly.
In essence, this is a neo-Dengist model. It fits perfectly with the vision of the late Chinese supremo Deng Xiaoping, who consistently and unambiguously embraced capitalism while rejecting democracy. But there are two key differences.
Deng, a reticent leader who preferred simple and direct phrases (such as his famous saying that a good cat is one that catches mice regardless of its color), had a more effective way of connecting with the Chinese people and offering them a more dynamic vision: “reform and opening.” Mr. Xi and the neo-Dengists, in contrast, are struggling to find the right phrase to inspire the nation. His “China dream,” hijacked by a discredited propaganda machine, has yet to rally a people long disillusioned by a government that has promised much but delivered little.
Deng was also a risk-taker and doer, contemptuous of empty rhetoric, impatient for action and always ready to gamble his political capital. But neo-Dengists are long on slogans and short on action. Risk-aversion, not risk-taking, is their name of the game.
The great danger for the neo-Dengists, of course, is that they’re fighting an unwinnable war. It is doubtful that Deng himself could have ensured the permanent survival of one-party rule even if he were alive today. The Chinese society that embraced Deng’s vision—a society traumatized by Mao Zedong’s brutal rule and grinding poverty—no longer exists. It now aspires not just for economic well-being, but also for political rights and personal dignity.
From this perspective, the neo-Dengists could make matters significantly worse for the party. By denouncing and rejecting the most moderate approach to political reform—transforming a one-party state through the implementation of the existing Chinese constitution—the party is merely encouraging the radical view that the regime is so bent on self-preservation that the only possibility of change lies in revolution.
Mr. Pei is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College
