History shows that conflicts or disagreements within India can’t be solved easily.
Damming the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra by China and India’s decision to construct dams of different sizes on the mainstream Brahmaputra and its 39 tributaries, and the outcomes of the whole exercise is a hugely debatable issue. New Delhi’s plan to construct particularly large dams on the mighty river is facing massive opposition from environmental groups and communities living on its banks in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. Only experts and government agencies can delve deep into the intricacies of the issue and find a way out.
History shows that conflicts or disagreements within India and its fraught relations with some of the neighbouring countries can’t be solved easily. The result: a section of people continues to bear the brunt. The controversy surrounding the damming of the Brahmaputra by India is also part of these underlying disagreements. To stop China from damming the Tsangpo (called Siang when it enters Arunachal Pradesh and Brahmaputra in Assam), India, of course, can take resort to means like entering into a multi-lateral agreement with countries both upstream and downstream, bringing in a third party negotiator and taking China to court. But all these measures will take time and do not guarantee a positive result for New Delhi. These measures can only temporarily dissuade ‘rogue’ Beijing from damming the Tsangpo, but can’t stop it in the long run from exploring the river for its own benefits.
However, the international law on this subject is clear. The principles expected of China in using rivers also apply to India vis-à-vis our downstream neighbours. As per international law, no upper riparian state can take so much water that the utilizable or essential character of the river is seriously modified when it reaches downstream territory. The 1923 Geneva Convention also safeguards the right of any riparian state to carry out on its territory any operation for development of hydraulic power that it may consider desirable, subject to “the limits of international law”.
So, what can be done to deal with the problem? In ad summum, both the countries can approach the issue of riparian rights in the spirit of mutual accommodation and joint studies. Quite interestingly, there is also a possibility of grid inter-linkages that exist for marketing the North-east region’s power, which can be explored by India.
China means business and we must do business with them too. Currently, India does not have the institutional capacity to execute power generation projects in that region and resultantly around 90 per cent of hydropower capacity in the North-east is not explored. If India can temper the bureaucratic and defence-dominated approach as well as China, New Delhi, could actually be looking at successful reciprocal arrangements such as supplying the region’s power to the Tibet power grid and the southern power grid in China. Contiguous areas in China such as the Tibet Autonomous Region are power deficient. Such economic vision also offers India a techno-legal basis to strive for a mutually satisfactory arrangement over Brahmaputra. But again, India must take into confidence the communities concerned before going ahead with such ideas to avoid opposition.
India-China relations reflect the classic debate in international relations theory wherein both countries have growing economic interdependence and yet there are outstanding issues relating to strategic trust. Despite sharing the second longest boundary, people in both these countries know very little about each other. This has to change or else the complexities are only set to increase.
The author is a senior journalist based in Guwahati
