Jayadeva Ranade
The New Indian Express
October 29, 2013
China’s unusually protracted intrusions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh sectors just months earlier cast their shadow on Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh’s three-day (October 21-23) visit to Beijing. As anticipated, the visit was high on hospitality but short on tangibles.
Diplomats sought to exaggerate the importance of the trip that marked the first time in 60 years that the Indian and Chinese prime ministers had exchanged visits within a year, and the invitations to meals extended by Xi Jinping and former Chinese premier Wen Jiabao.
During his sojourn in Beijing, Singh met Chinese president Xi Jinping, premier Li Keqiang, former Chinese premier Wen Jiabao and chairman of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Zhang Dejiang. He also addressed the Central Party School in Beijing, which is the crucible for training select upward-mobile party cadres.
In an effort to create a positive atmosphere for the visit, China’s Liberation Army Daily published an interestingly worded article by Sun Peisong, president of the Jiangsu Lianyungang Institute of Development. Published on October 22, the article said China and India are trying to restore stable bilateral relations. It accused the Indian media of always regarding China as India’s “regional opponent”. In earlier articles, Sun Peisong has assessed that China does not regard India as a threat and that China should re-orient its policy towards befriending India.
In this article, he said, “China has been taking care of India’s concerns: even though the Western countries have multiple times reminded China to take part in the NATO’s military operations in Afghanistan, China didn’t do that. One of the major reasons is that Afghanistan is located in the flank of India. Once China sends troops there, it’ll make India feel contained. China’s military deployment in Tibet Autonomous Region is to a large degree out of an overall consideration instead of being leveled against India. That is the reason why China’s heavy artillery, tanks, mid- and short-range tactical missiles are not forwardly deployed. When China launched the great-scale project of diverting water from the south to the north, China didn’t use the abundant water resources of the Yarlung Zangbo River to supply the north. Besides, China was the last among the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to dispatch naval task force to the Indian Ocean to fight against piracy”. Describing the border conflict in 1962 as “just a little “episode” he added the past should not obstruct the future. He concluded that “as long as China and India are not enemies to each other, Asia is safe from big turbulence. China-India friendship is the basis for the new order in the future of Asia”.
The 11-paragraph joint statement issued on October 23 indicated there was limited, but apparent, forward movement on the border issue. It was evidenced by the observation that “peace and tranquility on the India-China border was recognised as an important guarantor for the development and continued growth of bilateral relations”. The joint statement was an implicit reference to the growing border intrusions by China and negative reactions they provoke.
The Border Defence Co-operation Agreement (BDCA) was described in the joint statement as intended to “strengthen maintenance of stability on the border”. It was clubbed with agreements signed in 1993, 1996 and 2005 and portrayed as just another confidence-building measure. Absent were references to ensuring the current status quo in construction of border defences or mention of limits on patrolling by either side.
Article II (i) of the BDCA provides for the exchange of information, “including information about military exercises, aircrafts, demolition operations and unmarked mines, and take consequent measures conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and tranquility along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas”. The wording raises concern that advance intimation would be required of such activity thus possibly opening the window for objections that these were occurring in territory the ownership of which was under dispute. Recent Chinese actions in Ladakh substantiate such concern.
The provision that “the two sides agree that they shall not follow or tail patrols of the other side in areas where there is no common understanding of the line of actual control in the India-China border areas” is ambiguous. It does not address how to respond to an intruding patrol. There is no specific mention of the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) in the statement, giving little cause for comfort on the issue of the river’s diversion. There have been indications earlier that China favours diversion of the Brahmaputra.
While the Tibet issue was apparently not formally raised during the meetings, China’s State Council released its White Paper on Tibet to coincide with the Indian PM’s arrival on October 21. The White Paper charged that “the 14th Dalai Lama and his clique in exile are conducting separatist activities for a long time to sabotage the development and stability of Tibet. After the failure of their armed rebellion in 1959, they fled abroad and began to harass China’s borders for years.” It asserted that “their true aim is to overthrow the socialist system and system of regional ethnic autonomy that have ensured the development and progress of Tibet”. For the third time in a row, India withheld routine ritual recognition of Tibet as an inalienable part of China in the joint statement.
Results on the economic agenda were mixed with no progress on the issue of a Free Trade Agreement or, as the Chinese refer to it the Regional Trade Agreement. There was some progress on SEZs and incremental progress on China’s so-called “Southern Silk Route”, or BCIM Economic Corridor. The latter proposal, being ardently pursued by China, needs careful study as its implementation could disrupt the fragile economy of India’s north-eastern states. It will also cause India’s approximately US$39 billion trade deficit with China to burgeon and simultaneously open the way for hundreds of Chinese workers to enter the country.
Singh’s visit signalled that India was keen on peace and tranquility along the borders and was not teaming up with the US against China. It suggested that border intrusions would undercut the basis for building relations and a hint of India’s ire was its declining to reiterate that Tibet is a part of China. China’s leaders similarly conveyed their interest in peaceful borders, accompanied by interest in economic interaction, but they yielded no ground on key, substantive issues.
The writer is a member of the National Security Advisory Board and former additional secretary in the cabinet secretariat, Indian government.
