Srikanth Kondapalli
The Times of India
May 7, 2013
A day after the major transgression of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops in Depsang Valley in the Western Sector of the Sino-Indian border, China released its eighth white paper on defence on April 16. With the emphasis of the paper on trans-theatre mobility of the PLA forces, the writing is on the wall. The PLA is determined to push its frontiers and intrude into Indian domains.
The main thrust of this white paper is to suggest that the PLA is longing to push beyond China’s landmass to protect and expand China’s interests abroad. This is not only triggering security dilemmas in India, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, but also reassessments in the United States about global and regional power transition.
The distinctive features of this paper, in comparison to the previous ones of this genre, include an announcement that China will play a significant role internationally “commensurate with China’s international standing”; elaborations for the first time on conventional force structures and personnel; military exercises; unambiguous positions to carry forward pan-theatre military capabilities (even overseas operations such as the ones the Chinese military conducted in Egypt and Libya recently); “joint[ly] safeguard the security of the international sea lines of communication (SLOCs)” (in the Gulf of Aden) and finally, the resolve to construct river projects across the Yarlung Zangpo river in Tibet, which becomes the Brahmaputra.
Unlike the rhetoric in the previous papers that the Chinese defence budget is small compared to the Pentagon allocations, no mention of how much China spends on the defence sector or its rationale is mentioned in the current white paper. In March 2013, China’s finance minister announced an allocation of about $119 billion for the defence sector. This figure is more than what Southeast and East Asian countries spend on defence and nearly thrice that of Indian figures.
For the last few years China’s spending on internal security had surpassed (with allocations of more than $120 billion in 2013) defence allocations. Glaring also was the omission to the nuclear No First Use pledge.
For India, the implications of this white paper are obvious. And the PLA’s aggressive intent along the border is greatly facilitated by infrastructure developments in Tibet in roads, railways, air field construction, etc. The white paper also stated that PLA forces will “preventa¦ changes to the current borderlines” by its adversaries, in addition to establishing border surveillance systems. The fact that after three weeks of staying in Indian-claimed areas, PLA troops insisted that Indian forces should also withdraw as a “compromise” solution underscores this resolve to make India step back.
China is also sending a signal to India on the growing asymmetries in power between the two and indicating to New Delhi its inability to do anything concrete in evicting the Chinese transgressors. In the Depsang Valley incident, China acted at will and left after scoring points with India. This requires some serious introspection on our relations with China in diplomatic, military and economic terms.
The emphasis of the white paper of “safeguarding SLOCs” and specific mention of the Gulf of Aden and Somali coasts — and the thirteen contingents of the Chinese naval deployments in the region — point to the upcoming contest with India in the Indian Ocean region. As of now, China’s efforts are directed to protecting its energy interests, but also against the US in the region. China’s thrust in this sector can be inferred from its takeover of the Gwadar port in Pakistan as well as from voices within its navy pushing for the setting up of naval bases off Somalia, Yemen, Oman and Pakistan.
While India had suggested a joint mechanism on maritime cooperation with Beijing, China appears to be interested in “setting up a different kitchen” [to borrow Mao Zedong’s words] in the region. India needs to tilt the emerging contest in the Indian Ocean in its favour by enhancing conventional and strategic deterrence capabilities.
In addition, as a part of its wider effort to contribute to the civilian economic sector, the PLA had been involved in construction work — be it in the hydroelectricity sector or in laying roads and railways. The PLA’s role in this regard in Tibet and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir as well as in the Northern Areas was mentioned.
Interestingly, the current paper resolved to “harness” Yarlung Zangpo in Tibet. In light of the controversy related to whether China’s work in the region is “run of the river” projects or dam construction for the sake of diverting waters northwards, the PLA appears to be sending a definitive signal — more so after this issue was specifically raised by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the recent BRICS Summit meeting at Durban with President Xi.
India needs to reassess its options, ranging from protecting its lower riparian state interest and nudging China to join multilateral efforts to approaching the World Water Council and seeking indigenous people’s opinions.
The writer is professor, Chinese Studies, at JNU.
