Jayadeva Ranade
Daily News and Analysis
February 6, 2013
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s 18th Congress, held in Beijing from November 8-14, 2012, gave a new direction to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In addition to strengthening the CCP’s overall control over the PLA, the authority exercised by the PLA’s General Political Department (GPD) and Political Commissars over the operational officers was authoritatively reinforced by the new chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping. At the same time there has been an apparent nudge towards greater professionalism of the PLA.
Since its inception the CCP has had a close relationship with the army. The majority of CCP leaders till the 1980s had emerged from the ranks of what later became the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with many senior echelon CCP leaders having served as Political Commissars. The linkage between the Party and army was actively nurtured over the years, with the CCP viewing the PLA as its sword arm essential for the retention of power. The CCP regards the PLA as the Party’s army.
Events at the time of the 18th Party Congress addressed two important issues. These concerned the doubts as to whether the PLA was a national army or that of the Party and, related to that, the emphasis on political reliability as a criteria for promotion. Debate as to whether the PLA is an army of the nation or army of the CCP — described by senior CCP leaders as inspired by ‘hostile foreign forces’ — has been going on for over a decade.
On the sidelines of the National People’s Congress (NPC) session in March 2011, senior PLA officers unusually and candidly elaborated that since over seventy per cent of PLA personnel had college education they could well be affected by the political view points of ‘non-party affiliation and depoliticisation of the military’ and ‘nationalisation of the military’. Calls for ‘de-politicisation’ of the PLA were again voiced by some ‘liberal’ Chinese intellectuals in the months leading up to the 18th Congress.
Speaking for the first time after his appointment as chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) to an enlarged meeting of the CMC on November 16, Xi Jinping at once addressed both issues. He unequivocally confirmed the importance of “the Party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces”. He stressed that to ensure the Party’s “firm grip over the troops ideologically, politically and organisationally”, it was essential to take “ideological and political building as the top priority in army building”.
Xi Jinping simultaneously settled the long-standing debate of “red over expert” or vice versa, by declaring that: “the military must promote and appoint cadres based on their political performance and guarantee that ‘guns’ are always controlled by reliable people with loyalty to the Party.”This confirmed the role of the PLA’s political commissars, whose authority had been enhanced by Hu Jintao early in his tenure as CMC chairman.
Professionalism of the PLA and smooth transition of military power have been important considerations for the CCP. In a major departure from past practice, except for the top post of chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s senior military leadership line-up was formally announced before the 18th Party Congress convened. Appoint–ments to the PLA’s four principal departments, including the post of PLA chief of general staff, or director of the general staff department (GSD) and equated with the army chief, were announced on October 25, 2012. The Commanders of the PLA Air Force, PLA Navy and China’s strategic missile force or, Second Artillery, were also announced the same day.
Their professional backgrounds were seemingly a factor in their appointment to specific posts. Shortly thereafter, on November 6, the names of the three Vice chairmen of the CMC were announced.
All these positions are Party appointments and are approved by the CCP. Announcements are usually made during, or after, the Party Congress. On this occasion, though, only the post of Chairman of the CMC was transferred during an enlarged meeting of the CMC coinciding with the 18th Party Congress.
Since virtually all officers appointed to the top posts in the PLA are loyalists of Hu Jintao, it indicates that Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping shared a close collaborative relationship and confidence in the new appointees. Xi Jinping, in fact, recently appointed Chen Shiju,the head of Hu Jintao’s Presidential office and his secretary since 1985, as head of the CMC General Office. The early announcement of these appointments, however, appears to suggest that the CCP decided to insulate senior level PLA appointments from the political undercurrents in the Party, especially in the aftermath of the incident involving the ousted Politburo member Bo Xilai, while also giving emphasis to the professionalism of officers.
The author is a Member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and a former additional secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India.
