Kashmir Images
July 19, 2013
A satisfied citizenry is more vital an asset than strong military. India has a framework of democracy, which if practiced with sincerity, can make the country more durable than China, which grapples with severe internal contradictions and problems that cannot be resolved within an authoritarian system, comments Dr. Dibyesh Anand. Dr. Dibyesh Anand reflects on the Indo-China conflict and the consequences of prolonged confusion between the two neighbous in an interview with Kashmir Images Literary Club Head, Mushtaque B Barq.
The GDP of China is 5430, and that of India 1489. How can India embark upon growth comparable to China in terms of defense and security?
World, including Asia, is big enough to accommodate more than one rising powers and it is not always healthy to compare China and India. Both countries are developing and the growth models are meant to cater to the specific needs of their own people and yet both are producing more inequality than development. Seeking to compete with China in terms of defense and security, India may be more affluent at focusing first on a more equitable and inclusive development of its citizenry than seeking to match or balance China. A satisfied citizenry is a more vital asset than a strong military. India has a framework of democracy which if practiced with sincerity can make the country more durable than China that grapples with severe internal contradictions and problems that cannot be resolved within an authoritarian system. Practicing and strengthening genuine democracy, unlike the deeply corrupt and flawed democracy of the present, can offer India an advantage over China. If we talk specifically of military modernization, the main threats where China and India compete are on the border which is disputed and had witnessed a war in 1962. This dispute is a result of the transformation of British India-Tibet border into India-China border due to the Chinese occupation of Tibet. Both the countries have to manage that legacy. While being weaker, India has within itself a conspicuous Tibetan Diaspora led by the Dalai Lama and other religious and political leaders and this is the biggest buffer India has against a possible aggressive and expansionist China in the Himalayan region. India must strengthen this ‘buffer’ by support the flourishing of Tibetan and Buddhist settlements in India.
Indian establishment and media have always blamed neighboring countries for most of the ills plaguing the country. However, the track record shows something reverse. How do you see the relation of India with its neighbours?
India inherited from the British a difficult neighborhood where the dominant mode of relation with small neighboring countries was of paternalism. During Nehru’s time, efforts were made to reduce paternalism and increase mutually dependent relation but this took turn for worse during Indira Gandhi’s time when a paternalistic and even bullying attitude was adopted. The failure of Pakistan project and the creation of Bangladesh after large scale massacre in East Pakistan and India backed Mukti Bahini’s resistance increased the confidence in India’s ability to be hegemonic in the sub-continent. But by 1980s, it was clear that what was confidence in India was perceived as arrogance in the smaller countries. In recent decade, there is a healthier trend of shifting to a more equitable and mutually respectful relation between India and the neighbours. This has been a result of assertion by the smaller countries, including by diversifying their relations with other foreign powers including China, and the realization in Delhi that economic predominance need not imply political paternalism and hegemony. This trend has to continue for a more peaceful and confident South Asia.
On April 15 almost 30 Chinese soldiers crossed an unguarded section of China-India border and set up camp there. How do you see such incident in the light of current dispute between India and China?
When we read news in Indian or Chinese media about border incursions, we should exercise caution because much of it is based on ignorance, lies, misinterpretations and propaganda. Such incursions can be a result of various things. We need to understand that both the militaries are seeking to modernize and highlight their own importance within their own countries as much as trying to give message to the other country. For instance, Chinese PLA is competing with PLA Navy for a bigger share of pie in Chinese defense budget and same is the case with Indian army and navy. Such incidents could be a result not of policy shifts in Beijing or Delhi but bureaucratic competitions or initiatives of local commanders. One thing that makes me unconvinced and I do not buy the Indian narrative fully is that given the increased tensions between China and Japan, Vietnam and others in various sea disputes, it does not make good sense for China to antagonize India and thus push the latter more toward closer military cooperation with USA. Geopolitically, it does not make sense for China to antagonize India.
Dr. Luiz Zongyi, a visiting fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) acknowledges the complexity of the border issue, but simultaneously emphasizes the symbolic relationship between the two countries saying India stands to gain more by allying with China rather with USA. Your take?
