Srikanth Kondapalli
The Times of India
May 23, 2013,
China’s visiting premier, Li Keqiang, since taking over office in March this year, had stated that India would be his first stop overseas on a trip that would also take him to Pakistan, Germany and Switzerland. The priority Li placed on the India visit surprised many — as also with President Xi Jinping’s maiden visit to Moscow two months ago. This indicates that the new Xi-Li leadership that took over from Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao at the 18th Communist Party congress in November last year had worked conscientiously according to a script in pursuing its international strategy.
First, the new leadership in China — unlike the Hu-Wen proposals on developing relations with major powers, neighbouring and developing countries — candidly suggested that “commensurate with its international standing”, China henceforth would seek its place under the sun. However, against the backdrop of the US plan for “rebalancing” in the Asia-Pacific region and its quest to seek “net-security providers” — and also in light of territorial and sovereignty issues that have come to the fore thanks to China’s military’s assertiveness against Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines and a rising tide of nationalism — China’s leadership needed to go back to “partners” in the international system to ward off challenges to its rise.
Moscow and New Delhi — in the immediate vicinity of China — offered such prospects. According to the joint statement of the Indian and Chinese prime ministers, “Both countries view each other as partners for mutual benefit and not as rivals or competitors.” Beijing is thus assiduously trying to reshape the international and regional order in its favour, and for this its leaders need to fan out in different directions and expand “strategic consensus” with like-minded states. Premier Li, in his press statement on Monday, alluded to this.
It is significant that the joint statement emphasised the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the 60 {+t} {+h} anniversary of which will be celebrated in 2014. The joint statement also referred to India and China as the “largest developing countries” promoting “multipolar world, economic globalisation, cultural diversity and information revolution”, and to their coordinating in the Doha rounds and on climate change propo-sals. These measures provide breathing space to the new leadership till a “well-off society” is established by 2020.
Secondly, against the backdrop of the global financial crisis and intensifying eurozone crisis — restricting China’s exports to the developed world due to decreasing consumption — Li is tasked with exploring additional markets. Last year, China’s growth rate fell to about 7.9% and trade frictions with the US and the EU are increasing. Relations with Japan are also a problematic for Beijing given the Senkaku Islands issue and demonstrations against Japanese companies in China.
India and other rising countries provide consumers for its goods and services as well as productive investment destinations. Investments in infrastructure projects and industrial parks — despite Beijing’s failure to get New Delhi to sign a free trade agreement — provide an opportunity for Chinese enterprises. Given that these enterprises are facing rising labour costs and environmental issues at home, India provides rich opportunities.
Thirdly, in a broader context, Li appeared to move away from the previous position of China looking at India through the South Asian prism. He expanded dialogue on the “immediate neighbourhood” in Asia. Speci-fic mention of the Afghanistan reconciliation process was significant for both countries given the gradual withdrawal of US troops and its possible impact on their security.
This is also in line with the Indian initiative a decade ago on “enough space in the world” — that of recognising respective niche areas of interest. China is also pushing cooperation — reflected in the joint statement emphasis on the stalled Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar initiative or the cooperation in naval escort missions in the Indian Ocean region.
As far as bilateral relations are concerned, China yielded little to Indian demands on the territorial dispute resolution, river waters, trade imbalance and recognition of nuclear weapon status of India. The only exceptions were certain tactical concessions on hydrological data exchange on the upper stream of Brahmaputra river, expanding investment, etc.
The territorial issue — raised as the top priority by Manmohan Singh — was relegated to the 24th paragraph of the joint statement, and with hardly anything new to deal with transgressions on the border. China also did not endorse Indian candidature in the expanded United Nations Security Council.
Li appeared to be more relaxed and forthcoming during the visit. His speeches were covered live on television in India, although the same will not be accorded to Manmohan Singh when he visits China next. US President Barack Obama was similarly denied such a facility in November 2009 during his visit to China. The joint statement also referred to setting up a joint high-level media forum.
In this round of Premier Li’s visit to India, then, China made several tactical manoeuvres — and, on certain issues, concessions to India — but gained strategic momentum in the international and regional order.
The writer is a professor of Chinese studies, JNU.
