Gopilal Acharya
Kuensel Online
The meeting between Prime Minister Jigmi Y Thinley of Bhutan and Premier Wen Jiabao of China on 21 June 2012, on the sidelines of the Rio+20 Summit in Brazil, sprung a surprise for most India-Bhutan-China watchers. It stirred the calm waters of Bhutan-India relations.
With headlines like ‘China’s coziness with Bhutan rings security alarm for India’, the Indian media spread such panic that many Indians thought Bhutan was on the verge of severing its old ties with India for a new romance with China. Security analysts and strategists reviewed the Chumbi Valley triangle, saying this was the first bold move by the Bhutanese government after the signing of the revised Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty in February 2007.
This write-up tries to analyse the meeting of the two dragons in a broader perspective of India-Bhutan-China relationship.
What did the two leaders discuss?
Bhutan shares about 470km of border with China in the north. Therefore, the only reason Bhutan and China occasionally met in the past had been the border talks. This was the first meeting between the heads of the two governments.
The most reliable sources, regarding what the two leaders discussed, are the websites of ministry of foreign affairs (MoFA) of the People’s Republic of China and Bhutan’s cabinet secretariat.
The Chinese MoFA site states that Premier Wen Jiabao told Prime Minister Jigmi Y Thinley that China was ready to forge formal diplomatic relations with Bhutan, complete border demarcation at an early date, and strengthen exchanges in various fields.
The site notes that PM Jigmi Y Thinley said his meeting with Premier Wen carries “great historic significance, as it marks the first meeting between the heads of the two governments. (…) Bhutan firmly sticks to the one-China policy, and has strong desire to strengthen understanding of and friendship with China. Bhutan wishes to forge formal diplomatic ties with China as soon as possible, and is willing to settle border issues with China in a cooperative manner, enhance bilateral economic and trade cooperation….”
On the other hand, Bhutan’s Cabinet secretariat website notes: “Prime Minister Lyonchhen Jigmi Y Thinley met Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Rio De Janeiro today (June 21) on the sidelines of the Rio+20 Summit. (…) They discussed bilateral issues of mutual interest and multilateral cooperation, including Bhutan’s bid for a non-permanent seat on UN Security Council for the term 2013-2014, elections for which are to be held in fall this year.”
In the wake of the meeting, New Delhi is supposed to have called up Thimphu for details of the discussion. A Chinese delegation had also reportedly visited Bhutan before the Rio+20 Summit.
Reaction in India
Now read this dramatic introduction to an article by Indrani Bagchi, diplomatic editor of The Times of India: “India confronts a new strategic situation in its neighborhood, as its staunchest ally Bhutan prepares to establish full diplomatic ties with China. Until now, Bhutan had been the only South Asian country, where China did not have a presence. That is about to change.”
In plain language, the elephant was not terrifically happy about Prime Minister Jigmi Y Thinley’s hobnobbing with Premier Wen Jiabao. It augured new twists in India-Bhutan-China diplomacy.
While many Indian citizens thought the move was a snub from an “an Indian territory/protectorate country”, others blamed the naiveté on the part of the Indian foreign policymakers, who thought Bhutan would “remain strapped to India’s coattails forever”. Some cautioned that the Rio meeting of Bhutan and China revealed the longstanding fissure in India’s South Asia policy. Some believed there are “nuclear weapons and Agni missiles all over Bhutan, and China can do nothing to Bhutan”.
Most of these reactions came from people outside the corridor of powers, people from outside the South Block. For them, it was an open interpretation – a change of policy on the part of Bhutan.
Reaction in Bhutan
Bhutan’s new dreams are based on the pervasive belief among its educated citizenry that the country has come of age and that, as an independent sovereign state, the country is ready for self-determination. Further, the revised Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty opens up new possibilities for Bhutan. The mood before the revision of the treaty was summed up as: “Bhutan is not only landlocked but, more importantly, it is India-locked.” Therefore, the revised treaty was seen as a release from an iron clutch. Suddenly, Bhutan need not seek India’s consensus to forge new diplomatic ties.
Article 2 of the 1949 treaty, in effect until February 2007, states: “The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations.”
In the February 2007 Treaty, Article 2 was revised as: “In keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other.”
Within Bhutan, resentment had been building among the educated lot about Article 2 of the 1949 treaty, and the country’s economic vulnerabilities, given that India dictates everything about its gateways in the south, and up north, along its 470km or so border, is a cold wall of silence. Thus, at least in the last 10 years or so, many Bhutanese had expressed the necessity for the country to open up to China. An Indian citizen probably best sums up what Bhutanese are increasingly feeling: “Bhutan has long lived in India’s shadow, and you can’t blame them for stepping out and exploring other avenues of trade and political ties.”
Today, Bhutanese feel the country must diversify its engagements, while continuing to maintain its strong ties with India. Many see economic opportunities, especially in terms of FDI inflows and infrastructure development. Some even say that Bhutan, like many other developing countries in Asia and Africa, must also benefit from the rise of China. Moreover, Bhutan’s new economic dreams have been made clearer with the establishment of its sovereign investment institution, Druk Holding & Investments, and the launching of its new and liberal FDI policy.
In fact, could Bhutan’s opening up to China be another of its just-in-time response to the developments already taking place up north? The economic importance of the railroad – that China has long announced it is building – from Gyantse to Phari (in the sensitive Yadong county, where Chumbi valley is located) cannot be underestimated. It may be noted that Phari was a traditional trading hub for Bhutan, and is about an eight-hour walk from the Bhutan-China border.
According to the Tourism Council of Bhutan records, Chinese citizens visiting Bhutan increased to 2,896 in 2011 from 25 in 2002. Bhutan’s trade with China has also seen a steady increase. According to Bhutan trade statistics, Bhutan’s import from China stood at Nu 611M in 2010.
However, longtime Bhutan watchers say the country must first settle its border disputes with China, and then think about exchanging diplomatic missions.
“Still, should Bhutan ‘trade’ (or be seen to trade) diplomatic recognition with China, as a perquisite or concurrent factor affecting the border settlement with that country?” asks Dr Brian Shaw, retired international relations professor at the University of Hong Kong, who has been keeping an eye on Bhutan since 1980. “Regardless, Bhutan’s ‘peaceful existence’ must consist in resolutely maintaining a strong sovereign state presence, not totally beholden to any neighbouring power.”
An Indo-China expert and international relations professor at Westminster University in England, Dr Dibyesh Anand, told a local newspaper in 2010: “…As a matter of principle, Bhutan should work toward a full diplomatic relations with its northern neighbour. In an international scenario, where China is a major global power and the key player in Asia, it will be rather shortsighted for Bhutan not to consider this option earnestly. A formal full diplomatic relations will facilitate Bhutan in fixing the border with China….”
If some semblance of diplomatic exchange takes place between the two countries, Bhutan would then become the last South Asian country to open up to China