Chinese system despite being authoritarian is more diverse than people assume and there are differences of opinion and one should therefore not take views of one or two scholars as reflecting a dominant thinking within the Communist Party. India-USA alliance would be a disaster for India because it would create permanent antagonism with the most important neighbor China, distance from traditional ally of Russia, and create more extremist reaction through paranoia in Pakistan. On the other hand, alliance with China is unnecessary and unfeasible until the border dispute is resolved. India will benefit most from pursuing an independent foreign policy and a genuine non-alignment where it seeks co-operation with different major powers. India is too important for any country to give up on and it is not important enough to be vital for geopolitical calculations of USA or China when formulating their Asian policies. India needs to learn from the experience of Pakistan that has been in closer military and political relation with USA since 1950s and the detrimental domestic impact of such proximal relation.
How significant is the Indo-Japan relation keeping in view Chinese infiltration on June 17 into the disputed territory in the Chumar sector of Ladakh? How is this permeation being analyzed?
As scholars including John Garver have pointed out, China does not like to antagonize Japan and India at the same time. In recent years due to various disputes over islands and seas, a China-Japan relation has not been cordial. And in this context, the more China instills anxieties and fears in India, the more India will seek to improve relation with Japan, Vietnam and other countries in Asia who are worried about China’s political rise.
Chinaclaims 92,000 square kilometers of Indian Territory. The border between India and China is defined by the 4,056-kilometer LAC, which is marked neither on the ground nor on mutually accepted maps. How are such claims going to be tackled?
These can be tackled only through political negotiations and not military posturing, international courts or mediation. The two countries have a boundary that is neither delimited on the map nor demarcated on the ground. The only realistic option is for the countries to accept the status quo and convert LAC into an international boundary. This would entail India giving up its claim over Aksai Chin area and China giving up its claim over Arunachal Pradesh. Indian fantasy of getting back Aksai Chin or Chinese occasional claims of wanting Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh are obstacles in successful negotiations and do nothing but vitiate the environment. Both countries are powerful and already have under their possession territories vital to their security and strategic interests and therefore, the current impasse is more due to a lack of vision and political will in Delhi and Beijing.
How long have you been studying the Indo-China conflict, and what has been your experience after taking such a challenging subject for research?
I have been studying Tibet since 1998 and India and China relations for a few years. Currently I am finishing a book on the border dispute and how the 1962 war came about through a shift of the Himalayan region from being a zone of contact to a zone of conflict. It is sad to see how derivative and repetitive and nationalistic much of the scholarship on China-India relations is in both the countries. While there are a few exceptions, scholars tend not to fulfill their duties toward knowledge and scholarship and focus on buttressing the claims of their own respective states. While this is understandable in authoritarian China, it is surprising and sad to see in supposedly democratic India. There is a tendency to brand scholarship and writing as pro-India, anti-India, etc ignoring that a good scholarship cannot but be critical. Nationalist scholarship is an oxymoron. Nationalism demands conformity, scholarship criticality. A healthy and diverse research and scholarship, some of which will go against the state’s preferred narrative, is actually better because it allows them a bigger room to maneuver.
How do you see the relation of India and China vis-a- vis Kashmir dispute?
China’s position has been shifting since 1950s but for the last decade it has been more or less the same as that of the Western countries which is to see Kashmir as disputed between India and Pakistan. The stapled visa for Kashmiris was an experiment by China that should be understood in the context of India’s approach toward the Dalai Lama and Tibetan exiles. The period when this issue was alive is the period when there were new developments within Tibetan diasporas seem to want to give a message to India that its neutrality on Kashmir while Sino-Pakistan relation being very important can shift unless India restricts further the political activities of Tibetan exiles in India. China has been clear that it will not accept an independent new state in the region. Actually, it is in China’s interest for the dispute to continue and for India and Pakistan to be on loggerheads with each other. This fulfils the primary agenda of preventing any new independent state in the region that may have a domino effect on Uighur Muslims and Tibetans and the secondary agenda of keeping India, the only possible competitor to China in Asia, tied down in South Asia through a permanent rivalry with Pakistan. China will not allow Pakistan to weaken further and one of the reasons is to prevent more Uighur separatists getting radicalized and trained in Pakistani territories. In all this geopolitical game between China, India and Pakistan, unfortunately the aspirations, dignity and welfare of Kashmiris and Tibetans get crushed.
