dailypioneer.com
Pravin Sawhney
November 5, 2015
Until India realises that China ought to be its foreign policy priority, with the border dispute at the heart of the matter, it will not make progress on other bilateral issues. India’s reluctance to catch the bull by the horns has weakened its diplomatic options
China’s Vice President Li Yuanchao’s five-day India visit began on November 3 and Vice Chairman of Central Military Commission, General Fan Changlong is expected here later in the month. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Hua Chunying has confirmed that in addition to talks on counter-terrorism, a host of bilateral issues would be on the table.
What comes in the way of resolving these issues is mutual distrust on account of the border dispute. Until India wakes up to the reality that China ought to be its prime foreign policy priority with the border dispute at the heart of the matter, its long shadow will continue to fall on other bilateral matters disallowing their optimal fruition. India’s hesitancy to catch the bull by the horn has weakened its political, economic and diplomatic options when dealing with other majors powers. This squarely impacts on India’s strategic autonomy policy and desire to become a leading power.
At the recently held sixth Xiangshan Forum in Beijing, India’s former National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon, when asked about India’s challenges to an early resolution of the border dispute with China, offered a disconcerting response. He said, “The border is not settled because things are going well. Both sides have done a remarkable job.”
Unfortunately, this is far from the truth. The border dispute cannot be settled because India cannot give what China wants. Moreover, as China’s national power and political stature grows, let alone a catch-up which under the present circumstances is not possible, even managing the bilateral relationship so that it does not impact adversely on India’s rise, will become increasingly difficult for India. A badly handled border dispute by India will impact negatively on other contentious bilateral issues, something that is already happening. By not acknowledging that the border dispute rankles and is unresolvable, India cannot explore options to mitigate its deleterious effects in order to build a win-win relationship based upon mutual trust with China.
To place this matter into perspective, consider this: China, on July 21, 2008, resolved its outstanding territorial dispute with Russia under the 2004 proposal of Russian President Vladimir Putin of a 50-50 division of disputed islands. China did this because it grasped the importance of close ties with Russia for both strategic and military-technology gains. Today, Russia is China’s partner in President Xi Jinping’s one belt, one road plan as well as the alternate security architecture that Beijing is building in Asia. Thus, the possibility of softening the Chinese position on the border dispute exists.
Meanwhile, four bilateral issues where the two sides could have done better if India had handled the border dispute properly are worth considering. While India’s Act East policy and China’s OBOR and its Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation are about trade liberalisation, financial integration, better connectivity and policy coordination in Asia, there is deep suspicion and reluctance on India’s part to jump on the Chinese bandwagon.
India has three problems with OBOR. One, its key artery, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir which India considers its territory. India’s objections to this were brushed aside by China saying it was a commercial venture meant to improve peoples’ lives.
Two, India worries that joining the BCIM which might connect with China’s OBOR land route will incentivise Beijing to push Delhi to join OBOR or the Maritime Silk Route also (India insists that the BCIM and OBOR are separate issues). India considers the one road which passes through its backyard and connects with the Gwadar maritime hub in Pakistan as detrimental to its security.
Three, India believes that joining the China supported connectivity projects, when it has a few of its own, would undermine its own Act East policy. In what is seen as a belittling of India, China has offered that India’s maritime projects like Mausam and Spice Route become part of its Maritime Silk Route project. While India has joined the China-supported Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Brics’s New Development Bank (the official argument is that India, with its large economy, will benefit these China-backed institutions), it is hesitant to be a part of Chinese agenda. This explains India’s dilly-dally on the BCIM, which was offered by China before its expansive OBOR plan unfolded. India, since 2013, has still not completed its half-track-study (by a Joint Secretary) to conclude whether it should join the BCIM. Delhi’s grouse at a deeper level is that China has not endorsed its Act East policy.
The other bilateral issue where suspicions linger is China’s Zangmu hydropower dam over the Brahmaputra river (called Yarlung Tsangpo river in Tibet) which was completed in October this year. This is the largest dam built at a high altitude and is reported to provide 2.5 billion kilowatts of electricity per year. China says it is a run-of-the-river project and has agreed to share hydrological data and assistance in emergency management (flood data) with India, as it is the lower-riparian state. It has, however, turned a deaf ear to India’s demand of providing it with lean period data and that a cooperative framework be worked out between the two sides to assuage India’s apprehensions. For instance, India fears that China may divert the river water or build large water storage facilities. Both of these will affect India’s entire North Eastern region which is fed by the Brahmaputra river.
Another area where the unresolved border issue looms large was the first bilateral meeting on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control held in April in Beijing, ahead of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s China visit in May. China is the only permanent member of the United Nations Security Council which does not accept India as a state with nuclear weapons and continues to demand that India sign the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state as per UN Security Council resolution 1172 of June 6, 1998. It was after years of prodding by India that China agreed to take the first baby step where the two sides exchanged views on global technology regimes and conference on disarmament held under UN aegis.
As China does not recognise India as a nuclear weapon state, it has refused to discuss bilateral issues like respective nuclear doctrines, proliferation of Chinese nuclear and restrictive technologies to Pakistan, and more recently, China’s military strategy paper.
Yet another bilateral issue affected by the border dispute is military diplomacy. The fifth hand-in-hand exercise held in October in Kunming was a part of bilateral agreement to have counter-terrorism exercise in India and China each year. A total of 175 Indian troops had participated with the GOC 33 corps and the director general military training being part of the observation group. The ultimate aim of these exercises is symbolic, exemplified by the presence of general officers for what are essentially company level counter terrorism manoeuvres.
The focus of military diplomacy is to plan more exchanges between the two Armies, an endeavour which has not gone far. For example, the two sides had agreed to set up a hot line (to ease border incidents) between the Indian Army Headquarters and People’s Liberation Armys General Staff Headquarters in Beijing in May during Prime Minister Modi’s China visit. The Chinese have reportedly been dragging feet as even the Memorandum of Understanding has not been signed. Similarly, India has been reluctant to accept the PLA offer of joint Naval and Air Forces exercises, besides hand-in-hand. The contention is that India has a land-centric dispute with China. This may not remain true once China’s one-road joins the Gwadar hub.
India should plan ahead on the biggest military threat and strategic challenge confronting it — how to compel China to moderate its stand on the disputed border which come in the way of India’s rise in Asia.
