Jeremy Page
The Wall Street Journal
August 16, 2013
On a visit here in July, Chinese President Xi Jinping went to a lakeside villa where Mao Zedong spent summers in the 1950s enjoying such luxuries as a swimming pool and air conditioning. Opening a new exhibition there that makes no mention of the millions who died under Mao’s leadership, Mr. Xi declared that the villa should be a center for educating youth about patriotism and revolution.
A week earlier, he went to a village from which Mao attacked Beijing in 1949. There, Mr. Xi vowed that “our red nation will never change color.”
It isn’t just Mr. Xi’s rhetoric that has taken on a Maoist tinge in recent months. He has borrowed from Mao’s tactical playbook, launching a “rectification” campaign to purify the Communist Party, while tightening limits on discussion of ideas such as democracy, rule of law and enforcement of the constitution.
Mr. Xi’s apparent lurch to the left comes as Chinese authorities prepare for the coming trial of Bo Xilai, the former party rising star who led a Maoist revival movement until his dramatic downfall last year. Two of Mr. Bo’s lawyers said they expected the trial where he faces corruption charges to take place next week. Before he was detained, Mr. Bo rejected allegations of corruption.
The Chinese president’s Maoist leanings have dismayed many advocates of political reform, who hoped that Mr. Bo’s downfall signaled a repudiation of his autocratic leadership style and might lead to a strengthening of the rule of law and other limits on party power.
But Mr. Xi’s recent record has delighted and emboldened many former Bo supporters who advocate stronger, centralized leadership as the solution to the country’s problems.
“Chairman Mao is a rich resource for us,” said Hu Angang, an economist and leading member of the “New Left” intellectual movement that backed Mr. Bo. “I’m not surprised by what Xi is doing.” Zhang Hongliang, another New Left economist, said in a blog post last month that the New Left should support Mr. Xi because his recent speeches showed he had fully absorbed their political agenda.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry, which usually handles inquiries from the foreign press, didn’t respond to a request for comment for this article.
Mr. Xi’s use of Maoist imagery, rhetoric and strategy sets him apart from his two predecessors—who both emphasized collective leadership—and suggests to many party insiders that he won’t pursue meaningful political reform during the 10 years he is expected to stay in power. In fact, he appears to be doubling down on China’s authoritarian political model, while borrowing elements of Mr. Bo’s Maoist revivalism and media-savvy politics to boost his own stature and revive public support for the party, according to political insiders and analysts.
Last month Mr. Xi launched a yearlong campaign to strengthen and purify the party that for many insiders is a conscious echo of Mao’s “rectification” movements to purge rivals and enforce ideological discipline.
He has commanded army generals and senior officers to reconnect with the “masses” by serving as privates for 15 days minimum.
The new Chinese leadership has also ordered officials to combat the spread of “seven serious problems” including universal values, press freedom, civil society and judicial independence.
At the same time, state media have published a series of attacks on civil society and “constitutionalism”—the idea that the party’s power be limited by China’s existing constitution.
Human-rights groups say police have detained dozens of political activists in recent weeks, including Xu Zhiyong, a constitutional lawyer who has called for officials to declare their financial assets publicly. The government hasn’t commented on Mr. Xu’s detention.
Mr. Xi’s attitude toward political reform is a critical issue in China today because the country may be entering a prolonged period of slower economic growth and mounting public discontent over environmental problems, patchy public services and widespread corruption.
The new Chinese leadership has sent clear signals that it plans to unveil a package of economic reforms this year to stimulate domestic consumption as an alternative growth engine to the investment and exports that have powered the economy for the past 30 years.
On the political front, however, Mr. Xi has shown no sign of considering even limited liberalization, party insiders say. “Xi is really starting to show his true colors,” said one childhood friend who recalls Mr. Xi spending hours reading books on Marxist and Maoist theory as a teenager. “I think this is just the beginning.”
That friend and others who have known Messrs. Xi and Bo for many years said they had been deeply affected by the experience of their fathers, both revolutionary heroes who were jailed by Mao in the 1960s and rehabilitated after his death.
Yet rather than losing faith in one-party rule, both Mr. Xi and Mr. Bo had worked harder than many contemporaries to prove their allegiance to Mao as young men, and had been left with a heightened sense of how to get ahead in Chinese politics.
“Their thinking is quite similar: They have the same Maoist education, the same red family background, and the same experiences growing up,” said Zhang Lifan, a historian whose father was a senior official. “When they face a problem, they revert quickly to Maoist thinking.”
No one expects Mr. Xi to turn the clock back to the Mao era, during which millions of Chinese died as a result of political campaigns and a man-made famine.
Mr. Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, also paid public homage to Mao, as did the president before him, Jiang Zemin, and both carried out limited campaigns to root out corruption in the party. But neither launched those campaigns so early in their tenures, or in such explicitly Maoist terms.
Mr. Xi’s political posturing is all the more striking in the context of the controversy surrounding Mr. Bo, whose wife was convicted last year of murdering a British businessman.
After Mr. Bo was detained, many in the party concluded that he made powerful enemies through his policies in Chongqing, the city he governed, which included a crackdown on organized crime and a campaign to revive Maoist values through mass renditions of revolutionary songs.
Now, however, party insiders are saying that the charges against Mr. Bo are far less severe than expected.
They believe that Mr. Xi has struck a deal with Mr. Bo’s supporters and other “princelings”—sons and daughters of party chieftains—under which Mr. Bo will plead guilty to lesser charges as long as no further action is taken against his family and allies, or other princelings whose families have gotten rich in recent years.
In exchange, many of Mr. Bo’s former supporters and several powerful princelings have thrown their weight behind Mr. Xi’s efforts to establish himself as much a stronger leader than his predecessor, the party insiders said.
Mr. Xi spent much of his first few months in office trying to reunify the party by appealing to different interest groups, including advocates of limited political reform such as the sons of Hu Yaobang, a reformist party chief who was close to Mr. Xi’s father but was ousted by hard-liners in 1987.
But people in the latter camp were alarmed when Mr. Xi made a speech in December in which he declared that the Soviet Union had collapsed because of a lack of ideological conviction among its leaders, and because there was no “real man” to stop the process.
In June, the transcript of a speech by Hu Yaobang’s second son, Hu Dehua, was posted online in which he directly contradicted Mr. Xi’s analysis, arguing that the Soviet Union collapsed because a privileged elite monopolized power and resources for its own benefit.
“We blame everyone else, but never try to find problems from within. Is this a correct attitude?” he said.
Hu Dehua confirmed that the transcript online was his, but declined further comment, telling the Journal: “I’ve said everything I want to say.”
Party insiders say his views are shared by senior people in the party, but many of them are now in their 70s or 80s and have dwindling political influence.
Advocates of political liberalization have been further dismayed in recent weeks by a spate of attacks on constitutionalism and civil society in prominent party publications, some of them penned by prominent New Leftists.
“Just as liberals pinned their hopes on Xi supporting their agenda, the New Left saw an opportunity when Xi’s rhetoric veered to the left and adopted Maoist overtones,” said Joseph Fewsmith, an expert on Chinese politics at Boston University.
More important, Mr. Xi was given a highly unusual public endorsement last month from former President Jiang, who was once a patron of Mr. Bo and is still considered the leader of an influential group of current and retired party officials.
A statement on the Foreign Ministry website said Mr. Jiang had met with Henry Kissinger, the former U.S. Secretary of State, in Shanghai and declared that “a big country like China with a population of 1.3 billion needs a strong and capable leader.”
Mr. Jiang described Mr. Xi as “a wise leader who can really get things done,” the statement said.
