Anurag Viswanath
The Financial Express
November 1, 2012
On the eve of the historic 18th Party Congress scheduled on November 8, China’s reinvented Emperor, the Communist Party of China (CPC), stands poised at the threshold of a fifth generation leadership transition that is systematised, regularised and institutionalised with Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang in the waiting as President and Premier, respectively. The CPC (1921-) is booming, with 82.6 million members and an estimated 4 million grassroots organisations, presiding over a colossus that is significantly diverse, stratified (rural-urban, rich-poor) and economically prosperous. China is markedly different from what it was at the conclusion of the 17th Party Congress in 2007 due to a relentless socio-economic transformation. Despite credible achievements, the President Hu-Premier Wen era draws to a disquieting close with an estimated 170,000 social protests in 2012. It has not been all ‘win-win’, leaving behind a mass of contradictions emanating from reforms and unfinished business. Thus, the Hu-Wen combine bequeath a fractured legacy that places the new leadership at a precarious crossroads.
So what has changed on the political front? First, the most important change in the political landscape is that the era of one-man dominance, the ‘strongman’, is over. In the post-1949 period, Mao Zedong loomed large, steering both revolution and practice through land reforms, the Great Leap Forward and the controversial Cultural Revolution until his demise in 1976. In the post-1976 period, Deng Xiaoping heralded the ‘second revolution’, establishing credentials as a ‘reformer par excellence’ through reforms and open doors—de-collectivisation, recognising private entrepreneurship, creating SEZs and relaxing the household registration system. Deng reigned supreme until his demise in 1997.
All the post-Deng leaders are from a younger cohort who rule not by virtue of theoretical prowess, revolutionary credentials, charisma or persona but by consensus. ‘Rule by consensus’ has replaced the primacy of the ‘strongman’. There is now a strict two-term tenure (10 years) for the President, general secretary of the party and the Premier, and retirement at 70 years has become the norm.
Second, the CPC has decidedly departed from its ideological dogma and proletarian roots (peasants & workers), transforming into an umbrella coalition of ‘new social forces’ (professionals, entrepreneurs, emerging middle class, students and peasants & workers) partly because of the enormous social transformation, unprecedented in history. Political scientist Bruce Dickson’s euphemism ‘red capitalists’—’red’ by rhetoric, but ‘capitalist’ by intent—describes the churning in the CPC rank and file. Surprisingly and shockingly, the one and only threat supposedly emanates from an aspiring, technology-savvy student population (Goddess of Democracy and Tiananmen in 1989), which seems well-contained given that the largest social base of the CPC is students—a whopping 40% of its membership. Thus, CPC has renewed its own mandate, becoming representative of diverse interests, which explains recent internal polls in China attesting to its continued popularity and mass appeal.
Third, rule by consensus and transformation of CPC social base aside, the nature of elite politics has become contentious and even problematic. China’s ruling elites display factions and deep divisions. Three factions prominent in recent years are the so-called ‘Shanghai gang’ (for example, ex-President Jiang Zemin and others who owe their rise due to careers in the prosperous Shanghai municipality), the Princelings, who are the offspring of Party elders, intimately networked and interlinked by political and business interests (for example, Bo Xilai, the purged party secretary of Chongqing municipality and heir apparent Xi Jinping; Xi also owes his rise to ex-President Jiang) and the third faction is the Communist Youth League, whose members are from less privileged backgrounds and have worked in inland areas (for example, current President Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang, the Premier-in-waiting).
What are the larger implications of these on the polity? First, despite devolving into a rule-by-consensus system, there is little transparency or room for intra-party democracy. Direct elections at the village level (since 1988) have resulted in limited success given that the lowest level, the village committees, are excluded from the government apparatus. At present, there is no such election system (although fledgling and limited experiments are ongoing in some places) through the 5 tiers of governmental hierarchy (centre-province-prefecture-county-township). For the first time around, in the run-up to the 18th Party Congress, the CPC keyed in balloting by the provincial/ministerial cadre in seeking the current arrangement at the top, which led to Xi Jinping emerging as the front-runner—but according to unsubstantiated rumours, the rationale and intent of the election was unclear and ill-defined, which led to the recent events, i.e. the split within the Princeling faction.
The standing committee of the political bureau is a nine-member body and is the most powerful decision-making body. The standing committee sits atop a 25 member political bureau. However, entry to both is based largely on an informal practice that indicates that external factors play a role—like patron-client relationships, vertical and horizontal guanxi (connections), factions and, as rumours go, money and muscle power. Given the lack of political accountability at the top, the danger of oligarchs and embedded interests has become too real in recent times.
Moreover, the two-term tenure system has led to some peculiarities in succession politics. Typically, the new leadership battles a standing committee hand-picked by the previous occupant; the second tenure is marked by an attempt to hand-pick a cohort of loyalists. Often, it is a balance between factions and interests. It is well-known that the standing committee during President Hu’s first tenure was manned by President Jiang loyalists, which paralysed decision-making. It was only in President Hu’s second tenure (2007-2012) that he established his supremacy. The question is with two ex-Presidents—President Jiang and President Hu—in the sidelines, how the structure of the standing committee unfolds. There is a lot of controversy given that there are 14 candidates in the running for the likely seven-member body.
Second, despite a sea change in the social base of the CPC, it lacks an overarching, unifying thread. Plural interests, while welcome, also endanger and undermine the CPC future by positing complex challenges and interests. Given the lack of intra-party democracy, the wide base of interests may prove to be a ticking time bomb.
Third, the scheduled 18th Party Congress has also less admirably brought to the fore the contentious world of elite politics and factions to the public eye. As recent events show, these factions are not united, cohesive blocs, but embattled with deep divisions. The formal ouster of Princeling Bo Xilai, the swashbuckling party secretary of Chongqing and rising star of the 2000s, the disappearance of heir apparent Xi Jinping for two weeks from the public eye, and the recently-published scandalous revelations (rumoured to be leaks by insiders) about current Premier Wen Jiabao’s accumulated wealth (to the tune of $2.7 billion) published by the New York Times (October 25, 2012) are glaring reminders that even the Princelings are beset with deep rifts.
Bo Xilai’s attempt to catapult to the top both overtly and covertly, changing the rules of the game, failed. Bo used populist policies, popular appeal and an impeccable background to seal his claim, but this backfired. Bo’s fall threw up the complicated question of how to deal with a fallen Princeling star placing networks and interests at stake, and also showed the limits of the rule of law. This informed guess explains why Bo was treated with some sympathy and why it is being said that the NYT walked right into the battlefield of elite politics.
Fourth, it remains to be seen whether President Hu will gracefully relinquish the post of chairperson of the central military commission. If not, there will be a split in command, as the power to command troops and, ultimately, press the nuclear button resides with the chairperson of the CMC. There has been a precedent for this, with both ex-leaders Deng (who never held office, but retired in 1987) and President Jiang (who stepped down in 2002 but continued to hold the CMC position for 2 more years).
The continued opaque system and seething intra-party pressure of consensus and compromise makes Chinese politics no easy task. It remains to be seen whether Xi will be king—i.e wear all the three hats of general secretary, President and chairperson of the CMC. It also remains to be seen how long it will take for the new leadership of Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang to define itself.
The author, a Singapore-based sinologist, is currently a visiting fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi.
