Ashok K Mehta
The Pioneer
May 29, 2013
To counter a belligerent China and Pakistan, New Delhi should upscale its relations with Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan and Mongolia, and even supply the Brahmos. Soft approach must now be discarded as useless.
The Depsang intrusion in Ladakh, according to Indian Ambassador to China S Jaishankar, was an “unusual” incident (why was it not an ‘intrusion’?) which was sorted out by existing mechanisms. Never short of words, External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid said that we “are looking at the possibility of discovering why it happened, how mechanisms can be strengthened”, and philosophically added: “No one can solve what has been there for decades”. Despite two high profile visits —Mr Khurshid’s to Beijing and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s to India — and several conversations between top leaders of the two countries, New Delhi was unable to obtain the reasons for the landmark intrusion.
The purpose of the Ladakh intrusion was simple: To press Chinese claims in the region beyond the 36,000 sq km they possess and contain India in the western sector which is strategically more vital than other disputed sectors, including Tawang, which has a settled population and which, according to the 2005 Framework Agreement on Border Settlement, cannot be disturbed. There is a history of the Chinese needling India, especially since 2006 when their leadership decided not to hide its strength and bide its time.
When, in 1998 India, blamed China for its nuclear tests, Beijing forced New Delhi to acknowledge that China was not a threat. It has never recognised India as a nuclear weapons state, tried to block its entry into international nuclear non-proliferation bodies, hived off 2,000 km of the Jammu & Kashmir border, claimed all of Arunachal Pradesh as ‘South Tibet’, propped up Pakistan as a strategic equaliser to India and never supported India’s quest for a seat at the UN Security Council. Beijing has never de-hyphenated Pakistan from India, as Mr Li’s flight from Mumbai to Islamabad demonstrated.
This is approximately the China we have to deal with — one that inflicted a crushing military defeat in 1962 and is now emboldened further with its economic and military might to belittle India. Accompanied by unsettled borders, the two-front situation has imposed severe strategic constraints which India has failed to neutralise through proactive measures. Our continued deference to Beijing’s core interests — Tibet and trade — is baffling, reflecting the absence of our creative and coercive diplomacy. India’s legendary preoccupation with Pakistan and lack of any strategic defence review whatsoever have created a military and infrastructural imbalance in the North, giving Beijing the strategic advantage. Our catch-up has been lethargic and devoid of any politico-military guidance.
Against this background, the new Chinese leadership did an early test of our mettle and resolve and left most Indians wondering what new meaning was there in Premier Li’s reiteration of old homilies. Most analysts see the apparent cosying up due to their fear of the US re-balancing in the Asia Pacific region and the need to wean India away from the US from any containment of China at a time when its plate is full with problems in the South and East China Seas. Premier Li has made token concessions on trade imbalance and the border dispute which figured in the 24th paragraph of the joint statement he issued with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
The realists know that since 1981 the Chinese have, at every stage, scuppered a border settlement. Even on the first stage of the ongoing three-stage 2005 Framework Agreement, there are 18 points of consensus and an unknown number of differences, including on the agreement not to disturb settled populations. At this rate, the border resolution can take another 30 years, by when the Chinese will be in a position to impose a settlement. It is imperative to revert to map exchanges of the remaining eastern and western sectors defining the respective perceptions of the Line of Actual Control. The Border Defence Cooperation Agreement which the Chinese have offered as one more confidence building measure is a ploy to freeze and reduce troop levels so that Indian defence capability remains permanently disadvantaged. It also seeks to delink the border dispute from other bilateral issues .
The India-China model of keeping the border dispute on the back-burner and allowing trade and investment to bloom in the hope that increased economic dividends will facilitate and speed up a solution to the border issue, has failed. Further trade without trust cannot be the sine qua non of sound relations. A new Indian public opinion poll on China done last year by two Australian think tanks shows that 84 per cent believe China is a threat; 60 per cent hold that it wants to dominate Asia; and opinion is divided on whether India should join others to contain China or cooperate with it.
The conclusion is that so far, India has played into China’s hands — at times meekly, sometimes with timidity. Beijing has squeezed New Delhi strategically while reaching out tactically. China has used trade as a tool for diplomatic coercion. Similarly, its aggressive and assertive behaviour on the border shows out India’s helplessness and weakness as a rising power. While the earnestness of Chinese overtures for a new relationship requires to be tested, prudence dictates that New Delhi prepares to create leverages to match China’s diplomatic infidelity.
Take China’s historical balancing India with Pakistan. With Islamabad, Beijing’s relations, which are “higher than the Himalayas and deeper than the Indian Ocean” are now with an “Iron Brother” — a Li coinage. Song Tao from the Chinese Foreign Ministry said last week: “No matter which Government comes to power, our relations with Pakistan are eternal”. Premier Li has flatly overruled India’s objections to Chinese investments in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. China’s Global Times said: “India must accept and adapt to the friendship between China and Pakistan as Beijing cannot scale down this relationship to address New Delhi’s concerns”.
The message is clear: New Delhi should upscale its relations with Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan and Mongolia, including supplying to some, the Brahmos. The Tibet issue should be subtly introduced while the Dalai Lama is around. The Indian Navy should contrive accidental difficulties for Chinese ships in the Indian Ocean, especially by buzzing their vessels around Malacca Straits to deter misdemeanours on the border.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Premier Li that for good relations, peace on the border is essential. He should have said that continued good relations and a strategic partnership are contingent upon serious efforts towards peace on the border and an early settlement of the border dispute.
