Dr. Anurag Tripathi
South Asia Monitor
August 20, 2014
On June 24, 2014, 200 students and professors of Nazarbayev University located in Astana, the national capital of Kazakhstan, met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing. Xi Jinping welcomed Kazakh students and professors in the Great Hall of the People, a political hub of Beijing and the meeting place of the National People’s Congress, the Chinese parliament.
The Chinese leader highlighted in his speech that China and Kazakhstan were good neighbours and the people of the two countries had a natural feeling of closeness to each other. The two countries were linked throughout the 2,000-year-long history of the Silk Road, he said.
The Chinese president said: “I hope that this visit will enable you to discover the real China and will leave pleasant memories of it. I believe that you will become the builders of the China-Kazakhstan friendship and cooperation in future.”
Last year, on Sep 6, President Xi, during his state visit to Kazakhstan, delivered a speech at Nazarbayev University and invited 200 students and professors to attend summer camps in China. He also proposed to create the Silk Road Economic Belt to boost cooperation between China and Central Asian countries. He suggested that China and Central Asian countries could work together for the prosperity and development of the region. He urged to promote people-to-people exchanges as a key facilitator of deep and strong cooperation between the countries.
China’s policy in Kazakhstan is linked to its larger strategic and geo-political interests following the disintegration of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and gradual Russian withdrawal from the region. China’s economic policy is also largely based on its energy security needs and search for a market for its finished goods. During 1997, China reaped the first fruits of its efforts to enter Kazakhstan’s energy market. The neighbours through CNPC (Chinese National Petroleum Corporation) signed their first cooperation agreement to jointly develop Kazakhstan’s refining capacity.
There is also a fear among the Chinese policy makers with regard to the policy of “opening up” of its northwestern frontier towards the Muslim republics of Central Asia as it would invite the risk of Islamic fundamentalism and cross-border ethnic separatism which are grave threats to China’s national securities. According to a media report, since 2008, China’s Xinjiang province has recorded 702 fatalities (510 civilians, 158 militants and 34 security forces) in terrorism-related incidents. In recent such incidents on Aug 2, 2014, masked militants attacked civilians, police and officials in China’s far western region of Xinjiang, leading to almost 100 deaths, the government said, giving details of one of the worst incidents of unrest in years.
The most important concern of China is the security of its border region in Xinjiang. Many Uygurs live in Kazakhstan and there is also a substantial Kazakh minority living in China’s province of Xinjiang, both having their relatives on either side of the border. This situation caused serious disquiet in China, especially in 1990s. The Chinese policy has been to maintain peace and tranquility along its border in Xinjiang. China has been wary of its minority ethnic group of Uygur Muslims being subjected to any separatist influence. So, Chinese position in Xinjiang depends as much on Beijing’s ability to influence events across its border as it does on controlling events within.
However, after establishing good relations with the neighbouring Central Asian countries and establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), China has ensured its security in Xinjiang, besides promoting bilateral trade and economic relations. Chinese policy on Kazakhstan has thus been governed by both strategic and economic considerations, which have strong linkages with the geo-politics of Xinjiang.
In the political sphere, China has historically maintained active interest in Central Asia. China maintained close contacts with Central Asia through the Silk Route. In this regard, China wants India to play a key role in its ‘Silk Road’ plan. Outlining the plan, Gao Zhenting, Counsellor, Department of International Economic Affairs of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, on Aug 10, 2014, said the master plan, which envisages renewing the old Silk Road linkages connecting China to South Asia, Central Asia and Europe, would be unveiled in two or three months.
The plan is expected to emphasize infrastructure projects aimed at boosting regional connectivity, as well as a range of initiatives such as maritime connectivity and ecological cooperation. “After the ‘one belt’ and ‘one road’ plan is ready, the Chinese government will have further communication with Indian government on how to promote our cooperation in this field,” he added. Chinese President Xi Jinping first announced the economic belt during a visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013, and unveiled the Maritime Silk Road plan when visiting Southeast Asia last October.
Chinese engagement in Kazakhstan stems from four basic factors-
Firstly, Beijing wants to ensure its access into Kazakhstan’s rich energy sources which is very important to meet its growing energy (particularly oil and gas) needs in future. According to one estimate, Chinese domestic oil demand is expected to rise by around 4% annually. The presence of vast oil and natural gas reserves in Kazakhstan (at the end of 2000 Kazakhstan’s proven total reserves of petroleum and natural gas were estimated to be 1,100m.metric tons and 1, 84,000 m cubic meter respectively).
Secondly, China wants to subdue the ethno-religious nationalism in its Xinjiang province.
Thirdly, it wants to protect its own political and economic interests in Kazakhstan vis-à-vis other external players.
Finally, China is interested in using the Kazakhstani market to sell its consumer goods.
It must be noted that over the years, from 1992 to 2014, the highest trading volume was between China and Kazakhstan, which represented 80 to 86 percent of all Chinese-Central Asian trade. This growing economic cooperation has had a social impact on the development of a Central Asian diaspora-based business in Xinjiang. China has also demonstrated its capacity to use the local rampant corruption and internal weaknesses of Kazakhstan to its own interests. From the earliest years of independence, smuggling to China, especially the export of metals and import of consumer goods, has proved to be a very profitable venture for Kazakhstan officials. However, this economic relationship is still at an early stage of development and for this reason, there is some randomness in the commercial processes and relationship.
Beijing is keen to play an important role in regional affairs, making the best use of its political, economic and military capabilities. The emergence of independent Kazakhstan provided China an opportunity to reassert its traditional regional interest. China has also adopted an active policy in the region through SCO and bilateral agreements. The SCO is playing a key role in dealing not only with the regional, political, economic and ecological issues, but it also provides a strong regional forum to take common initiatives to combat terrorism, drugs trafficking and separatism.
Consequently, in view of the centrality of this issue for China’s domestic stability, its global foreign policy, and for regional developments in and around Central Asia, the future course of its quest for Eurasian energy supplies must, and surely will, exercise a profound impact on energy markets and upon both China’s internal stability and international affairs in general.
Anurag Tripathi is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management.
